


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VIEWPOINTS

GLOBALIZING REAGAN'S INF TREATY

Easier Done Than Said?

David A. Cooper

When it was concluded more than a quarter century ago, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was hailed as a disarmament watershed, eliminating entire classes of nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the arms-racing Cold War superpowers. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated calls to convert this legacy treaty into a new international norm against nuclear and missile proliferation by broadening it into a global prohibition on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Indeed, variations on this proposal have been knocking around for so long and with so little success that the entire concept has come to be dismissed by many knowledgeable insiders as something of a farce. Looking beyond its inauspicious pedigree, however, this viewpoint suggests that the time is opportune for Washington to give the idea a fresh look. Drawing on a detailed review of the history of "Global INF" and an analysis of the contemporary context, the author recommends that the Obama administration consider a simple declaratory approach that promises modest initial benefits, avoids previous and foreseeable pitfalls, and plausibly lays a solid foundation for achieving significant long-term progress.

KEYWORDS: Nonproliferation; disarmament; ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; nuclear weapons; Missile Technology Control Regime; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

"We now need a new taboo against testing, developing and deploying medium-range missiles. What was permissible needs to become deplorable."
—Kenneth L. Adelman, former Reagan administration director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, September 2009¹

"The relaxation in US-Russia nuclear tensions ought rightly to be viewed as an opportunity to try to 'globalize' arms control treaties—arguably the single most stabilizing thing that could happen in East Asia would be to limit Chinese intermediate-range missiles."
—Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute, June 2012²

Have you heard the one about the perennial disarmament-*cum*-nonproliferation proposal that never gets any respect? Rodney Dangerfield, meet "Global INF."

The idea seems straightforward and compelling. Why not try to prevent the accelerating proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, simply by broadening the scope of a Cold War treaty that eliminated US and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) so as to morph it into a modern global anti-missile norm? With Washington and Moscow

having entirely forsworn the possession, development, or testing of medium-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles for more than a quarter century, why not provide a ready and legally-binding means to induce others to follow suit? Or, put in more cantankerous terms, why should the United States and its erstwhile adversary from last century remain the only major powers on the planet that are permanently barred from having these types of missiles in their arsenals, especially when an alarming number of other countries are developing, modernizing, and deploying them apace, with rising peer-rival China leading the pack?

Why indeed. Proponents for internationalizing the INF Treaty have been posing questions along these lines since almost before the ink was dry on the original bilateral agreement signed by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on December 8, 1987. Led most prominently by the Reagan administration's former disarmament tsar, Kenneth L. Adelman, a small band of advocates has been pressing the case to broaden INF for more than two decades. Although the idea recently has attracted a smattering of new support, it has not sparked any real buzz of interest within the wider disarmament and nonproliferation communities. As for official Washington, this proposal has not been seriously considered since it was soundly rejected early in the Bill Clinton administration. In fact, other than a single reluctant and fleeting gesture of support in the waning year of the George W. Bush administration (more on this anon), eschewing Global INF stands out as something of an enduring bipartisan consensus.

Despite this unpromising history, the present viewpoint argues that the concept of Global INF merits a fresh look. It begins with a detailed historical survey suggesting that: 1) a string of bad luck, bad timing, and poorly conceived policy options—compounded by the association with entirely more problematic proposals—has unfairly tarred the underlying concept; and, 2) many of the understandable concerns that derailed prior consideration no longer apply in the contemporary context. It then offers a forward-looking assessment positing that most of the lingering potential concerns about Global INF could be allayed by avoiding what would inevitably be a thorny multilateral negotiating process, and that this could easily be achieved through the simple expedient of the United States and Russia declaring the existing treaty open for others to join on a “take it or leave it” basis. The analysis concludes that such a declaratory initiative could quickly produce tangible, albeit initially modest, security benefits for the United States and the wider international community—benefits that could then be built upon over time—with little risk and at modest cost. The article concludes by noting the immediate political payoffs that launching a Global INF initiative along these lines could provide to President Obama as low-hanging disarmament fruit in his second term.

Failure(s) to Launch: Overcoming a Checkered Past

More than two decades of sporadic stumbles have earned Global INF the reputation of an essentially bad idea that inexplicably refuses to go away. The question is whether this unpropitious heritage reflects inherent flaws in the basic concept, or instead stems from contingent factors such as bad luck or timing, guilt-by-association with cognate proposals,

or poorly conceived policy options; and if some combination of the latter, then is there any reason to suppose that similar snares could be avoided if the proposal were revived? Answering these questions necessarily requires understanding the considerable historical baggage that Global INF has accumulated.

The INF Treaty took the better part of a decade to negotiate. It came into force, however, just in time to be made largely irrelevant when the collapse of the Soviet Union abruptly ended the nuclear arms race that the treaty had been intended to mitigate. It bans all possession, testing, development, or deployment of shorter- and intermediate-range (500 to 5,500 kilometers) ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. Remaining in force indefinitely, it still applies only to the United States and now four Soviet successor states (Russia, along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine).³ The total elimination of its proscribed classes of missiles was long ago completed through a process that was verified by a complex set of intrusive monitoring procedures that eventually expired in 2001.

So why have we *not* tried to expand it? This notion was first floated by the Soviets at the summit meeting where the treaty was concluded.⁴ Moscow's suggestion did not garner much interest in the final year of the Reagan administration, however, and the proposal was not explored by the interagency bureaucracy until the transition period for the incoming George H.W. Bush administration.⁵ But when the new administration took up consideration of Global INF as part of a wider review of arms control and nonproliferation issues, the idea quickly found an eager bureaucratic champion in the person of a new assistant director at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) named Kathleen Bailey. Overseeing the agency's nonproliferation portfolio, she directed her staff to develop a draft Global INF treaty for the administration to consider as a proposal to serve as a basis for new international negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. However, this initiative met with stiff internal resistance. Other agencies were concerned that launching global missile treaty negotiations could provide an opportunity for hostile states to subvert a nascent, and at the time extremely controversial, multilateral export control mechanism, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). According to one study, "Because all agencies staunchly opposed the idea and it was never strongly backed by top echelons within ACDA, the Bailey proposal never received serious consideration."⁶

