

**THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS:
A CASE OF INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING**

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The Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, concluded with the mediation of the United States on September 17, 1978, represent a remarkable event in Middle East history. For three decades Egypt had been Israel's most avowed enemy, having fought four wars and championed the pan-Arab and Palestinian causes. A generation of Egyptians grew up knowing Israel simply as "the illegitimate Zionist enemy" that had displaced the Palestinian people. It is no wonder, then, that when President Anwar el Sadat of Egypt announced his intention to visit Jerusalem, in a gesture that led to Camp David, most people were surprised, some indeed shocked; Israelis danced in the streets in a state of euphoria. And when the accords were finally signed, the repercussions were equally dramatic: Egypt, the historical leader of the Arab world, was expelled from the Arab League, and the Egyptian people showed no great enthusiasm. The Camp David accords are thus something of a puzzle.

As a case of international bargaining, Camp David provides an unusually appropriate opportunity for examining the relative explanatory power of several causal variables. At the level of superpower and regional relations, the outcome of the Camp David process had a substantial impact on superpower interests, the chances of war, and regional politics in the Middle East. In addition, the bargaining process, involving the highest levels of government, was so well defined (especially in its later stages), so clearly isolated, and so intensely continuous, that it offers a clear insight into the effect of the art of negotiating on the final agreements.

Moreover, the striking contrasts between the systems of government in Egypt, Israel, and the United States should shed some light on the relative effects of internal structures on the process of bargaining. Finally, if personalities ever play a major role in international affairs, then surely the dominant personalities of Anwar Sadat and Israel's Menachem Begin should be expected to show their unmistakable marks on the events leading to the accords, especially in the context of their respective systems of government.

Although the accords were bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt, they also proposed a framework for Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank and in Gaza —non-Egyptian territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 War. The stakes were high, and the terms promised to affect Middle East politics for years to come. Explaining these accords and understanding the negotiations leading to them, while of interest to students of international bargaining, is a challenging task.

THE PRE-NEGOTIATION CONTEXT

Traditional Egyptian Pan-Arabism and hostility toward Israel as the "illegitimate, temporary, Zionist entity" were largely based on a profound sense that the Palestinians had been wrongly displaced, and that Arab land was forcibly taken from the Palestinians when Israel was established in 1948. Adding to this hostile Egyptian attitude was Israel's collaboration with France and Britain, the former colonial powers, in attacking Egypt following its nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956.

Although Israel and Egypt had been in a state of war since 1948, the road to Camp David began in the wake of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In that war Israel had soundly defeated the

armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and had occupied the West Bank and Gaza (the only parts of Palestine not under Israeli control), Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, and Syria's Golan Heights. As a result, the reality and durability (if not the legitimacy) of the State of Israel were reinforced in Arab minds. In addition, the previously rhetorical confrontation with Israel became a costly business for Egypt and Syria; portions of their own territories were occupied and many of their people became refugees.

The change in atmosphere demonstrated itself quickly after the war when key Arab states, notably Egypt, accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Besides calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, Resolution 242 also affirmed the right of all states in the region to live within secure borders. It was the first time that Arab states had officially signaled their willingness to recognize the State of Israel.

But progress was slow. Israel, with complete military dominance and newly-occupied territories, had little incentive to negotiate. The Egyptians had minimal leverage not only over Israel, but also over oil-rich Arab states, whose economic aid Egypt needed, and the Soviet Union, whose military aid was necessary to rebuild the Egyptian army. The superpowers were preoccupied with other issues. Except for the initiative of U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers in 1969-1970, the United States did not seem inclined to expend much effort on the problem. And although the Egyptians accepted the Rogers Plan, largely based on UN Resolution 242, even before Anwar Sadat became president, the plan finally failed due to lack of support from Israel. Israel also accepted Resolution 242 following the 1967 War, but by 1970 Israeli sentiment for keeping significant parts of the territories had increased.

A breakthrough seemed possible in 1972. To the surprise of most analysts, President Sadat suddenly expelled Soviet advisers from Egypt and signaled to Washington his willingness

to negotiate. He hoped that his move would open the way for better relations with Washington, which he could eventually use as leverage with Israel. Indeed, Ezer Weizman, former Israeli defense minister, viewed Sadat's moves with concern. "In driving out the Russians from Egypt," Weizman wrote, "[Sadat] brought the West closer to him, necessarily diluting its loyalty to us ... costing us our position as the cosseted godchild of the Western world."¹

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, however, did not see the need for an urgent response. The Egyptian army was considered weak, Sadat had not yet established domestic or international credibility, and the Soviets were cooperating with the United States in the atmosphere of detente. (The Soviet Union, for example, partly out of deference to Nixon's wishes, restrained the flow of arms to Cairo.)

But, as had happened before in Middle East history, the unexpected startled the international community — despite perceived military weakness, in October 1973 Egypt and Syria launched a surprise war against Israel, without much hope of military victory. This war turned out to be the catalyst for the Camp David negotiations.

Most Middle East experts now agree that the war was, in effect, the first bargaining move by Egypt and Syria. Although the war ended in a military stalemate, Egypt and Syria performed much better than expected. More important, the war led to a serious confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, and created an urgent need to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. A simultaneous Arab oil embargo also highlighted a serious tension among several American interests in the Middle East: the commitment to Israel on the one hand, and the need to secure the flow of oil to the West and to minimize Soviet influence in the region on the other. Only through a durable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict could this tension be substantially

reduced. Indeed, an appreciation of this dilemma at a time of energy shortage later led the Carter Administration to go to great lengths to resolve this conflict.

