South Asia After the Tests

Motivations for Testing and Domestic Political Implications

South Asia After the Tests: Where Do We Go From Here?
Roundtable Workshop
July 1, 1998

India’s Decision to Conduct Nuclear Tests

Structural and proximate explanations for India’s decision to conduct nuclear tests were offered. The structural reasons include:

the failure of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to delegitimize nuclear weapons;
the momentum of India’s domestic scientific-bureaucratic-technological nexus; and
the collapse of the Soviet Union, including Russia’s failure to renew the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that included an article (9) interpreted by many as establishing a quasi-alliance relationship between India and the former Soviet Union.

The proximate factors offered to explain the tests include:

the failure by India to anticipate U.S. ability to get an “unconditional” and “indefinite” extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
India’s failure to anticipate passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), especially the “entry into force” clause that obligates India (and 44 other countries with nuclear reactors) to sign the treaty as a precondition for the treaty entering into force;
Indian domestic political considerations, and especially the effort of the Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) to shore up support for its weak coalition government;
India’s perception of its deteriorating security environment in and around South Asia precipitated by China’s alleged supply of M-11 missiles and nuclear assistance to Pakistan, Pakistan’s testing of the Ghauri missile, and China’s supposed intransigence on the China-India border dispute; and
India’s perception that its substantial concessions to China in order to improve relations have been met with only symbolic overtures by China.

One participant sought to explain India’s nuclear tests by focusing on the cultural and psychological foundations underlying India’s decision. Three different—and at points, contradictory—“meanings” were offered for the tests. First, in the eyes of intellectuals, the strategic community, and the rising middle class—all of whom recall India’s defeat in the brief 1962 China-India Border War—the main concern is China not Pakistan, and the nuclear tests are seen as a message that India will not place itself at a disadvantage to China. In another interpretation, China is a relatively irrelevant factor and the tests were seen as a message to Pakistan, which looms as a much larger threat in the popular imagination. This is especially true for the BJP, with its hatred for Islam and Pakistan, which saw the tests as a way of making India appear stronger than Pakistan. Finally, the tests were seen as a response to low self-esteem in both the elite and the mass mentality. For decades now, India has felt neglected and ill-treated by the international community, and discriminated where China is concerned.

The importance of China to India’s calculations was repeatedly stressed. Apart from the humiliation of India’s defeat in the brief border war and China’s test of a nuclear device two years later, three other reasons were offered to explain China as a factor in India’s move to test. First, India is home to some 100,000 Tibetans, many of whom are growing restless with their long-held nonviolent approach toward change in their homeland. Second, Indian strategists are considerably worried about China’s rising energy needs. While the Chinese economy grows at a rate of almost 10 percent a year, the growth of domestic oil production is only 7 percent. In this context, the cheapest route of access for Chinese energy supplies is through the Indian Ocean, and not from yet-to-be-built pipelines across Central Asia. These perceptions of China’s energy needs and the way it might seek to meet them has created fear in some Indian circles that China will seek an increasingly active role in the Indian Ocean. Finally, there is concern among Indians that China increasingly regards the world in cultural—that is, China as the “Middle Kingdom”—rather than in ideological terms. In the cultural view, parts of India (specifically in India’s Arunachal Pradesh state) and other areas surrounding India such as the Spratly Islands and Tibet are potential Chinese territories.

In this broad context, the ascent of the BJP is important. Like Israel, the BJP’s vision of external relations is one of tough and uncompromising when vital security and national interests are at stake. However, unlike Israel, the BJP has failed to build a useful international political coalition to support its policies.

Pakistan’s Decision to Conduct Nuclear Tests

Pakistan’s decision to conduct nuclear tests did not come immediately after India’s tests. Indeed, the mood in Pakistan after India’s tests was very somber and reflective. Yet, within about ten days, as India grew more bellicose in public statements, Pakistan’s mood changed considerably. It seemed increasingly clear to some in Pakistan that India wanted Pakistan to test. This led some Pakistani observers to argue against the tests precisely because it was something that the enemy seemed to want Pakistan to do. As Pakistan’s scientists remained ready to undertake any decision by the government, no formal decision to test was taken while policymakers considered two essential factors. The first consideration was the response of the Group of Seven (G7), including the United States, to India’s tests. Although opponents of the test were appalled at the weak response issued by the West in response to India’s tests, Pakistanis who supported the tests were delighted and emboldened.

An even more important consideration was the increasingly hostile statements emerging from New Delhi. In fact, Pakistan’s chief of armed forces had toured troops along the line of control in Kashmir, and was extremely concerned about their morale. Given India’s aggressive statements and worries about Pakistan’s popular and troop morale, fear began to dominate Pakistan’s debate about whether to test. Opponents of the tests began to lose influence to those who wanted to press ahead. The majority of retired military officers who initially had urged restraint, now began to support testing. Amid this debate, internal terrorism within Pakistan continued unabated. As each day went by, morale declined and fear increased, especially among the junior and middle levels of the armed forces. As fear of what India might do if Pakistan did not test became an important consideration, a decision was made to test about six days prior to the actual detonation.

