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Slovakia:
Problems of Democratic Consolidation
and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game

Sona Szomolányi and John Gould, editors

New York

Columbia International Affairs Online

1997

Bibliographic Data

9. The Role Of The Mass Media In The Post-Communist Transition Of Slovakia 1

Andrej Skolkay

This article analyzes the development of the mass media in the post-communist transformation of Slovakia from 1989 to 1996. The process of transition has involved not only the transformation of the economy from central planning to a "free" market and the creation of democratic political institutions, but also the establishment of a mass media appropriate to an emerging open society and a rule-of-law state. The case of Slovakia illustrates the importance of free and independent political communication to this process as well as the many difficulties involved in media reform. Constantly changing circumstances since 1989 have affected the capacity of the media to assist in the consolidation of democracy, both while Slovakia was part of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and, especially, during the first years of independent statehood.

The media's ability to play a positive role in democratizing Slovak politics has been adversely affected by a number of factors, including: a political culture inherited from the communist and pre-communist past; the re-emergence of some historical patterns of political and social behavior, including unresolved issues of national identity and constitutional structure; the lack of experience of former dissidents with democratic contestation; the excellent populist communication skills of Vladimir Meèiar; the confused and often contradictory expectations of the post-communist public; the absence of a stable legal framework; the lack of professionalism on the part of Czech and Slovak journalists; and, not least, the authoritarian policies of political elites distrustful of a genuinely independent media.

By the end of 1996, the status of the media remained uncertain. While the media was no longer a docile instrument of political elites, the authoritarian practices of Slovakia's ruling elites and their well-documented attempts to re-assert various forms of political and economic control over the mass media continued to inhibit the latter's capacity to contribute to accountable democratic rule.

As the scope of this paper does not allow a comprehensive discussion of all features of media development, I will limit my focus to the most significant aspects of the complex relations between politics and the media in Slovakia. In spite of its perhaps fragmentary character, this analysis is important because it debunks some recent myths about the situation of the Slovak media. Perhaps the most common myth is that Slovak journalists have been routinely and centrally involved in one or another conspiracy. While this myth has been propagated by the Meèiar government in particular, the belief in the allegedly conspiratorial behavior of Slovak journalists is widely shared by Slovakia's political elites. Indeed, even as late as 1997, experienced Slovak journalists and media analysts themselves maintained that the fall of the Carnogoursky government in 1992 was the result of a conspiracy of journalists. The very prevalence of these conspiracy theories is an apt indication of the continued political and cultural barriers to the creation of a mass media appropriate to a democratic polity.

In order to allow an examination of the most important aspects of the relations between media and politics in post-communist Slovakia, this study is divided into the following sections: the role of the mass media in a democracy; the main phases in the transformation of the Slovak media; the peculiarities of the evolution of the Slovak media--the relations between politicians and journalists; the freedom of the mass media--the influence of the mass media on public opinion and vice-versa; and emerging trends of political communication.

1. The Role Of The Mass Media In A Democracy

In 1948, Harold Lasswell identified three basic social functions of the mass media: the dissemination of information; the provision of commentary and interpretation to help place fragmentary information into a broader, coherent context and to assist the formation of social consensus: and the transmission of cultural values and symbols essential to the identity and continuity of any political community (Lasswell 1960, p.179). Merton and Lazarsfeld emphasized the sociological influence of the media slightly differently. They maintained that the media perform both a normative role, by promoting and reinforcing certain societal norms, and a status conferral role, by which media attention automatically legitimizes and enhances the status of those individuals and groups selected as subjects. They also pointed to the negative or socially dysfunctional effects of the mass media; the oversupply of information, they argued, creates the illusion of political participation and social contact and thus serves as a kind of social narcotic (McQuail 1969, p. 85). McQuail identified social and political mobilization as another critical function of the mass media, which together with the dissemination of information, enabled the mass media to act as promoters of change. In contrast, in performing the roles of "correlation", "continuity" and "entertainment," the media were, according to McQuail's schema, an agent of integration (McQuail 1983, p. 79). Significantly, Doris Gruber has added a fifth important function of the mass media: the deliberate manipulation of politics (Gruber 1993).

Modern democratic theory expects that the media play key roles in social and political life. According to Meyn, the role of the media in a democratic society includes three political functions: the dissemination of information; the formation of public opinion; and the regulation of accountable politics through public criticism and exposure. To be effective in these political functions, the mass media need adequate legal and institutional supports such as: constitutional protections of freedom of expression; an independent judiciary; and physical access to a plurality of sources of information (Meyn 1994). With these minimal requirements in mind, the following discussion provides an outline of the political context and the internal features of the post-communist Slovak media in an effort to assess their relative capacity to fulfill the roles most critical to democracy, in particular the dissemination of information, the provision of informed commentary, and the effective promotion of political accountability.

2. The Place Of Mass Media In Post-Communist Transformation Of Slovakia

The development of the mass media during the period in question can be divided roughly into three phases, although important areas of overlap remain. Each of these phases was marked by significant changes in the structure of the media and of their social and political functions, and these changes have had a cumulative effect on the character and capacity of the Slovak media today. In The first phase, extending from 1991 until 1992, the mass media had the strongest influence on politics and society, directly as well as indirectly. At this time also, the majority of the media enjoyed wide freedom of action, although there were some notable exceptions in the case of television and some publications. During the second period, from 1992 to 1994, the mass media found themselves struggling to maintain their recently won independence from state control. Ironically, however, their capacity to shape policy debates or popular opinion declined significantly. In the third period, from 1994 to 1996, the mass media remained largely independent but experienced increasing political pressures, both from the Slovak government and from new partisan owners, which led to a defensive form of self-censorship, especially on the part of public television broadcasters. While the professionalism of journalists has improved significantly, their public authority has remained low.

