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Slovakia:
Problems of Democratic Consolidation
and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game

Sona Szomolányi and John Gould, editors

New York

Columbia International Affairs Online

1997

Bibliographic Data

4. The Development Of Interest Representation
In Slovakia After 1989:
From 'transmission Belts' To 'party-State Corporatism'

Darina Malova 1

Introduction

The relationship between the state, politics, and civil society is one of the key concerns of democracy theories. Research conducted on this topic in Latin America and Southern Europe, and also in Slovakia, has shown that although a developed and robust civil society is not a sufficient condition to prevent the return of authoritarian rule, once a civil society is established, it helps to consolidate a democratic regime (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Arato 1992; Mannová 1992; Schmitter 1993). In this paper, civil society is defined as the sphere of organized social life which occupies the space between the state and family. It is a set of autonomous and self-organized intermediary groups that are relatively independent from both public authorities and private units of production and reproduction, that is, from firms and families. Moreover, these groups accept pre-established rules of a legal nature and are able to undertake collective actions to protect and promote their interests (Schmitter 1993; Diamond 1994). I argue that the forms of relations that have emerged since 1989 between interest groups, political parties, and the state--as well as the rules governing these relations--influence the prospects for democracy in Slovakia.

This chapter examines interest groups within civil society; it analyzes both their emergence and the changes in their organization and mode of representation since November 1989. The aim of this study is to analyze transition processes in the domain of civil society. I argue that the development of interest association and representation is going through three overlapping phases of democratization. The first phase began immediately after the collapse of communism, when the erosion of the party monopoly over interest representation encouraged the emergence of thousands of new, independent, and pluralist organizations and groups. The second stage brought the growth of corporatist structures which have comprised two modes of interest representation, one state-oriented and the other societal. The third stage, which I conditionally label 'party-state corporatism,' has been marked by the emergence of interest organizations that are affiliated with the ruling Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Slovakia's strongest political party. Party-state corporatism is a variation of corporatism in which the party in power uses its near exclusive access to public finance and other public resources either to establish new party-affiliated organizations or to 'colonize' already existing groups. It then attempts to use these mechanisms both to win votes in elections and to gain support for changes in established rules.

The current state of coexistence between the different modes of interest group organization and representation could strengthen the democratic order. However, the increasing strength of party-state corporatist forms of interest representation poses several threats to democratic consolidation in Slovakia. First, it increases the possibility that one strong political party may seize control over both the state apparatus and the main interest groups. Second, such strong party control violates the boundaries between the state, politics, and civil society, the separation of which is a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy. This trend, moreover, is reinforced by the institutional and cultural legacies of the former regime. Consequently, these two trends may result in both the restriction of the substantive institutions of representative democracy and the return of an authoritarian regime.

1. Political Dimensions Of The Relationship Between The State And Political And Civil Society

I suggest two criteria for the foundation of democracy. First, democratic rules must be institutionalized and, second, there must be a marked separation of the boundaries and competencies between the state, political parties, and civil society. Both processes are interlinked and interdependent; the institutionalization of democratic rules contributes to the clear separation of the three domains of society, while their growing separation and autonomy reinforces democratic rules and institutions.

The idea that the founding of a viable democracy consists of several processes and steps is widely shared in recent scholarship on democracy. Authors differ, however, on how to conceptualize these stages. I argue that the post-communist transformation process begins with the liberalization and democratization of the authoritarian regime and ends with democratic consolidation. Liberalization is defined as the loosening of political restrictions and the expansion of individual and group rights within the authoritarian regime (Przeworski 1991). Democratization involves extrication from the authoritarian regime, holding free elections on a regular basis, and the formation of a government in accordance with electoral results. There are two essential stages in democratization: the transition to democracy and democratic consolidation. Both are linked by the process of institutionalizing selected rules of the political game. Democratic transition includes the transfer of power, the establishment of political rules, and the acceptance of the results of the first democratic elections by all relevant political forces. Institutionalization is the establishment and acceptance of the democratic rules and norms that were selected (or emerged by accident) during the transition from autocracy. Consolidation of democracy has occurred when all significant social and political forces consider the basic institutional set-up of the polity and its political procedures to be legitimate. 2

The following analysis explores how Slovak civil society was re-created, how its governing rules and boundaries were set up, and how they were re-defined and renegotiated. Because the relative autonomy of all three sectors--the state and political and civil society--is a necessary condition of democracy, I focus first on attempts made by the state or political parties to intervene in the sphere of civil society. The struggle over these boundaries is a critical question of consolidation. Individual and collective actors, both old and new, engage in political struggles which often cross from one realm to another. Second, consolidated democracy is only one among several possible outcomes of the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Democratic institutions may systematically generate conditions that encourage some political forces to subvert them. I try to indicate such situations as they have occurred in Slovakia.

