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Slovakia:
Problems of Democratic Consolidation
and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game

Sona Szomolányi and John Gould, editors

New York

Columbia International Affairs Online

1997

Bibliographic Data

1. Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime

Sona Szomolányi

Introduction

Slovakia is in its third electoral cycle since November 1989. However, if one takes Slovak independence on January 1, 1993 as the starting point, it is just approaching the end of its second electoral cycle. There is some reason to do so. The post-communist era's first free elections took place in June 1990 while Slovakia was still part of Czechoslovakia. Standard theory on democratic transitions would define this vote as a founding election - to be followed in all the theory's teleo-logic by a periods of democratic institutionalization and consolidation. Had other things been equal, this indeed might have been the case. But enduring disputes over constitutional issues, both between the national elites of the two republics and among the Slovak elite itself, prolonged decisions on, and acceptance of, basic institutions and rules of the game. Perhaps the only sustainable agreement that the winners of the 1992 elections could have reached was to mutually agree to divide Czechoslovakia. 1

The establishment of an independent Slovak Republic on January 1, 1993 and the process of building of a national state thus significantly complicated the process of regime change. In addition to a simple process of "democratization," Slovakia also had to contend with the parallel process of "nation-state building." The two processes often contained conflicting logics which have made regime change in Slovakia more troublesome than in the Czech Republic - a culturally and ethnically more homogenous country.

Upon independence, Slovaks not only had to build many state institutions from scratch, they also had to agree upon norms of political conduct governing the functioning of the new institutions. By contrast, the Czechs inherited the fully functioning state and political know-how of the former Czechoslovakia. Thus while the Czechs were well steeped in the phase of democratic consolidation - in which all actors had begun to see the institutional frameworks as the only game in town - the Slovaks underwent a prolonged period of transition and institutionalization.

Regime change was further complicated following the electoral victory of Vladimír Meèiar in fall, 1994. Immediately after the elections, I argued that the change of regime begun in 1989 remained incomplete. Political actors continued to struggle over the implementation of rules and procedures largely because Meciar's party appeared bent on shaping these rules to perpetuate its stay in office (Szomolányi 1994, p. 29). At the time, I emphasized that in spite of entering a stage of democratic consolidation, in which all actors began to accept constitutional framework of the new state as the basic reference point for political conduct, institutionalization - or the struggle over how that framework would be respected and implemented - was still going on (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, p. 6). Two and half years later, in the second half of the same electoral cycle, I still consider that statement valid.

The continuing conflict over the rules of the game in Slovakia was best illustrated in a night session of the Slovak Parliament of November 3-4, 1994, that followed a month after the elections. This session produced changes that still have not been accepted by the opposition. Specifically, a majority coalition consisting of the nationalist-cum-populist HZDS, the extreme right nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS), and the extreme left Alliance of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) have waged what some describe as "politics-as-warfare," on all opponents. The primary principle of this form of political conduct is to subordinate the management of key institutions to the power considerations of the ruling coalition. Because the rules set up disadvantage the parliamentary minority, consolidation remains blocked.

Today, Slovakia is beginning to bear the impact of HZDS's political ruling style in its present failure to join the ongoing Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Exclusion from the group of increasingly westward-looking Central European countries - a place where I believe Slovakia belongs both by history and culture - raises the risk that Slovakia will remain peripheral to, as well as isolated from, the main stream integration process. This is a failure of Slovakia's national elite. 2 While elite failure also contributed to the split of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (resulting from a pact between the winners of the 1992 elections), socio-cultural differences between the two nations also played an important role. By contrast, the contemporary failure of Slovakia to participate in the first wave of integration is a clear outcome of the specific subjective, individual and narrow group-oriented decisions of the ruling coalition. 3

The means by which the ruling coalition has concentrated power in Parliament since the 1994 elections is the best example of the decisions of the ruling coalition's elites. 4 The sessions of November 2-4, 1994 violated rules and norms of political conduct that had been in place as far back as the November 1989 revolution. These rules and norms assured the parliamentary minority opposition meaningful participation in key institutions - from proportional representation on parliamentary committees to inclusion in bodies monitoring and supervising important state functions. In November 1994, the new parliamentary majority completely excluded minority party MP's from participation on, or oversight of, the Supreme Control Office, Special Control Body (OKO), the General Prosecutor's Office, and the National Property Fund (NPF). 5 Opposition exclusion from OKO was particularly critical as that body monitors the security service. The parliamentary majority effectively placed it under the exclusive control of the Prime Minister and his ruling coalition parties.

The Director of Slovak Radio, and the Board of TV and Radio Broadcasting were also selected from the party ranks of the ruling HZDS and its coalition partners. This too was a departure from past practice and the law. In addition, the ruling coalition reduced the representation of opposition MP's on important parliamentary committees to levels far below their representation in Parliament. Nor were opposition parties allowed to assign preferred MP's to those committee positions that were allotted to them. Finally, in a break from prior Slovak as well standard practice in many western European parliaments, no committee vice-chairman positions were alloted to the opposition.

The night sessions of November took complete power by applying a majoritarian principle to a Parliament elected under a proportional electoral system. Under the latter, the opposition is supposed to play a significant proportional, but not dominant, role in parliamentary decision-making. Exclusion from this role means that a significant segment of the Slovak electorate is effectively without representation. The violation of this basic principle of proportional representation came as a shock to opposition delegates and western observers alike. It violated the basic western norm and Slovak constitutional stipulation enabling political minorities to serve as an opposition.

Beyond breaking with past practice, most of these steps broke with standard norms and practices of western parliamentary democracies and resulted in European Union comment and complaint (Duleba, in this volume). The lack of civil control over all Slovak security forces in particular violates one of the formal criteria of modern democracy as set out by the European Union (Kusy, in this volume).

The institutionalization of majoritarian practice continues to be considered illegitimate by Slovakia's opposition and has thus delayed regime consolidation. The result is continued uncertainty and the risk of instability. There is a fundamental sentiment on the part of both opposition MPs and western, most notably EU, observers that the current game has been institutionally stacked in favor of the ruling coalition in a fashion that violates prior expectations of democratic behaviour. Consolidation of a democratic regime will therefore require undoing some of the institutionalizing steps of the current government.

1. Conceptual Framework

Regime change is a general concept which covers trends and processes in different sectors of society that undergo systemic change. Concepts of transition and consolidation may be subsumed under regime change. They represent processes that finally result in the establishment of a new regime.

I conceptualize a "regime" not only in its strict political, institutional and legal meaning as a set of "basic patterns in the organization, exercise, and transfer of government decision-making power" (Higley & Burton 1989, p. 18), but also in its sociological dimension: a regime is a set of generally observed economic, political, and socio-cultural norms, which comprise the "rules of the game" that determine the behavior of political, economic, and social actors. In other words, formal-legal norms themselves do not fully define a regime. It is true that, for instance, a constitution determines a regime's fundamental legal framework. What is crucial, however, is how an existing constitution is respected and what mechanisms guarantee that constitutionality is restored after its violation.