It was in the wake of the 1973 War that the United States began to play a more active role in the Middle East peace process. Efforts to negotiate "disengagement of forces" agreements between Egypt, Syria, and Israel were mediated by Secretary Kissinger. In 1974-75, disengagement agreements were reached between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights and between Egypt and Israel on the Sinai. These agreements defused the immediate crisis and minimized the chance of surprise war. But the agreements were intended only as a prelude to a comprehensive settlement to the conflict, to be negotiated at an international conference in Geneva and co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Geneva Conference bogged down over the same substantive and procedural issues that figured heavily in the Camp David process: Palestinian representation and the future status of the Israeli-occupied territories. Moreover, while Israel viewed Geneva largely as a "cover," preferring instead to negotiate with each Arab state bilaterally, the Arab states, with the possible exception of Egypt, preferred collective bargaining as a way of improving their leverage. It was not until the late 1970s that conditions arose for the more serious pursuit of a negotiated settlement by Egypt, Israel, and the United States.

In 1977 the Carter Administration began a new Middle East initiative. Strategically, Egypt's continued shift away from the Soviet Union offered the United States an opportunity to play a leading role in the negotiation process while limiting Soviet participation. Regionally, several events influenced the new American effort. First, the Israeli Government's decision to hold early elections (in May) suggested that a solid government would be in place by midyear. Second, U.S. officials became concerned about Egypt's political stability as riots broke out in

Egypt following food price increases.² More generally, the United States enjoyed good relations with the primary regional actors: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Finally, at a more individual level, President Carter's personal interest in a resolution to the conflict was important to the new initiative.³

Much of the early U.S. strategy toward the Middle East was based on the idea of holding another Geneva Conference. According to this framework, all parties to the dispute — including the Palestinians — would be represented, and the United States and Soviet Union would serve as co-chairs of the discussions. There was initial consensus within the Carter Administration that bilateral talks with all participants should take place before Geneva and that the objective should be a comprehensive settlement based on the "territory for peace" formula.⁴ This formula was itself based on Resolution 242, and stressed the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and the "withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict."

For Egypt, the incentives to move toward a peaceful settlement were largely international and regional in nature.⁵ At the strategic level, it had become clear that by the mid-1970s Egyptian reliance on military power to increase its bargaining leverage was ineffective. Sadat's abrogation of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty was the beginning of a closer Egyptian relationship with the United States intended to undercut U.S.-Israeli commitments, and possibly increase bargaining power for the future. Regionally, changes in the military and economic distribution of power made Egypt highly dependent on other oil-rich Arab states and inhibited its ability to prevent Israel from politically dominating the region.⁶

Israel's interests in renewed negotiations probably stemmed from its long-term relationship with the United States, as well as from perceived regional benefits. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin viewed a settlement as insurance for continued U.S. military and

economic support, and as a means to increase Israel's regional influence to the detriment of renewed Arab unity.

Although all parties had an interest in obtaining a peaceful settlement, the Geneva framework became increasingly inappropriate throughout 1977. There had been various high-level meetings between the United States and the parties concerned, and it was generally felt that while progress had been made on procedural matters, issues of substance remained unresolved. Other events contributed to a sense of deadlock late in the year. The Israelis became frustrated with the Geneva model when it appeared that the United States would insist on Resolution 242, and they resented continuing efforts to have the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) present during negotiations. Sadat, on the other hand, objected to the idea of Geneva being a negotiating forum rather than a perfunctory document signing ceremony. He preferred that the details be worked out ahead of time, preferably according to the U.S. proposal. Egypt's bargaining power, Sadat feared, would be undercut in real negotiations, especially with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad and Jordan's King Hussein at the table.

Meanwhile, the United States was frustrated by Israeli military bombings of PLO targets in South Lebanon and the continued building of settlements in the occupied territories. Various bilateral meetings occurred between the United States, Arabs, and Israelis, but agreement on the structure of the negotiations and on PLO representation proved elusive. Finally, the Carter Administration tried to provide impetus for the process on October 1, 1977, by issuing a joint U.S.-Soviet communiqué regarding a format for the Geneva Conference, only to be caught politically on the defensive by conservatives and the pro-Israel lobby in Congress.

Although U.S., Egyptian, and Israeli officials continued discussions on the structure and substance of Geneva, there was a general sense that efforts toward negotiations had stalled.

Continued Israeli opposition to Egypt's position that Palestinians sanctioned by the PLO be part of a unified Arab delegation prompted President Carter to appeal personally to Sadat to help break the stalemate. It was less than a month later that Sadat, in a speech before the Egyptian National Assembly, announced that "he was prepared to go anywhere for peace, even to talk to the Israelis in their Knesset in Jerusalem."⁷ When Israel decided to take him up on this suggestion by issuing a formal invitation, Sadat accepted as much of the world watched.

During his historic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, Sadat launched his opening bargaining position in his speech to the Knesset. This position was essentially consistent with Egypt's previous demands, calling for the return of all Arab territories in exchange for peace with Israel, and vowing that Egypt would not accept a bilateral treaty with Israel that would exclude other Arab interests. Egypt's formal opening position at Camp David was largely similar.

Despite the hard line of Sadat's formal statement, many of his advisers were concerned that he was inadvertently making poor bargaining moves. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, who apparently agreed with Sadat on the need to make peace with Israel, resigned largely because he thought that Sadat was making unnecessary compromises. He argued, for example, that in going to Jerusalem, Sadat was recognizing Israel before the actual negotiations and thus undermining Egyptian leverage. Similarly, he believed that Sadat's declaration in the Knesset of "no more war" removed Egypt's military leverage prematurely.⁸ Sadat disagreed, believing that the goodwill his visit would generate in Israel and the United States would bring bigger rewards.

What may be considered Israel's opening bargaining position was presented the following month during Prime Minister Begin's visit to Ismailiyya, Egypt. The key new element in that proposal was the concept of granting "autonomy" to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza instead of returning the territories to Arab sovereignty. Sadat rejected this proposal at once as

unacceptable, believed Begin to be ungrateful for Sadat's own initiative, and threatened to call off the talks. From that point on, the process made little progress. Concerned about wasting a historic opportunity, the United States decided to act.

