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Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms *

Alexander A. Sergounin

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

Contents

Introduction

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and its Marxist ideology, and the re-emergence of the Russian Federation as a separate, independent entity have compelled Russia to redefine its national interests and make major adjustments in the spheres of both foreign policy and international relations theory (IRT). These enormous tasks, together with an attendant polarisation of opinion on how to deal with them, have pitted Russia's policy makers and experts against one another in a fierce battle of world views. This debate is far from at an end. Neither a new security identity nor a coherent foreign policy strategy have yet been found.

This paper deals with the different Russian security theories that emerged during the late 1980s and 1990s. It has three main purposes: First, to distinguish and characterise the major schools of foreign policy thought in the country. Second, to examine the sources of change in Russian security thinking. Third, to find out what part of the Russian academic discourse was incorporated by the policy makers into the country's security concepts.

Contemporary scholarship is replete with works describing Russian domestic debates on foreign policy issues. However, there are different views as to the classification of various Russian schools of thought and political factions.

Some analysts have distinguished three main groups: reformist (pro-Western), conservative, and pro-Communist, depending on their attitude towards reform. The first group has been pressing Russia to concentrate its efforts on developing close relations with the West, on integrating into the world economy and on reforming Russia's economy, political system and culture. The second group has been calling for Russia to focus its efforts on developing relations with its neighbouring states, setting priorities roughly according to where these states lie in a perceived scheme of concentric circles emanating from Russia. This school construes the country's national interests as parallel to the traditional concerns of the Soviet Union or Tsarist Russia. A third group has been advocating the restoration of the Soviet empire. 1

This classification could be useful for understanding Russia's domestic debate, but is somewhat simplistic and does not correspond with the specific foreign policy concepts circulating in Russia.

Other scholars prefer to depart from ideological criteria to categorise Russian political factions. Some analysts have accordingly distinguished between reformers, reactionaries, and centrists, which, in turn, can be further sub-divided into many sub-factions and groups. 2 However, this classic Western scheme is hardly applicable to Russia as these terms do not correspond with Russian political life; some of them (for example, the one of political centre) in reality barely exist. To demonstrate the irrelevance of Western terms for a description of Russian politics one can refer to a number of examples. For instance, Yegor Gaidar was viewed as a liberal with economic and social policy doctrines borrowed from monetarism. The Communists have been depicted as conservatives as their political platform coincides (at leat on paper) with the European Social Democrats.

Some scholars, howver, have proposed a more sophisticated classification on the basis of ideological criteria. They have singled out four groups: pro-Western, moderate liberals, centrist and moderate conservatives, and, finally, neo-Communists and nationalists. 3 There is also a slightly different version of this classification identifying Liberal Westernisers, Fundamental Nationalists and Pragmatic Nationalists. 4 However, these schemes still project a Western frame of reference on Russian politics instead of inventing one more oriented to the realities of Russia's situation. Moreover, it is not clear why different factions competing with each other (for example, centrist and moderate conservatives, neo-Communists and nationalists) have been attributed to the same groups. Again, this classification departs from political camps and movements rather than certain foreign policy concepts.

A number of experts have prefered to categorise Russian schools of foreign policy thought according to the theoretical principles that characterise these groups: New Political Thinking, 'Atlanticism', 'Eurasianism', the 'derzhavniki', etc. 5 Undoubtedly a distinction on the basis of concrete IRTs appears more promising than the reformist or ideological criteria. This theory-scheme is helpful not only in distinguishing various schools of thought, but also in providing an insight into their views and role in policy-making. Simultaneously, the two criteria mentioned above should be taken into account as well. Some schools are eclectic in their theoretical principles and, therefore, it is very difficult to draw lines between them merely on the basis of the IRTs to which they apply.

Bearing in mind that reality is richer than the analytical schemes applied in describing it, we will try to use all three criteria - theoretical principles, attitude to reforms, and ideology (with emphasis on the former) - in this study. Chronology is also important for such an analysis as some schools have succeeded each other, while others have co-existed with their rivals.

As contemporary Russian security thinking has its roots in the debates of 1980s (and still echoes them), it is expedient to depart from the foreign policy discourse since the period of perestroika initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev.

 

Paradigm lost: on the ruins of New Political Thinking

Gorbachev's concept of security presented a distinct departure from the old Soviet foreign policy doctrines. His political philosophy - New Political Thinking (NPT) - offered a completely new interpretation of the very nature of security. The concept of security embodied in the NPT was based on a number of political and theoretical principles distinct from orthodox Marxist international relations theory and close to some Western (Social Democratic) IRTs. In doing so, NPT intended to join the more universal modernist thinking grounded on rationality and humanist norms.

First, NPT proclaimed that nuclear war was senseless and inadmissible. As Gorbachev suggested "The fundamental principle of the new political outlook is very simple: nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological or any other goals... Nuclear war is senseless; it is irrational. There would be neither winners nor losers in a global nuclear conflict: world civilization would inevitably perish. It is suicide, rather than a war in the conventional sense of the word." 6 This implied that for the Soviet leadership nuclear arms race with the United States had become senseless. NPT regarded nuclear armaments as threat and a source of tension rather than a deterrent or stabilising factor.

Second, NPT introduced an understanding of security which departed from a set of different characteristics (military, economic, societal, environmental. etc.) rather than just an absence of military threat. According to Gorbachev's ideas, security could not be ensured by military strength, or by a favourable 'balance of forces' in which military strength played a main part. Security depended ultimately on good political relations with potential enemies: arming against them was more likely to increase the external danger than reduce it. The way forward was therefore to do everything possible to build trust and to reduce the level of confrontation. The capitalist West, which Lenin had described as innately aggressive and militaristic, was in reality capable of reaching reasonable compromises and of co-operating to reduce the danger of war, which in a nuclear age had become unthinkable. Both sides should size-up opportunities for confidence-building, disarming by unilateral steps where appropriate, re-deploying their forces in defensive configurations, striving for maximum transparency and regular consultation.

Third, the idea of interdependence was very important for Gorbachev's theory. He believed that security could not be provided on a unilateral basis because the world had become increasingly interdependent. Gorbachev noted, that "all of us in the present-day world are coming to depend more and more on one another and are becoming increasingly necessary to one another... And here we see our interdependence, the integrity of the world, the imperative need for pooling the efforts of humanity for the sake of its self-preservation, for its benefit today, tomorrow and for all time." 7 As the world becomes more and more interdependent, NPT maintained, co-operation was indeed becoming imperative in all spheres of international relations.

Fourth, Gorbachev was fascinated with the principle of the indivisibility of security. "The new political outlook calls for the recognition of one more simple axiom: security is indivisible," he wrote, "It is either equal security for all or none at all. The only solid foundation for security is the recognition of the interests of all peoples and countries and of their equality in international affairs." 8

Fifth, NPT understood security as a synonym for self-determination and freedom of choice. According to Gorbachev, "Universal security in our time rests on the recognition of the right of every nation to choose its own path of social development, on the renunciation of interference in the domestic affairs of other states, on respect for others in combination with an objective self-critical view of one's own society. A nation may choose either capitalism or socialism. This is its sovereign right." 9 In this respect, Gorbachev's interpretation of security was close to Johan Galtung's view of security as a definition of peace and development. 10

The principle of self-determination was a clear message not only to the Third World countries which had to choose between pro-Western and pro-Soviet orientations, but for Eastern European ones as well. In fact, NPT created favourable conditions for starting 'velvet revolutions' in a number of Warsaw Pact countries.

Sixth, NPT proclaimed that ideological differences should not be transferred to the sphere of interstate relations, nor should foreign policy be subordinate to them, for ideologies may be poles apart, whereas the interest of survival and prevention of war stand universal and supreme.

Finally, with adoption of NPT, Soviet threat perceptions changed radically. They were no longer connected to NATO as the primary source of military threat. Instead the NPT focused on the global threats challenging all mankind rather than particular threats to Soviet security. Gorbachev underlined that global issues had become "vital to the destinies of civilization". "I mean nature conservation", he wrote, "the critical condition of the environment, of the air basin and the oceans, and of our planet's traditional resources which have turned out not to be limitless. I mean old and new awful diseases and mankind's common concern: how are we to put an end to starvation and poverty in vast areas of the Earth? I mean the intelligent joint work in exploring outer space and the world ocean an the use of the knowledge obtained to the benefit of humanity". 11

This reconsidering of threat perceptions also paved the way for new military concepts such as 'sufficient defence' and 'reliable defence'. This, in turn, provoked military reforms in the former Soviet Union. 12

On the other hand, NPT acknowledged that the Soviet Union should pay more attention to domestic rather than international problems. As Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, pointed out, "As far as I can see the primary challenge to socialism is no longer of a military nature (although the possibility of accidental war is of course still there). The real challenge does not come from outside but from within socialism itself. The question is whether and how socialism can adapt to the changing realities of the contemporary world, to the scientific and technological revolution, to ecological problems, and to the democratization of political processes, and so on. This is what perestroika is all about." 13

As mentioned, this new concept of security represented a clear departure from old Marxist international relations theory. Global problems - the danger of nuclear war, economic instability, poverty, environmental degradation and disease - threw into relief 'all-human interests', which for the sake of mankind's survival had to prevail over lower-order (national or class) interests. The future reference point should be not the axioms of historical materialism, but what were described as all-human values; peace, justice, and self-determination. International relations should no longer be envisaged merely as an expression of class struggle, but rather as a process that aims at working out a just 'balance of interests'. 14

In line with the NPT, Gorbachev and his advisers ended the Cold War with the West, and subsequently blocked neither the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact nor German (re)unification. Furthermore, a number of far-reaching arms control agreements were signed.

NPT resulted in the concept of a Common European House (CEH) as regards the future model of security order on the continent. As Gorbachev put it, "Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" is a cultural-historical entity united by the common heritage of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, of great philosophical and social teachings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These are powerful magnets which help policy-makers in their search for ways to mutual understanding and cooperation at the level of interstate relations." 15

Gorbachev's main political aim was to end the division of Europe into two camps; capitalist and socialist. A better, more peaceful European security order based on the demilitarisation and humanisation of inter-European politics should be created. From confrontation one should proceed to mutually beneficial co-operation. Furthermore, Gorbachev proposed the establishment of a special arms control regime on the continent, the transformation of NATO and the WTO from military-political into political organisations, the making of the CSCE into the main instrument of pan-European security politics, the resolving of the German problem, and the development of economic and cultural co-operation with the European Economic Community. 16

According to Hannes Adomeit, originally the CEH idea was more slogan than substance. Initially, the implications of this theme were that the United States, as a trans-Atlantic power, really had no business in the European house. 17 However, Gorbachev's approach towards the Atlantic alliance and America's role in Europe gradually changed. Finally, the Soviet leader acknowledged a positive role for NATO in European security and even ceased to oppose a unified Germany's membership in NATO.

The impact of the NPT on late Soviet and early Russian security debates was really crucial. As far as its authors occupied leading positions in both the foreign policy machinery and expert institutions under Gorbachev, it turned into an official ideology as well as a foreign policy doctrine. There was no room for any alternative schools of thought. However, such schools existed, albeit embryonically, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. With Boris Yeltsin climbing to power they got an additional spur. The first stage of their development (1990-92) could be called 'negative': these schools lacked constructive views of their own on security issues; instead they criticised the theoretical, and especially the practical, legacies of the NPT.

Most Russian analysts welcomed NPT's denial of numerous Marxist dogmas. At the same time they were critical of Gorbachev's idea of the supremacy of 'all-human interests' over national interests. They charged Gorbachev with neglecting Soviet security interests in the context of German unification, the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe and arms reduction agreements.

Gorbachev's CEH idea obviously failed. Instead of equality in international relations, the balance of power shifted in favour of the West. Germany was reunited mainly on the West's conditions. NATO did not respond to the collapse of the WTO by dissolving itself. The CSCE did not become the main pillar of the new European security order. Moscow failed to diminish America's influence and participation in European matters. Western European countries refused to negotiate separately with Russia on arms control issues. Nothing had so far come out of Gorbachev's attempt to establish political links with the European Community. The former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe turned out to be unfriendly to Moscow. Processes of disintegration in the outer empire spread rapidly to the USSR itself and finally resulted in its collapse.

According to Neil Malcolm of the University of Wolverhampton, three main schools of foreign policy thought opposed the NPT.

The first one - 'Defensive Realism' - consisted of various political groups from party, diplomatic and military elites united by a concern with the decline of the Soviet power as a result of the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze line. Contrary to the concept of security embodied in the NPT, this group stated that political means of ensuring security are good only in so far as they are backed up by effective military power. 'Defensive Realists' referred to the Gulf War and NATO's policy towards the Yugoslav crisis as proof of the West's adherence to military power in creating a new world order that was far from the naive and romantic NPT scheme.

They were especially infuriated with Gorbachev's rhetoric on 'all-human values' and 'interests'. "The concept of New Political Thinking put forward at the dawn of perestroika," wrote one analyst in February 1991, "has come into blatant contradiction with the processes of real life." Developments in Central and South-Eastern Europe demonstrated, in his view, that 'contrary to widespread belief' other countries are not guided in their actions by all-human values: "We can have either the all-planetary approach, in which national security does not come into it, or classical nation-state approach, in which case we have to reject the principles of all-planetary universalism. There can be no middle position - otherwise we have eclecticism, logical contradiction and, as a result, confusion and muddle in foreign policy." 18

The 'Defensive Realists' underlined that it was naive to ask the West to admit Moscow into its economic and politico-military institutions without changing the foundations of the socialist system and overcoming Russia's economic and technological backwardness. Moreover, they were very sceptical about Western promises of economic assistance for Soviet and Russian reforms and also warned that the ex-socialist states could become part of the pro-Western camp and violate the East-West strategic balance. These countries could soon then become a base for subversive, separatist movements, and could even provoke border disputes involving Moscow.

In many cases the 'realist' criticism of the NPT's theory and practice was well-grounded. However, the 'Defensive Realists' were unable to generate any coherent foreign policy doctrine of their own to cope with the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Their failure to create a theoretical alternative to NPT can mainly be explained by their lack of a clear social ideal. Some of them were in favour of 'classic socialism', while others preferred a 'Chinese model' or a nationalistic version of capitalism, and so on.

Despite the difference in their ideological principles, the 'Defensive Realists' were united in praising realism as the only political philosophy able to guide foreign policy. Power politics and national interest became the central categories of their security thinking. In fact, the 'Defensive Realists' articulated many of the ideas which became fashionable in the Russian foreign policy establishment four-five years later.

The second school of foreign policy thought - the 'New Thinking Radicals' (according to Malcolm's terminology) - tried to defend the initial principles of NPT, and so justify the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze line. The 'New Thinking Radicals' argued that the CEH idea had not failed: there had not a shift of the balance in Europe, but rather an overcoming of its divisions, the creation of a real community on the continent. According to the 'Radicals', the project of building a CEH was only the first stage towards the creation of a global international society.

To explain why Moscow had not yet admitted to the European club, the 'Radicals' pointed to the lack of progress in domestic reforms and the country's inability to meet universally recognised standards for membership. They favoured the further transformation of Russia from a totalitarian to a democratic society as a precondition for the establishment of a new security order on the continent. 19

However, the 'New Thinking Radicals' were unable to generate convincing responses to charges introduced by the 'Defensive Realists' and to adapt the NPT's principles to new international realities.

A third faction - the 'New Realists' - were critical of both NPT and 'Defensive Realism'. They acknowledged the value of the NPT in the destruction of Marxist dogmas and its confrontational thinking, but believed that the NPT was largely irrelevant in this chaotic and multipolar world which does not appreciate 'all-human values'. As one Russian analyst observed, "The slogans of the New Thinking must again be coordinated with real world problems and the country's capabilities, while the good of mankind has to be dovetailed with national interests; political idealism has to be replaced by sober realism." 20

In line with the 'Defensive Realists' the third group believed that an adequate concept of national interests should be elaborated and defended on the world arena. However, this concept should be grounded on democratic values rather than on socialist or nationalist principles as the 'Defensive Realists' suggested. Moscow should be open to co-operation with the West and should continue with Russia's domestic reforms.