Despite the political setbacks of November 1994, the current political problems of Slovakia remain problems of democratic consolidation and not those of an authoritarian regime. Establishing such a regime, however, would be possible if democratic forces to fail to mount an effective resistance to current authoritarian tendencies. Consolidation thus remains an open-ended process. It is not an accomplished end-state. Nor does entering the stage of consolidation automatically imply a stable democratic regime will emerge. Empirically, the number of successfully completed democratic transitions is less than the number of countries in which political transformations have started (Linz & Stepan 1996, p. xiii).

Democratic consolidation is defined by Schmitter as a "process of transformation of accidental arrangements, norms, contingent solutions shaped during the transition into relations of cooperation and competition that are sufficiently known, regularly exercised and freely accepted by all persons and groups, participating in democratic governance of a country" (Schmitter 1992, p. 424). The concept can refer to both a process and its outcome. The point at which a democratic regime may be properly called consolidated remains under dispute but most would agree that democratic practice must be considered, to paraphrase, the only game in town (Przeworski 1991, p. 26). This occurs when no relevant actor can conceive of acting outside of democratic institutions; when those who lose agree to continue the contest within the same framework of institutions and rules. All relevant political actors in a consolidated democracy agree that it is best to subject their own interests and values to the mutual interactions of institutions which guarantee both unambiguous rules of the game and uncertain outcomes.

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan distinguish between behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions in their evaluation of the deg constitution is respected and what mechanisms guarantee that constitutioree of consolidation achieved (Linz & Stepan 1996, p. 6). One advantage of their approach is that they can draw a nuanced, differentiated picture that can capture the uneven pace of democratization. Schmitter questions this approach and suggests focusing on the most crucial aspects of democratic consolidation, specifically, "the process by which actors reach agreement on mutually acceptable rules of the game regulating their competition and cooperation." Schmitter argues that only then is it meaningful to think of the implications that choices of rules may have on "behaviors" and "attitudes" (Schmitter 1997, p. 171). I consider this focus on rules of the game to be the most appropriate approach to the study of regime change in Slovakia. A focus on rules calls our attention to the stability of nascent democratic institutions and allows us to see when they are being challenged.

I seek the establishment of a modern democracy in Slovakia. My normative goal, however, is by no means an assured outcome. Regime change in Slovakia remains an open-ended process. Indeed, theoretically, it is possible to consider a range of possible regime types, including, a stable modern democracy (or what Dahl and Sartori have labeled "polyarchy"), a persistently unconsolidated democracy, or an unstable, authoritarian regime. It is also possible that the regime could oscillate between a democratic and authoritarian form of rule. This has been observed in a number of cases in Latin America (Higley & Burton 1989, p. 28).

The growing global acceptance of democracy as the most desirable regime type has forced even the most populist leaders to avoid being labeled undemocratic. Indeed, the adjective "democratic" has become so frequent in declarations of post-communist populists that there is a risk the term will eventually be purged of any meaning. Indeed, something similar happened to the term "socialism" in the former communist countries. Confusion does not stem from the many competing meanings of the term, "democracy," but rather because the term may mean anything and is frequently misused to cover undemocratic practice. As Sartori says, democracy already means too much (Sartori 1993, p. 9). It is useful therefore to specify my understanding of democracy and then to work with it as an ideal type and identify how an actual state deviates from it.

My definition of democracy is based on the theoretical perspective of Dahl and Sartori who define a modern democracy, or polyarchy, as a regime type in which pluralist, autonomous elites share power according to mutually-accepted rules, including free and regular electoral competition over the power to govern (Dahl 1989; Sartori 1993). Dahl's use of the term 'polyarchy' refers to seven institutions essential to a democratic process of governance in a given country. He thus avoids a minimal definition of democracy that reduces it to the precondition of free elections. The descriptive and more precise procedural definition of Dahl's polyarchy consists of: elected power-holders; regular free and fair elections; the franchise; a right to be elected; freedom of expression; the right to alternative sources information; and freedom of association (Dahl 1989, p. 221).

The presence of these seven institutions in a given country is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. As I mentioned earlier, a regime is defined not only by its formal-legal institutions, but also by practice. An emphasis on practice is particularly desirable in East-Central European post-communist countries where the "semantic occupation" of the region by Soviet totalitarian thought once distorted the meanings of many words and terms. Thus, I would add indicators of the degree of implementation of formal procedures. This would include: the rule of law with constitutionality as its organizing principal; separation of powers; inclusive citizenship; and civil control of security service (Kaldor & Vejvoda 1997). These enable a more substantial operationalization of the level of democratization in single countries.

2. Slovakia in a Comparative Framework

Dahl's approach forms the basis of a recent international comparative study that seeks to identify the level of democratization achieved by the ten Associated Members of the European Union. The study's authors argue that all associated countries, including Slovakia, possess Dahl's seven core institutions and procedures of modern democracy. Differences become more apparent when they compare the implementation of formal procedures. As of 1996, when the study was conducted, Slovakia compared poorly to its Central European neighbors in a number of areas. Specifically, the authors found patterns of a violation of the rule of law, degradation of the separation of powers and a loss or a threat to civilian control of the security service. Romania and Bulgaria had similar problems (Kaldor & Vejvoda 1997, pp. 63-65).

However, both countries have since changed governing elites and made marked improvement. By contrast, Slovakia's performance has slipped further from that of its neighbors. In particular, in May 1997, the government unilaterally cancelled a referendum on direct presidential elections--thus violating the constitutionally-guaranteed right of the citizenry to freely voice its will. 6 This event demonstrates how far Slovakia has to go before it achieves democratic consolidation. Indeed, the ruling coalition has demonstrably found the costs of violating basic legal norms to be acceptably low.

A second comparative study of East European countries employing the same criteria places Slovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria in the category of "fragile democracies." Just below in the rankings are the "semi-" or "pseudo-democracies" which includes countries like Albania, Croatia, and Yugoslavia (Bozoki 1997, p. 20). Due to the failure of the referendum, by the beginning of summer 1997, some analysts might have included Slovakia in the third category. This would probably be a mistake. Semi-democracies are typified by the illusion of free competition for power and the lack of any real possibility to exchange ruling parties save by violent or extra-procedural means. In Slovakia, by contrast, most would agree that conditions still exist for the procedural electoral victory of the current opposition parties. Still, following the cancellation of the May 1997 referendum on direct presidential elections, many are speculating that the ruling coalition might also be willing to introduce undemocratic obstructions or unfair forms of competition into the next elections.