After a period of political and social reforms, all three components--the state, political parties, and civil society--should gain and institutionalize relative autonomy in their mutual interactions. In different political systems, however, the center of political power can have different locations. In authoritarian regimes, the state is the most important arena of politics and state actors have an almost exclusive capacity to structure political outcomes. While this locus of political power was inherent in Czechoslovakia's former communist regime (1948-1949), the state itself was dominated by a single party with a monopoly of political power. Together they formed one political body known as the "party-state."

In liberal democracies, the dominant position is occupied by political society; most political decisions are made in parliaments or in other legislative bodies and are mediated by periodic elections. Slovakia was a liberal democracy during the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938). However, the main political parties established a special political body, known as the Great Five, which held formal and regular meetings of the leaders of the coalition parties. This composition slightly modified the focus of power, because the coalition parties enjoyed the central position in decision-making. In effect, it was a party-government, in which the ruling political parties and their executive organs enjoyed decision-making power.

Civil society becomes the locus of political power only in rare circumstances, such as when national political institutions collapse during revolutions or civil wars. These situations have occurred on Slovakia's territory a number of times over the course of this century: in 1918-1920, when the Czechoslovak military struggled with Hungarian troops to establish the new state's boundaries; and during the Slovak National Uprising of 1944, when a part of the Slovak army joined civil resistance groups against the ruling clero-fascist government. More recently, civil society became the locus of political power during the Prague Spring of 1968 and again in 1989, when the communist regime collapsed.

In my previous research on this question, I expected that after 1989 all three sectors of modern liberal democracy--civil society, political society, and the state--would gradually and simultaneously separate from the communist party-state 'Leviathan' (Malová 1994). In addition to the political paralysis of the Communist Party, there was a significant weakening of the coercive capacity of the state. At the same time, the political mobilization of organizations and movements within civil society grew rapidly. During this period, the Communist Party and the societally-based opposition reached a compromise and formed the Government of National Understanding. These negotiations culminated in the successful restoration of democracy. Crucial to this success was the re-emergence of a pluralist political and civil society, characterized by the growing activity of independent actors, organizations, and groups. The first free democratic elections in June 1990 marked the completion of the transfer of power from civil to political society.

This stage also witnessed the establishment of new rules regulating relations between social and political actors. The new government adopted a corporatist mode of interest organization. The government ministries, managers of state companies, and labor union leaders established a tripartite mechanism of social bargaining. In addition, other interest and professional groups established professional, trade, and commercial associations. Corporatism transferred some important political decision-making powers from political society to mechanisms that regulated relations between the state and interest groups. The establishment of corporatist mechanisms was the natural response of interest groups to an unstable, fragmented, and nascent political society--but the shift also strengthened the state and its agencies.

From the June 1990 elections until the June 1992 elections, all three realms--the state, political society, and civil society--underwent important transformations. However, their character, scope and composition were increasingly influenced by the legacies of the preceding regime which maintained a significant inertial influence over rational political reform. In Slovakia especially, a tradition of strong political parties and state corporatism, combined with more than 40 years of party-state monopoly, have complicated further democratization. Due to their relative lack of political skill and capacity, both the Slovak and Czech elites failed to negotiate inter-elite pacts, to solve conflicts and to reach compromises--a failure that was especially evident in the process of drafting new Czechoslovak and Slovak constitutions. This lack of skill and capacity also influenced cooperation between elite and social groups in the simultaneous rebuilding of civil society as well as in the re-definition of the state and its power.

The already unfolding process of 'crafting democracy,' that is, the process of separating, developing, and institutionalizing the boundaries between three public realms, was dominated not only by national conflicts and demands but also by nationalistic ideology. However, the split of Czecho-Slovakia and the approval of the new and independent Slovak Constitution did not rule out the possibility of moving to the next stage of democratic reform: the consolidation of democracy. During this phase, I originally expected that all three components of state and society would become further institutionalized or, more specifically, that the rules establishing their relative autonomy would be implemented and respected, with the end result that both the rules themselves and the expectations of political actors would become more stable and predictable.

Political developments in Slovakia since 1993 have not fulfilled this expectation. First, the rules of the game have changed frequently. Second, a new form of corporatism has emerged. In itself, corporatism does not jeopardize a democratic order. However, after the 1994 elections, what may be called 'party-state corporatism' rapidly took hold, thereby inhibiting the further separation of the state, political society, and civil society. 3 Thus, the institutionalization of liberal democracy has been reversed in Slovakia. The failure to clarify the rules of the game in Slovakia has also left vague the boundaries and competencies of such controversial areas as privatization, social policy, and the constitutionality of newly passed legislation. This uncertainty, and the lack of consensus over basic rules, has raised the level off antagonism between collective actors.