Because the Carter Administration viewed Begin as somewhat intransigent, an effort was made to first deal with Sadat directly and then to focus on Israel. At Carter's invitation, Sadat arrived in the United States in early February 1978 for talks at Camp David. The discussions revolved around the Egyptian stand on the occupied territories as well as potential Israeli compromises on Resolution 242 and settlements. Yet, like previous meetings, there tended to be agreement only on procedural issues; substantively, discussions centered on bilateral Egyptian-Israeli concerns (i.e., withdrawal from Sinai) and were less focused on the broader Palestinian problem.⁹

With the hope of injecting some momentum into the negotiation process, the United States sent Vice President Walter Mondale to Israel and Egypt in early July, and later that month Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with the Israeli and Egyptian foreign ministers in London. These discussions produced a number of proposals on the future of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel was particularly sensitive to the issue of sovereignty. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan stressed that the farthest they would go "would be an end to the occupation, withdrawal of the occupying forces and a discussion of sovereignty after five years."¹⁰ Both Israel and Egypt seemed willing to discuss various ideas pertaining to the West Bank and Gaza, but no consensus emerged. Fearing a complete breakdown in the talks, and sensing that the political clock would soon be against him, President Carter decided to convene a summit meeting with Begin and Sadat. His invitations to Begin and Sadat were quickly accepted.

THE STRUCTURE OF BARGAINING

Even before formal negotiations began, there was a great deal of maneuvering by each side to improve the bargaining situation in its favor. Two controversial issues surfaced: the role of the United States in the negotiations and the wisdom of isolated, open-ended negotiations at the highest level.

The first issue boiled down to this: should the United States play the role of a "full partner" in the negotiations, or should its role be limited to that of a "mediator" in bilateral negotiations between Israel and Egypt? Egypt favored partnership, believing that it badly needed American leverage with Israel in order to improve its position. As Carter noted, "Sadat has urged me to play an active role, to be a full partner. . . ." ¹¹ Israel, fearing U.S. pressure, favored the more limited role of mediator. As Ezer Weizman put it,

My objections to excessive American involvement in the negotiations with Egypt stemmed from a simple consideration: I foresaw that U.S. interests lay closer to Egypt's than to ours, so that it would not be long before Israeli negotiators would have to cope with the dual confrontation as they faced a Washington/Cairo axis. ¹²

The United States itself felt it was necessary to play an active role; Carter wrote that he "saw no possibility of progress if the United States should withdraw and simply leave the negotiations to the Egyptians and the Israelis. We wanted final decisions at Camp David and . . . we were going to put forward our positions forcefully." ¹³

But the United States may have sent mixed signals to Egypt and Israel. On the one hand, it assured Israel that it would not seek to impose a solution or exert pressure, prompting Begin to complain during the negotiations "that the United States negotiators were all agreeing with the

Egyptian demands that the Sinai settlements be removed, and that this was no way for a mediating team to act.”¹⁴ On the other hand, Carter assured Egypt that the United States intended to use its leverage with Israel and secretly agreed with Sadat on a mutual strategy to generate Israeli compromise.¹⁵ But Carter changed his mind, apparently on moral grounds, without informing Sadat of this change.

Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, suggested that wiretapping the cabins of the Israeli and Egyptian delegations would enhance whatever role the United States played. Carter refused to go along with this suggestion, again apparently on moral grounds. As it turned out, both the Israeli and Egyptian delegations seem to have assumed that their cabins were bugged and conducted their private deliberations in the open air.¹⁶

The second issue involved the desirability of secluded, top-level negotiations without a time limit. Carter believed that seclusion would allow maximum American leverage without domestic pressure, and that the involvement of the leaders themselves was essential to the kinds of decisions required for success. Others, like Henry Kissinger, criticized this approach on the grounds that it was highly risky. Given global attention and expectations, a failure would seriously undermine American prestige, and setting no time limit would eventually put pressure on the United States as other matters began to require presidential attention.

The Israeli team was not unanimous in their views on this issue. Although some, like Ezer Weizman, were concerned that such a format would allow Egypt and the United States to gang up on Israel, Prime Minister Begin was apparently less concerned.¹⁷ Impatient with the slow progress of the negotiations, the Egyptian team favored this format both as a last-ditch effort to save Sadat's initiative and also as a way of maximizing U.S. pressure on Israel.

In the end, Carter had his way. For thirteen remarkable days in September 1978, delegations from the United States, Israel, and Egypt, led by Carter, Begin, and Sadat, met in the seclusion of Camp David, away from reporters and television cameras. The outside world, intrigued and attentive, anxiously awaited the results, for the outcome promised to affect Middle East politics in significant ways. War and peace were hanging in the balance.

FORMAL BARGAINING AT CAMP DAVID

Issues of Bargaining

The actual boundaries of each actor's position are difficult to draw, and should be left to the student of the case to speculate about. There are, however, several bargaining issues that can be stated at the outset, based on the opening positions of Egypt and Israel. These are issues over which the game between Israel and Egypt was zero-sum; in this regard they were truly bargaining issues.

The first issue was the extent of normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. While Israel's long-term regional strategy required at least a peace treaty with Egypt, it also sought maximum normalization of relations. Egypt, however, sought to minimize normalization so as to retain some degree of leverage with Israel over other issues and to make the agreements more acceptable at home and in the Arab world. The second issue was the extent of demilitarization of the Sinai after its return to Egypt. Israel sought maximum demilitarization so as to inhibit Egyptian military leverage, while Egypt sought minimum demilitarization so as to retain the military option in the future.

The third issue was the degree of linkage between normalization of relations and future agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt sought maximum linkage and a role in future negotiations (to prevent unilateral Israeli decisions) as its ticket for future influence in the Arab world. Israel, on the other hand, sought the opposite. The fourth issue was the extent to which Egypt would be able to secure some *a priori* general agreement on principles — the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and the Israeli intention in principle to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. These were issues that could only be resolved through bargaining. How they were finally resolved can be assessed only by examining the bargaining process.

The Bargaining Process

Stage I (Days 1-4): Opening Moves and Testing the Waters

The first four days at Camp David involved the opening bargaining moves by each side and, in some important ways, helped to define the nature of bargaining for the following week.