An additional indicator of democratic development in Slovakia is to note changes in comparisons with Rumania. In 1996, Charles Gati performed a comparative analysis of the democratic transitions in 27 former-communist countries in which he lumped Slovakia together with Rumania in his second category of semi-authoritarian regimes (Gati 1996). At the time, Slovak citizens and politicians alike generally felt Gati's analysis was more of a subjective degradation of Slovakia than an accurate measure of reality. Since then, however, democracy in Rumania has enjoyed a renaissance that has improved international recognition and raised Rumania's acceptability as a candidate for integration into euro-atlantic structures. The crucial turning point was a change in the configuration and character of Rumania's national elite. Over the past year, Rumaina's elite have achieved consensus among themselves over Rumania's foreign policy orientation and have unambiguously indicated the political will to direct the country towards western economic, security, and military structures.

The presence of a consensually unified national elite may be more important than popular political culture in generating useful comparisons of levels of democratic consolidation. In comparison to Rumania, Slovakia's national elite remain divided in their readiness to integrate into euro-atlantic structures. The two minor parties of the ruling coalition--the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS)--question steps in this direction and publicly express their opposition to the pro-western aspects of the government's foreign policy. Despite its role in the government cabinet, the leadership of the Slovak National Party has broken with official government policy and officially called for the neutrality of Slovakia. Jan Slota, its chairman, also recently asked United States Ambassador Ralph Johnson to request his government's official guarantee of Slovakia's neutrality. Meanwhile, the Slovak Defense Minister is a SNS cabinet post (For more on Slovakia's foreign policy orientation, see Duleba, in this volume).

3. Threats to the Stability of the Post-November 1989 Regime

Slovakia's political development is frequently associated with "problems of political stability" in common parlance. This vague term is more a diplomatic expression than a clear cut notion. It can include anything from the possibility of a Russian coup d'etat or government overthrow, to popular rebellions in Albania, frequent changes of government in post-war France and Italy, or the breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America during the 1970's. In each of these cases, the degree of threat to the stable democratic regime has varied. A high incidence of political protests, strikes, mass demonstrations, or frequent changes in the make-up of governing coalitions and cabinets, however, do not necessarily result in a unstable regime. Yet, at the same time, an attempt, or the threat of an attempt, to seize government executive power by open force is more likely to indicate an unstable regime (Field et. al. , 1990, p. 156).

By these criteria, Slovakia should not be classified as unstable. Over the past seven and half years Slovakia has had six governments. Nonetheless, considering the "accelerating dynamic" of the economic and political transition or the change in the state's legal framework that accompanied independence, these changes of government should not be considered too frequent.

The first Slovak government was formed in late 1989 and led by Milan Èic, the Minister of Justice of the last communist government of the Slovak Republic. The government resulted from a pact between the old communist elite and representatives of society organized under the civic movement, Public Against Violence (VPN). For this reason, the government was labeled the "government of national understanding." This was intended to be a transitional government--set up only to administer the country until founding elections could be held. It successfully completed this task.

Political formations supporting Meèiar won the first free elections of 1990 as well as the second election in 1992 and the most recent election in 1994. His first and second cabinets lost majority support in Parliament and were recalled. Yet, in both cases, the change of executive governing power took place in accordance with then-valid rules. Meèiar and his supporters, however, argued that the vote of no-confidence that disposed him in March 1991 was undemocratic because it was decided through a vote of the Presidium of the Slovak National Council and not through a plenary session. 7 The second no-confidence vote occurred in March 1994. This time Meèiar and his supporters argued that the dismissal was a "constitutional crisis." Yet his second peaceful removal occurred through a vote of the plenary session of Parliament. When Meèiar assumed power a third time after winning the 1994 election, a committee was established to investigate his March 1993 dismissal. The Constitutional Court, in turn, judged the activity and existence of the investigative committee to be unconstitutional. Nor did the investigation uncover any information that could have been qualified as a government overthrow or a constitutional crisis.

Thus, despite this "crisis rhetoric," political development has been relatively stable since the 1992 elections. This is also due in part to the continuity of the fundamental democratic institutions inherited from the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic: a parliamentary form of government and a proportional electoral system. After independence, these institutional pillars of democracy were strengthened by new institutions of the independent Slovak state--particularly the Presidency and the Constitutional Court.

To head the Presidency and Consititutional Court, the government appointed Michal Kovaè and Milan Èic respectively. Both men were former communists (and subsequently HZDS members). Their communist background led many people to doubt that the new institutions would strengthen democratic practice in Slovakia. Fewer still expected that the institutions would become guardians of democratic rule. Indeed, the tendency of Slovaks--including both the post-November 1989 elite and the general population--to personalize politics, meant that initially they greatly underestimated the importance of the institutional aspect of the political transition. This was true too of the dissident elite who, reflecting Havel's concept of "non-political politics," downplayed the importance of formal institutional and legal structures after the fall of totalitarianism.

There is thus some reason to question a classification of Slovakia as an instable regime according to the popular stereotype of the term. Indeed, Slovakia has demonstrated remarkable stability across a number of contentious--but procedurally correct--changes of government. Moreover, the addition of the Presidency and the Constitutional Court, two important checks on parliamentary power, has raised the level of resiliance of the post-November 1989 regime.

That said, the basic institutions of the regime have come under increasing pressure over the past two years leading one to question whether the popular definition of stability is sufficiently nuanced to capture the changes. One crucial attribute of a stable democratic regime is that rulers can be removed, governments may be exchanged, but the regime remains. 8 A precondition of a stable democratic regime is thus the existence of unambiguous, rules of the game that do not guarantee pre-ordained outcomes for any competing actors. Actors must submit themselves to the uncertainty of free and open elections at regular intervals. When power-holders establish rules that pre-ordain outcomes in their favor, the regime ceases to be democratic. By this reasoning, a challenge to the democratic rules of the game is a threat to the stability of the regime.

Under this more nuanced definition, Slovakia's stability has been challenged. Since the elections of 1994, the incoming governing elite have made several attempts to change rules of game that have been in place since the November 1989 revolution. In addition to the restrictions in minority representation on parliamentary committees, on governing bodies of the National Property fund, and on oversight committees for key state functions; and in addition to the cancellation of the May 1997 referendum on direct presidential elections, the new majority coalition has made a number of changes that weaken Slovakia's democratic character in a number of sensitive areas. Just a few examples include:

While the means used to enact these changes were by and large procedurally constitutional, the ruling coalition's changes, and attempted changes, in the rules of the game went beyond a standard struggle for power between a ruling coalition and its opposition. Indeed, this was a battle over the very rules that decide who will be winners and losers in the contest for political and economic power.

Wherever possible, HZDS attempts to ensure that the new rules would guarantee it an advantage. Worse, constitutionality as an organizing principle of the rule of law has been subordinated to this principle in much of the ruling coalition's legislation and many of its administrative decrees. For this reason, a large number of the laws passed by the government have since been rejected by the President or later returned by the Consitutional Court. In this sense, HZDS has maintained a sustained attack on the stability of the democratic regime.

