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Slovakia:
Problems of Democratic Consolidation
and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game

Sona Szomolányi and John Gould, editors

New York

Columbia International Affairs Online

1997

Bibliographic Data

5. Slovakia's Regions And The Struggle For Power

Vladimír Krivy

Introduction

A knowledge of Slovak regional issues is crucial to understanding the process of regime formation since 1989. The present system of local administration began in 1990 when the powers of the communist-era National Committees were divided between two sets of administrative bodies. Some responsibilities went to local state administrations which were an arm of the central state administration and governed ultimately by the ruling government of Slovakia. A second set of responsibilities went to locally elected, independent ruling bodies at the town and municipality level, commonly referred to as self-governments.

Despite this early division of powers, relations between the independent, local self-governments and the centrally-controlled local administrations have been consistently tense. Three major controversies dominate the conflict. First, the independent self-governments and government-controlled state and local administrations are locked in a tight contest over financing and the division of rights and responsibilities. Second, there is an ongoing dispute over appropriate boundaries of administrative and electoral units. Finally, there is conflict over the creation of a second set of self-governments at the regional level.

Efforts by the government of Prime Minister Vladimír Meèiar to increase its control over Slovakia's regions have shaped policy on all three issues since its assumption of power at the end of 1994. First, the Meèiar government has made a concerted effort to centralize and consolidate the power of the local state administration at the expense of local self-governments. Second, there is a threat that it could gerrymander administrative and electoral boundaries to maximize electoral advantage--particularly over Slovakia's Hungarian minority. Third, it has delayed and complicated the process of creating a new, regional level of independent self-government that might compete with the state's regional administrations.

Part I of the following essay documents these three conflicts as they've played out across six regional issues: the new territorial-administrative division of the Slovak Republic; the political context of territorial redistricting and the staffing of their administrative bodies; problematic trends in the development of public administration; problems facing local self-governments in establishing cross-border co-operation and Euro-regions; Slovak delays in joining the European Charter of Regional Self-Government; and finally, a new parliamentary election bill that may be in preparation in Parliament.

Part II of this essay discusses the territorial basis of the contemporary division and polarization of Slovak society. The essay then concludes with a brief description of the type of regime that is forming in Slovakia.

1. Issues Of Regional Conflict In The Slovak Republic

1.1 The New Territorial-Administrative Division of the Slovak Republic

Following the parliamentary election of 1992, the new government of Prime Minister Vladimír Meèiar rejected a "county variant" of territorial-administrative division and started preparing a new bill. The county variant called for the establishment of districts based upon, but not identical to, traditional boundary lines--dating as far back as medieval times and administered as recently as the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It been had favored by the previous Slovak government.

Meèiar's decision to reject the county variant led to discussions with the Association of Cities and Villages of Slovakia (ZMOS), an organization that represents more then 95 percent of towns and villages and supports the rights of self-governments. 1 ZMOS and other groups wanted the government to establish the powers of local and regional self-governments before it redefined administrative boundaries. ZMOS's greatest concern was to avoid the weakening of self-governments at the level of the towns and municipalities and to avoid a delay in the creation of self-governments at the regional level. After some deliberation, they convinced the government to agree that a decision on new administrative-territorial boundaries should be made only after agreement was reached on the division of responsibilities between local self-governments, state administrative bodies and the new regional state administrations and self-governing bodies that would be created at some time in the future.

The ZMOS/government agreement lasted until October 1995 when Meèiar's third government abruptly chose to break the agreement and began to redraw the territorial-administrative division of districts and the new self-governing regions without first having settled the division of responsibilities between the myriad administrative bodies involved. The government argued that the original process of establishing competencies first was "too time consuming." Rather than justifying his decision, Meèiar simply stated that the county variant of territorial-administrative division had become outmoded.