In the first phase, the majority of the established print media freed themselves from the political monopoly of the state. One paradoxical consequence of this new state of affairs was that new governments and new political parties attempted to establish their own periodicals. These periodicals, however, usually did not survive for long and had limited impact, in part because of poor quality, poor marketing and distribution, lack of popular appeal and political bias. Increasing production costs and decreased subscription revenues also played a role. Government control over federal television and radio, and partial control over Slovak television, remained during this period. The quality of current events commentary gradually improved as the media gained editorial independence.

While these were, on the whole, positive developments, they did not have as much influence on enhancing the public's understanding of social and political processes as one might have expected. There are several possible explanations for the media's inability to provide an arena of effective public policy debate. First, both the unprecedented nature of the events themselves and the relatively new vocabulary used to describe new institutions and processes such as free markets, democratic federalism, and national sovereignty, were so confusing that even the main political actors often lacked a full comprehension of either the background or the implications of the political struggles in which they found themselves.

More importantly, the charismatic personality of Slovakia's most able post-communist politician - Vladimír Meèiar - often exercised decisive influence over the course of events through his frequent appearances on television and radio. In 1990-1991, Meèiar was able to create a highly positive media image, not only because of his privileged access to the media, but also because many journalists, who were initially quite taken by his strong personality and powers of verbal persuasion, sought him out. Meèiar's public charisma was undoubtedly one reason why the majority of the Slovak media at this time supported him in his criticism of both the reform-oriented federal government and of the Èarnogursky coalition which assumed power in the Slovak Republic after the April 1991 vote of non-confidence in the Meèiar government. Despite Meèiar's dismissal, his popularity did not decline his popularity did not decline by as much as many assumed it would. His popularity decreased only to around 55 percent in May 1991, in part because the official reasons given for his dismissal were not coherent, while the allegations against him were unsubstantiated (Friè et. al. 1991, 31). As a result, many citizens did not understand the reasons for his dismissal while others did not find these reasons persuasive enough to change their opinion of him. Meèiar was already at the peak of his popularity with 75- 80 percent of public support, and he managed to persuade both journalists and the wider public that the rationales for his dismissal were manufactured by his enemies (Gal 1992, p. 32; Friè et. al. 1991, p. 31; LeSko 1997, pp. 56-63). Unintentionally, the still inexperienced media contributed to this outcome, simply mirroring public scepticism rather than providing clarification or analysis. Another factor that contributed to Meèiar's positive image was his skill at capitalizing upon the failure of the federal and Czech politicians to work out a fair and timely compromise on the question of Czech-Slovak relations. In this regard, the failure of Czech and some foreign journalists was somewhat different. Although they were able to detect Meèiar's populist and undemocratic tendencies, they tended to view all events in Slovakia as evidence of nationalism and neo-fascism. 2 In the event, even when commentaries and analyses by the Slovak press became increasingly critical of Meèiar, the media proved unable to modify the highly positive public image of him which they had earlier helped to create.

In the second period, news reporting and commentary in the mass media, especially in the dailies, were quite comparable to that found in other democracies, once due allowance is made for regional and local traditions. By 1994, some new journalists had established themselves as respected political commentators in print, radio, and television discussions of public policy, including in particular Róbert Kotian, Juraj Hrabko, Július Gembicky, and Marián LeSko. In general, the media offered more quality information and commentary. At the regional and local level, new radio and television stations were founded at this time, although their coverage of political issues and their broadcasting range remained limited.

However, in this period, the government exploited various administrative, legislative, and fiscal methods to constrain the independence of the publicly-owned mass media (Skolkay, 1995, 1996c, 1996d). Some intellectually oriented and politically critical periodicals were forced to close down, in some cases because of government opposition, in others because they could not withstand the rigors of the free market. For example, the intellectual cultural monthly, Slovenské Poh3/4ady, known for its highly critical articles, was forced to close down when the government established and subsidized an identical periodical -- with a virtually identical name -- thereby undercutting the former's market share. Many critical periodicals did, however, manage to survive and to retain an independent editorial policy in both their news reporting and commentary on current events. Still others emerged even more critical of the government than they had been before. In any case, this critical stance had little effect in engaging the public. In 1992, political parties in Slovakia considered the idea of establishing a national private television but because of short-term partisan interests and the fear that private television might escape their control, the plan was dropped. It is noteworthy that, shortly before the 1992 elections, two companies were awarded a joint television broadcasting license only to lose it after prolonged disputes over management and programming issues.

In the third period, tensions between the mass media and the Meèiar government, first evident after the 1992 elections, increased significantly. On the one hand, the shift in attention from Czech and Slovak disputes to new domestic issues surrounding the dual transition to a market economy and to independent statehood naturally enhanced the Slovak media's scrutiny of Meèiar's policies. On the other hand, Meèiar was increasingly preoccupied with consolidating his grip on power through more blatantly authoritarian means. By 1995, only a marginal part of the daily press continued to support the Meèiar government. Despite political pressures, public radio continued to be both relatively neutral and objective in its news reporting and enjoyed high ratings. 3 By contrast, both the quality and popularity of Slovak Television's news broadcasts was low (see Názory 7/3, 1996, p. 29).