In addition to the question of instability, these frequent attempts to change the rules of the game have reduced the level of democratic institutionalization in Slovakia. The opposition's ability to compete for power on equal terms and its opportunity to participate in the control of the current executive has been severely circumscribed. The executive dominates Parliament and there are few remaining parliamentary checks on his power. Parliament's relevance is now very low as it generally rubber stamps the decisions of the the ruling coalition parties. As U.S. Ambassador Johnson recently warned, "Parliament itself appears to be relegated to an increasingly marginal role; with less and less scope for meaningful participation by oppositon parties in key decisions" (Johnson 1997).

An additional challenge to democratic institutionalization has been the trend towards party-state corporatism. Party-state corporatism is a type of interest group representation in which the dominant ruling party or parties either establish party-affiliated or controlled interest group monopolies in a certain field, take control of ("colonize") existing societal interest groups, or establish parallel interest groups that compete with independent societal interest groups in their particular field. Recent work by Darina Malova has demonstrated how this form of societal interest group representation has become a standard control mechanism of the current coalition over the past two years (Malova, in this volume). Party-state corporatism is actually a more sophisticated way of establishing the hegemony of the ruling party under the conditions of formal democracy.

Beyond erosion of constitutionality, the rule of law, and the principle of equal access to the state, HZDS has also attempted to change the Constitution itself to maximize its partisan advantage. HZDS parliamentarians have explored means to replace the parliamentary form of government with a presidential form. However, the ruling coalition requires a qualified majority to change the Constitution. Their simple majority is thus eight delegates shy. In addition, HZDS proposals to change the electoral law to favor a large party by establishing a winnner-take all majoritarian electoral system (which could then be gerrymandered to HZDS advantage), would fail to gain even a simple majority. Its small-party coalition partners steadfastly refuse to support a change in the electoral system that they would clearly find unfavorable (Krivy, in this volume). HZDS probes go beyond a simple conflict between two different understandings of democracy. What is really at stake is the persistence of the post-November 1989 democratic regime itself and its norm of a fair and free political competion in which the outcome remains uncertain.

4. Indicators of Political Backsliding

Two and half years after the current ruling coalition came to power, political backsliding is continuing and even accelerating. In no other electoral cycle have the opportunities for the oppositon to participate in key decisions been as circumscribed as they are now. Samuel Huntington's criterion for democratic consolidation is the second governmental turnover. If, after the second turnover, "elites and publics are operating within the democratic system." And if, "when things go wrong, you change the rulers, not the regime," the regime can be safely considered successfully consolidated (Huntington 1991, p. 267). Slovakia has had two turnovers since the 1992 elections but arguably fails this "two turnover test." The first turnover occured in March 1994 after a split in the ruling HZDS produced a subsequent change of government. The grand coalition that followed comprised five parties ranging from the center-right Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) to the Party of Democratic Left (SD_). These ruling parties failed in the elections of September 1994 leading to a second turnover. After a month of negotiations, parliamentary power settled around Meciar's HZDS and its two coalition partners, ZRS and SNS.

The leaders of the failed parties surrendered their offices and power without incident. Yet, since the second turnover, the current ruling coalition has spent significant resources attempting to change the rules of the game in ways that privlege them in current and future political competition. Slovak democracy has therefore not consolidated, rather it is backsliding as the country's leaders take steps to minimize the role of the oppositon in the country's governance.

Backsliding in democratic institutionalization has damaged perceptions of Slovakia abroad. Criticism from European Union and NATO bodies point out a number of political impediments to Slovakia's fulfilling the political pre-criteria necessary to be considered eligible for EU membership. Among the most promenant are: (EU Commission document, 1997)

The gap between formal rules--including constitutional design and administrative "hardware"--and the way many political institutions increasingly work in Slovakia strongly suggests a delegative, rather than representative, notion of political authority. Modern state governance is based on legal-rational authority. By contrast, delegative authority is frequently rooted in charismatic and populist leadership. The concept of "delegative democracy" was perhaps best discussed by O' Donnell as an empirical generalization drawn from Latin American transitions (O'Donnell 1996). Although the development delegative forms of rule may have been a progressive step in certain periods in the Latin American context, it is inapprorpiate for Central Europe. At the most basic level, a delegative electoral mandate to a charismatic and populist leader will not meet the political criteria for EU or NATO membership--particularly if the leadership fails to feel fully constrained by the rule of law. Nor does charismatic, delegative rule meet even the minimum requrements of a modern democracy (Dahl 1991).

Yet one could argue that delegative rule is at the core of the political style of the current Meèiar cabinet. Once elected and endowed by a parliamentary majority, cabinet members have asserted that the government is empowered to govern the country as it deems fit. The ruling coalition's political style is confrontational rather than consultational. Many of its statements and actions better resemble Sartori's formal definition of "power politics" in which force, deception, lies, and arrogance are justified by the end-goal of retaining rule (Sartori 1993, p. 41). Hence in Slovakia, moments of agreement, negotiation, or compromise with governmental opponents have been rare. This includes various sectors of the society and their civic associations--from higher educaton and independent cultural organizations to secondary and primary school teachers and ethnic minority groups. Above all, there has been an absence of constructive dialogue between the representatives of the executive power and a number of interested publics.

In addition, legislative changes introduced by Meciar's third government have weakened the horizontal accountability of state bodies. As we have seen, the opposition is not represented in bodies which supervise the key insitutions of the political and economic transformation and which are crucial in terms of meeting the substantive criteria of democracy. These include the secret service, public television and radio broadcasting, and the National Property Fund. The governing coalition also takes steps to establish party-state corporate arrangements that make relatively autonomous sectors of society, such as universities, mass media, NGO's, and cultural institutions, accountable to the government (Malova, in this volume). A potential common denominator between these policies could be an attempt to ensure ruling party control. 12

In general, pervasive clientalism (particularly in the privatization process), delegative rule, and weak accountability have allowed a number of authoritarian practices to reassert themselves under the cover of formal democratic institutions. Because the opposition are disadvantaged by these arrangements and hence won't accept the changes, the government's rules and norms actually obstructs consolidation.

In the eighth year of regime change, Slovakia is thus an unconsolidated, unstable democracy. It remains a democracy because elementary, yet fragile democratic institutions persist. But implementation of democratic procedures is often thwarted by the policies of the power holders. The continuing struggle over the rules of the game also reduces certainty and enhances ambiguity. The process of regime change has thus neither led to democratic consolidation nor the establishment of an authoritarian regime. Morover, there still exist relevant actors in Slovakia who do not hesitate to use nondemocratic means to achieve their goals. Consolidation at the behavioral level has therefore regressed rather than advanced.

