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Slovakia:
Problems of Democratic Consolidation
and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game

Sona Szomolányi and John Gould, editors

New York

Columbia International Affairs Online

1997

Bibliographic Data

10. Democratic Consolidation And The Conflict Over Slovakian International Alignment

Alexander Duleba

1. The Foreign Policy Orientation Of Slovakia And An Interpretation Of The "Alliance" Issue

The history of international relations distinguishes two types of alliance between countries: an alliance based on military-political and/or economic interests, and a higher alliance form--an alliance of countries which, apart from common military-political and economic interests, share a common system of fundamental civilization values. 1 Military political or economic alliances dominated international history before the 19th century. The first historically significant case of a "value-based alliance" was the anti-Napoleonic "Holy Alliance" established at the Vienna Congress in 1815. It attempted to eliminate anti-monarchist tendencies by coordinating the diplomacy of European monarchies.

In the interwar period of the 20th century, totalitarian regimes rested upon two consistent systems of civilization values, fascism and communism. Each system presented a significant source of global instability, and formed an immediate reason for a profound change in United States' European and international policy. From President Wilson's historic speech before United States Congress, 2 up to the most recent American conception of national security strategy articulated in 1996, the fundamental civilization values of American foreign policy have not changed significantly. The main priorities remain support for human rights, democracy, free market principles, and observation of laws. An increasing number of countries adhering to the values of liberal democracy is also believed to be the best possible guarantee of peace, stability, and economic progress. 3

The participation of the Soviet Union in the anti-fascist coalition during World War II resulted from specific allied military-political goals. The strains between these immediate goals and civilization values became manifest soon after the war. Both the Western and the Eastern postwar blocks exemplified alliances of countries formed around a higher alliance type, combining both common military-political and economic interests and a commonly shared system of civilization values. 4 When the communist regimes of the Eastern block broke up in the late 1980s, the new rulers of the former Soviet satellites expressed their wish to become an integral part of the advanced democratic world and its integrating structures (NATO, EU). They believed membership in western structures was consistent both with natural internal and general international developments.

In addition to post-communist countries, Austria, Sweden, and Finland--countries whose "neutrality" was more or less the artificial by-product of the prewar and postwar confrontations--also manifested their will to become an integral part of the common European economic and political sphere. Following the end of the Cold War, their neutrality had become devoid of any political or economic justification. The European "Twelve" thus extended their ranks to fifteen European states on January 1, 1995. 5

Official EU membership applications submitted by the governments of Switzerland and Norway in 1992 were withdrawn only due to the results of national referendums. But even these remaining neutral countries had to coordinate with Western structures: In accordance with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty of European Union of February 7, 1992 (the Treaty took effect on November 1, 1993), all EU countries were obliged to coordinate their foreign and security policy. Moreover, the majority of EU countries are members of the military-political organizations of the West European Union and NATO. 6 "Neutral" countries thus have to coordinate their security policy with NATO members. 7

As a result of the breakdown of the Berlin Wall, the "classical alliance" issue of the pre-World War II era--how and against whom to seek allies--has acquired a completely new sense for democratic European countries. Among post-communist countries in particular, the choice of alliance partners is now almost entirely "internal" in nature. With the end of the bipolar conflict, a prime criteria for membership in the western alliance has changed from strict calculations of external threat to an ability to demonstrate the appropriate civilization values and behavior. Thus, one of the most important factors in determining alliance alignment is how quickly and successfully Central and Eastern European states can build the stable democratic systems and free-market economies that are prerequisite to integrating into the political, economic, and security structures of the West. 8

The integration of Austria, Sweden, and Finland into the EU did not pose any serious dilemma for the EU. 9 These states possess established and stable democratic systems and advanced economies. Post-communist countries present a more difficult challenge. The transformations of their political and economic systems since the late 1980's have met with markedly different levels of success. NATO's Partnership for Peace 10 program and the European Union's European Association Agreements, 11 provide a sufficient framework and for each country of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to take steps to become full members by demonstrating compatible values and behavior. The framework thus limits the influence of military-political considerations in alliance orientation and allows CEE countries greater freedom to determine their foreign-policy orientation.

In sum, in the post-Yalta, bipolar world, international factors and the need to maintain global stability and peace, took precedence. Today, alliance orientation is almost exclusively the product of internal policy. This freedom of choice is nearly unprecedented for most CEE countries

Since independence on January 1, 1993, all Slovak governments have unequivocally declared the desire to become regular members of integrating Western structures. Relevant official governmental documents have also nearly universally indicated that the natural interest of a democratic Slovakia is to integrate itself into Western structures. Following the 1994 elections, the Program Declaration of the Government of Prime Minister Vladimír Meèiar specified the following foreign policy priorities:

The government wants to keep developing a democratic social-market space compatible with [the] advanced countries of the world... We want to continue the hitherto policy of bringing Slovakia nearer to European and Transatlantic political, security, and economic structures. To intensify this policy, and emphasize our determination is to become a fully-fledged part of these structures. This effort is aimed at the economic space to which we are linked by historical traditions and natural relations... The ultimate priority consists in purposeful[ly] approaching the European Union, and becoming a member in the horizon of 2000... The basic security orientation goal of the Slovak Republic consists in becoming a member of NATO and the West European Union.... 12

In June 1995, Prime Minister Meèiar delivered Slovakia's EU membership application to French President Jacques Chirac, who at the time served as EU President. The application included a memorandum that explained the reasons for the application:

After 1948, Slovakia was forcedly broken away from the cultural and historical context [to which it had]... belonged... for centuries.... The majority of Slovak people have never identified themselves with the change in fundamental, value-related orientation forced upon Slovakia from outside after 1948.... From its origin, the Slovak Republic has been emphasizing the necessity of functioning democratic institutions and the principles of a law-respecting state which should guarantee human rights to all people, including those belonging to minorities. Development in the Slovak Republic bears witness to the fact that democratic institutions are firmly anchored, and, in spite of various political changes, that the constitutional system is stabilized.... Political dialogue is considered to be one of the highly positive examples of the process of integration of the associated countries into EU.... Importantly, the Slovak Republic shares the same values as the EU countries do. Moreover, the Joint Foreign and Security Policy gives space to activities of the associated countries as early as the period prior to their regular EU membership.... When formulating its foreign policy, the Slovak Republic works on the assumption that economic, political, and security problems constitute a mutually complementary whole.... The Slovak Republic is aware of its predominant responsibility for success of the process aimed at its regular EU membership..... 13

In spite of the high value attached to "political dialogue" in the process of EU accession, Slovakia's membership application violated the elementary principles of a fair dialogue. The memorandum did not respond to the EU's specific misgivings concerning democratic developments expressed in an EU démarche submitted to the Slovak government on November 24, 1994. 14 Rather, the Slovak government responded that it "appreciated the attention paid to it by the EU." Yet it failed to provide any explanation why it had not yet addressed the EU's concerns. 15 Nor did the government adequately respond to a subsequent EU demarche submitted on October 25, 1995.

