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

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COURTING THE GLOBAL SOUTH WITH "DUAL-BENEFIT" NONPROLIFERATION ENGAGEMENT

Brian Finlay and **Johan Bergenäs**

President Barack Obama and an array of other Western leaders continue to assert that the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-state actors is one of most pressing challenges to global security today. Yet, Western efforts to engage governments—particularly governments across the global South—in a practical nonproliferation dialogue have largely yielded disappointing results. This viewpoint examines the need for a new strategy to engage the developing world in nonproliferation programs. It argues that strategies focused strictly on WMD nonproliferation are unsustainable, and ultimately are destined for failure. An alternative "dual-benefit" nonproliferation engagement strategy utilizes the enlightened self-interest of partner governments needed to achieve broad-based buy-in among all partners. In a concluding section, we recommend that the "Group of 8" Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction standardize this model of nonproliferation engagement as it sets out to identify and fund WMD nonproliferation capacity-building initiatives beyond the states of the former Soviet Union.

KEYWORDS: Nonproliferation; cooperative threat reduction; weapons of mass destruction; Group of 8; UN Security Council Resolution 1540; globalization

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Although we may be witnessing the denouement of counterterrorism as the organizing principle of US foreign policy, President Barack Obama and an array of other Western leaders and security policy experts continue to identify the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-state actors as one of the most pressing challenges to global security.[1] Propelled by the progressive diffusion of a weapons capability to additional states and fueled by forces of globalization, the proliferation supply chain today has more links in more countries, and in more corners of the globe, than at any other point in history. Most worryingly, proliferation in the post-Cold War era is no longer merely a government-driven and government-controlled phenomenon. There is an increase in innovation, manufacturing, and transshipment of dual-use technologies amidst deep regulatory vacuums around the world, overseen by governments with either little capacity or little interest to prevent their illegal acquisition. Meanwhile, Western efforts to engage these governments—particularly in the global South—in a practical nonproliferation dialogue have generally yielded sub-optimal results.

This should, however, come as little surprise. In many respects, developing countries' or emerging economies' unwillingness to inculcate a security culture or make longer-term strategic investments in sustainable nonproliferation programs is far from unreasonable.

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Even those governments with the most acute proliferation potential have, in most cases, prioritized the abatement of extreme poverty, economic growth, trade diversification, the development of adequate public health infrastructures, the mitigation of drug and small arms trafficking, countering the growth of youth gangs and criminal enterprises, and myriad other immediate human security and development challenges. To many, the seemingly ethereal threat of WMD proliferation, albeit disconcerting, does not warrant the redirection of limited human and financial capital. This is particularly true amidst a global financial downturn when traditional lines of development assistance are facing a new round of budgetary reductions—and at the very moment when the forces of globalization have facilitated easier access to the means of mass destruction.[2]

It is clear that, unless we change the terms of the debate and incentivize a broader group of countries to participate in robust enactment and sustained enforcement of global proliferation prevention standards, the likelihood of successful WMD acquisition by a terrorist organization will increase.

In such an environment, it is incumbent upon those most seized by the proliferation threat to break traditional approaches to nonproliferation and to develop models of engagement which satisfy not only Western ''hard security'' demands, but which also validate, and ultimately ameliorate, poorer countries' higher priority, ''soft security'' and development needs. This strategy—a ''dual-benefit'' nonproliferation engagement—necessitates an unparalleled new ''whole of society'' approach leveraging a wider spectrum of interests and capabilities. It requires a new recognition on the part of the national security community that development and human security interests are equally critical factors in long-term safety and stability. And it demands a willingness to widen the dialogue to include interests articulated by the private sector and civil society, and not limited to those prioritized by governments. In due course, such a strategy promises to yield a successful new approach to proliferation prevention that is not only more sustainable, but that ultimately costs less.

