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Slovakia:
Problems of Democratic Consolidation
and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game

Sona Szomolányi and John Gould, editors

New York

Columbia International Affairs Online

1997

Bibliographic Data

2. The Open-Ended Formation Of Slovakia'S Political Party System

Grigorij Meseznikov

A certain teleology inevitably sneaks into discussions about party system development in Slovakia. This is because the primary examples of consolidated multi-party systems are Western democracies. As Slovakia moves away from totalitarianism and central planning, it is difficult not to make comparisons with the West.

The following article outlines developments in the formation of parties and the party system structure in Slovakia. It provides a brief overview of system development since 1990. As the overview demonstrates, Slovakia has progressed towards approximating a "normal," western conception of a consolidated party structure with standard western-style programmatic parties committed to democratic competition whether in or out of power. However, a number of unique "pathologies" have also developed that serve as a sharp reminder that comparisons with the West do not necessarily imply convergence.

Most important among Slovak idiosyncrasies has been the emergence and continued dominance of a coalition of parties led by the powerful and authoritarian personality of Prime Minister Vladimír Meèiar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). Meèiar's confrontational style of politics and undemocratic methods question the basic principles of constitutional democracy. He is opposed by a loose coalition of ideologically diverse, programmatic political formations which appear to have firmly embraced democratic principles, constitutionality, and free political competition. 1

Due to the relatively hopeful electoral prospects of the opposition, the prognoses for Slovak convergence with Western forms of party system remains good. However, the fundamental divide between these two groups serves as a sharp reminder that Slovak approximation towards a Western party system is by no means pre-ordained. Indeed, at stake today is the issue of whether Slovak party system consolidation will continue to approach the characteristic forms of Western democratic systems, or whether it will stabilize--at least for the medium term--around a semi-democratic party system structure.

1. Consolidation Of The Party System

A pre-condition for successful democratic consolidation in post-communist conditions is the consolidation of the system of political parties. A consolidated system is marked by the disappearance of anti-systemic parties and a transition to moderate pluralism. Major political formations will be ideologically moderate and have formed groups of opposing cartels committed to long-term competitive coexistence with opponents, whether in or out of power. Political formations will also have generally moved beyond traditionalism and developed transnational party ties. 2

Using these criteria, party system consolidation in Slovakia lags behind its Central European neighbors. The current system is a deformed version of moderate pluralism that might best be described as "fragmented polarization," because it consists of two polar hemispheres of fragmented political parties and movements (Lukas & Szomolányi 1996, p. 203). In strict numerical terms, the Slovak party system is highly, rather than moderately, pluralist. There are no less than twelve political parliamentary parties that possess the strength and ability to participate in government coalitions. They range in size from large (HZDS) and medium (KDH, SD1/4, DU), to small parties (MKDH, ZRS, SNS, DS, Coexistence, SZS, SDSS, MOS). 3

There is only one remaining anti-systemic party, the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). But its political relevance is questionable. In opinion polls, the party barely reaches the five percent threshold needed to enter parliament. KSS has extremely low coalition potential. It is possible to imagine a coalition of KSS with the small, leftist Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), but a ZRS-KSS coalition would be an unacceptable coalition partner for other parties.

Applying the criterion of ideological distance to assess Slovakia's party system produces confusing results: Over the last few years, coalition groupings have simultaneously included right, left, and centrist parties. There are also essential differences in the density of international ties and level of europeanization of political formations. The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), Democratic Union (DU), Party of the Democratic Left (SD1/4), Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), Green Party (SZS) and parties of Hungarian coalition (MKDH, MOS, Coexistence) possess intensive transnational links thanks to their membership in international party organizations. 4 Two of the three political formations which comprise the current ruling coalition--HZDS 5 and ZRS--do not maintain extensive international ties. Recently, the third member of the ruling coalition, the Slovak National Party (SNS), has been cultivating closer contacts with nationalist party leaders elsewhere in Europe, particularly Jorg Haider of Austria's Freedom Party, Jean Marie Le Pen of France's National Front and Vojislav seselj of Serbia's Radical Party.

Slovakia's party system is notable for its lack of process towards general cartelization. Cartelization is the creation of opposing groupings of political parties oriented towards long term competitive coexistence either in government or in opposition. It reduces societal polarization and minimizes the bitterness of political conflict. Authoritarianism slows progress towards cartelization by challenging the right of opposing formations to co-exist. It transforms competition between parties into sharp and polarized antagonism between main party groupings. The authoritarian methods of the present government coalition of HZDS, SNS and ZRS, are a major cause of polarization in Slovkia's party system. The ruling coalition openly adheres to "winner takes all" principle of political competition, in which victory in elections is the first step to political revenge and a further weakening of opposition parties through the legislative and executive mechanisms of the state. It is a "zero sum" game which increases the intensity of political confrontation and minimizes opportunities to reach political, and specifically procedural, consensus.

Traditionalism still plays an important role in Slovakia's party system. Some parties build on historical traditions. The SNS, in particular, expresses affinity with the traditions of the war-time Slovak state (1939-1945). Several other parties frequently appeal to traditionalist notions that reflect the historical and socio-cultural conditioning of segments of the population. ZRS makes extensive use of the socialist-collectivist stereotypes and egalitarian and anti-capitalist sentiments that persist among a part of the population from communism. Similarly, HZDS builds on the residues of inter-war, national-conservative authoritarianism and the mode of perceiving reality that existed during the communist period. KDH inclines towards the values of religious traditionalism (morality, family, confession) and orthodox conservatism of the inter-war period. Finally, one can find elements of traditionalism in the ethnic rhetoric of some representatives of the Hungarian coalition (for more on the ideological continuity of Slovak political parties, see, Mese_nikov 1996b).