The government decision led to objections from ZMOS, the Union of Towns, the Bratislava City Council, and some opposition parties--including all Hungarian opposition parties. Despite the objections, on March 22, 1996, the ruling coalition majority in Parliament passed Act No. 221/1996, establishing a new territorial-administrative division of Slovakia. The ruling coalition also rejected nearly all efforts to amend the bill. In April, Slovak President Michael Kováè returned the bill to Parliament for further discussion. For several months--while coalition parties were wrangling over bank privatization--the government left the bill off the parliamentary agenda because it could not be sure that it would have the support to pass important legislation. Soon after Meèiar succeeded in restoring the effectiveness of the coalition agreement among the three governing parties, he reintroduced the bill for a second reading. On July 3, 1996, Parliament refused all amendments proposed by the President and re-approved the act.

Act 221/1996 redivides Slovakia into 8 regions and 79 districts. The new borders frequently cut across traditional units, as in Spis, Gemer, Zemplín, Tekov, Hont or Záhorie. It also diminishes the status of Bratislava, the capital. At the same time, Meèiar's government passed a second act, no. 222/1996, that both created new regional state authorities and expanded the responsibilities of existing district state authorities.

The new territorial-administrative division of the Slovak Republic has a number of disturbing implications. First, there is a threat that the new state administrative bodies will take over tasks more appropriately handled by the regional self-governments--before the latter have even been established. Second, the acts were a product of authoritative governmental decision-making. They reflected a fundamental unwillingness by the senior coalition partner, Meèiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), to negotiate with important segments of society. They in particular failed to acknowledge the interests and opinions of the Hungarian minority. Democratic decision-making was thus reduced to the politics of majoritarian fiat. Third, the government decision prompted competition at the local level over the location of district capitals. Ultimately, the state administration "awarded" district capitals according to highly discretionary, and even politically clientalist, criteria (Ni_òansky 1997, pp. 63-64). Fourth, the acts strengthened the positions of local and regional state administrations, while only making promises to shift certain responsibilities to local self-government authorities at a later date.

1.2. Political Context of Territorial-Administrative Changes

Coalition Occupation of State Administrative Positions in Districts : While the Slovak government quickly pushed legislation in Parliament to restructure territorial boundaries and regional administrative competencies to the advantage of coalition parties, it also ensured that the regional state administrations would be politically subservient. Soon after Meèiar's return to power, the ruling coalition established a number of boards, each consisting of teams of five political appointees known as the "coalition fives." It staffed these boards with coalition members and loyalists. The coalition fives' role was to appoint or reappoint personnel to non-elected positions at the district level. Positions that fell under the boards' mandate included director of the district medical authority, the director of the district library, and the director of the local school authority, as well as many other local bureaucratic and service functions. Overall, the boards conducted a general, government-led purge of the ranks of district state administration based on explicit political criteria. The government tested the political reliability of candidates by monitoring their response to a call by a group of district chairmen of the state administration for the resignation of President Kováè, who had emerged as a strong critic of Prime Minister Meèiar. The boards removed officials who failed to comply. The state government also removed district chairmen--some of whom were HZDS members--who had welcomed Kováè when he visited their districts (For more details see Lesko 1996, pp. 208-211).

The creation or restructuring of new organs of state administration under Acts 221/1996 and 222/1996 has provided an additional opportunity to introduce political appointees into administrative positions at the local and regional levels. HZDS officials have made substantial personnel changes according to explicit or implicit political criteria, frequently pressuring state administrators to become members of one of the governing coalition parties. They have also used reorganization as a means of dismissing politically unreliable workers. (Ni_òansky 1997, p.65)

The hidden agenda behind the dismissals appears to be a desire to solidify coalition power positions. Yet, the HZDS agenda also includes elements of patronage and clientalism. The ruling coalition strengthens its clientalist ties through the distribution of state finances according to political criteria at both regional and local level. The effect of this misuse of state finances and abuse of state power will likely show up in the form of greater spending on some municipalities in an effort to gain the support of certain local constituencies during the campaigns for parliamentary and community elections currently scheduled for 1998.

The Electoral Success of HZDS and Creation of New Districts :: The recent territorial-administrative division of Slovakia has createded districts in which HZDS is more likely to maintain an electoral advantage in local elections. Redistricting created few districts that would boost the electoral chances of other political formations. HZDS strongholds, therefore, now constitute a majority of districts. The means were simple. Redistricting created districts with a smaller population in regions with higher electoral support for HZDS. It grouped territories with populations that appeared less likely to support HZDS into a smaller number of larger districts. The new redistricting places substantially more district capitals in areas with a "correct" political orientation than areas populated by voters with an "incorrect" orientation.

