Iraq "The Day After": Internal Dynamics in Post-Saddam Iraq
Analysis by Dr. Phebe Marr
The Naval War College Review
Winter 2003
Of all the unknowns facing policy makers in Iraq, the greatest is
what kind of leadership is likely to come after Saddam Husayn. Much, of
course, will depend on the means of unseating him. However, little hard
thought has yet been spent on who might replace him, what orientation
and policies alternative leaders might have, and the processes by which
leadership can be selected and legitimated over the long term. These
gaps need to be addressed, though the answers may have to remain
somewhat speculative.
Regime replacement will be one of the most difficult decisions facing
the U.S. administration, because of the absence of good options. Inside
Iraq, there is no alternative political leadership available. Well
qualified leaders may exist, but they will be difficult to identify
beforehand. It is clear that no such leadership can emerge while Saddam
Husayn’s regime is in place. By definition, political leaders must
have followers and at least some rudimentary organization. Under Saddam
Husayn’s security system, no such activity can take place. The
absence of clearly identifiable alternative leadership leaves a great
deal to chance and to last-minute efforts at organization by would-be
successors the “day after”—not a good foundation for
exercising control over the situation.
Some attempt to identify sources of leadership inside Iraq can be
undertaken beforehand. The best framework for such a process is probably
examination of Iraq’s institutional framework and of the leadership
below the top levels, which will inevitably depart with Husayn. Such
institutions obviously include the military, elements of the
bureaucracy, the educational establishment, and even the Ba’th
Party itself. But there is a problem here. These institutions have been
heavily infiltrated by party members and clan relations of Saddam
Husayn, and anyone with experience in administration and in the exercise
of authority is likely to have been influenced by their thinking and
orientation. How much change is likely to result from such leadership?
Outside of Iraq, alternative political leadership does exist. The
“outside” opposition has been operating among Iraq’s
exile community—in Europe, the United States, and the Middle
East—for over a decade, and its members can be clearly identified.
However, the various groups constituting this opposition have different
agendas and some deeply held but divergent views about Iraq’s
future, preventing coalescence around a common direction or leader.
Meanwhile, aside from the Kurdish parties, it is not clear how much
support the outsiders have inside Iraq. Hence, if an outside opposition
element is to become Iraq’s alternative government, it will have to
be put in power by the United States.
These factors present the United States with a policy dilemma. The
major justification for a policy of “regime change” advanced
by the Bush administration rests on U.S. interests, not the benefits it
would bring to the Iraqi population, although these may be substantial.
Paramount among American interests are an end to Iraq’s program of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and institution of a regime that would
be more friendly—or at least not hostile—to U.S. aims,
including cooperation in the “war on terrorism” and
achievement of regional stability. The alternative leadership most
likely to produce these results is the opposition in exile, most of whom
have been in the West for an extended period of time and have absorbed
Western ideals and aims. However, installing this leadership would be
the most expensive option for the United States; it would require U.S.
forces on the ground and other military support for some time. A change
from inside Iraq, initiated by as-yet-unidentified leaders, would be the
least costly for the United States, as presumably avoiding long-term
occupation and possibly even destructive military action. But such
leadership, especially if it emerges from inside the regime, may not be
able—or willing—to guarantee a long-term change in WMD policy
or a new, more friendly, political orientation. It may also have
difficulty in maintaining domestic order and control.
The “Inside” Option
Should the regime in Baghdad disappear, by whatever means, what
potential leadership forces would the United States have to work with
inside Iraq? What is it likely to find? A critical factor in this regard
is that in the decade since 1991, Iraq has become more
fragmented—socially, culturally, and even politically—than at
any time since the Second World War. This is not to say that Iraq is
likely to break up into its three main ethnic and sectarian
components—a Kurdish north, an Arab Sunni center, and a Shi’i
south. Such an eventuality is highly unlikely, because of the
demographic mixture of these communities in many large cities and
because none of these communities is itself homogeneous.1 But Iraq’s cohesion as a
state and its sense of identity as a nation could break down. Indeed,
this cohesion has been eroding steadily over the decade, owing to the
alienation of all Iraqi communities from a repressive, narrowly based
government that has kept itself in power by, in part, relying on one
sectarian group and playing off one community against another. As a
result, keeping Iraq together and reconstituting a spirit of unity will
be more difficult than it would have been a decade ago, and a failure of
the central government in Baghdad to maintain control over the country
could have more serious consequences.
