War and the Art of Governance
Nadia Schadlow
United States Government
Autumn 2003
"Power is one thing. The problem of how to administer it is another."1
— Douglas MacArthur
On 9 April 2003, jubilant crowds and US troops toppled the statue
of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad and drew down the curtain on
the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Within hours of
the liberation of Baghdad, amid spreading disorder and growing
expectations, debate began over the reconstruction challenges ahead.
Criticism and frustration with the chaos on the ground intensified
over the apparent failure of the United States to plan adequately
for the
restoration of political and economic order once major combat
operations had ended.
The root of Washington’s failure to anticipate the political
disorder in Iraq rests precisely in the characterization of these
challenges as “postwar” problems, a characterization used
by virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The Iraq
situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance of
civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to
consider the establishment of political and economic order as a
part of war itself. The point is not academic. It is central to
any effective reconstruction strategy in future wars and has
profound implications for the military’s planning, command
arrangements, and implementation of current and future governance
operations.2
Military and political leaders need to distinguish between
governance operations, which are a core element of all wars, and
activities such as peace operations and peacekeeping that may occur
independently of war. Labeling political and economic reconstruction
as a postwar problem muddles the fact that central to strategic
victory in all wars fought by the United States has been the
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creation of a favorable political order, a process overseen and
administered by US military forces—usually the Army. The United
States entered virtually all of its wars with the assumption that
the government of the opposing regime would change or that the
political situation would shift to favor US interests. During the
Spanish-American War, we sought to change the governments of Cuba
and Puerto Rico, and succeeded. During the Civil War, Washington was
determined to change the way the South was governed. In Panama in
1989, the United States ousted Manuel Noriega, and the war did not
end until the regime against which US forces had fought was out of
power and political stability had resumed. In virtually all
contingencies, political leaders in Washington conceded that only US
military forces were up to the task of overseeing and implementing
this final aspect of war. Arguably, the 2003 war in Iraq is rooted
in the most prominent recent case where the political order did not
change—the 1991 Gulf War. Some top Defense Department leaders
have called the 2003 war a logical conclusion to the 1991 campaign.
President Bush’s early concerns, which emerged during his
presidential campaign, about the involvement of US military forces
in nation-building and peace operations stemmed from his desire to
avoid overextending American resources and commitments.3 A clear distinction between governance
operations that are integral to war and the myriad of missions
referred to in the peace operations discourse would be hugely
beneficial. Such a distinction would allow US defense planners to
focus on the political and economic reconstruction that is a part of
war, while relegating humanitarian and nation-building missions to
other organizations. Moreover, equating the governance tasks that
occur in all wars with the broader missions associated with peace
operations and humanitarian assistance reinforces the tendency to
avoid planning for governance operations in tandem with planning for
combat operations. The essential point is this: Combat operations
and governance operations are both integral to war and occur in
tandem. US soldiers in Iraq today are wondering why, if “the
war is supposed to be over, we are still being shot
at.”4 They remain in Iraq because the war there is
not over. The war in Iraq will not be over until a legitimate
government is in place and until, as Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz has emphasized, the Iraqi people no longer live in
fear.
Furthermore, it often has not been specialized civil affairs
personnel who have conducted governance operations, but tactical
combat personnel in the
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theater. Before World War II, in fact, specialized civil affairs
units did not exist. Even after the creation of these units, the
reconstruction tasks in the theater were almost always more than
they could handle alone. Thus tactical troops worked side-by-side
with more specialized civil affairs officers to restructure corrupt
police ministries, organize for local elections, and ensure that new
government officials were, in fact, new. The civil affairs community
that emerged after World War II did not succeed in integrating these
tasks into the Army’s conception of war. The post-World War II
reservists worked hard to convince the active Army to recognize the
value of civil affairs-related missions. However, by emphasizing the
“specialness” of civil affairs tasks and making arguments
about the distinct, specialized skills required for civil affairs
missions, their approach actually strengthened the prevailing view
of governance operations as separate and distinct from conventional
warfare. In making the case for their own specialties, civil affairs
advocates tended to ignore that in many previous wars, tactical
combat forces performed reasonably well in implementing key aspects
of political and economic reconstruction. Furthermore, except for
one active-duty brigade, all of the Army’s civil affairs units
ended up in the reserve component, reinforcing the separation from
the active Army’s focus on combat operations and setting
governance operations apart from the professional heart of the
military.