This viewpoint examines the need for a renewed commitment to nonproliferation programs in the global South. It argues that strategies focused strictly on WMD nonproliferation are unsustainable and will ultimately fail. Subsequently, it proposes a ''dual-benefit'' nonproliferation engagement strategy that utilizes the enlightened self-interest of partner governments in order to achieve broad-based buy-in among all partners. We then point to several precedents for this model of engagement in the Caribbean Basin and Central America as evidence of successful implementation. In a concluding section, we recommend that the Group of 8 (G8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction standardize this model of nonproliferation engagement in its funding of WMD nonproliferation capacity-building beyond the states of the former Soviet Union.

The New WMD Nonproliferation Landscape

In the last quarter century, there can be little doubt regarding the tangible benefits of globalization. Skyrocketing volumes of foreign direct investment and global trade,

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technology democratization, the accelerated movement of goods and services, and the spread of innovative capacity have led to growing literacy rates and improved access to education, not to mention a remarkable pace of economic development. In the last five years alone, more than half a billion individuals have escaped the grinding poverty associated with living on less than $1.25 per day.[3]

While development specialists celebrate these trends, security analysts are rightly concerned that an increasingly interconnected world has equally extended the supply chain for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction technologies into wide regulatory and enforcement vacuums around the planet. Due to a lack of previous experience with dual-use industrial or innovative capacities, real capacity shortfalls in enforcement, or competing national priorities, many governments, particularly in the developing world, have become fertile environments for proliferant activities.[4] Lacking adequate export and border controls, customs enforcement, police and judicial capacity, and sufficient rule of law standards, or, pressed by internal pressures such as violence, crime, or public health crises (to name but a few), these sometimes weak and fragile states are unable or unwilling to adequately implement global nonproliferation standards to prevent the diffusion of technologies of proliferation concern. As a result, and despite significant nonproliferation investments over the last decades, the international community finds itself vulnerable to WMD proliferation to non-state actors.

The lackluster embrace of the 2004 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 by many governments is indicative of this North-South dichotomy.[5] Although much of the debate over the legitimacy of the resolution—including among states in the Non-Aligned Movement—has largely faded, and the number of governments submitting their preliminary reports to the 1540 Committee—the entity responsible for monitoring implementation of the 2004 resolution—has grown, little evidence of pragmatic implementation of UNSCR 1540 standards is evident across much of the global South, nearly nine full years after passage of the resolution. Indeed, many governments have come to view the proliferation prevention measures mandated under the broader nonproliferation regime as both overly onerous and unnecessarily inhibitive to their prospects for economic growth and development. To them, stricter compliance with international nonproliferation standards means more bureaucracy, a return to technology denial, and a reduction in one's competitive position within the global economy.

Continued and occasionally sanctimonious appeals by wealthier governments to strengthen legal mandates, citing either the dire human and financial costs of a WMD incident, or tangible evidence of weapons proliferation, have systematically failed to inculcate robust adherence to the nonproliferation regime by many states in the developing world. A new approach that inspires sustained (and successful) engagement with these new proliferation-capable actors is necessary.

Such an approach necessitates a broader application of our foreign policy toolkit. For the United States, this means that implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) agenda—historically referring to efforts to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-related materials in the former Soviet Union—can no longer be the sole purview of the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State. In a complex and interdependent world where strategic security issues have mixed near-seamlessly with global economics,

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international development, and business, and all within new geographic contexts, it is clear that successful implementation of our nonproliferation objectives necessitate the inclusion of economists, development specialists, and the business community in a way not demanded quite so explicitly by the post-Soviet CTR priorities.

A New Outreach Strategy

In order to build a nonproliferation strategy in accordance with the new threat environment, it will be critical to change the terms of the current debate. Appealing to the enlightened self-interest of all partners transforms developing states from recalcitrant "targets" of nonproliferation policy into sustained advocates for effective nonproliferation engagement, enabling us to better address modern security challenges.