The 'New Realists' also acknowledged that the Soviet Union - and later Russia - had lost its superpower status and its former influence in international relations. But they disagreed with the nationalists and the Communists who explicitly or implicitly proposed regaining the country's former status and authority by any means. For example, the 'New Realists' were not upset by the collapse of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. "It is better to have on our borders," wrote Vitaly Zhurkin, Director of the Institute of Europe, "a set of varied but free states with the prospect of prosperity than an illusory, deceptive monolith made up of ever less reliable allies." 21

The 'New Realists' admitted that Russia could restore its power and influence in the distant future, but linked this perspective with the success of economic and political reforms rather than with military capabilities. They recognised the fairly modest position of Russia in both the European and global security systems. The main purpose for Russian diplomacy should, in their view, consist of preventing a new confrontation with the powerful Western countries and providing favourable conditions for Russia's internal reforms.

At the same time, the 'New Realists', similar to their opponents from the 'Defensive Realism' camp, did not elaborate any particular security concept. They simply preferred to follow Machiavellian and Morgenthau-oriented principles in order to outline their vision of international security instead of inventing any new ideas. In general, theorising was not fashionable among the 'New Realists'. They preferred to call themselves pragmatists rather than theorists.

Yet, paradoxically, the 'New Realists" who eventually occupied the top positions in Russia's foreign policy machinery and expertise in 1991-92, were doomed to experience their own period of 'romanticism' or 'idealism'.

To sum up, all three schools either criticised or defended NPT's practical results rather than developing a new international security theory themselves. They borrowed theoretical principles from either NPT itself or classical Western realism.

There were several schools of foreign policy thought in post-Communist Russia, differing both in their conceptual foundations and in their approaches to concrete international issues. It goes without saying that these political and academic groups were still fluid coalitions, and to condense a complex debate into just a few categories obviously risks oversimplification. They do, however, provide us with a helpful framework for analysing Russia's domestic discourse on foreign policy.

 

Drift towards the West: the 'Atlanticists' ('Westernisers')

Some continuity has been seen in present Russian security debates as compared to the years 1990-91. As mentioned, prior to the collapse of the USSR, the 'New Realists' assumed top positions in the Russian Foreign Ministry, presidential apparatus and academic institutions. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev became their recognised leader. Contrary to the period of their opposition to the NPT, they experienced a euphoria of their own as regards their relationship with the West. As Malcolm observed, the 'New Realists', in fact, tended to echo the unconditional Westernism of the 'New Thinking Radicals'. 22 Quite soon this faction was viewed as the 'Atlanticists' or 'Westernisers'.

The 'Atlanticists' occupied key positions in the Yeltsin's encirclement. Besides Kozyrev, Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, State Secretary Gennady Burbulis, Minister of Communications Mikhail Poltoranin, and deputies of Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, Georgy Kunadze and Fedor Shelov-Kovedyaev, were part of the grouping. 23 For that reason, from the very beginning of his career as Russia's leader, Yeltsin's foreign policy was clearly pro-Western. Proponents of these views were also to be found in a small faction in the Supreme Soviet, including Viktor Sheinis, Sergey Yushenkov, Vladimir Kuznetsov, Gleb Yakunin, and Galina Starovoitova; in academia (e.g., Nikolai Kosolapov, Konstantin Sarkisov, Andrei Kortunov); and among well-known journalists (Andrei Nuykin, Otto Latsis, Yuri Karyakin, Vitaly Korotich).

From August 1991 to the end of 1992, the ideas of this group dominated policy formulation and implementation as well as security discourse in Russia.

The 'Atlanticists' believed that the West (Western Europe and the United States) should be the main orientation for Russian foreign policy. They insisted that Russia historically belongs to the Western (Christian) civilisation. That the main task for Russian international strategy should be one of building a partnership with the West and joining Western economic, political and military institutions - the EU, NATO, IMF, World Bank, OECD, GATT, G-7, and so on. Mr. Kozyrev stressed in the NATO Review that Moscow's main guideline is to "join the club of recognised democratic states with market economies, on a basis of equality". 24 He regarded such a partnership as a principal source of international support for Russian reforms.

The 'Atlanticists' believed that the Soviet Union and Russia had been pushed to the sidelines in the development of the international relations system; one that was moving from a bipolar world towards 'concentric circles'. This new world had its core consisting of the most developed nations constituting an informal centre of global development, as well as its periphery. The trend towards the consolidation of the 'centre' of the world policy was largely represented by the G-7 leading states of the world. The 'Atlanticists' considered Russia's joining the G-7 and other Western institutions as the main tool for the country's shift from the periphery to the core of the world. 25

According to the 'Atlanticists', joining the West constituted the best way for Russia to both get rid of its totalitarian past and keep its uniqueness. They pointed out that the experience of many countries, such as Germany or Japan, showed that only by taking the road to civilised, democratic development can a country fully bring its distinctive character as a nation-state to bear. 26

The 'Atlanticists' agreed with the NPT as regards the changing meaning of the concept of security in the post-Cold War epoch. They noted that along with military-political dimensions the new concept should include economic, environmental, demographic, ethnic, religious and other aspects. The 'Atlanticists', however, were against the NPT's 'idealistic' vision of the world and proposed to focus purely on discussions concerning concrete national interests of various countries. 27

During that period (1991-93) Moscow refrained from opposing NATO enlargement. Moreover, on a number of occasions high-ranking Russian officials (President Boris Yeltsin, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, State Secretary Gennady Burbulis, etc.) proposed that Russia itself could one day become a full member of NATO. 28 In the 'Atlanticists' view, NATO was an important instrument in providing both European and trans-Atlantic security. Their only reservations, however, were as to the pace and scope of enlargement. According to one expert, "Russia should not strive to be admitted to NATO before any other country, but neither should it be the one to join it last." 29

The 'Atlanticists' maintained that combined with the CSCE, NATO could become the starting point for the formation of a new type of Euro-Atlantic Community; one which could guarantee international stability from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The 'Atlanticists' insisted that Russia should reduce the global activities of the former USSR due to a lack of resources, and radical changes in the country's foreign policy doctrine should be implemented. They believed that a renunciation of the global imperial policy and the ideological messianism of the former Union could open up prospects for domestic reforms and facilitate Russia's national revival. At the same time, this should not lead to Moscow's self-isolation from wide-ranging processes of international co-operation. 30

The domination of the 'Atlanticists' in Russia's foreign policy making led to a 'honeymoon' period in Moscow's relations with the West. Despite occasional talks on the CIS or the East's importance for Moscow, Russia's attention and efforts were mainly concentrated on contacts with the West.

However, a new geopolitical situation following the breakdown of the USSR, and a number of international and domestic developments, caused a crisis in the 'Atlanticist' school of thought, as well as a shift towards traditional strategic concepts.

It appeared that the West was not really responsive to Russia's demands of large-scale economic assistance and its endeavour at participation in Western economic and politico-military institutions. Moreover, the Western countries often ignored Moscow's position with regard to important security questions (for example, the speed and conditions of Russian troops pulling-out from Eastern Europe, national minorities' rights in the 'near abroad', NATO expansion, conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the arms trade with China, Iran, India and other Third World countries). Thus, the West did not accept Russia either as a part of Europe or Western civilisation in general (the main thesis of the 'Atlanticists'). On a number of occasions Yeltsin and Kozyrev complained about the 'non-constructive' policies of its Western partners.

In addition, bloody national conflicts throughout the southern borders of Russia changed Moscow's security philosophy. It was in relation to the 'near abroad' that the Russian leadership started to define its 'strategic interests', to speak of 'spheres of influence' and to express concern about a possible 'power vacuum' being filled by hostile powers. In fact, Moscow elaborated a sort of a Russian Monroe doctrine when, in February 1993, Yeltsin laid claim to being responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the whole post-Soviet space, and also when Kozyrev appealed to the international community (the UN and the OSCE) to grant Russia an international mandate of peacekeeping efforts in the former Soviet Union. 31

Finally, Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet republics, as well as the anti-Yeltsin political opposition, put pressure on the Russian government to make the latter more assertive regarding the protection of ethnic Russians in the 'near abroad'.

These developments reduced the influence of the 'Atlanticists' in Russian foreign policy and forced their leaders (including Kozyrev) to move closer to nationalist views. 32

Moreover, the 'Atlanticists' split into two groups. While Kozyrev's followers became more assertive as to the West and neo-imperialist as to the 'near abroad', a number of liberal politicians, academics and journalists were in favour of 'civilised dialogue' both with the West and the FSU countries. The liberals opposed Kozyrev's 'linkage tactics' regarding troop withdrawals and Russian national minorities in the ex-Soviet republics. They were also against the maintainance of Russian military bases and its considerable military presence in the 'near abroad'. 33

In 1994-95 the 'Atlanticists' no longer acted as a united political force. At the political level they were able to sell a few ideas to some liberal and reformist organisations and election coalitions (Chernomyrdin's 'Our Home - Russia', 'Yabloko' ('An Apple') led by Grigory Yavlinsky and Vladimir Lukin, Russia's Choice, and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord headed by ex-Vice Prime-Minister Sergei Shakhrai).

 

Looking towards the East and South: 'Eurasianism'

The Yeltsin-Kozyrev pro-Western line evoked painful reactions from many Russian politicians and intellectuals who tried to elaborate some alternative concepts of security. Since 1992 'Eurasianism' has been the first serious alternative to the pro-Western theories which were dominant in Russian security thinking during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 34

The 'Eurasianist' concept ('evraziistvo' in Russian) became very popular among Russian intellectuals during the mid-1990s. The concept drew heavily upon a philosophical school of 1920s Russian emigres who had tried to find a compromise with the Stalinist version of Socialism. It stresses the uniqueness of Russia: One of its key postulates being that in civilisational terms Russia has never been part of Europe. 35 Hence, it should choose a 'third way' between the West and the East. Globally, Russia should be a bridge between these civilisations.

Contemporary proponents of this theory have been split into two opposing groups. One of them resided in the reformist (so-called 'democratic') camp, while the other belonged to the Slavophiles. 36

The Democrats tried to adapt 'Eurasianism' to their views for a number of reasons. First, they realised their own weakness in terms of neglecting the national question and Russian national values. The nationalists and the Communists were obviously stronger in this field, and thus, in part, managed to capture the sympathy of the ordinary people by appealing to their humiliation over their national dignity. According to a well-known Russian writer, Leonid Vasiljev, the Democrats have had to confront the patriots with the Russian idea, and try to reclaim the national, cultural and historical legacy of which the patriots have tried to claim for themselves. 37 Obviously, the adoption of 'Eurasianism' by the Democrats was part of a strategy aimed at conquering both Russian public opinion and the political elite.

Second, 'Eurasianism' was a reaction by those Democrats disappointed by both the the West's reluctance to admit Russia to its institutions, and the scale of Western assistance to Moscow. They understood that it was unwise to rely to heavily upon the West. By adhering to 'Eurasianism' they tried to demonstrate to the West that it could well lose a potential ally.

Third, 'Eurasianism' reflected the geopolitical position of Russia, the need to maintain stable relations with both the East and South. Speaking at a meeting at the Russian Foreign Ministry in February 1992, Sergei Stankevich, the then Advisor to the President, said: "There is no getting away from certain facts. One of them is that we are now separated from Europe by a whole chain of independent states and find ourselves much further from it, which inevitably involves a definite and, indeed, a quite substantial redistribution of our resources, our potentialities, our links and our interests in favour of Asia and the Eastern sector". 38

As apparant from the term 'Eurasianism' itself, the geographic frame of reference for the 'Eurasianist' security concept implied first of all the Eurasian continent. Other regions were of peripheral interests for 'Eurasianism'. Hence, in the methodological sense, the 'Eurasianist' concept of security was somewhat close to the geopolitical school of thought (comparable with the MacKinder 'Heartland' theory).

The 'Eurasianist' philosophy departed from a thesis on Russia's special mission in history. According to Stankevich, "Russia's role in the world is, in my view, to initiate and maintain a multilateral dialogue between cultures, civilizations and states. It is Russia which reconciles, unites, and coordinates. It is the good, Great Power that is patient and open within borders, which have been settled by right and with good intentions, but which is threatened beyond these borders. This land, in which East and West, North and South are united, is unique, and is perhaps the only one capable of harmoniously uniting many different voices in a historical symphony". 39

Konstantin Pleshakov of the Institute for American & Canadian Studies has put it in more pragmatic terms: "...the primary object of Russia's mission today is to be fundamental to Eurasian continental stability... Another aspect of Russia's mission is to guarantee at least minimum respect for human rights in post-Soviet space". 40

The basic idea of the 'Eurasianist' security concept was the notion of 'national interests'. According to Stankevich, the national interests of any country are predetermined by geography, history, culture, ethnic composition, and political tradition. However, from this rather traditional mixture of geopolitical and realist principles he suddenly moved to the messianistic terrain of a 'national idea': "Between those fundamental interests that do not change at all and those that are always changing, there is a set of interests which reflect what may be called the "national idea." The national idea is a nation's self-identity. It is a very emotional topic; a subject concerning the changing course of a nation's history. It is not a scientific value system but a set of visualizations of the national past - and the national future." 41

Stankevich believed that Russian national idea should be one characterised by democracy, federalism, and patriotism rather than totalitarianism, imperialism and socialist internationalism. More precisely he identified Russian national security interests as follows: self-preservation; the prevention of further collapse; the creation of a system of democracy and federalism that checks both imperial dictatorship and separatist tendencies; efficient guarantees for ethnic Russians who live in the 'near abroad'; and the evolution of a strong and efficient state with a stable foreign policy. 42

The 'Eurasianists' hence perceived security as an interaction of internal and external factors from the very beginning. Security was not regarded simply as a phenomenon related to the outside environment (international politics). In fact, the term 'security' was seen as a synonym for 'stability'. Stankevich emphasised that: "What is at stake is our internal stability. Unless we resolve this problem, it will remain a constant source of tension that could explode at any time." 43

The 'Eurasianists' believed that the government had paid too much attention to the Western direction of its foreign policy, while Russia's most compelling needs were in the South and in the East. The 'Eurasianists' argued that, first of all, Moscow should deal with 'the arc of crisis' developing on Russia's southern borders, and with the problems which had arisen in relations with its own sizeable Muslim population. Russia, they argued, has to develop an active diplomacy to meet challenges posed by Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Islamic countries. And that coping with these threats and challenges is more important than maintaining an active dialogue with the West on European and trans-Atlantic issues.

The 'Eurasianist' approach gave priority to the consolidation of economic, political and security ties between the countries of the FSU, preferably within the context of the CIS. "The most important element of Russia's new foreign policy", wrote one follower of 'Eurasianism', "must be the development of relations with countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). These countries are inextricably linked by geographical proximity and historical ties... Because it is the only nation capable of serving as the focus of this new union, Russia must assume the role of protector and guarantor for the smaller states of the former Soviet Union. In addition, it is through such a union that Russia can best support Russians who now find themselves living in foreign countries." 44 The 'Eurasianists' persuaded the Yeltsin government to make the CIS a priority for Moscow's international policy, and to initiate the Commonwealth's integration.