In the North
In the north of the country, in a zone encompassing about 10 percent
of Iraqi territory, the Kurds have been governing themselves for over a
decade. In 1992, after the upheavals of the uprising, an exodus of
refugees (almost half the population), and the establishment of a safe
haven and a no-fly zone by the United States and its allies, the Iraqi
government withdrew its forces and administration from an area that
extends from Zakhu in the north through Irbil in the center to
al-Sulaymaniyyah in
the south. Kurdish political
parties took control. However, despite an election in 1992 and the
establishment of a Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the Kurds were not
able to establish and maintain a unified government. After several years
of civil conflict between the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdish
region split in two. In the northeast, the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP), under Mas’ud Barzani, governs the territory from Zakhu, on
the Turkish border, to Irbil; in the southwest, the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), under Jalal Talabani, governs the remaining territory
from its capital in al-Sulaymaniyyah. A slice of territory on the
Iranian border around the town of Halabjah has come under the control of
religious parties, leaving the Kurdish border open to hostile forces
from Iran or Iraqi territory under Saddam’s control.2 A slice of territory on the
Iranian border around the town of Halabjah has come under the control of
religious parties, leaving the Kurdish border open to hostile forces from Iran or
Iraqi territory under Saddam’s control.2
A slice of territory on the Iranian border around the town of
Halabjah has come under the control of religious parties, leaving the
Kurdish border open to hostile forces from Iran or Iraqi territory under
Saddam’s control.2 portion of Iraqi territory. Their
peshmergas (militias) maintain security, their parties administer
the region, and in recent years, with some help from outside, a measure
of prosperity and greater freedom has come to the north.3 This new reality and the
bargaining power it gives the Kurds will have to be recognized in a
post-Saddam Iraq.
However, although the Kurdish political parties can be expected to
join a post-Saddam government—indeed, they would certainly bargain
for a hefty share of power in it—they cannot provide alternative
political leadership for the country as a whole. In this sense, the
Kurdish parties are not comparable to the Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan. The real issue is whether the Kurds would be willing to
cooperate with other Iraqi groups across ethnic and sectarian lines to
establish a unified Iraq. Indeed, they may instead seek to enlarge their
territory to include Kirkuk and the oil fields of the north. (The Kurds
have consistently claimed this territory in bargaining with the central
government and have just as consistently been refused, foreshadowing a
future, post-Saddam problem.)
The Kurdish parties have demonstrated time and again that they are
interested in greater self-government in the north, not leadership of a
government in Baghdad.4 The PUK has shown more willingness to cooperate with Arab
opposition groups to overthrow the regime than has the KDP, which has
preferred to solidify its base in the north.5 But neither party has shown much of a desire to lead an
Iraqi state; in fact, the degree of self-government to be accorded to
Kurds in a future Iraq has been a bone of contention in all opposition
discussions. A decade of self-government by these parties, including the
development of separate institutions of government and the extensive use
of the Kurdish language—weakening the facility to use
Arabic—will pose problems of integration in the post-Saddam
period.
An alternative leadership exists among the Kurds—one that is
less nationalist and more interested in integration into Iraq—but
it shows little evidence of being able to displace the two dominant
political parties. This leadership centers on tribal leaders, such as
the Baradostis, the Surchis, and others, who used to be affiliated with
the central government’s apparatus of control in the north. These
leaders commanded tribal contingents who worked with the Iraqi army in
defending the border against Iran (and from the Kurdish parties). The
1991 rebellion, in which they played leading roles, ended in their
displacement as leaders.6 Interestingly, some of them have formed an association
with Arab tribes in territory under Saddam’s control, with a view
to working for a new government. Their group comprises Kurds and Arabs,
Sunni and Shi’ah, giving more promise of integration.7 However, their tribal
organization cannot now match that of the two political parties,
although the tribal leaders could play supportive roles in a new
government.
A small “Islamic” enclave on the border with Iran has
produced alternative leadership vested in, notably, the Islamic Movement
of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), under Mullah ‘Uthman ‘Abd
al-’Aziz, and other smaller Islamic parties. These groups and the
support they command are far too small to play a role in any alternative
government in Baghdad, but as Sunni Islamists they represent a new trend
in Iraq, one that may have increasing appeal to Arab Sunni youth as well
as Kurds. In fact these Islamic groups have been a destabilizing force
in the north, frequently fighting with military forces of the PUK, in
whose neighborhood they operate. In fact, news reports claim that this
region is harboring militant Islamic groups, such as the newly formed
Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam), that would come under U.S.
definitions of terrorist.8 This small enclave suggests the larger dangers that could
emerge in case of the collapse of centralized control in Baghdad.
In the South
South of Baghdad, the Shi’ah population, accounting for at least
60 percent of Iraq’s inhabitants, has over the past decade become
more alienated from the central government and more isolated from the
outside. They have borne much of the brunt of two wars, a rebellion that
was brutally put down in 1991, and the effects of neglect and sanctions.
The result has been smoldering unrest and repressed animosity toward a
Sunni-dominated regime. These factors have encouraged a greater
Shi’i identity, although this Shi’i voice lacks a sense of
direction and a domestic outlet for expression. Whatever form this
Shi’i identity may take in the future, it shows as yet little
evidence of separatism. Rather, the Shi’ah, virtually all Arabic
speakers except for a small minority of fayli, or Shi’i
Kurds, consider themselves indigenous Iraqis; they want a say in
Iraq’s government commensurate with their numbers. Increased
Shi’i identity may well translate into a demand for a
Shi’i-dominated government, which would change fundamentally the
dispensation of power in Baghdad.