Nor can we speak about any progress at the consitutional level--particularly after the thrwarted referendum. Completed consolidation at that level would mean that both governmental and nongovermental forces would agree to resolve thier conflicts within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (Linz & Stepan 1996, p. 6). This has not happened. At this stage, it is reasonable to ask whether there are conditions in Slovakia will prevent its unstable democracy from turning into an unstable authoritarian regime?

5. Conditions for Stable Democracy and Slovak Reality

Comparative political sociology has assembled a number of empirical generalizations drawn from democratic transitions--many of which have failed. On this basis, it is possible to determine favorable and unfavorable conditions for the development of a stable modern democracy. 13 Generally favorable conditions include a standard of socio-economic development typical of a modern, dynamic and pluralist society; a culturally homogeneous society; and the existence of consensually pro-democratic elites. This final variable is crucial. Elite activity can compensate when the other two variables are unfavorable; when, for example, society is heterogeneous, or the country posesses segmented subcultures which are a source of acute conflicts.

I would tentatively argue that Slovakia has a divided political culture. 14 Slovak attitudes to fundamental political decisions as well as beliefs about how to resolve society's most pressing problems, are deeply split (Butorová, in this volume; Krivy 1996; Almond & Powell, p. 44). Subcultures are formed around ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic, or regional distinctions, as well as divergent historical experiences. In some countries, however, strong and distinctive subcultures have also been formed around a nexus of political parties and ideologies (Dahl 1989, p. 225).

There are three distinct subcultural divides in Slovakia. First, a cleavage along the urban-rural divide has resulted into two segmented subcultures inside the majority Slovak population. Second, a subculture has formed around the Hungarian minority (Krivy, in this volume). There are also regional subcultures.

Urban-rural divide : Slovakia's antagonistic political camps have crystallized loosely along the urban-rural divide. On the one hand, the nationalist-cum-populist parties of the current ruling coalition (HZDS, SNS, and ZRS), tend to gather along the rural cleavage while standard democratic opposition parties (which, ranging from center right to center left, are, KDH, DS, DU, SDSS, SZS, and SD_), are gathered around the urban cleavage. The Hungarian subculture is represented by the parties of the Hungarian Coalition (For more about political profiles of all relevant political parties, see Mese_nikov, in this volume).

Antagonism between these two groupings of political parties are not based on differences in socio-economic interest. Rather, antagonism reflects a fundamental and deeply polarized cleavage in beliefs and attitudes about current politics. Indeed, political beliefs are sharply split on a number of fundamental issues, including "evaluation of the old regime, efficiency of the economic transformation, social problems, [and] foreign policy orientation" (Miháliková 1997, p. 16).

The Ethnic Divide : Slovakia posesses a ethnically heterogeneous society even within the framework of the traditionally heterogeneous Central European region. According to the most recent 1991 census, approximately 14 percent of the inhabitants of the Slovak Republic claimed non-Slovak ethnicity. 15 The Hungarian minority is the largest and represents about 11 percent of the country's population (Dostál 1997, p. 63).

An indicator of the distinctiveness of the Hungarian minority subculture is that few Hungarian voters support a Slovak political party (see Butorova, in this volume). The Hungarian minority also maintains its own left-right constellation of political parties, MKDH, Coexistence, MOS. Pressure to pass the minimium threshold required to take a place in Parliament led the Hungarian formations to form the Hungarian Coalition.

The regional divide : While contemporary political cleavages roughly trace the urban-rural and ethnic divides, regional cultural differences also play a role. There is, for example, a strong correlation between the contemporary voting preferences of certain regions and electoral support for nationalist-populist Hlinka's People's party (HS_S) in the inter-war period. Generally, regions that voted for HS_S in the 1920's and 1930's are significantly more likely to support ruling coalition parties today (Krivy 1996, p. 150; also see his article in this volume).

Cleavages formed around ethnic, urban-rural and regional differences have produced ongoing cultural conflict and contributed to the deep polarization of society. The most divisive conflict is a line between the nationalist-populist camp on the one hand, and the leaders of both the Slovak opposition parties and Hungarian opposition parties on the other. 16 The political antagonism of those two camps, however, has deeper socio-cultural roots at the level of the urban-rural societal cleavage--despite the fact that this cleavage appeared to have been eradicated by "socialist industrialization." The accelerated transition dynamics since the collapse of the old regime have revealed how relevant the impact of the nature and timing of modernization is on the capacity of a society to respond to the challenge of economic and political transformations. Slovakia experienced the peripheral modernization of an early-late comer. Moreover Slovakia was seriously affected by Soviet-type industrialization. Neither factor entirely eradicated rural traditionalism as a force in Slovak political culture. Thus, although Slovakia is industrialized, it has achieved a lower degree of modernity--particularly in its cultural dimension. The Czech Republic, by contrast, was the only early modernizer in East-Central Europe.

The evidence of continuity of the patterns of such type of modernization is reflected in the ongoing significance of the classical urban-rural cleavage and its role in the formation of the major subcultures (Szomolányi 1995). Hence the reason why the current ruling coalition finds its greatest support in a "socially conservative rural setting," while support for opposition parties comes more frequently from urban or even metropolitan surroundings (Krivy, in this volume). In short, Slovakia's relatively traditional rural culture favors the emergence of a charismatic and populist politician (For a sociological explanation of the Meèiar phenomenon, as well as polling data, see Szomolányi 1996).

The relationship between the political representatives of the Hungarian minority and the Slovak democratic public is less tense than the relationship between these two camps and the ruling coalition. At the same time, there are significant obstacles to their cooperation which stem from different concepts of minority rights, particularly in the dispute over the issue of ethnic autonomy. Recently, however, stronger pressure by the ruling coalition on the Hungarian minority has promoted cooperation between these two groups. In this respect, it may be argued that the weight of the ethnic divide has decreased among those two political subcultures.

5.1 Configuration of the National Elite as an Independent Variable

Cultural heterogeneity and subcultural pluralism complicate the task of establishing a sustainable democracy, but they are not fatal obstacles. History offers numerous examples of countries with extensive subcultural pluralism which have developed consolidated democracies, including Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands (Dahl 1989, p. 257). These countries demonstrate that it is possible to overcome unfavorable conditions if they posess a coherent national elite that is able to manage subcultural conflicts. This should take the form of political leaders and activists with clearly prodemocratic attitudes and support for democratic institutions. A pre-requisite for a stable democracy is a compromise among elites over the parameters of the political system, forms of ownership, and property distribution. Democratic stability also requires consensus on the country's basic foreign policy orientation (for an extended discussion of this point, see Duleba, in this volume).