There was some difference of opinion in the 'Eurasianists'' camp as to Russia's priorities within the CIS. Some advocated Ukraine and Belarus as Russia's natural Slav allies, 45 while others proposed a closer relationship with the Kazakh leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev, who was responsive to 'Eurasianist' ideas, and even proposed to establish a Eurasian Union on the basis of the CIS. 46

Alongside the nationalists, the 'Eurasianists' were the first to vigorously push the Yeltsin team in the protection of Russian-speaking minorities in the 'near abroad' and to put this issue at the top of Russia's foreign policy list. Stankevich, for example, stressed that this issue involved the fate of 25 million people and the stability of the entire post-Soviet space. He vigorously denied charges of Russian 'imperialism' by pointing out that every great power normally defends its citizens residing abroad. At the same time, he also ruled out the use of military force or other imperialist methods to protect the Russian minorities. He suggested that Russia should follow the historical experience of a number of the post-imperial countries such as Turkey under Kemal Atatěrk or contemporary Germany, who were both able to take care of their compatriots in a non-imperialist manner. 47

In defining the 'Eurasianist' concept of security regarding the 'near abroad', Vladimir Lukin, the then Russian Ambassador to the United States, called it a Russian variation on the 'good neighbour' policy. According to Lukin, democratic Russia does not fear the sovereignty and independence of its new neighbours; in fact, Russia helped them to become independent in the first place. Moscow is not going to force them to adopt its own form of government, nor will it interfere in their internal affairs. At the same time, Russia is entitled to expect them to respect and uphold the human and civil rights of their Russian-speaking residents. Russia is also justified in expecting its neighbours to prevent threats to Russia from arising on their territory as a result of the activities of third countries. Russia is prepared to provide them with any co-operation necessary to establish their own security through both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Lukin concluded: "In sum, keeping the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) stable through good-neighborliness and collective security serves the security interests of both Russia itself and also those of its neighbors. Maintaining stability also serves the interests of other powers, including the United States, which is the main external player in the strategic balance of Eurasia." 48

For the 'Eurasianists', Eastern Europe was geographic priority number two after the CIS. In 1992-93, the 'Eurasianists' viewed this sub-region through the prism of Russia's economic, rather than purely security, interests. They complained about the disruption of traditional economic ties with Eastern European countries who had appeared to have re-oriented themselves towards the West. However, the school also predicted that very soon these countries would again be interested in co-operation with Russia as the Western markets would no longer have vacant niches. According to one observer, "Russia's economic interests would be well served by a preferential protectionist policy that would enable the East European countries to trade their non-competitive products for Russian non-competitive products. It is incumbent in the Russian government to develop a foreign policy that reflects this fundamental objective - the creation of an Eastern market". 49

It should be noted that many 'Eurasianists' had a background in the academic institutions which dealt with oriental studies. For that reason, 'Eurasianism' clearly had a pro-Eastern bias. The 'Eurasianists' recommended co-operation with the Third World rather than with the industrial West. While the former perceives Russia as an equal partner the latter treats Moscow as a 'second-echelon' state. In addition, a number of prosperous and rich Asia-Pacific nations such as Japan, South Korea and some of the ASEAN countries could be promising trade partners and a source of investment for Russia's troubled economy. 50 Moreover, military co-operation with India and China could be important pillars for the new Eurasian security complex. 51 As Lukin put it, "Russia must put its political and economic relations with China on an equal footing to its relations with Europe and the United States. Russia's goal here should be to establish an "irreversible interdependence", in which neither country could return to a policy of direct confrontation with the other". 52

To the south, the 'Eurasianists' suggested, Russia's primary interest lies in preventing open conflict with third countries over influence in the developing vacuum of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan are already involved in the region. In the 'Eurasianist' view, it was important not only to focus simply on the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, but also to take into account a possible military confrontation between Islamic, Christian, and Asian civilisations. The possible Balkanisation of Russia's southern 'underbelly' would be full of colossal threats, not only for Russian security, but for the strategic stability of all of Eurasia. 53

At the same time, this faction of 'Eurasianists' has not denied the importance of keeping good relations with the West. They do not object to Russia entering either the international economy or the 'defense structure of the advanced part of the world community'. 54 In their view, Russia's most important interest consists of improving their relations with the European Union, and their gradual integration into the European economic and political system. At the same time, Russia should oppose the transformation of Europe into a closed economic system and military-political union, just as it should oppose the appearance of a dominant regional power (Germany). For the 'Eurasianists', it is best to preserve both the multipolar nature of European politics and the role of the United States in the region. At the same time, both the function and the role of NATO should be reconsidered. According to Lukin, "Continuing a NATO-like policy at a time when Germany is strong and Russia is weak is not politics but inertia. It can lead only to the destabilization of Eastern Europe all the way to the Urals, and to the growing "Germanization" of Europe rather than the "Europeanization" of Germany". 55 Instead, he proposed to establish a new European community with the participation of a democratically-transformed Russia and other post-socialist countries.

The 'Eurasianists' placed the United States at the bottom of their priority list. Even so, they still acknowledged the need for close and long-term co-operation with the United Staes simply because it remains as a leading political-military force in the world. The most important area of Russo-American bilateral relations should consist of US support for Russia's progress toward democracy and market economics on the basis of the recognition of its legitimate security interests. If Russian democracy does not succeed, then the entire wave of contemporary democratisation in Eurasia may also fail. Among mutual geopolitical interests, Russian interests in America as a counter-balance to Germany in Europe and to Japan in Asia-Pacific, and US interest in Russia as a stabilising force in the Eurasian strategic space, were mentioned by the 'Eurasianists' as well. 56

The main point in the 'Eurasianists'' dispute with the Atlanticists has been the need to adjust the balance between the Western and Eastern directions of Moscow's international strategy. As one advocate of 'Eurasianism' explained, "Partnership with the West will undoubtedly strengthen Russia in its relations with the East and the South, while partnership with the East and the South will give Russia independence in its contacts with the West." 57

Stankevich described the entire history of Russian foreign policy as a struggle between pro-Western and Eurasian policies. A Russian foreign policy focused exclusively on the West first emerged under Peter the Great. Russia has periodically returned to this policy throughout its history, most recently under Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. A Eurasian-based foreign policy was most strongly pursued during the nineteenth century, when Russian foreign policy was characterised by isolationism from, and confrontation toward, Europe. Stankevich concluded: "Today, neither the Atlantic nor the Eurasian orientation is, by itself, a good recipe for Russian foreign policy. Russians must seek a balance, aiming not towards integration for its own sake, but towards constructive interaction. Russia in no sense rejects the idea of joining the leading states of the world. The question is, when will we enter this group and what do we have to offer the other members?" 58

Initially the 'Eurasianists' were much less influential than the 'Atlanticists' inside the Yeltsin government and Russian political elites. However, as Russian society's discontent with Kozyrev's pro-Western line increased, 'Eurasianism' became stronger among both policy makers and foreign policy experts. Along with Stankevich and Lukin, leading figures most closely associated with this view have been Nikolai Travkin, the leader of Democratic Party of Russia, Anatoliy Sobchak, the former mayor of St. Petersburg, and Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, the head of Committee on International Affairs, Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. 59

However, most of the 'Eurasianists' belonged to the so-called institutchiki (research fellows at various academic institutions such as the Institute of American & Canadian Studies, IMEMO, the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute on Far Eastern Studies, the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, and so on) rather than to professional politicians. 'Eurasianism' for the institutchiki became both fashionable and a chance to make a political career. 'Eurasianism' became so much in vogue that even the doors of influential Russian political science journals such as International Affairs, USA - economics, politics, ideology, Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye othosheniya, Polis, and so on, which usually tend to be pro-Western, were eventually opened to the proponents of this theory.

The 'Eurasianists' did not limit themselves by appealing only to a Russian domestic audience. They undertook a number of public relations campaigns oriented to foreign audiences. For example, the 'Eurasianists' dominated a seminar entitled "Russia's National Interests: An International Dialogue", held in Moscow in October 1992. Two years later, papers presented at the seminar were published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC. 60 'Eurasianism' was met with sympathy by such well-known American theorists as Henry Kissinger, Francis Fukuyama, and Stephen Sestanovich. They presumably took the 'Eurasianists' simply as people who tried to express themselves in terms understandable for Westerners. Moreover, a clear definition of Russian national interests would possibly make Moscow's foreign policy more predictable. They may also have been pleased with how the 'Eurasianists' saw Russia's place and status in international relations. The 'Eurasianists' stated explicitly that Russia no longer pretended to be a superpower and would thus focus only on the post-Soviet space and adjacent regions, leaving the rest of the world for America. In addition, it would clearly be in the interest of the US to have some responsible power in Eurasia which could maintain order and prevent chaos or emerging threats such as resurgent regional powers, militant Islam, nuclear proliferation, and son on.

Starting to coalesce in 1992, by 1993 the 'Eurasianist Democrats' were able to influence security debates in Russia. The theoretical framework of Russia's 1993 foreign policy doctrine (especially the setting of regional priorities) was obviously affected by 'Eurasianist' ideas. 61 The nationalists and the 'Eurasianists' were together successful in forcing Kozyrev to link Russian military politics and troop withdrawals with national minorities rights in the ex-Soviet republics (especially in the Baltic states). Echoing these 'Eurasianist' themes, President Yeltsin during his 1992 visit to India emphasised Russia's Eurasian identity by pointing out that most of Russia's territory - 10 million out of 17 million square kilometres - lay in Asia, and that most Russian citizens lived in the Asian part of Russia. 62

 

'Eurasianism': Slavophile version

In contrast with the 'democratic' version of 'Eurasianism', the Slavophiles downplayed the country's unique geopolitical position and instead stressed Russia's distinctiveness from both the West and the East. Elgiz Pozdnyakov, a Russian authority in international relations theory, noted: "The geopolitical location of Russia is not just unique (so is that of any state), it is truly fateful for both herself and the world... An important aspect of this situation was that Russia, being situated between two civilizations, was a natural keeper of both a civilized equilibrium and a world balance of power". 63

According to the Slavophiles, this predetermined in no small measure the evolution of the Russian state as a great power and the establishment of a strong central authority. Unlike the Democrats, the Slavophiles have not been frightened to label Russia as an empire and to support its revival. Pozdnyakov pointed out that: "Russia has always been held together by a strong system of state power... I have no doubt that guaranteeing Russia's existence is a top priority today. This can only be done by a strong authority equal to saving the people from arbitrary practices, anarchy, hunger and civil war. This must extend to the whole nation". 64

Contrary to the Democrats, the Slavophiles opposed Western assistance. They considered it irrelevant and burdensome, and proposed a reliance upon Russia's own resources. They opposed Russia's joining the of Western economic, political and military institutions on the basis of it restricting the country's sovereignty.

They also favoured turning the protection of Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics into a top foreign policy priority. Contrary to the Democrats, however, the Slavophiles did not rule out the use of force to defend these minorities.

Finally, they proposed to change the current geopolitical priorities by paying more attention to Russia's southern and eastern neighbours and to keep a relatively low profile in the West.

Representatives of this faction have been scattered among many different political parties and groups. The Slavophiles have tended to be grouped around some newspapers and journals - Den (Day), Nash Sovremennik (Our Contemporary), and Molodaya Gvardiya (Young Guard). Politically, they have been organised in associations and election coalitions such as the Russian National Assembly (Sobor), and the Congress of Russian Communities.

By the end of 1993, both versions of 'Eurasianism' - democratic and Slavophile - found themselves, similar to 'Atlanticism' in a critical situation due to a number of intellectual and political factors.

Intellectually, 'Eurasianism' has been unable to respond to two fundamental issues. Firstly: what are the civilisation criteria for drawing lines between the West, the East, and Russia? If a civilisation is to be defined by religion, why does the West include, along with Catholic France and Italy, a Protestant America, a mixed Protestant-Catholic Germany, and an Orthodox Greece? Which religion should serve as a basic criterion in defining the East? Is Russian identity defined by Orthodoxy alone, or instead by a mixture of Orthodoxy and Islam? Does Israel belong to the West or to the East? Indeed, if the level of industrial and technological development is important in distinguishing the West from the East, then Japan is certainly a more Western state than, say, many Western European countries. Moreover, this school of thought has also failed to explain why prosperous Asia-Pacific nations such as Japan, South Korea, some ASEAN countries, Turkey, and so on, have undergone modernisation (including import of some Western values) without any serious damage to their national values and traditions. Being unable to find satisfactory answers to these questions, 'Eurasianism' has operated with concepts which have been misleading, contradictory and unfit for building new theory.

Some critics of 'Eurasianism' have pointed out that what is now called the 'West' can no longer be reduced to Europe and its civilisation. It is a synthesis of cultures and civilisations that has taken decades to accomplish. An important aspect of this synthesis has been the adoption of European cultural values, although this process did not amount to renouncing one's own distinctiveness. Now the West includes not only Europe and North America, but also Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other newly industrialised countries. 65

Secondly, the 'Eurasianists' have been challenged by the question: what is this unique Russian national idea which provides Moscow with a special historical mission? Stankevich's definition of the Russian national idea as 'democracy, federalism and patriotism' hardly reflects the uniqueness of such an idea.

The United States, Canada, Germany, India and a number of other states could describe their 'national ideas' in these terms as well; but it does not provide them with a sufficient moral basis to proclaim their 'special historical mission'. The Slavophiles have also failed to define the Russian national idea. From time to time different concepts - sobornost (conciliarism, rule by a collective mind), dukhovnost (spirituality), the peace-loving Slav tradition, etc., - have been proposed as a frame of reference. But these concepts have obviously contradicted real life in post-Communist Russia and failed to conquer the country's market of political ideas.

Politically, neither democratic nor Slavophile 'Eurasianists' have been able to form an influential political party or coalition. Alternative political movements such as the Communists and the Liberal Democrats have not so much not been concerned with theorising but, instead, have concentrated on more concrete domestic problems. And hence, they have been much more successful on the Russian political arena. Being a product of political and intellectual elites, by the end of 1993 'Eurasianism' had definitely tended towards political marginalisation.

In addition, 'Eurasianism' had had a mixed record in the international arena. With the exception of Kazakhstan, the CIS countries showed little interest in implementing 'Eurasianist' ideas. For some of them (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) 'Eurasianism' represented a cover for Russian imperialism. A number of the FSU countries (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) were interested in co-operation with the Western rather than Asian countries. Neither Western Europe, nor the United States, were satisfied with the role that Russia had been playing in post-Soviet space. Instead of stabilising and mediating, Moscow often fuelled local conflicts operating under the old imperialist principle 'divide and rule'. Moreover, Russia suddenly discovered that it was no longer the only country which laid claim the role of 'bridge' between various civilisations. Some CIS member-states (Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan) and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states) has also sent clear messages to the world that they too claimed the same status.

As 1993 progressed, other schools of thought, alternatives to both 'Atlanticism' and 'Eurasianism', became influential.

 

The rise of the 'derzhavniki'

In June 1992, an important political development occurred in the Russian political arena. A powerful centrist alliance, the Civic Union, was formed. This co-alition of centrists was the end result of a process of consolidation of the three major political forces - the industrial lobby, the federal military and civilian bureaucracies, and the moderate Democrats. The three leading figures of the new alliance were Arkadii Volskii, co-leader of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, the de facto head of the 100,000-member People's Party of Free Russia; and Nikolai Travkin, chairman of the 50,000-member Democratic Party of Russia. 66 The former Secretary of the Security Council Yuri Skokov and Vice Premiers Oleg Lobov and Mikhail Malei supported the group as well. In the intellectual community its positions have been elaborated by Sergei Karaganov, Andrei Zubov, Andranik Migranian among others. 67

This group was quickly labelled the 'derzhavniki' or the 'gosudarstvenniki' (proponents of state power). 68 The term of 'derzhavnik' denotes the advocation of a strong and powerful state which can maintain order and serve as a guarantee against anarchy and instability; a rather traditional Russian view of the state's role.

Their domestic political aim had been to slow down the pace of market reform and to force the government to make major concessions to the powerful interest groups that they represented (state-owned enterprises, workers in the defence sector, some leaders of organised labour).

They proposed paternalism as the main ideology for the new Russian state. According to Karaganov and Alexander Vladislavlev, First Vice President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, "The central authority seems bound to become paternalistic with a strong presidency as its basis, but also with democratic institutions, a parliament, a judiciary and above all a free press preventing its possible degeneration into totalitarianism. A most powerful barrier to degeneration can be raised by promoting the nonstate sector of the economy, private enterprise, and the economic freedom of the individual". 69 In particular, paternalism should be based on three main principles - reforming the central authority and consolidating the social base of the new regime; reforming local government; and federative policy.