As Bailey was busy promoting Global INF within the Bush administration, Kenneth L. Adelman, President Reagan's former high-profile ACDA chief, decided to champion the idea publicly in a widely noticed *Washington Times* opinion article in April 1989.⁷ He was echoed a year later by Bailey herself, who published a similar article in the *Washington Post* soon after leaving government.⁸ Both former Republican disarmament officials stressed the need for a new global treaty in order to address the growing threat posed by missile proliferation, asserting that the MTCR, as a voluntary supply-side cartel, was insufficient to prevent this burgeoning menace. Adelman reprised this case in the editorial pages of the *New York Times* with renewed urgency after a series of Iraqi missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf War brought heightened public awareness of missile proliferation threats, and yet again the next year in the *Washington Times*.⁹ While stressing the proliferation threats that they envisioned Global INF addressing, however, none of these short commentary pieces delved into any details of the raft of nettlesome issues that might be expected to bedevil

the scheme, including, for example: how to adapt highly complex and inherently bilateral verification measures to a global context; how to deal with predictable demands from Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries and others to abolish the “discriminatory” MTCR as a quid pro quo for joining consensus on any global missile treaty, as well as calls to expand the scope of any new or adapted treaty to capture non-ground-launched intermediate-range missile systems, such as the US Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) in order to make it a truly fair and “nondiscriminatory” arrangement;¹⁰ or, how to reconcile negotiating a global missile ban with the widespread international support that existed for the right of all states to develop and possess civilian space launch vehicles (SLVs) that are technically nearly indistinguishable from offensive ballistic missiles other than in their peaceful intended use. Adelman and Bailey effectively punted such devilish details to prospective CD negotiations, where they vaguely hoped an “INF-type accord” could “build on” the original treaty, possibly based on a draft text that Washington and Moscow could jointly introduce.

Meanwhile, after Bailey’s departure from ACDA in early 1990, the agency quickly pivoted to a stripped-down approach designed to avoid the many pitfalls that the interagency bureaucracy feared from multilateral missile negotiations. Rather than seeking to negotiate an entirely new treaty, or even the more modest goal of modifying INF, the Bush administration mulled inviting other countries simply to accede to the existing INF Treaty.¹¹ By way of providing an incentive to join, ACDA proposed that Washington facilitate technical assistance for the civilian SLV programs of Global INF signatories, loosely mimicking the underlying “atoms for peace” bargain of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with a parallel “rockets for peace” variation. This initiative foundered on vigorous opposition to the “rockets for peace” aspect of the scheme, especially by the Pentagon. Department of Defense (DOD) experts were concerned that by conferring legitimacy on indigenous civilian SLV programs, Global INF would overtly undercut the MTCR, which does not distinguish between SLVs and offensive missiles because of the nearly total interchangeability of the underlying technologies.¹² Thus, providing SLV assistance under the auspices of Global INF would necessitate violating MTCR rules, requiring the export control regime to be fundamentally renegotiated or abandoned altogether. At least outside of ACDA, this was not seen as a worthwhile tradeoff. These concerns led the Bush administration formally to reject the ACDA proposal in September 1990.¹³

By early 1993, however, the stage seemed set for Global INF to audition for another act. The *dénouement* of the Cold War, the growing concern about proliferation in the wake of revelations from UN weapons inspectors in Iraq, and perhaps most importantly, the arrival of a Democratic administration open to new ideas and hankering to make its own mark in the disarmament sphere, all seemed to augur favorably for reconsidering Global INF.

Oh! Canada!

Sensing an opportunity, the Canadians, always indefatigable entrepreneurs in the cause of disarming others, decided to seize the moment to seek a new global missile treaty. Even as

the new Clinton administration was sorting out its thinking on various arms control and nonproliferation issues, Ottawa called on its MTCR partners—at a special meeting convened in Interlaken, Switzerland, in late 1993 that had been intended to chart the long-term future of the still fledgling regime—collectively to propose an internationally negotiated ban on medium-range missiles, complete with intrusive verification and the codification of a legal right to develop and possess civilian SLVs.¹⁴ This precipitous initiative would prove to be a diplomatic blunder. According to one reliable account:

The suggestion received a cool response from a majority of MTCR partners . . . who said they preferred to strengthen supply-side efforts. The MTCR's nuclear-weapon states [the United Kingdom, France, and the United States] were particularly hesitant to create another treaty that would be explicitly discriminatory, especially in light of the growing attention being directed toward the 1995 NPT Conference.¹⁵

By prematurely forcing the issue, as well as seriously overreaching with an overly ambitious proposal to negotiate a fundamentally new treaty rather than one explicitly derived from INF, Canada instigated a hardening of what had, up to that point, been an undetermined stance by the Clinton administration on the notion of Global INF. The departments of State and Commerce resolutely lined up with the DOD against the Canadian proposal. Even the nonproliferation bureau within ACDA, for years the principal advocate for Global INF, disavowed the Canadian approach.¹⁶ At the same time, by not having first sounded out Washington privately, Ottawa exacerbated the damage from provoking negative reactions from other key allies that lined up behind open US opposition.

Resistance to the Canadian initiative was predictable within MTCR circles. France had the most immediate cause for alarm, since at the time it relied on ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles as a mainstay of the *Force de Frappe*, its cherished independent nuclear deterrent. The United States also had reason to fear that multilateral missile negotiations would impact its own forces, despite having forsworn most medium-range missiles pursuant to INF. Washington's main concern was that multilateral negotiations would open the door to demands for a so-called "nondiscriminatory" treaty that would expand INF prohibitions to include longer or shorter range missiles, or intermediate-range air- or sea-launched systems.¹⁷ It was also taken as a virtual given within the US bureaucracy that achieving broad consensus for any multilateral missile treaty would ultimately necessitate exempting civilian SLV programs, thereby undermining the MTCR. This was a longstanding concern dating back to the formative MTCR negotiations in the early-to-mid-1980s, when the Reagan administration had rejected both exempting SLVs from MTCR controls and a push by its negotiating partners to propose the creation of a parallel global missile treaty to underpin the new export control arrangement.¹⁸ This concern had been greatly reinforced by an influential technical study from the RAND Corporation that had been released several months prior to the Canadian initiative, demonstrating not only that indigenous SLV programs would not be economically viable for developing states without external assistance, but also that it was not technically feasible to safeguard such programs against the risk of contributing to missile proliferation.¹⁹

In the aftermath of Canada's failed initiative, President Clinton's ACDA director, John Holum, very publicly tried to steer consideration back to Global INF per se. During Senate testimony in March 1994, he expressed support for creating a global missile ban by means of inviting all nations to assume the obligations of the INF Treaty.²⁰ Elaborating on this theme in a major policy speech, he stated, "We should consider opening up the basic obligations of the INF Treaty to every country in the world. This would invite, encourage, and press all countries to forego the threat of intermediate-range missiles, under global nonproliferation norms."²¹ In essence, Holum was dusting off the declaratory approach considered by the Bush administration subsequent to Kathleen Bailey's departure, only now stripped down even further by dropping any hint of SLV incentives. Holum's minimalist approach was clearly intended to refocus the administration's internal deliberations away from the unpopular Canadian initiative. Once again though, Washington's renewed consideration of Global INF was overtaken by the rambunctiousness its northern neighbor.

