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Slovakia:
Problems of Democratic Consolidation
and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game

Sona Szomolányi and John Gould, editors

New York

Columbia International Affairs Online

1997

Bibliographic Data

6. Public Opinion: Continuity And Change 1

Zora Bútorová

Introduction

Developments after 1989 marked several crucial turning-points for Slovakia's citizens. The first was the 1992 election which resulted in the separation of CSFR and establishment of an independent Slovak state. It soon became apparent that Slovakia's inherited political tradition has been much more powerful than the liberal critics of the communist regime imagined. 2

After the establishment of the independent Slovak Republic in 1993, the executive power has developed more authoritative and nationalist features, compared to the first post-communist leadership. In consequence, Slovak politics have been marked by intense struggles to maintain a democratic separation of powers, freedom of the media, respect for minority rights and the preservation of other recently acquired features of post-communist liberalization. After a brief interlude of a broad coalition government in 1994, in which political confrontation was replaced by consensus-seeking, another turning point took place: following the 1994 parliamentary elections, authoritarian tendencies have strengthened and threaten to divert Slovakia's development of democracy and rule of law.

This study outlines the trends of public opinion in Slovakia after 1989, particularly after the elections of 1994. Based on the findings of representative surveys conducted by the FOCUS agency (formerly the Center for Social Analysis), this report presents a brief analysis of popular opinions on a number of critical issues, including: perceptions of Slovak statehood, the current and former regimes, economic reform, policies regarding the Hungarian minority, foreign policy developments, civic rights and freedoms, reactions to the concentration of power, as well as normative ideas about the principles of political life, the efficacy of citizen political participation, profiles of party adherents, and recent developments on the party landscape.

1. Attitudes Toward Slovak Statehood

Although Slovakia entered its fifth year of independence in January 1997, the level of popular identification with independent statehood has remained moderate.

A comparison with surveys conducted periodically since 1993 shows that the attitudes of citizens toward the Slovak Republic have changed only marginally.  By and large, people have retained their original attitudes: the political decision to split the country was supported by 27% of those Slovak citizens polled, while 67% remained critical. 3

Table 1: "Four years have passed since the division of Czechoslovakia. What was your attitude at that time and what is it today?"(%)


1994

1995
1997
I was in favor of the division of the CSFR right from the beginning and my attitude has not changed
22
21
19
I was in favor of the division of the CSFR but today I believe it was a mistake
8
8
8
I was against the division of the CSFR but today I believe it was the right thing to do
11
13
12
I was against the division of the CSFR but I have accepted it
28
27
30
I was against the division of the CSFR from the start and I have still not accepted it
28
26
25
Don't know
3
5
6
Source: FOCUS, December 1994, December 1995, January 1997

As indicated in Table 1, 31% of respondents identify positively with the division of the CSFR. This group of people is made up primarily of those who believed separation of the country was an appropriate solution from the very beginning (19%) as well as those who have changed their original opinion (12%). Thirty percent of respondents have accepted the independence of Slovakia even though they did not desire it at the outset. Thirty-three percent of respondents consider the separation unacceptable. The majority of this group is made up of the original opponents of independent Slovakia (25%), joined by people who had originally supported the separation (8%) but who subsequently became disappointed. Since the 1994 elections, the number of those who have not accepted the split of the country has dropped slightly.

According to these findings, the views of Slovakia's citizens on the separation of the CSFR are evenly distributed among men and women, among different age categories, and among people with different levels of education. The youngest respondents (those under 25 years) had the least articulate opinions: as many as 23% of them were not able to take a stance. The members of the Hungarian minority identified with Slovakia's independence significantly less than ethnic Slovaks.

Polling results also registered significant differences on this issue among adherents of political parties. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) are the only two parties with a majority of adherents who approve of the division of the CSFR. Among supporters of all other political parties, support for dissolution of the common state was the minority position. 4

These findings suggest that, after four years of independence, the official interpretation of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as the culmination of the emancipation efforts of the Slovak nation has not been generally accepted. The identification of people with Slovakia's independence has been hampered by political developments since the parliamentary elections of 1994. After power was, once again, taken over by HZDS and its coalition partners, the SNS and the ZRS (Association of Workers of Slovakia), loyalty to the new state has become equated with support for the current ruling coalition and some protagonists of the opposition have been labeled as the "internal enemies of the state", or as "anti-Slovaks".

The low level of identification with Slovak independent statehood is also due to the manner in which the CSFR was dissolved. According to surveys from that period, most of Slovakia's citizens did not support the division of the federation and regretted that no referendum took place (Current Problems..., 1993a, pp. 2-7; Bútora and Bútorová, 1993a, pp. 720-722). However, they did not take effective enough action to prevent the winners of the 1992 elections, Václav Klaus and Vladimír Meciar, from implementing this historical decision. It can be assumed that gaining independence in such an unheroic manner will be remembered by the Slovak nation for a long time, will become a part of the collective memory.

To establish democracy in the Slovak Republic, it is crucial to deal openly with the past, particularly with the heritage of the Slovak State of 1939-45. According to a survey conducted by FOCUS in June 1996, 57% of citizens expressed the view that continuity with the heritage of the wartime Slovak State should not be endorsed by the present Slovak Republic . Eighteen percent of respondents held the opposite opinion, while 25% held ambiguous views. However, the top representative of the wartime Slovak State, President Jozef Tiso, was appraised somewhat less critically. Forty-nine percent of respondents evaluated his historic role as negative, 13% as ambivalent and 14% as positive, while 24% of respondents had no opinion. A comparison with earlier findings (Current Problems..., 1993b, pp. 6-8) suggests that, since 1993, Slovakia's citizens have not developed a more critical attitude toward the wartime Slovak State. In part, this stagnation of opinions may be attributed to the currently unfavorable political conditions for public debate of the wartime regime. Such issues are discussed by the ruling coalition and on government controlled media broadcasts, but without sufficient critical analysis. Highly subjective and distorted accounts of history are most visible in the efforts of the Slovak National Party and Matica Slovenská to rehabilitate the wartime Slovak State and to diminish the historic responsibility of President Jozef Tiso for his collaboration with the Nazi regime. These efforts have been silently tolerated by the other parties of the ruling coalition.

