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The Camp David Accords: A Case of International BargainingShibley Telhami *
University of MarylandThe Camp David Accords: A Case of International Bargaining (Full Text, PDF, 34 pages, 57 KB)
Formal Bargaining at Camp David
Issues of Bargaining
The actual boundaries of each actor's position are difficult to draw and should be left to the student of the case to speculate about. There are, however, several bargaining issues that can be stated at the outset, based on the opening positions of Egypt and Israel. These are issues over which the game between Israel and Egypt was zero-sum; in this regard they were truly bargaining issues.
The first issue was the extent of normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. While Israel's long-term regional strategy required at least a peace treaty with Egypt, it also sought maximum normalization of relations. Egypt, however, sought to minimize normalization so as to retain some degree of leverage with Israel over other issues and to make the agreements more acceptable at home and in the Arab world. The second issue was the extent of demilitarization of the Sinai after its return to Egypt. Israel sought maximum demilitarization so as to inhibit Egyptian military leverage, while Egypt sought minimum demilitarization so as to retain the military option in the future.
The third. issue was the degree of linkage between normalization of relations and future agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt sought maximum linkage and a role in future negotiations (to prevent unilateral Israeli decisions) as its ticket for future influence in the Arab world. Israel, on the other hand, sought the opposite. The fourth issue was the extent to which Egypt would be able to secure some a priori general agreement on principles—the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and the Israeli intention in principle to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. These were issues that could only be resolved through bargaining, How they were finally resolved can be assessed only by examining the bargaining process.
The Bargaining Process
Stage I (Days 1-4): Opening Moves and Testing the Waters. The first four days at Camp David involved the opening bargaining moves by each side and, in some important ways, may have defined the nature of bargaining for the following week.
On the first day, September 5, 1978, Israel and Egypt focused on the kind of role the United States would play; Carter met individually with both Begin and Sadat. Sadat promised that he would present Carter with a formal proposal on the following day. He also emphasized that he was doing so partly to save Carter from having to put forth an American proposal. Sadat apparently assumed that the conspiratorial "partnership" formed with Carter several months before still applied. Under this partnership Sadat was to advance an extreme position, wait for an Israeli counter-proposal, and then Carter would save the day with a "compromise" proposal, the elements of which would already have been approved by Sadat. Although Carter had given up on this approach, Sadat did not know this. 18
Begin's first meeting with Carter also centered on the American role. Continuing his campaign to limit the U.S. role to that of a mediator, Begin armed himself with a letter from former U.S. president Gerald Ford, signed in conjunction with the Sinai disengagement agreement of September 1975, stating that the United States would consult Israel before putting forward any peace proposals. 19 Begin also stated that there had to be two agreements:
... the most important was between the United States and Israel, and the other, of secondary importance but obviously also crucial, was between Israel and Egypt. The most important one would have to come first. He wanted the world to know that there were no serious differences between Israel and the United States. 20
Responding to Israeli concerns about relations with the United States, Carter wondered if offering Israel a mutual defense treaty would help. 21
Day two was the first day of substantive negotiations, during which formal proposals were put forth. Sadat had come to Camp David with a detailed proposal, which he presented to Carter for review. Carter, however, was deeply alarmed by the Egyptian position. The document called for complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, dismantling of settlements, a five-year transition of authority in the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan and Egypt respectively, which would culminate in Palestinian self-determination, and other traditional Egyptian positions. In exchange for all this, Egypt was prepared to sign an accord, formally recognize Israel, and would support Israeli security measures and access to religious shrines in Jerusalem. Sadat, however, assured Carter that this was not Egypt's "bottom line," but one to pressure Begin into making concessions. Sadat then gave Carter a typewritten statement, the first page marked "For the President's Eyes Only," outlining Egypt's fallback positions which would serve to break stalemates in the negotiations. 22 This document had apparently been prepared with the knowledge of one Egyptian aide, Usama El-Baz, who advised Sadat against it on the grounds that it would undermine Egypt's bargaining position. But Sadat believed that cultivating a relationship of trust and partnership with Carter would help Egypt's position. 23 Sadat cautioned Carter "not to reveal these to anyone, because it would destroy his negotiating strength if his final positions were to be placed on the table at this early time." 24 As he read the document, Carter "saw for the first time that we might possibly achieve substantial success." 25
In view of the terms of Egypt's fallback position, Carter's optimism was understandable. To begin with, Sadat indicated for the first time his willingness to normalize relations with Israel, including diplomatic and consular relations, free movement of people across borders, and trade relations. Only weeks before, Sadat had told Carter that such normal relations would have to wait until the next generation, given the hostile sentiments at the popular level. A second change in the Egyptian position was the willingness to agree that Jerusalem should not be a divided city—a central Israeli demand. In addition, Sadat agreed that Palestinian representatives should come exclusively from the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza—also an Israeli demand, but an unacceptable position to most Palestinians.