After the firm rebuff that they had received in Interlaken, one might have expected the Canadians to drop or at least scale back their unpopular MTCR proposal, but instead Ottawa decided to double down. Again without first consulting Washington, in early 1995, Canada circulated an expanded version of its previously rejected proposal, announcing that it would host a special "MTCR seminar" that summer at a resort near the CD in Geneva in order to consider and further refine the proposal in time for positive consideration at the next formal MTCR plenary meeting that autumn.²² In diplomatic terms, this amounted to a full-court press. In response, Washington circulated a sharply negative critique within the MTCR, enumerating an array of objections to the revised Canadian proposal. Undeterred, the Canadians pressed forward. This audacious gambit resulted in a singularly spectacular diplomatic debacle. During a day of bilateral consultations preceding the official start of the meeting, the Canadians discovered, to their chagrin, that the initiative enjoyed no support whatsoever. Consequently the "Montreux Seminar" opened with Canada formally withdrawing its own proposal. Delegates thus spent the next two days explaining to one another why pursuing a global missile treaty was a terrible idea.²³ The lasting repercussions of this fiasco are difficult to exaggerate. As a subsequent assessment dryly noted, "It was considered that this event 'soundly killed' the idea of directing missile technology non-proliferation efforts towards an international treaty."²⁴

Having finally squelched the Canadian proposal, the Clinton administration was well and truly done with any and all global missile treaty schemes, even within ACDA and certainly including Global INF as specific collateral damage. In the intervening years, this guilt-by-association dynamic for Global INF would become even more pronounced in the US bureaucratic imagination, as calls for a global missile instrument were taken up by two states with dubious missile proliferation track records, first the Russian Federation, and then, worse still, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Russia Takes the Initiative

Russia had been seen as a leading source for the proliferation of missile technology in the chaotic years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow took an important step to

rehabilitate this dodgy reputation by joining the MTCR in 1995, although it remained openly uncomfortable with the ad hoc character of this supply-side cartel operating without the normative underpinnings of an associated treaty framework. In June 1999, President Boris Yeltsin used a G-8 Summit to propose what he termed a Global Control System (GCS) for missiles.²⁵ The Russians envisioned GCS as an international grand bargain in which unspecified incentives would be offered in exchange for missile constraints, also not clearly spelled out but potentially ranging from greater transparency to some type of an outright ban.²⁶ Facing skepticism from the United States and others, Moscow unilaterally opted to convene a major international conference to create momentum for this idea.²⁷ In response to this Russian initiative, the Clinton administration concocted what amounted to a counterproposal within the MTCR, which was then carried forward by the incoming George W. Bush administration and eventually became the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOG). Implicit in the idea behind HCOG was to negotiate an acceptable alternative to GCS within the relatively friendly confines of the MTCR that could then be offered up to the rest of the world on a "take it or leave it" basis. The tactic proved highly successful, derailing GCS and co-opting Moscow and even a goodly number of moderate NAM states into HCOG. Harmless (a cynic might say feckless) by design, HCOG does not actually prohibit much of anything, but instead asks its now 134 subscribing governments to adhere to hortatory principles of restraint and transparency regarding the production and export of ballistic missiles.

With the successful launch of HCOG in November 2002, Washington declared victory and tried yet again to turn the page on talk of a global missile treaty. Iran, however, had other notions. Seeing overt US opposition to a legally-binding global missile instrument as an opportunity to score propaganda points by highlighting American hypocrisy in seeking to prevent itself and others from acquiring capabilities that were not prohibited under international law, Tehran—with overwhelming NAM support and European acquiescence—sponsored a series of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions to study this issue in 2002, 2004, and 2008. The outcomes of these assessments revealed deep divisions that confirmed longstanding US assumptions about the futility of trying to forge a broad international consensus on any global missile instrument on terms that Washington could even remotely contemplate supporting.²⁸

As Iranian posturing was playing out behind the scenes at the UN, Moscow dramatically revived world attention on Global INF as such, although in the most harshly negative context imaginable. In early 2005, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov had warned, seemingly in passing, that Russia might withdraw from INF unless it was internationalized.²⁹ Two years later, then and future President Vladimir Putin significantly upped the ante by reiterating this threat in a combative speech to an annual transatlantic security conference, arguing that it did not make strategic sense for Moscow to abide by restrictions that did not apply to most other states. Ominously, he also explicitly linked the issue to NATO missile defense plans, the clear inference being that an alliance decision to deploy a theater missile shield could prompt Russia to reconstitute the medium-range missiles needed to once again target Europe for nuclear attack.³⁰ Russian military leaders underscored this message by publicly asserting that they had the necessary infrastructure to quickly resume production of medium-range missiles.³¹ In October 2007, President

Putin pressed Washington directly on the need to expand INF, raising the issue with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates during private consultations prior to the UNGA.³²

In the face of this prevailing Russian pressure, and unwilling to yield on Moscow's underlying concerns about missile defense, the Bush administration took the course of least resistance and—reluctantly, tepidly, even stealthily—expressed grudging support in principle for the goal of broadening INF. Specifically, buried within a routine US-Russian statement at the UNGA taking note of the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the INF Treaty, there was a call for:

... all interested countries to discuss the possibility of imparting a global character to this important regime through the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the destruction of any such missiles, and the cessation of associated programs.³³

Through this joint statement, the United States had, for the first time, formally endorsed Global INF. That said, the oddly passive language attests to Washington's ambivalence in its artful obfuscation, avoiding, for example, any call for specific negotiations at the CD or elsewhere, and even leaving open to interpretation the key question of whether this aim should be realized through a new multilateral treaty or if countries should just renounce these missiles unilaterally. Nor did the United States seek to explain, expand upon, or otherwise follow up on this vague and terse endorsement.