2. Legal Institutional Framework

While consolidation of the Slovak Party system lags behind its neighbors, its legislative design is compatible with the legal norms of democratic states. Still, a number of problem areas remain. The party system is based on two laws. The Law on Political Parties and Movements (No. 47/1993 adopted on January 21, 1993) establishes a legal framework for the activity of political parties and movements while the Law on Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic (No. 197/1994) sets out electoral procedures. The Law on Elections sets up a proportional system consisting of a party candidate list with preferential voting and thresholds for entry into parliament of five percent for a single party, seven percent for a double or triple coalition, and 10 percent for a coalition of four or more parties. One of the remaining problematic areas in the electoral law includes a paragraph on deputy-substitutes. It stipulates that a substitute replace a departing deputy if he/she received the next largest portion of the vote in the elections. But electoral law does not specify what should happen when a substitute leaves his/her party in the inter-electoral period.

The Constitution requires the separation of political parties from the state. Formally, this separation includes the economic activity of parties. The issue of party finances is governed by the Law on Political Parties and Movements and by Czechoslovak Federal (ÈSFR) Law No. 190/1992 on financial contributions to political formations from the state budget. But the finances of parties and movements remains one of the most problematic issues. The law allows political formations to promote their business activity only in clearly defined areas. But in 1996, the Slovak media revealed that HZDS members had founded businesses that participated in privatization projects in spheres of business activity not covered by the Law on Political Parties and Movements. Moreover, HZDS often informed would-be participants in the privatization process that partnership with HZDS-tied companies was a necessary precondition of the successful realization of their privatization projects (SME , March 1, 1996; November 14, 1996). The use of these methods to strengthen the position of a particular political formation risks negating the rules of democratic political competition. This can complicate the process of democratic consolidation.

Despite these gray areas, existing laws dealing with the activity of political parties and movements in Slovakia provide an adequate framework for the development of a party system in the Slovak Republic. The large number of political parties in Slovakia is more a reflex of Slovakia's societal diversity than a simple mechanical result of the implementation of a proportional electoral system. Efforts to decrease the number of relevant political formations by replacing the proportional electoral system with one which would give a prominent role to single-mandate, winner-take-all districts would not necessarily stabilize the system. Instead, it would break down the existing links between particular groups of the population and established political formations. The preservation and refinement of the existing electoral system is thus one of the most important preconditions of the maintenance of the democratic pluralist framework for the development of the party system in Slovakia.

3. Party And Coalition Configurations

In December 1989, the movement Public Against Violence (VPN), whose actions were instrumental in initiating the change in regime in Slovakia, declared that it would run in the first free parliamentary elections in June 1990 as a "democratic civic movement." The following month, the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly approved the Law on Political Parties and Movements (ÈSFR Law No. 15/1990), under which VPN and other political formations began to crystallize around political interests in the run up to the first parliamentary elections in June 1990. 6

The ideological and political proliferation of new parties followed shortly on the heels of the June 1990 elections. Numerous factors influenced their development over the following two years including, the beginning of the economic transformation; the existing social structure; regional differences; a search for a solution to the issue of Czechoslovakia's state form; and the articulation of demands of ethnic minorities. During this period, the party system was configured around two groups of parties: those with an unambiguous pro-reform orientation and those with an anti-reform or underspecified reform orientation.

The first group was comprised of the government coalition, consisting of VPN, KDH, and the Democratic Party (DS), and a parliamentary coalition of ethnic-Hungarian parties--including the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH) and Coexistence. This group supported both radical economic reforms and the existence of the common Czechoslovak state. Despite similar programs, however, the pro-reform grouping was divided along ethnic lines, reflecting the ethnic division of the Slovak electorate. In effect, this led to the creation of two separate party systems in Slovakia: one consisting of ethnic Slovak political parties and the other consisting of Hungarian political parties (Malová 1995, pp. 2-3). Yet, despite their different approach to the ethnic minority issue, the governmental coalition and Hungarian political formations collaborated on approving and implementing pro-transformation legislation.

An important element influencing the configuration of the main political forces thus was the compatibility of the economic program of the Slovak government coalition with the model of economic reform of federal Czechoslovak government in Prague. The second grouping (see Figure 1)--including KSS, SD1/4, SNS, the Green Party, HZDS after 1991, and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH) after 1992--criticized or rejected the "federal" model of economic reform. Several of the opposition formations also adhered to anti-federalist views and questioned the form of further coexistence with the Czechs. SNS called for the independence of Slovakia in its political program. HZDS presented itself as a representative of the "Slovak national interest" and suggested dissolving the Czechoslovak federation, declaring state sovereignty, and creating some form of "co-state" with Czech Republic in the form of a confederation or a loose union.

While VPN had a broad social base, it maintained a clear ideological and political profile through the June 1990 election. VPN condemned the communist past, supported the program of radical economic reforms, rejected the idea of a socialist-tinged "third path" towards markets, maintained support for the federal state, advocated civic principles, and refused to cater to nationalist sentiment. VPN's initial diversity stemmed from an alliance of a wide range of societal streams that had opposed the totalitarian power of the Communist Party. But this did not mean that VPN was a ideological and political broad-spectrum formation. VPN was a coherent party from the beginning of its existence, not a factional party. The party was well-placed on the political spectrum.

As a coherent, programmatic party, VPN was thus able to form a coalition only with formations that had similar views on basic programmatic issues (M. Laver, N. Schofield, 1990, p. 19). This excluded any possibility of an alliance with the communists (KSS) or nationalists (SNS). Like VPN, both KSS and SNS were coherent parties, but they had absolutely opposite political programs. VPN was much more predisposed to collaborate with KDH and DS, both of which were relatively coherent parties with programs closer to VPN's political agenda.