As for Russia's foreign policy, the 'derzhavniki' proposed that it should be guided by the principle of self-limitation and self-sufficiency. First of all, they pointed out that "the disintegration of the Soviet Union has turned Russia into a medium-sized power. Of course, we still have an immense territory and nuclear potential. Nevertheless, the size of our population and especially the dimensions of our GNP place our country in a different category of nations". 70 For these reasons, it was argued, Russia should not compete for influence as a global power. It could not in the foreseeable future pose a meaningful military threat to the West. 71

According to the 'statists', Russia's present international environment, especially in relation to its Western partners, showed a rather strong inclination towards isolating Russia, the CIS as a whole, and part of Eastern Europe in order to safeguard itself against this area of instability. As Vladislavlev and Karaganov put it, such a semi-isolation may also suit Russia for the time-being: "It may well be that by choosing to concentrate on its internal problems and sacrifice foreign policy ambitions for stability and reform at home, Russia will realise its place in the world to be and join all the sooner the community of civilised and prosperous nations as a full-fledged member". 72

But this period of concentration on its internal problems should not, however, prevent Russia from pursuing an active foreign policy in various parts of the world. The 'derzhavniki' opposed either a pro-Western or pro-Asian choice for Russia's foreign policy. They believed that Russia is both a European and an Asian country. According to the 'derzhavniki', the best way to define Russia's identity was to become Russian and to respect the nation's own history and values. They were fascinated with the ideas of Dostoyevsky: "As soon as Europeans see that we have begun to respect our people and our nationality, they will begin to respect us for their part". 73

Along with the 'Democratic Eurasianists' they considered the CIS and the 'near abroad' as a top priority for Moscow's security policy. "Russia must bear its cross and fulfil its duty by playing an enlightened post-imperial role throughout the ex-Soviet Union", observed Vladislavlev and Karaganov, "A decisive component of Russia's new mission in the world is to ensure, with help from the world community, that the ex-Soviet area does not become a geostrategic hole radiating instability and war and ultimately endangering the very existence of humanity". 74 A need for the gradual economic and military integration of the CIS has been acknowledged as well. Belarus and Kazakhstan have been most the promising partners in the Commonwealth in this respect. 75 The 'derzhavniki' have put pressure on the government to create a proper CIS mechanism to provide such integrationist processes with the essential institutional support. 76

The 'derzhavniki' described Kozyrev's policy of ignoring minority rights violations in the Baltic republics as 'amoral' and 'short-sighted'. In their view, Russia has a duty and mission to defend the rights of all its ex-compatriots. This is imperative, not only due to it being a moral duty, but also because of practical considerations. They emphasised that suppressing the rights of some minorities would trigger an inevitable chain reaction.

At the same time, they stated, Russia's assertive policy in the 'near abroad' should not imply an imperialist policy. The 'derzhavniki' assumed that any attempt to forcibly re-establish the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire would be fraught with danger; overstraining Moscow itself and also possibly leading to international isolation. As Karaganov suggests, Russia must choose between 1) the partial reintegration of parts of the former Soviet Union in a confederative-like structure, along with managing instability in the rest of the former Soviet Union; and 2) the creation of a system of dependent and dominated states with only formal independence. In Karaganov's view, the second choice is by no means desirable, but yet is still preferable to the first. 77

This group regards the West as an important priority in Moscow's foreign policy and favours better relations with the West, but not at the cost of diminishing Russia's role as an independent great power with its own 'spheres of influence'. They remain fairly sceptical as to the West's willingness and capability to help Russia in realising its reforms. They argue against an excessive reliance on Western economic assistance and political guidance and advocate an active arms export policy regardless of Western opposition. 78

The 'derzhavniki' advised the West to put a stop to all its talk of aid, which incidentally never came, and probably never will do in the future. The West, they continued, should accept the possibility that Moscow's influence over most of the former USSR's territory will be reinstated, probably in the form of domination over a periphery of weak states rather than the recreation of an empire. Russia and the West have common interests in the strategic sphere: the management of the superpower nuclear legacy; non-proliferation; the containment of regional conflicts and of Islamic extremism in Asia; the prevention of Russian neo-imperialism or the creation of a geostrategic 'black hole' in the centre of Eurasia, if Russia cannot provide for some stability in this area, or if Russia itself falls apart; the management of the emerging Chinese leviathan; the creation of a new stable core of the international system, which cannot be built only around Western institutions; and the linking of Russia's resources (and later its human and economic capital) to the West. 79

The 'derzhavniki' believed that while a Russian-American strategic partnership was developing quite dynamically, an efficient Russian-European dialogue was still lacking. Karaganov repeatedly criticised the Foreign Ministry for neglecting the European dimension of Russia's foreign policy. At a forum organised by the Russian Foreign Policy Council in late 1992, he blamed Kozyrev for pro-American bias and for not having clear vision of Europe's role (in particular, Germany's role) in Moscow's international strategy. 80

The 'derzhavniki' also proposed to develop Russia's friendly relations with the Asia-Pacific countries such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea. But they warned against illusions over the possible extent of rapprochement with these countries, pointing out their preoccupation in their own affairs and a number of serious problems in bilateral relations (for example, border disputes with China and Chinese illegal migration, Kuril Islands issue in relations with Japan, etc.). 81

Some 'derzhavniki' suggested that in the long run a strategic association between Russia and the West, as well as Japan and South Korea, is not only advisable but also possible. In the short term, such an association could only function in a relatively narrow military-political and geostrategic sphere. 82

conflicts and of Islamic extremism in Asia; the

However, it was the 'derzhavniki' who first suggested that the West may well choose to implement a sort of neo-containment policy towards Russia because of its irritation at Moscow's less than compliant tone, its increasing concern about signs of Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space, as well as over Moscow's reluctance to accept NATO enlargement, to restraint its arms sales, and to stop playing the 'Chinese card'. 83

The 'derzhavniki' have been the leading critics among Russia's political elites over Western policies concerning NATO's expansion. They warned that enlargement could lead to a resumption of the East-West confrontation, although in a milder form than before. They recommended that the West should delay its decision on expansion for a number of years. Moreover, both Russia and the West should propose some positive programme for Central and Eastern European countries to reduce their security concerns. There could be bilateral or unilateral Western guarantees for their security, and an early enlargement of the EU and WEU, and so on. And that Russia should develop its relations with the EU and WEU as a counterweight to NATO's offensive capabilities. 84

Remarkably, along with their criticism of 'Westernisers' and 'Eurasianists', the 'derzhavniki' have appealed to different political factions in an effort to shape a sort of foreign policy consensus. "We are weak," wrote Karaganov, "and if there is a reasonable and solid basis, we must forget all about differing party positions and intellectual discord to unite on that basis". 85

The 'derzhavniki' have been influential not only in the theoretical debate, but they have also been able to exert a certain amount of political pressure upon the Yeltsin government.

Throughout 1992, Yeltsin and Gaidar found themselves forced to make political concessions to the powerful 'statist' lobby. In May, three representatives of the industrial lobby (including the future Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin) were brought into the government in an effort to appease the centrists. Under pressure from the 'statists', Yeltsin was forced to remove a number of leading Western-oriented Democrats as well as his loyalists: Gennadi Burbulis, Galina Starovoitova, Mikhail Poltoranin, Yegor Yakovlev, and Fedor Shelov-Kovedyaev. Finally, the author of Russian economic reform, Yegor Gaidar, was forced to resign in December 1992. He was replaced by Viktor Chernomyrdin, a leading representative of the gas lobby. Karaganov was appointed to the President's Advisory Board.

In 1993, however, Yeltsin succeeded in breaking down the Civic Union. While Volskii, Karaganov and Travkin were fairly loyal to the government, Vice President Rutskoi preferred to coalesce with the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet ,Ruslan Khasbulatov, in a failed attempt to oust the President.

As a result of the December 1993 elections, which demonstrated the success of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the domestic basis for pro-Western policy shrunk. For many Democrats 'statist' ideology became the only way to save the remnants of Democratic principles and confront the extremists, nationalists, and Communists. A significant group of 'Atlanticists' (including Kozyrev) and the Democratic 'wing' of the 'Eurasianists' both joined the 'derzhavniki'. 86

The so-called Kozyrev Doctrine, proclaimed by the then Russian Foreign Minister in a speech to Russian diplomatic representatives in the CIS and Baltic states in January 1994, became a symbol of the 'derzhavniki's' concept of foreign policy. He declared that the vital strategic issue for Russian diplomacy was the defence of Russian minority rights in the 'near abroad'. He affirmed the need for a Russian military presence in this area and advocated the idea of dual nationality. 87

Russian policy towards the West also became more assertive. At the same time, as Hannes Adomeit put it, "The neo-imperialist bark has been worse than its bite; aggressiveness has been more a matter of words than deeds. This discrepancy is in all likelihood due to the fact that several of the derzhavniki, Kozyrev among them, are essentially sheep in wolves' clothing. They retain a fundamentally Western outlook but feel obliged to make verbal concessions and tactical adjustments to changes in popular mood and pressures exerted from within the political establishment". 88

1996 took off with the appointment of a new Russian Foreign Minister. Andrei Kozyrev was replaced by Evgeniy Primakov, previously Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Primakov was a less controversial figure than Kozyrev: the Democrats and the government's opponents both acknowledged his professionalism and eagerness to protect Russia's national interests. He also followed the 'derzhavniki' course. Primakov proposed a slightly different set of geographic priorities - the CIS, Eastern Europe, Asia-Pacific, Europe and the USA - to demonstrate to the West Russia's capability as a counterweight to NATO and EU enlargement. 89

 

Realism: return of the repressed

The 'derzhavniki' with their suspicions toward idealism and romanticism and their advocacy of national interests, paved the way towards the rehabilitation of the realist school of thought. The balance of power, rather than the balance of interests, was again in fashion. National, not international, security became a matter of primary concern. Commenting on the concept of foreign policy presented by the Foreign Ministry early in 1993, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, the then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, declared that: "The important thing is that there is real evidence of a departure - in theory at least - from idealistic declarations in favour of a great measure of Realpolitik. I was glad to hear that politics should not be partisan, and hence ideologised, but should reflect national interests; the interests of the state." 90

A number of prominent foreign policy experts from different political camps gradually became fascinated with realist principles - Director of the Institute of American & Canadian Studies, Sergei Rogov, leaders of the 'Yabloko' association, Vladimir Lukin and Alexei Arbatov, former Secretary of the Security Council, Marshall Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Directorate of the Foreign Ministry, Vadim Lukov, and so on. By 1995, Sergey Karaganov and his influential Russian Foreign and Defense Policy Council 91 had also slowly shifted to the realist position. Furthermore, the re-birth of realism was well-received by Russia's military/defence-industrial complex.

The realists had tried to formulate their doctrine as early as autumn 1993. An animated discussion on Russia's national security concept was started by Yuri Skokov, Secretary of the Security Council up until spring 1993. However, it was only by 1995 that the realists gained full strength. They did not form a united political organisation or coalition. Politically, the realists have belonged to different groups, although with a predominant orientation to the democratic parties and associations. The realist concept simply provides them with a common theoretical framework and ideas which easily cross party-lines.

According to the realists, Russia's national security concept should depart from the real potential of the state, provide for a rational use of resources, combine and interact with internal, foreign policy, socio-economic, scientific, technological, information, as well as all other aspects of life and work among the state's people. In fact, the realists were one of the first schools of thought in Russia to propose extending the concept of national security to include, not only 'hard security' issues, but 'soft security' topics as well. As the realists underlined, a security concept should contain a comprehensive analysis and classification of the existing and potential threats to Russia's security, as well as starting points for the development and functioning of internal and external mechanisms for both the prevention and operational elimination of these threats. In other words, the concept should be a complex of security goals and ways of ensuring this; of ways and means of achieving this that would correspond to Russia's historical position and future role. It should ensure a co-ordinated effort on the part of both the state and the people as a whole to provide security at the national, regional, and global levels, as well as the organisation of internal and international interaction in solving urgent and long-term security problems. 92

The realists distinguish four main categories in terms of Russia's national interests. First, there are functional interests - economic, political, social, military, humanitarian, and environmental. Second, there might be other groups, depending on the degree of these interests' longevity - short-term, mid-term, and standing interests. Third, interests could be categorised depending on their importance - vital, important, or marginal. Finally, domestic and foreign policy interests could be defined. 93

The realists stress that in an interrelated and interdependent world national interests of different countries may overlap, cross, or even clash in various forms, ranging from 'soft', diplomatic to radical, military ones. The realists divide these clashes of interest between states'national interests into four main types depending on their nature:

  1. Confrontational interests. This group includes opposite, mutually exclusive interests that cause antagonism between states.
  2. Diverging interests. They differ from confrontational interests, not so much in their absence of contradictions, but to a lesser degree in their intensity and profundity. When rivalry intensifies, diverging interests can become confrontational. The opposite, of course, also be true. (However, it seems that the difference between the first and second groups of interests lies mainly in the behaviour of states rather than in the nature of their interests.)
  3. Parallel interests. This group is characterised by an absence of antagonisms. By contrast, the sides pursue essentially close, homogeneous interests. However, in doing so each party tries to realise them on its own, without co-ordinating its actions with the other. Furthermore, it should also be noted that one more sub-group could be added to the category of parallel interests. In addition to those interests which are not inter-linked, and thus do not influence each other at all, could be added those inter-linked and even potentially confrontational interests that may exist unless the parties try to co-ordinate them.
  4. Joint interests. This means that there is a similarity in both sides' approaches; a high level of affinity between the two states' views on both the ends and means of pursuing such interests. Joint interests call for a maximum degree of co-operation between of the two sides in achieving joint goals. 94

It is important, the realists maintain, to identify interests on this basis. It thus becomes possible to single out those states that could be potential allies because of joint interests; rivals because of diverging interests; neutral states because of parallel interests; and enemies because of confrontational interests.

The realists also distinguish two kinds of threats to Russia's security: external and internal.

The External sources of threat were defined as follows:

  1. political: attempts to challenge the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation by exploiting inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts; territorial claims laid by foreign powers; blocking integrational processes in the CIS; creating obstacles to Russia's co-operation with the former Soviet republics Eastern European countries; political instability in neighbouring countries; human rights violation and the resultant uncontrollable mass migration from these countries; efforts to weaken Russia's role and positions in the international organisations, and so on.;
  2. economic: the diminished economic independence of Russia; a decline in its economic and scientific-technical potential; fixing its fuel and raw material specialisation in the world division of labour; restricting Russia's presence on some world's markets; blocking Russia's access to advanced technology; uncontrolled exports of capital and strategic raw materials; Russia's non-admittance to the international financial, trade and economic organisations; smuggling, and so on.;
  3. military: existing and potential armed conflicts in the vicinity of Russia; the unsettled problem of nuclear weaponry in the former Soviet republics; nuclear weapon and technology proliferation; the lack of a proper border regime, especially in the south and west of Russia; the unclear status of Russian military presence in the ex-Soviet republics; the military build-up in neighbouring countries and adjacent regions, and so on.;
  4. environmental: ecological disasters in neighbouring countries; long-term negative effects resulting from global environmental shifts;
  5. social: the internationalisation of organised crime, drug trafficking, international terrorism, mass epidemics, the modern slave trade, and so on. 95

However, the realists were also keen to emphasise that at present the main sources of threat to Russia's security come from inside the country which is in a deep system crisis.

Internal threats were described as follows:

  1. the potential disintegration of the Russian Federation as a result of inter-ethnic and centre/regions conflicts;
  2. socio-economic tensions stemming from economic decline, the rupture of economic ties, inflation, rising unemployment, deep-going social differentiation, the degradation of science, educational system, medical services, and so on.
  3. organised crime and corruption;
  4. cultural and spiritual degradation;
  5. the degradation of the environment;
  6. the lack of information security. 96

To cope with these threats Russia should first accomplish its domestic reforms. Only in this way will the country have necessary resources to restore its internal, and to some degree its external, stability. The realists believed that a cohesion of all levels of security - intraregional, national, CIS, European, Asia-Pacific, global - should be reached. This should be aided by the rational and effective use of all forces and means currently at the disposal of the Russian state. And it should be the job of The Security Council of the Russian Federation to co-ordinate the functioning of all agencies and forces in working out and implementing an integrated state security policy.