The first private national television companies, VTV and Markíza, were established in 1995 and 1996 respectively, creating the first real competition for state-controlled Slovak Television. For a relatively brief period, VTV offered more balanced news programming than did Slovak Television. However, it soon became clear that this was due to the efforts of particular journalists rather than to any institutional consolidation of the managerial and editorial independence of the media. In early 1996, the editor-in-chief of the news division resigned in protest after refusing to follow the orders of network managers to adopt a more "pro-national" editorial line. As a result, VTV's news programming became more pro-government, although VTV news and public affairs reporting still remained relatively more critical than that of Slovak Television. The second national private television station, Markíza, started broadcasting on 31 August 1996, with a range covering nearly two-thirds of Slovak territory. Markiza offered even more balanced news coverage, although its early public affairs reporting was quite timid and remained secondary (in terms of the allocation of time slots and production resources) to more commercially viable entertainment programming.

By 1996, almost 20 private radio stations had been established. As the majority of them had broadcast ranges limited to the city or regional level, their capacity to provide an integrated alternative to state-supported radio was weak. Only one of them, Radio TWIST, had any interest in producing domestic political news programs of a scope and quality which could provide an effective alternative to those of the government-supported Slovak Radio.

It was during this period that big domestic investors such as the Harvard Investment Fund, Sipox Holdings, and the East Slovakia Iron Works entered the media market and made majority acquisitions in several print and broadcasting concerns. Although motivated largely by financial considerations, these investments also had a political dimension. The political polarization of Slovak society was evident also among these investors and was reflected in their differing approaches to the media which they had acquired. For example in early 1996, owners of the East Slovakia Iron Works--whose leadership includes some close Meèiar associates--boldly muzzled those journalists it considered too critical of the government, and especially of Prime Minister Meèiar. In the case of Národná Obroda, the struggle for editorial autonomy ended in victory for the owners and in the resignation of its respected editor-in-chief, Tatiana Repková. From the start, the Harvard Investment Fund, owners of Pravda, took a slightly different approach by allowing the editors to pursue a more critical line, although still within unwritten limits. They preferred to encourage the self-censorship of their columnists rather than to enforce more explicit editorial restrictions. In contrast to these two cases, the third major domestic owner, Sipox Holdings, supported news coverage in its daily SME that was highly critical of the Meèiar government, while offering financial support to other independent media outlets like the private regional television station, Sever.

Despite these variations in management style and editorial control, however, at no point have either of these two newspapers--Národna Obroda and Pravda--been as openly pro-Meèiar and uncritical in their reporting as the government standard-bearer, Slovenská Republika, which is owned and controlled by Meèiar's party, the HZDS. One of the significant features of the Slovak print media is that even in spite of certain limitations on editorial freedom, a healthy measure of pluralism has managed to develop. That dailies like Národna Obroda and Pravda have developed their own distinctive styles is because rather than in spite of various managerial intrusions; the distinctive nature of their respective editorial policies is a direct reflection of the political inclinations, commercial rivalries, and perhaps personal animosities of their respective owners.

An additional factor which has threatened the viability of the independent media is their continued financial vulnerability. As a consequence, the government has been able to influence the privately-owned media by exerting effective pressure on advertisers. By extending patronage benefits to select advertising agencies and publishing houses, such as Donar and Kubko-Goral, the government has been able to deprive its rivals in the privately-owned media of badly needed revenues, while securing the most lucrative advertising deals for pro-government outlets.

3. Peculiarities Of The Evolution Of The Slovak Media

The first characteristic feature of mass media developments in Slovakia (and also, at that time, in Czecho-Slovakia as a whole) is that significant liberalization of media practice in the print sector occurred much faster and was more far-reaching than in many other states of post-communist east-central Europe. The rapid transformation of the mass media from a tool of communist indoctrination into a pluralist support for political liberalization during the Velvet Revolution occurred not only in the print media but also in state television and radio, which were eventually reconstituted as public broadcast institutions at the republic level. Significant changes in the legal status of broadcasting bodies occurred in Slovakia over a period of one-and-a-half years, beginning with legal reforms in the spring of 1991. Slovakia thus became the first post-communist country to pass statutes on public broadcast institutions designed, at least initially, to maintain their independence from political influence. The Czech Republic adopted almost identical laws about six months later.

Interestingly, the transformation of state television and radio into public broadcasting institutions was not initiated by either the transitional authorities which governed immediately after the Velvet Revolution or by the coalition government (consisting of Public Against Violence, the Christian Democratic Movement and the Democratic Party) which was elected in June 1990. Rather, the impetus for reconstituting state-owned television and radio into public broadcasting bodies came from the new managers of Slovak radio and television. In contrast to politicians, the managers had some understanding of the nature and importance of public service broadcast institutions and had a professional interest in promoting such changes. From the outset, however, their efforts to reconstitute state radio and television were caught up in the larger political and constitutional struggles over the direction of federal reform.

On the one hand, the federal authorities strongly resisted the transformation of state-owned radio and television into politically independent, public entities. Given the federal government's preference for the de-etatization of all other state institutions and for radical market reforms, their conservative stance on this issue might appear surprising. In part, federal resistance to liberalizing the federal media can be attributed to the usual bureaucratic reluctance to relinquish power and to the federal authorities' desire to compensate for the rapid loss of government influence over the press. At this time, federal regulation of the broadcast media was secured most effectively through the federal government's control of the selection of directors and editors of news departments. Equally important, however, federal authorities were anxious to prevent the disintegration of the federation. As they saw the maintenance of a unified federal media as an important symbolic and practical support for the viability of the common state, they were eager to forestall any significant devolution of broadcasting authority to the republic level. 4 When, in the spring of 1992, the federal government finally presented a bill to the Federal Assembly for the partial de-etatization and restructuring of federal broadcast institutions, there was no political will in the Federal Assembly to enact the necessary legislation. The main political parties were unable to find agreement on the final structure of both federal and republic broadcasting institutions. In the absence of such agreement, both federal television and radio remained under the control of the federal government until the dissolution of the state in 1993.