Begin and Sadat had a meeting the same afternoon in which Sadat presented Begin with his formal position. He also insisted that he was interested a comprehensive settlement that dealt with all the controversial issues; he "would not sign a Sinai agreement before an agreement is also reached on the West Bank. 26 That meeting was followed by a session between Begin and Carter, during which Begin strongly denounced the Egyptian proposal. But it was not until the following day that a full Israeli response came, generating heated arguments between Sadat and Begin that led to a new negotiating approach.
As the three leaders met on the third day of the negotiations, Begin, excited and irate, offered a point-by-point rebuttal of Sadat's proposal. "This smacks of a victorious state dictating peace to the defeated," he declared, concluding that "This document is not a proper basis for negotiations." 27 Sadat replied that Begin was only interested in the retention of occupied territories: "Premier Begin, you want land! ... Security, yes! Land, no!" Sadat shouted. Carter remarked that he "thought Sadat would explode." 28
Although Carter was trying to keep the negotiations on track, he also complained about Israeli positions and that the Israelis had not indicated to him what their minimal needs were:
My problem is with the issues that do not really relate to Israel's security. I must have your frank assessment. My greatest strength here is your confidence—but I don't feel that I have your trust. What do you really need for your defense? It is ridiculous to speak of Jordan overrunning Israel! I believe I can get from Sadat what you really need, but I just do not have your confidence. 29
Carter also agreed with Sadat that the negotiations should seek a comprehensive settlement and accused Begin of wanting to keep the West Bank, suggesting that Begin's self-rule/autonomy plan presented at Ismailiyya was a "subterfuge."
After that meeting it became clear to the American team that the positions of Egypt and Israel remained far apart and that Begin and Sadat could not interact constructively on a personal level. This latter point resulted in more active involvement by Carter and an attempt to keep Sadat and Begin separate as much as possible. From that point on, Sadat and Begin did not attend any negotiating sessions until the last sessions at Camp David.
At the same time, however, Secretary Vance seemed to make some progress in a meeting with Foreign Minister Dayan and Defense Minister Weizman. Dayan and Weizman gave indications that the Israelis were willing to make concessions on the issue of removing Sinai settlements, which was central to Sadat: " [Dayan] and Weizman hinted that the settlements in Sinai would not be an obstacle, and that some type of moratorium on settlements in the West Bank should be possible." 30 This seemed particularly promising after the frustrating day with Sadat and Begin.
Later that day, Dayan appeared to support the idea of an American proposal. He did not find Sadat's acceptable, and the American delegation was increasingly inclined to present one.
Whatever hope had emerged from Vance's meeting with Israeli officials, especially on the issue of Sinai settlements, disappeared on day four. The day began with a meeting between Carter and Begin, in which Begin once again dwelled on his criticism of Sadat's proposal. Alarmed by Begin's negative mood, Carter sought to assure Begin that Sadat was nonetheless reasonable. In this effort, Carter revealed to Begin that he already had several Egyptian compromises in hand. William Quandt, participating in Camp David as a member of the National Security Council staff, wrote: "What the effect of this revelation was on Begin can only be surmised, but from then on Begin adopted an unyielding position on settlements in Sinai." 31 Perhaps he concluded that if Sadat could use the tactic of adopting a deliberately hard position at the outset, then he might do the same. But unlike Sadat, he had no intention of telling Carter what his fallback position really was. "It soon became clear to the American side," Quandt concluded, "that the Israeli strategy was to hold off making concessions on the things most important to Sadat, such as settlements in Sinai, until he agreed to drop most of his unacceptable demands on the West Bank and Gaza." 32
The third and fourth days thus defined the next stage of the negotiations, during which the United States would seek to develop a realistic proposal, and in which the issue of Sinai settlement would play a central (and, to the Egyptians and Americans frustrating) role.