Moreover, the realists prefer political, diplomatic, economic and other peaceful methods to meet security challenges. However, they do not rule out the use of military force if differences between states' vital interests cannot be reconciled. According to the realists' assumptions, military force as a means of both pursuing national interests and of resolving differences between states, can be used in the following cases:

  1. When other means besides military force are either non-existent or ineffective.
  2. When other means are also available, but the role of military force becomes paramount and is recognised to be both more suitable and effective.
  3. When the state is forced to respond in kind to a military challenge by another state.
  4. When circumstances construe to compel a state to use military force, provided it does not run the risk of a retaliation. 97

The regional priorities of the realists are similar to those of the 'derzhavniki'. Rogov suggests that there are three main circles of Russian interests - 'near abroad'; East Europe, the Middle East and Far East; the West (the United States and Western Europe). The remainder of the world meanwhile is of peripheral importance for Russia. 98

The 'near abroad' is the first regional priority in Russia's international strategy. The main goals of Moscow's foreign policy in the 'near abroad' are to prevent the rise of unfriendly regimes and the emergence of ethnic and religious conflicts, to establish stable relations with its neighbours, to protect Russian citizens' human rights, to shape a common security space on CIS territory, and to resolve territorial disputes with the NIS. 99

Alexei Arbatov singled out five groups among the NIS, which would imply five principal differentiated courses of Russian policy. The first group consists of the Baltic states and Moldova. Russia is interested in the neutrality of these states. The second group includes Georgia, Armenia and, to a lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan. Russian security interests largely overlap with those of these states. They need Russian security guarantees and military presence to protect their outer borders against perceived foreign threats. Belarus is a special case and represents a class on its own. Co-ordinated democratic reforms in Belarus and Russia would be the best, most mutually beneficial option, and a precondition to their rapid reintegration within a federal state. The fourth group consists of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. While neither Russia nor these states would seek future reintegration, they still have many common security interests. Russia should avoid direct military intervention in these countries under the slogan of opposing the spread of Muslim extremism. Finally, the fifth group includes Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Russia should seek to prevent both the rise of tensions in, and the disintegration of, these states as this could pose a serious challenge to Russian security. Moscow should provide the two countries with security guarantees and develop defence co-operation through the CIS mechanism. 100

According to the realists, reimposing Russia's military and political dominance over the post-Soviet space at any cost would cause numerous sacrifices and lead to countless failures. Instead, Russia's diplomatic inventory must contain a wide range of accurately weighed and measured economic, political, military and cultural methods which could assist with the protection of Russian interests and with the development of friendly relations with their neighbours. The realists have emphasised that CIS integration could only be achieved once Russia becomes attractive to its partners. Integration will be costly for Moscow; Russia could afford it only if its domestic reforms succeed. 101

As Rogov put it, the second circle of Russia's national interests includes Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.

The realists are critical of Kozyrev's policies towards Central and East European countries because Moscow has been unable to prevent their drift towards the West both in economic and security terms. According to the realists, Eastern Europe must be shown, through clever initiatives in various fields, that it will be more safe and prosperous, not in the role of a cordon sanitaire thrown around Russia, but functioning as a connecting link between Eurasia and Western Europe. 102

In line with other schools of thought, the realists have stressed the Eurasian geopolitical location of Russia. However, Russian foreign policy on the continent should be defined by real interests rather than messianistic ideas.

Russian policy towards the Middle East should be determined by its interests in the 'near abroad' - the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Potentially, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan may be Russia's opponents. As Arbatov suggests, "In the near future Russia may gain from conducting a policy of power balancing in these regions, since it is too early to contemplate realistically any lasting collective security arrangement." 103 According to Lukin, very likely, Russia will, in the years ahead, have to vigorously resist Islamic fundamentalism, the spread of which would threaten to destabilise the situation both near and inside the CIS. Still, it is essential, however, not to be drawn into a confrontation with the biggest Islamic countries (including Iran), but instead seek various avenues of agreement and develop mutually beneficial interstate relations. Russia must rebuff all attempts by Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan to encroach on Russian economic, political, and military interests. 104

As for the Far East, the realists have noted Russia's current weakness and declining role in the region. Rogov admits that some of the ex-Soviet republics could be drawn into the spheres of interest of such regional centres of power as China or Japan. 105 Arbatov even suggests that China may represent the greatest external security threat to Russia in the long run. 106 He and other realists do not approve of too quick a military rapprochement with the PRC and warn of the possibility of Russia's one-sided dependence on Beijing. 107

For that reason, Arbatov observes, the interests of Russia in the region may be best served by the maintenance of America's political role and limited military presence. 108 If the United States were to withdraw, the Japanese reaction could be none other than remilitarisation in view of the rapid growth of economic and military power in China. A clash between these two giants could draw Russia into the conflict as well. In addition to keeping US military presence, Russia's national interests would be best served by a new multilateral security system in the region.

Arbatov believes that Moscow should eventually transfer the disputed Kuril Islands to Japan as a part a fundamental revision of political and security relations between the two countries. A new security regime based on arms reductions and confidence-building measures could be created in the Western Pacific. Economic co-operation between Moscow and Tokyo could follow, provided that Russia creates attractive conditions for foreign investments in Siberia and the Far East. Russia should also promote the (re)unification of Korea in order to eliminate this source of serious tension in the region. 109

"By carefully picking our way, capitalising on the competition and differences or the common approaches of our partners," summarises Lukin, "we must reinforce Russia's impact on the processes unfolding in the region, and earn strategic, military, political and economic dividends as a result." 110

According to Rogov, the third circle of Russian interests includes Moscow's relations with the West, in particular with the United States and Western Europe. However, these priorities hardly reflect the real significance of the West for the realists provided that most of them are professionally and ideologically oriented to the United States and Western Europe (by the way, Arbatov, Karaganov, Lukin, Lukov, and Rogov have degrees in either American or European studies). Perhaps, by ranking the West third in terms of priority, the realists demonstrated their opposition to Kozyrev's pro-Western course. They also sent a clear message to the West that not only is Russia on the periphery of Western interests, but the West itself might be of declining importance for Moscow. 111

As for the United States, the realists see a number of areas where the two states have common interests:

At the same time, the realists have singled-out some sources of tension between Russia and the United States - Russia's inability to move fast with its domestic reforms; the lack of a common enemy, which is indispensable for any military-political alliance; the model of mutual nuclear deterrence inherited from the Cold War; America's refusal to admit Russia into the Western community; the preservation of the system of military-political alliances set up by the United States during the Cold War; NATO and EU enlargement through admitting the Soviet Union's former clients but not Russia itself; Russia's arms and dual-use technology transfers to Third World countries, and so on. 113

Many of these differences may well remain in the foreseeable future. According to the realists, Russia should be firm as regards its most vital interests (for instance, preserving a common European security system and arms control regime, the prevention of a military build-up and alliances in the country's vicinity, Moscow's dominant position in the post-Soviet security space, and son on.). At the same time, Russia should avoid quarrelling with America over differences on secondary matters such as nuclear deals with Iran, missile engine technology transfers to India, advanced weaponry transfers to China, and so forth. 114

Concerning European security problems, the realists have focused first of all on NATO and EU enlargement. They do not oppose the latter, and regard the former as detrimental to the regional security system. The realists do not favour NATO's dissolution. On the contrary, they acknowledge the Alliance's positive role in the maintainance of European security both in the Cold War era and beyond. 115 But they also believe that NATO should not be extended and strengthened at the expense of Russian security. According to the realists, to prevent a new clash between the East and the West the entire European security architecture should be changed. The OSCE should become the main collective security organisation on the continent. Its job should be to create a European Security Council (ESC) with permanent members possessing veto power and a number of rotating non-permament members, representing smaller European and CIS states. NATO and the WEU should be subordinated to the ESC and serve as its military arms in maintaining regional security (especially in peace-keeping operations). 116

Since this proposals has proved to be unrealistic, the realists have focused on the search for a compromise with the West. They have proposed both a delay in NATO's expansion for a number of years, and for its eventual enlargement to be limited to the Visegrad countries only, and not to be extended to the Baltic states. They have also proposed a special Russia-NATO charter to ensure Moscow's security (no further expansion to the CIS countries, no military bases and nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, the continuation of arms control dialogue, and so on.) 117

The realist legacy has had a fairly mixed record. On the one hand, realism has contributed positively to the Russian foreign policy debate. The realists have helped to overcome the crisis in Russian foreign policy thinking which had been generated by the struggle of two extremes represented by such powerful schools of thought as 'Atlanticism' and 'Eurasianism'. The realists succeeded in articulating Russia's real security interests and priorities to both domestic and foreign audiences. Moreover, the spread of their ideas made Russian security thinking more predictable and understandable for the West. On the other hand, the coming of realism with its emphasis on national interests, national security, and national sovereignty implied an obvious return to the old paradigms belonging to the age of classical modernity. They failed to develop any concepts addressing the challenges of postmodernity. They deliberately avoided any discussions on future world order models. For that reason it was left to other schools of thought to capture the postmodern problematique.

 

Geopolitics: new opportunities in Russia?

Along with realism, its close 'relative' - the geopolitical school of thought - is currently in fashion in Russia. In part, it could be viewed as a counter-reaction to Russian theories concerning Marxism and NPT which both denied the role of geopolitical factors in international relations. As late as 1983 the Soviet Encyclopaedic Dictionary noted that geopolitics is a monopoly of "racism, Malthusianism and social Darwinism". 118 With the collapse of both Marxism and NPT the Russian 'catacomb adherents' of geopolitics were permitted to argue that geography plays a crucial role in international politics in general, and also in shaping national interests in particular. As Leonid Medvedko wrote, "The moral priorities accentuated by "new political thinking" turned out to be unwanted at the new level of conflict, for they underrated or perhaps even ignored objective geopolitical factors. While giving priority to the value of human life over national interests, "new thinking" - meaning not so much political as broader and more concrete geopolitical thinking - should first develop an appropriate mechanism for guaranteeing national security priorities." 119

One additional reason why many Russian theorists have been fascinated with geopolitics is that this concept assisted them in escaping from the intellectual dead-end caused by the 'Atlanticism'-'Eurasianism' political controversy. At a certain stage both schools realised that both pro-Western or Eurasian orientation was imposed by ideological preferences rather than dictated by Russia's real national interests. The geopolitical paradigm was seen by many thinkers as having a solid theoretical basis compared to many other concepts. In fact, all leading 'Eurasianist' theorists (Pozdnyakov, Pleshakov, Bogaturov, etc.) became followers of the geopolitical school. 120 Indeed, even some former 'Westernizers' (Razuvayev, Kudrov, Sorokin, etc.) accepted geopolitical views as well. 121

The geopolitical school departs from the assumption that every state consists of three indispensable components: territory, population, and political organisation. Wherever people may live, and under whatever political system, their activities are invariably conditioned by the physical environment. Every state has unique geographic features. Its territory has a location, landscape, form, size, and natural resources. These specifics account for the equally unique historical background of any country. Of the numerous factors influencing people's activities, geography changes least of all. It underlies the continuity of national policy provided that the geographic area remains unchanged.

The size of territorial possessions is a tangible element of the relative strength of a country in defending its interests. Natural resources and geography are factors for either the solidity or looseness of social and economic ties. Coupled with climate, they set a limit to agricultural production and condition internal communications and foreign trade. The country's strength should therefore be assessed primarily by looking into geography.

According to proponents of the geopolitical paradigm, today's divided world is both a political and a geographic reality to be reckoned with by the political and military strategy of every state, as well as by the concept of national security and interests. Every country's vital interests includes its self-preservation as a specific cultural and historical community. Geopolitically, this means primarily defending national territory. This is the precondition for political and economic independence. Pozdnyakov believes that countries giving priority in their foreign policies to ideological, moral, emotional or other factors are defeated sooner or later and become dependent on stronger powers. Some politicians demonstrate the greatest political dilettantism by imagining that in a world dominated by power politics, good relations between countries are a product of 'friendly' sentiments between their leaders or peoples. 122

Many Russian adherents of geopolitics, in fact, accept Saul Cohen's concept of two geostrategic regions: the maritime world dependent on trade (with the United States as its core) and the Eurasian continental world (where Russia is the core) . 123 According to Pozdnyakov, the United States, as one of the two geostrategic regions, is now the only remaining superpower. And, it is trying to take advantage of this situation as a means to achieve some of its goals, which, until recently, have largely been unattainable. As he wrote, "What that country sees as its main geopolitical object today, and what has already found thinly veiled expression in a number of statements by American officials, is to destroy the Eurasian geostrategic monolith for all time and ensure that Europe is never dominated by any one power, meaning primarily Russia." 124

To geopoliticians' minds, two things are of paramount importance for the maintenance of world order and stability: (a) establishing a clear boundary between Western sea power and Eurasian land power in Europe, and (b) preserving the unity of the Heartland. According to some analysts, both these principles of global security are seriously challenged by the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The boundary between the West and Eurasia has shifted eastward. To date, this boundary is not properly defined. Russia, which controlled most of the Heartland, has shrunk in terms of territory and is currently unable to play the role of balancer in a geopolitically unstable world. A geopolitically imbalanced Eurasia might provoke a universal re-division of the world with its resources and strategic boundaries. In turn, it could imply a protracted period of turbulence, rift and bloody conflict. To avoid such a worst-case scenario, both Russia and the West should make joint efforts to stabilise the post-Soviet geopolitical space. It could restore Russia's historic mission to be the mediator and to serve as a safeguard against forces aiming at world-wide domination. Pozdnyakov coined his own geopolitical formula: "He who controls the Heartland can exercise effective control over world politics, above all by maintaining a global geopolitical and power balance, without which lasting peace is unthinkable." 125

Based on a rather old-fashioned frame of reference, the geopolitical school has, however, failed to explain a number of important phenomena and processes in a contemporary world. First, a geopolitical interpretation of how the geographic environment inter-acts with society and politics is often simplistic and wrong. With its emphasis on geography, the geopolitical paradigm almost completely ignores other crucial factors shaping the international relations system, such as economy, trade, information, social movements, interest groups, political leadership, law, culture, religions, ideologies, an so on. These factors not only constitute international politics; usually they also serve as a buffer between geography and world politics, a buffer which transforms geographic impulses into a language of diplomacy or military strategy. Geographic factors effect international politics indirectly rather than directly. For instance, landscape as such does not matter for international relations, say, in the Middle East. But, it becomes important when economic reasons (water resources distribution) or military-security considerations (potential battlefield) are involved.

Second, the geopoliticians very often misinterpret both the sources and the nature of countries' foreign policy behaviour. For example, the desire of many Central and East European countries to join NATO and the EU could hardly be explained by their geopolitical motivation alone. Obviously, they hope to get both economic and security-strategic benefits from their NATO and EU membership. In addition, cultural and identity considerations force them to choose a pro-Western orientation.

Japan is yet another example. Given its geographic characteristics - peripheral location, small territory, a lack of natural resources, and overpopulation - Tokyo should be treated as a minor power. Contrary to geopolitical assumptions, Japan was able to develop one of the prime economies in the world and evolve into one of the real power poles in contemporary international relations. Again, in contrast with the Heartland concept, not 'continental' (Russia) but 'maritime' (the United States) power has bridled potential Japanese hegemonism most effectively during the last fifty years.

Third, geopolitics rarely explains the genesis of many phenomena and the causes of changes in international relations. This theory focuses on a description of the geopolitical interests of various countries or the world's geopolitical structure at a given time, but does not examine how and why these interests or this structure were formed and transformed. For example, why did the United States become the core of the 'maritime world' and Russia gain control of the Heartland? Or, why is Russia unable to play a dominant, and therefore stabilising, role in Eurasia any longer? Why do the small states accept one great power as a leader and reject another?

Finally, the very concept of either a unipolar (Heartland, World-Island, Rimland) or bipolar ('maritime' and 'continental' worlds) geopolitical structure is open to debate. Many theorists believe that the existing international relations system is multipolar. Others argue that the world was always probably multipolar. While some suggest that there is no system at all and chaos prevails. Many scholars admit that the world could be either unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, but point to economy, military strength, ideology, and so forth as foundations for leadership rather than geographic determinants.

Some Russian geopoliticians have seen the drawbacks of their paradigm and put forward improved versions. Pleshakov, for instance, thinks that a geoideological paradigm (GP) should replace geopolitics in explaining international relations in the 20th century. He defines the GP as a dynamic interaction between geopolitics and a universal ideology. 126 The GPs came into being with the rise of powerful modern ideologies marked by two parameters: the highly active involvement of the masses in the declared transformation of the world, and the establishment of durable institutions ensuring ideological control. Chronologically, it took shape after Bolshevik ideology became the state ideology of Russia. Later on Nazism created its own GP.

