CIAO DATE: 9/01
From CIAO's Board: Commentary on the Terrorist Attacks against the United States
University of California, Irvine
Bruce J.'s statement earlier this morning advances that "this is precisely the kind of security issue that is very much about globalization and the new agenda, not just classical security terms. So how do we approach it in our scholarly work?"
I couldn't agree more with the premise, and would like to begin to answer this query.
Bruce calls for integrative approaches that cannot be easily classified as fitting a single classical paradigm. The problem of globalization (G) posits a very difficult analytical challenge with no less difficult implications for responding to the current crisis. The analytical challenge is as follows: People throughout the world have been polarized by the economic, cultural, and human rights implications of G. This polarization results into a rather fragmented domestic picture that we are only now beginning to understand. In this respect, as on issues such as the relationship between G and equity, we are "under the fog" of G, to paraphrase Clausevitz. Having said that, in very broad terms, 3 ideal-typical domestic camps can be said to form in response to G (supporters, detractors, hybrids). Clearly, not all detractors join terrorist groups (far from it) but all terrorists are detractors. Many a country out there is cleavaged in this way, leading to hybrid forms. Take Iran, where president Khatemi's renovating agenda has been constantly challenged by his combative opponents in control of vast segments of the Iranian state (judiciary, military, rogue state agencies developing weapons of mass destruction, etc). The rest of the Middle East all the way to Pakistan doesn't look much different. Few approach the degree of ideal-typical purity that the Taliban has, flouting just about any tenet or international principle of tolerance and cooperation. At the same time, the Taliban has a stranglehold, above all, on most of its own population, which does not deserve further punishment than being saddled with such rulers.
Among the policy implications to be considered is the need to weigh both political and military responses against this background. It is important to take steps, in both domains, that are sensitive to these domestic cleavages and their potential future evolution. This is not an easy task, but it must be faced. The balance between an effort not to alienate legitimate opponents of G further, on the one hand, and decimating their criminal faction on the other, will be a tough one to reach. I personally believe that a carefully designed multilateral military dimension will have to be part and parcel of the response. For the alternative is simply to provide international criminals free rein to kill innocent people and create global mayhem. We (the public) do not know at this stage how many groups, rogue state agencies, etc. are involved. Al-Qaeda is a network that does not end with Bin Laden and its sinews may reach deep into segments of states that are otherwise considered "friendly" to the US. Other agents (some say Saddam H.) may be involved.
While it is important
to put in place global policies attentive to the plight of opponents of G in
the longer term, it is no less important that the short term policy responses
do not reward terrorist activities, whetting their appetite for more.
Kirkpatrick Professor of International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Professor of Public Policy, Duke University
Director, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy
Response by Etel SolingenSteven Weber
Professor of Political Science
University of California, Irvine
Response by Stephan Haggard
Professor, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
University of California, San Diego
Response by Stephan HaggardPeter Katzenstein
Response by Robert Keohane