South Asia After the Tests

Regional Stability and Strategic Balance: Perspectives from East Asia

South Asia After the Tests: Where Do We Go From Here?
Roundtable Workshop
July 1, 1998

Impact on Asia-Pacific Region

The focus of this presentation was twofold. First, what are the implications of India’s and Pakistan’s tests for the Asia-Pacific region? Second, what have been Japan’s reactions to India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests? It should be said that on neither front is there anything dramatic to report.

Asia-Pacific Reaction

In the Asia-Pacific region, neither India nor Pakistan are seen as vital forces in political, economic, and strategic terms. For most Southeast Asian and East Asian states with the exception of China, which has its own unique concerns here, India’s and Pakistan’s tests have not had a great deal of resonance.

However, in the broader context of India’s and Pakistan’s attempts to improve relations with Southeast and East Asia, certain factors should be noted. First, in spite of the dissatisfaction with India’s position on the CTBT and indefinite extension of the NPT as well as other nuclear-related issues including its nuclear tests, India’s relations with the wider region has improved. During the same period that India has opposed these treaties it has been inducted into the ASEAN Regional Forum over American and Japanese objections, and moved from a sectoral to a full dialogue partner status with ASEAN. Although chronology does not equate with causality, it is important to keep in mind that India’s nuclear policies have not harmed its relations with the rest of Asia in any fundamental way.

Likewise, on the economic front, India’s nuclear policies has not harmed its relations with Southeast and East Asia. Although India’s economic relations with the region are marginal, the real constraint to further growth is not the country’s nuclear policies, but rather its lack of real economic opportunities.

Southeast Asians are keen to keep this dispute from impinging upon their region. To this extent, the increase in India-Pakistan tensions resulting from their respective nuclear tests has been unwelcome and is growing as a source of concern.

Finally, it is important not to assume that Southeast Asia or ASEAN as a bloc are in complete opposition to India’s nuclear policies. Not long ago, for example, an Indonesian journalist said that Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons may in fact serve a useful purpose of deterring other regional countries, although none was named.

Japan’s Reaction

Japan’s initial reactions to the tests were quite strongly negative. Japan suspended aid, imposed sanctions, called on the G8 to respond, and briefly recalled its ambassadors from Islamabad and Delhi. But, even Japan’s reaction must be placed into three larger contexts:

Japan’s reactions must be placed within the context of its overall relations with the South Asia region. Over the last two decades, and especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japan was urged by Washington to play a more active role in the subcontinent. Japan began to improve and increase its relations with both Pakistan and India. In turn, India’s economic reforms further increased Japan’s interest in that country. At the same time, Japan also began to take a relatively more active role on the Kashmir issue and the nuclear issue. Some Indians and Pakistanis feel that Japan’s more active role was motivated by its emergence as the largest source of bilateral aid to both countries and because Tokyo was acting at the urging of Washington. Whatever the precise distribution of motivations, the fact is that Japan over the past two decades has played a more active role in the subcontinent.
The second context for understanding Japan’s reactions involves its own nuclear nonproliferation policies and attitudes toward nuclear weapons in general. Japan has always had misgivings about the NPT. In 1970, Japan signed the NPT, but took another six years to ratify the treaty, attaching eleven conditions to their signature. These conditions are very illuminating because they are quite similar to India’s traditional objections to the NPT regime. Japan, in signing the treaty, objected to the discriminatory character of the NPT regime; to the unwillingness of the major powers to pursue nuclear disarmament more seriously; and expressed concern about the implications of the NPT on the sharing and development of civilian nuclear power. In fact, the Japanese Diet only ratified the treaty after receiving specific assurances that Japan would be able to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel. More recently, Japan has given mixed signals in its support for the NPT. Japan hesitated about supporting the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT; approved the legality of the use of nuclear weapons during a case before the World Court; and stressed Japan’s right to retain the option to have nuclear weapons while reemphasizing its commitment to its non-nuclear principles.
Finally, the third context in understanding Japan’s response is in its relations with Washington. This issue was not explored in depth.