The EU has a contracted right to such a political dialogue. This right follows both from the Association Agreement with the Slovak Republic and the official EU membership application of the Slovak government. Premier Vladimír Meèiar himself discussed the close interconnection between the issues of democratic development of the Slovak Republic and its EU membership as early as October 4, 1993, before he signed the Association Agreement, "As opposed to the previous agreement closed with the ÈSFR, this Association Agreement contains a so-called suspension clause, i.e., the Association Council is entitled to suspend the Agreement in the case of violation of substantial association elements, i.e., the principles of democracy, human rights, [and a] market economy." 16 Thus, there is good reason to believe that representatives of the Slovak government are aware that undemocratic ruling methods at home can lead to international complications. Nevertheless, Slovak internal policy continues to produce critical comment from the West.

2. Slovakia's Dialogue With The West About Democracy, (1993-1996):

The Slovak dialogue with the West dates from independence in 1993. Since then, no other Visegrad Four country has received as many official and unofficial notices concerning the exercise of democracy. In 1993, external concern focused on issues of minority rights and protections, including, the right to use first names and surnames in minority languages; the use of minority languages in designating offices, towns and villages; and respect for minority concerns within the new territorial-administrative division of Slovakia.

The Slovak government attempted to reflect some of the West's concerns in the legislative process. As a result of its efforts in relation to minorities, the European Council adopted Slovakia as its 31st regular member in June 1993. 17

Over four years later, however, Slovakia has still not fulfilled its Council of Europe obligations. The Official Language Act of November 15, 1995, which substituted for the earlier Czechoslovak Administrative Language Act passed in 1990, is one example. 18 In spite of the governmental promise to establish the constitutional rights of minorities, the present legislation does not specify the right to use of minority languages in administration.

Failure to pass specific legislation clarifying the minority language issue also violates the Skeleton Agreement of the Council of Europe, which promotes protection of minorities. The Slovak Republic joined the Skeleton Agreement on February 1, 1995. Article 10 of the Agreement pledges signatory states to allow for the use of minority languages in administration in those regions which are mostly inhabited by minority citizens provided that they apply for this right. 19 Yet as late as January 1997, the government stated that it would not include a bill specifying the right to use minority languages in administration in its legislative program.

The Skeleton Agreement of the Council of Europe is a component part of the Stability Pact. The EU and NATO have been monitoring the fulfillment of the Stability Pact tasks by all signatory countries. Compliance with the conclusions of the Stability Pact Conference will be one of the criteria taken into account when evaluating individual countries' alliance membership aspirations. 20 Fulfillment of Stability Pact task is also both consistent with the Slovak governmental program and its stated intent to gain membership in the EU and NATO.

During the application process to the Council of Europe in 1993, the Slovak government incorporated four Council recommendations into its legislation. By contrast, as of early 1996, Edit Bauer, an MP and a member of the Slovak delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, stated that the number of Council recommendations to the Slovak Republic had increased to 11. In June 1996, the monitoring report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe evaluated the fulfillment of obligations on the part of the Slovak Republic since it had become a member of the Council of Europe. Its final report contained 13 recommendations. 21

Western criticism of Slovakia in the early "Pre-démarche" period is summed up in the report, "Human Rights and Democratization in Slovakia," issued by the Helsinki Commission of the United States Congress in October 1993. The report presented a long list of concerns about the state of democracy and markets in Slovakia. First, it was particularly critical of the attitude of the ruling coalition. Slovak public representatives, it warned, perceived the state as a goal in itself rather than something which should serve the citizens. In addition, the report also criticized the government's practice of denouncing critical reports as "anti-Slovak"--as if the government was somehow identical to the state. Second, Slovak governmental policies tended to be highly centralized and retain excessive control over the economy. Slow privatization policies also received critical comment. Third, the report warned of government constraints on the independent media. Meanwhile, it argued that government officials misused the publicly-owned mass media for their own partisan advantage. Fourth, the report commented negatively on the government's minorities policy. It criticized the insensitive language of the Preamble of the Slovak Constitution (see Kusy, in this volume). Slovakia's minorities language act, the US Helsinki report added, complied with the international obligations of Slovakia only to the least extent possible. Even then, more chauvinist bill was submitted to the Parliament. 22 Finally the report expressed concern about chauvinism in Slovak society, specifically citing anti-Romany, anti-Hungarian, and anti-Jewish graffiti. The Roma, it added, suffer most from deeply rooted racism. 23

Slovak governmental and societal reaction to the Report of the Helsinki Commission of the Unites States Congress was one of partial denial. Some press reports indicated that in reality there had been no report. Others conceded the report's existence, but added that it had been "withdrawn." Still a number of others accepted the report's existence but argued that it was tendentious and untrue. 24

In mid-October 1993, the Chairman of the Slovak Parliament, I. Gasparoviè, visited the United States. In his discussion with the vice-chairman of the Helsinki Commission, congressman S. H. Hoyer, Gasparoviè stated, "We do not require you to speak of Slovakia in superlatives only, however, we cannot be indifferent to the fact that, due to the ignorance of the problem's complexity, an official USA report contains data distorting the objective picture." 25

In 1994, political changes introduced substantial new elements into the "dialogue about democracy" between the Slovak Republic and its Western partners. The intolerance of Meèiar's cabinet from 1992-1993, intensified the political crisis both in society and within the governing movement. A number of MP's left the parliamentary club of Meèiar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). As a result, the ruling HZDS lost its fragile majority in Parliament. The stop-gap formation of a coalition government of HZDS and the Slovak National Party (SNS)--with tacit support from the Party of the Democratic Left (SD1/4)--averted a governmental crisis for only a short period. Perhaps this was because it did not change the content and the methods of government rule.