For largely the same sorts of political reasons, efforts to create public broadcast institutions in Slovakia in 1990 and 1991 were supported by the VPN leadership, especially by Milan Èic and Vladimir Meèiar, who saw these initiatives as an effective weapon in the wider struggle for the decentralization of the quasi-federal state. As with other areas of federal restructuring, they advocated maximal devolution of jurisdiction to the republic level, and maintained that any remaining "federal" media or common broadcasting should be based on the cooperation and mutual consent of Czech and Slovak republic-level media institutions. On this issue, there was broad agreement between the Slovak government and the managers of Slovak broadcast institutions.

Subsequently, however, it became clear that the transformation of the Slovak state-owned broadcast media to a "public service" media did not really secure their independence. This was because the new laws did not guarantee either their financial (see Skolkay 1996d). In addition, legal protections designed to ensure media independence through the creation of publicly accountable supervisory boards were soon undermined by legislative amendments introduced in late 1992 and 1993 by the Meèiar government. These laws changed the rules of selection for both the Council of Slovak Television and the Council of Slovak Radio, reducing both the political diversity of Council members and the political autonomy of the Councils themselves. Previously, the Councils were formed on the basis of a power-sharing formula which guaranteed representation for each parliamentary party. According to the new laws, the number of Council members was reduced to nine, while control over the selection of the directors of Slovak Radio and Slovak Television was transferred from the presidency to the HZDS-dominated parliament. In 1993, Parliament passed laws which made it possible to dismiss the members of the Council of the Slovak Republic for Radio and Television Broadcasting, the Council of Slovak Television, and the Council of Slovak Radio on the initiative of 15 MPs and by a simple majority vote in parliament. These amendments served to re-establish the indirect but exclusive influence of the parliament on Slovakia's main broadcasting authorities. Although they retained their legal identity as "public broadcasting institutions," Slovak Radio and Television in effect became state-controlled agencies. The same legislative means were also used to create barriers to the creation of independent television networks at the national level.

The liberalization, decentralization, and partial de-etatization of the electronic mass media did not signal a definitive move towards an authentically independent and democratic media largely because of the peculiar social and political environment in which the media operated (Skolkay 1997a, 1997b). Neither journalists nor political elites nor citizens were psychologically or professionally prepared for radical systemic change and its consequences. The rapid liberalization of the mass media in the first days of the Velvet Revolution might suggest that there was a broad public readiness for and understanding of the importance of a fully independent media. However, the reality of the situation was far different.

Journalists, citizens, and politicians had little or no experience with either democracy or the free market. The first two groups had few clear ideas about the rules of the market economy. At the same time, Slovakia's new political elites, and particularly the HZDS-coalition government which has been in power for most of the post-1992 period, have relied on broadly undemocratic methods, both in their approach to the independent media and in day-to-day politics generally (Skolkay 1996c). While the Èarnogursky-led coalition of 1991-1992 generally respected the written and unwritten "rules of the game" of a democratic and "rule-of-law" system, even they were slow to understand and accept the idea of a truly independent media and sought to preserve some degree of political control. Yet, the interventions of the Èarnogursky government were limited to naming members of supervisory boards and executive editors. The Meèiar government, on the other hand, has merely paid lip service to democratic norms, while conducting its media policies in an increasingly authoritarian manner.

Properly speaking, the political system which has emerged in Slovakia since 1992 is neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic, but contains elements of both and can be described as a populist democracy. This is especially evident in the relations which have developed between an increasingly interventionist state and a media struggling to preserve its independence. To be sure, the number of independent sources of information during this period has increased, and citizens now have greater access to various sources of independent information and analysis. However, whether citizens have actually taken advantage of this new media pluralism or whether, instead, they continue to rely on older, trusted methods of political communication, such as word of mouth and informal social networks, remain open questions. 5 Some evidence, particularly the decrease in circulation of the daily press and the general lack of interest in politics, suggests that a large number of people either ignore news about politics or approach politics with strongly preconceived attitudes.

Throughout the whole post-1992 period, the public sphere has been dominated by the major national media outlets, although since 1994 there has been a visible, if still small, shift of audiences away from Slovak national radio and television toward both the private and regional broadcast media. There are several reasons for the dominance of the national media. First of all, the end of communism reduced the influence of the foreign mass media, including those which had broadcast in the Slovak language. Events at home were moving so rapidly that they overshadowed events outside the country. In other words, the domestic mass media became the dominant source of news and analysis. Face-to-face exchanges of information and opinion also remained a very important part of political communication. In addition, and contrary to the conventional wisdom about the dominant influence of television, both the print media and radio also emerged as significant players in the shaping of political discussion. This was particularly true in the pre-1992 period. Since then, both the press and radio have lost much of their power to affect public opinion. In the case of the press, the main reason for its declining influence has been economic: with steadily increasing newspaper prices, readership has naturally declined. The influence of the print media has also fallen victim to the political polarization of society. In other words, many readers preferred newspapers whose editorial lines reflected their existing political tastes, while ignoring or discounting the legitimacy of other views (Bútorová et. al. 1994, pp. 101-102). This was particularly evident among the readership of the daily, Slovenská Republika, and to lesser degree among the readers of Pravda and Sme. A third factor, and one that applies equally to the declining influence of radio broadcasts in shaping political opinion, is the political apathy and malaise which, in 1995 and 1996, was shared by over half of the Slovak population (Bútorová et. al. 1996, 4). Finally, Markíza, a truly national, private terrestrial television station, started broadcasting only on August 31, 1996. Most private radio stations expanded their range even later. national radio and television toward both the priva