US Army officers have directly supervised the creation of new
governments in many defeated states. They faced remarkably similar
governance challenges in all of these contingencies. These include
the well-known success stories of Germany and Japan at the end of
World War II, as well as cases that garner less attention, such as
the Mexican War in the 1840s, reconstruction at the close of the
Civil War, and Puerto Rico and Cuba during the Spanish-American War.
Interventions that included governance operations took place during
the Cold War period, too: the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in
1986, and Panama in 1989. Since the 1800s, in over 13 instances,
Army personnel under the theater commander’s operational
control supervised and implemented political and economic
reconstruction.5 In virtually all of the Army’s
major contingencies, Army personnel remained on the ground
overseeing the political transitions that were essential to the
consolidation of victory. Furthermore, the continued presence of
Army troops in several cases—Germany and Japan following World
War II, South Korea after the Korean War—transformed the
geostrategic landscape.
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Yet due to
a host of reasons, most Army and civilian officials have failed to
absorb the historical lesson that reconstruction is an integral part
of war.
Governance Operations as “Strange and
Abhorrent”
US civilian leaders always have been reluctant to give the
military control over governance tasks, which are fundamentally
political in nature. The military’s conduct of governance
operations seemed to challenge the principle of civilian control
over the military, an ideal fundamental to the creation of a
standing American army. America’s founding fathers were
determined to subordinate military to civil power and, as such, were
careful to create the first standing army in a manner that prevented
the acquisition of too much power by one organized group. Allowing
the military to develop a capacity to govern could endanger civilian
control of the military if these skills were, in turn, used at home.
Civilian discomfort with entrusting the Army with governance
tasks persisted through all of America’s wars. During the
Reconstruction phase of the Civil War, President Johnson expressed
deep concern over the Army’s role in the political
rehabilitation of the South, fearing that such power was in
“palpable conflict” with the Constitution and a formula
for “absolute despotism.”6 As the Army began
the reconstruction of Cuba during the Spanish-American War,
President McKinley reassured the public that military government was
being established for “non-military purposes.” In the
early years of World War II, President Roosevelt and many of his
advisors believed that “military government was . . . a
repulsive notion, associated with imperialism, dollar diplomacy, and
other aspects of our behavior we had abandoned” and was
“both strange and somewhat abhorrent.”7 After receiving one of his first briefings
on occupation plans for Japan, President Truman remarked that civil
government was “no job for soldiers” and that the War
Department should begin to plan to turn occupation responsibilities
over to the State Department as soon as possible.8 Adding to concerns about military despotism
was the persistent ambivalence of Americans with the United
States’ role as “an empire” and the Army’s role
as “guardians” of this empire,9
which governance functions essentially represent.
Civilian leaders supported the Army’s leadership over
governance operations largely because of a lack of alternatives.
Political leaders realized that the Army was the only agency capable
of accomplishing reconstruction in the midst of and aftermath of
combat. While some World War II leaders expressed concern that
civilians could “lose” the postwar world by default (by
failing to offer a “comprehensive plan to rival that of the
Army’s”), President Roosevelt recognized that only the
Army would be able to deliver “prompt results.” Even the
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, acknowledged that the State
Department did not have the capacity to run an occupation. He
compromised by arguing that the State Department would have
oversight over policy, with the War Department responsible for the
execution of the occupation.10 During the Vietnam War, there
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was an
acceptance by the Johnson Administration that civil agencies were
not up to the task of overseeing pacification; thus the Civil
Operations for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was
created within the US Military Assistance Command.
Similar concerns about military control over governance seem to
have influenced decisions in Operation Iraqi Freedom, contributing
to the decision to avoid ceding full operational control of
governance functions to US Central Command (CENTCOM). The Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), created before
the start of hostilities in February 2003, was charged with
administering the country, providing humanitarian aid, and
rebuilding damaged infrastructure. ORHA’s relationship to
CENTCOM seemed to create dual authorities, with ORHA
technically under CENTCOM’s operational control, but with
CENTCOM controlling critical resources (such as security), and ORHA
itself charged with creating the conditions for Iraqi self-rule.