Stage II (Days 5-7). Developing an American proposal. By day five, central elements of the U.S. proposal were emerging. Following meetings between Carter and the American drafting team (during which Carter presented a list he had prepared called "Necessary Elements of Agreement") a more modest approach to the negotiations was crystallizing. Among these elements were an end to war, permanent peace, free transit by Israel through all international waterways, secure and recognized borders, a full range of normal relations between nations, phased withdrawal by Israel from and demilitarization of the Sinai, monitoring stations to insure compliance with this agreement, termination of blockades and boycotts, a procedure for settling future disputes, the extension of the principles to future agreements between Israel and its other neighbors, rapid granting of full autonomy to the Palestinians followed by a five-year transition period for determining the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the West Bank into specified security locations, prompt settlement of the refugee problem, and a three-month period to complete a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. 33
Perhaps most significant was the fact that by the end of this day Carter was no longer speaking of the comprehensive settlement he had earlier envisaged. He now advocated a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli treaty and believed that delays in negotiating a West Bank/Gaza agreement were "somebody else's problem. He said that he hoped both agreements could move in parallel, but it was clear that the Egyptian—Israeli one took priority and if nothing happened in the West Bank for ten years he would not really care very much." 34
Because day five was a Saturday, no negotiating sessions were held. But on Sunday, day six, the American team, headed by Carter, met with Israeli negotiators for more than five hours and presented the U.S. proposal. During these sessions, Carter revealed to the Israelis the new priorities that he had articulated to the American team the day before. "The question of eventual sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza would not be solved at Camp David." 35 Nonetheless, Begin's response was one of aggressive criticism.
In any case, a pattern emerged following the sessions on Sunday: with the American proposal as the central negotiating document, each side would be given time to react to it and propose written changes, which might or might not be incorporated into the proposal.
The seventh day, during which the Israelis offered written modifications to the U.S. proposal, was marked by one noteworthy development. Although the focus had been on the Sinai and Israeli-Egyptian relations, general principles pertaining to the West Bank and Gaza were also discussed as part of one framework document. On this day apparently based on a suggestion by Dayan, the idea emerged for two separate documents.
Another noteworthy point is procedural in nature, but was typical throughout the negotiations. Carter was involved in all levels of the negotiations, including those involving only lower-level negotiators from the Israeli team. The Israeli side preferred not to involve Begin at every stage of the negotiations. Carter's dealings with the Egyptian team, however, were typically through Sadat. Moreover, the American team spent much more time with the Israelis than with the Egyptians. As Carter put it:
I would draft a proposal I considered reasonable, take it to Sadat for quick approval or slight modification, and then spend hours or days working on the same point with Israeli delegation. Sometimes, in the end, the change of a word or phrase would satisfy Begin, and I would merely inform Sadat. 36
Stage III (Days 8-11): Deadlock. The period between September 12 and September 15 were days of gloom for the negotiations, and failure seemed the most likely outcome. To begin with, tension appeared within the Egyptian delegation. While Sadat was more accommodating toward the American proposal, his advisers were seriously opposed to major aspects of the plan. Foreign Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel objected to the deletion of language referring to the 1949 armistice lines as the basis for future borders, with only minor modifications, and to what he saw as lack of concern for the Palestinian issue. Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs El-Baz complained that the document pertaining to the West Bank and Gaza did not specify an Israeli commitment to eventual withdrawal, and that while Egypt would agree to recognize Israel, he did not see the need to exchange ambassadors.
Sadat also appeared concerned. He expressed worries that the U.S. proposal would be totally unacceptable to the rest of the Arab world, and especially to Saudi Arabia. He nonetheless seemed committed to the proposal.
The Israelis, too, were concerned. Dayan argued that the aim of the negotiations remained too ambitious, and that a new goal of reaching only limited agreements should be set. Even on the issue of the Sinai, Dayan thought that an agreement was not likely, because Israel would not accept the central Egyptian demand of removing the settlements. When American negotiators refused to change the objective of the negotiations, Dayan predicted failure.
Day nine brought nothing but bad news. After several negotiating sessions between the Israelis and the Americans, the focus remained on the single issue of Sinai settlements. Israel continued to be adamantly opposed to their removal, and Sadat grew more frustrated.
By day ten, failure seemed imminent as deadlock continued on the issue of settlements. Carter began to think that the remaining objective was to reduce the impact of failure and preserve his special relationship with Sadat.
Carter faced a new problem on day eleven. Earlier, Carter had remarked that "although we had been at Camp David only three days, the affairs of the rest of the world seemed to fade rapidly from our minds." 37 But by day eleven, these affairs could no longer be ignored. FBI Director William Webster, Attorney General Griffin Bell, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown all needed to see the president on urgent business. "These kinds of visits werebecoming frequent and time consuming." 38
With Carter aware of "the realization that we could go no further," the question became how to deal with failure. 39 Carter's plan was simple: Summarize the differences between Egypt and Israel on the following day (Saturday), issue a joint statement adjourning the conference on Sunday, and put an embargo on further public statements until Monday. This plan was quickly handwritten and delivered to Begin and Sadat, both of whom accepted it.
