CIAO DATE: 05/2014
October 2013
Post-conflict missions by the United Nations are increasingly mandated to reform the security sector and to establish viable security governance organs in, often, collapsed states. UN missions in Timor-Leste, tasked with the build-up of local security institutions and forces from 1999 to 2005, were regarded by some as successful examples of externally-led security sector transformation in so far as they managed to establish a local police force and local security governance institutions. Yet, the breakdown of the Timorese security sector during violent clashes between newly created security forces in 2006 hinted at weaknesses in the externally driven implementation of SSR. The UN mission subsequently mandated to assist in rebuilding the dysfunctional security sector, was however openly challenged by growing local resistance towards external meddling into the highly sensitive domain of security, and simultaneously, by assertive local approaches to security governance. By tracing the UN mission’s steps in performing SSR before and after the security breakdown of 2006, the paper explains inherent flaws in the UN’s approach and expounds the Timorese’ alternative approach. It will be argued that the UN failed to enforce its security governance model in Timor-Leste creating the way for an evolving local approach to security governance.
Resource link: Security sector reconstruction in a post-conflict country: Lessons from Timor-Leste [PDF] - 656K