From 1990-1992, party system formation in Czechoslovakia was characterized by "unceasing regrouping of political forces and the gradual proliferation of parties as emerging centers in the political decision-making process" (Dvoøáková & Kunc 1996, p. 59). In 1991, a process of internal change within the main force of the pro-reform government coalition began. "Broad" movements transformed into well-profiled parties. VPN, we have noted, was well-profiled and programmatic from the start. Many of its members, however, left the formation as they began to identify and act on their particular interests. A similar change began at that time in practically all Central European countries, but in Slovakia, the process neither simplified the political scene nor made it more transparent. Rather, the transformation of movements led to a substantial regrouping of political forces.

This transformation occurred against the backdrop of the marketization of the Slovak economy and the associated restructuring of key industrial branches. The changes disrupted the lives of large groups of the population and strengthened open anti-transformation feelings. In neighboring countries, radical economic reforms catalyzed the process of transforming mass political movements into clearly profiled political parties able to effectively mobilize citizens behind support for transformation. Mass movements split into numerous political formations which did not fundamentally challenge the basic direction of reforms. In Slovakia, the split of VPN and the subsequent appearance of HZDS (March - April 1991) produced a sharp programmatic discontinuity with the initial main pro-reform force. HZDS, built its support around stratas of the population which were dissatisfied with the realization and consequences of reforms. Rather than focusing on deepening reforms, they attempted to elaborate an alternative conception--one that was incompatible with the "federal" model of transformation.

Nor did the split of VPN produce motion towards real consolidation of the party system around a clear, left-right spectrum of programmatic parties. HZDS was less coherent than VPN, retaining the parent movement's "broad-spectrum" character. HZDS members typically held negative attitudes toward the federal model of radical reform but supported declarations about the necessity of economic transformation. HZDS efforts to mobilize "non-federalist," "nationalist," or even "separatist" voters led to proposals to rearrange the constitutional state form of Czechoslovakia to allow "coexistence" with the Czechs in a new, ill-defined state form. In the 1992 elections, HZDS's broad, multi-front attack on the status quo tenants of federalism and radical reform won the votes of widely divergent groups of the population and raised HZDS's ability to form a ruling coalition with a variety of parties.

According to coalition theory, HZDS is a "factional" party with the ability to form government coalitions with other "factional" as well as "coherent" parties (Laver & Schofield 1990). This was expressed most apparently after the 1994 elections when HZDS, in spite of its own declarations about its civic and pro-transformational character, formed a government coalition with the radical nationalist SNS and the unambiguously anti-transformational ZRS.

Since 1991, however, some internal differentiation within HZDS has taken place. Two splits have occurred. In March 1993, a group led by M. Kòa_ko separated from HZDS and founded the Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic (ADSR). In March 1994, the platform Alternative of Political Realism (APR) appeared within HZDS. The platform united with ADSR and splinter groups from SNS and the National Democratic Party (NDS), to form the liberal Democratic Union (DU). Some politicians of social-democratic orientation also left HZDS.

It would be incorrect after these splits to characterize HZDS as a movement of "many parties in one party." Despite the splits, the movement has not lost its "broad-spectrum" character. HZDS rhetoric ranges from right-wing nationalism to left-wing egalitarianism. This has allowed HZDS to form government coalitions on both the left and the right; with SNS at the end of 1993, and with both SNS and ZRS at the end of 1994.

In contrast to HZDS, civic democratic parties, including VPN, fragmented in the run-up to the 1992 election. The end result of this fragmentation was to split civic democratic forces so thinly that no single splinter party received the votes necessary to pass the five percent threshold to needed get into parliament. Thus an important segment of the electorate was devoid of representation in parliament. The total electoral result of post-VPN, civic democratic political formations actually exceeded 10 percent. This would have been enough to create the third strongest faction in Parliament. The political space which the civic democratic forces abandoned was later occupied by the splinters from HZDS and SNS, specifically, ADSR, APR, and NDS which have subsequently merged to form the liberal-centrist DU.

4. Hzds: The Syndrome Of The Big Party

The division of Slovak political formations along pro-federal and secessionist lines lost its political relevance after independence on January 1, 1993 and raised the salience of people's conceptions of economic transformation and societal democratization; their attitudes towards the values of democratic political culture; and their approaches to the ethnic minority issue. Within months of the 1992 elections, new trends indicated the possibility of a split and polarization of the party system. HZDS did not get an absolute majority of seats in parliament. However, the movement refused to form a broader coalition with other political formations. At that time, two coalition alliances were possible, HZDS-SD1/4 or HZDS-SNS. HZDS however, preferred to create a "single color" government, with quiet support from SNS.

The decision reflected an apparent aversion of HZDS leader Vladimír Meèiar to standard coalition alliances. In 1990, Meèiar, then a member of VPN, came out against a coalition with KDH. After the June 1992 election, growing antagonism between Meèiar's HZDS and both KDH and Hungarian parties rendered a coalition impossible and complicated communication and cooperation in parliament. The antagonism became especially apparent during the approval of the Declaration on Sovereignty and the Constitution. KDH MP's voted against the documents while Hungarian party MP's abstained.

Yet the main reason for tense relations between HZDS and other parties was as much a result of Meèiar as any apparent differences in programs. Meèiar's political style reflects the "syndrome of the big party," which, given the support of a relatively large and stabilized segment of the electorate, uses its success at the polls to justify authoritarian methods both inside and outside the movement. Particularly disturbing was the HZDS decision to claim seats for parties that did not reach the five percent threshold predominantly following the 1992 election. The total number of votes for parties that did not pass the threshold was 23.8 percent. HZDS won 37.3 percent of the votes, but appropriated these votes to take 74 of 150 deputies, or 49.3 percent of the total number of seats.