The focus on elites is relatively recent in research on democratic transitions (Higley & Burton 1989, p. 17). An advantage of an elite framework is that it allows the analyst to use elites as an independent variable in the study of the persistence of democracy and formation of regimes. A number of studies devoted to the relationship between a type of regime and the extent of structural integration and value consensus have concluded that "stable democracy requires strong elite... consensus.... accompanied by wide elite differentiation into specialized, relatively autonomous and competing sectors and groups" (Higley & Pakulski 1995, p. 430). 17 According to scholars of this new elite framework, until a settlement between elites is achieved either by a one-time historical compromise or by gradual transformation, stable democracy is unlikely. In other words, divided or fragmented elites must struggle over and settle on procedural consensus before prospects a sustainable democracy can improve.

Following the 1994 elections, the national elite was configured into a "fragmented polar" arrangement (Szomolányi 1994, pp. 18-20). Since then a shift towards consensual unity has occurred among the leaders of non-governmental opposition parties. The ruling coalition's confrontational style of "politics-as-war" have made the opposition leaders aware of the necessity to search for consensus and effective communication. The struggle for consensus includes an elite faction representing the Hungarian minority. 18 But while the non-governmental elites have come closer together, the absence of communication and negotiation between governmental and non-governmental elite has become decisively more marked. The ongoing struggle for the rules of the game, contributing to the thwarted referendum, has damaged even the minimal elite consensus which existed previously.

The referendum confirmed the suspiscions of many elites that the ruling coalition and its associated elites are waging "politics-as-war" in which the rules and norms of democratic competition are subordinated to ultimate victory. The threat of elite polarization is therefore significant. This is disturbing because Higley associates a deeply polarized elite configuration with a greater likelihood of an authoriatarian regime (Higley & Pakulski 1995, p. 418). Yet despite the widening of the gulf between opposition and government elites after the May referendum, the current configuration of the Slovak national elite remains more fragmented than polarized. Higley and Pakulski's study of the configurations of national elites in eight East Central Europeans countries argues that both Slovakia and Bulgaria demonstrate "no convincing evidence of a basic democratic-reformist consensus among the major elites." In Slovakia, they add, the leaders of the Hungarian minority "are excluded from political decision making" (Higley & Pakulski 1995, p. 431).

But while Slovakia lacks an elite unified behind the concept of democratic norms and procedures as "the only game in town," it has not crystalized into two irreconcilable camps--one of which will only be ruled by authoritarian force. The implication for Slovakia's democratic future is that its elite configuration neither predisposes it to consolidated democracy nor to authoriatianism. Rather, the fragmentation of the elite allows some room for maneuver and pact building and hence the potential to swing in either direction.

5.2 Elites fail the Slovak people

While historical generalizations lead us to expect that the configuration of national elites has an independent impact in regime formation, society might also play an independent role. Thus it is reasonable to ask, who is responsible for Slovakia's "democratic deficit"--the fragmented national elite or the Slovak population? Put another way, is it the political elites or the voters who eventually decide how the country will be governed? While the political culture of elites and general population are two sides of the same coin, the final composition of the ruling coalition is not determined by election results alone. Subjective decisions, accidents, and contingent moments also play a role. The degree of consensual unity among the elite shapes the final composition of the ruling coalition and specific power relations.

Political and economic elites have the power to make strategic decisions and thus bear responsibility for the direction of the Slovak Republic. Individual or factional responsibility directly corresponds to their share of executive and legislative powers. In Slovakia, power is highly concentrated in the hands of the politicians of the ruling coalition. They have reduced Slovak politics to a "zero-sum game"--excluding their parliamentary opponents from a wide range of important policy decisions. Opposition leaders cannot be entirely exempted from responsibility, however. They have failed to demostrate to the outside world that there is an alternative to the politics of the current regime. They have also failed to dispel the foreign stereotype that reduces all events in Slovakia "the phenomenon of Meèiar."

Slovakia differs from its Central European neighbors in the absence of consensus over the foreign policy of the country--this includes division amongst opposition leaders. Slovak leadership also lacks diplomatic skill and retains a parochial view of the world and politics. Again, this includes a number of opposition leaders. The effect has been to damage their image abroad as as an efficient and influential political force.

An empirical analysis of popular beliefs and attitudes indicates that Slovakia's capacity for EU integration is no worse than that of Poland or Hungary (See Central and Eastern Europe  1996). The current ruling elite, however, fails to mobilize Slovakia's human capital for the country's interests. They appear to fear standard democratic rules would endanger their power. It thus seems apparent that they give priority to their particular group and individual interests--while ignoring the broader interest of most Slovak citizens. But their policies and weak pro-western orientation also reflect their beliefs and values, and not only their vested interests (Szomolanyi 1993, 1994). A significant segment of the ruling elite began their political careers under the communist regime of the 1950's and 1970's when the fundamental aspects of the modern state--a separation of powers and a distinct, horizontal division between state and civil society--were criticized as bourgeois excess. Thus, they never internalized the principles of the modern state. Nor do they feel obliged to respect such principles, particularly while they hold power. 19

Civic political culture has never taken deep roots in Slovakia. But once again, this is not distinctly different from Slovakia's neighbors such as Poland or Hungary. The prevalence of populist beliefs and attitudes in those countries is about the same (Miháliková 1997). Slovakia, however, deviates from its neighbors in another important respect: the extent to which extreme elements of society have been mobilized and pushed into the center of the political system. A number of Slovak political parties, such as the far-right SNS and leftist ZRS, would have been marginalized in Poland or Hungary (for more on this, see Szomoláni 1995). Yet, in Slovakia both are coalition members and their activity as the representatives of the state administration has strongly damaged the perception of Slovakia abroad. As a rule, they have operated with the silent consent of the major coalition party--HZDS.

To summarize, while Slovak society has contributed to the unique path of regime formation in Slovakia, empirical analysis demonstrates that popular patterns of political beliefs and behaviours are not significantly different from the populations of Slovakia's Central European neighbors. An explanation for Slovakia's Democratic deficit must therefore be found in the configuration and attitudes of the national elite. Slovakia's ruling elite were socialized under communism and lack values consistent with a modern state. Slovakia's ruling elite also mobilize extreme elements at all key sectors of the society and pushes them into the center and not the margin of the society (Szomolanyi 1995). communi

6. Factors Underlying Slovakia's Transitional Lag

A comparison of Slovakia with its Central European neighbors indicates that the country possesses the least robust cumulation of favorable conditions for democratic consolidation. Slovakia has a higher degree of ethnic heterogeneity, greater subcultural segmentation, and an absence of a sustained, historical experience with statehood. At the same time, the number of tasks that Slovakia has had to complete simultaneously is higher than in the Czech republic, Poland, or Hungary. The additonal task of state-building, in particular, has complicated regime change. Perhaps most importantly, the circumstances and events under which the state was established had a significant formative effect on the values and configuration of Slovakia's national elite. 20

The origin of the current disunity among Slovakia's elite is to be found in the problem of statehood. Historically, this problem is not exceptional. But, the Czech lands, Poland, and Hungary experienced problems of state-building as early as the 19th century. In the Czech lands, for instance, civil society began to emerge simultaneously with the process of national emancipation in the second half of the 19th century. This paved the way for a smoother transition to statehood following the First World War. By contrast, the Slovak process of democratization and statebuilding have overlapped and been compressed into a relatively short time frame. Often the two processes have contradictory logics.