2. Assessment Of The Pre-1989 Regime

Seven years after the collapse of communism, Slovakia's citizens have had a chance to experience various stages of development of the post-communist regime. How have people's views on these changes and on the previous communist regime been developing? Immediately after the collapse of communism, supporters of the post-1989 regime highly outnumbered its opponents. However, after an initial euphoria, there was growing disenchantment with the new regime as people's expectations remained unfulfilled. The year 1993 was particularly critical. After the separation of the CSFR, insecurities about the future grew (Bútora and Bútorová, 1995, p. 120- 133). 5

At the beginning of 1997, only 36% of Slovakia's residents thought that the current regime offers more advantages than the pre-1989 one ; 18% believed both regimes offer about the same, and 42% ascribed more advantages to the pre-1989 regime (Table 2).

Table 2: "Compared to the pre-1989 regime, the current one has:" (%)


1992

1993
1994
1995
1997
Many more advantages
12
10
11
13
10
Slightly more advantages
29
24
26
30
26
Is about the same
18
13
16
17
18
Slightly more disadvantages
21
20
19
19
21
Many more disadvantages
16
31
26
20
21
Don't know
4
2
3
2
4
Source: C. S. A., January 1992 and March 1993; FOCUS, December 1994, December 1995, January 1997

The assessment of the current situation compared to the pre-1989 era is far more unfavorable when it concerns the citizens' concrete life conditions (Graph 1). As many as 50% of respondents feel negatively affected by the post-1989 changes, while one fourth of respondents maintain that life has remained the same. Only one fifth of respondents assess their life under the current regime more positively. 

Graph 1

Life chances under the current regime are viewed positively by the younger generation, men; by people with higher levels of education and/or foreign language skills; by professionals, students and, in particular, entrepreneurs. Workers, pensioners and the unemployed are more likely to emphasize the disadvantages of living under the new regime. Employees of private companies assess their present chances more positively than those employed in state-owned companies and cooperatives. Inhabitants of large cities (Bratislava and Kosice) assess their present chances more positively than inhabitants of small villages. 6 However, it should be noted that among all of these social categories, entrepreneurs are the only group in which a majority displays a positive assessment of the present situation relative to the pre-1989 regime. In all other social categories, self-pity and a sense of martyrdom are prevalent  (Bútorová and Gyarfásová, 1997, p. 2).

As in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, there is a widespread belief that privileged positions have been preserved by former managers of state-owned companies, communist party functionaries and state administration employees. In contrast, workers and pensioners are generally viewed as the primary victims (Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch, 1997, p. 162).

The trauma experienced by Slovakia's citizens from post-1989 developments is primarily expressed through their weaker sense of social security and well-being . They see the decreased standard of living, increased unemployment, unsatisfactory social welfare (including health care, education, housing, pensions, and social security) and increased levels of crime as negative features of the current regime (Current Problems..., 1995, p. 5).

Since the 1994 elections, pessimism about future opportunities has spread among people. While immediately after the 1994 elections 52% of citizens believed that today their children face better prospects than they would have under socialism, two years later only 38% shared this opinion (Graph 2).

Graph 2

3. Economic Transformation

Before 1989, most people in Slovakia underestimated the necessity for fundamental economic restructuring. 7 They were not sufficiently aware that the socialist economic system had reached its limits for growth and was functioning at the expense of future generations. This lack of recognition of the need for profound economic change  continues to shape citizens' attitudes. Even though seven years have passed since the fall of Communism and even after six years of economic reform, most people have not accepted the necessity of a radical transformation of the socialist economy. In January 1997, only 39% of respondents believed that the pre-1989 economy required profound changes; 47% of respondents acknowledged the necessity of only minor changes, while 6% rejected the necessity of any changes whatsoever. The proportion of economic "pragmatists" continues to be small (Bútorová, 1997).

In the recent years, people's views in respect to key economic principles have remained remarkably unchanged.  In economic orientations, the social market orientation is predominant (60%), followed by socialist (26%) and liberal (14%) orientations. 8

State paternalism  still prevails among Slovakia's citizens. In January 1997, as many as 63% of respondents believed that the government should be responsible for providing every citizen with a job and a decent standard of living. The opinion that every individual should be responsible for his/her job and standard of living was expressed by only 18% of respondents.

Distrust of an economy based on private ownership  has been enduring. Fifty-four percent of respondents preferred principal industrial enterprises to be regulated by the state. Only 13% of respondents preferred regulation by private owners.

Opinions on the necessity of opening Slovakia's economy are rather reserved . Only 38% of respondents believed that domestic producers should compete with foreign producers, while 36% approved of economic protectionism.

Popular assessments of economic reform were significantly correlated with critical attitudes toward privatization.  However, it must be noted that these attitudes have been shaped by deeply-rooted negative stereotypes and prejudices against privatization which were prevalent in Slovakia even before the onset of the privatization process (Krivy and Radicová, 1992, pp. 59-67). After the 1994 elections, the process of privatization appeared to confirm popular fears in several respects, particularly as privatization policies were removed from public scrutiny and developed clientelistic features (Miklos, 1997). According to repeated surveys, the immediate consequences of privatization in people's everyday lives has not played as important a role in shaping their negative assessments as has the manner in which privatization has been proceeding: that is, people are opposed to the non-transparent and undemocratic method of privatization and to the open exercise of clientelism  (Bútorová, Gyarfásová and Kúska, 1996b, pp. 137-138; Bútorová, 1997). Thus, the specific form of privatization in Slovakia has reinforced popular skepticism toward privatization generally. In January 1997, only 40% of respondents believed that privatization was beneficial to the development of the national economy, while 43% believed that it was harmful for development. Seventeen percent were unsure.

Growing clientelism and corruption since 1994 are probably the main reasons for the spread of feelings of social injustice  and for increased calls for the elimination of excessive social disparities  during the same period. The number of respondents claiming that "people in Slovakia become rich mainly through dishonest methods" has increased from 86% at the end of 1994 to 91% at the beginning of 1997, while the number of respondents desiring that income differentials be reduced has increased from 67% to 74%.

Clientelism and corruption in the privatization process have not only negative economic and political impacts, but also deleterious effects on the moral climate of society, the legal consciousness of citizens and their respect for law.