The problem for the Shi’ah will be translating this potential
vision into reality. As yet, they have no indigenous leadership or
organization that effectively represents their interests. The best-known
Shi’i group is SCIRI (the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq), which has at least a recognized leadership, an
administrative hierarchy, and some irregular military forces (the Badr
Brigade). These, however, are all situated outside Iraq, mainly in Iran.
How much support SCIRI can call on inside Iraq is a question. It can
probably count on a core constituency in such Shi’i strongholds as
the holy cities (al-Najaf, Karbala) and the marsh area (or what is left
of it), and underground in southern cities and towns. But these
supporters are probably a minority of the heterogeneous Shi’i
community; the ability of Shi’i groups like SCIRI to recruit
widespread support may be limited by their ties to Iran, their clerical
leadership, and their strong religious agenda.
Inside Iran, SCIRI has an elaborate organization, consisting of an
executive council of about fifteen, a larger assembly (a potential
parliament in exile), and a military wing of five to ten thousand
soldiers. While SCIRI does include some Kurds and Turkmen, the
overwhelming majority are Arab Shi’ah, some of Persian origin and
background. In 1982, when it was founded, SCIRI was an umbrella
organization for various Shi’i religio-political organizations,
including al-Da’wah (“The Call,” the original Iraqi
Shi’i party, founded as an underground movement in the late 1950s),
the Islamic Action Organization, SCIRI itself, and others; since then it
has mainly become a vehicle for Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, an ayatollah
from a well known Najaf clerical family.9
The base of the movement is mainly Iraqi Shi’i exiles in Iran,
whose numbers have been estimated at anywhere from 250,000 to a million
(the latter figure is probably too high). While some of these people are
poor refugees in camps along the border with Iraq, many others are
middle class and have integrated into Iran’s cities and towns. Many
of these would have to relocate to Iraq if Hakim was to have a base in
the country.
SCIRI suffers from several other drawbacks in addition to its foreign
location. The movement and its leadership have undergone a number of
splits, particularly over issues of Shi’i ideology—such as
support for Ayatollah Khumayni’s concept of the vilayat al-faqih
(rule by the Islamic jurist), now incorporated into the Iranian
government. The most pronounced difference has occurred with members of
the Da’wah, some of whom have retained a distance from SCIRI.
Factional fighting among followers of various clerical leaders has also
taken place. Far more important, however, has been SCIRI’s tie to
Iran, which has hurt Hakim’s movement in two ways. First,
Iran’s support (indeed, control and domination) of the movement has
been used by the regime to justify repression of the
Shi’ah—expulsion of Iraqi Shi’ah to Iran, especially
during the Iran-Iraq war; arrests and executions of Shi’i
activists; and gradual reduction of the mobility of Shi’ah into
government—as a result of which Shi’i ability to affect policy
and attitudes in the center has virtually disappeared. Second,
SCIRI’s ties to the adversary against which Iraq fought an
eight-year war has hurt the group’s potential for recruitment. It
is generally agreed that during the rebellion of 1991, when Shi’ah
raised banners displaying Hakim’s picture, a number of potential
recruits were alienated.
At the same time, SCIRI has not had the benefit of a strong outside
patron. Iran provides aid and support, but it is itself a weak and
politically fractured polity, not in a position to overthrow the regime
in Baghdad. SCIRI and other Iraqi Shi’i opponents of the regime
have complained (with justification) of too little help from Iran, which
has been far more concerned with its own national interests and with
preserving the peace along its border with Iraq.
The religious seminaries in al-Najaf and Karbala, the usual sources
of Shi’i leadership, have been greatly weakened by repression over
the last two decades. Attacks on Shi’i clerics and their followers
began in the mid-1970s and reached a climax in 1980 with the execution
of Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, a militant and popular Shi’i figure who
had been a founder of al-Da’wah in the late 1950s. Expulsions and
persecution continued during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1991, after the
Shi’i rebellion, the chief marja’ (religious
authority), Ayatollah Abu-l-Qasim al-Khu’i, was forcibly taken to
Baghdad, made to appear on television in support of the government, and
then put under virtual house arrest. This incident was followed in
subsequent years by the unexplained deaths of a succession of religious
leaders.10 The most recent (February 1999) was that of Muhammad
Sadiq al-Sadr, a chief marja’ who had been selected by the
regime for his “moderation” but who sealed his own fate when
he began to exercise real leadership on behalf of the Shi’i
community, generating widespread popularity. These executions and deaths
have stripped the community of religious leaders capable of organizing
opposition to the government. Under whatever circumstances, however,
clerical leadership has always been somewhat problematic for the
Shi’ah, since it mobilizes religious followers but tends to raise
anxiety among the secular Shi’i community, as well as among Sunnis,
Arab and Kurd, who fear sectarianism.