Authoritarian methods also characterize HZDS internal party policy. HZDS frequently takes extraordinary steps to suppress or ostracize critics from inside the movement. Perhaps the most obvious example would be the parliamentary majority's Fall 1996 vote to strip HZDS founding member, Frantisek Gaulieder, of his parliamentary mandate following his resignation from the HZDS Parliamentary MP club. The HZDS-led vote came despite EU disapproval, Gaulieder's express desire to continue to serve in Parliament, and a Constitutional stipulation guaranteeing the freedom of parliamentary MP's to exercise their own mandates (see also Zavacká and Szomolányi, in this volume).

Indeed HZDS's internal-party governance reflect what D. Segert has termed "democracy-endangering procedures" (Segert 1996, p. 224). The authority of HZDS leaders is paramount and is imposed from the top down. Internal dissent and criticism is not allowed and the rank and file are expected to follow a "leading principle" demonstrating the unity of the party rank and file with the views and policies of their leadership.

Externally, the embodiment of the big party syndrome is HZDS's confrontational policy towards opponents and real and potential coalition partners. Most dramatically, following their fall 1994 election victory, HZDS and its completely excluded opposition parties from any participation on bodies overseeing important state functions (e.g. broadcasting, privatization, and perhaps most importantly, oversight of the Slovak Intelligence Service). HZDS also denied parties of the parliamentary minority proportional representation on a number of important parliamentary committees (For more, see Szomolányi, in this volume).

Yet prior to the fall 1994 elections, HZDS's confrontational style greatly increased parliamentary instability. HZDS tactics contributed to an unsuccessful attempt to create a coalition with SNS immediately after defection of the group of HZDS deputies led by M. Kòa_ko. They also produced the subsequent failure of the HZDS-SNS coalition during the period November 1993 - March 1994.

The loss of the HZDS-SNS coalition majority in March 1994 brought down the second Meèiar government and paved the way for a new broad-coalition government, consisting of KDH, SD1/4, and DU. 7 Hungarian parties did not enter the government, but they supported it on the basis of a public agreement with the coalition parties. The coalition combined a wide range of ideological profiles and programmatic concerns. After the elections of 1990, KDH had been part of the pro-reform government block while SD1/4 had been in the opposition. Similarly, ADSR and APR had emerged from within HZDS which had profiled itself in opposition to federal economic reform while NDS had separated from the nationalist SNS.

The collaboration of these diverse parties, however, contributed to political stabilization in the country and helped strengthen democratic elements of political life. Perhaps most importantly, broad collaboration reduced the level of confrontation between political formations, enhanced government adherence to the rule of law, and raised Slovakia's status in international society.

5. Defining The Character Of Political Parties And Movements

The short period of rule by the broad coalition lasting from March to September 1994 was characterized by a bipolar party configuration. The 1994 elections and the creation of a new government coalition reinforced the trend. Remarking that the parties of the opposition pole maintained links to transnational party organizations while the parties of the ruling coalition did not, Slovak political scientists and analysts began to distinguish between "standard" parties and "non-standard" parties. Non-coalition opposition formations fell into the standard party category (KDH, DU, DS, SD1/4, SDSS, SZS, MKDH, MOS, Coexistence), while ruling coalition formations fell into the non-standard category (HZDS, SNS, and ZRS). 8

Applying a typology of European political parties to the Slovak party system 9 --we see that all the Slovak "standard" parties are easily located within this scheme. By contrast, it is difficult to place HZDS and ZRS on the continuum. SNS, could probably be included within the group of right-wing populist parties due to its radical nationalist views.

The division between "standard" and "non-standard" political formations not only reflects differences in established ideological patterns and international party links, it also reflects the different roles the formations can play in the process of democratic consolidation (see Figure 2). Indeed, one can relatively easily group political formations in Slovakia according to their reception of democracy and political styles. It is possible to offer three categories that might be used as reasonable proxies, authoritarianism vs. liberalism, conflictuality vs. consensuality, and accentuation of the interests of collective entities vs. preference of individual values (for more, see Ivantysyn 1995, pp. 88-100). On each of these scales, I would place the ruling coalition parties--including SNS--firmly into the first, category. The implication is that the non-standard ruling coalition parties undermine the process of democratic consolidation.

The differences in the internal character of political formations are also closely connected with the socio-cultural and ethnic diversity of the population of Slovakia. Indeed, differences in party support overlap the main cleavages of Slovak society. Vladimír Krivy mentions several basic lines of division in the Slovak electorate that run parallel to the divisions between political formations. These consist of an ethnic line dividing ethnic Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians; parallel urban-rural and educational lines; and finally, a line distinguishing adherents of authoritarianism and state paternalism from supporters of liberal and market values. According to Krivy, the 1994 elections transferred political power to parties "anchored" in an electorate that is predominantly rural and less educated. These voters more frequently maintained authoritarian and state-paternalist views (Krivy 1996, pp. 127-145). In addition, Slovak ruling coalition formations are typically more isolationist--maintaining no or relatively tenuous links to transnational party organizations (see Figure 3).

