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The Camp David Accords: A Case of International BargainingShibley Telhami *
University of MarylandThe Camp David Accords: A Case of International Bargaining (Full Text, PDF, 34 pages, 57 KB)
The Agreements
Although copies of the agreements, appended letters, and opening bargaining positions are included as an appendix, it is useful to highlight some key terms of the Camp David accords.
To begin with, there are two separate agreements. The first, between Egypt and Israel, stipulates Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (including settlements and bases) in return for which Egypt would sign a peace treaty with Israel and normalize relations, including an exchange of ambassador and travel across borders. In addition, much of the Sinai would be demilitarized, and a multinational force would be stationed there to prevent future hostilities.
The second agreement provided for a three-stage framework to determine the status of the West Bank and Gaza, as mentioned earlier. Although elections were to be held in these territories in the second stage, followed by a five-year transitional autonomy, no time limit was set for reaching the second stage. In effect, the status quo could be maintained indefinitely without violation of the agreement. As of 1992, fourteen years after the accords were concluded, there has been little progress in that direction.
The two agreements were also separate in that progress on one was not linked to progress on the other. Although the peace treaty has been signed, ambassadors exchanged, and Israel has withdrawn from the Sinai, little has been done about the West Bank and Gaza. Nonetheless, despite massive criticism of the accords, the assassination of Sadat, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the peace treaty has survived.
Criticism of the accords came from many quarters. In Israel some felt that the government should not have withdrawn from the entire Sinai and that Jewish settlements should not have been dismantled; in short, that Israel gave up too much for an uneasy peace with Egypt. In Egypt, there was a feeling that Sadat gave away the store; that there need not have been an exchange of ambassadors with Israel, that Israel should have made more concessions on the West Bank and Gaza, and that the limitations on Egyptian troop movement were unacceptable. The basis for such judgments is a matter for the student of bargaining, but some facts are worth noting.
Following Camp David, Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders was dispatched to the Middle East in an attempt to sell the accords to Arab states. Although these states unanimously rejected the accords, Saunders felt that the inclusion of only two more points would have made them acceptable to at least several Arab states: an indefinite freeze on settlement building on the West Bank and Gaza and a recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination. 52
Although it is difficult to assess Saunders' judgment on this matter, there is little doubt that the issue of Jewish settlements has emerged as a central issue in the negotiations, especially after the controversy over differing interpretations of the agreement on settlements. Specifically, Egypt and the United States have understood the agreement as entailing a freeze on settlement building for the duration of negotiations leading to Palestinian autonomy, while Israel has argued that the freeze was to last only for the three-month period of the negotiations with Egypt.
It is useful to review the settlements issue, given its central importance. First, most of the negotiations were conducted on the twelfth day of the conference, one day before its conclusion and after agreement had been reached on all other issues. Second, both sides agreed that the issue should not be addressed in the text of the accords, but in a public letter from Begin to Carter. The text of the letter was to read:
. . . after the signing of the framework agreement and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The issue of future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among the negotiating parties. 53
Third, there is no doubt that the U.S. delegation specifically understood this to refer to the negotiations for autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, so stated during that particular session, and that the Israelis understood this as well. Fourth, the Israelis apparently thought that the autonomy talks would last two to three months, but that they could be extended. Fifth, the U.S. delegation had the distinct impression that the Israelis fully approved this agreement as they (the Americans) understood it, while some members of the Israeli delegation understood Begin's approval to be only tentative, and that he was to give his final answer the next day. Quandt's conclusion was that "it seems most likely that on Saturday night Begin did not give Carter a firm agreement to a freeze on settlements for the duration of the autonomy negotiations. But he may have wanted to leave the president with the impression that such an agreement had almost been reached. 54 Sixth, the letter handed to Carter by Begin the next day, after agreement had been reached on the text of the accords, stated that the freeze on settlement building applied to the three months envisaged for the negotiation of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
On Sunday, September 17, the final day of the negotiations, an "exhausted" American delegation that was already basking in the sun of success suddenly discovered the discrepancy over the settlement issue. As Quandt put it: " ... by then, they chose to overlook this 'misunderstanding.' It was a costly mistake." 55 Asked why the American delegation, which had clearly perceived the significance of this issue, did not press it further, Saunders replied. "You cannot imagine how difficult, how agonizing it was to deal with Begin. It was so time and energy consuming. Carter dreaded having to deal with him. And we were all exhausted, yet so thrilled that we finally had an agreement." 56 Final judgment on this issue is yet to be made, providing the student of bargaining with some intriguing questions.
Impact of the Accords
The full impact of the Camp David accords on Middle East politics is difficult to assess, but some things are relatively clear. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel reduced the chance of war between them; Egypt regained control of the Sinai, but was also expelled from the Arab League and lost economic aid from Arab states (though it did gain American aid). Beyond that, the impact on regional politics and realignments is difficult to judge. Arab states generally argue that the loss of Egypt's military leverage with Israel enabled Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982 and that the accords essentially legitimized Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Some in Israel argue that they gave up something tangible—the Sinai—for something intangible—peace—and that Egypt may yet be Israel's enemy in any case.
These controversies aside, there can be little doubt that the accords were a remarkable and important event in Middle East, and indeed interna-tional, politics. Their impact has been substantial at both levels.
Given their global significance, the Camp David accords provide a wonderful "laboratory" for the student of bargaining. The surprising events leading up to them, the well-defined nature of the negotiations, the contrasting personalities and systems of government involved, and the visible difference in negotiating tactics all provide interesting questions for both regional specialists and international relations students in general. The rich data available on these important negotiations can help provide answers to a broad range of questions.
Endnotes
Note 52. Interview with Harold H. Saunders, February 15, 1984, Princeton. Back
Note 53. Quandt, p. 248. Back
Note 54. Ibid., p. 250. Back
Note 55. Ibid., pp. 250-51. Back
Note 56. Interview with Saunders, February 15, 1984. Back
Note *: Shibley Telhami holds the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to the University of Maryland, he was Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Near Eastern Studies Program at Cornell University and a Visiting Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He has taught at several universities including the Ohio State University, the University of Southern California, Princeton University, Columbia University, Swarthmore College, and the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in political science. Among his publications are Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords (Columbia University Press, 1990); International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict, ed. with Milton Esman (Cornell University Press, 1995); and Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, ed. with Michael Barnett (forthcoming, Cornell University Press, 2001); and numerous articles on international politics and Middle Eastern affairs.
Besides his academic activities, Professor Telhami has been active in the foreign policy arena and has been a contributor to the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times. While a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, he served as advisor to the United States delegation to the United Nations during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, and was on the staff of Congressman Lee Hamilton. He is the author of a report on Persian Gulf security for the Council on Foreign Relations, and the co-drafter of another Council report on the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition, he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the advisory committee of Human Rights Watch/Middle East. He has been a member of the American delegation of the Trilateral American/Israeli/Palestinian Anti-Incitement Committee mandated by the Wye River Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. He also has a weekly radio commentary that broadcasts all over the Middle East. He was recently appointed by President Clinton to the Board of the United States Institute of Peace. . (Columbia, 1990). Back.
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