This early organization illustrated the ambivalence of civilian
leaders about ceding too much control to the military. Furthermore,
the original appointment of a retired Army general, Jay Garner, to
head ORHA exemplified the sort of uncertainty plaguing US leaders
over who should control governance tasks. A retired general officer
offered the benefits of previous Army experience, but without the
perceived political ramifications of appointing an active-duty
officer to head such a political task.
These concerns seemed to only increase with the replacement of
Garner by a stronger civilian leader, L. Paul Bremer, to oversee the newly
created Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). While the appointment
of Bremer seemed to reflect an effort to improve unity of command in
the theater, with Bremer reporting directly to the Secretary of
Defense, the CPA remains dependent on CENTCOM for many of the
resources needed by the CPA to accomplish its mission. The specific
sets of activities that fall under CENTCOM’s purview and the
CPA’s purview are being worked out in the theater, and although
the situation seems to be improving, there are still disconnects
between the two organizations. One example: the CPA lacks the
capability to secure areas, and without security, reconstruction in
unstable pockets of the country cannot begin. Joint Task Force 7,
under CENTCOM’s command, retains responsibility for security,
creating a bureaucratic separation between two inextricably linked
tasks. The hundreds of CPA administrators control very few resources
on the ground. The CENTCOM theater commander almost literally holds
all the keys (Army convoys accompany top officials), and CPA
personnel remain dependent upon the Army for accomplishing many of
their day-to-day activities. CENTCOM has a great deal of control on
the ground, without the necessary authorities, while CPA has more
control on paper than it does in reality.11
These are precisely the kinds of problems and constraints that
hampered civil agencies in past wars and led to the decision by US
leaders to cede control over governance to the Army. Indeed, with
the appointment of Bremer,
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US civilian and military leaders failed to appreciate the key
difference in Germany at the end of World War II between General
Lucius Clay and High Commissioner John McCloy. It was General Clay,
serving as theater commander and military governor, who oversaw
the toughest political and economic reconstruction tasks, including
intensive denazification and demilitarization efforts as well
as banking and monetary reform. The civilian leader, John McCloy,
arrived in 1949, well after stability had been achieved. In Iraq
today, the Army— with appropriate political direction—is
the only organization that is capable of asserting the countrywide
reach necessary for effective reconstruction to take root and
evolve.
Reluctant Military Governors
The Army has never relished the tasks associated with governance.
Army leaders have had recurring concerns about the dilution of
resources away from Army combat missions. During the Mexican War,
Secretary of War William Marcy warned his commanding generals that
tasks related to civil administration would be the “least
pleasant” part of their duties.12 During and after
the Civil War, the Army’s power during reconstruction made
General Ulysses S. Grant uncomfortable, and Union generals were
reluctant to divert any of their forces to meet the requirements of
the military governors: “Fighting generals believed that
military objectives should come first: win the war and then worry
about the political ramifications later.”13 During World War II, General Eisenhower was
reportedly eager to hand duties over to civilian administrators as
quickly as possible,14 though in fact this transfer did not occur until
political and economic reconstruction was well under way.
Despite these kinds of reservations, the Army often has sought
control over governance operations due to military necessity and the
desire to preserve unity of command. Army commanders have recognized
that operational control over all activities in the theater was
critical for maintaining stability and for protecting US forces
during the course of the war. During World War II, competition
between the Army and civilian planning efforts emerged less because
of the Army’s desire to lead governance operations and more
because of the Army’s determination to rise above the confusion
of civilian planning and preserve unity of command. Frustrating
coordination problems had arisen in North Africa in the summer of
1942, and General Eisenhower was determined to avoid a situation in
which conflicting civilian and military authority over the same
territory existed.15
Furthermore, in practice, combat and reconstruction virtually
always occurred in tandem, with the defeat of the enemy forces in
rear areas requiring a consolidation of the political situation
while remaining troops pushed ahead. In Germany during World War II,
US troops overtook towns in rear areas and began to restore order
and stability even as the advance into Germany continued. During the
Korean War in 1950, the Army actively resisted efforts by the State
De-
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partment and the United Nations to retain control over governance
tasks, not because the Army was eager to assume reconstruction
tasks, but because the commanding general insisted upon unity of
command.16
The situation in Iraq today reinforces this link between combat
and reconstruction—not as separate phases of the war, but as
interrelated components. Reconstruction efforts are under way, but
American troops remain targets of almost daily attacks by Iraqi
irregulars. Indeed, CENTCOM’s regular briefings from Baghdad
repeatedly refer to the intermixing of maneuver forces that are
continuing to clear potentially hostile pockets while conducting
assessments and aiding reconstruction efforts. Combat in Iraq,
albeit at a different level of intensity, continues at this writing
in late July 2003, and there will be no clear separation between
combat and reconstruction until a new Iraqi governing body is
elected and reasonably stable.