An additional means of characterizing political formations can be found in H. Kitschelt's typology of political parties according to their type of organization (Kitschelt 1995, p. 449). On this schematic, non-standard Slovak political formations fit into the category of charismatic and clientelist parties, whereas the standard formations would be included in the category of programmatic parties. Support for HZDS, the strongest political formation, is based to a significant degree on the charismatic popularity of V. Meèiar. Yet, at the same time, HZDS has apparently built significant clientelist relations to meets its substantial financial expenses. HZDS probably uses the personal linkages of part of its own leadership with organized economic interests to maintain party financing--specifically, industrial associations, financial groups, particular business lobbies, and privatization teams. 10

The nationalist SNS is clientelist as well, but due to its essentially smaller voter base, it cannot court the favor of important economic groupings as HZDS. SNS has tried to infiltrate into several state financial institutions and it attempts, by getting involved in the public debate on military and security topics to strengthen its position in the military and security forces. The leftist-populist ZRS emerged as a charismatic party with Ján 1/4upták, a worker-leader at its head. It appealed to citizens who are dissatisfied with the impact of transformation processes. Yet during the first few months of its existence, ZRS has apparently transformed into a clientelist party attempting to maximize its share of executive power.

The experiences of post-communist Slovakia confirm Kitschelt's statement that programmatic parties are harder to build than charismatic or clientelist parties, but they are also more likely to reinforce the consolidation and stability of democratic regimes (Kitschelt 1995, p. 450). Conversely, the governance of charismatic and clientelist parties can slow, stop or reverse consolidation. Indeed, since 1995, ruling coalition parties have created societal circumstances in which the decisive factor in political competition has not been a free and equal playing field, but rather a series of powerful positions monopolized by the incumbents. These include positions in the apparatus of executive power, including security structures; preferential access to the portion of the public electronic media that plays a decisive role in disseminating information to a predominant part of population; close links to economically strong lobbies--probably providing effective party finance; direct membership of top leaders of the parties on the supervisory boards of profitable enteprises; and finally, creation and support of a network of satellite organizations and associations (cultural, professional, labor, etc.) with the aim of influencing public life in favor of the ruling parties (see Malová, in this volume). 11

HZDS has concentrated economic and political power since the end of 1994. In addition to enlarging its own membership, HZDS pressures officials of local organs of state administration and ruling workers of key industrial enterprises to become members and participate in party building/organization activities or lose their privileged positions. 12 In addition, it has shaped its economic transformation policies around the desires of a powerful strata of politically loyal owners of former state-owned assets. To this end, HZDS canceled voucher privatization which the new owners could not easily manipulate in their favor, and awarded "direct sales" of state property to politically selected privatizers. Finally, HZDS preferentially rewarded its members and supporters in the organs of the state administration, especially on the regional and local level. The result has been the creation of a nation-wide structure of "patronage relations" that are oriented to the long-term "conservation" of the dominant position of HZDS in the system of political parties (Blondel 1994, p. 4). 13

An additional factor which could strengthen the dominant position of HZDS would be a favorable change of the electoral system. The most obvious change would be to replace the proportional system with a single-mandate system in which the winner of the vote represents the entire district. HZDS might also be considering some form of mixture of the two systems. Other steps could include gerrymandering, and favorable methods of counting votes in distributing the seats of parties that did not pass threshold to enter Parliament.

As a government party, HZDS maintains strong links between its own leadership and the cabinet of ministers. Three among the five top elected leaders of HZDS are members of the cabinet (the Prime Minister and two Vice-Prime ministers), the former secretary of HZDS is also a member of cabinet. The two other coalition parties have a relatively weak links between their party leadership and government.

Participation in the government coalition with HZDS provides SNS and ZRS with a share of executive power, but it also creates a problem of maintaining identity. In their electoral programs, SNS and ZRS emphasized topics and solutions that they have often failed to realize as coalition partners. SNS focused on the Hungarian issue, while ZRS rejected privatization of banks and other financial institutions. Frequently, however, HZDS has tried to deliver solutions on these issues which differ from the ZRS and SNS approaches. During 1995-1996, SNS and ZRS episodically had to resort to tactics of internal opposition--perhaps in order to maintain their image among constituents. In 1995, SNS protested ratification of the basic Slovak-Hungarian Treaty. In 1996, SNS (with ZRS support) protested HZDS personal changes on board of the state-run, Slovak Insurance Company. Subsequently, in February 1997, ZRS initially rejected HZDS attempts to privatize key financial institutions. The occasional internal opposition of the SNS and ZRS towards HZDS has not weakened the cohesion of the governmental coalition. However, in all three cases, HZDS found solutions that have satisfied the ZRS and SNS while at the same time maintaining its strong position.

HZDS policy towards opposition political parties includes limiting opposition participation in the institutions that monitor and control executive power, including applying discriminating procedural steps against opposition parties in Parliament and removing adherents of opposition parties from the state bureaucracies. These steps--which in essence seek to remove opposition parties from any control over the governance of the polity--are accompanied by propagandistic declarations that only HZDS and its leader are true advocates for the Slovak people.

HZDS steps resemble elements of hegemonic party, or "state-party," practices, well-known from the past. In 1996-1997, top officials of the state administration, beginning with the heads of regional and district state offices, were elected chairmen of HZDS regional organizations. Persistent attempts to weaken opposition parties also reveal the hegemonic politics of HZDS. HZDS intentionally attempts to fragment opposition formations; it actively supports the establishment and function of "parallel" formations. For example, the HZDS-inspired Slovak Christian Democratic Movement/Christian Social Union parallels KDH; ZRS parallels SD1/4; Slovak Green Alternative parallels the Green Party; Social Democracy, and Social Democratic Union of Slovakia parallels the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia; Hungarian People's Movement for Reconciliation and Prosperity parallels the Hungarian Coalition; and the Civic Liberal Party of Slovakia parallels DU. By supporting these parallel formations, HZDS hopes to split the electorate of opposition parties.