In a speech on New Year's day, 1994, President Michal Kováè, denounced the intolerance of the government's policy, and called for a broad governing coalition that could stabilize political conditions and improve Slovak chances of joining the European and Atlantic structures. 26 Kováè's speech raised the latent conflict between the President and the Prime Minister to a qualitatively new level. On March 1994, the President presented a "Report on the Situation in the Slovak Republic" to Parliament in which he openly criticized the Meèiar's cabinet's style of exercising power. He illustrated a pattern of misuse of power, and pointed out the discrepancies between government's policy and the internal and external objectives of a democratic Slovakia. 27 Due to the report, Parliament voiced distrust in Meèiar's government. In mid-March, J. Moravèík formed a new coalition government with himself as Prime Minister. Early parliamentary elections were set for October 1994. HZDS, headed by former Prime Minister Meèiar won a plurality in the election and formed a new government in coalition partnership with the right-wing nationalist SNS and the left-wing, Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS).

On November 3-4, 1994, in an "ill-famed" meeting of the new Parliament, the new parliamentary majority carried out what many considered to be an act of revenge for March 1994. The governmental majority decided to fight with the "internal enemy" by "reducing" the scope of democracy and concentrating power in their hands. A similar event has not been experienced by any other post-communist EU associate country.

The night session took numerous steps that marginalized opposition role in governing the country. In a break from past practice, opposition MP's were denied the vice-chairmanship of Parliament and the chairmanships of all parliamentary committees. In addition, opposition representatives were prevented from playing a role in the oversight or management of the public mass media and National Property Fund (NPF). The same was true of the National Inspection Office, and the Special Commission for Supervising the Intelligence Service. The majority also amended the Large Privatization Act--transferring decision-making competence from the government to the NPF. In short, in one parliamentary session, the opposition was stripped of any role in the central organs of the Parliament, and was deprived of any control over the Intelligence Service, public mass media, and privatization process. 28 In addition to dangerously concentrating power in the hands of the ruling coalition parties, the acts violated basic Western European standards of proportional representation in the governance of a parliamentary democracy. The changes were so extreme that many in Slovakia still refer to the November 3-4 session as the "parliamentary night of long knives."

On November 24, 1994, deputies of three EU presiding countries delivered Meèiar's government a démarche expressing "misgivings about some phenomena" in Slovakia after the parliamentary election. The démarche expressed "expectations and a hope that Slovakia, carefully considering its own interests, will consistently follow the way of democratic reforms." 29 While the most significant subject of the 1993 dialogue was the minority issue, the November 3-4 session shifted the EU's focus to the broader issue of democracy in the Slovak Republic.

Meanwhile the Western actors in the dialogue with Slovakia changed. In 1993, Western advice to Slovakia came from politicians, experts, and non-governmental institutions. Recommendations form the Council of Europe, and CSCE missions were exceptions--but these did not represent "exceptional" advice limited only to Slovakia. By the end of 1994, however, the dialogue assumed an official diplomatic form, involving the governments of leading democratic countries. Similar démarches have not been issued to any other country applying for the EU membership. Nevertheless, Slovak government policies demonstrated disregard for the increase in the content and level of the EU-Slovak dialogue. 30 Although the government expressed its appreciation to the EU "for attention paid to the developments in the Slovak Republic," its practical policy in 1995 remained in the spirit of the November 3-4 session of Parliament.

The period following brought a number of questionably democratic steps: First, there was particular attention on the President-government relationship--with the government hurling ever-stronger attacks towards the President. The coalition majority took the extra-constitutional and hence, mostly symbolic, step of voting no-confidence in the President. The government also scorned the Constitutional Court, which overturned most of the more controversial laws passed by the ruling coalition. Court decisions led government representatives to refer to the court as another "ill element of the system"--after the President.

Second, the governmental coalition also misused the police--employing it for the partisan purpose of checking petition sheets of the opposition party, Democratic Union (DU), in an apparent attempt to cast doubts the upon legality of DU participation in Parliament. Third, budgetary allocations to support the minority press were allotted instead to the Pro Slovakia fund, which in turn allotted the funds to mass media loyal to the coalition. Fourth, government appointed commissions replaced top and mid-level administrators across the country. The main criteria for appointment was membership in one of the coalition parties. Fifth, a bill was submitted to Parliament that violated the principle of equal economic conditions with proposals that worked to the detriment of mass media that had foreign capital participation. Sixth, Parliament deprived the President of his responsibility for appointing the director of the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS) director. The same bill transferred the right to the government. The only possible way that Parliament can currently inspect the Intelligence Service is to pass a vote of no-confidence in the government.

Seventh, the son of the President was kidnapped to Austria, while the public mass media accused him of criminal activities. Meanwhile, two investigators who wanted to follow up on leads that that the kidnapping had been organized by the SIS were called off the case. A decision by the District Court in Austria argued that that the President's son had been kidnapped and brought Austria against his will. The court added that there was a reasonable suspicion that a national body of the Slovak Republic took part in this action. In response, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a note of protest to the addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs took this step despite the fact that no executive body is entitled to intervene in decisions taken by an independent court.

Eighth, Parliament considered language bills which proposed abolishing preexisting standards concerning the use of minority languages in administration. The bill, however, failed to replace the old standards with new standards. Finally, Parliament also considered an amendment to the criminal law, referred to as the "Republic Protection Bill," under which individuals might be criminally prosecuted for a number of forms of anti-government speech. 31

The EU did not perceive this litany of developments indifferently. Indeed, it retained its contractual obligation to maintain a dialogue with the Slovak government. On October 15, 1995, the EU issued its second demarche to the Slovak government. A few days later, the US government also expressed its "misgivings" in an additional demarche.