On the first day, September 5, 1978, Israel and Egypt focused on the kind of role the United States would play; Carter met individually with both Begin and Sadat. Sadat promised that he would present Carter with a formal proposal on the following day. He also emphasized that he was doing so partly to save Carter from having to put forth an American proposal. Sadat apparently assumed that the conspiratorial "partnership" formed with Carter several months before still applied. Under this partnership, Sadat was to advance an extreme position, wait for an Israeli counter-proposal, and then Carter would save the day with a "compromise" proposal, the elements of which would already have been approved by Sadat. Although Carter had given up on this approach, Sadat did not know this.¹⁸

Begin's first meeting with Carter also centered on the American role. Continuing his campaign to limit the U.S. role to that of a mediator, Begin armed himself with a letter from former U.S. president Gerald Ford, signed in conjunction with the Sinai disengagement agreement of September 1975, stating that the United States would consult Israel before putting forward any peace proposals.¹⁹ Begin also stated that there had to be two agreements:

... the most important was between the United States and Israel, and the other, of secondary importance but obviously also crucial, was between Israel and Egypt. The most important one would have to come first. He wanted the world to know that there were no serious differences between Israel and the United States.²⁰

Responding to Israeli concerns about relations with the United States, Carter wondered if offering Israel a mutual defense treaty would help.²¹

Day two was the first day of substantive negotiations, during which formal proposals were put forth. Sadat had come to Camp David with a detailed proposal, which he presented to Carter for review. Carter, however, was deeply alarmed by the Egyptian position. The document called for complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, dismantling of settlements, a five-year transition of authority in the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan and Egypt respectively, which would culminate in Palestinian self-determination, and other traditional Egyptian positions. In exchange for all this, Egypt was prepared to sign an accord, formally recognize Israel, and would support Israeli security measures and access to religious shrines in Jerusalem. Sadat, however, assured Carter that this was not Egypt's "bottom line," but one to pressure Begin into making concessions. Sadat then gave Carter a typewritten statement, the first page marked "For the President's Eyes Only," outlining Egypt's fallback positions, which would serve to break stalemates in the negotiations.²² This document had apparently been prepared with the

knowledge of one Egyptian aide, Usama El-Baz, who advised Sadat against it on the grounds that it would undermine Egypt's bargaining position. But Sadat believed that cultivating a relationship of trust and partnership with Carter would help Egypt's position.²³ Sadat cautioned Carter "not to reveal these to anyone, because it would destroy his negotiating strength if his final positions were to be placed on the table at this early time."²⁴ As he read the document, Carter "saw for the first time that we might possibly achieve substantial success."²⁵

In view of the terms of Egypt's fallback position, Carter's optimism was understandable. To begin with, Sadat indicated for the first time his willingness to normalize relations with Israel, including diplomatic and consular relations, free movement of people across borders, and trade relations. Only weeks before, Sadat had told Carter that such normal relations would have to wait until the next generation, given the hostile sentiments at the popular level. A second change in the Egyptian position was the willingness to agree that Jerusalem should not be a divided city — a central Israeli demand. In addition, Sadat agreed that Palestinian representatives should come exclusively from the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza — also an Israeli demand, but an unacceptable position to most Palestinians.

Begin and Sadat had a meeting the same afternoon, in which Sadat presented Begin with his formal position. He also insisted that he was interested in a comprehensive settlement that dealt with all the controversial issues; he "would not sign a Sinai agreement before an agreement is also reached on the West Bank."²⁶ That meeting was followed by a session between Begin and Carter, during which Begin strongly denounced the Egyptian proposal. But it was not until the following day that a full Israeli response came, generating heated arguments between Sadat and Begin that led to a new negotiating approach.

As the three leaders met on the third day of the negotiations, Begin, excited and irate, offered a point-by-point rebuttal of Sadat's proposal. "This smacks of a victorious state dictating peace to the defeated," he declared, concluding that, "This document is not a proper basis for negotiations."²⁷ Sadat replied that Begin was only interested in the retention of occupied territories: "Premier Begin, you want land! . . . Security, yes! Land, no!" Sadat shouted. Carter remarked that he "thought Sadat would explode."²⁸

Although Carter was trying to keep the negotiations on track, he also complained about Israeli positions, and about the fact that the Israelis had not indicated to him what their minimal needs were:

My problem is with the issues that do not really relate to Israel's security. I must have your frank assessment. My greatest strength here is your confidence—but I don't feel that I have your trust. What do you really need for your defense? It is ridiculous to speak of Jordan overrunning Israel! I believe I can get from Sadat what you *really* need, but I just do not have your confidence.²⁹

Carter also agreed with Sadat that the negotiations should seek a comprehensive settlement, and accused Begin of wanting to keep the West Bank, suggesting that Begin's self-rule/autonomy plan presented at Ismailiyya was a "subterfuge."

After that meeting, it became clear to the American team that the positions of Egypt and Israel remained far apart and that Begin and Sadat could not interact constructively on a personal level. This latter point resulted in more active involvement by Carter and an attempt to keep Sadat and Begin separate as much as possible. From that point on, Sadat and Begin did not attend any negotiating sessions until the last sessions at Camp David.

At the same time, however, Secretary Vance seemed to make some progress in a meeting with Foreign Minister Dayan and Defense Minister Weizman. Dayan and Weizman gave indications that the Israelis were willing to make concessions on the issue of removing Sinai settlements, which was central to Sadat: "[Dayan] and Weizman hinted that the settlements in Sinai would not be an obstacle, and that some type of moratorium on settlements in the West Bank should be possible."³⁰ This seemed particularly promising after the frustrating day with Sadat and Begin.

Later that day, Dayan appeared to support the idea of an American proposal. He did not find Sadat's acceptable, and the American delegation was increasingly inclined to present one.

