CIAO DATE: 01/2015
Volume: 20, Issue: 1
March 2013
EDITOR'S NOTE (PDF)
Stephen I. Schwartz
As this year marks our twentieth anniversary, it is perhaps worth pausing to reflect for a moment how the world has changed since the Nonproliferation Review first appeared in 1993.
Twenty years ago, the Cold War was still a fresh memory, not a distant one. We were very concerned about ‘‘loose nukes'' and the Nunn-Lugar program to safeguard and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and related materiel in former Soviet states was in its infancy. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan had each inherited thousands of nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union collapsed. It would be several years before all those weapons were repatriated to Russia and all three newly independent states joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Contributors (PDF)
CORRESPONDENCE (PDF)
Stephanie Lieggi, Richard Butler AC
Justin Hastings's analysis (‘‘The Geography of Nuclear Proliferation Networks: The Case of A.Q. Khan,'' 19.3, November 2012, pp. 42950) provides a unique look at the workings of the A.Q. Khan network by examining the trafficking linkages from a geographic perspective. Previous research on Khan and related Pakistani procurement networks has primarily focused on the shifts in the network's operations by comparing activities related to the importer stage (when the aim was to build Pakistan's nuclear program) and the exporter stage (when the aim was to supply customers outside of Pakistan).
IRAN AND THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD: Where is the Line? (PDF)
Jacques E.C. Hymans, Matthew S. Gratias
This article clarifies and evaluates the intellectual underpinnings of the respective military red lines that Western leaders have drawn against Iran's developing nuclear program: (1) the red line of ‘‘no Iranian nuclear weapon''*the stance that has been embraced by President Barack Obama* and (2) the red line of ‘‘no Iranian nuclear weapons capability''*the stance that has been embraced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and many prominent American Iran hawks. We contend that the key intellectual divide between these stances is that the Netanyahu view implicitly assumes that a ‘‘significant quantity'' (SQ) of highly enriched uranium is essentially equivalent to a bomb because an explosive nuclear test is technically unnecessary, whereas the Obama view implicitly assumes that if and when Iran gets to the point of being technically and psychologically ready to assemble a nuclear weapons arsenal, it will conduct a test. We show through theoretical and empirical analysis that the likelihood that Iran will choose an ‘‘Israelistyle'' policy of creating an arsenal of untested but operational nuclear bombs is very low. Therefore, Obama's red line is more intellectually defensible than Netanyahu's.
HOW THE UNITED STATES HELPED IRAN BUILD A LASER ENRICHMENT LABORATORY (PDF)
Anton Khlopkov
In the spring of 1975, Iran became one of the first states to begin comprehensive research into using lasers for uranium isotope separation. As part of that research, the government sought the expertise of Jeff Eerkens, a leading American specialist in the field. This investigative article tells the story of their relationship: how it began, how it developed, and how it ended, drawing extensively from the authors' personal interviews with Eerkens as well as numerous publications and other interviews.
EXPLORING THE NEXT GENERATION OF PROLIFERATORS Why Venezuela Is Not the Next Iran (PDF)
Patrick Homan
This theoretical analysis explores which countries might constitute the next generation of nuclear proliferators, using Venezuela as a case study of one of the possible next nuclear weapon states. Three alternative theoretical frameworks or models are used to analyze the preconditions that might or might not drive Venezuela to pursue nuclear weapons in the near future. This study finds that there is little evidence to support the alarmist claims surrounding a future Venezuelan nuclear weapons program. These findings are important for both devising an accurate US national security strategy for identifying and combating the next generation of proliferators and also for implementing effective policies for the future of US-Latin American relations.
Arturo C. Sotomayor
Latin American countries have historically followed different paths and logics toward the nonproliferation regime. Some states have unconditionally advocated for global and nonproliferation efforts, while others have vehemently opposed such measures or remained ambivalent toward the regime itself. By historically comparing two of Latin America's most influential countries—Brazil and Mexico—this study identifies the underlying domestic conditions and external influences that explain their differences in behavior and policy toward the nonproliferation regime. Because little is known about the reasons why different Latin American countries adopt these different approaches, the purpose of this article is to resolve this problem, primarily by focusing on the ways in which evolving civil-military relations and US influence have shaped nonproliferation policy preferences in Latin America. It concludes with a discussion of how these historical cases might shed light on current nonproliferation policies in Latin America.
ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT Why the Obama Plan Won't Work (PDF)
Andrew Futter, Benjamin Zala
The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defense posture. However, such a strategy is fundamentally flawed because increases in US conventional superiority will exacerbate US relative strength vis-à-vis other powers, and therefore make the prospect of a nuclear weapon-free world seem less attractive to Washington's current and potential nuclear rivals. Consequently, it is highly likely that the impact of efforts to increase US advanced conventional superiority through ballistic missile defense and a conventional “prompt global strike” program will ensure that the Obama administration is adopting a pathway to nuclear abolition on which it is the sole traveler for the foreseeable future.
BUSTING OUT Iranian Public Opinion Toward the NPT (PDF)
C. Christine Fair, William Miller, Karl Kaltenthaler
This report explores Iranian popular opinion on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the determinants of Iranian attitudes. Using data from a 2008 survey of 710 Iranians administered by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes, we find that that a significant minority of Iranians (10 percent in 2006 and 14 percent in 2008) would prefer that Iran withdraw from the NPT. Our statistical analysis shows that Iranians who fear a US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and distrust the International Atomic Energy Agency are more likely to want to quit the NPT. We therefore argue that those who do not trust other nations are most likely to oppose the NPT.
IMPLEMENTING A WMD-FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: Track-two Insights on the Technical Dimensions (PDF)
Benjamin Bonin, Amir Mohagheghi, Michael Yaffe
The goal of establishing a Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) is shared in principle by all governments in the region. Political and strategic realities continue to make achievement of that goal elusive. For the past three years, the authors have participated in track-two discussions on the technical implementation parameters of a zone. The discussions brought together policy and technology experts from throughout the region, with an initial focus on biological arms control challenges. The interactions have yielded important insights, not only on specific technical issues, but also on how regional and global policy-making communities might move forward on advancing the broader WMDFZ question. This report provides an overview of the discussions, including the authors' insights and recommendations.
GLOBALIZING REAGAN'S INF TREATY: Easier Done Than Said? (PDF)
David A. Cooper
When it was concluded more than a quarter century ago, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was hailed as a disarmament watershed, eliminating entire classes of nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the arms-racing Cold War superpowers. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated calls to convert this legacy treaty into a new international norm against nuclear and missile proliferation by broadening it into a global prohibition on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Indeed, variations on this proposal have been knocking around for so long and with so little success that the entire concept has come to be dismissed by many knowledgeable insiders as something of a farce. Looking beyond its inauspicious pedigree, however, this viewpoint suggests that the time is opportune for Washington to give the idea a fresh look. Drawing on a detailed review of the history of “Global INF” and an analysis of the contemporary context, the author recommends that the Obama administration consider a simple declaratory approach that promises modest initial benefits, avoids previous and foreseeable pitfalls, and plausibly lays a solid foundation for achieving significant long-term progress.
COURTING THE GLOBAL SOUTH WITH "DUAL-BENEFIT" NONPROLIFERATION ENGAGEMENT (PDF)
Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenäs
President Barack Obama and an array of other Western leaders continue to assert that the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-state actors is one of most pressing challenges to global security today. Yet, Western efforts to engage governments—particularly governments across the global South—in a practical nonproliferation dialogue have largely yielded disappointing results. This viewpoint examines the need for a new strategy to engage the developing world in nonproliferation programs. It argues that strategies focused strictly on WMD nonproliferation are unsustainable, and ultimately are destined for failure. An alternative “dual-benefit” nonproliferation engagement strategy utilizes the enlightened self-interest of partner governments needed to achieve broad-based buy-in among all partners. In a concluding section, we recommend that the “Group of 8” Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction standardize this model of nonproliferation engagement as it sets out to identify and fund WMD nonproliferation capacity-building initiatives beyond the states of the former Soviet Union.
GREAT POWER RESPONSIBILITY AND NUCLEAR ORDER (PDF)
Tanya Ogilvie-White
A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order, by William Walker. Routledge, 2012. 247 pages, $42.95.
ATOMS FOR PEACE: Catalyzing Bombs for Cheats (PDF)
Henry Sokolski
Atomic Assistance: How "Atoms for Peace" Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity, by Matthew Fuhrmann, Cornell University Press, 2012, 344 pages, $29.95.