Districts in Ethnically Mixed Areas and Other Places : Politically motivated redistricting is exceptionally apparent in regions with a significant Hungarian minority. If we take maps of three territorial-administrative divisions of Slovakia (1930, pre-1996, and since 1996) and overlay the census results from 1991, we see that, first, the average size of the population of districts with over 20 percent Hungarians is now larger than the average size of the population of the rest of the districts. Second, the number of districts in which the proportion of Hungarians surpasses 20 percent (as a portion of all districts) has declined. In short, the new territorial-administrative division has created a smaller number of larger, Hungarian districts. This, in turn, has reduced the influence of the Hungarian minority in the state as a whole under the present electoral system.

Indeed, the territorial-administrative division of Slovakia existing before summer 1996 was less advantageous for the Hungarian minority than the division of the early 1930's. The most recent redistricting, however, is distinctly less beneficial than the pre-summer 1996 districting. The primary reason for deterioration is the reduction in the proportion of districts in which the Hungarian minority is 20 percent or greater.

Reducing ethnic Hungarian influence in the ethnically mixed Slovak-Hungarian zone was surely one of the dominant criteria underlying preparations for the redivision. At the end of 1995, the Union of Cities held a conference in which some members attempted to reestablish government support for the "County Variant" of redistricting. The government responded with its own proposals, entitled, "Proposals of Criteria for the Territorial-Administrative Division of Slovakia," possibly written by the Ministry of the Interior. The document makes specific reference to political-strategic criteria, one of which is "to help to eliminate or weaken the possibility of misusing the territorial-administrative division for the purpose of actual disintegration of the country."

The document then suggests ways to prevent the creation of administrative units with an exclusively regional identity. Without a regional identity, the government can more easily push regional and administrative units in desired directions. Specifically, they can strengthen state identity at the expense of local and regional identity. Again, some have interpreted this as directed at reducing local Hungarian influence (Nová 1996, p. 8). In the material, however, there is no explanation for the creation of a smaller number of larger than average districts in ethnically mixed areas (For more details see Krivy et. al. 1996, pp. 353-356). Professor Koloman Ivanièka, a well-known champion of ethnic Slovak interests, asserts that the deciding criteria in the preparation of the territorial-administrative division were "considerations of minority interests" (Ivanièka 1996, p. 62). But my analysis shows that if "considerations of minority interests" were taken into account, then it was only to reduce their influence in Slovak politics. Indeed, the government has failed to make a concerted effort to integrate regions. Rather, its goal appears to be to restrict and isolate minority influence at the local and regional level.

1.3. Problematic Trends in Public Administration after 1994

Since the 1994 parliamentary elections, the ruling coalition has used its political power to increase central controls over independently elected local self-governments. This has taken three forms. First, government efforts have focused on restricting the financial independence and responsibilities of local governments. Second, it has created and strengthened institutions of state administration at the regional and local level. Finally, the government has brushed aside discussions about its pledge to create regional self-governments with the statement that "this is a very sensitive matter."

Law No. 369/1990 marked a significant milestone in the development of local democracy in Slovakia. Passed by the Slovak National Council, it stripped formerly Communist Party controlled national committees of their administrative power and established a common system of public administration that legally separated the state administration from the municipal self-governments. Specifically, it determined local self-governments' distinct responsibilities and settled their proprietal and economic positions vis a vis the state administration. The introduction of direct elections for local mayors in both the Czech and Slovak constituent republics of the common federal state guaranteed additional independence. Slovaks, however, went a step further by passing Law No. 346/1990, providing for the direct election of deputies to local representative bodies (Fal_an & Krivy 1997).