According to Pleshakov, there are three main GP models:

  1. Reciprocal generation of geopolitics and ideology is a model in which geopolitical factors and ideological motivations constantly reinforce each other. The symbiosis of geopolitics and ideology becomes so strong that one cannot exist without the other. Interacting in this model are strong ideologies that are irreconcilable by definition, and exert lasting influence on the masses; they are state ideologies projected into the future to the point of utopianism, and often, in fact, make pretensions to the role of civilisations. As each of them implies an expansion in space (control over space), it perceives every opposing ideology as an irreconcilable adversary. In this context geopolitics, is seen also as a spatial dimension of ideological control that can only be exercised if the adversary's geopolitical positions are weakened. This model is represented by communism, liberalism, Nazism, Maoism, Fidelism, and son on.
  2. The other model of interaction is that of reciprocal 'extinction' of geopolitics and ideology. This model can be described as a system under which ideological motivations stave off possible geopolitical disturbances, and vice versa. The ultimate winner is the aspiration to preserve the geopolitical and ideological status quo for an indefinite period. Relations between the Soviet Union and the West under Gorbachev would fit into this model.
  3. The model of geopolitics dominating ideology is based on the prevalence of the former and subordination or absence of the latter. The model of dominant geopolitics becomes possible where state-to-state relations are not directly influenced by ideology (although ideology is present as a variable) and geopolitical issues have attained a greater or lesser degree of acuteness. Such was the situation in Soviet-Chinese relations during the mid-1980s. 127

Pleshakov believes the GP was essentially destroyed as an ideology and dropped from international relations by the end of the 20th century. He sees no threat from liberalism or religious fundamentalism because they are unable to interact effectively with geopolitics for various reasons. The only powerful idea capable of winning the masses (and intervening in foreign policy by way of an ideology) might be that of nationalism in the form of pancommunities. There are some prerequisites for such an ideology in the form of rather artificial boundaries between ethnically related communities looking to their neighbours for co-operation. According to Pleshakov, there is a number of regions potentially vulnerable to new nationalist ideologies: Turkish Central Asia, the Arab world, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, areas of 'Greater China' and the 'Russian-Slavic' area. 128

In assessing the GP's pros and cons, this paradigm, more accurately than geopolitics, describes international relations dynamics in the 20th century because it takes into account not only geography but such a powerful factor as ideology. At the same time, the GP still ignores other important factors shaping international politics.

Some Russian theorists prefer to produce 'soft' geopolitical concepts which do not neglect the plurality of factors influencing international politics, but regard geography as a most important one. For them, the geopolitical paradigm is a theoretical departure in order to justify their reading of Russia's foreign policy priorities. For example, they use geopolitics to prove the importance of the 'near abroad' and adjacent regions for Moscow's national interests. 129

Despite the seemingly old-fashion argumentation, the geopolitical paradigm should retain its influence in the Russian foreign policy debate in the foreseeable future. Not only the existence of a theoretical vacuum, but current geopolitical challenges and a need to define Russia's national identity (including national interests and security politics) make this paradigm both significant and attractive to Russian policy makers and analysts.

 

The neo-Communists

There are several pro-Communist groups in contemporary Russia. They vary from neo-Stalinist to Socialist-like organisations. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), led by Gennady Zyuganov, is the strongest among them. However, despite its influential role in domestic politics, the CPRF lacks a well- articulated and positive foreign policy platform. It prefers to criticise the former Soviet and current Russian leadership rather than produce a new conceptual departure itself. 130

The Communists have been unable to reconcile themselves to the demise of the Soviet Union and to the country's loss of great power status. "The great power of a few years ago, it is a poor shadow of its former self", wrote the leaders of the CPRF. "Russia does not "coagulate", our diplomats commented with reference to the hard situation Russia had found itself after the Crimean War in the mid-19th century. Russia is fragmenting itself, spreading itself too thin. It lacks a well-defined objective and is unaware of which tools it will have to use in its foreign policy." 131

The Communists believe that Gorbachev and Yeltsin led the USSR to defeat in the Cold War and finally to its collapse. These leaders are regarded as national traitors. "Just ask yourself one question", wrote high-ranking party officials, "Can the Russian people think highly of its government's foreign policy when you can see the western border of new Russia from the rooftop of the Government House in downtown Moscow? When will our present-day frontiers run where they used to be under Ivan the Terrible, Boris Godunov and Alexei Mikhailovich? Clearly you cannot suspect people at the helm of our country of great power or patriotic mentality." 132 Early in 1993 the Communists established the Civic Tribunal which condemned Gorbachev for his betrayal of the Communist Party and blamed him for the destruction of the Soviet Union.

According to the Communists, Gorbachev and Yeltsin's lack of patriotism and their unrestrained Westernism have been the main causes of national catastrophe: "In the Communists' view, all this happened because Russia has been subordinated to Western interests, because the Soviet Union has been illegally torn apart, and because we have lost strategic allies in every corner of the world". 133

As some pro-Communist experts have suggested, in search of a national security doctrine, Russia should choose between two alternatives - (a) the domination of national-state interests over cosmopolitan ones, and Russia's independent position in the international relations system; or (b) an orientation towards Western values and the joining of a 'community of civilised countries'. 134 The CPRF opts for the first alternative. The Communists emphasise the invariable nature of the country's national interests which do not depend on a concrete regime or dominant ideology. They believe that the main Russian national interest inherited from its history consists of preserving the country's territorial and spiritual integrity. An idea of a powerful state based on multi-ethnicity is equivalent to the Russian national idea. Thus, the breakdown of the Soviet Union and weakening of the Russian state have undermined Russian security and worsened its geostrategic position.

As for the threat perceptions, pro-Communist analysts have singled-out some global developments which could challenge Russian national security:

The Communists have also advocated a number of measures to prevent a further weakening of Russia's international authority:

The Communists believe that Russia is part of neither the West nor the East. It should define its own, independent way. At the same time, the Communists are not really fascinated with 'Eurasianism', regarding both Russian and world history as a result of objective processes rather than messianistic ideas. However, they acknowledge the need for a national ideal or doctrine that could consolidate Russian society. 137

Moreover, a number of regional priorities could be identified as part of the Communist foreign policy platform.

Similar to the 'Eurasianists' and the 'derzhavniki', the Communists regard the CIS and 'near abroad' as a first priority for Moscow's foreign policy. As they believe that the Soviet Union has been dissolved illegally, the Communists have tried to foster the reunification of the former Soviet republics. Even so, they have ruled out the use of force to restore the USSR. According to Zyuganov, it should be done on a 'voluntary basis'. 138 The main tools of reunification are the development of economic, political, military, and cultural co-operation between the CIS member-states, the creation of a proper institutional framework, as well as the gradual transformation of the Commonwealth into a confederation with the final aim of restoring a united federative state. As the CPRF document puts it, "In their election platform the Communists are unambiguously aiming to reunite the great Russian people that has created its own civilisation of world caliber. One of the key tasks, therefore, is pulling down the unnecessary barriers between our peoples, without infringing upon anyone's original lifestyles, language, and culture, first and foremost between Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan. These people have been preordained by history to be united. In economic terms, these three republics have been supplying more than 70 percent of their output to the Russian Federation, and in personal terms, every second family in Russia or in these three republics have close or distant relatives on each other's territory. Undoubtedly, there has never been, nor is there now, a compelling reason for the natural historic union of our peoples to be broken up." 139

In March 1996, the State Duma passed a Communist-drafted resolution that annulled the 1991 Belovezhskaya Pusha agreements on the dissolution of the USSR and creation of the CIS. Despite its political rather than legal significance (it was not mandatory for the President), the Duma's move accelerated the timetable for the signing of the quadripartite agreement between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the union treaty between Russia and Belarus. As both Malcolm and Pravda have stressed, on this, as on other foreign policy questions, parliamentary action initiated mainly by the Communists have affected the timing of policy moves and the overall climate of policy rather than determining its strategic direction. 140

Critics of the CPRF, however, believe that reunification is both neither feasible nor desirable. As Alexei Pushkov comments, "Gennady Zyuganov's favorite thesis - the historic necessity to restore the alliance of the former Soviet nations through voluntary reunification - generates no enthusiasm in CIS countries." 141 Political elites in the CIS countries have expressed their view on the matter in the words of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan. He told the CIS summit in Moscow on the eve of the Russian presidential elections that if the Communists come to power in Russia, the CIS will either cease to exist, or it will exist without Russia, which is quite impossible. On the other hand, the 'derzhavniki' and 'realists' have opposed any form of reunification with the more troubled post-Soviet states because of it aggravating Russia's economic situation and involving Moscow in new, dangerous inter-ethnic conflicts. 142

Along with some liberals and nationalists, the Communists have put pressure on the Yeltsin government in order to protect Russian minorities abroad. In case of their victory in parliamentary (1995) and presidential (1996) elections, they have planned to sign relevant treaties with Russia's neighbours, "to be closely monitored by the Russian authorities, and to demand unflinching compliance with them from our partners." 143

The Communists believe that the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact, Russian troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and the loss of Moscow's control over this region have generated new threats to Russia's security. According to the CPRF paper, "Russian borders, collapsed or "transparent", have become inviting highways for junk commodities, dirty money, infectious diseases, narcotics, weapons, and radioactive wastes." 144

The pretensions of NATO on expanding its 'zone of responsibility' and the alliance's potential enlargement are also included among the Communist threat perceptions: "With the undisguised connivance of the UN Secretary-General, and in defiance of the basic principles of international law, NATO is today attempting to arrogate the function of "collective peace-keeper" and to take up matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of states in whose territory military conflict happens ... The West's attitude to Russia is strikingly illustrated by what is actually the secret deal struck between NATO and the UN behind Russia's back that gives the former the right to use armed force in Yugoslavia purportedly in the name of the UN." 145

The CPRF points out that NATO's eastward expansion violates the strategic balance in Europe in a number of ways. The enlargement will inevitably:

It seems that the Communists interpret the West's intentions as departing from the so-called 'conspiracy theory'. As the CPRF paper concludes, "It is crystal-clear today that NATO's involvement in Bosnia, the Alliance's proclaimed intentions to expand its "zone of responsibility" and to give it a new role, and the plans to enlarge the Alliance further to the east and to draw into it not only the former socialist countries but also the traditionally neutral states are all components of a single strategy spearheaded against Russia." 147 According to other assessments, the aim of the United States is to undermine Russia's economic, scientific-technical, and military capabilities, and also to isolate Moscow from promising trade partners and markets (in particular, in areas such as advanced technologies and arms trade). The West's motive for doing so, it has been argued, is to hopefully prevent Russia's transformation into a potential rival. 148

To put pressure on both the 'pro-Western' Yeltsin government and NATO itself, the Communists undertook some measures through their faction in parliament. The faction proposed to revise the CFE Treaty in accordance with the 'new realities' and voiced its negative attitude to the ratification of the START II Treaty until the US and NATO changed their position on the Alliance's extension. According to experts close to the CPRF, the Treaty is detrimental to Russia's security because it is grounded on Moscow's unilateral concessions and undermines the country's deterrent potential. 149 The Communists again threatened to return to the discussion of Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace programme. Finally, the CPRF faction together with the Liberal Democrats urged the government to oppose 'the NATO countries' drive in the Balkans' through bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. 150

Their opponents from the 'derzhavniki' and 'realist' camps agree in principle with the Communists on their assessment of the implications of NATO's enlargement . However, they point out that it is wrong in the first place to represent the NATO member-states as a completely united organisation with regard to enlargement, and to also ignore the difference of opinion between various political forces on the pace and scope of extension. Secondly, the decision on enlargement was made in an attempt to overcome NATO's identity crisis and to cope with post-Cold War threats rather than being targeted against Russia. Third, there could be a compromise between the Alliance and Russia to guarantee Moscow's security and minimise the enlargement's detrimental effects. 151

As for other regions, the Communists have proposed to restore Russia's links with its 'traditional friends and allies' such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba. 152 This could prevent America's unchallenged world-wide leadership and provide Russia with profitable orders for its troubled arms industry. They accepted a detente in Sino-Russian relations as well as active arms export policy in the region because it strengthens Russia's international authority and supports the defence industry. Many leaders of the CPRF are fascinated with the Chinese model of socialism and believe that Gorbachev should have used the PRC's experience to reform the Soviet Union. At the same time, the CPRF is concerned with the future security orientation of China and the correlation of forces in Asia-Pacific which is turning out to be quite unfavourable for Russia. 153

As mentioned above, contrary to the domestic sphere, the CPRF has failed to produce any coherent and clearly pronounced foreign policy doctrine. Instead, it operated with an amalgam of the party leadership's statements and remarks which made it difficult to reconstruct the CPRF's foreign policy platform. For this reason the party was quite vulnerable to criticism from its opponents. The CPRF deliberately kept a low profile on foreign policy issues during both the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995-96. Despite its immense domestic influence, the CPRF has, in fact, been unable to influence the Russian discourse on international relations theory.

 

The Social Democrats: re-vindicating NPT?

After his resignation in December 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev and a number of his close friends (Aleksandr Yakovlev and Georgi Shakhnazarov, the most prominent among them) committed themselves to the creation of a social-democratic movement in Russia to confront both the Communist-nationalist coalition and the monetarists. The Gorbachev Fund and the journal Svobodnaya Mysl became the most important pillars for the emerging Social Democracy in Russia. Although the Social Democrats failed to form any influential political coalition comparable with the 'derzhavniki,' the Communists or Zhirinovskiy, they were able to produce some foreign policy concepts which affected Russian security discourse.

Similar to the 'Eurasianists', Social Democratic security thinking has focused on the concept of 'stability.' Internal stability has been defined as cohesion within the political system, adherence to normal democratic procedures concerning the rotation of ruling elites, the absence of pressing ethnic and social conflicts, and a healthy, functioning economy. 154 International stability has been seen as a balance of interests among major international players (contrary to the balance of power in the past). 155

Along with other schools of thought, the Social Democrats have contributed to the Russian discussion of national interests. Contrary to the Gorbachev doctrine that was grounded on the unconditional priority of 'all-human interests' over national interests, the Social democrats admitted that national interests is the subject of primary concern for any country. They define national interests as a manifestation of the nation's basic needs (survival, security, progressive development). 156 National interests may be subjective in terms of their form or way of expression, but they are definitely objective in terms of their nature. In a nation-state, national interests are usually synonymous with state interests. In multi-national countries (like Russia) the articulation and representation of national interests are a much more complicated process involving numerous political actors and requiring more time and effort to reach a public consensus.

Some analysts close to the Social Democrats suggest that Russian national interests should include three main components:

  1. The protection of democratic order, territorial integrity, ensuring military security, peaceful conditions for development, and preventing various military threats. Moreover, some less significant interests are identified - arms control and disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, combating international terrorism.
  2. The creation of favourable, mutually advantageous, and equal conditions for participation in the international division of labour and international commercial and humanitarian exchanges.
  3. The protection of the interests of the Russian citizens outside the country. 157

The Social Democrats, however, do not limit themselves to an acknowledgement of the significance of national interests. They believe that in an interdependent world international actors cannot afford to pursue solely their own interests. Since the international environment has become multi-dimensional the actors should take into account both the national interests of other players and universal ('all-human') interests. According to the Social Democrats, narrow-minded nationalism is absolutely outdated and detrimental not only to the world community but, in the end, to a nation conducting nationalist policy as well. 158 As Yuri Krasin of the Gorbachev Fund observed, "There is a compelling need for the cardinal and qualitative transformation of the entire world community system in our time. Such a need is caused by numerous threats to humankind's existence. In this connection, all-human interests, values and approaches become more important than parochial interests including the national interests of particular countries in their traditional sense." 159

Thus, New Political Thinking is still relevant for Russia and the rest of the world. However, the principal mistake of the Gorbachevian version of NPT should not be repeated: national interests must not be sacrificed for the sake of 'all-human' values. Instead, the balance between national and universal interests should be found. 160 So, faced with the eternal realist-idealist debate the Russian Social Democrats have disagreed with both parties.

They realise that democracy in the international relations system is still in its infancy, and few 'all-human' values have taken root in humankind's mentality. The Social Democrats regard the creation of a global civil society as the only way of replacing national interests by 'all-human' values. In their view, a world civil society could be based on a system of horizontal links between both inter-government and non-Governmental Organisations dealing with economic, political, environmental and cultural issues. 161 Some experts (Shakhnazarov) have proposed to create a world government to solve global problems and to save humankind from imminent catastrophe. 162 Thus the Kantian project of 'eternal peace' - the methodological basis of NPT and its currents proponents - could be put into practice.