Whatever hope had emerged from Vance's meeting with Israeli officials, especially on the issue of Sinai settlements, disappeared on day four. The day began with a meeting between Carter and Begin, in which Begin once again dwelled on his criticism of Sadat's proposal. Alarmed by Begin's negative mood, Carter sought to assure Begin that Sadat was nonetheless reasonable. In this effort, Carter revealed to Begin that he already had several Egyptian compromises in hand. William Quandt, participating in Camp David as a member of the National Security Council staff, wrote: "What the effect of this revelation was on Begin can only be surmised, but from then on Begin adopted an unyielding position on settlements in Sinai."³¹ Perhaps he concluded that if Sadat could use the tactic of adopting a deliberately hard position at the outset, then he might do the same. But unlike Sadat, he had no intention of telling Carter what his fallback position really was. "It soon became clear to the American side," Quandt concluded, "that the Israeli strategy was to hold off making concessions on the things most important to Sadat, such as settlements in Sinai, until he agreed to drop most of his unacceptable demands on the West Bank and Gaza."³²

The third and fourth days thus defined the next stage of the negotiations, during which the United States would seek to develop a realistic proposal, and in which the issue of Sinai settlement would play a central (and, to the Egyptians and Americans, frustrating) role.

Stage II (Days 5-7). Developing an American Proposal

By day five, central elements of the U.S. proposal were emerging. Following meetings between Carter and the American drafting team (during which Carter presented a list he had prepared called "Necessary Elements of Agreement"), a more modest approach to the negotiations was crystallizing. Among these elements were an end to war, permanent peace, free transit by Israel through all international waterways, secure and recognized borders, a full range of normal relations between nations, phased withdrawal by Israel from and demilitarization of the Sinai, monitoring stations to insure compliance with this agreement, termination of blockades and boycotts, a procedure for settling future disputes, the extension of the principles to future agreements between Israel and its other neighbors, rapid granting of full autonomy to the Palestinians followed by a five-year transition period for determining the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the West Bank into specified security locations, prompt settlement of the refugee problem, and a three-month period to complete a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.³³

Perhaps most significant was the fact that by the end of this day Carter was no longer speaking of the comprehensive settlement he had earlier envisaged. He now advocated a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and believed that delays in negotiating a West Bank/Gaza agreement were "somebody else's problem. He said that he hoped both agreements could move in parallel, but it

was clear that the Egyptian-Israeli one took priority and if nothing happened in the West Bank for ten years he would not really care very much.”³⁴

Because day five was a Saturday, no negotiating sessions were held. But on Sunday, day six, the American team, headed by Carter, met with Israeli negotiators for more than five hours and presented the U.S. proposal. During these sessions, Carter revealed to the Israelis the new priorities that he had articulated to the American team the day before, adding that: "The question of eventual sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza would not be solved at Camp David.”³⁵ Nonetheless, Begin's response was one of aggressive criticism.

In any case, a pattern emerged following the sessions on Sunday; with the American proposal as the central negotiating document, each side would be given time to react to it and propose written changes, which might or might not be incorporated into the proposal.

The seventh day, during which the Israelis offered written modifications to the U.S. proposal, was marked by one noteworthy development. Although the focus up to this point had been primarily on the Sinai on and Israeli-Egyptian relations, general principles pertaining to the West Bank and Gaza were also discussed as part of a single framework document. On this day apparently based on a suggestion by Dayan, the idea emerged for two *separate* documents.

Another noteworthy point is procedural in nature, but was typical throughout the negotiations. Carter was involved in all levels of the negotiations, including those involving only lower-level negotiators from the Israeli team. The Israeli side preferred not to involve Begin at every stage of the negotiations. Carter's dealings with the Egyptian team, however, were typically through Sadat. Moreover, the American team spent much more time with the Israelis than with the Egyptians. As Carter put it:

I would draft a proposal I considered reasonable, take it to Sadat for quick approval or slight modification, and then spend hours or days working on the same point with Israeli delegation. Sometimes, in the end, the change of a word or phrase would satisfy Begin, and I would merely inform Sadat.³⁶

Stage III (Days 8-11): Deadlock

The period between September 12 and September 15 was one of gloom for the negotiations, and failure seemed the most likely outcome. To begin with, tension appeared within the Egyptian delegation. While Sadat was more accommodating toward the American proposal, his advisers were seriously opposed to major aspects of the plan. Foreign Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel objected to the deletion of language referring to the 1949 armistice lines as the basis for future borders, with only minor modifications, and to what he saw as a lack of concern for the Palestinian issue. Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs El-Baz complained that the document pertaining to the West Bank and Gaza did not specify an Israeli commitment to eventual withdrawal, and that while Egypt would agree to recognize Israel, he did not see the need to exchange ambassadors.

Sadat also appeared concerned. He expressed worries that the U.S. proposal would be totally unacceptable to the rest of the Arab world, and especially to Saudi Arabia. He nonetheless seemed committed to the proposal.

The Israelis, too, were concerned. Dayan argued that the aim of the negotiations remained too ambitious, and that a new goal of reaching only limited agreements should be set. Even on the issue of the Sinai, Dayan thought that an agreement was not likely, because Israel would not accept the central Egyptian demand of removing the settlements. When American negotiators refused to change the objective of the negotiations, Dayan predicted failure.

Day nine brought nothing but bad news. After several negotiating sessions between the Israelis and the Americans, the focus remained on the single issue of Sinai settlements. Israel continued to be adamantly opposed to their removal, and Sadat grew more frustrated.

By day ten, failure seemed imminent as the deadlock continued over the issue of settlements. Carter began to think that the remaining objective should be to reduce the impact of failure and preserve his special relationship with Sadat.

Carter faced a new problem on day eleven. Earlier, Carter had remarked that, "although we had been at Camp David only three days, the affairs of the rest of the world seemed to fade rapidly from our minds."³⁷ But by day eleven, these affairs could no longer be ignored. FBI Director William Webster, Attorney General Griffin Bell, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown all needed to see the president on urgent business, and "These kinds of visits were becoming frequent and time consuming."³⁸

With Carter aware of "the realization that we could go no further," the question became how to deal with failure.³⁹ Carter's plan was simple: Summarize the differences between Egypt and Israel on the following day (Saturday), issue a joint statement adjourning the conference on Sunday, and put an embargo on further public statements until Monday. This plan was quickly handwritten and delivered to Begin and Sadat, both of whom accepted it.