Lessons for the Future
History offers some lessons for the contemporary situation in
Iraq. First, although the ongoing problems in Iraq reflect, to some
degree, the inevitable “fog of war,” most observers agree
that planning for the reconstruction phase was not as advanced as
the planning undertaken by CENTCOM for the first three phases of the
war. CENTCOM had responsibility for planning four phases of
Operation Iraqi Freedom: setting the conditions for war, the air
campaign, major combat operations (the ground offensive), and
postwar stability operations. However, this temporal approach to war
planning has permitted civilian and military planners to allow
CENTCOM to pay less attention to the final phase of the
war.17 The organizational arrangements that emerged on the
ground following the main combat operations reflected an eagerness
to delegate perceived “postwar duties.”
An acceptance of political and economic reconstruction as an
integral part of war would facilitate decisions about appropriate
command arrangements, decisions that have been so difficult and
incendiary in Iraq. History suggests that leadership over
reconstruction efforts should run through US military channels and
that the military should have direct responsibility for
implementation. Unity of command should prevail. This in turn
suggests that the conventional wisdom of allowing greater civil
control is wrong and that the tendency to bring in civilian and
international organizations too quickly should be carefully
considered. Of course, appropriate resources need to be given to the
military to allow it to do the job.
Until the opposing regime is fully dismantled, the war is not
over, and the Army should remain in control of all governance
activities. A formal acceptance of this link between governance
operations and war could offset some of the political pressures
faced by US leaders as they try to manage international pressure to
be inclusive. Relying primarily on civilian international
organizations for conducting humanitarian relief activities, as the
White House announced in May,18 could prove to be disastrous
for the accomplishment of final American war aims. Con-
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sider, for example, the current morass related to the failure of
the international coalition to rebuild the “ring road” in
Afghanistan.19 Policy can and should be made by political leaders in
Washington, but implementation falls squarely within the US
military’s mandate.
An acceptance of governance operations as a key component of war
also suggests that military planners will need to rethink those
tasks that have traditionally formed the core of the Army
profession.20 Indeed, governance operations clash
with traditional notions of the “military profession.”
Samuel Huntington’s classic work on the subject, The Soldier
and the State, argued that “the management of
violence” sets the military profession apart from
others.21 This view of the profession has shaped military planning
and training. Governance operations do not explicitly involve
“the management of violence” and require the military to
engage in activities that are essentially civilian in nature, such
as rebuilding the civic infrastructure, restoring educational
systems, and planning for new elections. Similarities with civilian
life set governance operations apart from the military
profession’s traditional view of itself.
Furthermore, Army doctrine emphasizes the defeat of an
enemy’s combat forces—not the concomitant replacement of
an opposing state’s political leadership, which is virtually
always required to consolidate victory. Despite the considerable
influence of Carl von Clausewitz on the Army, governance activities
reside in the gray area of Clausewitz’s distinction between
“preparations for war” and “war proper.”
Clausewitz does not directly address the operational steps that
military forces need to take to consolidate victory during and
following combat. Clausewitz focuses principally on the
“why” of war, since wars are fought for political reasons.