HZDS has also supported party factions that are most inclined to collaborate with it. Most notably, HZDS gave support to the radical nationalist wing of SNS in 1993-94 by supporting the election of Ján Slota over moderate 1/4udovít Èernák as national chairman of the SNS.

Because the depersonalization of power increases the significance of political competition and motivates political parties to be more organized around programmatic competition (Kitschelt 1995, p. 452), it is logical that HZDS might try to personalize societal and political life. Indeed, personalization of power appears to be an important means of reproducing the power position of HZDS.

In the period 1995-1997, opposition activities have been typical of standard programmatic political parties. In spite of the ideological heterogeneity of opposition parties, the opposition is not radically polarized. However, there are two basic lines of "mutual demarcation" among opposition parties. The first line is between the parties of the Hungarian coalition and other opposition parties and is drawn over competing solutions to the ethnic minority issue. The least problematic of the splits is between the Hungarian coalition and Democratic Party. Relations between the Hungarian coalition and SDSS and KDH are also manageable--particularly in comparison with the relationship between MK and SD1/4 or DU.

Mainstream Slovak opposition parties have the most critical attitude to the movement Coexistence due to incompatible views on minority issues. Yet, representatives of Hungarian political formations realize that only a small part of the present Slovak opposition would be ready to accept some of their key demands, particularly their demand for minority self-government. They also realize that the eventual creation of a government including the present opposition parties would bring positive changes in minority politics. Thus, Hungarian parties try to look for an understanding with Slovak opposition parties (Dostál 1996, p. 42).

The second line of mutual demarcation among opposition parties focuses on the "independent" opposition politics of SD1/4. These combine a critical attitude towards the government with a rejection of a common stance of all opposition parties against the government. SD1/4's location within the camp of opposition parties is shaped by the party's division between advocates of a "soft" and "strong" line towards HZDS among SD1/4 leadership. Soft liners advocate pragmatic cooperation with HZDS while the strong liners look to greater cooperation with other opposition parties. SD1/4's "independent opposition politics" have become stronger since its members elected a new leadership at its last congress in April 1996.

Greater independence, however, has so far been unproductive, voter preferences for SD1/4 have not increased (see Table 2). Moreover, SD1/4's independent politics have complicated its relations with other opposition parties and provided HZDS the leverage to cement the loyalty of its small coalition partners and further fragment the opposition. Moreover, in spite of the efforts of the new SD1/4 leadership to redefine its place within the system of relations between the government coalition and the opposition, the independent politics of SD1/4 have not result in attempts to enter into coalition with HZDS. Indeed, SD1/4's soft line overtures have led SDSS, its former partner in the left-leaning opposition coalition, "Common Choice" (SV), to abandon SD1/4 for the broad Slovak Democratic Coalition ("Rainbow Coalition"), consisting of KDH, DU, DS, SDSS and the Slovak Green Party (SZS). This coalition will present a single candidate list in the general elections of 1998.

6. Three Scenarios For The Further Development Of Slovakia'S Party System

If the present proportional electoral system persists, one might expect the following possible outcomes from the next general elections in 1998:

  1. Continuation of the government coalition HZDS-SNS-ZRS. In this case the process of consolidation of the system of political parties will continue to reflect currently emerging power structures, thus postponing the maturation of the party system towards more familiar Western democratic forms. Organized economic interests will henceforth support HZDS. Clientelism will become the basic characteristic of society and authoritarian tendencies in domestic politics will minimize the chances of Slovakia to join the EU and NATO.

  2. Creation of a government coalition of programmatic parties with the participation of all formations of the present opposition, including the Hungarian coalition. The probability of such a variant would require overcoming the two basic cleavages within the opposition camp; Slovak parties vs. Hungarian parties and left parties vs. right parties. Statistically it is unlikely that the government would be formed from only parties of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (KDH, DS, DU, SDSS, SZS) and Hungarian coalition without SD1/4, or from only the Slovak Democratic Coalition together with SD1/4 and without the Hungarian parties. If a broad government coalition including "Rainbow," Hungarian coalition, and SD1/4 could be created, however, HZDS could be forced into opposition for several years. This would probably compel organized economic interests to develop new channels to provide for their political aims through standard parties. Clientelist pressure moreover, would make it difficult for these parties to preserve their programmatic character. Meanwhile, however, the significance of the opposition HZDS as a clientelist party would decrease. In addition, if changes in the leadership of HZDS occur, it is possible to expect that the more moderate part of the movement would attempt to bring the party nearer to SD1/4 or DU. The radical wing of HZDS would then incline towards SNS and the process of consolidation of party system would accelerate.

  3. Creation of a government coalition of HZDS-SD1/4. This coalition would probably not be stable over the long term because of the different approaches of both parties to the practical realization of political power. In accordance with previous and present practice, HZDS would attempt to split SD1/4's pragmatic "soft liners" from its more hostile "hard liners," thus initiating a processes of disintegration within SD1/4. The consequences of such a development are difficult to predict. The party system would be characterized by a bilateral or even trilateral opposition, including, potentially, an extreme right faction, SNS; an extreme left faction, ZRS; and a democratic center made up of the left-right spectrum of Slovak Democratic Coalition and Hungarian parties.

The probability of any of these three variants would be decreased by a change in the electoral law. This possibility has contributed to the incentives to opposition parties to collaborate more closely. In October 1996, KDH, DU and DS signed an agreement to collaborate within a "Blue Coalition." In July 1997, the formation of the Slovak Democratic Coalition, from the same "blue" parties, plus SDSS and SZS, further weakened the HZDS opportunity to change the electoral law towards a majoritorian or mixed, majoritarian-proportional system.