2. Different Models Of Relations Between Political Power And Interest Groups

The mode of interest representation in communist countries characteristically consisted of a few organizations controlled by the party and exercising a monopoly over a particular area.. They served as 'transmission belts' for centralist and autocratic power. Following the 1989 revolution, it was thus necessary to create new political and legal conditions for citizens to exercise their right of free association and thereby provide an institutional base for the linkage between government and citizens. In addition, more than 40 years of social leveling and homogenization limited the natural diversity of social and economic interests. The articulation of social interests needed new, open channels (Malová 1994, 1996a).

Liberal democratic regimes have produced diverse mechanisms which incorporate interest groups into political decision-making. Pluralism and corporatism represent two opposite poles. According to Phillipe Schmitter, pluralism is "...a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unlimited number of voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically arranged and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled." By contrast, he defines corporatism as, "a system of interest representation in which the constituent elements are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, and functionally differentiated types; recognized, licensed or even created by the state. The state grants a representational monopoly within their respective fields in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands" (Schmitter 1974).

The literature distinguishes between at least two types of corporatism. Developments in established democracies have proven that some corporatist forms can exist within a democratic and pluralist order. 'Associations of associations' emerge from below when associations and organizations demand a peak organization to represent their allied and united claims and requirements. Because these corporatist bodies have already gained support and approval from the society from which they emerge, Phillipe Schmitter calls this mode of interest representation 'societal' corporatism (Schmitter 1981). By contrast, 'state' corporatism comes into existence as the result of conscious efforts by those in power to promote the type of interest mediation system most convenient to their authoritarian mode of rule.

To this, I add the concept of party-state corporatism which reflects the efforts of the ruling party to found its own party-affiliated and party-controlled organizations or to gain control over already existing groups. The main distinction between state corporatism and party-state corporatism is that, in the former, it is the state and its agencies rather than a party which is the main actor involved in the creation and control of interest organizations. Party-state corporatism also differs from 'party' corporatism, a mode of interest representation characteristic of some Latin American countries, in which interest groups are affiliated with political parties "from below" and which become official interest group representatives only if their party affiliates come to power.

The role of the state differs significantly among these five models. In the pluralist model, the government and its administration play a largely passive role--allocating resources on the basis of the balance of power between interest groups in society. In state corporatism, state agencies play an active role by designating particular interest groups and providing them with a monopoly of interest representation. In societal corporatism, the role of the state is somewhat diminished because the officially recognized groups have already gained their effective monopoly from society at large. In party corporatism, state agencies and their resources are colonized and controlled by the winning party, which allocates resources to its affiliated groups. However, in this mode of interest representation, the party-affiliated groups emerge from below. Finally, in party-state corporatism, the winning party uses state resources to create its own interest groups from above--often forming such groups within state agencies. The party also aims to limit political competition.

Seven years of reform in Slovakia have encouraged the growth of numerous new interest organizations and significantly changed the 'transmission belt' mode of interest representation inherited from communism. The state, government, and political parties have promoted different channels and mechanisms to incorporate interest groups into the decision-making process.

I argue that interest groups are central to the consolidation of democracy, as they represent one of the building blocks of civil society and provide mechanisms for limiting the power of political and bureaucratic incumbents. However, as I have already noted, interest groups need to be both independent from the state and supported by it, if they are to fulfill this role effectively. At the early stages of the post-communist transition, hopes for well-balanced relations between the state and civil society are perhaps idealistic. Such a balance certainly has been difficult to attain in Slovakia, where the state has tried occasionally to limit the independence and autonomy of civil society. 4 Moreover, civil society has often proved to be too weak to contend with state power or to mediate its own diverse interests and preferences efficiently.

3. History And Tradition Of Associational Life In Slovakia

The development, strength, and vitality of civil society depends on the historical circumstances of each country. Slovakia enjoys a long tradition of voluntary association whose beginnings can be traced back to the eighteenth century. According to historical studies, associations flourished mainly in cities and towns and contributed to democratization at the beginning of twentieth century. After the foundation of the first Czechoslovak Republic, the number of registered voluntary groups and civic organizations reached 16,000. This, in turn, promoted the development of civil society (Mannová 1990).

While Slovakia had many diverse forms of associations, smaller charitable, self-help groups and associations were most prevalent. However, these groups usually acted in isolation. Separated, locally confined, and without broader coordination, they had little impact on policy-making. Nor did large class-based organizations typical of modern industrial society, such as labor unions, gain political influence in Slovakia. Large labor unions, formed only later as a result of modernization and even then, they were perceived as a foreign import; a new form of associative life introduced from the Czech Lands and neighboring countries. They never received genuine support from the Slovak society. By contrast, large-scale and class-based interest groups had much greater influence in the Czech lands.

The development of small Slovak organizations, particularly charitable and self-help groups, stemmed from the cultural specificities of Slovak society--in particular from informal traditions of trust, solidarity, and co-operative self-help behavior. Generally, they were produced by and limited to family, neighborhood, and other small group ties. The composition of Slovakia's civil society determined the fragility and vulnerability of these small citizens' associations. They neither gained support from contemporary political parties nor were they able to organize collective action to defend themselves effectively against the incursions of authoritarian regimes. Authoritarians, therefore, had only first to control the 'imported' mass organizations and then to dissolve or regulate the small charitable organizations.