4. Civic Rights And Freedoms

While Slovakia's residents view the social and economic impact of regime change as negative features of the post-communist era, they tend to perceive the liberalization of the political regime  as a positive feature. For example, in December 1994, respondents considered democracy and freedom, the right to travel, and freedoms of speech, conscience and religion as benefits of the new regime (Current Problems..., 1995, p. 5). In the first years after 1989, people took these political benefits for granted, directing their criticism against the social and economic aspects of their everyday existence. However, as Table 3 indicates, in the deteriorating political climate since the 1994 elections, popular awareness of the importance of political rights and freedoms has changed .

Table 3: Civic rights and freedoms ranked by their importance (mean values)


Importance

Respect

XII. 1994
II. 1997
II. 1997
Right to health care
4.87
4.85
3.51
Right to personal safety
4.77
4.77
2.75
Right to equality before the law
4.78
4.77
2.76
Right to social security
4.74
4.73
3.21
Right to work
4.69
4.64
2.85
Right to education
4.63
4.59
3.78
Right to healthy environment
4.45
4.58
3.03
Right to private property
4.49
4.55
3.98
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
4.43
4.51
4.03
Freedom of speech
4.37
4.42
3.40
Right to vote and to be elected
4.29
4.35
4.37
Freedom of press, radio, TV
4.08
4.26
2.97
Right to travel
4.17
4.24
4.30
Freedom of enterprise
3.86
4.00
4.06
Right to strike
3.33
3.52
3.53
Right to associate in the political parties
3.31
3.48
4.17
Right to form organizations, associations
3.13
3.40
4.10
Note: These are mean values. The importance of rights and freedoms  was rated on a five-point scale from 1 - unimportant (rights need not always be respected) to 5 - important (they should always be respected). Respect for rights and freedoms  was evaluated on a five-point rating scale from 1 - rights are often violated to 5 - rights are fully respected.
Source: FOCUS, December 1994 and February 1997

As Table 3 shows, both at the end of 1994 and at the beginning of 1997, respondents assessed social rights as more important than political rights and freedoms.  However, in the last years, awareness of the importance of political rights and freedoms has grown.  The fourth column in Table 3 indicates that at the beginning of 1997 not only social rights  such as the right to personal safety, the right to work and the right to healthy environment, but also political rights , including the right to equality before law, freedom of press, radio and TV, were perceived by the respondents as the most violated.

Special attention should be paid to the fact that the right to freedom of media, although ascribed only a medium level of importance, was at the same time perceived to be the fourth least observed right. A similar discrepancy characterized popular perceptions of the freedom of expression. These discrepancies indicate that people in Slovakia have become more sensitive to the attempts of the government to control the media and to regulate political communication in society .

A comparison with findings from two years ago indicates an observable and important trend: after the 1994 elections, the number of people who believe that the right to equality before the law, freedom of media and freedom of expression are being respected has decreased.  9

A similar trend, but in a condensed form, was recorded by a Eurobarometer survey which documented a considerable increase in popular dissatisfaction with the state of civic rights in Slovakia. The opinion that civic rights are not respected in Slovakia was shared by 29% of respondents in 1994, 51% in 1995 and as many as 58% in 1996 (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 7, 1997).

5. Hierarchy Of Social Problems

After the 1994 elections, popular assessments of the pressing problems in society have changed considerably.

Table 4: Order of social problems by their importance for citizens (%)

Standard of living, social security

64
Unemployment
44
Democracy, political culture, respect for the constitution
36
Crime, personal safety
35
Economics
25
Ethics in everyday life, quality of human relations
14
Health care
15
Schools and education
8
Housing
7
Drug abuse
6
Ethnic issues
6
Environment
1
Foreign policy
1
Position of women in society, women's issues
1
Note: Respondents could choose three problems. Therefore the total exceeds 100%.
Source: FOCUS, September 1996

As Table 4 indicates, respondents ascribed greater priority to the issues of living standards and social security, unemployment, democracy, political culture, respect for the constitution, crime and the economy.

As previous surveys have showed, people in Slovakia are primarily interested in improvements in their living standards and the elimination of unemployment and crime (Current problems..., 1993a, p. 8; Current Problems..., 1995, p. 10). The new trend is that people have become far more responsive to the issues of democracy, political culture and respect for the constitution . 10

6. Reactions To Concentration Of Power

The establishment of the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition after the elections of 1994 has had a great impact on the quality of democracy in Slovakia. Criticism by both the domestic opposition and officials of the Euroatlantic community has been directed at the clientelistic mode of privatization, the government's influence over the public electronic media, particularly Slovak Television, and the lack of public supervision over the Slovak Information Service, etc. This has led to demands for greater participation of the opposition in decision-making and in controlling the conduct of the government.

These demands have been welcomed by most citizens. In September 1996, 87% of citizens supported the participation of both the ruling coalition and the opposition parties in the National Property Fund. Fully 80% agreed that the Radio and Television Boards should be comprised not only of members of the ruling coalition, but also of opposition representatives. Seventy-four percent supported the demand that the opposition parties be granted greater representation on the Special Control Authority (OKO) which supervises the Slovak Information Service and that an opposition deputy be appointed as Vice-President of the Slovak National Council.

Thus, the concentration of decision-making and control in the hands of the ruling coalition is not supported by the great majority of people who view political opposition as an important part of an effectively functioning democracy . Moreover, democratic measures have been required by most adherents of all political parties, including those of the ruling coalition parties . Paradoxically enough, the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling coalition exceeded the preferences even of their own adherents.

After 1994, the ruling coalition has attempted to restrict the implementation of the principle of self-government in society.  Popular dissatisfaction with this policy became more visible in 1996, when collective protests intensified. According to a survey taken in September 1996, public protests by theater artists and other representatives of the cultural community against the intrusive policies of the Ministry of Culture attracted the attention of 78% and the approval of 53% of respondents. Protests by university teachers and other members of the academic community against the government's proposed university law were noted by 67% and supported by 50% of respondents. 11 This broad support for civic protest suggests that a considerable number of citizens disapprove of the ruling coalition's attempts to restrict the development of self-government in society.

7. Professed Principles Of Political Life

Our findings suggest a growing positive identification of people with political rights and freedoms, which may be interpreted as a natural reaction to the increased authoritarian tendencies of the government since 1994. We shall now take a closer look at whether this development has been reflected in people's normative ideas concerning the principles of political life. 