The Hungarian Coalition is also debating whether to join a single, united political formation. But if Meèiar succeeds in implementing a majoritarian or at least a mixed system, the creation of several separate blocks will probably not be sufficient to compete effectively with HZDS. The implementation of a majoritarian system would cause the disappearance of small and medium-sized democratic parties. In this situation all opposition parties would be confronted with the task of finding a suitable electoral union. A more pressing issue however, may be the opportunity of Meèiar to change institutional bodies which establishes and monitors electoral procedures. This would allow him to substitute electoral courts for electoral commissions. The latter consist of representatives of all parties while the former consist of state employees, nominated by the HZDS-dominated Parliament.

Conclusion

Slovak political parties and movements fall into two types. Non-standard parties and movements use a confrontational style of politics and authoritarian methods which endanger the basic principles of constitutionality. These formations employ populist mobilization strategies related to personalization of political power which decrease the significance of free political competition. 14 The use of these methods and strategies, plus emerging conditions of clientelism, increases the risk that the Slovak party system might "consolidate" around undemocratic principles.

Despite the broad variety of their political programs, ideological profiles and different approaches to the solution of particular societal problems, standard political formations stand firmly committed to democratic principles, constitutionality and free political competition. Programmatic rejection of authoritarianism is a unifying characteristic.

Recent summaries of voting preferences reveal a shift from approximate equilibrium between standard and non-standard formations towards a stronger position of the former. At the beginning of 1997, about 60 percent of decided voters would have voted for a standard party or movement (See Table 2). If the opposition succeeds in maintaining a proportional electoral system, there is the possibility that a government of standard formations may follow the next election. This will decrease the risk of an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian political regime emerging in Slovakia. A change of the electoral system, however, would all but eliminate this possibility. By disadvantaging medium-sized, standard political formations, the change could not only substantially alter the configuration of political forces and terminate consolidation of the party system around Western democratic ideals, it could also return Slovak society to a position where the critical choice facing citizens is not be between competing democratic parties but between competing regimes (Rose & Mishler 1994, p. 161).

Supplements

Table 1. Parties in Slovak parliament : Votes and Seats, 1990-1994

Political formations

Elections 1990
Elections 1992
Elections 1994
(coalitions)
Votes
Seats
Votes
Seats
Votes
Seats
VPN/MNI
29,34%
48
-
-
-
-
KDH
19,20%
31
8,88%
18
10,08%
17
SNS
13,94%
22
7,93%
15
5,40%
9
KSS / SD1/4 / SV
13,34%
22
14,70%
29
10,41%
18
MKDH-Spolu_. / MK
8,66%
14
7,42%
14
10,18%
17
DS
4,39%
7
-
-
-
-
SZ
3,48%
6
-
-
-
-
HZDS
-
-
37,26%
74
34,96%
61
DU
-
-
-
-
8,57%
15
ZRS
-
-
-
-
7,34%
13

Sources:

Vo3/4by 1990. Slovenská národná rada.  SsÚ-PVT-MV SR. Bratislava 1990, pp. 8-12, 118-121.

Vo3/4by do Slovenskej národnej rady. 5.- 6. jún 1992 . Slovensky statisticky úrad, Bratislava 1992, pp. 8-12, 78-81.

Vo3/4by do Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky konané 30.9 a 1.10.1994.  statisticky úrad Slovenskej republiky, Bratislava 1994, pp. 10-17, 93-97.

Table 2. Voting preferences of political parties in Slovakia (1996-1997)

1/96a 2/96a 3/96a 4/96a 4/96b 5/96a 6/96b 9/96b 11/96a 11/96b 1/97a 2/97b 3/97b 6/97a 7/97b 8/97a 10/97a 10/97b
HZDS 30,2 33,2 30,5 35,2 32,4 34,3 28,0 28,3 24,3 24,4 28,2 24,5 24,3 26,1 27,0 23,8 26,2 25,0
SDL 10,2 10,9 11,5 10,9 10,0 9,1 9,1 9,9 13,9 8,8 10,6 11,0 10,0 13,4 10,5 12,3 11,0 11,3
SDSS 2,6 1,5 2,6 2,7 2,9 1,7 3,2 3,8 4,1 5,0 1,9 4,3 2,6 3,5 2,5 2,1 2,4 2,2
SZS 4,1 4,3 3,7 2,7 4,3 3,7 5,4 5,6 1,9 4,5 3,0 2,6 5,7 3,1 3,2 3,2 3,1 3,1
MKDH 5,5 5,6 5,2 5,0 7,4 6,9 7,5 6,2 4,7 7,5 7,6 7,3 4,7 4,6 5,6 4,3 4,8 6,7
Coexistence 2,4 3,3 2,5 1,4 3,1 2,6 2,7 3,4 1,9 1,5 2,3 2,7 3,0 1,9 3,9 3,6 3,6 3,1
MOS 1,2 1,6 1,9 1,5 1,7 1,5 1,1 2,4 2,1 1,5 1,6 2,0 1,9 1,0 2,1 1,7 1,6 1,3
KDH 12,6 12,4 13,9 11,8 10,8 13,0 12,8 10,8 15,8 13,2 14,2 12,2 12,1 13,4 12,1 14,8 17,1 11,5
DU 8,2 9,4 8,6 8,1 8,2 9,7 9,4 10,9 8,8 11,4 10,1 12,2 12,1 8,9 11,8 9,4 8,5 10,0
ZRS 5,2 4,2 2,9 3,8 4,3 3,9 5,1 3,8 3,3 3,7 4,2 4,6 4,3 3,7 4,0 4,5 3,9 4,4
SNS 6,7 4,0 5,4 6,7 6,4 4,8 6,4 5,6 8,0 7,1 6,2 5,2 8,4 7,5 8,2 4,5 5,7 7,3
DS 6,1 4,7 4,0 3,7 4,8 4,0 5,1 5,0 4,7 6,2 4,7 5,3 5,6 5,3 4,9 6,5 4,6 4,6
KSS 2,4 3,0 3,2 3,0 2,9 2,4 3,7 3,9 3,4 4,5 3,7 4,4 4,6 3,4 3,3 2,7 3,3 4,6