Tribal groups also represent a certain potential for leadership in
the Shi’i community (as is true for Arab Sunnis). In towns and
rural areas of the south, tribal ties have always been stronger than in
Baghdad, and in recent years the regime has strengthened tribal
leadership as a means of shoring up a failing local administration.
Tribal leaders who are loyal are rewarded with land, positions in the
military for their sons, and other favors. Many new clan and tribal
leaders have been appointed by the regime, to ensure their loyalty.
Nonetheless, as tribal leaders have been given more local authority and
opportunities to acquire wealth, they have used it to increase their
power and status—some might turn against the regime. In the 1991
rebellion, for example, a number of tribal leaders helped galvanize
their districts and communities, particularly in Hillah and
al-Diwaniyyah. But tribal leadership too is problematic. Traditionally,
tribes have been better at rebellion than at the construction of new
political formations. Their leaders collaborate across tribal and ethnic
lines only with difficulty. Moreover, tribal ties do not constitute a
desirable basis for a modern state.
Since 1991, the south has been the locus of sustained unrest. Roads
have been cut, government installations attacked, and on occasion riots
unleashed. Such events have been intermittent but a constant factor over
the decade.11 Neglect of the region and decline in its economy have
caused an outflow of its population; once Iraq’s second most
populous city, Basra is now fifth. This decline has produced resentment,
but it has not yet produced groups or leaders that can mobilize the
population. This growing alienation in the south from the
regime—and the Sunni center—may make cooperation more
difficult in any new regime.
In the Center
The geopolitical center of the country is focused on Baghdad, a
demographically mixed city, but it includes the predominantly Arab Sunni
cities along the Tigris River north to Mosul and the Euphrates west to
Syria—a zone often called the “Sunni triangle.”12 This central region has provided
the bulk of the leadership for Iraq, not only under the current regime
but under previous regimes as well. Never, however, has any regime been
as narrow in its base as the present one.13
Even if the top levels of the current regime are
removed, leadership at lower levels is likely to continue to come from
the center, which contains most of the Iraqis with the experience and
capacity to govern. Moreover, the center is most likely to provide new
political leadership at the top, if change is engineered from inside.
Aside from Saddam and his coterie, what are we likely to find
here?
The current regime rests on three pillars: the kinship network that
surrounds and supports Saddam; the institutions of party and state that
implement his orders; and a small economic elite that enjoys most of the
benefits of the state-controlled oil resources. It is within this nexus
that we must look for what we are likely to get if the regime is
replaced from inside.
Saddam himself refers to the first two pillars as, respectively,
ahl al-thiqah (the people of trust—that is, those on whom
one can rely for loyalty), and ahl al-khibrah (the people of
expertise—the technocrats and professional administrators). While
there is some overlap, these two groups are, for the most part, distinct
and separate.
The “people of trust” are drawn almost wholly from
Saddam’s kinship group, and it is to their kinship tie that they
owe their positions. At the top of the system is a thick network of
people from Saddam’s extended family and clan, the Albu Nasir, or
Bayjat.14 Much has been written on this phenomenon, which has
consistently grown over the last three decades but has reached an apogee
since the rebellion of 1991.15 Saddam’s own extended family, whether descendent
from his father (the Majids) or his stepfather (the Ibrahims) or his
uncle (the Talfahs), and now including his sons, has, during his long
tenure, occupied key posts in the security system and the Republican
Guard, helping to keep the regime in power. A system of marriages within
the clan has strengthened this extended family and its hold on power.
Allied with the Bayjat, for purposes of recruitment, are other Sunni
tribes and clans from the central area, among them the Ubayd, the Jubur,
and the Dulaym.16
This political structure, now solidified in Iraq, raises several
policy questions relating to “the day after.” First, while any
change must replace Saddam Husayn and his entire extended family, as
well as the secret police and the top of the security system, how much
of the clan network can be removed without bringing an end to law and
order—indeed, without a serious outbreak of retribution? In the
military as well, much of the clan network may remain, particularly if
new leadership emerges from the military. Second, if new political
leadership emerges as a result of a coup or a struggle within the
regime, will another clan or tribal group replace the Albu Nasir? How
much of the clan system will persist? Above all, how can the kin/clan
network be replaced with more modern institutions, open to all, and less
dependent on personal loyalty and ties? Whatever leadership comes to
power, the clan system, now deeply imbedded in key structures, will have
to be dealt with.
The ahl al-khibrah—the experts, technocrats, and educated
professionals—are much more numerous than the “people of
trust,” and they are to be found in the various institutions of
state. Chief among these are the Ba’th Party, the bureaucracy, the
educational establishment, and the military. While in a change of regime
the party itself is likely to collapse, many of its cadre would remain.