Even this flimsy veneer of US support turned out to be evanescent as Russia, moving quickly to capitalize on the joint statement, launched an aggressive diplomatic initiative to promote a robust vision for Global INF on its own terms. With the fanfare of a ministerial appearance at the CD, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov traveled to Geneva to introduce a draft treaty text that he proposed as a basis to launch full-blown Global INF negotiations. While not explicitly renouncing the earlier joint statement, the Bush administration nonetheless firmly distanced itself from this Russian proposal.³⁴ Although as a presidential candidate Barack Obama had indicated his support for pursuing Global INF, he never reiterated this stance after taking office.³⁵ For whatever reason, the Obama administration opted to let Global INF fall by the wayside even as it launched an otherwise strikingly ambitious nuclear disarmament agenda within months of taking office.

Adelman Redux

Once it became evident that President Obama had no plans to pursue any type of Global INF, the idea's most prominent and die-hard champion, former Reagan aide Adelman, took anew to the *New York Times* op-ed pages to bemoan this omission. For the most part, Adelman's latest article did little more than reiterate the same general arguments that he and Kathleen Bailey had first articulated some two decades earlier about why internationalizing INF, consistent with President Obama's wider nuclear disarmament goals, would serve US national security interests by addressing a dire aspect of the nuclear proliferation threat. One notable innovation, however, was in how he now proposed to go about achieving this outcome. Whereas he and most other advocates had always

envisioned negotiating a new treaty in Geneva, with INF merely serving as a starting point, Adelman instead now suggested a straightforward “take it or leave it” declaratory approach. “The prescription is simple: open the treaty to all countries, and urge them to sign it,” he suggested, noting that, “All the language is written, the terms defined . . . What took seven years on the bilateral treaty would take only a few hours to flip into a global one.”³⁶ Adelman, in effect, had belatedly embraced the very same minimalist approach initially toyed with by the first Bush administration, only to be set aside over the issue of whether to offer SLV incentives, and then later promoted *sans* SLV carrots by his Clinton-era successor at ACDA, John Holum, before his vision was derailed by Canada’s inopportune missile treaty antics.

Adelman’s newest missive on behalf of Global INF attracted little attention at the time. One suspects that his decades of advocacy for this idea was by now easily dismissed as a quixotic preoccupation by someone long out of power and who, in any case, had come to be looked askance at by both ends of the ideological spectrum. A self-described conservative ideologue whom most liberals had long regarded warily, Adelman had recently provoked the ire of many conservatives by very publicly endorsing Barack Obama on the eve of the 2008 election.³⁷ Moreover, his idea to revive Global INF through a declarative *fait accompli* was virtually guaranteed to invite ideological ambivalence from both left and right alike. Staunch liberal internationalists tend to prefer their disarmament big, bold, and institutional, cooked up in the diplomatic kitchens of Geneva or Vienna with all of the technical and organizational fixings. On the other hand, although many of Global INF’s small band of supporters come from the conservative-leaning ranks, staunch national security hawks as a rule tend to be skeptical about the inherent utility and unforeseen consequences of *any* new arms control or disarmament treaty, particularly those of indefinite duration, however seemingly harmless or incremental. The simple truth is that modest disarmament proposals rarely garner much enthusiasm at the ideological poles and that strong centrist advocacy has atrophied in recent years with the departure of champions like former senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.³⁸ Still, while the minimalist approach suggested by Adelman is unlikely to excite either die-hard disarmament enthusiasts or their equally diehard skeptics, an objective assessment would suggest that it deserves serious consideration on cost/benefit merits.

When Less is More: Pros and Cons of Reprising an Old Wrinkle

Many of the most longstanding and persuasive objections to Global INF focus on pragmatic concerns about its negotiability.³⁹ There has never really been any dispute that negotiating such a treaty would be fraught with difficulties, particularly with the CD as a default venue. It is hard to imagine Washington finding common ground with hostile missile proliferators like North Korea, Iran, or Syria (abetted by sympathetic fellow travelers like Cuba and Venezuela), or, for that matter, with otherwise friendly nuclear missile possessors like India, Israel, and Pakistan, not to mention China, the only NPT-sanctioned nuclear weapon state that is increasing its nuclear missile forces—and each of these countries is a member in good standing of the CD that holds an absolute veto over

consensus on any eventual outcome. In light of these considerations, the prevailing view in Washington has long been that the nearly inevitable outcome of any Global INF negotiations would be a protracted process that stretches over many years and ultimately culminates in the United States facing a devil's bargain between acceding to politically damaging incentives and/or militarily damaging concessions versus shouldering the blame for a stalemate.⁴⁰ All of these risks could be avoided, however, if Washington and Moscow were to sidestep negotiations by simply declaring the existing treaty open to new adherents.⁴¹ In this scenario, no SLV incentives or SLCM concessions would be needed in order to gain broad multilateral consensus. Any country that opposed the treaty could opt not to join, but none would wield a veto to prevent supportive countries from doing so.

There are good reasons to think that this approach could work better in today's context than might previously have been the case. One of the main arguments in the past for why multilateral negotiations were needed quite literally no longer exists. INF verification involved a complex and intrusive bilateral system of onsite short notice inspections and persistent monitoring. Just adapting this bilateral system to accommodate less than a handful of Soviet successors required protracted and intensely difficult negotiations. Except for the easily expanded cooperative use of national technical means (NTM), however, most INF verification provisions expired more than a decade ago. Consequently, there is no longer any need to revamp or replace them with a new multilateral arrangement. As discussed below, covert development of missiles is unlikely to go undetected by NTM beyond a certain stage of testing and development, so the absence of intricate verification mechanisms should not pose undue compliance and enforcement concerns, as has been the case in other disarmament areas, such as biological weapons or fissile material. States acceding to INF would be signing up to a straightforward legal ban on possessing, producing, or flight testing systems meeting the treaty's operative definitions. The treaty's existing consultative provisions provide an available forum to negotiate any political side-agreements that may be necessary in order to tailor the Elimination Protocol or develop *sui generis* monitoring arrangements for states joining with proscribed programs or missiles, or to address any compliance concerns that may arise. There really is nothing more that needs to be negotiated in the basic treaty.