Sources: a MVK SRo/MVK, s. r. o.

b FOCUS/IVO

Abbreviations

HZDS (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko) - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia

SNS (Slovenská národná strana) - Slovak National Party

ZRS (Zdru_enie robotníkov Slovenska) - Association of Workers of Slovakia

KDH (Kres_anskodemokratické hnutie) - Christian Democratic Movement

DU (Demokratická únia) - Democratic Union

SV (Spoloèná vo3/4ba) - Common Choice

SD1/4 (Strana demokratickej 3/4avice) - Party of the Democratic Left

SDSS (Sociálnodemokratická strana Slovenska) - Social Democratic Party of Slovakia

SZS (Strana zelenych na Slovensku) - Green Party of Slovakia

MK (Maïarská koalícia) - Hungarian coalition

MKDH (Maïarské kres_anskodemokratické hnutie) - Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement)

MOS (Maïarská obèianska strana) - Hungarian Civic Party

DS (Demokratická strana) - Democratic Party

VPN (Verejnos_ proti násiliu) - Public Against Violence

MNI (Maïarská nezávislá iniciatíva) - Hungarian Independent Initiative

References

Note 1: For the purposes of this article, party refers to an organized political entity with a controlled, dues-paying membership and internal hierarchal control over policy formulation. A movement is a less organized, decentralized collaborative organization formed around a set of similar, yet broadly defined political interests. A formation is a generic term referring to a political organization and encompassing both movements and parties. Back.

Note 2: For a theoretical framework on the process of consolidation of party systems, see: Ágh 1996; Roskin 1992; See also, Sartori 1990; Katz & Mair 1995. Back.

Note 3: The Hungarian Coalition, consisting of MKDH, Coexistence, and MOS, acts in parliament as a medium-size party. Back.

Note 4: These include in respective order, European Democratic Union, Liberal International, Socialist International, Party of European Socialists, European People's Party, European Federation of Green Parties. Back.

Note 5: The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia is more a party than a movement as defined above. It has a well organized hierarchal structure with strong party discipline and a top down policy-making structure. Back.

Note 6: The "democracy-supporting functions" of parties performed include: mobilizing citizens to participate in free elections; exercising social control over the choice of political leaders; and ensuring democratic control over power and organizational activity within parliament (Segert 1996, p. 223). Back.

Note 7: DU formed from the merger of ADSR, APR and NDS during the coalition period. Back.

Note 8: Mese_nikov 1995, 1996a; Krivy 1995; Bútorová 1995; Ivantysyn 1995; Balko 1995; Wightman & Szomolányi 1995; Gyarfásová 1996. Back.

Note 9: This scheme specifies nine party families: communists, libertarians, socialists/social democrats, greens, agrarians, liberals, Christians, conservatives, radical right-wing populists (Knutsen 1994, p. 19). Back.

Note 10: While the exact mechanisms by which HZDS "clients" contribute to the financial support of the party remain unclear, ranking coalition figures have clearly benefitted from the privatization process and are quite likely to be expected to support the ongoing functioning of the party. Among the most notable examples are; Milan Rehák, Trenèín's HZDS Chairman, is both Vice-President of the National Property Fund, and President of its Advisory Board. Rehák is also on the advisory boards of at least four joint-stock companies. Arpád Matejka, a Vice-Chairman of HZDS, is a key member of the "Trnava Group," a group of businessmen with coalition ties that also control a network of some of the most important privatized companies in the country. Vladimir Poór is another prominent member of the Trnava group. He is both Trnava's HZDS Chair and co-owner of VTV, a private television station as well as a number of other significant firms. Alexander Rezes was Minister of Transportation under Meèiar from 1994-1997. He controls 47 percent of the industrial steel giant, VSZ (see Miklos, in this volume). SNS party members who have clearly benefitted from the privatization process include Anna Malíková and Jozef sedoviè, both of whom sit on a number of corporate advisory boards. Back.

Note 11: For more on this list of topics, see, in respective order, Duleba, skolkay, Miklos and Malová in this volume. Back.

Note 12: For example, at VS_'s steel factory in Kosice at the beginning of 1997, HZDS drafted new members among ruling workers, see articles in Slovak dailies Národná obroda , January 31, 1997, February 3, 1997, and SME , February 2,1997. Back.

Note 13: The independent daily SME  asked HZDS Vice-Chairman Augustin Marián Huska whether HZDS demanded that state adminstrative officers in newly-created adminstrative districts join the party. He responded, "We did it and we will do it." Indeed, HZDS, and to a lesser extent, its coalition partners, have systematically sought to ensure that heads of regional and district offices are party members or sympathetic. In addition, probably 10 percent of the heads of these regional offices were directly involved in the 1994 campaign. (SME , August 23, 1996; also see Krivy in this volume) Back.

Note 14: Government coalition politics recently evoked the following comment from abroad: "A number of actions served to consolidate the Government's power in a manner, which, taken as a whole, gave rise to continued concern over the future course of pluralism, separation of powers, and democratic development overall." (U.S. Department of State, 1997) Back.