Around the time of the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1918, founding Czechoslovak President, Tomas Masaryk, claimed that the "original idea of founding a state is the basis for its persistence." I think this is a rather romantic phrase which misses the substance of the problem. More appropriate is a generalization from systems theory, "the circumstances of the origin of a system determine its development." This applies to Slovakia's foundation. communi

An independent Slovak Republic was established on January 1, 1993 due to a pact of the winners of the 1992 elections. 21 The decision was made without a referendum and against the will of the majority of the Czech and Slovak citizens (For polling data, see Bútorová in this volume). The "founders" of the Slovak republic, however, never elaborated a concept for building the new state. The concept of an "ethnic Slovak nation-state," however, was strongly present in their policy. The preamble of the Slovak Constitution, for example, begins with a phrase, "We, the Slovak nation." Only later are ethnic minorities mentioned as "other citizens," but not as a part of the "Slovak nation." This implies the exclusion of national minorities from participating in state-formation (Kusy, in this volume).

Formally the principle of inclusive citizenship exists, but the founders of the new Slovak state have applied a principle of exclusion. This is not the formal, transparent exclusion that has afflicted ethnic Russians in the Baltics. Rather, citizens are informally divided into categories of "good Slovaks" and ethnic Slovaks who were against the division of the former Czechoslovakia and independent statehood of the Slovak Republic. Ethnic Hungarians are also excluded. The leaders of the ruling coalition derive at least some of their legitimacy from their status as "founders" of the independent Slovak state. On this ground, they claim the right to prevent all who were against the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republic from participating in building the new Slovak state. They often tell both opposition leaders and representatives of the cultural elite, "You were against it--you have no right to talk."

I consider this way of state formation to be an illegitimate privatization of the state by a group that actually represents a minority of Slovak citizens. It is an attempt to use the symbols and rhetoric of statehood to achieve partisan advantage within that state. Moreover becuase it promotes elite disunity and exacerbates subcultural conflicts--rendering them more difficult to manage--it contradicts the logic of democratization.

An additional Slovak disadvantage in regime change was the delayed start of liberalization from the communist regime. In Poland and Hungary, liberalization of the political system began in the pre-transition period. Both countries thus experienced economic and political reform attempts prior to the year 1989. During this period, communist rule was both more flexible and pragmatic. Czechoslovakia's communist regime prevented liberalization almost to the eve of November 1989. The Czech Republic overcame this less favorable pre-transiton period with its comparative advantage of being the only early modernized country in Central and Eastern Europe. The Czech lands profited from experience with advanced capitalism and modernization before the communist regime imposed Soviet industrialization. By contrast, Slovakia entered the communist period a rural, traditional country.

Cultural conflict in Slovakia and the resulting polarization of Slovak society may be interpreted as an outcome of Slovakia's peripheral modernization within the framework of the Austrian-Hungarian empire at the beginning of the century and the later misdevelopment of "socialist industrialization." While both Hungary and Poland industrialized largely under socialist conditions, both had the comparative advantage of a significant experience with statehood. By contrast the modernization of Slovakia was dominated by external economic and political actors . Liberal civic principles imposed at first from Budapest and later from Prague were often refused only on the ground of the nationality of their advocates. They were perceived as "alien" or foreign. In addition, Hungarian revolutionary liberals lacked any understanding of the national emancipation demands of the Slovaks. Later, Czech administrators were perceived as equally insensitive.

Since November 1989, endogenous actors of regime change have introduced principles of economic and political liberalism. Considering the short time frame of the transition, the outcome has not been so bad. There is reason to speculate that Slovakia may have never had such significant support for modern democracy in its history. In particular, according to the analysis of dynamics of beliefs and attitudes conducted by Z. Bútorová, support for democratic principles has increased markedly. Particularly, support for the rule of law, a plurality of opinions, and politics as a bargaining process with an uncertain outcome, as well as respect for minority rights and freedom of media, has strengthened. Compared to findings in 1994, support of democratic principles increased from 47 to 59 percent, while support for hybrid principles declined from 40 to 30 percent. In addition, support for nondemocratic principles declined from 13 to 12 percent. Similarly the demand that the opposition should participate in decision-making and the supervision of executive power obtained strong support among the general population. 87 percent of respondents agree with the participation of the opposition in the supervising committee of the National Property Fund; while support for opposition participation on the supervising committees of the TV and Radio Board and Slovak Intelligence Service was 80 and 74 percent respectively. The strength of this support implies that many of the supporters of the ruling coalition are included in the civic majority (Butorova, in this volume).

Thus, according to existing data from recent surveys, one could even conclude that, "the strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life" while "support for antisystem alternatives is quite small" (Linz & Stepan 1996, p. 6). These are criteria set out by Linz and Stepan for the attitudinal dimension of democratic consolidation. Yet while Slovak attitudes towards democracy seem to be improving, development of the two remaining dimensions of democratic consolidation--behavioral and constitutional--have been characterized by backsliding.

The positive shift in attitudes thus contrasts with the growing "democratic deficit." Nevertheless, it is certain to be a positive resource in the development and consolidation of a democratic regime in Slovakia. Other favorable parameters include: the persistence of a favorable constitutional design (a parliamentary form of rule and a proportional electoral system); the independent performance of the Constitutional Court; the democratic and anti-isolationist performance of the President; the continued survival of an independent mass media; and the activities of a great number of civic and professional associations and NGO's. While these advantages are many, they may ultimately be outweighed by the lack of a consensually unified national elite.

Conclusion

The title of the Slovak version of this paper is "What type of regime is developing in Slovakia." I left off the question mark because I wanted to indicate my desire first to grasp things as they are, and only then speculate about where the young country is going. The presense of unfavorable conditions--cultural heterogeneity, subcultural conflicts, in addition to the absence of a consensually unified elite, civil control of the security service, or any significant experience with independent statehood before 1993--leads to rather pessimistic forecasts. Dahl's descriptive theory of democracy concludes that if a country lacks favorable conditions and obverse conditions are present, "a country will almost certainly be governed by a nondemocratic regime" (Dahl 1989, p. 264). Dahl's prognosis bodes ill for Slovakia. Yet there is some reason for optimism. That authoritarian tendencies are present in Slovakia cannot be questioned. An authoritarian regime, however, has not been established. The struggle for the rules of the game continues while democratic institutions and procedures do exist--although their implementation is often called into question and sometimes even blocked.

A transformation of Slovakia's fragmented elite factions into a consensually unified national elite that backs democratic procedure as the only game in town is not likely in the short term. For this reason, I believe that today's unstable regime is likely to continue into the future. In more favorable circumstances, that instability may take the form of an unconsolidated democracy.

