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Foreword
by Marshall Bouton, Executive Vice President, Asia Society
Overview
Introduction
Motivations for Testing and Domestic Political Implications
| India's Decision to Conduct Nuclear Tests |
| Pakistan's Decision to Conduct Nuclear Tests |
| Discussion |
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India Tests as the Window of Opportunity Closes |
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Bureaucratic Origins of the Test |
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Strategic Factors not Domestic Politics Key to Explaining Tests |
Next Steps: Weaponization and Deterrence?
| Possibility of Weapons Use |
| Why Weaponization Should Be Avoided |
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Stabilizing Nuclear Relations |
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Safety and Security |
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Weaponization and Policy |
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Real Time Monitoring Capability |
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Accommodation and Reassurance |
| Discussion |
Regional Stability and Strategic Balance: Perspectives from East Asia
| Impact on Asia-Pacific Region |
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Asia-Pacific Reaction |
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Japan's Reaction |
| Geography and Pathology |
| Discussion |
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Chinese Perspective on India's Nuclear Strategy |
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Dealing with the Tests |
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Japan and the Tests |
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India and FMCT |
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India's Missile Delivery System |
Economic Dimensions of Tests
| India and Pakistan Should Focus on Weak Economies |
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India's Economy |
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Pakistan's Economy |
| Discussion |
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Impact of Sanctions on India |
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Impact of Sanctions on Pakistan |
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Defense Expenditures in India and Pakistan |
Conclusion
Economic Reforms After the Tests (currently not available)
Appendix: List of Participants
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