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Event Analysis: Opening War Moves by the United States
Kenneth W. Estes *
Columbia International Affairs Online
September 12, 2002
Background
Although previous analysis pointed to the December-March timeframe as ideal
for the coming US offensive against Iraq, several indications point to new
motivations for an earlier, pre-November option. This option would begin
the air offensive in September, and launching the ground campaign by
mid-October. The campaign plan would require no changes in scope or
detail, as the forces and logistics already available for use will suffice
for the mission of effecting 'regime change' in Iraq.
US actions during August and September have tended to reinforce this
assessment and we are now seeing the beginning of the offensive against
Iraq, in the guise of Northern/Southern Watch air actions of an especially
heavy and threatening nature.
Discussion:
Specific indicators and pre-conflict moves suggesting that the early fall
attack may be in preparation and execution phase:
US and UK air attacks in the Southern Watch region, reaching to the
southern approaches to Baghdad, have intensified, focusing on air defenses
and command and control centers, virtually the same targets as the initial
air offensive would have to eliminate. Reports that up to 100 aircraft
participated in a single raid are denied in Washington, but if true could
indicate extensive reconnaissance of the Iraqi electronic order of battle,
as well as the proofing of low level flight routes, general reconnaissance
and identification of checkpoints for cruise missile navigation and simple
pilot orientation. In effect, the US/UK forces have already begun the air
offensive and are beginning to erode the remaining Iraqi air defenses. Pre-conflict movements of ground and air forces in the region
continue to be reported. Most clear as an indicator is the shift of the set
of equipment for an army mechanized brigade from the Qatar storage site to
Kuwait. Camps in Kuwait already contain about 15,000 troops, including the
headquarters of the Commander Third Army, the land component commander for
the US Central Command. By all accounts the US Air Force air component
command is ready in Qatar, with adequate munitions and other stores shifted
from Saudi Arabian sites. Further troops are en route or already in the region for announced
'exercises,' including an army mechanized brigade in Jordan and a US Marine
Corps force of 20,000 in the Gulf region. An unknown number of units are
believed to have remained in Egypt after last years' Bright Star exercise.
Carrier deployments of the US and UK will have several units in place for
September-October operations. President Bush has undertaken an open campaign to influence allies
who were already queried in the late Spring by the vice president Mr.
Cheney. It seems clear that the administration will state that the allies'
points were studied, but that the US has decided to act on the basis of
evidence and Iraqi intractability. The Iraqi opposition groups have been
approached openly for supporting a future campaign. Specific claims, such
as the interception of materials for possible use in nuclear weapons
fabrication, indicate that the leadership has made its decision and is
marshaling data to support it. Bush is also expected to move forward in the United Nations shortly
to press for further approval by the Security Council for military action
and regime change. Of the key allies, he has firm support from Russia and
the UK, France is bending and China may concede the issue. Only Germany
refuses to participate, no doubt because of historical-political reasons. Bush has queried and briefed the leaders of the US Congress and may
be content with that as meeting the requirement for consultations
considered lacking thus far. Reports that Mr. Cheney will travel to the region in 'mid-October'
may represent a final check with regional allies to announce the coming
US/UK actions, invite participation and exhort the continued support of
host nations during the coming operations. The US is expected to require
continued support as a minimum demonstration that the host nation is on the
'right' side of the issues and conflicts. It may be that a final UN
resolution calling upon Saddam Hussein to admit arms inspectors will be
made, and when Iraq makes the slightest hesitation, the US will proclaim to
its friends and allies that it is going in and that all allies are expected
to support. However, the 'mid-October' timeframe may also pose
disinformation to the Iraqis to leave them complacent that an earlier
attack will not develop. It indeed may come sooner and Mr. Cheney's
itinerary might shift abruptly.
Note *: Kenneth W. Estes is a 1969 Naval Academy graduate who served in a variety
of command and staff assignments in the U.S. Marine Corps until his
retirement in 1993. He earned his doctorate in European History in 1984 and
has taught at Duke University, the U.S. Naval Academy, and local schools.
He is the author of several books, and has written extensively in defense
and academic journals throughout his career. Many of these analyses were
written while serving as a strategic fellow at a defense thinktank in the
Gulf region. Back.
The Future of Iraq | The War and the Wider World | A Violent Month | Events of the Past Year | Government Documents | Maps
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