To be sure, just opening up the existing treaty would not come without potential costs. For some, these would include further locking in existing US and Russian INF obligations. While INF still enjoys wide support within the US national security community, a few prominent figures on the right, most notably President George W. Bush's fiery former UN ambassador, John Bolton, argue that, because INF limits US offensive options and complicates our missile defense countermeasures without constraining today's missile proliferators, the treaty has become woefully obsolete and needs to be either effectively internationalized, or, more realistically, in light of the dubious prospects for achieving this vis-à-vis Iran and other hostile powers, scrapped altogether.⁴² From this perspective, although Ambassador Bolton does not say so, a Global INF negotiation that ends in stalemate might not necessarily be a bad thing, since this could provide a plausible pretext for the United States and Russia to jointly pull the plug on INF. By contrast, from this perspective, opening the treaty up without ensnaring Iran and other hostile actors might represent the worst of all worlds by further entangling the United States in INF with

nothing meaningful to show for it. Even if one accepts this logic, however, opening up INF would probably amount to little more than accepting a sunk cost. Previous Russian renunciation threats and calls from the political right for US abrogation notwithstanding, it seems improbable that INF is going anywhere, regardless of whether or not it is broadened. As a recent RAND Corporation study notes, "the political and security costs of a U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty would be significant and far-reaching."⁴³ While acknowledging that Russia might be somewhat more likely to initiate an INF withdrawal, either unilaterally or cooperatively with Washington, this same study finds that, on balance, Moscow probably has good reasons not to do so.⁴⁴ Assuming that these political calculations are correct—and of course they may not be, particularly for Russia in light of President Putin's past penchant for dramatics and unpredictability—and even stipulating Ambassador Bolton's perspective, any nonproliferation gains that might be achieved from Global INF, however modest, incremental, or distant, would at least offer something to show for having to live in perpetuity with an outdated arms control burden. Conversely, from the perspective of those who do see enduring value in INF, moving quickly in partnership with Russia to launch a Global INF initiative might be a prudent insurance policy against any unforeseen future temptation by either Moscow or Washington to walk away from their obligations.

INF Versus MTCR

There may also be lingering worries that Global INF could undermine the MTCR. This was a valid and oft-expressed concern when the idea was initially proposed, but now represents far less of a risk, particularly for a declaratory scenario. When Global INF was first being considered in the late 1980s and early 1990s, nonproliferation export controls were new and controversial tools, particularly as applied to missiles by MTCR partners in the absence of any treaty prohibition. Likewise, the MTCR itself was small, immature, homogeneous (read Western), and the target of incessant questions about its international legitimacy. Furthermore, missiles with ranges less than 500 kilometers—like the notorious SCUD-B—were still the prevailing focus of efforts to nip missile proliferation in the bud. Today, by contrast, national export controls on missile technology are mandated by the UN Security Council, the MTCR just celebrated its silver jubilee as a large, diverse, and widely respected bulwark against proliferation, and, regrettably, the problem of missile proliferation has largely graduated to INF ranges and beyond. Under these changed conditions, a global missile treaty could arguably now reinforce MTCR by bolstering the political legitimacy of supply-side efforts against countries that decline to join. This in turn would provide an incentive for states without missile aspirations to join the new treaty as a way to burnish their nonproliferation bona fides, thus further sharpening the focus of supply-side attention on the holdouts.

Of course, any nonproliferation treaty potentially may complicate supply-side efforts when covert cheaters successfully hide within the normative tent, as has happened repeatedly with the NPT, for example Iraq in the 1980s, Iran and North Korea in the 1990s, and Libya and Syria in the 2000s. However, this would be less of a concern with Global INF than for other nonproliferation treaties because, even without intrusive verification

measures, the difficulty of hiding large missiles and associated launch infrastructure makes the feasibility of undetected cheating comparatively low, and nearly impossible for indigenous development of new missiles requiring large and distinctive production facilities and several years of conspicuous flight testing.⁴⁵ It therefore seems probable that any government that wants medium-range missiles would eschew joining rather than assuming legally-binding obligations in bad faith, particularly without an explicit intent-based exemption for “peaceful” space launch vehicles that are effectively banned by the INF Treaty and which otherwise might muddy the compliance waters.⁴⁶ Finally, even if bad actors were to join in bad faith, the recent NPT experiences of Iran and Syria demonstrate that, when evidence of cheating arises, sneaks inside the normative tent do not necessarily enjoy greater immunity from supply-side measures and punitive sanctions than is the case for overt outliers.

What *would* be unavoidable is undercutting the MTCR’s legitimacy in trying to prevent Global INF members in good standing from having missiles in the 300-500 kilometer range. This is a real cost. But it very well may be worth paying the price of allowing this small gap in return for setting an only slightly higher cap, given that missiles at INF ranges represent greater threats both in and of themselves and as stepping stones to mastering development of truly strategic-range missiles. Put bluntly, we can probably live with countenancing states possessing shorter range missiles like the SCUD-B in return for their forgoing INF-range systems.

Another consideration against springing Global INF as a “take it or leave it” proposition is the sudden political pressure that this would put on a few key US friends and allies that have or are pursuing pertinent systems. One abiding obstacle in this regard has been removed, now that France has retired all of its land-based INF-range missiles.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, beating the drum for Global INF would complicate important US relationships with Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Korea (see Table 1). The latter would be especially awkward in that the United States and its Korean ally only recently renegotiated a longstanding bilateral agreement that had restricted South Korean ballistic and cruise missiles to below INF ranges.⁴⁸ Having thus secured a US blessing bilaterally to acquire INF-range missiles, the South Koreans might understandably be peeved if Washington were to then turn around and urge giving them up in the context of a new multilateral treaty.

These various bilateral complications represent another valid and unavoidable cost of pursuing Global INF. At the same time, these are all already complicated relationships, not least in the cases of Israel, India, and Pakistan because of their defiance of US and international opposition to nuclear proliferation—the very thing that makes them need to retain the nuclear-capable missiles that Global INF would ban. In the context of having resisted decades of pressure to renounce nuclear weapons and join the NPT, it seems unlikely that the advent of Global INF would significantly alter anything fundamental in these relationships, although painstaking diplomatic groundwork would be needed prior to any public unveiling. As for the unique case of South Korea, Washington could finesse this issue by supporting (or perhaps even suggesting) a “principled” stance that South Korea should join Global INF in tandem with its nuclear-armed neighbor. This would more