The unbalanced combination of a traditional society embedded in family and neighborhood relations and a modern industrial society based on class and professional alliances has twice contributed to the breakdown of democracy in Slovakia. Under the war-time Slovak state, the regime dissolved almost all independent associations. The clero-fascist regime established a state corporatist form of interest representation--permitting only a few selected organizations to remain. These were either directly governed by the state and ruling party or fell under close ideological and police supervision.

After the war, associations re-established themselves with astonishing speed--leading to the founding of more than 10,000 organizations involving more than half a million citizens; but the Communist regime replaced spontaneous, independent organizations from below with party-controlled 'social organizations' (Mannová 1992). The main pillars of these organizations were the labor unions, the women's organization and the communist youth league, as well as numerous other special-interest groups. These 'social organizations,' together with the Communist Party and four minor parties that were permitted a formal existence, were organized into a 'National Front.' The communist takeover thus interrupted the revival of a pluralist civil society replacing it with renewed state corporatism.

Because the traditional form of societal organization in Slovakia has been dominated by small groupings, small, associative activities remain the prevalent mode of collective action. Organized protest politics and activities, such as mass demonstrations and strikes, were more a product of Czech political parties and unions than of Slovak culture. Genuine Slovak protest activities were either usually very local and stressed the protection of traditional values--such as the right to have religious services in the Slovak language--or they took the form of non-organized, spontaneous violent actions, aimed at damaging property. In the past, Slovaks have usually chosen individual and defensive solutions, such as emigration or limiting consumption of inessential goods and services, as a means of coping with severe economic crises and growing unemployment (Malová, 1996b). Slovaks did not move towards collective and organized contest and struggle to achieve their demands. Thus, while the standard of living declined in Slovakia after 1989, there has been a lasting social peace. It may be suggested, even if only hypothetically, that the roots of this peace can be found in these cultural traditions.

4. The Development Of Organized Interests In Slovakia After 1989

Over the past seven years interest representation in Slovakia has ranged along the pluralist - corporatist continuum. While prior to November 17, 1989, there were only a few hundred officially permitted associations, by the end of 1996, the Ministry of the Interior had registered over 12,000 organizations. The sheer number of associations and foundations--occupying the fields of culture, environmental protection, leisure time, and charitable and other activities--created an organizational structure reminiscent of pluralism. Their large number, however, did not automatically guarantee that these small interest groups had an impact on political decision-making. State agencies retained the ability to control the field by providing subsidies from state funds to select groups. 5 Voluntary organizations possessed little control over or influence upon government policy or the government's distribution of resources. Nor did they retain the same official status as organizations which represented economic and professional interests.

Not surprisingly then, many voluntary organizations began to co-ordinate their activities from below and formed several leading 'peak' or 'top' organizations, similar to what Schmitter has called 'associations of associations.' These organizations include the Slovak Humanitarian Council, the Slovak Catholic Charity, and more recently, the Gremium of the Third Sector (G3S). This development reflects a shift in the mode of interest representation from a pluralist form towards societal corporatism, with a concurrent strengthening of the bargaining position of voluntary organizations against state agencies. In addition, after 1989 some of the coordinating organizations of the previous regime - such as the Slovak Union of Environmental Protection or Life Tree - have successfully transformed themselves into society-based peak organizations.

The independence of societal corporatist forms of interest mediation has produced a counter-response from the ruling HZDS. HZDS has sought to create 'from above,' and with state resources, its own party-directed, parallel organizations in many of these fields. In the summer of 1996, for example, HZDS used state resources to promote a new peak organization, the Union of Citizens' Associations and Foundations (UOZN), by which it has sought to coordinate other groups operating in the field of voluntary and charitable activities. The UOZN, according to one specialist: "...has been formed in opposition to the Third Sector Gremium" (Drozd 1997). This action reveals efforts by the party-state to penetrate and gradually replace the originally pluralist and societal corporatist sector of civil society.

The development of party-affiliated and even party-controlled interest groups has also been politically influential. As in party corporatism, as long as the affiliated party wins seats in the Slovak parliament or government, these interest groups gain direct access to the decision-making process. In its most extreme form, such as the 'partidocracia' or 'party-archy' of Venezuela (Coppedge 1994; Levine 1973), this type of representation can combine pluralistic competition among parties with a special model of party corporatism in which a party once in power designates its associated interest groups as 'official' groups to profit from direct access to political decision-making and state resources.