The EU demarche voiced misgivings "about the contemporary political and institutional tension in the country." They also related concerns about, "actions...taken against the President of the country, which are in defiance of the EU constitution and democratic practice." In addition, the EU reminded Slovakia of its obligation to observe the criteria of the Association Agreement--which apply to all EU membership applicants and of the basic criteria of democratic behavior, stipulated by the Copenhagen summit. The most significant is the first condition, that there must be "stability of institutions in order to guarantee democracy, the state of law, [and] human rights." The second demarche also noted that "misgivings pertaining to the political and economic transition of the country, underlying the [first] demarche, persist."

The United States' government demarche expressed "misgivings" about undemocratic developments in the Slovak Republic, including "...growing intolerance of the ruling coalition towards opposition views, an atmosphere of political intimidation, and jeopardized market reform by concealed, party-based decision-making in privatization." The Americans added that they continued to "...carefully monitor the investigation of the recent kidnap of the President's son, and hope the case [will] be soon resolved." The US government concluded, "progress in transformation towards democracy and [a] free market is crucial in terms of our support, and critical with regard to Slovak membership in the transatlantic community."

The two demarches were followed by a resolution of the European Parliament concerning democracy in Slovakia. The resolution openly indicated the "prospects" for Slovak membership in the EU if the ruling method in the Slovak Republic did not change: "If the government of the Slovak Republic continues a policy which does not comply with elementary principles of democracy, human rights, and minority rights, and the state of law, the EU will have to [re]consider its programs of assistance and cooperation within the European Association Agreement--which will have to be suspended." 32

Reaction of representatives of the Slovak government to the shower of Western criticism towards the end of 1995 varied. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' standpoint to the EU demarches was "fresh," but, according to the daily Pravda , absolutely "deaf." The Ministry stated,

The Slovak Republic, as an associated EU country, takes all aspects of its dialogue with EU very seriously... The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is pleased to state that the Slovak party has recently launched a number of specific initiatives aimed at approaching the Union even before its adoption ...Nevertheless, it is not only the Slovak public that can notice that many countries and also some institutions cannot get beyond a kind of stereotype in relation to Slovakia... 33

In his speech at an international conference in Berlin on November 10, 1995, Slovak Prime Minister Meèiar compared the EU procedure to making decisions "about us, without us," as had occurred in 1938, 1939, and 1968. 34 ... Much later, HZDS MP, Roman Hofbauer, gave what one analyst described as the "most emotional" but "accurate" picture of the post-demarche mood in the coalition with regard to the dialogue with the West: "We are advised by all as jerks, enlightened as fools, taught as illiterates, judged as recidivists, scolded as delinquents, given tasks as the retarded, frightened, and threatened as some criminals." 35

In policy making, the HZDS reaction to the wave of Western criticism was business as usual. In January 1996, after the meeting of the SNS Central Council, Chairman J. Slota stated that his party would only ratify the Meèiar government's intergovernmental agreement with Hungary if his coalition partners reciprocated by passing several implicitly undemocratic acts--each of which apparently strengthened the hand of the state in a number of crucial aspects of Slovak life. These included the Republic Protection Act, the State of Emergency Act, the Educational Act, the Local Election Act Amendment. 36 The SNS price for its support was high as the praise Slovakia received for settling a number of outstanding international issues with its southern neighbor was drowned out by the chorus of concern over continued undemocratic trends in its internal policy. HZDS's choice of the patently undemocratic SNS as a coalition partner thus drove it further into a into an "undemocratic" vicious circle, in which it could not rule without SNS support, but could not retain SNS support without undermining its claims to its Western dialogue partners that their concerns regarding the state of democracy in Slovakia were unfounded. 37

The policy direction exercised in 1995 continued in 1996. In addition to the Republic Protection Act, parliament passed a State Secret, Official Secret and Coded Information Exchange Act, which restricts mass media's abilities to inform the public. Parliament also approved the division Slovakia into administrative districts without consulting minority representatives. In addition, Parliament ignored the protests of third sector representatives in passing a restrictive Foundation Act. A new University Education Act restricted the autonomy and academic freedoms of universities--subjecting them to greater political control.

Meanwhile, government-controlled public television continued its unfounded campaign against the President--accusing him of unsubstantiated criminal activities. On April 29, R. Remiás, a key witness in the case who claimed that the SIS did indeed participate in kidnapping the President's son, died when his car mysteriously blew up en route. 38 On May 17, the case of the President's son was put into abeyance without a solution. The case of R. Remiás followed soon after. 39

Finally, the Constitutional Court ruled that November 1994 legislation transferring privatization decisions from the government to the Fund of National Property did not comply with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Nonetheless, the NPF kept privatizing.

The response of Slovakia's Western dialogue partners was to speak more frankly about their concerns. On the occasion of opening a branch of the Society for Foreign Policy in Presov on October 22, 1996, United States Ambassador to the Slovak Republic, Ralph Johnson, delivered an official US government policy statement in which he specified individual legislative norms which complied neither with the spirit of democracy nor with Slovakia's goal to become a regular member of the transatlantic community,

The United States provides support to a Slovakia that is democratic both in terms of electoral process and laws and their observation, and in observing individual rights--including the right to express one's disapproval without being considered a national enemy. From the point of view of Slovakia's aspirations to become a member of Western democratic organizations we find it necessary to resolve serious cases, such as the kidnap of Michal Kováè Jr. and the death of Róbert Remiás. We would not like to express ourselves on results of these investigations, however, putting them into abeyance might, in our view, seriously impair the chances of Slovakia... The time of taking decisions is approaching. The first decisions on NATO enlargement are supposed to be taken in spring next year [1997]. 40

The Slovak government's response was consistent with past practice. Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Ham_ík commented, "I cannot see any reason for the Ministry to give its standpoint on speeches of ambassadors." 41

Again, the disturbing trend of undemocratic practice continued. On December 4, 1996, Parliament's coalition majority deprived the Member of Parliament, F. Gaulieder of his mandate after he broke from the parliamentary club of HZDS members--despite his public declaration before Parliament that he did not want to give up his mandate. 42 Parliament's action breached the elementary principle of representative parliamentary democracy that deputies are free to exercise their mandates as they see fit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, perhaps attempted to preempt the controversy by warning that no demarches from the EU or NATO were expected in relation to the "Gaulieder case." Indeed, neither body issued a demarche. However, Chairman of the Parliament and Co-chairman of the Common European Union-Slovak Republic Parliamentary Committee, A.M. Húska, received a letter from his EU colleague in the Common Committee H. Bosch, that stated,