Much of the education establishment, including the elaborate university
system, would also endure, although much of its administration has been
“Ba’thized,” especially at the upper levels. The
bureaucracy, which together with the educational establishment employs
about 17 percent of the workforce (exclusive of the military), is the
repository of much of Iraq’s educated middle class, and it will
remain as the bulwark of government after any regime change.17
Iraq’s military, for its part, is a key repository of potential
leadership. Iraq has several militaries, not just one. The regular army,
greatly weakened by sanctions, is an old, pre-Ba’th institution
with some degree of independence and a sense of national identity. The
Republican Guard—smaller but more effective, and more carefully
recruited, trained, and vetted for loyalty—is presumed to be a main
base of regime support, but it could fracture in the event of a change.
The various special forces protecting the president and the members of
the regime would certainly disappear with Iraq’s leader.
The educated technocrats are also more mixed in background and more
reflective of Iraqi society as a whole than the ahl al-thiqah.
They include substantial numbers of Arab Shi’ah, as well as Kurds,
Turkmen, and urban Sunnis outside the clan system. What can be expected
of the “people of expertise”? One segment of this
class—in its middle to late forties or older—may be Western
educated, often in Britain or the United States. They are generally
secular and culturally Western. They are also likely to be energetic,
well disciplined, and competent managers and professionals. A second
layer of the bureaucracy, and a larger one, has been educated in Iraq.
Many have gone through the Saddam University system, which includes a
variety of faculties, from law and political science to medicine. While
regime loyalty is necessary for entrance, its students are drawn from
the best-performing high school graduates. The selection process
provides the best students a channel for upward mobility and gives the
regime competent apparatchiks and managers. Military officers, whether
regular or Republican Guard, are generally educated in Iraq; their
exposure to the English language and foreign environments may be more
limited than those of preceding generations. But officers, especially in
the regular army, represent a cross section of the Iraqi population, and
many do not identify with the regime.
While most of these professionals and technocrats will adapt to a new
order, a number are Ba’th party members and have imbibed a number
of attitudes inculcated in the last two or three decades that may be
difficult to change. As in the Soviet Union, the old ideology and
predilection for an authoritarian order may remain among the core.
The third pillar of support is a growing wealthy elite, sometimes
referred to as an “economic mafia.” This group includes
Shi’ah and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, most of whom owe their
positions to patronage from the regime, which controls the oil revenues
that flow through the state’s coffers. While this revenue has been
limited under sanctions, it has increased since the “oil for
food” program began to take effect at the end of 1996. Many members
of this elite are contractors and new entrepreneurs, but almost all are
dependent for their income on their relationships to the regime. While
some economic and financial expertise may reside in this group, it
cannot be expected to produce new political leadership.
Future political leadership from inside Iraq would more likely come
from the first two pillars and probably the second. Among Iraq’s
institutions it is the military—or even remnants of the Ba’th
Party—that is most likely to provide alternative leadership; it is
less likely that new political leaders would come from the bureaucracy
or the educational establishment, whose members have been more
accustomed to following orders than to leading. However, the presence of
competent, experienced administrators and military officers bodes well
for a transition. Once new political leadership is in place, the country
can be defended and an administration put in place.
However, should new leadership emerge from within this establishment,
questions would arise for the future. Could political leadership from
the center—most likely Arab Sunni—accommodate the pent-up
desires and aspirations of the Kurds and Shi’ah, and would it be
willing to cede to them appropriate shares of power? Will such a
leadership be trusted by other communities? And would it be able to
establish control over the country, or would it face rivals for power?
If the leadership were military, additional problems of civil-military
relations would arise; few Iraqis want the return of military rule,
which in the 1960s brought instability, coups, and dictatorship.
A second set of questions relates to the degree of change a new
centrist leadership would bring, particularly with respect to policies
of concern to the United States. Would a new military leader be
willing—and able—to forgo the entire Iraqi WMD program and
still maintain the support of the armed forces? How far would such a
leadership go to accommodate the United States and the West, after
decades of hostile propaganda from the regime, as well as actual
hostilities and a decline due to sanctions? U.S. support for the
regime—in the short term—would be essential for its survival.
Above all, political attitudes and practices, acquired under an
authoritarian—indeed, a totalitarian—regime might be difficult
to change, especially in the short term. The political nature of the
regime and its willingness to be inclusive will affect the degree of
U.S. support for it.
The “Outside” Opposition
Unlike potential leaders in Iraq, “outside” opposition
leaders can be clearly identified and are fairly well known, especially
to U.S. policy makers; the key actors are briefly described below. Over
the past decade, many of them have been exercising political leadership
among the Iraqi exile community and within key constituencies of Western
governments. Their views and their disputes are public—because, of
course, they are operating in an open, Western environment.
The flaws of this outside opposition are also clear and need not be
elaborated on here. First, of course, is their fragmentation and their
inability to cooperate, even among like-minded groups. While some, like
the Shi’i religious organizations and the Iraq Communist Party,
have mutually exclusive agendas that make real collaboration difficult,
even moderate, middle-of-the-road groups, such as the Iraqi National
Congress and the Iraqi National Accord, have been unable to bury
personal and political rivalries to cooperate constructively.