Financial Problems:  Yet despite clear early separation of national state and local administration, the independence of local self-governments remains endangered. Most threatening is the economic dependence of towns and villages. Both have a limited ability to raise money through taxes. The ratio of budgets allocated to the state administration to budgets allocated to local state-governments is 9:1 respectively. The ratio of tax incomes earned by the state to that earned by the self-governments, is an even worse, 24:1 (Miklos et. al. 1996). This means that the majority of local budgets must come from state financing. The shortfall provides leverage which, in the absence of safeguards, the state administration can manipulate to accomplish the political objectives of the ruling government coalition.

The government has demonstrated the willingness and ability to use self-government's financial dependence to reward politically reliable towns and municipalities in a fashion that borders on party-state clientalism. In making its financing decisions, the HZDS-dominated government frequently preferentially rewards towns and municipalities whose mayors belong to the Association of Mayors--an organization of approximately 500 HZDS mayors elected by their constituencies. The government also clearly prefers the Association of Mayors over ZMOS as a partner in policy making and the drafting of laws. ZMOS considers the failure of the government in 1996 to pass any amendments to the law on a common system of administration to be a considerable success. The organization fears that any  government action would simply further weaken its members' position (Sykora 1997).

An analysis done by the independent research corporation, M.E.S.A. 10, disclosed the following additional complications facing self-governments in their efforts to maintain financial and political independence: (Miklos et. al. 1996)

  1. From 1990 to 1995, local self-government budgets expressed as a portion of GDP have sunk from 21.6 percent to as low as 4.3 percent. In both the Czech and Slovak Republics, local budgets shrank by more than state-wide budgets. In Slovakia, however, this difference was even wider. Economic decline from 1990-1993 was also more than proportionally matched by a decrease in the resources of local budgets. Self-governments were thus more burdened than the center by the recession that accompanied the initial stages of economic transformation.

  2. So far, the state has not worked out a clear and stable proportional system for allocating funds from centrally-collected taxes to municipalities. As a result, allocations are discretionary, unreliable and politically manipulable.

  3. The state does not allow sufficient opportunities for municipalities to make direct use of incomes generated within their territories. In addition, there is almost no correlation between the number of taxable sources of income in a particular municipality or region and the actual income the municipality or region receives from those sources.

  4. Generally, the proportions of subsidies, taxes and fees that are transferred to local budgets have been in decline. In Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Holland, France, Germany and even the Czech Republic, this proportion ranges from 70 to 100 per cent. In Slovakia the proportion of these sources of revenue that reach local budgets declined during 1993-1995 from 52 to 44 per cent.

  5. The economic problems of municipalities result not only from low allocations of subsidies from the state-wide budget, hey also stem from the general attitude of the state administration to the role of municipalities in society, from its attitudes towards the formation of a civil society; and from its disrespect for the principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity states that problems should be solved at the lowest level and only insoluble problems should be pushed up to higher levels. The progression of competencies and responsibilities should run from citizens, to municipalities and regions and then to the state.

Because of these problems, municipalities--through their memberships in ZMOS and the less influential Union of Cities--are seeking to increase the share of taxes available to local budgets. At the same time they are raising objections to the system of allocating state subsidies. They protest in particular against the discretionary means of determining the allocation of resources to a town or municipality.

Controversy Over Division of Responsibilities:  A second area of tension between the local self-governments and regional state administrations is the division of administrative responsibilities. Despite early distinctions made under Law 369/1990, the Slovak state's regional administrations have progressively sought to erode the rights and duties of local self-governments. Recently, the state administration has manipulated public administration to strengthen its responsibilities and control at the expense of self-governments. The government has proven reluctant to shift responsibilities from state administration to self-government at both local and regional levels. Nor is the government even willing to acknowledge the genuine responsibilities already possessed by self-governing authorities. This process goes as far as to threaten the complete dismantling of self-governments in public administration (Ni_òansky 1997). In addition, it undermines other independent bodies. In summer 1995, for example, the Coordinating Council of the Association of Chief Officers of municipalities of Slovakia published a number of concerns in a letter addressed to the municipalities of Slovakia: "Because of well-known political pressure on the Chief Officers of municipalities of Slovakia... we are sorry to state that... the role of the Chief Officers is being politically occupied.. [by] initiating [a] new election with the intention of personnel changes" (Obecné  1995 no. 31).