Party corporatism has been emerging in Slovakia in a slow and irregular fashion. After the collapse of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, most associations and interest groups sought independence from all political parties, as they were afraid that if their party lost the election, they would lose access to politics. Only the larger and more stable parties, such as the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) or the Party of the Democratic Left (SD1/4), have begun to establish close ties with associations and interest groups (Malová 1994). Since the 1994 elections, HZDS has been particularly active in forming party-affiliated interest representation, establishing such organizations as the Association of Slovak Journalists, the Association of Mayors, the Slovak Youth Congress, and the General Free Labor Union. Moreover, the activities of some HZDS deputies within the Democratic Union of Women in Slovakia and especially the recent election of HZDS member Irena Belohorská as Chairperson have confirmed that HZDS will use every opportunity either to gain control over key civil society organizations or, failing that, to set up its own competing organization in the same field.

There are two modes of party corporatism in Slovakia. The KDH and the SD1/4 have built their links with interest groups ,,from below," or encouraged the formation of interest groups within the party organizations and provided them the same rights as local party organizations. On the other hand, HZDS has used the access to state resources which it possesses as the ruling party, either to attract and "penetrate" existing organizations or to establish new organizations to compete with existing organizations. For example, the Slovakia Association of Towns and Municipalities (ZMOS) permitted the existence of party clubs of mayors within its organization. HZDS, however, has transformed its own party club into a separate organization of mayors, to establish a counter-weight to the relatively independent ZMOS.

As pluralist forms of interest representation have developed unevenly since 1989, various corporatist modes of interest representation have become the main axis of linkage between interest groups and the state in Slovakia. This trend began immediately after the collapse of the communist regime. The post-communist state had more resources at its disposal than did society, in which even the basic pre-conditions for the formation of a strong and independent interest realm were still missing. The supports for a more robust, independent civil society--such as, private property, private companies, and a strong middle class--were completely absent.

By contrast, the old branch structure of industrial production shaped the formation of labor unions and associations of employers according to the structure of state ministries, thereby helping to strengthen the already close links between these interests and the state apparatus. The branch structure of organization promoted the rapid emergence of a tripartite mechanism in a way that resembled state corporatism, that is an interest organization which is created from above by a grant of representational monopoly to one selected organization. This tripartite structure was founded in autumn 1990, at a time when most enterprises and companies were still state-owned. Thus, the initial structure of tripartite bargaining was closer to a state-labor 'bipartite' mechanism than to the negotiation of three autonomous elements with clearly separated and identified interests. The government accepted the former communist labor unions as an exclusive partner for bargaining, ignoring the Federal Parliament's law allowing independent formation of labor unions. Thus, while the pluralist mode of representation was accepted and granted as a formality, independent or 'unofficial' labor unions were not permitted to participate in bargaining with the government.

The state's political decisions on the tripartite arrangement shaped the mode of interest group representation in Slovakia and the way in which it developed. Thereafter, all the main interest groups accepted and emulated corporatist forms of interest mediation (Malová 1994). The trend towards state corporatism is particularly well illustrated by the changing position of professional, trade, and commercial associations. Initially, these groups shared many of the characteristics of societal corporatism. They emerged from below, from the vacuum of organized economic and social interests after 1989, and were able to organize around clearly defined professional goals. They formed 'associations of associations' out of plural, competitive organizations and used the resources and skills of their members to win state recognition as legal monopolies. The result has been a shift towards state corporatism (Malova 1994).

Slovakia's history of corporatist forms of interest group representation also played a role in encouraging the establishment of corporatist structures after 1989. Communist-era labor unions and other social organizations paved the way by demanding direct participation in the legislative process. The communist regime's response was to provide both labor unions and state employers with a large bureaucratic apparatus that allowed them to pursue their political and institutional interests. This bureaucratic apparatus survived the collapse of the Communist Party and actually became prominent in the reform process when it became apparent that the new government lacked the expertise to draft new social and economic legislation.

Even despite these favorable preconditions, the emergence of such a formal tripartite arrangement was unexpected. In Western Europe, tripartite structures were the product of decades of strong pressures by social democratic parties for formal representation in the policy- making process. There were no such pressures in Czechoslovakia in 1990. The establishment of corporatist mechanisms came during a time of near consensus on the need for economic and political changes and before the new government had implemented its painful economic reforms. Thus, the government created an elaborate system designed to resolve social conflict when such tensions did not yet exist. A partial explanation of this puzzle is that many of the decisions of the early 1990's are attributable to the phenomenon of 'transition by replication,' that is, by the mechanical implementation of Western democratic institutions. State corporatist structures appeared desirable because they had been successful in keeping social peace in Western Europe (Cambáliková 1992; Brokl & Mansfeldová 1993).

The tripartite arrangement, however, did serve the interests of all of the three parties involved. Union participation in the tripartite bargaining structure ensured labor involvement in the political process without forcing labor to become political actors. The unions' past experience of subordination to the communist party, combined with the uncertainty of the post-1989 transition, produced strong apolitical and non-party tendencies among unions, which simply did not know how to act under the new democratic circumstances. Labor feared that the linkage with a party which was not in government would diminish their bargaining power (Malová 1994). Similarly, the tripartite agreement allowed industry to remain outside the political spotlight during the sensitive period of privatization, while actually strengthening the position of communist era industrial branches by formalizing their position before several waves of privatization changed the structure of industry.