But even this minimal face-saving plan suddenly faced failure. News came that Sadat and the rest of the Egyptian delegation were packing to leave in frustration. Carter faced not only a failure of the conference but serious political ramifications, his special relationship with Sadat hanging in the balance. "I envisioned the ultimate alliance of most Arab nations to the Soviet Union, perhaps joined by Egypt after a few months had passed." 40
Stage IV (Days 11-13): Breakthrough. The news of Sadat's impending departure had Carter rushing to Sadat's cabin. The encounter between the two men was apparently the most confrontational since the two had met. Carter was particularly harsh with Sadat, warning that if Sadat left,
it will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the United States and Egypt. There is no way we can ever explain this to our people. It would mean an end to this peacekeeping effort, into which I have put so much investment. It would probably mean an end to my Presidency because this whole effort will be discredited. And last but not least, it will mean the end of something that is very precious to me: my friendship with you. 41
It is useful to put Carter's remarks into proper context. The American team believed that what both Israel and Egypt wanted, even more than an agreement with each other, was close relations with the United States at the expense of each other. They both could live with failure, so long as the other was blamed and close relations with the United States were preserved. During the first week, for example when Begin believed that the negotiations were headed toward failure, the only question for him was how to maneuver to avoid blame. This was also true of Egypt. When he came to Camp David, Sadat apparently believed that the negotiations were likely to fail due to what he considered Begin's intransigence. Consequently, on his way to Camp David, Sadat summoned his major ambassadors and briefed them that following the failure of the negotiations he wanted Begin blamed, hoping that this would lead to closer American-Egyptian relations at the expense of Israel. 42
According to Kamel, Sadat told his colleagues that during the encounter on day eleven, Carter had explained to Sadat that if an agreement were reached at Camp David, his (Carter's) reelection would be guaranteed, enabling him to focus on the follow-up negotiations. 43
Following Carter's determined remarks, Sadat explained his reasons for leaving. He said that Dayan had told him that Israel would not sign any agreement at Camp David, and that his aides had pointed out a serious problem with the approach of simply articulating differences. If negotiations were later resumed, the Israelis could say: "The Egyptians have already agreed to all these, points. Now we will use what they have signed as the original basis for all future negotiations." 44
When Carter replied that there would he complete understanding that if any nation rejected any part of the agreements, none of the proposals would remain in effect, Sadat's reply suddenly revived Carter's hope. "If you give me this statement," Sadat declared, "I will stick with you to the end." 45 The immediate crisis was thus averted. Later that night Carter joined Sadat in his cabin to watch the Spinks—Ali boxing match as though nothing had happened!
Following the Carter-Sadat encounter there emerged a last-ditch American strategy that attempted to conclude a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli treaty. This strategy was intended to persuade Israel to relinquish the Sinai settlements and airfields and add some language about Palestinian rights to the framework agreement on the West Bank and Gaza that would make the agreement more acceptable to other Arab states.
There was also an alternative plan in case Israel failed to make the final concessions that would assure an agreement. A "failure speech," prepared by William Quandt of the National Security Council staff, would be delivered to the American people explaining the failure of the negotiations. The speech would outline the remaining gap between Israel and Egypt and explain that Sadat was prepared to make major concessions, including the recognition of Israel and detailed security provisions. More important, the speech would specify two obstacles to an agreement: Israel's unwillingness to relinquish the Sinai settlements and its refusal to acknowledge the applicability of Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza, which would commit Israel to withdrawal from most of these territories in the event of a final agreement.
On both points, Carter was prepared to say that he sided with Sadat. He would ask the American public for understanding as the diplomatic process continued, and he would appeal to the Israeli public to urge its leaders not to miss the chance for peace. Doing so would of course mean a confrontation of some kind with Israel and could prove to be politically painful for the president. 46
On that day, however, there were already signs that the speech might not be necessary. Weizman indicated to the Americans that Israel might be willing to give up the Sinai airfields in exchange for two new fields—to be built by the United States in Israel's Negev desert. On that issue, the United States tried to persuade Sadat to allow the United States to take over one of the air bases, but Sadat refused. Later, Weizman's proposal was adopted fol-lowing an American commitment to pay $3 billion to build two modern air bases in the Negev.