TABLE 1
Missile Systems Likely Meeting INF Parameters

Country	System	Inventory Estimate	Status Assessment
<u>Ballistic Missiles</u>			
China (PRC) ^{abij}	CSS-2/5/6/7	118 (combined total)	Operational
	DF-21D	Unknown	Deployed/Untested
Egypt ^{ab}	SCUD-C	Unknown	Operational
India ^{abi}	AGNI-1/2/3	100-125 (combined total)	Operational
	AGNI-4/5	Development	Tested
Iran ^{abd}	SCUD-C	Unknown	Operational
	Shahab-3	Unknown	Operational
	Shahab-4/5	Development	Unknown
	Ghadr-110	Development	Tested
	Sejjil-1/2	Development	Tested
Israel ^{abf}	Jericho-1/2/3	<150 (combined total)	Operational
North Korea ^{abi}	SCUD-C/D, No Dong-1	10 (combined total)	Operational
	No Dong-2,	Development	Tested
	Taep'o Dong-1/2	Development	Tested
	Musudan	Unknown	Unconfirmed
Pakistan ^{ab}	HATF-4/5	Unknown	Operational
	HATF-5a/6	Development	Tested
	Ghauri-3	Developmental	Unknown
South Korea ^g	(Unnamed)	Developmental	Announced
Syria ^{ab}	SCUD-C	Unknown	Operational
	SCUD-D	Development	Tested
	M-9	Unknown	Unconfirmed
Saudi Arabia ^{ah}	CSS-2	Unknown	Operational
Taiwan (Republic of China) ^{ah}	Ti Ching	Development	Suspended
<u>Cruise Missiles</u>			
China (PRC) ^c	HN-1/2 (ground launch)	Unknown	Operational
Pakistan ^c	HATF-7 (ground launch)	Development	Tested
South Korea ^f	(Unnamed)	Unknown	Unconfirmed

Sources: (a) Arms Control Association, "Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories (Updated January 2012)," <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles>; (b) Claremont Institute, "Ballistic Missiles of the World," <www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/pageID.134/default.asp>; (c) Claremont Institute, "Cruise Missiles of the World," <<http://www.missilethreat.com/cruise/>>; (d) Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "WMD Around the World: (Iran) Missiles," <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/>; (e) FAS, "Intelligence Resource Program: Saudi Arabia," <www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/saudi.htm>; (f) Global.Security.org, "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Jericho 2," <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/jericho-2.htm>; (g) Chico Harlan, "South Korea Extends Missile Range Under New Deal with U.S.," *Washington Post*, October 7, 2012, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/under-new-deal-with-the-us-s-korea-extends-missile-range/2012/10/07/77f2104c-1077-11e2-9a39-1f5a7f6fe945_story.html>; (h) Jane's Information Group, "Ti Ching (Taiwan), Offensive Weapons," <<http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Strategic-Weapon-Systems/Ti-Ching-Taiwan.html>>; (i) *The Military Balance 2011* (London: Routledge/International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011), Table 26, p. 469; (j) Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, "China Deploys World's First Long-Range, Land-Based 'Carrier Killer': DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches 'Initial Operational Capability' (IOC)," *China Signpost*, December 26, 2010, <www.chinainpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/China_SignPost_14_ASBM_IOC_2010-12-26.pdf>.

or less let Seoul off the hook politically, while effectively turning Global INF into a new source of diplomatic leverage against Pyongyang's nuclear recalcitrance.

By the same token, whereas Washington and Seoul might characterize the situation on the Korean Peninsula as exceptional, Pakistan would almost certainly employ a similar "principled" stance regarding India, just as India would for China and Pakistan both, not to mention the same dynamic between Iran and Syria and Israel. In other words, it would be naïve to imagine that the sudden appearance of Global INF would sway many states that have or are actively trying to develop INF-type missiles, at least not in the first blush and assuredly not to include China or the NPT outliers that all possess the nuclear weapons with which to arm them. This points to what in the final analysis is probably the single most potent argument against pursuing Global INF: namely, that its impact would be so inconsequential as not to be worth the effort, even if the risks and costs involved are relatively minor. This consideration entails not only how many countries of actual concern could realistically be persuaded to join (see below), but in the first instance what systems those joining would still be permitted to retain or pursue. Even in the highly unlikely event that every nation on earth immediately rushed in pristine good faith to join Global INF, this happy fantasy would still provide only a partial solution to a larger missile proliferation problem, by definition leaving shorter- and longer-range ground-launched missiles and all types of air- and sea-launched systems unaffected. For example: Russia and China are modernizing large ground- and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces above INF-ranges, including intercontinental systems; India, Iran, and North Korea are actively developing ground-launched ballistic missiles well above INF-ranges; India has already tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) beyond INF-ranges; China and Russia have, and Pakistan is developing, INF-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles; and, dozens of states have deployed or are developing short-range (less than 500 kilometers) ballistic missiles and at least seventy five possess various types of short-range cruise missiles.⁴⁹ None of these systems would be affected by Global INF.

But the importance of what Global INF *would* capture should not be underestimated. Most short-range missiles are used to deliver conventional explosives rather than nuclear weapons. Even nuclear-capable short-range missiles that can menace neighbors with grave harm still pose less of an escalation threat and have far less relevance for wider regional stability than longer-range systems. By contrast, most advanced nuclear-capable delivery systems of the most hostile nuclear proliferators are INF-range missiles (see Table 1).⁵⁰ Ground-launched medium-range missiles are also a significant element of China's military expansion over the past decade and include especially worrisome war-fighting systems, such as the ground-mobile DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, armed with fuel-air explosives and widely nicknamed the "Carrier-Killer." Moreover, developing INF-range ballistic missiles is a critical technological stepping stone to developing longer-range strategic capabilities. Other than for a handful of states that have already successfully developed and tested ballistic missiles beyond INF-ranges, forgoing development and testing of medium-range systems would acutely impede the future development of longer-range systems, for all intents capping the problem at sub-INF ranges.

No, the real telling argument here is that states that have or aspire to nuclear weapons and associated missile delivery systems would resist joining Global INF, potentially rendering the enterprise little more than an empty symbolic gesture. This is a reasonable near-term forecast, particularly for a treaty that had been foisted on an unsuspecting world without the legitimacy of emerging from negotiations within the UN system. However, this argument misses the sometimes long-term horizon in establishing a new treaty-based global nonproliferation norm. As one recent study observes, the advent of any such a treaty simultaneously provides a vehicle for: 1) the vast majority of states with low compliance costs (in this case, non-nuclear/non-missile states) to join as an easy symbolic gesture; 2) states with intermediate compliance costs (nuclear/missile "hedgers" and early-stage/investment developers) to be cajoled by the United States and others to join through bilateral incentives/disincentives; and, 3) states with high compliance costs (nuclear/missile possessors and late-stage/investment developers) to be punished over time by the United States and others for failure to join. The study notes that this is precisely the dynamic that the United States and Soviet Union successfully applied in putting the NPT in place and then systematically and incrementally expanding adherence.⁵¹ Applying this hierarchy to Global INF, the vast majority of states in the first grouping should be persuadable in reasonably short order, essentially comprising all states not listed in Table 1 (with the possible exception of a few radical fellow travelers who may make a show of solidarity with the "hard cases," as well as any passive hedgers hoping to keep their options open). In the second category, Egypt and Saudi Arabia—with deep security ties to Washington, obsolete missile programs, and an untarnished status as NPT members in good standing with no known nuclear weapons programs—represent potentially easy pickups (along with any closet hedgers that might have been revealed by their reluctance to join).⁵² In the third category, China represents the ripest target for applying international pressure, because it alone among the remaining states in Table 1 is a member in good standing of NPT and the wider community of responsible nonproliferation actors. Indeed, perhaps the single most persuasive reason for the United States and Russia to launch a declaratory Global INF initiative is to challenge China's long habit of disarmament freeriding by focusing international pressure on Beijing to bring a key part of its growing nuclear arsenal to the disarmament table.⁵³ As for the remaining proliferation "hard cases" like Iran and North Korea, forcing them to reject Global INF would add one more visible strike against their international credibility.