Representatives of the Meèiar government have effectively exploited this cultural climate as an opportunity for overt propaganda and the manipulation of mass opinion. Whereas Slovak Radio tended to be the main (if not always deliberate) vehicle for this style of political communication prior to 1992, since that time, and especially since 1995, Slovak Television has become the dominant propaganda medium. It would be an exaggeration to claim that STV broadcasts are merely pro-government propaganda. Yet, Slovak Television has broadcast news that attempts to disguise social and political turmoil with an illusion of Slovakia as "an island of tranquility and prosperity" (Skolkay 1996a, 1996b). Both Slovak Television and the private but pro-government VTV network have also allegedly colluded with the Slovak intelligence service in producing "investigative reports" apparently intended to compromise Meèiar's chief political rival, Slovak President Michal Kovaè.

The dominance of STV, and hence of the Meèiar government, in shaping public policy debate has been the result of three main factors: the absence of any genuine domestic television competition until September 1996, the stabilization of popular political preferences after 1994, and the superior political and communication skills of Prime Minister Meèiar (Bútorová et. al. 1994, p. 47). One could conjecture that while radio news broadcasts prior to 1992 served as the primary agenda-setting and opinion making medium, since that time, television broadcasts have become the primary medium and have largely served to confirm already developed attitudes. As discussed above, since 1992, the print media has had only a very marginal influence in promoting critical debates about public policy issues.

4. Relations Between Politicians And Journalists

The behavior toward the mass media of most political elites during the post-communist transformation of Slovakia reveals their common lack of appreciation for the norms of a democratic media. All of the main political elites (including, at that time, the Czech, and Czechoslovak Federal elites) have indulged in various kinds of conspiracy theories. According to most of these conspiracies, journalists were ascribed a significant, sometimes decisive, role. The first leaders of the post-communist Czecho-Slovakia, in part because of their experience as dissidents, in part because of their confusion with the rapid loss of media support, promoted the notion of a threatening conspiracy between former communist secret police agents and journalists. In fact, they developed at least five different conspiracy theories, some of which had an international dimension and most of which were directly presented by intelligence officials to the public as proven facts (see Skolkay 1997b). Likewise, a popular weapon used by the Meèiar government to discredit the independent media has been a series of allegations that Slovak journalists are systematically attempting to undermine their own state because of their "irrational hatred" of Vladimír Meèiar and of Slovakia. This conspiracy is typically presented as a determined alliance of "anti-Slovak" journalists with various foreign interest groups and hostile nations. From 1994 to the present, a number of articles on this theme have been published, notably by two high-ranking HZDS MP's, DuSan Slobodník and Roman Hofbauer, in the daily Slovenská Republika and in the weeklies, Extra S and Zmena,.

At no time have Slovakia's ruling elites acknowledged that the actions and attitudes of the Slovak mass media have been driven by a combination of subjective and objective factors other than an innate tendency towards political conspiracy. Chief among these factors, and most evident in the pre-1992 period, Slovak journalists have proven to be poorly prepared for the populist politics of Meèiar and his coalition partners, especially the Slovak National Party. Further, Slovakia's governing elites had their own public relations shortcomings. Èarnogursky's coalition failed to find a common language with average citizens. In contrast, the Meèiar government has been particularly unsuccessful in establishing effective channels of communication with journalists. The arrogant style of the Meèiar government towards its critics has been the major source of difficulty. Increasingly authoritarian methods of governing have been accompanied by a growing intolerance of any challenges. At the same time, these methods only serve to provoke the very media criticism the government seeks to avoid. No doubt, the Meèiar government's hostility has been aggravated by a general lack of experience in dealing with a newly independent and increasingly self-confident media which has a greater determination to act as the watchdog of the public interest.

Rather than irresponsible or unprofessional journalistic conduct, the primary source of tension between the media and the government lies with the policies and actions of the HZDS coalition, and particularly, of Meèiar himself. The coalition's hostility to an independent media has been manifested in a number of ways. Both the HZDS 1994 election platform and its January 1995 government program contained proposals for closer cooperation among the "public" media, the state news agency, and the government. This strongly implied a statist approach to the media and was in stark contrast to the previous priciple of a publicly accountable media. One section of the HZDS program reads: "We will urge the Slovak News Agency, Slovak Television and Slovak Radio to support the national, cultural and public interests of the Slovak Republic" (Slovenská Republika, 12 January 1995, Appendix, p. 14). More explicit evidence of the government's determination in this regard was brought to light with the disclosure of earlier remarks made by Meèiar at a closed session of top HZDS regional officials on November 27/28, 1993. At this meeting Meèiar proposed to bring "public" radio and television under closer HZDS supervision through control over the selection of their directors. At the same meeting, he also alleged that 40 leading Slovak journalists were being well paid in US dollars to write articles critical of the government.

The political strategies of the Czech and Slovak post-Communist elites against what they have perceived to be unjust media criticism have been very similar. One of the main goals of the Lustration law passed in 1991 was to prevent the allegedly subversive activities of some journalists. The same rationale was even more evident in draft Statute for the Protection of the Republic, which the Meèiar coalition proposed as an amendment to the existing Criminal Statute. This statute threatened both Slovak citizens and permanent residents with two years imprisonment or financial penalty for "the deliberate spreading of false information which causes harm to the Republic." The government attempted to pass this statute twice in 1996 but in both cases the bill was vetoed by President Kováè. In early 1997, after considerable domestic and international criticism, the parliament declined to give the bill another reading. In the revised draft of the law, the contested clauses concerning criminal punishment for the publication of "false information" was dropped. In terms of its ultimate intent, the Statute for the Protection of the Republic was radically different from the earlier Law on Lustration. While the Lustration law was passed by a government that was committed to the consolidation of a democratic polity, the Statute for the Protection of the Republic was proposed by a defensive Meèiar government in an apparent effort to restrict public criticism.