On the Sinai settlements, too, there was an emerging Israeli consensus. Most members of the Israeli delegation indicated a willingness to give up the settlements in exchange for peace with Egypt, although Begin himself held out a little longer.
Day twelve was marked by the focus on the West Bank and Gaza and by the visible absence of the Egyptian delegation from the substantive negotiations over this issue. Basically, the American draft for a framework agreement on the West Bank and Gaza had envisioned three stages. The first would have Israel and Egypt agree on general principles, such as elections for self-government on the West Bank and Gaza. The second would deal with setting up the interim government and would involve Jordan in the negotiations. The final step would commence no later than three years into the interim period, when negotiations (including, for the first time, elected representatives of the Palestinians in addition to Jordan, Egypt, and Israel) would begin on the West Bank and Gaza. The aim of these negotiations would be to determine the final status of the territories following the five-year transitional period. The problem was that the crucial final stage had not been adequately addressed. In particular, no agreement had been reached on how the final status would be determined, who if anyone would have veto power, and what would happen should the negotiations fail. These issues were the center of the negotiations on day twelve.
As mentioned above, the negotiations were conducted largely between the United States and Israel. Although these issues were obviously central to Egypt, the Egyptian delegation was not involved. As far as the Egyptians were concerned, the key element pertaining to the final status was the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" which, at least in Sadat's mind, would entail final Israeli withdrawal. 47 Although no specific agreement had been reached on this issue, the draft proposal appended Resolution 242 to the framework agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. Because the principle in question was part of 242, Quandt speculated that Sadat might have been satisfied with this arrangement, leaving the details to the United States. 48
During the negotiations between the Israeli and U.S. delegations it became clear that Israel would not commit itself to eventual withdrawal; Israel planned to put forth a claim for sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. The United States, on the other hand, believed that some agreement had to be reached on this issue in order to make the accords more acceptable to other Arab states.
Israeli Attorney General Ahron Barak put forward a compromise proposal, which was intentionally ambiguous on the grounds that there was no time for a final resolution of the issue. This proposal was reluctantly accepted by the United States. The central element of the plan was to divide the last stage of negotiation into two parts: the first part would involve Jordan and Israel, while the second part would involve the Palestinians' elected representatives plus Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. The agreement would then specify that Resolution 242 would apply to the "negotiations." Israel could thus claim that it applied only to the negotiations between Jordan and Israel (where the West Bank and Gaza would not be discussed); Egypt and the United States would claim that it applied to both parts of the negotiations. "The ambiguity was deliberate, and probably essential." 49
In the evening of day twelve (Saturday, September 16), members of the Israeli delegation, including Begin, Dayan, and Barak, met with Carter and Vance for a crucial session in which a key American objective was to get Begin's approval for removing the Sinai settlements. Carter insisted on a firm commitment, which Begin refused. A compromise solution was finally reached: if agreement was reached on all other issues, Begin would let the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) decide the settlements issue. Satisfied with this formula, Carter believed that he could sell it to Sadat.
Several other controversial issues were also resolved during this session. For example, Begin objected to the term "Palestinian people" appearing in the draft. As a solution, Carter agreed to write a letter to Begin acknowledging that Begin understood this term to mean simply the Palestinian Arabs of "Judea and Samaria" (Begin's terms for the West Bank and Gaza). Begin's problem was that the acknowledgment of the Palestinians as a "people" would entail recognition of their right to selfdetermination, and might also raise this issue for Palestinians outside the occupied territories.
Another Begin objection, to the phrase "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians, was removed by agreeing to an Israeli amendment. This amendment made the language more ambiguous by stating that Resolution 242 applied to the "negotiations" and not to the "results of the negotiations," because of the Israeli intention to claim sovereignty over the territories. Later, Begin also received a letter from Carter, appended to the agreements, acknowledging that "you have informed me" that "in each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions 'Palestinians' or 'Palestinian People' are being and will be construed by you as 'Palestinian Arabs.'" 50
With these issues resolved, one central issue remained: Israeli settlement-building on the West Bank and in Gaza. The United States and Egypt wanted an indefinite freeze on the building of settlements in the territories for two primary reasons First, the official position of both Egypt and the United States was that such activity was illegal. Second, Israel could build enough settlements to make withdrawal impractical, thus prejudicing the outcome of future negotiations. Israel, on the other hand, felt that Jews had a right to settle in "Judea and Samaria." This important issue was finally resolved under peculiar circumstances, which probably led to unintentional ambiguity that resulted in the heated controversy that followed the Camp David accords.