I would like to emphasize that you and your colleagues should realize that it is still more and more difficult for me to understand why the National Council of the Slovak Republic takes decisions which clearly contradict the idea of numerous statements... concerning the intention of Slovakia to build in your country a permanent parliamentary democracy... In any parliamentary democracy, members of the parliament represent only the citizens who elected them. This is a fundamental principle...if this trend does not change clearly and unambiguously, it will have serious consequences upon work of the Common Parliamentary Committee, and upon chances of Slovakia to join the European Union in near future. 43

A resolution of the European Parliament followed on December 13, 1996, requesting "the Slovak Parliament to reevaluate its standpoint in this matter." The resolution continued with European Parliament reminder, "that observing fundamental democratic principles, including free exercise of a deputy mandate, is a condition for entering into a developing cooperation with EU." 44

Despite these admonishments, the trend continued. On February 5, 1997, the coalition majority, in defiance of the Election Act, replaced the late SNS MP, B. Kunc, with L. Hruska instead of E. Spisák, who had received the next most preferential votes as an SNS nominee in the 1994 election. 45 Meanwhile, the government prepared a State of Emergency Bill and a new Police Bill, which, if passed, would abolish the Presidium of the Police Corps and would directly subordinate complete police structure to the Minister of Interior Affairs. This, in turn, would make it possible to politically manipulate police functions, including for example, to politically control all investigators, or to tap public servants without prior permission from a judge. 46

The almost four-year political dialogue, in which the Slovak partner largely failed to respond to Western concerns, is apparently coming to an end. The Western partners have already said "absolutely everything." In Madrid on 8-9 July, 1997, Slovakia was excluded from the list of countries which will be invited to enter talks about NATO enlargement. Later the same month, EU officials excluded Slovakia from their recommendations of countries that should be invited to the first wave of EU membership talks.

Perhaps as importantly, Slovakia's Association Agreement, a document that provides Slovakia with the same political and trade status as its Central and Eastern European neighbors, appears endangered. The willingness of the coalition to restore constitutional conditions and the institutions of parliamentary democracy in Slovakia is thus critical if Slovakia is to remain part of Central Europe's historical reorientation towards the West. Yet the current ruling coalition appears to remain "deaf" to Western entreaties and "blind" to its accession criteria. Prospects for resuming the dialogue with Western partners remain poor. When submitting its EU membership application in June 1995, the current leadership of the Slovak Republic made clear statements indicating that it realized that it held the key to the success or failure of gaining regular EU membership. Now that the dialogue has by and large failed, the Slovak government should admit that it was disqualified primarily "its own hands."

3. The "Slovak Way," The East, And The Post-Soviet Model Of Transformation

The démarche period of 1994-1995 demonstrated to the ruling coalition that without a change in their interior policy, the chances of Slovakia's successful integration with Western structures were minimal. The government faced a difficult dilemma: a change in interior policy would mean admitting that their interior policy was flawed. Failure to change, however, would mean that Slovakia would fail to integrate. Meanwhile, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, would probably be invited--leaving Slovakia isolated.

The coalition decided to adhere to its interior policy. They thus placed their own short-term term power considerations above their stated long-term national interests. A by-product was the ensuing search for justification: it was necessary to persuade both themselves and the electorate that that Slovakia, in fact, did "not need any integration" and that the "Western model" of transformation did not reflect Slovak needs.

The long-term direction of Slovakia's foreign-policy orientation, as first stated in the program Meèiar's governmental program declaration of 1995, was challenged by HZDS's coalition partners soon after it was issued. In October 1995, SNS chairman Ján Slota and ZRS chairman Ján 1/4upták gave two interviews for the Russian ITAR-TASS press agency, stating, "the Slovak Republic should not enter into various military blocks, and should preserve its neutrality" 47 ; "The majority of common Slovaks do not at all miss NATO, EU, or IMF." 48

Towards the end of the same month, Meèiar visited Moscow where he stated, "The programmatic declaration of our government contains NATO enlargement, and the government does not change this programmatic declaration for the time being." In Moscow, meèiar proposed a continental security system that would include Russia, "One of the possible ways is that NATO will be transformed into a Paneuropean organization, including both member countries and cooperating countries. It would be a historic fallacy to divide Europe into two parts." 49 Meèiar's speculations about the possibility of "pancontinental" security structures reflected the Russian view of new security architecture of Europe. 50

The dialogue with the West failed predominantly because of "interior policy." Russian policy took advantage of this. It tactfully responded to "Slovak problems in communicating" with the West. Ambassador to the Slovak Republic, S. Jastr_embskij, supported and defended Slovakia in its dialogue, "To say 'Follow us. There is only one way to democracy, and we know the way...', as many Western countries do, is a new Bolshevism." 51 In April 1996, Izvestija  published an extensive document on Slovakia in which the Russian ambassador defended Slovakia,

The West does not understand specific features of the young country, and does not take into consideration either the history of the Slovak folk or the Slovak way of thinking, their mentality. Dissatisfaction over the governmental policy itself is apparent... The Slovaks are saying: Look how things are done by the Czechs, Poles, or Hungarians. Why do you proceed in a different way? Just because it is a different country which wants to do it its way." 52

Later on, Jastr_embskij, now spokesman of the Russian President, characterized the US Ambassador R. Johnson's speech in Presov in October 1996 as "open pressure and unprecedented intervention into interior matters of the Slovak Republic. In other words, in Slovakia, things are not done undemocratically, just differently. As a sovereign country, Slovakia has a right to do so--a right denied by the "Bolshevik" West...."

Towards the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996, the image of a "Slovak way" of transformation began to be employed by governing coalition policy makers. The Slovak way, they argued represented a conception of reform that stood as an alternative to practice elsewhere in Central Europe.