As Table 5 indicates, after 1994 elections, the number of people who prefer pluralism of opinions and democracy to "national unity and togetherness" has grown. The awareness of the need to secure minority rights has increased, while the identification of democracy with unqualified majoritarian rule has decreased. The emphasis on consensus-seeking politics -- as opposed to the policy of the firm hand -- has also increased, if only slightly. Both the number of respondents who support the view that politicians should respect the law under all circumstances and the number who reject the government interference in the media have also registered slight increases.

Table 5: Normative ideas about the principles of political life

Principles Of Political Life
Statement A : Statement B

Year
Preference of A: Undecided: Preference of B
OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW


A. A politician should never breach the law
1994
66 : 6 : 28
B. In the interest of the people, a politician can sometimes breach the law
1995
69 : 11 : 20

1997
69 : 8 : 23
NEGOTIATION OR FIRM HAND RULE?


A. Patience during negotiations is important in politics
1994
51 : 23 : 26
B. Decisiveness and the firm hand of a strong personality is important
1995
54 : 25 : 21

1997
54 : 26 : 20
PLURALISM OR UNITY?


A. Pluralism of opinions and democracy is important
1994
36 : 28 : 36
B. Unity and togetherness of nation is important
1995
39 : 32 : 29

1997
43 : 30 : 27
MINORITY RIGHTS


A. In a democracy, the rights of the minority must be strictly observed
1994
50 : 23 : 27
B. In a democracy, the majority has the right to make decisions at the expense of the minority
1995
51 : 24 : 25

1997
54 : 26 : 20
FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA


A. The government should not control the television, radio and press
1994
68 : 8 : 24
B. The government should control the television, radio and press
1995
72 : 10 : 18

1997
71 : 8 : 21
Source: FOCUS, December 1994, December 1995 and February 1997

The attitudes indicated in Table 5 can be synthesized into a typology 12 which divides respondents into three categories according to their declared political principles. This typology documents increasing support for democratic principles in the post-election period  (Table 6).

Table 6: Professed political principles of Slovakia's citizens (%)


1994

1995
1997
Democratic principles
47
55
59
Hybrid principles
40
35
30
Non-democratic principles
13
10
12
Source: FOCUS, December 1994, December 1995 and February 1996

Support for democratic principles is not evenly distributed in the population. More advocates of democratic principles can be found among people with higher education, the young and middle-aged  generations, residents of large cities, and members of the Hungarian minority. Students, entrepreneurs, professionals and intellectuals are stronger advocates of democratic principles, in contrast with blue-collar industrial workers, agricultural laborers, and pensioners.

The political principles professed by respondents correlate with responses concerning popular conceptions of the economic system. Advocates of democratic principles are more likely to be found among those who support a free market or a social-market economy than among those who prefer a socialist economic arrangement.

8. Opinions On The Policy Related To The Hungarian Minority

As Table 5 documents, there has been a slight but visible shift from a majoritarian interpretation of democracy to one which respects the inclusion of minority rights. However, an analysis of the views of ethnic Slovaks regarding the government's policy towards ethnic Hungarians offers a different picture.

Since the 1994 elections, the number of ethnic Slovaks who believe that the government's policy regarding the Hungarian minority meets international standards has decreased. 13 However, only 30% of ethnic Slovaks preferred "the patient search for mutually acceptable solutions with the representatives of the Hungarian minority", whereas 50% favored "a more assertive advocacy of the Slovak nation's interests". Since 1994, the number of adherents of a consensual minority policy has remained the same. On the other hand, during the whole post-election period, members of the Hungarian minority have been nearly unanimous in their support for a more consensual minority policy. In 1997, the number of Hungarian respondents expressing this preference was 90%.

The ruling coalition's confrontational approach to the Hungarian minority thus has been supported by the majority of ethnic Slovaks. At the beginning of 1997, this type of policy was approved by 54% and disapproved by 28% of ethnic Slovaks. In contrast, the government's current approach to minorities was rejected by 88% and supported by only 7% of ethnic Hungarians.

Views on the government's minority policy have been strongly correlated with adherence to political parties: positive assessments of minority policy prevailed among the supporters of all three ruling coalition parties, while negative assessments characterized supporters of the non-leftist opposition, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Democratic Party (DS), and the Democratic Union (DU)). Adherents of the Party of Democratic Left (SDL) have occupied the middle ground on this issue.

9. Foreign Policy Orientations And Expectation

Since the 1994 elections, the international position of the new state and its chances of full integration into Euroatlantic structures have become the central issues of "high politics" in Slovakia. However, foreign policy issues have remained marginal concerns for the majority of average Slovak citizens. In January 1997, only 37% of respondents showed any interest in foreign policy, while up to 61% declared themselves to be indifferent.

In spite of growing discrepancies between the government's pro-integration proclamations and its actual anti-integration practices, pro-integration sentiments nonetheless prevailed among those asked how they would vote in hypothetical referenda on EU and NATO membership for Slovakia (Table 7). As in 1995, public support of Slovakia's integration into the EU was stronger than it was for NATO membership.

Table 7: "Imagine that a referendum is being held next weekend. How would you answer the following questions: Do you support Slovakia's integration into the EU? Do you support Slovakia's membership in NATO?" (%)


European Union

NATO

1995
1997
1995
1997
I would answer "yes"
59
56
43
39
I would answer "no"
13
12
22
21
I would not participate in the referendum
15
17
18
23
Don't know
13
16
18
18
% of affirmative answers of referendum participants
82
82
66
65
Source: FOCUS, December 1995 and January 1997

When considering only those respondents who would participate in a referendum held in January 1997, as many as 82% would have voted for Slovakia's integration into the EU and 65% for its integration into NATO. 

The integration of Slovakia into both the EU and NATO was simultaneously approved by 37% of respondents. Thirty percent held ambiguous views about joining NATO as well as about Slovakia's integration into the EU. Nineteen percent of respondents approved integration into the EU only, while 4% supported integration into NATO only. Ten percent of respondents rejected integration into both EU and NATO.

According to this analysis, people supportive of Slovakia's integration into both the EU and NATO also tended to be more supportive of the transition to a market economy and pluralist democracy and to profess a higher degree of inter-ethnic tolerance (Bútorová, Gyárfásová and Kúska, 1996a, p. 19). A Euroatlantic orientation is more frequent among men, young and middle-aged generations, people with higher education, respondents from upper classes and inhabitants of Bratislava.