But even this minimal face-saving plan suddenly faced failure. News came that Sadat and the rest of the Egyptian delegation were packing, ready to leave in frustration. Carter faced not only a failure of the conference but serious political ramifications, his special relationship with Sadat hanging in the balance. "I envisioned the ultimate alliance of most Arab nations to the Soviet Union, perhaps joined by Egypt after a few months had passed."⁴⁰

Stage IV (Days 11-13): Breakthrough

The news of Sadat's impending departure had Carter rushing to Sadat's cabin. The encounter between the two men was apparently the most confrontational since the two had met. Carter was particularly harsh with Sadat, warning that if Sadat left,

it will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the United States and Egypt. There is no way we can ever explain this to our people. It would mean an end to this peacekeeping effort, into which I have put so much investment. It would probably mean an end to my Presidency because this whole effort will be discredited. And last but not least, it will mean the end of something that is very precious to me: my friendship with you.⁴¹

It is useful to put Carter's remarks into proper context. The American team believed that what both Israel and Egypt wanted, even more than an agreement with each other, was a close relationship with the United States at the expense of the other. They both could live with failure, so long as the other was blamed and close relations with the United States were preserved. During the first week, for example, when Begin believed that the negotiations were headed toward failure, the only question for him was how to maneuver to avoid blame. This was also true of Egypt. When he came to Camp David, Sadat apparently believed that the negotiations were likely to fail due to what he considered Begin's intransigence. Consequently, on his way to Camp David, Sadat summoned his major ambassadors and briefed them that, following the failure of the negotiations, he wanted Begin blamed, hoping that this would lead to closer American-Egyptian relations at the expense of Israel.⁴²

According to Kamel, Sadat told his colleagues that during the encounter on day eleven, Carter had explained to Sadat that if an agreement were reached at Camp David, his (Carter's) reelection would be guaranteed, enabling him to focus on the follow-up negotiations.⁴³

Following Carter's determined remarks, Sadat explained his reasons for leaving. He said that Dayan had told him that Israel would not sign any agreement at Camp David, and that his aides had pointed out a serious problem with the approach of simply articulating differences. If negotiations were later resumed, the Israelis could say: "The Egyptians have already agreed to all these points. Now we will use what they have signed as the original basis for all future negotiations."⁴⁴

When Carter replied that there would be complete understanding that if any nation rejected any part of the agreements, none of the proposals would remain in effect, Sadat's reply suddenly revived Carter's hope. "If you give me this statement," Sadat declared, "I will stick with you to the end."⁴⁵ The immediate crisis was thus averted. Later that night Carter joined Sadat in his cabin to watch the Leon Spinks-Muhammad Ali boxing match as though nothing had happened!

Following the Carter-Sadat encounter, there emerged a last-ditch American strategy that attempted to conclude a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli treaty. This strategy was intended to persuade Israel to relinquish the Sinai settlements and airfields and add some language about Palestinian rights to the framework agreement on the West Bank and Gaza that would make the agreement more acceptable to other Arab states.

There was also an alternative plan in case Israel failed to make the final concessions that would assure an agreement. A "failure speech," prepared by William Quandt of the National Security Council staff, would be delivered to the American people explaining the failure of the negotiations. The speech would outline the remaining gap between Israel and Egypt and explain that Sadat was prepared to make major concessions, including the recognition of Israel and detailed security provisions. More important, the speech would specify two obstacles to an

agreement: Israel's unwillingness to relinquish the Sinai settlements and its refusal to acknowledge the applicability of Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza, which would commit Israel to withdrawal from most of these territories in the event of a final agreement.

On both points, Carter was prepared to say that he sided with Sadat. He would ask the American public for understanding as the diplomatic process continued, and he would appeal to the Israeli public to urge its leaders not to miss the chance for peace. Doing so would of course have meant a confrontation of some kind with Israel, and could have proven to be politically painful for the president.⁴⁶

On that day, however, there were already signs that the speech might not be necessary. Weizman indicated to the Americans that Israel might be willing to give up the Sinai airfields in exchange for two new fields — to be built by the United States in Israel's Negev desert. On that issue, the United States tried to persuade Sadat to allow the United States to take over one of the air bases, but Sadat refused. Later, Weizman's proposal was adopted following an American commitment to pay \$3 billion to build two modern air bases in the Negev.

On the Sinai settlements, too, there was an emerging Israeli consensus. Most members of the Israeli delegation indicated a willingness to give up the settlements in exchange for peace with Egypt, although Begin himself held out a little longer.

Day twelve was marked by the focus on the West Bank and Gaza and by the visible absence of the Egyptian delegation from the substantive negotiations over this issue. Basically, the American draft for a framework agreement on the West Bank and Gaza had envisioned three stages. The first would have Israel and Egypt agreeing on general principles, such as elections for self-government on the West Bank and Gaza. The second would deal with setting up the interim government and would involve Jordan in the negotiations. The final step would commence no

later than three years into the interim period, when negotiations (including, for the first time, elected representatives of the Palestinians, in addition to Jordan, Egypt, and Israel) would begin on the West Bank and Gaza. The aim of these negotiations would be to determine the final status of the territories following the five-year transitional period. The problem was that the crucial final stage had not been adequately addressed. In particular, no agreement had been reached on how the final status would be determined, who (if anyone) would have veto power, and what would happen should the negotiations fail. These issues were the center of the negotiations on day twelve.

As mentioned above, the negotiations were conducted largely between the United States and Israel. Although these issues were obviously central to Egypt, the Egyptian delegation was not involved. As far as the Egyptians were concerned, the key element pertaining to the final status was the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" which, at least in Sadat's mind, would entail final Israeli withdrawal.⁴⁷ Although no specific agreement had been reached on this issue, the draft proposal appended Resolution 242 to the framework agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. Because the principle in question was part of Resolution 242, Quandt speculated that Sadat might have been satisfied with this arrangement, leaving the details to the United States.⁴⁸

During the negotiations between the Israeli and U.S. delegations, it became clear that Israel would not commit itself to eventual withdrawal; Israel planned to put forth a claim for sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. The United States, on the other hand, believed that some agreement had to be reached on this issue in order to make the accords more acceptable to other Arab states.