Yet the “how” behind this linkage is equally important:
governance operations are the operational link needed to consolidate
a state’s final political aims in war. One challenge today is
to recruit and train soldiers in a manner that makes clear that
governance missions are a key part of the job they are signing up
for. By explicitly accepting governance operations as a part of war,
military and civilian leaders can help to offset the kind of
disillusionment being voiced by young US soldiers throughout Iraq as
they wonder about their ongoing purpose in the theater.22
A rethinking of the role of governance operations will require a
reconsideration of accepted Army definitions and doctrines. Existing
doctrine and the concepts that shape Army combat service support,
counterinsurgency operations, special operations, and civil affairs
missions may need to be modified. While many outsiders criticized
the Army for the decision to close its Peacekeeping Institute at the
US Army War College (a decision that has now been put on hold),
recreating it in its previous form should give the Army leadership
pause. A real step toward advancing strategic and operational
thinking about governance operations would be to revive the
institute under another name, with a mission that addresses the
strategic challenge of integrating various elements of war, from
combat to governance, with an emphasis on the planning,
organization, and
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training issues associated with military leadership over
governance tasks in war. Furthermore, consideration should be given
to how governance operations should be approached at the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command and at US Joint Forces Command.
Acceptance of governance operations as an integral part of war
also could offer US military and political leaders a stronger and
more sensible rationale for limiting US military involvement in
other kinds of operations. An acceptance of the reconstruction
requirements that are inevitably a part of war would provide
political and military leaders with a basis for distinguishing
between those activities that are clearly a part of war and those
that are not—thus providing a basis for rejecting US military
involvement in the myriad of other missions, not related to war.
This is not to say such missions should be rejected out of hand.
Clearly, such decisions are for political leaders to make.
Finally, US military planners need to consider how combat
operations and governance operations should explicitly inform each
other, since they are part of the same campaign. As noted earlier,
governance operations have always occurred in tandem with combat
operations. In Iraq, stabilization measures were occurring in
the defeated cities of Umm Qasr, Basr, and An Nasiriyah as
the Army’s 3d Infantry Division pressed on toward Baghdad.
Just as joint operations are about achieving a synergy among the
units of different services to accomplish the objective at hand, so
should thinking shift about the relationship between combat and
governance. These different elements of war should be viewed
synergistically. Accepting this interrelationship will have specific
ramifications for the combat phases of war and for how wars are
planned, fought, and ultimately won.
Notes
1. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 281.
2. I use the term governance operations here to avoid the various
connotations associated with existing terms, which refer to a very
wide range of different activities, some of which are not relevant
to war itself. This point will be expanded upon in this article.
3. In the 3 October 2000 debate with presidential candidate Al
Gore, Bush warned against the problem of extending US troops all
around the world in nation-building missions. Candidate Bush
repeated this theme in several of his campaign speeches through the
fall of 2000.
4. Daniel Williams and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “U.S. Troops
Frustrated in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 20 June 2003,
p. A16.
5.
These cases include: (1) the Mexican War; (2) Reconstruction; (3-5)
the Spanish-American War (i.e. the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto
Rico); (6) the Rhineland following World War I; (7-10) World War II
(i.e. Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea); (11) Korea in 1950;
(12) the Dominican Republic in 1965; (13) Grenada; (14) Panama in
1989. There were also the early cases of the Indian wars, in which
the Army administered territories throughout the West. See Henry
Putney Beers, The Western Military Frontier 1815-1846
(Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1935); and Fairfax Downey,
Indian Wars of the U.S. Army 1776-1865 (New York: Doubleday,
1963).
6. “Veto of the First Reconstruction Act,” in Paul H.
Bergeron, ed., The Papers of Andrew Johnson, Vol. 12,
February – August 1867 (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press,
1995), p. 84.
7. See Earl F. Ziemke, “Improvising Stability and Change in
Postwar Germany,” in Robert Wolfe, ed. Americans as
Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan,
1944-1952 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1984), p.
59. See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947),
p. 556.
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8. Memorandum of 30 August 1945, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1945, Vol. III (Washington: GPO), pp.
957-58.
9. This phrase is from Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of
Empire (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1997).
10. James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1947), p. 244.
11. Sources for the information in this paragraph are from the
official documents about the CPA, which can be found at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org, as well as from conversations with DOD
officials.
12. A reprint of Secretary Marcy’s June 1846
instructions to Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny is in Ward McAfee and
Cordell J. Robinson, Origins of the Mexican War: A Documentary
Source Book, Vol. II (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications,
1982), pp. 166-67.