Collaboration across ethnic and sectarian lines (the Kurdish parties
with SCIRI, for example) has been difficult. While all agree on the need
for regime change, none yet agrees on the formula for replacement.
(These deep-seated differences may be a good reflection of the kind of
struggle that may ensue “the day after.”)
The second problem with the outside opposition is the degree of
support they command inside Iraq, and among which constituencies. If
they should return to Iraq, would they be able to mobilize support from
a sufficiently large political spectrum to maintain stability? Or does
their present fragmentation presage a future struggle for power,
spreading instability, even a collapse of the central government? The
regime in Baghdad has charged that many opposition leaders have been
outside Iraq for so long that they have no ties with anyone inside. It
is a fact that once out of the country, it is difficult to continue
regular contacts within Iraq, let alone engage in political
mobilization. The Kurdish parties are on Iraqi territory, but support
beyond their own areas is limited. It is worth noting that the
opposition inside faces the same dilemma.
The Iraqi National Congress. The INC, headed by Ahmed
Chalabi, is the best known of the opposition groups in the West. Founded
in 1992 as an umbrella group, it originally included the two Kurdish
parties, the Iraq Communist Party (ICP), some Arab nationalist
groupings, and, at least nominally, SCIRI, as well as various
individuals and smaller bodies. A number of opposition groups continue
to belong to the INC, but most have since gone their own ways, leaving
the INC primarily a vehicle for Chalabi and his supporters.
Chalabi’s strength lies in his intellect (he is a graduate of MIT
and the University of Chicago, a former mathematics professor and
banker) and his political skill and tenacity in lobbying for support in
the West, especially within the American political system.18 For a time he tried to put down
roots in northern Iraq. However, he has alienated many leaders who
resent his attempts to keep the strings of power in his own hands. He
has also been controversial in American policy circles. The main
question with Chalabi and the INC is whether it can command support
inside Iraq.
The Constitutional Monarchy Movement. The
Constitutional Monarchy Movement, now attached to the INC, is headed by
Sharif ‘Ali bin al-Husayn, one of the few surviving members of the
Hashimite royal family of Iraq.19 Raised and educated in the United Kingdom, he has
proposed a liberal, parliamentary regime in which, if chosen by the
population, he would play the role of a constitutional monarch. There is
in fact nostalgia among Iraqis for the Hashimite period, seen in
retrospect as more moderate and democratic than its successor regimes,
but it is not clear how much support this option would enjoy inside Iraq
“the day after.”
The KDP and PUK. The two Kurdish parties have already
been dealt with. Both the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan are legitimate political parties, with leaderships,
organizations, and irregular military forces at their disposal. In the
summer of 2002, they were variously estimated to number from forty to
seventy thousand, altogether. They are already “on the ground”
in Iraq, controlling between them, as noted, about 10 percent of Iraqi
territory. They would have to supply the backbone of any domestic
military move to oust Saddam Husayn and would seek to have significant
roles in formulating a new political order in Iraq, as well as in a
replacement leadership. But their aspirations—and ability—to
lead regime change in an Arab Iraq are marginal, although they could
hold the balance of power in a new government.
The PUK, under Jalal Talabani, has given more evidence of a
willingness to cooperate with other groups in overthrowing the regime
than has Mas’ud Barzani and the KDP, which is reluctant to upset
the status quo without guarantees from the United States and assured
American protection. The rivalry between these two parties, though
currently submerged, could flare up again over any new allocation of
power after a regime change.
SCIRI. The main base of the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq is outside Iraq, within the large
exile community in Iran, many members of which may wish to return to
Iraq and would need to be integrated. SCIRI’s actual support for
change, its contribution to military operations through the Badr
Brigade, and the extent of its cooperation with the United States would
be largely determined by Iran. How much actual support it would get from
Shi’ah inside Iraq is a major unknown, given its affiliation with
Iran and its strong support for the concept of an Islamic republic in
Iraq. Although SCIRI has verbally espoused a democratic regime in Iraq,
its long commitment to Islamic Shi’i causes worry for some Iraqi
Sunnis and many secular Shi’ah. Hakim, its leader, may have a role
to play in a new government, but installing him as the leader of such a
government would be counterproductive in the extreme.
The Iraqi National Accord. The INA, formed in 1990, is
a centrist organization composed mainly of dissident Ba’thists who
have broken with the party. The INA, led today by Ayyad Alawi, a
neurosurgeon, a Shi’i, and a former Ba’thist, has attracted a
number of members who played a role in the regime and its military in
the 1970s and 1980s. This group claims to have an “insider”
understanding of the regime, as well as continuing contacts with
military and civilians who work for the regime but are committed to its
replacement. However, an attempted coup in 1996, with U.S. support,
failed because the INA had been penetrated by Saddam’s agents and
supporters. As before, it is not clear how many levers the INA can pull,
or whether a group with previous ties to the regime would find support
in the country as a whole.