It is clear that the intention of the Meèiar government is to gain a decisive influence over the decision-making processes of self-governing bodies. Indeed, there are indications that this is official HZDS policy. An internal HZDS document called "The Main Tasks of HZDS," which was apparently leaked to the public in 1996, argues that HZDS should continue to make personnel changes in both the state administration and diplomatic service. The goal of the changes, the document continues, is to strengthen HZDS's position and to surmount resistance to HZDS control in Slovak society. In addition, the document calls for greater cooperation with selected non-governmental organizations closely connected with HZDS. The document places particular importance on a continued cooperative and preferential relationship with the Association of Mayors (Lukas & Szomolanyi 1996, p. 207). 2

Delays in the establishing regional self-governments:  One of the more damaging government policies has been its slow progress towards establishing a regional level of self-government. Since the beginning of 1997, ZMOS and the Meèiar government have been holding ongoing talks regarding establishing the regional level of self-government. As of this writing, one of the major stumbling blocks remains the government's narrow definition of the competencies of the regional self-governments and the threat that regional self-governments will be subordinated to the regional state administration.

The ramifications of the delay are several fold. Ni_òansky points out that the state administration is preparing a number of area-regional development plans in spite of the fact that these plans are supposed to be prepared and coordinated by the yet to be created regional level of self-government. 3 A potential complication is that when regional self-governments are finally established, they will inherit predetermined plans from the regional offices of the state administration which they will be bound to follow (Ni_òansky 1997). 4

M.E.S.A. 10 demonstrates an additional complication of the failure to establish regional self-governments. Specifically, the absence of a regional level means that state administrators often have regional responsibilities. This risks subordinating mayors and local administrators who have only local competencies to, state administrators. Again, there is a threat that local autonomy will be eroded by the central state bureacracy (Miklos et. al. 1996).

In addition to the ruling coalition's delay in shifting competencies to local self-governments, ruling coalition officials maintain additional incentives to retain central control over state power. Principle among them is the fear that by shifting competencies to towns and municipalities in the South of Slovakia, local governments controlled by Slovakia's Hungarian minority would gain practical control over education policies. For this reason, in March 1996, an assembly of the pedagogical department of Matica Slovenská came out against handing educational competencies to local self-governing authorities. 5

1.4. Cross-border Cooperation and the Problems of Euro-regions

Of 79 contemporary Slovak districts, as many as 38 are in a geographical contact with neighboring countries. Local cross-border cooperation therefore plays a significant role in Slovak relations with its neighbors. The importance of cross-border cooperation is strengthened by the fact that over the past decades numerous border areas have been largely ignored in the industrial and infrastructural development of the country.

The duties of self-governments in the sphere of cross-border co-operation are insufficiently supported by legislation. Laws on common administration do not explicitly define the rights of self-government in the matter of cross-border cooperation. At the same time, however, the law does not forbid local self-governments from establishing cross border relations. A positive legislative arrangement would speed the development of such relations. But, there is little governmental political will to support such cross-border co-operation. Moreover, Slovakia has so far failed to follow ZMOS recommendations to join the European Framework Agreement on Cross-Border Co-operation.

Problems arise mostly where spontaneous cross-border co-operation has already developed. Two important examples are the Karpaty Euro-region, established by Slovak initiative in 1990, and the Tatry Euro-region, established soon after. Government activities have since resulted in a number of political obstructions paralyzing the activities of the Slovak representatives in these Euro-regions (Fal_an & Krivy 1997; For more details on Euro-regions, see Duleba 1993; Ièo 1996; Krivy 1996).

In October 1996, the government Office for Strategy produced a working proposal for a law on regional development. The bill proposes that the government will determine "the principles of inter-regional and cross-border co-operation with neighboring countries on local, regional and national levels." It also assigns responsibility to initiate and organize inter-regional cooperation to the state admi nistration's Office for Strategy. It allows state-administered regional offices to rule on the proposals of towns and municipalities for cross-border co-operation. Indeed, all major powers are held by the state administration. No tasks or responsibilities are reserved for the future regional self-governments (Návrh  1996).