Meèiar first discussed Slovakia's idiosyncratic transformation know-how during his visit to the Yugoslavian Federal Republic in late January 1996. On the first day of the Slovak delegation's visit to Belgrade, EU ministers postponed official recognition of the Yugoslavian Federal Republic. 53 Yet Meèiar stayed to receive an honorary doctorate from the University of the Kariè brothers. Meèiar also gave a lecture on "the Slovak model of economic transformation," in which he maintained, "Everybody has the right to his own way; we want to avoid dogmatism. The role of a state is not reduced in the period of transition. What is changed is its functions... The process of transformation can be supported from outside, however, it cannot be enforced from outside." 54

In February 1996, the exclusive Russian journal V.I.P.  (about leaders and for leaders), published an extensive interview with the Slovak Prime Minister, in which he claimed among other things,

No doubt, there are some circles in the West which take a critical attitude towards my person, our Movement [HZDS], or even our country... In the political area, we did not start to establish the traditional structure of Western countries. Our movement [HZDS] came into existence on pragmatic, rather than ideological, principles... It does not resemble Western parties... we have outlined the following perspective for our country: expecting as little as possible from outside, and making use of domestic resources... Not everybody understands it, and not everybody likes it... We are not looking for any "third way," we are looking for a way for ourselves. Only those who think schematically can be surprised at it: Why is it different in your country than in the West? Yes, it is different! But, if it is different and good--is it bad? 55

"The Slovak way" moved the Slovak Republic further away from Western transformation models, and brought it closer to the transformation models of post-Soviet slavic or "Slavonic" republics--Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Indeed, the Slovak way contains a number of elements in common with the transformation process of the Slavonic republics. 56 Perhaps for this reason, the Slovak way of transformation was appreciated in the East. In the course of years following the break-up of the USSR (1991-1996), political systems of the former Slavonic Soviet republics underwent a profound metamorphosis--characterized by a stormy internal political development that had its roots in a "war of the branches of power." The result was nearly always the same--the formation of presidential, or even super-presidential, systems dominated by executive power structures. This period of "transition" features a migration of power from one extreme to the other--from the almighty Supreme Soviets (parliaments) with their tradition of a "revolutionary" cumulation of legislative and executive powers 57 to new super-presidential systems characterized by a radical curtailment of parliamentary powers 58 and the existence of parallel structures of executive power at all strategic levels of state organization.

The new "executive" structures of power were built up on the basis of the bodies, infrastructure, and personnel of the former communist party. As opposed to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in the USSR there were neither mass movements of civic resistance nor new elites capable of replacing the original nomenclature. In the post-Soviet republics, democracy was "introduced from the top." New political leaders "brought" the republics to independence by eliminating the original national elite and attempting to gain dominant political positions in the new independent states. Necessarily, they clashed with the Supreme Soviets. It was unrealistic and, in fact, impossible to form absolutely new structures of power capable of competing with the Soviets without reflecting the interests of remaining structures of the defunct Communist Party. 59

The essence of the reform of the state organization in the Slavonic, post-Soviet republics consisted of "reforming" the former Communist Party structures by placing them--or their responsibilities--within the executive branch of power, headed by the President. Judicatory power played only a marginal role in the process. Ukraine, for example, completely dispensed with it. 60 The center of gravity of internal political struggle was elsewhere. In no way did the struggle respect valid constitutional law. Rather, the victorious forces applied direct force (as in autumn 1993 in Russia) or vigorous political pressure (Ukraine).

Another factor which influenced the course of transformation was the level of political awareness, or political culture, of the post-Soviet elite. In other words, it is the Soviet heritage of a "revolutionary cumulation of power," corresponding to a unilateral principle of rule (I decide and execute without supervision). Although this principle was one of main reasons for the communist system's crisis (because it engendered a "misuse of power"), it remained encoded in the "political genes" of the post-Soviet elite.

The transition period in the post-Soviet republics, moreover, was entirely lacking in any awareness of the principle of division of powers with clearly delimited responsibilities and independent activities. Like the Soviets before them, the new presidents cumulated executive and legislative powers. Indeed, the crucial question of the transformation was not over the principle of division of power. Rather, it revolved around the demands of the republic presidents for greater executive and particularly, legislative powers.

The defining characteristic of the presidential systems formed in the Slavonic republics was a culmination of power in the executive presidential branch. This approach resulted in "profanation" of the very notion of democracy in post-Soviet society. Social chaos was claimed to be a corollary of "introducing democracy." But chaos was really the by-product of clashing power interests of individual groups of the original elite as they slugged it out in the war of the branches. There was virtually no concern for the consistent application of a constitutional doctrine stipulating a precisely defined balance between independent branches of power. It is arguable whether any democracy at all was introduced in the Slavonic republics. One can only speak about democratization, but most democratic elements were merely "cosmetic." Constitutional doctrine has not been "truly" applied in the Slavonic post-Soviet countries. Rather, "hybrid" political systems have emerged, featuring a Soviet-style cumulating of power.

There are hence no guarantees of stability among these countries because the present situation implies the absolute victory of one party, and the defeat of the other. This is not a state of balanced compromise. It lacks mechanisms to balance various interests and to ensure their mutual control. It is also arguable whether the "hybrid" political systems of state organization in Russia, Belorus, and Ukraine can be considered democratic systems that guarantee both human rights and the elimination of misuse of power. As Szomolanyi points out in this volume, democracy cannot be reduced to the mere institution of free and fair elections and the freedom of speech. Even then, it is not at all apparent whether scheduled free and fair elections will even take place in the slavonic republics.

Democracy should be "permanent" in nature, which can be only achieved by thorough and consistent "democratization" of the political system. Democratization must be primarily based on the consistent application of basic democratic constitutional doctrine, including the principle of division of power at all levels of state organization and administration.

The strong executive "presidency" in all Slavonic republics has been bolstered by an oligarchy of new national property owners, and the informal and pragmatic "party of power." 61 The fusion of the presidency and executive power in the post-Soviet conditions has thus created a post-Soviet, political-economic oligarchy--connected with executive power structures. This oligarchy of "pragmatists," deideologized in the course of transformation, is satisfied with, and even dependent upon, the presidential dominance of executive power. Indeed, the cumulation of power in the hands of the state administration--uncontrolled by Parliament or the Soviets, not to mention of the public--effectively prevents any effective independent control of the oligarchy's "property-related" activities.