As indicated by Graphs 3 and 4, in January 1997, a Euroatlantic orientation would have been strongly supported in a referendum by the adherents of the Hungarian Coalition (MK), the DS, the DU, the KDH, and also the SNS. On the other hand, integration was opposed not only by a substantial portion of HZDS and ZRS voters, but also by SDL adherents. These findings indicate that, at the beginning of 1997, the opinions of adherents of the SNS and SDL were not identical with the official standpoints and rhetoric of leaders of these two parties.

Graph 3

Graph 4

According to these surveys, a substantial part of people in Slovakia has been aware of the growing discrepancy between the officially proclaimed and the actual foreign policy of the ruling coalition.  In November 1996, 54% of respondents predicted that the ruling coalition's policy would not lead to Slovakia's integration into Euroatlantic structures, whereas only 26% believed the opposite. Twenty percent of respondents found that the situation was too confusing to enable a decisive response.

How do people interpret the reasons for the exclusion of Slovakia from the first round of NATO expansion ? In November 1996, 58% of respondents thought that the main reason was the ruling coalition's refusal to conduct a more democratic policy, in spite of repeated warnings from the international community, while 25% did not accept this interpretation. Twenty-nine percent stated that the member states of NATO were biased against Slovakia, whereas 52% rejected this view. Thirty percent of respondents blamed the situation on the opposition, whereas 50% rejected this view. These findings indicate that the opposition's arguments were more convincing for the population than those of the ruling coalition .

It must be stressed, however, that a substantial part of the population did not fully realize the significance of joining NATO . According to a survey conducted in January 1997, only 44% of respondents believed that as a NATO member, Slovakia's security would increase, 23% expected better prospects for democracy and 21% better conditions for economic development. Only a marginal number of respondents associated better prospects for Slovakia with remaining outside of NATO. The number of respondents who ignored the security, economic and domestic political significance of NATO membership was alarmingly high (51%, 70%, 73%, respectively). While NATO membership does not automatically guarantee economic prosperity and democratic consolidation, without the hope for membership, the incentives for economic and political progress in Slovakia are greatly reduced.

Due to the absence of any government-led campaign in favor of NATO membership and to the absence of an open and informed public discussion, a prevailing part of the population has not realized the potential advantaged of the membership of Slovakia in NATO. This lack of information has reinforced both feelings of isolationism and geopolitical confusion among average citizens in Slovakia and has also increased the potential for their political manipulation .

10. Potential Of Political Participation

A shown in sections 4-7, after the 1994 elections, Slovakia's citizens started to regard the issues of democracy with greater care. Their comprehension of the importance of political rights and freedoms, as well as their support for fundamental democratic principles has increased. However, these developments have also been accompanied by continued feelings of alienation from politics . 14 First, a majority of citizens believed that politicians are insufficiently responsive.  In February 1997, as many as 85% of respondents held the view that "those in power are not interested in the opinions of common people". Second, a considerable number of respondents considered politics to be insufficiently transparent . Fifty-seven percent of respondents stated that they do not understand what was going on in politics. Third, politics remained on the margins of most respondent's interests , with 56% of respondents claiming that they were not interested in politics.

Similar to previous years, the groups of politically disinterested or politically disoriented people overlapped and they accounted for 45% of all respondents  (Current Problems..., 1994; Bútorová , Gyarfásová and Kúska, 1996a, p. 5). At the beginning of 1997, this alienation towards politics was more typical of people with only elementary education, women, people younger than 25 years, students, agricultural workers and the unemployed. In contrast, feelings of political alienation were less intense among those with university education, and among entrepreneurs, technicians and other professionals.

Since the 1994 elections, people have become less comfortable expressing their political views . In February 1997, 56% of respondents thought it was best not to discuss politics at all or only among close friends or relatives, as compared to 52% in 1994. In contrast, only 38% felt comfortable sharing their political views without reservation, compared to 44% in 1994.

The uneasy political atmosphere was accompanied by a feeling of civic helplessness . Seventy-six percent of respondents admitted that if the government or the parliament took policy measures harmful to their interests, they would not be able to effectively defend themselves. Fifty-three percent of respondents expressed similar sentiments in regard to the policy decisions of local governments. At the beginning of 1997, feelings of civic helplessness were as widespread as they had been immediately after 1994 elections (Current Problems..., 1995, p. 35).

These feelings of political alienation and civic helplessness led a substantial number of citizens to the conclusion that democracy in Slovakia is threatened  (Graph 5).

Graph 5

Events in Slovakia after the 1994 elections underscore a key problem in Slovakia's political development: what is the likelihood of establishing sustainable democracy in a society with no activist political traditions ? How can citizens who are not used to active involvement in politics prevent the restriction of democracy from occurring? Are they prepared to do more than go to the polls? Moreover, in a time of increased authoritarianism, can citizens afford to reduce their civic responsibilities to participation in elections?

In February, 1997 the response of the majority of Slovakia's citizens polled on their general attitudes to civic activism was positive: for 62% of the respondents, "responsible citizens should participate in solving political problems also in the period between the elections." On the other hand, we have recorded a widespread feeling of alienation from politics. What then is the actual level of political participation of citizens? And what might it be in the future? Do citizens prefer to realize their freedom by abstaining from politics  (Miháliková, 1996, p. 425), or are they prepared to get involved in public matters to a greater degree?

Table 8: Rates of actual and potential citizen participation in Slovakia (%)


In the past

In the future
Voting in general elections
76
80
Voting in local elections
72
82
Signing a petition
48
69
Joining the others in solving a community problem
43
78
Contacting an official (MP, mayor, etc.) in order to solve a problem
41
73
Attending political meetings
40
51
Joining a group or organization pursuing your interests
34
69
Attending protest demonstrations
26
48
Convincing friends how to vote
25
37
Working in a political party
17
34
Joining strikes
13
40
Commenting on political matters in press, radio, television
11
35
Running for office
10
22
Note: The rate of actual political participation  was determined by the percentage of positive answers to the question "Have you actually taken part in any of the following forms of political action?" The rate of potential political participation  was determined by the percentage of positive answers to the question "Would you use these forms of political action in the future, if you found it necessary?"
Source: FOCUS, February 1997

As Table 8 indicates, for all modes of political activity listed, the rate of actual citizen participation is lower than the rate of potential participation. This finding suggests that there exists some possibility  for increased citizen participation in politics . 15 In particular, community or local forms of participation, such as working with groups to solve community problems, joining an interest group, or contacting public officials could evolve in the near future.