Finally, corporatist arrangements also appeared to benefit the state. Indeed, in some respects the state gained more than the other two participants. In exchange for the advantages and privileges of political status, labor and management had to accept certain constraints and formalized obligations. They were expected, for example, to behave responsibly and predictably and to refrain from any non-negotiable demands or the use of unacceptable tactics (Offe 1981).

The tripartite system in Slovakia has fulfilled its original expectations. It has enabled state agencies to take the initiative in social and economic policy. Moreover, it has allowed policy makers to control the number and identity of organized collectivities. The state has empowered the official labor union, KOZ, as the only and exclusive representative of employees. It is thus able to withhold official recognition of the independent labor unions which have emerged since the approval of the law on plurality of labor unions. Again KOZ, 'in exchange' for this privileged position, has had to accept some restrictions on its participation in the bargaining process.

In sum, the tripartite mechanism has allowed the state to control both the intensity and shape of demands, particularly from unions. Unions have continued to participate in the tripartite process despite many unfulfilled KOZ demands, such as the establishment of a legal enforcement mechanism for the General Agreement or a law regulating strikes. Moreover, KOZ membership and public support have been declining. Thus, the state has perhaps gained more from creating a corporatist mechanism than the labor unions themselves. The existence of the tripartite mechanism has strengthened the government's ability to implement social and economic policies without risking real threats to social peace.

By comparison to KOZ, the position of employers' associations (AZZZ) is less transparent. They rarely make their demands within the public tripartite negotiations. However, meetings of the government and the AZZZ take place on a weekly basis and without the presence of labor unions, indicating that the 'experienced managers' of the former regime are realizing their interests effectively. Recently, AZZZ sent a letter to Ivan Gasparoviè, Parliamentary Chairman, which publicly expressed its disapproval of student and actor protest demonstrations. AZZZ called for an end to these actions in the interest of the "peaceful and prosperous development of our state" (Gottweisová, 1997). This unique and unusually public expression of the political opinion of AZZZ may be symptomatic of the close ties between the ruling HZDS and the employers' organization. There are unconfirmed rumors that the government requested AZZZ to support its policies toward other independent, protesting groups in Slovak society. If true, I would suggest that this indicates a shift in AZZZ's role from a state corporatist towards a party-state corporatist mode of interest representation and mediation. Indeed, AZZZ appears to be supporting the ruling party's repressive measures against other organizations.

While employees' and employers' unions enjoy a privileged position granted by the state, the situation of professional and commercial associations is even more favorable. These groups, consisting of lawyers, medical doctors, architects, entrepreneurs, and other specialized professionals, have obtained legal monopolies from the state to represent the interests of their respective professions and to regulate the rules governing their organizations, such as the right to issue professional licenses.

The state did not willingly grant these groups a privileged position. Rather, the professionals pressed their demands for state recognition through several different decision-making arenas, including the parliament, the government, and the state administration. Their current monopoly stems from their real influence in society and reflects some of the institutional legacies of the former regime, in which the party-state apparatus controlled access to education. Thus only a small and politically privileged group of people obtained professional education as lawyers, economists, and physicians. After 1989, these small groups were able to organize around clearly defined professional goals and to use their resources and the irreplaceable skills of their members to gain recognition and monopoly control over their respective fields.

The ability of professional and trade organizations to gain legal monopoly status does not necessarily guarantee autonomous power. There is always the possibility that the state administration or the government will revoke the representational monopoly and privileges of a specific profession or trade. A recent example of this is the 1996 amendment to the law regulating trade and industrial associations, which replaced compulsory membership of commercial and industrial companies in the Slovak Chamber of Trade and Industry (SOPK) with voluntary membership. The government's amendment seemed to give more autonomy to business interest organizations. Yet, the move should be evaluated in the broader context of the general activities of the SOPK. The Chamber has gained the respect of the business community both in Slovakia and abroad, by providing information and professional aid, as well as by articulating and representing business interests. But the SOPK's autonomous position vis-a-vis the state threatens the current government's ability to achieve some of its political goals--one of which was to install pro-government oriented representatives into the chamber's leadership.

Political developments have proven that the government and the state can more easily ignore the demands of autonomous, fragmented and uninformed interest groups than those of well-organized and coordinated groups. Recognition of this fact has prompted many interest groups in Slovakia to form central peak coordinating organizations that coordinate the actions of individual groups within a certain sector. As we have seen, the growing trend toward societal corporatism has been particularly intense within such sectors as charitable and environmental organizations, foundations, and local self-government organizations, but the trend also extends to sectors as diverse as investment funds, housing, tourism, other services, and transport.