To a lesser extent, the conduct of Slovak journalists has also contributed to the highly politicized character of the mass media. As in other democratic and democratizing societies, the Slovak media have adopted the formula that "good news is not news," a formula which necessarily privileges a negative bias and which is bound to provoke political elites. As in neighboring post-communist societies, however, specific habits of mind are slow in changing; journalists, no less than politicians, remain prone to what Ladislav Kováè, has called "Etruscan" thinking, which "...looks for a priori meaning and causes where there is only the simple dynamic of the causality of events." (Kováè 1989, p. 23). 6 In this respect, the conduct of a group of former communist journalists dismissed from their jobs after 1968 has been particularly problematic. More than other journalists, this group has demonstrated aggressive behavior, lack of objectivity, open partisanship, and a pronounced tendency to base their reporting on hearsay rather than hard evidence (see Skolkay 1997a). In the words of Peter Malec, central director of Slovak Television:

The revolution has had one negative consequence - the return of rehabilitated journalists. Many of them were awarded senior editorial posts for political reasons, which has been a source of difficulty. First of all, they were absolutely out of practice and out of touch. Secondly, while they may have been "right-wing opportunists" in 1968, by 1989 they were mostly Bolshevik in their thinking. 7

One can find similar evidence of a politicized media environment in other post-communist societies. In the Czech Republic and in Poland, the manipulation of information regarding the past activities of politicians and other public figures for political gain was a common practice, even as late as 1996. Both in Hungary in 1992-1994 and in Poland in 1995-1996, the struggle over the state television was even more intense than in Slovakia. Throughout the region, the common pattern has been one in which the media has struggled to acquire and then maintain their independence, as governing and oppositional elites continue their attempts to re-establish various degrees of political control.

While many of these struggles have been struggles of interest and power, they have also been affected by the ideological and cultural heritage of communism--a heritage which is first and foremost one of personal corruption, utilitarianism, and lack of respect for rule-of-law. Consequently, to describe the political culture of contemporary Slovakia more broadly as politically leftist, or more left-wing, is not an accurate description. A more correct description would have to take into account the predominance of a rural-based social conservatism, the continued--if indirect--effects of a deeply catholic population, as well as the populist political traditions which pre-date the Communist era. Given these features of Slovak political culture, as well as the political vulnerability of Slovak society in the course of post-communist transformation, the populist phenomenon of Vladimír Meèiar is more comprehensible.

Among the elements of contemporary Slovak political culture most relevant to media-society relations is the tendency of a large part of the population to place greater trust and authority in political personalities than in informed and objective analyses of political events. This mind set has remained stubbornly unchanged, resisting both rational argumentation and even, in many cases, the contrary evidence of day-to-day experience (see Rosová et. al. 1992, pp. 12-22). In part, the persistence of such attitudes is due to the fact that some stereotypes became deeply entrenched in the public mind in the initial period of the Velvet Revolution and continue to be supported through various methods of political propaganda employed by the Meèiar government. Whatever their ultimate source, these normative and cultural factors have been a major reason for the continuing low quality of political communication. As is common elsewhere, most people in Slovakia prefer to re-adjust their own criteria of evaluation or to ignore negative information about their chosen candidates rather than abandon their heroes or forsake deeply-held opinions. The dominance of these subjective predispositions, shared to various degrees by political elites and journalists, as well as by average citizens, have helped to create a climate which favors less rational modes of political discourse and mass communication.

5. The Freedom Of The Mass Media In Slovakia In 1989-1996

In spite of various attempts by all post-communist governments in Slovakia to subordinate the mass media to their own political agendas, a good measure of media freedom does exist in Slovakia. Firstly, the old ways of official censorship have been abandoned decisively and the majority of journalists have been able to select and frame news stories with an effective degree of autonomy. Obviously, media freedom here is far from complete. Yet, the situation has not been as grave as has been suggested by a 1995 report of the Committee to Protect Journalists, which listed Meèiar as one of the top ten enemies of media freedom in the world. While it is clear that the government has sought to undermine the independent media, it is no less true that Slovak journalists have mounted considerable resistance.

Together with various domestic and foreign institutions like Article XIX, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and Charter 77, Slovak media professionals have successfully defended themselves against the most radical attempts of the government to limit the media's capacity to inform and comment freely (see Skolkay 1995, 1996c). 8 The strong resistance of Slovak journalists to government efforts at media interference has likely had a salutary effect in prompting broader public discussion and awareness of the importance of media freedom, and especially freedom of expression, both at home and abroad. According to several recent comparative studies, Slovakia possesses strong elements of a "liberal" culture which, in contrast to "statist" cultures, principally reject government control of the media and are more skeptical of claims to objectivity by state-run media than of similar claims of the private media (Connors et. al. 1995; RoSko 1993, p. 197; Bútorová et. al. 1994). 9 Recent surveys have found that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the population disapprove of government control of the mass media. Even more promising, the number of respondents indicating this view has increased over time (Bútorová 1996, p. 243; Bútorová et. al. 1996, p. 94). Together with the persistent, and often successful, efforts of journalists to resist government interference, these surveys indicate a social climate which broadly appreciates the importance of an independent media. They also point to a broader contradiction: while, on the one hand, Slovakia features an active civil society and a citizenry generally supportive of media freedom, on the other, it possesses an elected but authoritarian-style government that seeks to limit media freedom.