By the morning of day thirteen it looked like an agreement was finally at hand. Carter had been able to convince Sadat that the agreement was acceptable, though Sadat himself had much more difficulty in convincing his aides. Foreign Minister Kamel found the agreements so unacceptable that he resigned even before leaving Camp David. This was the second resignation of an Egyptian foreign minister since Sadat announced his initiative: Ismail Fahmy had resigned over Sadat's plan to visit Jerusalem. Nonetheless, Sadat was determined to go ahead despite his advisers' objections.
But just as Carter thought an agreement was at hand, a new development threatened failure: the issue of Jerusalem. Although Sadat had insisted that the agreements clearly specify Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem (occupied by Israel in the 1967 War), the Israelis claimed sovereignty over the entire "unified" city. A compromise solution had been accepted by all parties: the text of the agreements would not specifically refer to Jerusalem, and a statement of each side's well-known position would be appended to the agreements. When the United States conveyed the text of the American letter on this issue, Begin objected strongly and threatened to walk out of the negotiations. In the end the United States modified the language of the letter to be acceptable to Begin.
By late afternoon Sunday (September 17), an agreement was finally at hand. But as Quandt notes, Sadat "was quiet, almost grim. There was no sense of victory or elation.... The mood of the Americans was surprisingly subdued." 51 Nonetheless, the outside world, having been kept in the dark about the negotiations and anxiously awaiting an outcome that could have serious ramifications for many parties, was in for a surprise. The sight of Begin and Sadat embracing, with Carter's smiling face in the background, was memorable to many, worldwide.
Endnotes
Note 18. Interview with William Quandt, April 14, 1988. London. Back
Note 19. Quandt, p. 220. Back
Note 20. Carter, p. 366. Back
Note 21. Quandt, p. 221. Back
Note 22. Ibid., p. 222; Carter, pp. 340-41. Back
Note 23. Interview with Quandt, April 14, 1988, London. Back
Note 24. Carter, p. 340. Back
Note 25. Ibid., p. 341. Back
Note 26. Ibid., p. 345. Back
Note 27. Ibid., p. 347. Back
Note 28. Ibid., p. 351. Back
Note 29. Ibid., p. 349. Back
Note 30. Quandt, p. 223. Back
Note 31. Ibid. Back
Note 32. Ibid., p. 225. Back
Note 33. Carter, p. 371. Back
Note 34. Quandt, p. 228. Back
Note 35. Ibid., p. 229. Back
Note 36. Carter, p. 356. Back
Note 37. Ibid., p. 364. Back
Note 38. Ibid., p. 391. Back
Note 39. Ibid. Back
Note 40. Ibid., p. 392. Back
Note 41. Brzezinski, p. 272. Back
Note 42. Interview with Tahseen Bashir, January 1986, Cairo. Back
Note 43. Interview with Ibrahim Kamel, August 25, 1983, Cairo. Back
Note 44. Carter, p. 393. Back
Note 45. Ibid. Back
Note 46. Quandt., p. 240. Back
Note 47. Ibid., p. 243. Back
Note 48. Ibid. Back
Note 49. Ibid., p. 244. Back
Note 50. Carter letter to Begin, September 22, 1978. Back
Note 51. Ibid., pp. 253-254. Back
Note *: Shibley Telhami holds the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to the University of Maryland, he was Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Near Eastern Studies Program at Cornell University and a Visiting Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He has taught at several universities including the Ohio State University, the University of Southern California, Princeton University, Columbia University, Swarthmore College, and the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in political science. Among his publications are Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords (Columbia University Press, 1990); International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict, ed. with Milton Esman (Cornell University Press, 1995); and Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, ed. with Michael Barnett (forthcoming, Cornell University Press, 2001); and numerous articles on international politics and Middle Eastern affairs.
Besides his academic activities, Professor Telhami has been active in the foreign policy arena and has been a contributor to the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times. While a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, he served as advisor to the United States delegation to the United Nations during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, and was on the staff of Congressman Lee Hamilton. He is the author of a report on Persian Gulf security for the Council on Foreign Relations, and the co-drafter of another Council report on the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition, he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the advisory committee of Human Rights Watch/Middle East. He has been a member of the American delegation of the Trilateral American/Israeli/Palestinian Anti-Incitement Committee mandated by the Wye River Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. He also has a weekly radio commentary that broadcasts all over the Middle East. He was recently appointed by President Clinton to the Board of the United States Institute of Peace. . (Columbia, 1990). Back.
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