At least two full electoral cycles are required to assure democratic consolidation. The independent Slovak republic is still facing the completion of the second cycle. The next election in 1998 may be crucial for the direction of regime development in Slovakia. Yet, even the most favorable outcome in the next elections would not complete the consolidation of democracy. It would only indicate which outcome of the open-ended process will be more probable.

Considering the significant accumulation of obstructive conditions for a stable democracy, the persistence and consolidation of democratic institutions are by no means pre-ordained. In the medium term, a variant of unstable regime seems to be the most likely outcome. Therefore the establishment of a stable democratic regime--in contrast to countries with historically more convenient conditions--is a great challenge for Slovakia. It requires extraordinary activity by both elites and citizens. But current developments show that the configuration of elites is not only an independent variable in the theoretical study of regime changes, but a crucial factor in the ability of Slovakia eventually to win accession into NATO and the EU. A prerequisite is thus to develop a "euro-compatible," consensually unified national elite.

References

Note 1: Václav Klaus of the Civic Democratic party (ODS) and Vladimír Meèiar of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) were the winners of the 1992 lections. Back.

Note 2: The National elite are "defined as top position-holders in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural organizations and movements in a society" (Higley & Burton 1989, p. 18). Back.

Note 3: Some scholars have even used Slovakia as an illustration of narrow-minded behavior of post-communist elites. These elites, they argue, calculate that "the costs of complying with the EU's expectations often outweighed the benefits afforded by the EU's approbation. This tension is exemplified by the fate of Slovakia" (Snyder & Vachudová 1997, p. 32). Back.

Note 4: It also typifies the classic practice of the "tyranny of the majority" in the constitutional sense of the term (For more, see Sartori 1993, p. 134). Back.

Note 5: Despite its majority, the ruling coalition did not actually form a cabinet until a month later. Until then, the exisiting cabinet was actually in the minority opposition. Back.

Note 6: In addition to the questions on the direct election of the President, the referendum included three questions relating to NATO membership. These were left on the ballot, but after the removal of the fourth question only around ten percent of the electorate actually turned out, leading the Central Referendum Committee to officially void the referendum on May 26. In its report to Parliament, the Central Referendum Committee said that the Ministry of the Interior had not carried out the ballot according to law. The Minister of Foreign Affairs subsequently resigned arguing that infighting between the President and Prime Minister was hindering the effective functioning of his office (SME , May 27, 1997). Back.

Note 7: This was procedurally correct, but Meèiar used it as an argument that his demission had been orchestrated by an insider's clique bent on preserving Czech and other non-Slovak interests in the Slovak transformation. His rhetoric was enormously successful--winning the trust of about 85 percent of people polled. Back.

Note 8: This attribute is considered by Huntington to be a criterion of consolidated democracy. He argues: "Democracy does not mean that problems will be solved; it does mean that rulers can be removed; and the essence of democratic behavior is doing the latter because it is impossible to do the former" (Huntington 1991, p. 263). Back.

Note 9: Nevertheless, the NPF continues to privatize through sales of shares on the capital markets. Many of these sales appear to have been done illegally (For more, see Miklo_, in this volume). Back.

Note 10: For more detailed evidence of both the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and the absence of civilian control over the security forces, see Valko (1997, p. 79). Back.

Note 11: "I wish to convey our concern that rule of law and democracy do not yet appear to be sufficiently deeply rooted in Slovakia," the EU External Commissioner Hans van den Broek told a news conference at the end of a one-day official visit on May 29. During his talks with Meèiar, President Kováè, parliamentary leaders from all parties and leading industrialists, van den Broek said concerns had been highlighted by events surrounding May 1997 referendums. "All Slovakia's friends were appalled by the circumstances surrounding the invalidation of last weekend's referendum," van den Broek said, "When the judgment of the Constitutional Court and the position taken by the Central Referendum Commission were effectively ignored by the authorities." ( Národna Obroda , May 30, 1997). Back.

Note 12: For a detailed and complex study of the struggle between NGO's, the third sector and the executive, particularly the case of the foundation law, see Martin Bútora et. al. (1996). Back.

Note 13: Given Dahl's four criteria of polyarchy - free and fair elections, freedom of organizations, freedom of expression, and existence of alternative sources of information, a classification of 168 countries from 1981-85 indicates that the establishment only 31 percent of the countries could be classified as democratic (Dahl 1989, p. 241). A second, later classification conducted by Huntington in 1990 shows that roughly 45 percent of world's countries had democratic systems, the same percentage as in 1922 (Huntington 1991, p. 26; See also, Almond & Powell, 1988; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Pakulski, 1995; Lane, 1997). Back.

Note 14: I use the findings of the complex sociological study of the socio-cultural differences by Vladimír Krivy, and analysis of results of a public opinion polls by Zora Bútorová (1997) and Silvia Miháliková (1995-1997). Back.

Note 15: According to Bricke (1994), the actual figure of non-Slovaks may be as high as 20 percent as many ethnic Roma claimed Slovak ethnicity. Back.

Note 16: According to Kitschelt's terminology, the conflict could be described as between the advocates of left and right authoritarianism of the ruling camp and the left and right libertarianism of the opposition camp (Kitschelt 1995; See also Bútorová 1996, 1997; and Szomolanyi & Lukas 1996). Back.

Note 17: There are three ideal types of national elite configurations: 1. Disunified: structural integration and value consensus is minimal--factions disagree on the rules and codes of political conduct.; accordingly, elites tend to distrust each other deeply, and perceive political confrontation as "politics-as-war." 2. Consensually Unified: structural integration is inclusive--no single elite faction dominates communication and influence networks; there is consensus about the rules of the game and elites perceive conflict over decisions in terms of "politics-as-bargaining." 3. Ideologically unified: Structural integration is inclusive in the sense that it is dominated by one faction or political party; all other factions conform to the single, explicit ideology of that dominant party ( Field et. al. 1990, p. 154). Back.

Note 18: The Hungarian opposition and the recently-formed Slovak Democratic Coalition signed a cooperation agreement in summer 1997. Back.

Note 19: Slovak elites differ from those in neighboring countries due to the different nature of the pre-transition period and the elite formative experiences (For a detailed discussion of differences between Slovak, Polish and Hungarian elites, see Szomolányi 1995). Back.

Note 20: As elite theorists assert, "nation-state formation has so frequently left a legacy of elite disunity and resulting regime instability as to constitute the modal pattern of politics in the modern world" (Field et. al. 1990, p. 159). Back.

Note 21: This was not modern Slovakia's first experience with statehood. In March 1939, a Slovak state was established in response to Hitler's threat to divide the country and annex its former parts to the neighboring states unless its leadership acted quickly to create a closely aligned Slovak state. Back.