What are the recent trends in citizen participation? A comparison with survey data from December 1994, reveals that participation in the following types of political activity has increased slightly: signing petitions 16 ; solving community problems, contacting officials, and working in a political party (Current Problems..., 1995, p. 38 and following). However, the rate of potential political participation has not changed .

What are the predictors of higher levels of political activism? According to a statistical analysis, more intensive involvement in different forms of political action can be expected from people with higher education, and from professionals, men, and ethnic Hungarians.  Since 1994, a new trend has emerged: an increased readiness of manual workers  to take part in protest activities (strikes, demonstrations) and to join an organization which pursues their interests. A higher potential for unconventional political activities -- such as petitions, demonstrations, and strikes -- is typical of inhabitants of larger towns, whereas residents of smaller communities are generally more inclined to participate in communal activities. This finding suggests the existence of distinctively urban and rural modes  of citizen participation.

Higher involvement in unconventional activities can be expected also from people supportive of economic transformation and democratic political principles , from adherents of non-leftist opposition parties (the DU, the KDH, and the DS), and of the Hungarian Coalition. One of the reasons for the greater readiness among supporters of these parties to engage in unconventional political activities lies in their restricted chances of influencing political decisions through their elected representatives in parliament.

It should be noted that a survey of public attitudes on this issue conducted immediately after the 1994 elections led to similar conclusions (Current Problems..., 1995, pp. 41-43). Indeed, the events from the first two post-election years confirm the findings of 1994: specifically, that attempts to modify the policies of the ruling coalition have been undertaken particularly by ethnic Hungarians, as well as by groups with above-average education -- such as university teachers and other academics, theater artists and other members of the cultural community, physicians and health care providers, and activists in non-governmental organizations. According to our findings of February, 1997, this trend can be expected to continue in the immediate future. 17

One might conjecture that the greater readiness of these groups of citizens to participate in political events is connected with their stronger sense of civic responsibility and an awareness that the successful democratization of Slovak society is currently being threatened by the increased authoritarian tendencies of the Meciar government 18 . They understand that Slovak society could pay high price for the political apathy and fatigue of its citizens.

11. Profiles Of Party Adherents

Despite the turbulent post-election period, the profiles of adherents of political parties have not changed dramatically. At the beginning of 1997, the crucial cleavage between the ruling coalition and opposition supporters was along the professed principles of political life . 19 This difference in political orientations among partisan groups has been reproduced since 1994 (Current Problems..., 1994, pp. 64-76; Current Problems..., 1995, pp. 45-47; Bútorová, Gyarfásová and Kúska, 1996b, p. 128). Most adherents among all of the main opposition parties profess democratic principles 20 and are inclined to a liberal, tolerant and open political culture. On the other hand, compared to the entire sample, support for undemocratic principles among ruling coalition adherents is above average, although still not the prevailing tendency. This provides an inkling of authoritarianism and majoritarian sentiments among this group (Graph 6).

Graph 6

As surveys taken since the 1994 election indicate, the cleavage between supporters of the ruling coalition and those of the opposition has been particularly visible in their attitudes toward concrete domestic policy issues. 21 Adherents of the ruling coalition have differed from the opposition adherents on a number of dimensions: they demonstrate a more positive evaluation of the government's policy, a milder criticism of the clientelistic mode of privatization, a more reserved attitude towards the opposition's participation in decision-making and in monitoring the conduct of the ruling coalition, and a stronger disapproval of citizens' collective protests.

From among the ruling coalition parties, HZDS supporters have usually taken the most articulate and most pro-government stand. Compared to SNS and ZRS supporters, they have been more interested in and more familiar with current political events and have tended to greater political mobilization.

As in the 1994 elections, our survey found that the ruling coalition parties were more frequently supported by voters with a lower education , whereas the opposition parties attracted voters with a higher education. 22 This educational gap between coalition and opposition supporters has been reinforced by the confrontational and populist rhetoric of the HZDS leadership.

Moreover, the HZDS has maintained the least favorable age structure  among its supporters, with the highest number of the oldest supporters and a below-average number of supporters under the age of 34.

12. Recent Developments On The Party Landscape

The period since the 1994 elections has seen an intensification of the ruling coalition's efforts to assert their economic, political and ideological control over society, the deterioration of the social and economic climate and an increase in political tensions. More than half of citizens polled have expressed distrust in the government and, since the second half of 1996, also of the Slovak National Council. Popular attitudes towards political personalities also indicate a chronic crisis of trust.

In the first year after the elections, we observed a growing discrepancy between popular disapproval of the ruling coalition's policies and stable voting preferences (Bútorová, 1996, p. 265). In 1996, some significant changes were recorded. The ruling coalition's policy provoked citizens' dissatisfaction, collective protests, and - most crucially - an erosion of popular support for the ruling coalition  (Table 9).

Table 9: Support for parties of the ruling coalition and of the opposition, after the 1994 elections and in early 1997 (%)


HZDS+SNS+ZRS (Ruling coalition)

KDH+DU+SDL+ SDSS + SZS+ MK + DS (Opposition)
1994 elections
47.7
39.3
February 1996
41.4
54.6
April 1996
43.1
53.2
June 1996
39.5
56.3
September 1996
37.7
58.0
November 1996
35.2
59.5
January 1997
34.3
60.0
February 1997
36.4
58.4
March 1997
37.0
58.0
Source: FOCUS, 1996 and 1997

As Table 9 indicates, the distribution of voting preferences between political parties of the ruling coalition and the parties of the parliamentary opposition has changed in favor of the opposition. It should be noted, however, that the calculation of support in Table 9 takes into account all political parties currently represented in parliament and disregards whether these parties exceeded the 5% electoral threshold at the time these surveys were conducted. 23

However, it is precisely the insufficient electoral -- support for the smaller parties which could have a decisive and negative effect on the potential of pro-transformation opposition parties to gain a parliamentary majority. In the parliamentary elections of both 1992 and 1994, the pro-transformation opposition parties have twice paid the political price for their fragmentation. Today, they must confront the challenge of creating a unified coalition if they are to enhance their parliamentary representation. For the non-leftist parties, the votes of the DS adherents are especially critical. Similarly, leftist parties which share a broadly democratic orientation need to prevent the loss of votes for the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and the Green Party of Slovakia (SZS).