Pakistan’s decision was also set against a broader and deeper background of the country’s concerns. First, it was noted that from the beginning Pakistan’s nuclear program has been designed as a hedge against insecurity, especially one that is demonstrated by the dismemberment of Pakistan’s territorial integrity in 1971. Pakistan concluded that the country’s conventional capabilities could not be balanced with India’s and hence a nuclear weapons capability would be a defense of last resort.

A second consideration has been Pakistan’s conclusion that neither alliances nor the United Nations provide adequate assurance about the country’s security and therefore Pakistan needs to possess an independent deterrent. Furthermore, there is the perception that Pakistan has been unfairly punished by the United States. For example, in 1989 Pakistan, under U.S. pressure, ceased to produce highly enriched uranium but the United States nevertheless imposed sanctions on Pakistan the following year. As a result of the sanctions, Pakistan’s conventional forces, heavily dependent upon U.S.-supplied weapons systems and spare parts, deteriorated further. Pakistan was also barred from receiving equipment for which it had already paid, such as the F-16 aircraft. Meanwhile, India did not operate under such constraints and continued to produce weapons-usable plutonium. India was also developing a variety of missiles, one of which, the Prithvi, was deployed in areas close to Pakistan’s borders. Such development encouraged the growing impression in Pakistan that the country was becoming increasingly vulnerable to Indian attack.

Finally, there was growing domestic pressure to test. An all-parties conference held in Lahore on May 21 adopted a resolution demanding that the Pakistan government either conduct tests before May 30 or face a nationwide agitation by a coalition of opposition parties.

A question was raised as to what, if any, relevance a purported plan for a joint Israeli-Indian attack on Pakistan moved the Pakistan government to conduct its nuclear tests? One participant responded that while reports about the possible attack were conveyed to the highest levels of Pakistan’s government, the decision to carry out the tests had been taken four days before the reports when the test shafts and tunnels were sealed with concrete.

Discussion

The discussion ensued addressed issues raised in the initial presentations and new factors explaining the Indian government’s decision to test.

India Tests as the Window of Opportunity Closes

One participant argued that India’s tests should not be interpreted as something “out of the blue.” Since China’s test of a nuclear device in 1964, every chief of India’s armed forces has argued in favor of a countervailing Indian nuclear capability. In fact, India has been moving toward conducting nuclear tests for some time but only in 1974 did India finally conduct a single nuclear test. India’s political leadership has in the past been cautious about calling for any tests to follow-up the 1974 test. More recently, then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was preparing to conduct a nuclear test in 1995 but was confronted with satellite photos of the preparations by the U.S. ambassador and was convinced to call off the tests. In light of India’s economic dependence upon U.S. support, India was wise not to conduct the tests then. Furthermore, during the earlier 13-day government of the BJP in 1996 Prime Minister Vajpayee also gave orders to prepare for a test, but these orders were scrubbed when his government chose to resign rather than face a no-confidence vote in the Lok Sabha. Then there is the CTBT that is scheduled to come into force in September 1999. This only heightens India’s momentum to test; once the treaty comes into effect, it will be politically very difficult for India to conduct tests.

Bureaucratic Origins of the Test

One participant emphasized that although the option to test has existed in India for some time, in the 1980s there was considerable dissension among the scientific and technical establishment, which included the Defense Research and Development Organization and the Department of Atomic Energy. In the 1990s, however, dissension dissipated and a pro-test consensus emerged.

Strategic Factors not Domestic Politics Key to Explaining Tests

Another participant argued that India’s motives for its tests were essentially twofold. First, India’s desire to be a more important player in the international community and a more dominant power in Asia; second, to compensate for changes in trilateral strategic relations among China, Russia, and the United States. In this strategic context, Russia and the United States now have a much more cooperative relationship than they had during the Cold War. To India, this is seen as detrimental given India’s previously close relationship with the former Soviet Union. Moreover, China-Russia relations have also improved considerably, again having the effect of marginalizing India. In addition, there has been a significant improvement in the U.S.-China relations. India’s effort to balance its relations with China, Russia, and the United States has been to some extent undermined by the improvement of relations between the three. India now has less room for maneuver and cannot take advantage of contradictions among them as their trilateral relations have improved. The improved relationship between China and India has not matched the trilateral improvement in relations among China, Russia, and the United States.

One participant asserted that India’s nuclear tests were designed to aim at three birds with one stone: China, Pakistan, and India’s place on the world stage. The fear was expressed that in trying to hit so many targets, none may get hit. In essence, India will not meet any of its security objectives through the tests, and this may leave India more confused and desperate than ever.