A Gambit Worth Trying?

If the most successful imaginable outcome of a Global INF initiative is nothing more than laying the groundwork for an incremental norm-building effort, would it still be worth trying? Assuming the risks and costs are relatively low, as the present analysis suggests, then yes. At a minimum, it would augment current international "best practices" for nonproliferation, thereby further stigmatizing scofflaws. This, in turn, would afford the United States and its nonproliferation partners a new source of leverage to induce joining

by these outliers and the moral high ground in the meantime to pursue supply-side remedies against them.

In addition to bolstering long-term nonproliferation goals, partnering with Moscow on a declaratory Global INF initiative could be just the thing to jump-start President Obama's seemingly stalled nuclear disarmament agenda as he begins a second term. In his April 2009 roadmap to a world without nuclear weapons, the president asserted that completing a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia, "will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor."⁵⁴ However, pursuant to an understanding reached with the US Senate in 2010 in connection to ratifying New START, the next step that the Obama administration is tackling is a new follow-on bilateral agreement with Russia in which the United States will seek to redress Russia's overwhelming imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons. In contrast, Russia is expected to resist this focus and will instead seek new limits on non-deployed strategic warheads and the total withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. These will be tough issues for the two sides to reconcile, and the Russians, for their part, are not seen to be in any particular hurry.⁵⁵ Even in an optimistic scenario, these negotiations are likely to occupy the rest of the Obama administration's tenure. Meanwhile, there is no clear path to coaxing any (never mind all) of the other nuclear weapons states to join in negotiating nuclear reductions. In a nutshell, as things stand, President Obama appears unlikely to achieve his stated goal to multilateralize the nuclear disarmament process. Global INF could provide a quick and easy solution that would strike a cooperative note with Moscow heading into the next round of bilateral negotiations while at the same time get the ball rolling on broadening the nuclear disarmament map. Globalizing Ronald Reagan's INF Treaty might even restore a healthy dollop of bipartisan support to at least this part of the president's nuclear disarmament agenda.

All in all, this seems like a disarmament-*cum*-nonproliferation proposal that deserves a little respect.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Naval War College, the Department of Navy, or the Department of Defense.

NOTES

1. Kenneth Adelman, "A Long-Term Fix for Medium-Range Arms," *New York Times*, September 25, 2009, p. A29.
2. Thomas Donnelly, "American Zero," *Weekly Standard*, June 4, 2012, p. 11.
3. It is debatable whether INF strictly applies only to the Russian Federation as the main legal successor to the Soviet Union, or alternatively whether its obligations extend to all of the Soviet successor states. As a matter of practice, however, only these three other governments have offered political commitments to abide by the treaty and actively participated in the Special Verification Commission overseeing its implementation.
4. Kathleen C. Bailey, "Rushing to Build Missiles," *Washington Post*, April 6, 1990, p. A15.

5. Ibid.
6. David A. Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Comparing the United States to a Close Ally* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2002), p. 125.
7. Kenneth Adelman, "Curing Missile Measles," *Washington Times*, April 17, 1989, p. D1.
8. Bailey, "Rushing to Build Missiles," p. A15.
9. Kenneth Adelman, "How to Limit Everybody's Missiles," *New York Times*, April 7, 1991, <www.nytimes.com/1991/04/07/opinion/how-to-limit-everybody-s-missiles.html>; Kenneth Adelman, "Going Ballistic... Globally," *Washington Times*, June 3, 1992, p. G1.
10. Technically Global INF would be "nondiscriminatory," in that all of its provisions would apply equally to all state parties. However, this term is used as political shorthand by NAM states and others to convey a general expectation for fairness in leveling disparities between the major powers and others. Thus, given that INF restrictions already apply to Washington and Moscow, there is likely to be a "what have you done for me lately" dynamic at play in any multilateral Global INF negotiations under the "nondiscriminatory" banner.
11. It is unclear how this might have worked in terms of the INF Treaty's complex and intrusive verification provisions, which were facility-specific and based on a system of national inspections and bilateral reciprocity. It does not appear that proposal ever went far enough to grapple with such details.
12. Richard Speier, independent consultant and former Defense Department missile proliferation desk officer, e-mail correspondence with author, November 19, 2011.
13. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes*, "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)," updated August 5, 2011, p. INF-6, <<http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/inf.pdf>>.
14. *The Arms Control Reporter: A Chronicle of Treaties and Negotiations, Proposals, Weapons & Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1993), p. 706.B.158; Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies*, p. 125; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes*, "Missile Technology Control Regime," updated May 4, 2012, <<http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/mtcr.pdf>>.
15. *The Arms Control Reporter*, p. 706.B.158.
16. Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies*, p. 125.
17. Although the Canadian proposal itself focused only on medium-range missiles, there had already been calls in the wider arms control community for a sweeping ban on all ballistic missiles. See, for example, Jerome J. Holton, Lora Lumpe, and Jeremy J. Stone, "Proposal for a Zero Ballistic Missile Regime," in *1993 Science and International Security Anthology* (Washington, DC: AAAS, 1993), pp. 379–96.
18. Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies*, p. 124.
19. Brian G. Chow, *Emerging National Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993).
20. *Arms Control Reporter*, 1994, p. 603.B225.
21. Ibid., p. 403.B.770.
22. This peculiar arrangement of hosting a meeting in someone else's country was probably intended to stir interest within the nearby CD while preserving a fig leaf of not straying beyond the MTCR, and in fact many of the MTCR delegations to the "Montreux Seminar" were led or reinforced by diplomats working at the CD.
23. Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies*, pp. 125–26. In addition to this prior research employing extensive interviews and declassified documents, the author is drawing here on first-hand experience on the US Delegation to the "MTCR Montreux Seminar" (August 31–September 1, 1995).
24. Yuri Nazarkin, *Implementation of Multilateral Arms Control Agreements: Questions of Compliance: The Case of the Missile Technology Control Regime* (Geneva: Geneva Center for Security Policy, 2000).
25. Mathew Rice, "Russia Proposes Global Regime on Missile Proliferation," *Arms Control Today*, May 2000, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/ru3ma00>.
26. Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies*, p. 126.
27. Mark Smith, "Verifiable Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation," *Trust and Verify* 95 (January/February 2001), pp. 1–3.