According to the Office for Strategy proposal, cross-border and inter-regional co-operation is to be realized only within a framework of international agreements signed by the government of Slovakia. The proposal does not discuss how to set up procedures to organize cross-border cooperation. The proposal stipulates that these procedures will be specified by amendments to Law No. 369/1990 of the code on common administration by the end of the year 1997, but, the government continues to postpone discussions on the amendments (Návrh, 1996). ZMOS representatives believe that any HZDS proposals to amend the law would be so heavily state-centric and self-serving, that failure to pass any amendment in 1996 is a considerable success.

The general tendency of the bill on regional development is thus evident. The decisive roles are allotted to the state administration. Nor are any rights or competencies promised to future regional self-governments. By contrast, ZMOS proposes shifting many of the responsibilities for cross-border cooperation to local and future regional self-governments. While the government-sponsored bill is only a working variant of the bill which can, no doubt, be altered later, the general attitude of the government on the issue remains clear and, for the foreseeable future, unchanging.

These problems put a question mark over the real will of the ruling coalition to allow self-governing bodies any decision-making power or control over issues of cross-border cooperation. The state administration's apparent desire to keep tight control may reflect fears of real or perceived threats to Slovakia's territory--specifically that inter-regions and euro-regions will serve as a mechanism of Hungarian irredentism and native ethnic Hungarian political opposition to threaten the sovereignty of the Slovak state. This fear was probably best articulated by former Vice Chief of the Office for Strategy, K. Ivanièka in his work, Slovakia: Genius Loci . In the final passages he paints a catastrophic scenario in which the failure of the Slovak economy and an increase of poverty lead to a situation in which "the very idea of national sovereignty and of independent statehood will be subjected to review or even to revision." He also indicates a distrust of Austrian intentions (Ivanièka 1996, p. 117).

Perhaps more disturbing is the author's optimistic" scenario in which Slovak society avoids dissolution by "taking uncompromising measures against the importation of destructive outward systems and values--crime, drug abuse, unemployment, decadent culture, [and] de-stabilizing impacts mediated through the foreign media and political channels" (Ivanièka, 1996, p. 118). The list is noteworthy in itself. Crime, decadent culture and unemployment are placed on an equal footing with the unspecified "de-stabilizing effect" of the foreign media. In this context, his "uncompromising steps" take on a distinct isolationist coloring. One could argue that such an undifferentiated approach and the attempt to solve one problem by producing another greater problem is hardly an optimistic scenario. It is simply another catastrophic alternative.

1.5. Postponing Signing and Ratifying the European Charter of Local Self-Government

At the beginning of 1995, the Slovak governmental Program Declaration stressed rather vaguely that, "in accord with the European Charter of Local Self-Government we will proceed from the current positive elements of functioning self-government of cities and municipalities." The government carefully avoided any promise that the Slovak Republic would sign the Charter. Some observers, however, conclude that the government is postponing signing the Charter because it would imply greater limitations on the direct involvement of the state in administration of self-governments.

The long delay in signing and ratifying the European Charter may reflect the political reluctance of Slovak governmental executives. A Slovak signature would imply its willingness to change means of financing municipalities and commit it to apply the principle of subsidiarity. Currently, the government has postponed signing the Charter until 1998--despite urging by ZMOS and the Union of Cities. 6

1.6. Indications of Preparations for a New Electoral Law on Parliamentary Elections

Speculation about a possible Bill on Election of Deputies of the Slovak National Council is closely related to both the law on territorial and administrative division and the amended electoral law of self-government. While the bill has yet to be put forward for consideration by Parliament, HZDS representatives have publicly discussed the possibility on several occasions. The intent may be to pass a law that will enable HZDS to win a majority in next parliamentary election--thus eliminating its dependence on coalition partners.