In the current period, i.e. in April 1997, it is not clear whether the so-called independent opposition policy of the SDL will bring it closer to the HZDS or to the rest of the opposition. Therefore, a coalition of the SDSS, the SZS and the DU, or even with the broader coalition of KDH-DU-DS appear to be more viable options.

Are the supporters of the opposition parties prepared to accept the creation of such a coalition? As concerns a possible KDH-DS coalition, a survey conducted by FOCUS in January 1997 indicated that 89% of KDH adherents and 73% of DS adherents would endorse a coalition of this type. The survey also recorded good prospects for a DU-SDSS coalition; this option was acceptable to 82% of DU and 83% of SDSS adherents. 24

Another FOCUS poll of March 1997 examined levels of support for the Blue coalition (KDH-DU-DS). This opposition party arrangement was supported by 96% of KDH, 90% of DU and 73% of DS supporters. The survey also tested support for a SDL-SDSS coalition which was welcomed by 84% of SDL and 88% of SDSS adherents. 25

At the beginning of 1997, negotiations between opposition parties have not yet determined future coalition arrangements. However, both of these surveys indicate that the adherents of the KDH, the DU, the DS and the SDSS were rather flexible and ready to accept a variety of coalition arrangements. Therefore, it is possible that they viewed the creation of a coalition as a necessary way to prevent the defeat of the opposition in the 1994 elections from being repeated in 1998.

Conclusion

The attitudes of Slovakia's citizens toward the key parameters of social, economic and political transformation have remained remarkably stable. First, there is evidence of a relatively low level of identification with Slovak statehood. Moreover, certain "black holes" in the historic consciousness of Slovakia's citizens and a tendency to endorse a whitewashed version of Slovakia's past in the name of "the philosophy of the lesser evil" remains rather widespread: less than three fifths of those surveyed viewed the regime of the wartime Slovak State critically.

Although economic reform was launched several years ago, a considerable number of people continue to approach this process with passive resignation but without an acceptance of its necessity. The unscrupulous clientelism which has characterized government privatization practices since the 1994 elections has only confirmed deep popular suspicions that the process is inherently dishonest, unjust and antisocial. In spite of the near-universal indignation over the course of privatization, neither the opposition parties nor civic associations have managed to enforce a reform of the government's privatization policy. Initial attempts at collective protest vanished amidst a pervasive feeling of helplessness and a culture of passive acquiescence.

Although Slovakia has opened its doors to the world, the foreign policy horizons of average citizens have remained rather limited. This is partly due to the lack of an open and informed public discussion of Slovakia's foreign policy options. A considerable number of citizens polled have not been able to "translate" foreign policy issues into their everyday social, economic and political concerns.

In spite of growing discrepancies between the government's pro-integration proclamations and its actual anti-integration practices, pro-integration sentiments nonetheless prevailed among those asked how they would vote in hypothetical referenda on EU and NATO membership for their country. During the whole post-election period, public support of Slovakia's integration into the EU was stronger than it was for NATO membership.

After the 1994 elections, citizen support for the principles and practices of democracy have increased. This trend may indicate an increasing sensitivity of people to present their views in politically correct terms. Even more important, these surveys found that most people express support not only for abstract democratic tenets, but that they are able also to detect concrete non-democratic elements in the policies and conduct of the ruling coalition. This suggests that the confrontational policy and authoritarian behavior of the parliamentary majority are not actively supported by the majority of population. On the contrary, most citizens appear ready to accept measures aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and practices. 26

The only exception to the gradual trend of strengthened democratic values among Slovakia's citizens is their persisting inclination to embrace ethnic and national stereotypes. The confrontational government policy towards the Hungarian minority has been supported by a significant proportion of ethnic Slovaks.

Although Slovakia has recently witnessed several cases of collective protest, civic action has not forced the ruling coalition to soften its authoritarian tendencies. Vladimír Meciar and his allies have intuitively calculated that they can safely override popular opposition. With an arrogance resembling the rulers of the pre-1989 era, they have consistently disregarded critical public opinion. More accurately stated, they have disregarded the opinion of most citizens who have reluctantly and disapprovingly adjusted to the undesired course of development of their country. The inability to effectively resist the strengthening authoritarian tendencies of the government naturally threatens to amplify feelings of helplessness among Slovakia's citizens. The old stereotype has still persisted in which politics is perceived as an isolated realm of those "above" who do not let themselves be influenced by those "below".

Given prevailing public attitudes, the representatives of the ruling coalition have a relatively large maneuvering space in which to adopt more democratic practices without jeopardizing their support base. However, they have become "prisoners" of their own non-democratic and clientelistic policies. To concede to their critics, to engage in genuine accommodation with the political opposition, and to correct their present policies would mean to admit the disputable and even unlawful character of their current policies. Given the potentially disastrous political and personal costs of such an admission, the ruling coalition is unlikely to reform itself.

On the other hand, however, there are also some promising trends. Besides the above mentioned growing understanding of common people for the principles and practices of democracy and the cases of citizen mobilization, one of them is the increase of popular support for opposition parties. Moreover, according to several polls, an overwhelming majority of the adherents of individual opposition parties are prepared to accept a coalition of their party with one or more other parties. 27

Due to the weakened position of the ruling coalition, the development of the political landscape has reached a stage where the opposition party leaders must improve their cooperation and overcome the fragmentation of the democratic, anti-authoritarian bloc. This is a demanding task, since their relations are still marked by a rather high degree of mutual mistrust. If the opposition leaders fail to build a broader coalition among their parties, a convincing political alternative to the authoritarian policy of the ruling coalition will not be created. If they succeed, the approaching 1998 elections could open the door to a new stage of democratic consolidation in Slovakia.

References

Note 1: The author and the editors would like to give special thanks to Karen Ballentine for editorial help on the final version of this paper. Back.

Note 2: For more on the Slovak political tradition during the first Czechoslovak Republic see Kriv[yacute], Feglová and Balko, 1997, p. 23 and following. Back.

Note 3: According to a March 1993 poll, only 29% of respondents stated that, had there been a referendum, they would have voted for the country's separation. In May 1994, the number was 27%. See Current Problems..., 1993a, p. 3; Current Problems, 1995, p. 5. Back.