Defecting Army Officers. The opposition in
recent years has been joined by a number of defecting military officers,
including generals. Chief among these are Nizar al-Khazraji, former army
chief of staff; Wafiq al-Samarra’i, former chief of military
intelligence; and Najib al-Salihi, former Republican Guard commander.
They and others have formed several opposition associations. A number of
these officers aspire to head a new, centrist regime, but most are
cooperating with civilian groups, such as the INC, and with the U.S.
government. While all these defectors claim to have important contacts
in Iraq, the degree to which they could sway military units is a
question. Outside, their organization is still weak, and they have yet
to win Western support for the dominant roles to which they aspire.
Their military backgrounds, while an advantage in terms of leadership
skills, may prove a liability with respect to civilian support,
especially from Kurds and Shi’ah.
The Iraq Communist Party. One group that has not
received much notice from the West is the ICP, one of the oldest and
best organized opposition groups in Iraq. Outlawed in Saddam’s
Iraq, the ICP now has members abroad, especially in Syria and in Western
and Eastern Europe. It may survive underground inside Iraq, but little
has been heard from it in recent years, aside from remnants in the
north, where they have some Kurdish supporters and are allowed to
operate. The ICP organization is small and weak inside Iraq, and the
party lost its patronage with the collapse of the USSR. However,
leftist, even Marxist, views are popular in Iraq in intellectual
circles, and they appeal to Kurdish and Shi’i dissidents, as well
as the lower classes, which have grown in recent years with sanctions.
The party’s anti-Western, anti-imperialist stand has prevented it
from taking part in U.S.-supported opposition activities. In a “day
after” scenario it could emerge as a significant intellectual
force, but not one likely to condone a Western-oriented regime or
support U.S. aims in Iraq. The same can be said for a number of smaller
nationalist and leftist opposition groups, situated in Syria, that are
unlikely to play a role in a U.S.-sponsored regime change.
The Policy Dilemma
As this brief survey of the outside opposition indicates, the major
problem with exile groups lies in the fact that they would have to be
put in power by the United States, and probably maintained there by
American forces if they are to survive until a new constitutional regime
can be established. With the exception of the Kurds, who cannot take
over Baghdad on their own, the opposition’s leadership and
organization is outside Iraq. While some groups could generate domestic
support if they were placed in power under U.S. forces, how much and in
which constituencies remain in question. They would have to contend with
forces, institutions, and individuals already in place and desirous of
maintaining their positions in the hierarchy. In short, putting the
outside opposition in power in Iraq would require the occupation of the
country. Invasion and occupation of Iraq is the most costly policy
option for the United States, not only in military and economic terms
but politically as well. In time, even Iraqis who initially greet the
change of regime with relief and delight would turn against a foreign
occupying force. Regional states would do so even earlier. The level of
military support would have to be carefully calibrated—enough to
sustain the new regime but not enough to generate increased
anti-American sentiment in the region. Such feeling would impede the war
on terrorism.
Although installation of the outside opposition is the most costly
scenario for the United States, it is the option most likely to effect
genuine change in Iraq over the long term. The exile opposition is the
most Westernized Iraqi community; it is most likely to agree to
eliminate WMD and reorient foreign policy in a productive way. It has
also had the most extensive exposure to democracy and hence is most
capable of leading a transformation of the system in that direction.
By contrast, a change of regime from inside Iraq is the least costly
option for the United States. Such a change is likely, at least
initially, to bring a centrist regime. This kind of change could be
induced in a number of ways—most of which must remain speculative.
American pressure, including military, could cause the regime to crack
and important elements inside it to turn against Saddam, to prevent an
invasion and to assure survival of the regime in some form. Regime
change could also be brought about by military action from the United
States, including forces on the ground. The United States could then
select a provisional local council from among forces inside Iraq,
necessarily relying heavily on technocrats and others with experience in
administration. How to select such a group and on what basis is one of
the major uncertainties with this option. If the regime is overturned
without U.S. troops on the ground, Washington will have little control
over the sequel.
Any change from the center is likely to replicate the current
distribution of power, with heavy reliance on the Arab Sunni population
and on the military and bureaucratic institutions that currently run the
country. Such a regime is less likely to bring real change. If the
military played an important role in the regime, several questions would
arise. Would it be willing to relinquish all weapons of mass
destruction? Would it be friendly to the United States and willing to
reorient foreign policy in a Western direction, or would nationalism
resurface? Above all, would such a regime be able to stabilize itself
without the assistance of U.S. forces? Would it be more inclusive of
Kurds and Shi’ah, more open and democratic? Infusing such a system
with perhaps four or five thousand people from the vast Iraqi exile
community who had been persuaded to return, even if temporarily, would
help set the transformation on a desirable path. But these outsiders
would have to be welcome to the new centrist regime.
In general, any change from inside Iraq will probably have to rely on
the second tier of leaders, military and civilian, now in place. The new
regime would have, first of all, to establish a modicum of stability in
and control over the country—a difficult task. It would have to
incorporate more Kurds and Shi’ah into the central government, to
provide this stability. It would have to accommodate the aims and goals,
especially on WMD and foreign policy, for which the United States would
have spent so much political, diplomatic, and even military capital.