The Social Democrats perceive the world as moving from the unipolar (America is the only superpower) towards a multipolar structure. None of the countries or ideologies will be able to impose its model on the others. The Social Democrats disagree with Fukuyama's thesis on the world-wide domination of the liberal-democratic model. Various civilisation models will compete in the foreseeable future. A future world will be born in the process of the interaction of two contradictory processes - integration and regionalisation. The future poles of power will emerge on the basis of economic, religious, and cultural differentiation. Some analysts distinguish Arab-Muslim, Europe-centric (including the United States), Eurasian (including Eastern Europe), South Atlantic, Indian, and Asia-Pacific centres. 163 Others point to North America, the EU, Eurasia, the Islamic world, and Asia-Pacific as the main future poles. 164 In any case, these developments will make the world less predictable and more multidimensional than has been the case so far.

Which identity should Russia choose? The Social Democrats usually pay tribute to the Eurasian geographic position of the country, but they emphasise that, from a cultural and civilisational point of view, Russia is part of Europe and Russians are part of the European nation. 165 For that reason, Russia should aim at entering pan-European economic, political, and security structures. 'Europe' is also defined in a civilisational rather than geographic sense: the Gorbachevian project of CEH or 'Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok' is still popular among the Russian Social Democrats.

The Social Democrats also emphasise the need for effective policy towards Eastern Europe because Russia has vital geostrategic, economic and cultural interests in the region. They believe many Eastern European countries, notable Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, are ahead of Russia in the pace and scale of their transition from the totalitarian system to democratic rule and a market economy. Russia should study more carefully and use more widely their experience in carrying out its own socio-economic reforms. Some experts recommend the establishment of a 'special economic relationship' with these countries which should be based on a proper legal ground and, in addition, to include the creation of an organisational structure - bilateral commissions for economic, scientific and technological co-operation; joint banks, chambers of commerce and industry; trade and investment insurance funds, etc. 166 The Eastern Europeans, however, have showed little interest in the 'special relationship' model mainly because they have already become oriented towards the EU rather than to their former partners in the socialist block.

According to the Social democrats, Russia has a vital interest in ensuring that the countries of Eastern Europe do not feel threatened. They understand that a perceived threat from Russia would likely compel many East European countries to join NATO. In order to prevent this scenario, Russia must offer solid guarantees to safeguard the security of the East European states. 167 However, the Eastern Europeans have not been happy with Russian guarantees; instead, they have opted for fully-fledged membership in NATO.

Despite pro-Western tendencies in social-democratic foreign policy orientations, some analysts have underlined the need for a more balanced approach to geopolitical priorities. They have recommended a more vigorous development of Moscow's relations with the East. As one expert observed, "Russia's most powerful neighbours are in the East - in Asia. Its relations with the East include relations with China. These are already of fundamental importance and their importance for Russia's destiny will grow further in the first decade of the next century, when China will have a real chance to become an economic (and possibly also a military) superpower, according to many forecasts." 168 To cope with challenges both in the East and in the West, the Social Democrats have proposed a model of 'multidimensional partnership' that is directed at co-operation with the major players of the world regardless of their geographic location. According to this model, Russia's policy should not be based on playing geopolitical 'cards' (Chinese, American, European). Instead, it should be oriented to establishing long-term and stable bilateral relations as well as to promoting multilateralism. 169 However, it remains unclear which methods should be used to create such relations and how to convince other powers to accept this model.

To sum up, the social-democratic foreign policy doctrine took over many concepts and principles of Gorbachev's NPT. The latter, however, was complemented with some advocacy of Russia's national interests and balanced policies towards the East and the West.

 

The 'Right Radicals'

There are a number of radical and extremist organisations in Russia. They are united primarily by their rejection of Yeltsin's domestic reforms and by criticism of his pro-Western foreign policy. At the same time there are also major disagreements about both the meaning of Russian history and the appropriate model for the future. Hence, they have been unable to go beyond negativism and to develop a coherent, forward looking agenda of their own.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is the most important among the right radical organisations. LDPR faction was the largest one in the Russian Duma in 1993-95. The party still has influential positions within the Russian parliament elected in December 1995.

It is difficult to reconstruct Zhirinovskiy's foreign policy concept due to the lack of its elementary logic and the extravagant form of expression of his ideas. One should take into account his numerous statements which often contradict each other. It seems that Zhirinovskiy prefers geopolitics as his theoretical basis, but at the same time he may borrow some ideas belonging to another schools of thought. All these circumstances should be taken into account in the process of analysing Zhirinovskiy's foreign policy views.

According to Alexei Mitrofanov, the LDPR representative in the Committee for International Affairs of the State Duma, Russia's national interests include:

The 'near abroad' is priority no. 1 for the LDPR. On the one hand, LDPR leaders have called for the ending of Russian assistance to other former republics of the Soviet Union and have declared that they do not want them as part of Russia, at least in the near future. Zhirinovskiy stated that: "The Ex-Soviet Union republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Middle East, Central Asian republics - all want to be included in Russia. We don't want them, because there's no profit for us in being all together." 171 On the other hand, however, he has also envisaged a Russia that includes all the territory of the former Soviet Union, suggesting that the former republics will experience further trouble and seek to subordinate themselves to Russia for economic and security reasons. As for Russia itself, he has suggested a new, expanded Russia which would have no separate republics based on nationality, and Russians would be essentially primes inter pares, with other nationalities allowed to maintain their cultural but not political identities. As Zhirinovskiy put it, "We are against preserving the CIS, just as we are against recreating the USSR. If anybody wants to join Russia, they are welcome, but only with the rights of a territorial unit: a province or oblast. No national-state formations." 172

In one interview Zhirinovskiy was reported to have said that Russia didn't want the Transcaucasus as there were only criminals there, no real economy, and no opportunities for Russia to profit; he said Iran could take over Azerbaijan and Armenia and Georgia could go to Turkey; but, he also said one day these countries would ask to belong to Moscow again. In another report, Zhirinovskiy said that Russia would step in to save the states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, if these states paid Russia to do it.

One report had Zhirinovskiy saying that Eastern Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova would be part of Russia; another account had him saying that Ukraine and Belarus are Russians and the people want to belong to Russia. He further told a Romanian newspaper that "Ukraine has not been, and will never be independent. It will be one of our provinces." 173

The Baltic states, according to Zhirinovskiy, would be part of Russia, except for Tallinn, which would be a separate city-state, and three cities in Lithuania which would form a small Lithuanian state. Koeningsberg might some day be returned to Germany. And, with respect to Finland, Zhirinovskiy has emphasised that there would be "no problem". But, if Finland was to want Karelia back, then all of Finland would have to be ceded to Russia. 174

In Zhirinovskiy's vision, Russians living outside Russia would be given dual citizenship and Russia would defend them, primarily with economic instruments of power. 175

In Eastern Europe, according to Zhirinovskiy, three cities in north-western Poland would become part of Germany, and Lvov in Ukraine might be given to Poland as compensation. He did not oppose Poland's joining NATO. He told Polish reporters: "... if Poland wants to join NATO, that is an internal matter for Poland and NATO.... Until recently, Russian forces guaranteed the Polish border. Today, in this matter, one should turn to NATO and Germany, which play the greatest part in this section of the continent." 176 On the other hand, he warned that the East European countries could become Western servants and advised them to remain neutral. He also insisted on dissolving NATO because the Warsaw Pact had already been dissolved. 177

In Zhirinovskiy's view, Slovakia might want to become a part of Russia. The Czech Republic would go to Germany. Austria and Slovenia should unite, perhaps along with Germany. Bulgaria would get the Dobrudja portion of Romania. Greece should return Thrace to Bulgaria. In the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians would all keep their existing borders. He proposed that all foreign or UN forces withdraw from the former Yugoslavia so that the warring parties could settle the conflict for themselves, but he also said that Russia and the Balkan states would together solve all the Balkans' problems.

While Zhirinovskiy had been performing a certain amount of sabre-rattling in the form of anti-Western, and anti-US statements before the December 1993 election, after the election he backed away, softening his rhetoric in an apparent effort to present himself as someone with whom the West could deal with.

Zhirinovskiy claimed that no one need fear Russia: "The world does not need to fear us anymore. No one will be exposed to any kind of danger from Russian soil ever again: There will be no claims on territory, no military missions, and complete adherence to international treaties. Russia will be a civilised European country, open to the rest of the world, without prison camps, without repression, without Stalinism, and - God save us - without fascism. There will only be democracy." 178 But, on one occasion or another, he has threatened to pursue nuclear blackmail against the US, UK, and France, to attack Germany, Japan, and Pakistan with nuclear or other forces, and to blow nuclear radiation into Lithuania. 179

The LDPR considers the United States to be the principal anti-Russian power, intending to break Russia into a multitude of states dependent on the West. However, due to American strength Russia is bound to co-operate with Washington in various fields, especially in the maintainance of international security. 180

In his book Last Dash to the South, Zhirinovskiy proclaims as a geopolitical concept the necessity for Russia to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean by military conquest. 181 Viewing this 'last dash' as the "task of saving the Russian nation," he argues that Russia needs to secure access to these warm water routes in order to thrive, and that it needs to subjugate its southern neighbours in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan to eliminate threats posed by pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. He claims that Ankara is planning "to establish a greater Turkey reaching from the Adriatic to Tajikistan." This would allow Turkey to dominate Slavic populations in the former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, while placing extreme pressure on Russia via the Caucasus and Central Asia. He argues that Moscow must fight back by leading a pan-Slavic and an anti-Turkish alliance, perhaps in partnership with a resurgent Germany. He suggests that a military conquest to the south would be the basis for a renaissance of a Russian military which has fallen on hard times. 182

According to Zhirinovskiy, a religious war between Islam and Christianity could take place at the end of the 20th century. Only Russia could prevent such a war. He commented that: "Russia could be a factor for stability. It could stop the process of disintegration in Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia..." 183

In one interview, Zhirinovskiy projected a trilateral German-Russian-Indian axis, linking together an expanded Germany, a new Russia that would include most of the former Soviet Union and some additional territory, and India. With some two billion people linked together, Zhirinovskiy imagined that the world would take whatever form this axis imposed upon it. India and Russia together could neutralise China, and Germany and Russia could either neutralise or control Europe. 184

The LDPR fears Chinese 'ethnic aggression' against the Russian Far East and favours using tough economic, administrative, and military methods to stop Beijing. 185

As for other regional problems, Zhirinovskiy told Japanese journalists "You'd better not raise the Kuril Islands issue, otherwise we'll bring up the issue of compensation for the 40 years of illegal use of Sakhalin by Japan... We'll drive everyone out of the Sea of Okhotsk - the Japanese, the Koreans, the Phillipinos... The Sea of Okhotsk will be a closed Russian sea. We'll establish a 200-mile zone, and you'll be fishing in Australia." 186

Furthermore, Zhirinovskiy opposes Russia's receipt of foreign aid. He told American reporters: "We need no help from the United States or the West!... We are a very rich country." 187 On another occasion he declared: "... Until now, the so-called help from the west has caused us more harm than good. Russia has been exploited materially and intellectually. Let them leave us alone, and we will reestablish Russian power..." 188 Zhirinovskiy also opposes Russia giving of aid to other countries, with the exception of Iraq and Serbia. He opposes defence conversion in Russia and strongly advocates sales of Russian arms abroad.

Despite the influence of theLiberal Democrats in domestic affairs, their impact on foreign policy issues has been moderate. The 'Zhirinovskiy phenomenon' has shifted Russian security debates slightly to the right, but has had no direct effect on official foreign policy and military doctrines as well as on theoretical discourse.

 

The Russian Orthodox Church

The Russian Orthodox Church has taken an active part in the Russian security debate of the 1990s. Of course, the Church did not produce a classical IRT grounded on rational argumentation, but it did have a clear position on a number of foreign policy issues and tried to explain its views to both policy makers and the broader public. Some Western experts have assessed the Russian Orthodox Church as an 'empire-saving' institution, referring to the fact that Patriarch Aleksii II supported Gorbachev's attempts to save the Soviet Union and Yeltsin's efforts to integrate the CIS. 189 Such an approach, however, seems to be a simplistic one as the Church is interested in ensuring stability and freedom of worship in the post-Soviet space rather than in restoring imperial structures.

The Church's vision of its own role in the politics of, and its relationship with, the state has been expressed by its spokesmen on numerous occasions. According to Archpriest Victor Petlyuchenko, Vice-Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, "The Church never interferes in the political process proper. But she can and must pass pastoral, moral judgement on developments in the world of politics, on the ideas and plans existing in it, on the activities of state and public structures as well as individual politicians. While, the Church must not join in political struggles, it cannot remain passive in the face of the suffering caused to people by actions denying them a fitting way of life." 190 The Orthodox hierarchy has underlined that the Church and the Russian state has always had a 'special relationship' throughout all periods of Russian history, with the small exception of the Soviet period. The Church favoured the country's unity and cared for the nation's moral health. It has advised the Russian head of state on foreign policy issues as well as on defining country's national interests. 191

The Russian Orthodox Church has always favoured a strong Russian state which can provide the nation with freedom of worship and economic well-being rather than an empire as a such. While the Church disliked the atheist, non-democratic Soviet regime, it could not afford an open confrontation with the Communist state in order to keep its ties with Orthodox believers. The Church favoured the dismantling of the Communist system of government in the Soviet Union but opposed the disruption of the country itself and the rise of nationalistic separatism. In December 1991, when the disintegration of the USSR had already become a reality, Patriarch Aleksii II wrote in his statement: "The self-determination of the republics which were part of the Soviet Union is a reaction to the domination of the totalitarian nationalities policy during many years when the natural wish of peoples to live according to their own traditions and aspirations was suppressed. However, the restoration of what was destroyed and lost in the life of peoples should be carried out by worthy and justified means. Thus, in protecting one's own freedom, one should not restrict the freedom of one's neighbour. One should not commit another sin - create artificial obstacles of misunderstanding and alienation among peoples united by many historical, religious and cultural links." 192

According to Orthodox theorists, the lack of a national idea that could unify the Russian people is the main threat to security of the country. As one author has suggested, "Fragmentation and alienation - this is what is typical of (contemporary( Russia, and many problems have sprung up precisely from that." 193 Russia needs a new foreign policy based on spirituality and a unifying national idea. Since the Russian Orthodox Church (along with some other churches) unifies people with diverse political views it could be a model for such a new policy.

The Church was content with the new principles of Russian international strategy as outlined in the Foreign Ministry's document on foreign policy doctrine (1993). In particular, they praised the Russian leadership for renouncing the ideologised foreign policy of the ex-Union and focusing on man and the protection of Russian people's lives, labour and freedoms. 194

The Russian Orthodox Church has repeatedly emphasised that Orthodoxy is not a nationalist religion designed only for Russians, but, on the contrary, is a multinational confession uniting not only Russians but Abkhazians, Belorussians, Fenno-Ugrians (including Estonians), Gagauzes, Georgians, Moldovans, Ossetes, as well as Ukrainians. 195

The Church's interest in protecting, and keeping ties with, the Orthodox believers has determined its set of foreign policy and national security priorities.

Similar to many Russian schools of thought, the protection of national minorities' rights in the 'near abroad' is of prime importance for the Church. As Father Gennady, Archpriest of the Kazan Cathedral in Moscow, told participants at the conference on Russian national interests, "About 25 million of our compatriots have found themselves outside the current Russian Federation against their will. We think that until this problem has been resolved these people cannot live a fruitful life. The trauma of divided families, the oppression of ethnic Russians in a number of states, where their rights and freedoms are trampled underfoot, the stirring up of anti-Russian sentiments by nationalist forces - it all requires a corresponding reaction by the Russian state and society." 196 It should be noted, however, that contrary to the secular schools which are concerned with ethnic Russians or Russian citizens living abroad, the Church is mostly worryied about Russian Orthodox believers.

The Church's concern with minority rights may be explained not only by its religious doctrine or historical traditions, but also by the Patriarch's personal background as well. Aleksii II (Ridiger), the son of a Russified Baltic German father and Russian mother, was born in Estonia in 1929. After ordination to the priesthood, he spent eight and a half years serving in the Russian city of Kokhtla-Yarve in north-eastern Estonia, a hotbed of anti-secessionist sentiment in 1989-91. In 1961-64 he was Bishop of Tallinn and Estonia, before acquiring the key position of chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate. >From 1988 through 1990, he served as the Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, before being elected Patriarch on 7 June 1990. 197 Hence, the Patriarch knows from personal experience how complex the problem of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the ex-Soviet republic is and how closely it is connected with country's security.