The emerging structures in the Slavonic republics are build on a relatively unsophisticated political culture and a civic society that appears ready to passively accept the executive's non-transparent "high policy" decisions if they are justified by the "need" for an "iron hand, and order." Given the absence of a genuine alternative elite capable of taking a "power initiative" and the marginality of political parties, one could argue that the post-Soviet countries are not democratic. Rather, they are stabilized quasi-democratic systems stabilized around a hierarchical oligarchic power structure which functions on the basis of rules restored from time-worn Soviet power games.

There were probably few alternatives to these contemporary outcomes. The immense consequences of the break-up of the USSR and its power structures; the complications of the state-formation process in the successor republics; and a political culture formed around the maxim, "stability-at-all-costs," were bound to shape the transition process in some unfortunate form. However, developments in the Slavonic republics should remain as unique as their underlying contributing circumstances. Certainly, these conditions were different from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These countries could draw on different political traditions and political culture. They also could build on a democratic state-formation ideal that was first expressed and formulated in the late 1980's.

The concept of the "Slovak way" of transformation by the "nonideological postcommunist pragmatists" of the HZDS and its coalition partners shares many elements with the post-Soviet, Slavonic transformation model--particularly, a disrespect for the principles of constitutionalism; a tendency to centralize executive power (albeit, in the office of the Prime Minister), and movement towards the establishment of a powerful oligarchic property-owning class. Hence, the introduction of the Slovak Way was hardly original at all. And it is highly arguable whether is a more appropriate approach for Slovakia's underlying conditions.

The question thus remains as to why the Slovak transformation direction leans so decidedly towards the Slavonic model of transformation. Heading in the direction of the hybrid Slavonic system is the Slovak way backwards. It is the path towards the international isolation of Slovakia from Western and Central European democratic countries and euro-atlantic integration structures. This was not stipulated as a priority of the program of the present Slovak government. Nor would such a program be likely to gain the support of the Slovak electorate in direct and free elections if it were put before them plainly. Let us hope that the present coalition--despite its monopoly position in public mass media--fails to persuade the majority of Slovak citizens of the contrary.

References

Note 1: For more details on the "alliance theory" within the theory of international relations see Frei 1973; Liska 1962; Riker 1962; and Sheehan 1996. Back.

Note 2: n April 2, 1917, in which he justified the necessity of American involvement in Europe and American participation in the First World War. See, for example, Levin 1972. Back.

Note 3: "National Security Strategy"--a document elaborated by the US administration in accordance with section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols' Act of 1986 concerning the reorganization of the Defence Ministry, and its tasks under new historical conditions. Nezavisimaja Gazeta , May 23, 1996. Back.

Note 4: See Czempiel 1991; 2nd edition, 1992, for the structure and development stages of the East-West conflict from the end of the World War II to the late 1980s, and for external reasons for the break-up of the Eastern block. Back.

Note 5: See Luif 1995, for an assessment of the integration of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the EU. Back.

Note 6: Samson 1995, p. 28, for an illustration. Other European countries may also be mentioned--Ireland is an EU member. Hence, the Maastricht Treaty provisions also apply to this country. Norway is not a member of the EU, but it is a member of NATO. Switzerland is the best example of a neutral European country whose traditions date back to the period long before the bipolar conflict. It joined NATO's Partnership for Peace project in 1996. Back.

Note 7: In accordance with the Maastricht Treaty, the West European Union, which carries all the features of a military pact, became an indispensable defensive structure of the European Union. On May 6, 1996, NATO and the WEU signed an agreement on security cooperation. The agreement supported the transformation of WEU into the European pillar of NATO. Based on this agreement, WEU will be provided with access to NATO's data and military means. This will enable WEU to implement military missions without the United States armed forces. See SME , May 7, 1996, p. 7. Back.

Note 8: United States National Security Strategy (1996), q.v.. The new situation in Europe was also reflected in the Stability Pact Initiative, launched by the French Prime Minister Balladur at the EU summit in Copenhagen (June 1993), where the EU decided to adopt new members from among post-communist countries. The Conference on the Stability Pact was held in Paris in March 1995. Back.

Note 9: Austria submitted its official EU membership application on July 17, 1989; Sweeden on July 1, 1991; and Finland on March 18, 1992. All three countries became EU members on January 1, 1995. In addition, the Swiss government submitted its EU membership application on May 26, 1992, and the Norwegian government on November 25, 1992. In the latter two cases, the applications were withdrawn because of the results of the respective national referendums. Back.

Note 10: Approved at the NATO summit in Brussels on January 1994. The skeleton document on joining the programme was signed by the Slovak Prime Minister Vladimfr MeFiar at NATO headquarters in Brussels on February 9, 1994. NATO membership criteria were first specified in an official expert analysis of NATO entitled, "Study on NATO Enlargement" in September 1995, pp. 23-26. The key criteria is full acceptance of the fundamental principles specified in the Washington Treaty: support for--and protection of--democracy, individual freedoms, and the law. Other criteria include settled and stable relations with neighbouring countries. Back.

Note 11: European Association Agreements were signed with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (ÈSFR), Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuenia, and Slovenia. When the ÈSFR was divided, both successor states signed special agreements with the EU on October 4, 1993. These became effective on February 1, 1995. The decision to enlargement the EU by adopting postcommunist countries was approved at the EU summit in Copenhagen in June 1993, and further specified at the Essen summit in December 1994. There are five fundamental enlargement conditions--four of which pertain to associated countries applying for regular membership: 1. political stability, stability of democratic institutions, recognition of human rights and minority rights; 2. functional market economy; 3. ability to resist the pressure of economic competition within the Union's economic structures; 4. ability to cope with the duties and goals entailed by membership--and in particular the project towards political, economic, and currency union. (The fifth condition applies to the Union-ability to cope with the enlargement and to implement an institutional reform.) For details see, Cameron 1994. Back.

Note 12: "Programmatic Declaration of the Government of the Slovak Republic," Introduction, p 1; Foreign affairs, see also, Pravda , January 16, 1995, p. 8. Back.

Note 13: "Governmental memorandum to the EU membership application of the Slovak Republic." Trend , June 12, 1995, pp. I-II. Back.

Note 14: See, for example, Lesko, June 19, 1995. Back.

Note 15: J. Santer, chairman of the European Commission, reminded Slovak President Kováè during his visit to Brussels on October 18, 1996 (one year after the second demarche), of the fact that the EU was still waiting for a positive response by the Slovak government to the demarches. SME , October 19, 1996. Back.