Israeli Attorney General Ahron Barak put forward a compromise proposal, which was intentionally ambiguous on the grounds that there was no time for a final resolution of the issue. This proposal was reluctantly accepted by the United States. The central element of the plan was to divide the last stage of negotiation into two parts: the first part would involve Jordan and Israel, while the second part would involve the Palestinians' elected representatives plus Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. The agreement would then specify that Resolution 242 would apply to the "negotiations." Israel could thus claim that it applied only to the negotiations between Jordan and Israel (where the West Bank and Gaza would not be discussed); Egypt and the United States would claim that it applied to both parts of the negotiations. "The ambiguity was deliberate, and probably essential."⁴⁹

In the evening of day twelve (Saturday, September 16), members of the Israeli delegation, including Begin, Dayan, and Barak, met with Carter and Vance for a crucial session in which a key American objective was to get Begin's approval for removing the Sinai settlements. Carter insisted on a firm commitment, which Begin refused. A compromise solution was finally reached: if agreement was reached on all other issues, Begin would let the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) decide the settlements issue. Satisfied with this formula, Carter believed that he could sell it to Sadat.

Several other controversial issues were also resolved during this session. For example, Begin objected to the term "Palestinian people" appearing in the draft. As a solution, Carter agreed to write a letter to Begin acknowledging that Begin understood this term to mean simply the Palestinian Arabs of "Judea and Samaria" (Begin's terms for the West Bank and Gaza). Begin's problem was that the acknowledgment of the Palestinians as a "people" would entail

recognition of their right to self-determination, and might also raise this issue for Palestinians *outside* the occupied territories.

Another Begin objection, to the phrase "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians, was removed by agreeing to an Israeli amendment. This amendment made the language more ambiguous by stating that Resolution 242 applied to the "negotiations" and not to the "results of the negotiations," because of the Israeli intention to claim sovereignty over the territories. Later, Begin also received a letter from Carter, appended to the agreements, acknowledging that "you have informed me" that "in each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions 'Palestinians' or 'Palestinian People' are being and will be construed by you as 'Palestinian Arabs.'"⁵⁰

With these issues resolved, one central issue remained: Israeli settlement-building on the West Bank and in Gaza. The United States and Egypt wanted an indefinite freeze on the building of settlements in the territories for two primary reasons. First, the official position of both Egypt and the United States was that such activity was illegal. Second, Israel could build enough settlements to make withdrawal impractical, thus prejudicing the outcome of future negotiations. Israel, on the other hand, felt that Jews had a right to settle in "Judea and Samaria." This important issue was finally resolved under peculiar circumstances, which probably led to unintentional ambiguity that resulted in the heated controversy that followed the Camp David accords.

By the morning of day thirteen it looked like an agreement was finally at hand. Carter had been able to convince Sadat that the agreement was acceptable, though Sadat himself had much more difficulty in convincing his aides. Foreign Minister Kamel found the agreements so unacceptable that he resigned even before leaving Camp David. This was the second resignation

of an Egyptian foreign minister since Sadat announced his initiative: Ismail Fahmy had resigned over Sadat's plan to visit Jerusalem. Nonetheless, Sadat was determined to go ahead despite his advisers' objections.

But just as Carter thought an agreement was at hand, a new development threatened failure: the issue of Jerusalem. Although Sadat had insisted that the agreements clearly specify Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem (occupied by Israel in the 1967 War), the Israelis claimed sovereignty over the entire "unified" city. A compromise solution had been accepted by all parties: the text of the agreements would not specifically refer to Jerusalem, and a statement of each side's well-known position would be appended to the agreements. When the United States conveyed the text of the American letter on this issue, Begin objected strongly and threatened to walk out of the negotiations. In the end, the United States modified the language of the letter to be acceptable to Begin.

By late afternoon on Sunday (September 17), an agreement was finally at hand. But as Quandt notes, Sadat "was quiet, almost grim. There was no sense of victory or elation.... The mood of the Americans was surprisingly subdued."⁵¹ Nonetheless, the outside world, having been kept in the dark about the negotiations, and anxiously awaiting an outcome that could have serious ramifications for many parties, was in for a surprise. The sight of Begin and Sadat embracing, with Carter's smiling face in the background, was memorable to many around the world.

THE AGREEMENTS

Although copies of the agreements, appended letters, and opening bargaining positions are included as an appendix, it is useful to highlight some key terms of the Camp David accords.

To begin with, there are two separate agreements. The first, between Egypt and Israel, stipulates Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (including settlements and bases) in return for which Egypt would sign a peace treaty with Israel and normalize relations, including an exchange of ambassadors and allowing travel across borders. In addition, much of the Sinai would be demilitarized, and a multinational force would be stationed there to prevent future hostilities.

The second agreement provided for a three-stage framework to determine the status of the West Bank and Gaza, as mentioned earlier. Although elections were to be held in these territories in the second stage, followed by a five-year transitional autonomy, no time limit was set for reaching the second stage. In effect, the status quo could be maintained indefinitely without violation of the agreement. As of 1992, fourteen years after the accords were concluded, there has been little progress in that direction.

The two agreements were also separate in that progress on one was not linked to progress on the other. Although the peace treaty has been signed, ambassadors exchanged, and Israel has withdrawn from the Sinai, little has been done about the West Bank and Gaza. Nonetheless, despite massive criticism of the accords, the assassination of Sadat, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the peace treaty has survived.

Criticism of the accords came from many quarters. In Israel some felt that the government should not have withdrawn from the entire Sinai, and that Jewish settlements should not have been dismantled — in short, that Israel gave up too much for an uneasy peace with Egypt. In Egypt, there was a feeling that Sadat gave away the store, that there need not have been an exchange of ambassadors with Israel, that Israel should have made more concessions on the West

Bank and Gaza, and that the limitations on Egyptian troop movement were unacceptable. The basis for such judgments is a matter for the student of bargaining, but some facts are worth noting.