The outreach of the United States to virtually every country around the world is unparalleled. From individual donations to state-sponsored assistance, in aggregate, there can be little doubt that Americans are the most charitable people on earth.[6] More than 150 countries receive formal assistance from the United States government. Yet whether it is educational assistance to Afghanistan or public health assistance for Kenya, the US interlocutor for that cooperation is seldom the government sub-agencies that manage the proliferation threat. Considering the relationships, experience, know-how, and good will built over years of successful engagement around the world by these other government agencies, untapped opportunities exist to leverage existing foreign outreach programs in mutual support. When viewed in this way, the potential opportunities for synergy abound. For instance:

- Assistance provided to enhance border and export controls can also aid the prevention of small arms or drug trafficking and promote efficiencies at transit hubs that in turn facilitate trade expansion, business development, and national competitiveness within the global supply chain;
- Preventing human trafficking, a growing moral priority for many governments across the global South, relies upon many of the same resources and capacities necessary to detect the illicit movement of terrorists across borders;
- Detecting and responding to biological weapons requires a functional disease-surveillance network and a public health infrastructure;
- Trade expansion and business development cannot occur unless borders and ports are safe, efficient, and secure—a key requirement for the prevention of WMD proliferation;
- Assistance proffered to develop pre- and post-WMD incident response enhances governments' capacity detect an earthquake or respond to a tsunami; and
- Governments' pursuit of energy diversification through nuclear power can be aided and accelerated with technical and capacity-building assistance from nonproliferation accounts, all while reinforcing global confidence in a government's adherence to the regime.[7]

What is important to note is that while the objectives of the donor may differ from that of the recipient partner, in each of these cases, the modalities of engagement can be the same. As such, proffered nonproliferation assistance designed to prevent the spread of

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nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons may be received by the recipient partner as economic development assistance, as capacity-building assistance to address seemingly unrelated trafficking challenges related to drugs or small arms, as tertiary educational grants, or as public health assistance. Despite the incongruity in perception and objectives, the results are the same and include, significantly, sustainable interest in and implementation of nonproliferation programs.

A New Nonproliferation Engagement Model

Exploiting this more holistic approach has proven successful in the Caribbean Basin and in Central America, and there is much promise in Eastern Africa. To date, the approach has been most effectively leveraged by using UNSCR 1540 as a platform to address the intertwined challenges of globalization, under-development, and attendant proliferation risks; it has offered a more cost-effective alternative for donor governments by better linking official development assistance, ''soft'' security (e.g., technical and programmatic) assistance, and ''hard'' military expenditures. By better coordinating these financial and technical capacity flows, operationalization of this model has laid the foundation for an improved dialogue between the global North and South based upon mutual interests relating both to security and to development.

Beginning in 2007, a loose consortium of governments, regional organizations, and civil society groups undertook to prove the effectiveness of this ''dual-benefit'' model of nonproliferation engagement.[8] The first practical case study was the Caribbean Basin. Until that time, the Caribbean's relationship with the 1540 Committee—the body responsible for monitoring implementation of the 2004 resolution—had been marked by insufficient reporting. Moreover, no evidence of pragmatic implementation of the resolution could be found amidst the abject lack of interest across the sub-region in the nonproliferation policy arena. Rather than focusing on the region's unmet security obligations as defined by the Security Council, the approach in the Caribbean concentrated on ''dual-benefit'' aspects of available nonproliferation assistance to economic development, disaster relief, citizen security, and public health. Governments of the region began to view UNSCR 1540 not as a burden, but as an opportunity for capacity building. As a result, sustained buy-in was obtained from the participating Caribbean governments, and today, all of the countries in the region have taken the first step toward compliance with the UN resolution, submitting a report on steps taken and future implementation plans to the 1540 Committee. Moreover, the Caribbean Community hired a full-time regional nonproliferation coordinator—the first of its kind—to address nonproliferation capacity shortfalls jointly across all fourteen governments of the sub-region. The coordinator also engages with individual states to develop updated national reports and to initiate the development of national action plans to implement UNSCR 1540. In the span of three years, after decades of benign neglect, the Caribbean region has emerged as a bright spot of nonproliferation responsibility in the developing world as a direct result of a better pairing of interests and concerns.

A similar model was subsequently applied in Central America, also as a collaboration between the Stimson Center, the Organization of American States, and the relevant sub-

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regional organization. Today, under the auspices of the Central American Integration System, a new nonproliferation coordinator works with all member states to develop synergies between existing counter-trafficking programs in parallel threat silos—such as narcotics and small arms—in order to leverage sustainable solutions to enduring proliferation challenges in the region, while better utilizing dwindling international security assistance and development dollars.