Note 16: Kotian , October 9, 1993. Paradoxically, while the European Association Agreement with Slovakia became effective on February 1, 1995 after it was ratified by parliaments of member countries, it has not yet been published in the Digest of the Slovak Republic. Back.

Note 17: The process of adopting the Slovak Republic to the Council of Europe, see Estok 1993, pp. 89-113. Back.

Note 18: Act of the National Council on the official language in the Slovak Republic. "Document," Pravda , December 1, 1995, p. 9. Back.

Note 19: Skeleton agreement of the Council of Europe on the protection of minorities. "Document," Pravda , May, 1995, pp. 18-19. Back.

Note 20: Study on NATO Enlargement, ibid.; the first EU membership condition formulated at the Copenhagen summit, Cameron, ibid. Back.

Note 21: SME , February 5, 1997, p. 2; Parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe. SME , February 10, 1997, p. 5. Back.

Note 22: The Report was prepared more than two years before the much criticized Official Language Act was passed, i.e. at the time of effectiveness of the much more liberal Administration Language Act of 1990! Back.

Note 23: For the text of the Report of the Helsinki Commission of the United States Congress, see Pravda , October 6, 1993, pp. 1, 12. Back.

Note 24: Procházka , October 22, 1993, p. 3. Back.

Note 25: Pravda , October 18, 1993, p. 1; The image of a distorted, subjective picture of Slovak reality continues to shape Slovak political discussions. The government holds numerous groups and individuals responsible for its negative image--both at home and abroad: Nor is there any acknowledgment that their particular style of policy could be a potential source of the bad press. Back.

Note 26: The text of the speech was published in many Slovak dailies on January 3, 1994. Back.

Note 27: "Report on the Situation in the Slovak Republic presented by President of the Slovak Republic Michal Kováè at the 27th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on March 9, 1994." SME , March 10, 1994, p. 7. Back.

Note 28: Sámel , November 2, 1995. Back.

Note 29: Lesko , June 29, 1995. Back.

Note 30: Cameron, 1994, p. 9. Back.

Note 31: For a summary of antidemocratic measures and steps of the ruling power in 1995, see, for example, Sámel, November 2, 1995. Back.

Note 32: Texts of the EU and the USA demarches to the government of the Slovak Republic can be found in "Documents," Pravda , November 9, 1995, p. 5. "The European Parliament adopted a resolution concerning the observance of democracy in Slovakia," Pravda , November 17, 1995, pp. 1, 17. Back.

Note 33: "Standpoint of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the EU declaration," Pravda , October 26, 1995, p. 2. Back.

Note 34: Pravda , November 11, 1995, pp. 1, 13. Back.

Note 35: Hrabko , October 19, 1996. Back.

Note 36: "SNS conditions its support to the agreement," Pravda , January 15, 1996, pp. 1, 2. Back.

Note 37: For the tactics of SNS policy with regard to HZDS within the governmental coalition, see Lesko , December 19, 1996. Back.

Note 38: "Robert Remiás case," SME , October 7, 1996, p. 5. Back.

Note 39: "Kidnap of M. Kováè Jr.--one year after," SME , September 2, 1996, p. 5. Back.

Note 40: "From the speech of the US ambassador in the Slovak Republic Ralph Johnson on the occasion of opening the Presov branch of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy on October 22, 1996," Národná Obroda , October 24, 1996, p. 9. Back.

Note 41: Ibid., p. 1. Back.

Note 42: "Gaulieder's mandate," SME , December 6, 1996, p. 5. Back.

Note 43: "Letter. Bosch is writing to Húska," SME , December 16, 1996, p. 4. Back.

Note 44: "Text of the European Parliament's resolution," SME , December 14, 1996, p. 4. Back.

Note 45: SME , February 6, 1997, pp. 1, 2. Back.

Note 46: SME , February 3, 1997, pp. 1, 2. Back.

Note 47: SME , October 4, 1995, p. 1. Back.

Note 48: Pravda , October 21, 1995, p. 1. Back.

Note 49: Drábek, November 2, 1995. Back.

Note 50: For details on the issue of accepting the Russian views of global security problems into Slovak foreign policy, especially with regard to the proposed NATO eastward enlargement, see Duleba, 1996. Back.

Note 51: Wall Street Journal , January 11, 1996. Back.

Note 52: For information on Izvestija 's report on Slovakia (prepared by Leonid Mieèin), see Pravda , April 23, 1996, p. 10. Back.

Note 53: Pravda , January 30, 1996, pp. 1, 13. Back.

Note 54: Národné Obroda , February 8, 1996, p. 3. Back.

Note 55: "V. Meèiar for V.I.P. : If it is different (than in the West) and good - is it bad?" Pravda , February 15, 1996, p. 11. Back.

Note 56: Transformation in the Baltics and in the Central Asia reflects different cultural and economic background than the transformation on Russia, Belorus, and Ukraine. For detailed comparison of transformation models in the post-Soviet region, with emphasis on the Ukrainian experience with state-formation in the period of 1991-1995, see Duleba, in, Právnik 9/96, pp. 830-865. Back.

Note 57: Under socialism, Soviet citizens were represented at the local level by authorities having legislative powers. These bodies had "executive committees" which exercised executive powers. One and the same body thus comprise both legislative and executive powers. This "revolutionary" system of power accumulation contradicted the principle of division of power typical of Western democracies. Back.

Note 58: Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine accepted the "Jeltsinean 1990 model" of presidency: the president is the ultimate representative of executive power with the right to issue decrees having the nature of legislative rule-formation (decrees, rules); moreover, they are binding for the whole country. This phenomenon is atypical of democracies with strict and balanced division of power among individual branches. It violates the principle of division of power. Back.

Note 59: A case in point is the President Representative Act passed by the Ukrainian Parliament on March 5, 1992. In combination with President Kravèuk's decree, "On Local Administration" of April 14, 1992, it established a legislative basis to enable the Communist Party administration network to become a new vertical administration, directly subordinate to the President. Back.

Note 60: The Ukrainian Constitutional Court was established late, and started its work in October 1996. Back.

Note 61: For characteristics of the "party of power," see Riabèuk, in, Polityèna Dumka , 3/1994, p. Back.