In the end, how much support a new leadership has inside Iraq
may not be the most important question facing the opposition but rather
how much it has from the United States. The primary American interest in
regime change is an end to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and to its
hostile behavior. A more democratic government is an important, but
secondary, consideration. From the perspective of the United States, the
fall of the current regime may be the easiest part of the undertaking.
Replacing Saddam’s regime with a new leadership that is willing and
able to satisfy U.S. strategic demands may prove costly, and it may
require a long-term American presence on the ground. The United States
may be about to learn that “empire” cannot be achieved on the
cheap.
Notes
1. As is
well known, Iraq is a multiethnic, multisectarian country. The three
main communities consist of the Arab Sunnis (15–20 percent of the
population), who inhabit Baghdad and the cities and towns of the Tigris
and Euphrates north and west of the capital; the Arab Shi’ah (over
60 percent), who inhabit Baghdad (a Shi’i-majority city) and the
territory south to Basra; and the Kurds (about 17 percent), who inhabit
the mountains and plains of the northwest. Iraq also has sizable
minorities of Turkmen and various Christian minorities.
2. The PUK
has contested control over this area, but its authority is weak. The
region has been under strong Islamic influence; there have been numerous
press reports of hostile foreign groups penetrating the region (see the
Washington Post, 21 August 2002). On 2 April 2002, Barham Salih,
the PUK’s prime minister, was nearly assassinated and a number of
his bodyguards were killed, presumably by these forces.
3. These
conditions have been frequently described by visiting journalists in the
past four or five years, and they were observed by the author during
visits to the region in 1992, 1993, and especially 1998.
4. During
the rebellion of 1991, despite some cooperation with other opposition
parties, the Kurdish parties were not willing to sacrifice their own
aims or extend their control beyond the Kurdish area.
5. In 1995
and 1996, the PUK cooperated with the Iraq National Congress (INC) in
failed military attempts to overthrow the regime, an indication of PUK
willingness at that time to go beyond Kurdish aims.
6. The 1991
rebellion broke out in Basra in February and March, in the wake of the
Persian Gulf War. Violence, especially among the Shi’i population,
spread to other cities, including Baghdad, and inspired a parallel
uprising in the Kurdish north. Iraqi forces brutally quelled the
uprising in the following months, first in the south, then in the
Kurdish zone.
7.
Published statement of the Tribal Alliance of Iraq, 5 May 2002
(photocopy furnished to author).
8. The
origin and nature of the Ansar is not clear. The PUK accuses it of ties
to al-Qa‘ida. Associated Press, Ankara, Turkey, 29 April 2002.
9.
Hakim’s father was Muhsin al-Hakim, the chief marja’
from 1955 to 1970.
10. A son
of al-Khu’i, Muhammad Taqi, was killed in 1994. In 1998, two senior
clerics were killed—Ayatollah Shaykh Murthdha-l-Burujardi in April,
and Grand Ayatollah Shaykh Mirza ‘Ali al-Ghawari in June.
11. For
example, there were clashes between government and opposition forces in
the Basra province in August 1996 and in April 1997. In 1998 Vice
President Izzat al-Din Ibrahim was nearly assassinated in Karbala, and
in 1999 there were attacks on Ba’th Party headquarters in Basra in
April, and on a Republican Guard unit in May. ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid,
one of the regime’s henchmen, was finally
put in charge of
security in the south—temporarily.
12. These
areas include the provinces of Baghdad, Ramadi, Nineveh, Anbar,
Salah-al-Din, and Diyala.
13. For
example, of the seventeen members of the Regional Command of the Party
elected after the 1991 rebellion, thirteen were Arab Sunni; there were
only three Shi’ah, and one Christian. Geographically, twelve were
from the “Sunni triangle” in the center, one from Baghdad;
only four were from the rest of Iraq, excluding the area under Kurdish
control. Isam al-Khafaji, “State Terrorism and the Degradation of
Politics,” in Iraq since the Gulf War, ed. Fran Hazelton
(London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 28–9.
14.
Technically, the Albu Nasir is Saddam’s tribe, and the Bayjat his
clan. In practice the two are virtually interchangeable.
15. See,
for example, Amatzia Baram, Building toward Crises (Washington,
D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), chap. 2; and
Faleh A. Jabbar, From Storm to Thunder (Tokyo: Institute for
Developing Economies, 1998), chap. 1.
16. One
author has posed a hierarchy of clans in the current power structure,
with the Bayjat on top, followed by the Tikritis, the Duris, and various
clans from Anbar Province, Samarra’, and the Juburis. Jabbar, p. 6.
17. Ibid.,
p. 12.
18. Chalabi
is under a cloud in Jordan for allegations of banking fraud stemming
from his previous management of the family banking business.
19. He is a
maternal cousin of Faysal II, the last king of Iraq, killed when the
monarchy was overthrown in 1958.
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