All this suggests a certain ambiguity and flexibility in Japan’s position on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A very small minority of Japanese strategic thinkers have gone even further to say that Delhi’s possession of nuclear weapons is not contrary to Japanese interests and concerns about China. And this Japanese argument is not fundamentally different from similar arguments made by some Americans during the 1960s.

Geography and Pathology

Thus far two major issues have been raised: regional stability and the balance of power. However, two dimensions needed to be added: geography and pathology.

A major problem strategically is that in the Eurasian landmass surrounding the subcontinent, there are three distinct security dynamics: east central Europe, the greater Middle East, and finally east Asia. South Asia is tangential to all of these dynamics, but plays a central role in none. This geographic reality partly explains India’s pathology of feeling that it has not been given its due place in the world. This geographic reality is also a factor in India’s long-standing complaint that American policy does not take India as seriously as it should.

There is also the underlying pathology of relationship between India and Pakistan: Pakistan fears that India has never accepted Partition; India fears that Pakistan has refused to accept a kind of Indian dominance and seeks to dismember India. In a sense, both countries are correct.

One problem that confronts India-Pakistan relations is that there appears to be only one model of deterrence for each country to turn to with respect to the doctrines and command and control. The United States and the Soviet Union took a long time to arrive at a kind of equilibrium and strategic stability. In the case of India and Pakistan case there may be a long period of danger as the two “cross the river by feeling for stones,” as the Chinese say. India has a legitimate concern about China’s relationship with Pakistan. China has obviously provided Pakistan with a bomb design, ring magnets, and other material as well as missiles or components to build them. However, the core of the issue of conflict between India and China—in effect, a border dispute—does not come close to reaching an existential level that would merit the use of nuclear weapons. Frankly, if India wanted leverage over China it could use Tibet more effectively than by the deployment of nuclear weapons.

United States policy has not been helpful either. For the Clinton Administration to assert that it is shocked to find there is a proliferation problem in the subcontinent and to cast China as a neutral party is very strange. This approach is self-deluding and guaranteed to fail in terms of any kind of diplomacy to manage the situation. The United States has made a laundry list of demands on India and Pakistan but has nothing to put on the table for negotiations except sanctions.

Another issue is the effect of India’s and Pakistan’s tests on other would-be proliferators. To be sure, Iran has demonstrated an interest in developing nuclear weapons long before the Indian and Pakistani tests, and these tests can only encourage Iran to proceed in that direction. The tests also sharpens the dangers of a nuclear arms race in northeast Asia that is likely to be triggered by Korean reunification.

The South Asian situation also brings to the fore the involvement of East Asia. It is fairly certain that the Ghauri missile tested by Pakistan was partly a product of the long-standing relationship between North Korea and Pakistan. And although they often exaggerate their fears, some South Koreans and Japanese express concern that there will at some point be a payback for North Korea’s assistance.

It was suggested that India’s next move would be to join the nuclear suppliers group and in so doing, China would be pressured to join the group as well. As for officially recognizing India and Pakistan’s nuclear status, it will be impossible to do so in the context of amending the NPT.

From its viewpoint, India’s grievances in its relations with East Asia is justified: Japan and Germany are offered UN Security Council seats, India is not; India is not invited to join APEC; and the United States was strongly opposed to the idea of including India in the ARF. Actually, it makes excellent sense for India to be included in the above organizations. As a member, this will broaden India’s strategic perspective, strengthen its already long-standing historical and cultural ties to Southeast and East Asia, and participate in addressing legitimate security concerns emanating from the region.