The improved bargaining position of these central bodies has increased their influence on the decision-making process. A good illustration is the recent activity of the Gremium of the Third Sector (G3S), which has played an important role in coordinating the activities of private foundations and non-governmental organizations. In 1996, the state administration drafted a new law on foundations that was detrimental to the interests of many G3S members. G3S's subsequent "SOS campaign" to modify the law proved that it has the capacity to aggregate demands and represent the interests of its diverse community. However, G3S's campaign ran into stiff opposition from the HZDS-led ruling coalition. Indeed, HZDS resistance to the demands of the independent forces of the G3S indicates that there are limits to the ability of even the most effective peak coordinating organizations to guide policy when confronted by a determined government. Yet the SOS campaign was by no means a failure. It resulted in both concessions by the state administration and in an increased role for the G3S in drafting subsequent legislation on voluntary and non-profit organizations.

Other organizations have made similar attempts to influence government policy and with similarly mixed success. A high percentage of municipalities are represented by the Association of Towns and Municipalities (ZMOS). This organization provides information and organizational help to municipalities and towns. It also represents their interests and presses their demands in bargaining with the state administration. Issues discussed cover everything from budgetary matters to legislation on the division of powers between local self-government and other bodies. ZMOS-backed proposals have enjoyed relatively few successes. For example, ZMOS failed to gain acceptance of its proposal for regional reform based on the historic and economic ties of counties. Nor did the state grant it the same legislative rights to represent its interests directly in the decision-making process that it granted KOZ, AZZZ or business and professional associations.

To summarize, developments since 1989 have disappointed original expectations of the formation of a new pluralist form of interest representation in Slovakia. Early predictions underestimated the effect of historical traditions, institutional preconditions, international organizations, as well as the rationality of new social actors, who have come to appreciate the importance of information and collective action in the political process. In turn, new social actors have preferred the formation of either peak bodies or corporatist arrangements with the state or ruling party. Prior to the 1994 elections, the government and administration accepted formal and informal rules which provided for the relative autonomy of professional, voluntary, business and other interest organizations. Since the formation of the HZDS-led coalition after the 1994 elections, however, the government has attempted to create new groups under its control and to gain greater leverage over existing and emerging groups.

5. Concluding Remarks On Corporatism And Democracy In Slovakia

Recent scholarship on democratic transitions does not provide a clear and explicit formulation of the role of corporatism in the consolidation of democratic regimes. Close links between authoritarian regimes and state corporatism have often led analysts to reject corporatist modes of interest representation as unsuitable for new democracies. However, the experience of Latin American countries suggests that an extreme pluralist model of interest organization may in fact weaken the influence of groups that represent economically weak classes or discriminated minorities. According to Schmitter, extreme pluralism creates privileged positions for well-organized clientalist groups in the military, industry, or agriculture. Consequently, their penetration into structures of political and military power very often leads to the breakdown of newly democratic but still unstable and vulnerable governments. These cases have led to a revision of some traditional views on the role of corporatism in democratic development (Schmitter 1993). A pluralist mode of interest group organization can also weaken interest mediation. A large number of narrowly specialized, uncoordinated and overlapping organizations are overly dependent upon the views of their members and sponsors. They are frequently vulnerable to the influence of external economic and political actors which may misuse them in political struggles.

A societal mode of corporative interest representation is more likely to contribute to the institutionalization of democracy. 'Associations of associations' are relatively autonomous from the state, political parties, and other external actors; they possess relevant resources and are able to define and maintain a coherent strategy in the long run. At the same time they represent the main core of the interest groups in their sector, class or profession. Social groups form around different interests to solve their conflicts and to gain the influence in related decision-making processes, without being governed or colonized by the government, political parties or state agencies. In effect, they create a set of 'partial regimes,' in which political powers cannot intervene and impose their own decisions (Schmitter 1993).

Where societally-based peak organizations have the capacity to influence outcomes of the political process they can thus have a more positive impact on democratic consolidation than the pluralist model of interest representation. In Slovakia, the societal-corporatist form dominates in some sectors of interest organization and protects the autonomy of these portions of civil society from political parties, the state, and its agencies, while strengthening the position of civil society actors in bargaining with the government.

Recently, the ruling HZDS has promoted 'party-state corporatism,' a new competitive form of interest organization characterized by granting privileged access to politically loyal groups. The situation has been abetted and complicated by frequent changes in the rules of the game which have produced instability and mistrust in the political process, prolonged uncertainty in society, and perpetuated chaotic political behavior. If the rules regulating interest groups are frequently modified, then organizations will orient themselves towards receiving short-term advantages such as direct financial subsidies or some special exception from regular rules. Consequently, organizations will not make an effort to create general, equal, and binding norms and laws to regulate their activities.