This new approach in the Caribbean and Central America has resulted in increased streams of international funding at both the sub-regional and national level to support security and development objectives such as countering small arms proliferation, drug trafficking, and various forms of criminality threatening human security and civil society. Port modernization efforts are underway, and enhanced assistance for compliance with International Ship and Port Facility Security Code standards has meant new opportunities for economic growth and development in the Americas.

In the East African context, this "dual-benefit" nonproliferation engagement is showing early signs of bearing fruit. Kenya's former permanent representative to the United Nations has said of UNSCR 1540: "We can view our mandates under the Resolution as a burden on our limited resources, or as an opportunity to meet our high-priority needs while simultaneously adhering to our international obligations."[9] Working with a civil society organization, the Kenyan government is now capitalizing upon international assistance to implement UNSCR 1540 through a border security action plan that both addresses the challenge of WMD proliferation and simultaneously meets the challenge of small arms trafficking across national boundaries.

The proven success of this model of engagement could yield a more streamlined, less expensive, and more effective approach to nonproliferation. A critical first step, however, is ensuring that a whole-of-government, and indeed, "whole-of-society" culture can be integrated into the bureaucratic decision-making and policy implementation process. Such an approach requires better integration of the diverse agencies that execute the multifarious facets of foreign policy, both "hard" and "soft security" fields.

A "Dual-Benefit" Engagement Strategy for the G8 Global Partnership

The progress made in the Caribbean Basin and in Central America, combined with early progress in Eastern Africa, demonstrates the potential upsides for proliferation prevention when a wide variety of stakeholders cooperate in coordinating mutually beneficial assistance. In April 2011, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNSCR 1540 for ten years. Also in 2011, the Group of 8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) announced its Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction would be renewed and extended geographically beyond the traditional boundaries of the former Soviet Union. If the Global Partnership is to be successful in providing nonproliferation assistance under this expanded mandate, it would do well to target relevant human security and development needs of potential recipients, rather than focusing impractically and exclusively on what is perceived as the "Northern agenda" of WMD nonproliferation. Many of the aforemen-

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tioned areas where nonproliferation objectives coincide with security and development goals—including enhancing trade flows, building public health capacity, countering drug and small arms trafficking, and disaster mitigation—have been identified at recent G8 summits as important priorities of member states for development assistance.[10] As such, the G8 should leverage funds it has earmarked for security assistance to simultaneously meet its identified development priorities, in concert with the assessment of needs carried out by countries seeking assistance. If the current inflexible framework for proliferation efforts can give way to an adaptable approach driven by the domestic priorities of the recipient partner—borrowing from the successfully implemented model in the Caribbean and Central America—a sustainable nonproliferation engagement could result.

It is prudent to recall that the wider objective behind WMD nonproliferation goals is to save lives. Yet in the West, it is often forgotten that, for the lion's share of the world's population, poverty also means death. For one billion of our new nonproliferation interlocutors in the global South, one bad cold, the loss of a job, the illicit acquisition of a small arm by a criminal, or one unfortunate interaction with a corrupt law enforcement officer can be deadly. In such an environment, the proliferation of WMD is intellectually meaningless. For people who live in these desperate circumstances, moving out from under them is quite rightly their all-consuming struggle. Unless and until we can better tailor our nonproliferation programs to recognize, validate, and respond to these more immediate concerns, our engagement will not only be overly costly and wasteful, but ultimately unsustainable.

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8. This outreach process was conceived and coordinated by the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative of the Stimson Center in Washington, DC. In 2006, the Stimson Center developed a new "dual-benefit" approach to address the growing challenge of WMD proliferation emanating from the global South. Since then, the authors have worked with governments and regional organizations to develop projects that implement this model as proofs of concept. To date, pilot activities have been launched in the Caribbean, Central America, the Andean region, the Middle East, Eastern Africa, and Southeast Asia.
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