28. UN General Assembly, A/57/299, "The Issue of Missiles in All its Aspects: Report of the Secretary General," 57th Session, July 23, 2002; UN General Assembly, A/63/176, "The Issue of Missiles in All its Aspects: Report of the Secretary General," 63rd Session, July 28, 2008. Because the second panel that convened in 2004 did not produce a consensus report, the author is drawing here on firsthand experience as the US representative to that panel.
29. "Russia Eyes Withdrawal from Key Treaty to Cut Missiles," *Financial Times*, March 9, 2005, p. 8.
30. "Russian Threat to Quit Nuclear Treaty Over US Shield Plans," *Financial Times*, February 16, 2007, p. 1.
31. "Russia Missile Forces Ready to Quit INF Treaty," RIA Novosti, February 19, 2007, <<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070219/60957640.html>>.
32. Stephen J. Blank, *Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration?* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), p. 54.
33. Office of the Spokesman, "Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly (October 25, 2007)," U.S. Department of State Archive, <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94141.htm>>.
34. Blank, *Russia and Arms Control*, p. 53.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
36. Adelman, "A Long-Term Fix for Medium-Range Arms," p. A29. A reference to the availability of verification measures is omitted from this quote because most verification measures have expired by the terms of the treaty.
37. Ken Adelman, "Why a Staunch Conservative Like Me Endorsed Obama," *Huffington Post*, October 24, 2008, <www.huffingtonpost.com/ken-adelman/why-a-staunch-conservativ_b_137749.html>.
38. For a good example of this confluence of ideological equivocation about modest disarmament proposals, consider the bland reaction to the 2002 "Moscow Treaty" on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Although this modest treaty did nothing more than codify reductions that President Bush had already announced, conservative voices within the administration had initially resisted agreeing to a legally-binding treaty. At the same time, after a formal treaty was eventually concluded, it was disparaged within the liberal arms control community as being only "SORT" of a treaty (using an acronym that the Bush administration had seemingly sought to avoid with the "Moscow Treaty" moniker) that should have gone further in requiring deeper reductions and associated verification mechanisms.
39. For an excellent recent analysis of the many challenges that the United States would face in Global INF negotiations, see David W. Kearns, Jr., *Facing the Missile Challenge: U.S. Strategy and the Future of the INF Treaty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), pp. 122–26. For a succinct review of the longstanding arguments against Global INF, see Richard H. Speier, "A Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for Missiles?," in Henry Sokolski, ed., *Fighting Proliferation* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1996), <www.fas.org/isp/threat/fp/index.html>.
40. This is precisely the scenario that played out in Geneva in the 1990s during negotiations on a new verification protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and that is still in the process of playing out in long-stalemated CD efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
41. Moscow might not prefer this approach, having previously looked to the CD, and would doubtless seek to obtain some advantage in return for its support. However, it would be difficult for President Putin to back away from his personal demands to globalize INF in the face of enthusiastic support from his newly reelected US counterpart who heretofore had ignored the issue. As a purely legal matter, it is debatable whether the other Soviet successor states (which agreed to abide by the treaty as part of a political arrangement) would also need to accede to this, but this is probably a moot point since, in practice, it is nearly inconceivable that they would block a joint US-Russian initiative.
42. John R. Bolton and Paula A. DeSutter, "A Cold War Missile Treaty That's Doing Us Harm: The US-Soviet INF Pact Doesn't Address the Iranian Threat," *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2011, p. 11.
43. Kearns, Jr., *Facing the Missile Challenge: U.S. Strategy and the Future of the INF Treaty*, p. xv.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 94–99, 115–17. It is largely for this very reason that INF and START, although ostensibly "nuclear" treaties, focus on delivery platforms rather than harder to monitor warheads or fissile material.
45. Michael Elleman, "Containing Iran's Missile Threat," *Survival* 54 (February-March 2012), pp. 119–26.

46. Ann M. Florini and William C. Potter, "Goodwill Missions for Castoff Missiles," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December 1990, p. 25.
47. France still retains a relatively large nuclear force of just under 300 warheads, but has phased out its obsolete land-based missiles in favor of a strategic dyad of SLBMs and nuclear-capable aircraft. Arms Control Association, "Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories (updated January 2012)," <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles>; International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2011* (London: Routledge), Table 26, p. 469.
48. Chico Harlan, "South Korea Extends Missile Range Under New Deal with U.S.," *Washington Post*, October 7, 2012, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/under-new-deal-with-the-us-south-korea-extends-missile-range/2012/10/07/77f2104c-1077-11e2-9a39-1f5a7f6fe945_story.html>.
49. Arms Control Association, "Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories (updated January 2012)," <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles>; Claremont Institute, "Ballistic Missiles of the World," <www.missilethreat.com/missiles-of-the-world/pageID.134/default.asp>; Claremont Institute, "Cruise Missiles of the World," <www.missilethreat.com/cruise/>; Andrew Feickert, *Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004).
50. It is important to note that Table 1 represents a conservative estimate of likely INF systems based on open-source data. It is possible that additional systems have greater range capability than what is acknowledged via open sources. Likewise, non-ground-launch variants could also be captured given that INF stipulates that "If a GLBM [Ground Launched Ballistic Missile] or GLCM [Ground Launched Cruise Missile] is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles."
51. Daniel Verdier, "Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime," *International Organization* 62 (July 2008), pp. 439–76.
52. Taiwan also fits this category, although its status would preclude it from acceding to INF as a state party.
53. See, for example, Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, "Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond," Project 2049 Institute, May 27, 2010.
54. Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama," Prague, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered>.
55. James E. Doyle, "U.S.–Russia Nuclear Arms Reductions The Next Round," *FAS Public Interest Report* blog, June 25, 2012, <www.fas.org/blog/pir/2012/06/25/u-s-russia-nuclear-arms-reductions-the-next-round/>.