Discussion

Chinese Perspective on India’s Nuclear Strategy

The Chinese view India’s decision to test on three levels: First, India has a political strategy. Domestic political considerations played a role in the decision to conduct the nuclear tests. Internationally, India tried, through the tests, to name China as its number one enemy. Not only do the tests now serve as a strategic obstacle to continued improvement in bilateral relations, they are also an obstacle to the improvement of India-Pakistan relations. India has already been hurt internationally by its stance on nuclear issues: In 1997, India was severely criticized in ARF and other multilateral forum for its opposition to the CTBT, by trying to block the achievement of consensus on the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The tests have further undermined India’s international position, and made it quite unlikely that India will become a permanent member of the Security Council. In essence, India’s decision to test has been a political tragedy.

The Chinese also see the negative economic consequences. India’s growth over the past few years of its reform process has been strong. Like China, India needs foreign investment and technology to sustain growth rates and modernize and develop its economy. By provoking sanctions, the nuclear tests have seriously undermined the achievement of India’s economic objectives.

Finally, there is the view of the test as a strategic tragedy. Vis-à-vis China, India has gained no strategic advantages because China has a policy of no-first-use and also a policy barring it from threatening to use nuclear weapons against any state that does not have them. One participant countered that by stating that the pledge only applies to signatories of the NPT, of which India is not, China has deliberately kept its no-first-use pledge from applying to India. There was much debate and uncertainty over the precise application of China’s no-first-use pledge and whether or not it applies to India. The point was left unresolved.

Dealing with the Tests

It was suggested that one strategy to deal with India’s nuclear tests was to open a dialogue between India and the P5 members to seek a common consensual approach toward the South Asian nuclear situation. The focus should be on three aspects: nuclear arms reductions, nuclear non-proliferation, and security measures or guarantees.

A need for serious efforts to improve China-India and India-Pakistan relations was suggested. Improvements in these relations should be coordinated with the improvement of relations among China, the United States, and Russia. This would create an environment to stop nuclear competition and proliferation. One of India’s key concerns is the possible presence of nuclear weapons in Tibet. One thing China could do is improve transparency on this issue, which is notably lacking at the current moment, an extension of China’s general lack of transparency in its nuclear weapons program.

It was further noted that the United States has placed far too much emphasis on foreign contributions to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs while ignoring Canadian and Russian assistance to India’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

Japan and the Tests

Several points were made on Japan’s response to the tests. First, Japan’s response was consistent with sanctions placed on China after its nuclear tests. Second, Japan does not necessarily consider India’s nuclearization a negative development, as it did China’s, since India is a democracy and thus quite different from China. India’s nuclear weapons would be under the control of a democratic government. Strategically, India’s nuclear weapons capability could serve as a counter to China. Although Japan relies on the United States’ extended nuclear deterrence as a pragmatic necessity, it is not completely satisfied with this arrangement. At the same time Japan supports comprehensive disarmament by accepting the NPT regime as a necessary, but discriminatory, evil. Many in Japan are sympathetic to India and Pakistan’s criticisms of the existing NPT regime. If the other nuclear powers do not make a sincere effort to global disarmament, and if regional stability and security breaks down in East Asia, then Japan may have no choice but to become an NWS. Specifically, if the United States-Japan alliance falters or if the U.S. nuclear umbrella loses its credibility for Japan, then Japan will have no incentive to maintain its present restraint and acceptance of the NPT regime. Moreover, the United States and Russia must continue to pursue nuclear reductions and they must invite China to join in these reductions. If there is a reasonable degree of progress but India and Pakistan continue to build their nuclear weapons capabilities, then Japan will go beyond suspension of aid, perhaps even leveling sanctions on trade and investment with the two countries.

India and FMCT

It was pointed out that India could afford to enter into the FMCT immediately because the country has enough fissionable material required for the planned minimum deterrent.

India’s Missile Delivery System

India’s missile delivery system, the Agni, is a 1,500-kilometer range missile and does not meet any of India’s range requirements. The Agni II, about which India has been totally transparent, is an intermediate-range missile under development, with a range between 2,500-3,000 kilometers. It will probably take 2-3 years for the Agni II’s subsequent deployment. But in essence, the delivery systems that India has are or will be sufficient, and should be considered available at this point.