Any specific change that HZDS may be considering making in the rules of parliamentary electoral law is only conjecture. However, the change most frequently discussed by HZDS representatives is a transformation of the electoral system from a proportional system into a "combined" one--although none is quite sure what a combined system would be. Representatives of the Hungarian formation Coexistence, were the first to express concerns that after the territorial-administrative division of the Slovak Republic, an amendment of the electoral parliamentary system would follow. Gerrymandering could put them in the minority in many new electoral units while a switch to one-mandate electoral districts (in which the winner of the district vote would represent the entire district) would deprive them of much of the representation they currently possess under the proportional system.

While there is a strong possibility that one-mandate electoral districts would be based on contemporary territorial redistricting, Meèiar has said on several occasions that they would not be identical with either contemporary districts or regions. He has not said, however, that they would not be similar. There are thus many unanswered questions on possible changes to the electoral law. Perhaps most importantly, HZDS may not succeed in winning its coalition partners' support for an amendment. Both ZRS and SNS are small parties and cannot be interested in the amendment itself. They would probably disappear under a one-mandate system. Hence HZDS would have to offer an exceptionally profitable bargain to win their cooperation.

2. Territorial Aspects Of Political Cleavages In Slovak Society

The following section discusses the role of regional differences in the political polarization of Slovak society. It finds that Slovak society is split along two basic dividing lines: urban-rural and ethnic. It also reveals that there is a significant historical correlation in voting patterns. Regions that voted for Hlinka's People's Party in the 1920's and 1930's are markedly more likely to vote for a number of contemporary parties--particularly, Meèiar's HZDS. The section concludes with a brief discussion of a simple typology through which we might better place Slovakia's emerging political system amongst its central and eastern-European neighbors.

Urban-rural cleavage : The parliamentary election of 1994 shows a crystallization of two poles of parliamentary groupings along an urban-rural axis. The ruling coalition is represented by political parties anchored mainly in a rural setting. Generally, its voters are also less educated. During the 1994 election, HZDS strengthened the ties with small villages and less educated voters that it began to develop as early as the parliamentary election of 1992. ZRS found similar support in its first election in 1994. The majority of SNS supporters, by contrast, come from urban settings. However, there was a marked increase in rural support for SNS in 1994.

Opposition parties - particularly the Party of the Democratic Left (SD1/4), Democratic Union (DU) and Democratic Party (DS) - achieved better results in 1994 in larger towns and amongst more educated voters. This feature was already apparent in 1992, but became more marked in 1994. The trend was particularly pronounced for DU and DS. Over the same period, support for the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) slightly weakened from 1992 in small villages and among less educated voters. But like the other non-Hungarian opposition parties, the party made significant gains in bigger towns and among more educated voters. In 1994, the Slovak electorate polarized along an urban-rural line.

Ethnically Mixed Territories and Other Regions : A second dividing line in Slovak electoral politics has crystallized between Slovak and Hungarian ethnic groups in Slovakia. Ethnically mixed areas produce significantly different electoral results. In mixed areas, nationalist-oriented Slovak parties (HZDS, SNS) are less successful among ethnic Slovaks--even after one has controlled for a smaller proportion of ethnic Slovaks (For more details see Krivy et. al. 1996, pp. 151, 123-124).

Regional Political Traditions : There is significant continuity in regional voting preferences in elections between the 1990's and the 1920's and 1930's. Regional support for Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HS1/4S) in the 1920's and 1930's closely correlates to regional voting patterns for a number of parties in the 1990's. HS1/4S ceased to exist in 1945. Nor does the party have any direct heir. However, in parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1994, regions that registered support for HS1/4S six decades earlier registered above standard support for HZDS, SNS, SKDH (later renamed KSÚ), and KDH. The relationship was particularly strong for HZDS. Indeed, one of the strongest predictors of how a district was to vote for HZDS in 1992 and 1994 was how the district voted for HS1/4S in the 1920's and 30's.

The territorial-electoral heritage of HS1/4S goes beyond a simple significant correlation. In many districts, HZDS, like HS1/4S a half century earlier, received far more than a majority of the district's votes. In addition, HS1/4S (particularly the HS1/4S of the 1930's) and HZDS share similar political cultural profiles. Like the HS1/4S of the 1930's, HZDS maintains hegemonic ambitions. Thus, historical continuity in electoral behavior might be sustained by different regional traditions and political culture. In this sense, HZDS is the main territorial-electoral heir of HS1/4S (Krivy et. al. 1996).