Note 4: According to data from January 1997, approval of the dissolution of the ÈSFR among supporters of different political parties is as follows: 62% of HZDS supporters, 61% of SNS, 42% of Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), 36% of undecided, 34% of Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), 31% of non-voters, 22% of Democratic Party (DS), 20% of Party of Democratic Left (SD1/4), 17% of Democratic Union (DU) , and 4% of Hungarian Coalition (MK). Back.

Note 5: Compared to the current regime the socialist regime is viewed far more positively by Slovaks than by their former Czech compatriots and slightly more positively than by Poles, but far more critically than by Hungarians (Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch, 1997, p. 108; Bútorová and Bútora, 1995, pp. 27-28). Back.

Note 6: For similar findings for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary see also Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch, 1997, p. 161. Back.

Note 7: For an analysis of the socio-political and economic situation in Slovakia before 1989 and of its impact on post-1989 developments see Bútora and Bútorová, 1993a and 1993b; Bútora, Bútorová and Gyarfá[sinvcircumflex]ová, 1994; Kriv[yacute], 1993; Szomolányi, 1993. Back.

Note 8: A socialist economic orientation is sometimes referred to as state-paternalism and the liberal orientation as a liberal-market orientation. See Kriv[yacute], Feglová and Balko, 1996, pp. 75-77. For a construction of the synthetic typology of economic orientations see Bútorová, Gyarfá[sinvcircumflex]ová, and Kúska, 1996a, p. 25. Back.

Note 9: Compare Current Problems,1995, pp. 12-15. It should be noted, however, that the assessment of respect for civic rights and freedoms in 1994 and 1997 is not fully comparable due to the slightly different formulation of the question in each of the surveys. Back.

Note 10: By contrast, in December 1994, this last issue placed eighth in the ranking of pressing problems of society. For the purposes of comparison, we re-categorized some problems identified in the questionnaire used in 1994. See Current Problems, 1995, p. 9. Back.

Note 11: Popular reactions to socially motivated protests of physicians and health care providers against low wages were even more positive. These protests attracted the attention of 79% and the support of 64% of respondents (Bútorová, Gyarfá[sinvcircumflex]ová and Kúska, 1996b, p. 134). Back.

Note 12: For a construction of this synthetic typology of professed political principles see Bútorová, Gyarfá[sinvcircumflex]ová and Kúska, 1996a, p. 77. This typology is similar to but not identical with the typology of political culture developed by Vladimír Kriv[yacute], who classifies responses according to the categories of: authoritarian type or ,,hard interactions"; hybrid type; and anti-authoritarian type or ,,soft interactions." Back.

Note 13: On the question of whether the government's minority policy accorded with international norms and practices, 82% of ethnic Slovak respondents responded positively in October 1993. In February 1996, the number declined to 78% and in January 1997 to 74% (Bútorová, 1997). Back.

Note 14: Obviously, the attitude of citizens toward politics and politicians reflects not only current political events but also experiences from the pre-communist and communist periods which have been passed from generation to generation. Back.

Note 15: According to Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch, the extent of citizen participation in Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary corresponds to the extent of citizen participation in consolidated democracies such as Austria and Germany. As the authors emphasize, compared to the pre-1989 situation, it cannot be claimed that the citizens of these post-communist countries have withdrawn from politics into the private realm. See Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch, 1997, p. 115. Back.

Note 16: This is probably due to the fact that at the time that this survey was conducted (February 1997), the petition campaign for direct presidential elections was underway. Back.

Note 17: Obviously, a different scenario is also possible: the collective mobilization of populist and nationalist forces. So far, these forces remain pacified by the presence of HZDS, SNS and ZRS in the ruling coalition. However, it remains an open question what would be their reaction in the event of their defeat in the upcoming 1998 elections. Back.

Note 18: A higher level of participation among people of this profile is not due to any preference among them for the model of participative democracy which places high demands on individual time and energy. Although they do not refuse to participate in political life, they probably hope that such participation is not too frequent or too demanding. According to Miháliková, the participative model of democracy is currently in decline. This reflects a wider trend of the post-modern era and has been observed not only in the post-communist countries, but also in the liberal Western states (Miháliková, 1996, pp. 425-426). Back.

Note 19: For analysis of other differences in value profiles of adherents of political parties after 1994 see, Bútorová, Gyárfá[sinvcircumflex]ová and Kúska 1996b; Bútorová, 1997. Back.

Note 20: Kevin Krause, using O'Donnell's typology of democracy, characterizes the difference in the value profiles of the ruling coalition adherents and of the opposition adherents as a difference between support for delegative and representative forms of democracy. See Krause, 1996, p. 183. Back.

Note 21: For empirical documentation of these findings see Bútorová, 1997. Back.

Note 22: Among the opposition parties, supporters of DS and DU had the highest levels of education. The supporters of ZRS and HZDS had the lowest levels of education (Bútorová, 1997). Back.

Note 23: The calculation of the distribution of support for the ruling coalition and for the opposition is based on data published in Bútorová, 1997. Back.

Note 24: In January 1997, the distribution of voter preferences was as follows: HZDS 24.8%; KDH-DS 16.6%; DU-SDSS 15.6%; MK 12.3%; SD1/4 10.6%; ZRS 5.0%; SNS 4.7%; KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia) 4.7%; SZS 2.2%; other parties 3.3% (Unpublished study, FOCUS 1997). Back.

Note 25: In March 1997, the distribution of voter preferences was as follows: HZDS-SNS-ZRS 33.1%; KDH-DU-DS 29.7%; SD1/4-SDSS 13.6%; MK 10.5%; SZS 6.7%; KSS 4.5%; other parties 1.8% (Unpublished study, FOCUS 1997) Back.

Note 26: Editors' note: Since this writing, these parties have formed the Slovak Democratic Coalition, an electoral coalition.with a common party list. The Green party (SZS) also joined the coalition. Back.

Note 27: This is partly true even of the junior partners of the ruling coalition, SNS and ZRS, as their supporters positively identify with the government's policy significantly less than HZDS adherents. The supporters of SNS and ZRS are thus in an ambivalent situation. On one hand, they benefit from their representation in the ruling coalition, on the other hand, as a minority inside the HZDS-dominated coalition, they continue to experience some disadvantages. Back.