13. Peter Maslowski, Treason Must Be Made Odious: Military
Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, Tennessee,
1862-1865 (Milwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1978), p. 20.
14. General Lucius Clay wrote that he and Eisenhower had intended
to build an organization that could “be transferred bodily to a
civil branch of government.” Lucius D. Clay, Decision in
Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1950), p.
53. Note also that after the opening of the Army’s first school
of military government in 1942, Army leaders recognized that
although it was the “sole agency capable of initiating the
reconstruction process,” civilian agencies would eventually
help too. See Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 17 June 1942,
PMGO files, 321.19, MG, original citation in Harry L. Coles and
Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors,
United States Army in World War II Series (Washington: Center of
Military History, 1964), p. 12.
15. The Army believed this was in contrast to the British
system in which civil affairs operations were closely guided by
political authorities in London. See Coles and Weinberg, p. 162. See
also Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT
3586, original citation in Coles and Weinberg, p. 169.
16. Eighth Army had responsibility for all civil assistance
activities in Korea, and MacArthur gave Lieutenant General Walton
Walker (Commander of Eighth Army) “complete and overall
responsibility for the provision of necessary supplies and equipment
to prevent disease, starvation, and unrest among the civilian
population in Korea.” See CINCFE Directive to CG Eighth Army,
Korea, 17 Oct 1950, reprinted in Darwin C. Stolzenbach and Henry A.
Kissinger, Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-1951, Working Paper
(Chevy Chase, Md.: Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research
Office, August 1952), p. 67. There are other documents in
this collection which describe the tension between the Army,
the United Nations, and the State Department. It is also
interesting to note that the Department of the Army actually drew up
plans for the occupation of North Korea, anticipating the
need for military government there. For a discussion of the
occupation plan, see, RAD W 93721, DA to CINCFE 10 October 1950,
cited by James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year,
United States Army in the Korean War, Office of the Chief of
Military History, US Army (Washington: GPO, 1972), pp. 219-20.
17. Although CENTCOM reportedly did some planning for the
reconstruction phase of the war in a plan called Eclipse II, some
well-placed observers acknowledge that much less attention was paid
to this phase of the operation than the previous three. As an aside,
it is interesting to note that Eclipse was the name given to one of
the early plans that focused on the reconstruction of Germany after
World War II.
18. See press release, “President Bush Announces
Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” remarks by the
President from USS Abraham Lincoln, at sea off the coast of
San Diego, Calif., 1 May 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.
html.
19. Traditionally, Afghanistan’s unifying transportation
artery has been the road connecting Kabul in the east to Herat in
the west. This is the key link in Afghanistan’s “ring
road,” which also connects its northern provinces with the
capital. The reconstruction of this road was seen as an important
step demonstrating the US commitment to reconstruct Afghanistan. It
was to be done in conjunction with Japan and Saudi Arabia, but
progress has been extremely slow. See White House, Office of the
Press Secretary,
“Joint Statement on Road Construction in Afghanistan by the
President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Japan, and the
Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia,” 12 September 2002. See also
Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, “U.S. Honoring
Pledge to Help Rebuild Afghanistan,” 27 February 2003,
www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/n02272003_200302278.html.
20. Excellent work is being done on this by Don Snider. See Don
Snider, Gayle L. Watkins, and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future
of the Army Profession (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002).
21. Huntington described a military specialist as “an
officer who is peculiarly expert at directing the application of
violence under certain prescribed conditions.” Samuel
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations (2d. ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1985), p. 12.
22. There have been many articles about the frustrations of US
soldiers. See, for example, Williams and Chandrasekaran. See also
John Hendren, “For U.S. Soldiers in Iraq, Long Haul Grows
Longer,” Los Angeles Times, 16 July 2003, p. A1; and Ann
Scott Tyson, “Troop Morale in Iraq Hits ‘Rock
Bottom,’” Christian Science Monitor, 7 July 2003.
Nadia
Schadlow is a senior program officer in the International Security
and Foreign Policy Program of the Smith Richardson Foundation in
Westport, Connecticut. She previously served for six years in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. She is a graduate of Cornell
University, holds an M.A. from the Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, and is now
a Ph.D. candidate in the Strategic Studies Program at SAIS. Her
dissertation focuses on the Army’s experiences in the conduct
of military government.
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