The 1994 Electoral Victory of the Countryside : The territorially determined social base of particular political parties; the polarized cleavages between non-Hungarian post-election groupings; and electoral trends across the 1992 and 1994 elections, indicate that the current regime won the 1994 elections by gaining the greatest political support in the ethnic Slovak countryside (Krivy et. al. 1996, pp. 110-121). By contrast, the strongest political formation of the ruling coalition in the Czech lands, Civic Democratic Party, maintained its strongest support base in the metropolis of Prague, while in Belarus, President Lukasenko relies above all on the countryside for electoral support.

This provides us with the suggestion of a rudimentary typology of post-communist countries. In the first type, the city plays a leading role, in the second type, the leading role is played by the countryside. The type--city or countryside--is based on the social structure of particular countries and on the cultural and electoral influence of the city and countryside. I agree with ethnologist J. Podoba that Slovakia, despite urbanization and industrialization, remains mentally and culturally a predominantly rural society (Podoba 1996).

Conclusion

Analysis reveals a number of features that have emerged since the 1994 elections which contradict and even reverse the positive trends of 1989-1994. First, the strongest party, HZDS, controls the central state apparatus and has raised its control over regions and municipalities at the expense of self-governments. In its bid to centralize party-state control, HZDS has failed to support the principle of subsidiarity and has reduced the political decision-making process of self-governments to a top-down process that is rife with political clientalism. HZDS decisions seem frequently reckless and forced--ignoring broadly acknowledged western standards as well as the needs and desires of more or less independent interest groups and the political opposition. Symptomatically, HZDS seeks to support or create "politically friendly" representative organizations to compete with pre-existing independent and more critically oriented groups. Moreover, the new organizations are often politically and economically supported by the state.

HZDS and its coalition partners, maintain confrontational policies towards minorities and opposition parties. The regime also exhibits a general insecurity regarding Slovak statehood. In combination with an effort to enlarge its populist base, this very often leads to declarations of suspicion of neighboring countries and reduced openness of the country.

The mainstream of HZDS political support comes from the socially conservative countryside rather than from urban or even metropolitan surroundings. The current power elite also maintain provincial attitudes and a weak Western orientation. The result is the complete absence of a modern political strategy.

Since 1994, the current regime of Prime Minister Vladimír Meèiar has transformed Slovakia into a regime of personal power--strengthened by an economic elite formed through clientalism. This regime directs a society that is increasingly falling outside of the Central-Eastern European political sphere and leans decidedly towards the east. Both its future internal development and foreign policy direction remain uncertain.

References

Note 1: The Union of Cities is a coherent interest group representing approximately 35 cities with a combined population of approximately 1.5 million people. Since June 1997, its formal name has been Union of Cities and Municipalities. It now accepts other, smaller municipalities as well as cities as members. Back.

Note 2: HZDS officials responded that the article is a fake. Back.

Note 3: Until April 1997, the Meèiar government recognized 25 area-regions in Slovakia as a basis for infrastructure and social development (housing, construction, etc.) planning, They accepted a number of finished and partially finished area-regional plans for the development of these units. In April 1997, however, the state administration, without prior discussions with relevant actors collapsed the 25 territories into eight units that correspond with the regional division of the country. Back.

Note 4: Ni_òansky (1997) also points out that the state public administration intervenes excessively in the private sector and appears to be structuring the territorial-administrative division of Slovakia to provide HZDS with additional advantages in the case that they succeed in changing the electoral law Back.

Note 5: Matica Slovenská is a private organization dedicated to the preservation of Slovak culture and heritage. It ideologizes the national principle; is strongly against "cosmopolitanism, czechoslovakism and unreasonable Hungarian claims;" it stresses favorable memories of the Slovak wartime state (1938-1945); and enjoys special privileges granted by the state (See Zavacká article in this volume). Back.

Note 6: In January 1997, a group of mayors launched an initiative called, "Charter of Self-Government, 1997," to raise support for the approval of the European Charter of Local Government. Back.