The further consolidation of democracy presupposes that all relevant actors accept a new set of rules. Changing these rules is possible, but only when the change is promoted from below or is based upon the agreement of all relevant actors. By these criteria, the consolidation of democracy in Slovakia is in doubt. Until recently, relevant societal actors, like the foundations, professional associations or even universities, enjoyed a reasonable measure of autonomy and governed their respective fields with success, implementing and creating societal corporatist 'partial regimes.' Yet, today, changes of rules frequently take place from 'above' and catch relevant actors unprepared. Many changes occur despite significant protests. Examples involving civil society include legislation passed on foundations, universities, territorial-administrative reforms, trade and industrial chambers, local school self-government, among others. But there is a similar trend in other domains of post-communist society in Slovakia--particularly in the areas of privatization and economic reform--in which the governing coalition frequently changes the laws and where rules governing fundamental transformation processes change frequently and render many crucial decision-making processes opaque.

The institutions and structures which mediate interest representation emerged in Slovakia immediately after the collapse of the former regime. They have undoubtedly had a positive impact on the institutionalization of democracy by contributing to the separation and autonomy of civil society from the state and from political parties. The evolution of interest mediation in Slovakia has followed two distinct paths, reflecting the rules which regulated this field in the past: on the one hand, the informal rules of solidarity, self-help, and charity that governed associations from the previous century; on the other, the formal rules of state and party corporatism that dominated this sector under successive authoritarian regimes. Both sets of rules are being newly institutionalized in the post-communist era with a twofold impact. In some sectors of civil society, they have promoted the rise of societal corporatism. The formation of coordinating bodies among charitable organizations and foundations, based on modern organizational techniques and information technologies, reflects the rapid modernization of these sectors. This has improved their bargaining position vis-a-vis the state. It also has raised the ability of these organizations to protect their autonomous space from authoritarian attempts at intervention and subversion.

By contrast, in other sectors of civil society, organizations have been formed on the basis of state corporatism. These groups possess fewer possibilities to successfully mediate their fundamental interests. For example, labor unions were unable to achieve their demands either to enhance the legal provisions of the General Agreement or to pass a bill regulating strikes. It appears that state corporatism is more effective for interest groups when there are some detailed demands to be made, but it has proven to be a weak form of mediation when a change of rules is required.

One remaining issue is how the relationship between political parties and interest groups influences democratization in Slovakia. The growing influence of the HZDS in the sector of organized interests has opened the way for establishing organizations which are closely affiliated with the ruling movement and which can enjoy a privileged position in the decision-making process. This tendency may negatively influence the democratic environment because it violates the democratic rule of equal and fair competition for resources. It also raises the question of whether the growth of 'party-state' corporatism will lead to a return to party-state arrangements with fully controlled and monopoly-based interest representation. This trend constitutes one of the biggest pitfalls for many new democracies, and particularly for Slovakia. There is a likelihood that the party which controls affiliated organizations and provides them with resources from the state budget can count on the votes of these organizations' members. Such arrangements are typical in clientalist regimes. Moreover, under the current composition of power in Slovakia, in which one large and strong political party dominates other smaller and fragmented parties, 6 the shift to party-state corporatism has served to erode clear boundaries between the state, political society, and civil society, such that it has become increasingly difficult to ascertain how important decisions are made and by whom. 7 This trend could deform the institutionalization and consolidation of democracy in Slovakia.

References

Note 1: This chapter was partially written during a stay at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin as an East-Central European Research Fellow. Funding came from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Back.

Note 2: Democratic consolidation may be measured by a wide variety of criteria, including the emergence of political consensus, the rejection of authoritarianism by elites and masses, a broad commitment to democracy, a democratic political culture, and mass political participation (Shin 1994). However, most definitions of democratic consolidation include 'institutionalization' as a central criteria. Back.

Note 3: Specifically, the ruling HZDS attempted to influence the results of elections by attempting to remove the Democratic Union (DU) from the parliament, by using the police for the political purpose of reviewing signatures on DU petition lists, and creating own-party interest groups and organizations that receive subsidies from the state budget. Back.

Note 4: By 'state,' I refer specifically to incumbents in two sorts of public office: democratically elected leaders and appointed bureaucrats. Back.

Note 5: The Supreme Controlling Office recently published its financial report on the state-run cultural fund, Pro Slovakia. The report revealed an immense abuse of public finance--confirming suspicions that public control, based on open and equal access of all groups to information, is still absent in Slovakia. Not only were funds allocated according to political and ideological preferences, but there was also a great number of instances of clear abuse of these funds for private and political ends (Hric 1997). Back.

Note 6: Opposition parties do not have proportional representation in the most important bodies of parliament and their supporters have been forced to leave the state administration. Public control of political power is very limited and restricted by a lack of information. Back.

Note 7: See, for example, the statement by Prime Minister Meciar explaining that he does not know who privatized the state company, Nafta Gbely, despite the fact that his ruling coalition controls the National Property Fund. Back.