One possible reason for the somewhat exaggerated reactions of international organizations to the political situation in Slovakia is that, as a Central European country, Slovakia has been held to higher standards than many other post-communist states; that is, given Slovakia's relatively higher level of development compared to countries further east, most observers expected that democratic consolidation would follow the same pattern as that of the Czech Republic or Poland. Few anticipated that securing a stable democracy here would be so fraught with problems. Consequently, Slovakia has received far more international attention--and condemnation--than many other post-communist countries, even where, as in Hungary and Poland, attempts at government interference in the freedom of the broadcast media have been equally serious or, as in Belarus or the states of the Caucasus, even more damaging. Thus, while the development of an independent media in Slovakia remains problematic, a broader perspective would suggest that the situation in Slovakia is not substantially different from most other post-communist countries of east and central Europe (Skolkay 1995; Skolkay 1997b, forthcoming). It is important to note that, insofar as a "normal" independent media has been established, this has been accomplished despite--rather than because of--government media policy. Equally noteworthy, as a result of both the political and business interests of many entrepreneurs, as well as of more subtle methods of media manipulation, the capacity of the Slovak media since 1995 to engage in public policy debates and open criticism of the government has markedly declined. Despite this negative development, however, the greater part of the Slovak press has remained independent of the government.

6. The Influence Of The Mass Media In Slovakia's Post-Communist Transformation

The actual capacity of the media to influence popular political attitudes has been relatively low despite the plurality of sources of public information and the highly oppositional stance of the majority of Slovak journalists. If not always positive, the influence of the mass media on political changes in Slovakia in the first period of post-communist transformation has nonetheless been crucial. The media played a decisive role in helping Meèiar to establish a positive public image in the early years of the transition. In part, Meèiar's popularity has been due to his own skill at tapping into deep religious and national sentiments, and in appropriation of national symbolism of traditional folk heroes in his defense of the nation. As has been suggested, Vladimír Meèiar is not only a very clever politician, but also an excellent populist. His performances on television and radio are especially persuasive.

Radio broadcasts have always had a strong tradition in Slovakia and, together with Meèiar's skillful public relations strategy, this accounts for the great success of the news program Radio _urnál, which started its broadcasts on Slovak state-owned radio in the spring of 1990. Live broadcasts, topical reports, and a dynamic production style were additional reasons for the success of Radio _urnál, which rapidly became the most popular and trusted medium in Slovakia. Moreover, since it functioned as a news service for the other media, especially for the daily press, the influence of Radio _urnál was even more far-reaching. The daily press often quoted Radio _urnál and followed stories which first appeared there. Research has also shown that radio broadcasts in general have served as a source for topics that were discussed by the majority of population. Ninety percent of citizens regularly listened to radio broadcasts in the early 1990s. Significantly, 87.3 percent claimed that they frequently discussed with friends and colleagues topics that were broadcast on radio (Holina 1994b, p. 219). It is no coincidence that, in spite of the evident political inclination of some of Slovak Radio's program managers to favor Meèiar and the HZDS, Slovak Radio was second only to the military as an institution most trusted by Slovaks between 1990 and 1996.

The popularity of some newly established radio stations like Fun Radio and Rock FM can be seen as evidence that radio broadcasts remain very popular in Slovakia. However, neither these nor any other Slovak radio stations--with the partial exception of the dynamic and independent Radio Twist--have been able to compete with Radio _urnál, because these stations focus on music and other "soft" programmes, and because Radio _urnál has a monopoly on a state-wide broadcasting.

The potential influence of the print media, which is arguably the most suitable medium for rational discussion, has remained quite limited. In the first and crucial post-communist period, both news stories and commentaries merely reflected public opinion. The relative absence of independent, high quality analyses and commentaries in the Slovak daily press was another reason for the marginal influence of the press. In other words, journalists simply followed the conservative inclinations of the popular mainstream, with only a minority expressing positions in support of systemic reform. Because those journalists who were "reform-minded" tended to be closely connected with the first post-communist government, they lost political influence with the fall of the Èarnogursky-led coalition in 1992. Once Meèiar consolidated his power, they were categorically deprived of any place in Slovak Radio and Television.

A further reason for the lack of influence of reform-minded journalists was their attitude towards the contentious question of constitutional devolution, which was a central policy preoccupation until the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Most of those journalists who supported the early post-communist government in the Slovak republic were also very critical of any attempts to alter the federal status quo. In part, their conservative federal bias was due to their broadly "European" sentiments and their low estimation of the importance of the national question; in part, it was due to their obvious distaste for the personalities and radical positions of those Slovak elites who had taken up the nationalist cause. Yet, their promotion of "constitutional stability" ran contrary to the opinions of the majority of Slovaks, who were increasingly supportive of radical federal reforms that would secure an improved status for the Slovak nation. Economic decline, rising crime and unemployment, as well as the "destruction" of collective farms, which were all associated with the reformist policies of the Èarnogursky government, were additional factors contributing to the eroding influence of reform-minded journalists. In short, very soon after the Velvet Revolution, the polarization of Slovak society on the questions of constitutional and economic reform divided the media into two camps, each of which was associated with partisan political elites--even though the majority of the journalists would perhaps claim that they tried to find a balance between both sides of political debate. Subsequently, the capacity of the print media to act as a common forum of rational public discussion was further reduced by the political segmentation of their readers, with a majority of citizens choosing to read only those dailies and magazines which reflected their set political tastes. As newspaper prices increased and readership declined, and as interest in politics generally fell off, the print media's influence on political attitudes plummeted still further.