Following Camp David, Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders was dispatched to the Middle East in an attempt to sell the accords to Arab states. Although these states unanimously rejected the accords, Saunders felt that the inclusion of only two more points would have made them acceptable to at least several Arab states: an indefinite freeze on settlement building on the West Bank and Gaza and a recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination.⁵²

Although it is difficult to assess Saunders' judgment on this matter, there is little doubt that the issue of Jewish settlements has emerged as a central issue in the negotiations, especially after the controversy over differing interpretations of the agreement on settlements. Specifically, Egypt and the United States have understood the agreement as entailing a freeze on settlement building for the duration of negotiations leading to Palestinian autonomy, while Israel has argued that the freeze was to last only for the three-month period of the negotiations with Egypt.

It is useful to review the settlements issue, given its central importance. First, most of the negotiations were conducted on the twelfth day of the conference, one day before its conclusion and after agreement had been reached on all other issues. Second, both sides agreed that the issue should not be addressed in the text of the accords, but in a public letter from Begin to Carter. The text of the letter was to read:

. . . after the signing of the framework agreement and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The issue of future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among the negotiating parties.⁵³

Third, there is no doubt that the U.S. delegation specifically understood this to refer to the negotiations for autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, so stated during that particular session, and that the Israelis understood this as well. Fourth, the Israelis apparently thought that the autonomy talks would last two to three months, but that they could be extended. Fifth, the U.S. delegation had the distinct impression that the Israelis fully approved this agreement as they (the Americans) understood it, while some members of the Israeli delegation understood Begin's approval to be only tentative, and that he was to give his final answer the next day. Quandt's conclusion was that "it seems most likely that on Saturday night Begin did not give Carter a firm agreement to a freeze on settlements for the duration of the autonomy negotiations. But he may have wanted to leave the president with the impression that such an agreement had almost been reached."⁵⁴ Sixth, the letter handed to Carter by Begin the next day, after agreement had been reached on the text of the accords, stated that the freeze on settlement building applied to the three months envisaged for the negotiation of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

On Sunday, September 17, the final day of the negotiations, an "exhausted" American delegation that was already basking in the sun of success suddenly discovered the discrepancy over the settlement issue. As Quandt put it: "...by then, they chose to overlook this 'misunderstanding.' It was a costly mistake."⁵⁵ Asked why the American delegation, which had clearly perceived the significance of this issue, did not press it further, Saunders replied. "You cannot imagine how difficult, how agonizing it was to deal with Begin. It was so time and energy consuming. Carter dreaded having to deal with him. And we were all exhausted, yet so thrilled that we finally had an agreement."⁵⁶ Final judgment on this issue is yet to be made, providing the student of bargaining with some intriguing questions.

IMPACT OF THE ACCORDS

The full impact of the Camp David accords on Middle East politics is difficult to assess, but some things are relatively clear. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel reduced the chance of war between them; Egypt regained control of the Sinai, but was also expelled from the Arab League and lost economic aid from Arab states (though it did gain American aid). Beyond that, the impact on regional politics and realignments is difficult to judge. Arab states generally argue that the loss of Egypt's military leverage with Israel enabled Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982, and that the accords essentially legitimized Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Some in Israel argue that they gave up something tangible — the Sinai — for something intangible — peace — and that Egypt may yet be Israel's enemy in any case.

These controversies aside, there can be little doubt that the accords were a remarkable and important event in Middle East, and indeed international, politics. Their impact has been substantial at both levels.

Given their global significance, the Camp David accords provide a wonderful "laboratory" for the student of bargaining. The surprising events leading up to them, the well-defined nature of the negotiations, the contrasting personalities and systems of government involved, and the visible difference in negotiating tactics all provide interesting questions for both regional specialists and international relations students in general. The rich data available on these important negotiations can help provide answers to a broad range of questions.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ Weizman, Ezer. *The Battles for Peace*. New York: Bantam Books, 1981, p. 18.
- ² Quandt, William B. *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986, pp. 35-36.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 30; Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. New York: Bantam Books, 1982, pp. 273-274.
- ⁴ Quandt, p. 33. This strategy refers to UN Resolution 242, which followed the 1967 War. It stressed the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and affirmed the “withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.”
- ⁵ Telhami, Shibley. *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, Ch. 3.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, Ch. 4.
- ⁷ Quandt, p. 146.
- ⁸ Fahmy, Ismail. *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*. London: Croom Helm, 1983, pp. 256-257.
- ⁹ For details, see Quandt, pp. 172-178.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 201.
- ¹¹ Carter, p. 328.
- ¹² Weizman, pp. 115-116.
- ¹³ Carter, p. 414.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 356.
- ¹⁵ Quandt, pp. 173-175, 208, 235-36.
- ¹⁶ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle. Memoir of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983, p. 234.
- ¹⁷ Telhami, p. 179.
- ¹⁸ William Quandt, interview by the author, London, April 14, 1988.
- ¹⁹ Quandt, p. 220.
- ²⁰ Carter, p. 366.
- ²¹ Quandt, p. 221.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 222; Carter, pp. 340-41.
- ²³ William Quandt, interview by the author, London, April 14, 1988.
- ²⁴ Carter, p. 340.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 341.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 345.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 347.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 351.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 349.
- ³⁰ Quandt, p. 223.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 225.
- ³³ Carter, p. 371.
- ³⁴ Quandt, p. 228.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 229.
- ³⁶ Carter, p. 356.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 364.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 391.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 392.
- ⁴¹ Brzezinski, p. 272.
- ⁴² Tahseen Bashir, interview by the author, Cairo, January 1986.
- ⁴³ Ibrahim Kamel, interview by the author, Cairo, August 25, 1983.
- ⁴⁴ Carter, p. 393.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
- ⁴⁶ Quandt., p. 240.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 243.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 244.
- ⁵⁰ Carter letter to Begin, September 22, 1978. (where is this letter published?)
- ⁵¹ Quandt, pp. 253-254.
- ⁵² Harold H. Saunders, interview by the author, Princeton, February 15, 1984..
- ⁵³ Quandt, p. 248.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 250.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 250-51.

⁵⁶ Harold H.Saunders, interview by the author, Princteon, February 15, 1984.