Conclusion

This analysis of contemporary developments in the Slovak media illustrates a number of important issues. On the one hand, the case of Slovakia reveals that under normal circumstances direct attempts at political propaganda are ineffective in the long-term. On the other, it has shown the efficient possibilities of media abuse by more sophisticated populist and nationalist elites. Stereotypes established with the help of the mass media in first period proved to be resistant to rapid change. In resorting to populist and nationalist rhetoric, Meèiar and some other leaders have not discovered anything new. Rather, their effectiveness is due both to Meèiar's personal skill and to the vulnerability of a society under stress that is unaccustomed to such rhetoric. That Meèiar was able to win large-scale public support was due to his exceptional communication skills and his shrewd political instincts. Together with the political and media culture, historical traditions and the unpreparedness of the population to accept the negative consequences of the reforms, the mass media played an important, though mostly indirect, role in the first phase of transition. As with many emerging democracies, the Slovak mass media have not yet developed an effective degree of professionalism and are still hampered by a weak information and financial infrastructure. Their lack of familiarity and understanding of the norms and practices of democratic media has been evident in their often partisan behavior and their own susceptability to conspiracy theories.

As regards emerging trends of political communication, media independence and professionalization, the following development may be anticipated. First, we can expect a certain softening of the aggressive and intolerant tenor of the pro-government press, already observable since 1996. At the same time, there are signs of an increasing use of the "public service" broadcast media and other pro-governmental media for the purposes of more subtle forms of propaganda. Doubtless, partisan propaganda will intensify in the approach to the 1998 general elections. It is reasonable to expect a maximum effort on the part of the HZDS to retain its hold on power. In other words, the coming election campaign will be hard-fought and bitter, and the independence of the media will certainly be an object of contention. Second, even though government pressures on the media will likely intensify, particularly if the government succeeds in coopting "private" national television broadcasters and in tightening control over advertising revenues, we can nonetheless expect the continued existence of the independent media and of freedom of expression generally. There is a further need for Slovak journalists to build up their capacity for collective self-defense, and to overcome the polarization and political partisanship which has characterized both the state-supported and the opposition media since 1992. One hopeful sign is the recent efforts of Slovak journalist associations to establish a common professional standard of journalistic ethics. 10 As the capacity of the Slovak media to act as a support for democracy has been hampered in the past by a lack of such professional standards, this development is highly welcome.

References

Note 1: he author and the editors would like to thank Karen Ballentine for extensive editorial help in the final stages of this draft. For their critical evaluations and comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the author would also like to thank: Vladimír Holina, Grigorij Meseznikov, Soña Szomolányi, Rama Mannorah Reddy, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Tatiana Repková, Ján Füle, Peter Malec, Boris Koren, Vladimír Stefko. The author naturally assumes full responsibility for the claims made in this study and any errors or inaccuracies the study may contain. Back.

Note 2: After 1992, Czech journalists also have been rather uncritical of the role played by Czech politicians in the split of Czecho-Slovakia and of the undemocratic methods of some of the Czech politicians. In contrast, independent Slovak journalists have tended to be more even-handed in their accounts of the end of the federation. Back.

Note 3: The main reasons for this peculiar difference between both public broadcast institutions were the stronger internal resistance of journalists employed in Slovak Radio, more independent-minded directors of Slovak Radio, greater technical difficulties in controlling the flow of information in radio than in television broadcasts, and the lower interest of political actors in radio than in television. Back.

Note 4: Ironically, federal television and radio, like the other Czech-dominated media, contributed to political tensions; instead of promoting a common state, they contributed to break-up of Czecho-Slovakia. Their coverage of Czech-Slovak relations and of the ensuing constitutional disputes was often unbalanced and biased; political talk-shows routinely erred in their one-sided selection of discussants, to the exclusion of those points of view that strongly criticized the federal structure. This bias was reinforced by the refusal of some Slovak politicians take part in discussion in what saw to be biased federal television (see more in Bubílková & Èerny 1993). As opinion polls show, the vast majority of Slovaks believed that the federal media lacked objectivity, and most viewed the reporting and commentary of the Slovak electronic media as substantially less biased and more trustworthy (Názory 3/2, 3/3; Druker & Niè 1993, p. 8; Pehe 1992, p. 37). Back.

Note 5: There is no survey data available after 1996 on the question of which media citizens rely upon for news and information. The following statistics are based on an earlier period and may only be suggestive of current trends.

"Where citizens get their information and analyses of issues of interest"

Note 6: This issue is discussed at greater length in Skolkay, forthcoming Back.

Note 7: Interview by the author, 13 May 1996. Back.

Note 8: In the case of the short-lived Moravèík government, it should be noted that only the refusal of the Party of Democratic Left to agree to more radical changes and the resistance of other coalition partners prevented Moravcik from launching a full-scale attack on "public" television. Back.

Note 9: According to first survey in April 1995, 63 percent of citizens of Slovakia disagreed with the government's control of the media. According to RoSko only 19 percent of respondents agreed with statement that: ,,newspapers which writes strongly against the government should be officially banned. According to Bútorová et. al. 1994, December, p.134, 67.8 percent of citizens of Slovakia did not agree with government's control of the media, and only 8 percent agreed with it.. Back.

Note 10: There are two associations of journalists: the Syndicate of Slovak Journalists, which remains the most important independent journalists' organization with the largest membership; and the Association of Slovak Journalists--a largely pro-HZDS organization. Back.