The Church has ruled out the use of force to protect Russians living in the 'near abroad'. It has proposed that the Russian government should conclude bilateral agreements on national minorities status within the ex-Soviet republics. The government should also use the law-enforcement mechanisms of the UN, OSCE and other international organisations dealing with human rights issues. The Church itself has tried to influence those governments involved in human rights violations through its numerous international contacts, especially by participating in the work of the World Council of Churches, the Conference of European Churches and other ecumenical bodies. 198

The Orthodox Church does not exclude the possibility of the re-unification of the Russian nation in the long run. As one observer has suggested, "The realization that the Russian people have the right to reunification should become an unchangeable component of Russian policy." 199 At the same time, the issue is a peaceful, non-violent desire to unify, on a new basis, the countries that used to make up a single state. This implies first of all the restoration of the 'historical unity' of the three Slav nations - Belarussians, Russians, and Ukrainians.

One more foreign policy priority for the Russian Orthodox Church has been Russia's role as mediator and peace-keeper in the post-Soviet space. A special emphasis has been put on the importance of a just and peaceful settlement of territorial disputes between the NIS. At the same time, Orthodox spokesmen have underlined that Russia's help must under no circumstances be imposed but should really be needed by peoples involved in the conflict. The Russian army and CIS peace-keeping forces, the Church's representatives believe, can play a special role in maintaining peace in the ex-Soviet territory. However, Russia's military presence in the 'near abroad' is a most delicate matter requiring careful scrutiny with due regard to the national sentiments of host nations and the real usefulness of the troops presence there.

The Church itself is ready to share its rich historical experience of mediation with the state and to assist the government in peace-making. As Petlyuchenko noted, "The Russian Orthodox Church, which has served the cause of international and national reconciliation for centuries, sincerely aspires to fruitful cooperation with the state by supporting its peacemaking efforts and assisting its every action serving the good of people living in Russia and the rest of the world." 200

Inter-religious relations have also been an important foreign policy priority for the Russian Orthodox Church. Peaceful and constructive relations between various confessions are an essential pre-requisite for both domestic and international security. Religions themselves possess a vast peacemaking potential. However, Church spokesmen have noted, today the religious factor does not always play a conciliatory role in international relations and inter-ethnic relations. Certain forces' efforts to represent some inter-state and inter-ethnic conflicts (for example, in Caucasus and Central Asia) as inter-religious confrontation are particular disturbing in the view of the Orthodoxy. This could lead to real disaster and many years of medieval-type, religious wars. According to Orthodox experts, avoiding conflict with Islam is the most important strategic task for Russian diplomacy. 201

Contrary to Orthodox-Islam relations, the Church's stance on 'pseudo-Christian' sects and other foreign missionaries has been rather assertive. As Petlyuchenko observes, "we cannot ignore the 'spiritual intervention' coming from abroad in a muddy torrent and impinging destructively on the souls, especially those of young people." 202

The Church has charged these missionaries with dishonest behaviour: They have used the Orthodoxy's financial difficulties to undermine its influence in Russia. By distributing humanitarian aid and free literature, buying newspaper space and broadcasting time for hard currency, renting halls and stadiums, they have tried to divert potential Orthodox believers from their religion. What is particularly alarming for the Church is that some of those missionaries have tried to persuade people that Orthodoxy supports them. They have borrowed components of the Orthodox doctrine and used Orthodox religious symbols, a practice which the Church has seen as outright sacrilege. 203

An Orthodox spokesmen insisted that the Foreign Ministry and the security services should pay more attention to the 'subversive' activities of various foreign sects in Russia.

Relations between various Orthodox confessions has been a difficult question for the Church as well. At the time of the Millennium celebrations in 1988, it was reported that the Church had 6,893 functioning parishes. Of these, more than 4,000 were located in Ukraine and as few as 2,000 were functioning in Russia. Therefore, the 51.4 million Ukrainian citizens reported in the 1989 USSR census had twice as many functioning Orthodox parishes as did the 147 million citizens in the Russian Federation. 204

With the break-down of the Soviet Union nationalist elites in the ex-Soviet republics have pushed local Orthodox leaders to claim independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. The latter was forced to grant Orthodox Churches in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, and Ukraine autonomy in administrative, economic, educational and civilian affairs. This could not, however, prevent a schism in the Orthodoxy. Finally, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has become completely independent. Other churches preserve only a nominal dependence on the Moscow Patriarchate. In addition, angered by the Orthodox hierarchy's continued co-operation with the Communist Party and KGB, a small number of parishes in Russia itself have turned towards the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, a fiercely anti-Communist ecclesiastical body under Metropolitan Vitalii of New York.

The Moscow Patriarchate sees the schism as a serious threat to the security of Russia and Russians living abroad because it worsens inter-ethnic and inter-state relations. Referring to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Petlyuchenko pointed out that "Actions of this nature are carried out under the banner of the national idea and result in drawing the religious factor into inter-ethnic contradictions. Our Church has never approved of such behaviour and never will, deploring as she does the destructive impact of political processes on church life." 205

In spite of its significant influence on the minds of common Russian people, the Church's impact on the security debate has been rather limited. The Orthodoxy has had no meaningful effect on leading schools of thought such as the 'derzhavniki', 'realists' or geopoliticians. Orthodox ideas got a positive response only in the Slavophile and - to some extent - pro-Communist quarters,that is, in the periphery of Russian foreign policy discourse. 206 The Church, however, serves as a useful counter-balance to purely pragmatic and power-inclined schools of thought which now dominate the Russian security debate.

 

The environmentalists

The environmental movement has rapidly spread in post-Communist Russia and become rather influential in domestic politics. A number of the post-perestroika leaders started their political careers as environmentalists 207 . For example, the Russian 'greens' succeeded in promoting Academician Alexei Yablokov to the post of State Counsellor of the Russian Federation on Ecology and Health Care, and thus becoming their major voice in the government.

Environmentalism has also tried to influence the Russian security debate. The environmentalists were one of the first to re-define the concept of security. As Academician Yablokov said at the conference on Russian foreign policy doctrine in February 1992, "National security is no longer purely military. I am sure that Russia's national security is environmental by at least one-third." 208 Contrary to military or geopolitical threats which are mainly hypothetical, ecology directly affects the nation's economy, health, climate, etc.

Under environmentalism's pressure, nearly all leading schools of foreign policy thought included an ecological dimension in their concepts of security. A special section on ecological security was put into the draft of the Russian Law on National Security in 1995. 209

Interdependence theory has been the main conceptual basis for Russian environmentalists. They believe that Russian ecological problems are so acute that they threaten not only Russia itself but other countries as well. The environmentalists have distinguished a number of ecological problems affecting Russian, its neighbours, and the global environment:

- Forest (taiga) and bog destruction. Industrial and agriculture activities destroying forests and bogs in Siberia and on the Kola Peninsula violate the regional eco-system balance, deteriorate animal and human living conditions, and increase the 'greenhouse effect'. 210 The latter may result in long-range climatic change. Because of the greenhouse effect, biologists predict that tundra areas will shrink and forests will creep north along coasts, up mountain slopes, and into former tundra areas. 211 These processes would likewise change the composition of plant and animal communities. This warming trend has major implications for human activities in the North (offshore and onshore oil drilling, hydroelectric projects, and agriculture).

As Russian forests make up 25 per cent of all the world's forestry, they play a tremendous role in the functioning of the global biosphere and the climate of the planet. The Siberian taiga absorbs as much, or even more, carbon dioxide as the planet's rain forests, thereby stabilising the atmosphere. 212 Scientists also point out that an additional effect of deforestation consists of the soil releasing more methane into the atmosphere than before. Methane is a powerful gas which alters the atmosphere to a far greater extent than carbon dioxide, thus speeding up the greenhouse effect.

Despite the significance of the taiga for the biosphere, the Gorbachev and Yeltsin administrations have allowed Russian companies and joint ventures to increase their timber exports to Japan, South Korea, and Finland. Consequently, the taiga has shrunk rapidly threatening both the world-wide ecological balance and the traditional culture of some national minorities. 213

Reflecting international concerns, a parliamentary conference was held in 1992 in Washington, DC. Initiated by EU representatives, a special resolution on Siberian forests was adopted. 214

- Water pollution. According to some data, Russian oil companies pour some 20 to 30 million tons of oil into Siberian forests and rivers. 215 The daily waste of local industries in the St. Petersburg area amounts to 120 tons of ammonium, 40 tons of nitric anhydride, 132 tons of oil products, 36 tons of phosphor, 50 tons of iron, and 2 tons of phenol. 216 Barely some 2/3 of industrial waste water is purified. Further, the sediment that is created after the cleaning is usually thrown into the Neva river or the Gulf of Finland. As a result of a new dam construction, coastal water pollution has increased 1 and 1/2 times (now being 1500 mm/m3) during the last 5 years.

The Kola Peninsula, another northern region of Russia, is in real trouble too. According to the hydrometeorological service in Murmansk County, of the 514 water samples taken and analysed in the first half of 1991, one third were classified as containing a high degree of pollution, and of these, a further one third contained an extremely high degree of pollution. 217 The industrial centres most exposed to water pollution are Murmansk, Monchegorsk, Nikel and Kandalaksha.

- Terrestrial pollution. Major mineral and metallurgy exploitation activities in Siberia and on the Kola Peninsula have disrupted the landscape in many places. Exploration for oil and gas, the development of new fields and other activities connected with petroleum affect heavily the interests of reindeer herding. Military exercises and transport are very damaging to the environment as well.

- Radioactive waste. The environmentalists believe that the northern part of Russia and Arctic Ocean are most vulnerable to nuclear contamination. Radiation emanating from nuclear munition factories in Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Chelyabinsk used to float into the Arctic Ocean down the great Siberian rivers 218 . From 1964 to 1991, fluid and solid radioactive waste has been dumped in the Barents and Kara seas. According to the Yablokov Commission's report, the Soviet Union has dumped 16 nuclear reactors in the Kara Sea (including 6 with nuclear fuel). Also, a container with nuclear waste from ice-breaker 'Lenin' has been dumped. General radioactive waste amounts 319.000 curie in the Barents Sea and 2.419.000 curie in the Kara Sea. 219 The Yablokov Commission remained very pessimistic with regard to the prospect of either reducing or completely stopping the dumping. Still, the first plant for fluid waste processing should be ready by 1997 provided the government keeps to the current level of funding. Even so, the problem of solid waste processing has not yet been resolved even on the theoretical level.

Reactor operation involves the transport, processing, shifting and storage of radioactive fuel and waste. According to the Norwegian State Nuclear Inspection, the storage of highly radioactive used fuel on board vessels, as was the case in Murmansk city, represents an unacceptably high safety risk. In 1996, the Norwegian environmental organisation, Bellona, issued a report singling out the Northern Fleet as a main source of ecological threat. After the dumping was stopped in 1991, the storage facilities for liquid and solid waste were filled rapidly. The development of stationing systems, and the technical maintenance and repairs of naval nuclear-powered ships lagged far behind the production of those ships with the new requirements. The report describes several accidents which have occurred at spent nuclear fuel storage locations. It provides a detailed description of the accident which happened in Andreyev Bay in 1982, only 45 kilometres away from the Norwegian border. The authors of the report conclude that the situation has become disastrous because the stored nuclear fuel cannot be removed for at least another 30 to 40 years 220 . Meanwhile, the report has evoked a fierce reaction from both commanders in the Northern Fleet and Russian counterintelligence. Bellona was accused of being the Trojan horse of the Western intelligence services. Alexander Nikitin, a retired Russian naval officer who co-operated with Bellona and contributed to the said report, was arrested as a spy after supposedly gathering secret information on Russia's nuclear submarines. 221

- Hydroelectric power plants and water diversion schemes. Massive dams and strings of smaller dams have destroyed many acres of prime wildlife habitat and life support systems important to some northern communities. 222 When hydroelectric power plants were accompanied by industrial facilities, as used to be the case in the Soviet Union, the combination was especially devastating.

- Depletion of the ozone layer. Despite Moscow having signed the Montreal Protocol on protection of the ozone layer, Russian industry did not stop producing chloro- and fluorocarbons which are mainly responsible for destroying the ozone layer. According to some assessments, if the depletion of the ozone layer continues at the same high rate, Russian agriculture will end up producing roughly 30 per cent less than at present. Nor will microbial communities function as they should because of powerful ultraviolet radiation destroying the microbes, resulting in a marked increase in the incidence of skin cancer as a consequence. 223

Ecologists believe that Russian foreign policy must contribute to the resolution of these problems. As Yablokov put it, "The problems ahead are enormous. They must be tackled by ecologising our policy." 224

The environmentalists regard neighbouring countries as potential partners for co-operation because together with Russia they create a common ecological space. They are in favour of the unification of ecological legislation in the CIS member states. They also single out Chernobyl, and the Aral and Caspian seas as potential areas of bilateral and multilateral co-operation within the CIS framework.

At the same time, the environmentalists believe that traditional diplomatic methods are not sufficient for resolving ecological problems which have now tended to become global rather than national or regional. They believe that Russia, along with the entire world, should develop New Thinking based on a common interest in survival in the face of global problems. 225 The environmentalists are quite radical in their recommendations regarding solutions to global problems. They recommend a dissolution of political boundaries and a de-ideologising of international relations (of course, except for environmentalism itself). In order to cope with these ecological problems, humankind should be able to forecast both the near and distant future and should consider all the components of these problems in their historical and physical developments. Since only scientists are able to make good forecasts, this stratum should be elevated to the very top of society and charged with political management as well. The entire system of education should be re-oriented to environmental problems. National and international economies should be based on new technologies targeted at the rational exploitation of natural resources. Contrary to public and private properties, co-operative property will be the best form of ownership to deal with environmental issues. And, trans-national rather than national bodies should be in charge of global problems as nation-states are unable to cope with them any longer. 226

According to the environmentalists, managing ecological problems is merely the first step in humankind's progressive development. The main objective looming ahead is to move from a programme of survival to that of sustainable development. The latter can be described as a social order based on harmonious relations with nature and the prevention of major internal and external threats to stability and social well-being. 227

It goes without saying that these ideas are by no means original. Russian environmentalists have borrowed many of them from their foreign 'colleagues'. The Rome Club papers, the Brundtland Commission report, and the ideas of Bertrand Russell are among the most authoritative theoretical sources for the Russian ecologists. 228

However, the environmentalists have been less successful in their attempts to influence Russian discourse on future security challenges. Russian foreign policy makers and analysts regard this part of environmentalists' problematique an exotic intellectual exercise which is hardly relevant for present-day Russia. They are concerned with Russia's compelling needs (including some ecological issues) rather than with challenges in the distant future. However, this situation may change if Russia is able to resolve its most acute social and economic problems, and hence is more able to pay attention to ecology.

 

Postmodernism in Russia?

Up until now, Russian scholarship has been quite indifferent to postmodernism as a school of Western political thought. The Russian academic community has mainly ignored both the postmodern problematique and the discussions around it. Indeed, many Russian theorists are not even aware of this partcicular school. Few philosophers and historians have tried to implement postmodernist approaches to their research. 229 While some political scientists have studied postmodernism as one of the Western schools of political thought 230 .

Predominantly postmodernism is regarded as being irrelevant for Russian political discourse. Foreign policy experts are especially unfriendly to postmodernism because, they think, it neither provides them with a theoretical framework for producing national interests or geopolitical concepts nor with practical advice on concrete issues.

However, some have suggested that a certain postmodern insight could be evolving in Russia due to some peculiarities in the national mentality. Russians have never been happy with the project of modernity grounded on rationalism, a belief in linear progress and the decisive role of science and knowledge. Even Marxism, a typical product of modernity, has been adapted to Russian conditions. Russians have never perceived other civilisations as hostile; on the contrary, they have been quite open to dialogue with other civilisations and cultures.

There is growing feeling among some Russian scholars that the country has already entered the postmodern epoch. There are completely new time and spatial dimensions in which individuals and society live in the period of transition. Moral values and individual perceptions of the surrounding world have significantly changed as well. At the same time, Russia's economic and technological potential, social structure, and political system still remain in the age of modernity. This typically postmodern discrepancy between an individual's material conditions and his/her psychological and spiritual orientations is gradually emerging as a fashionable theme in Russian social science literature. In her essay published by the main Russian political science journal Polis, Irina Busygina of the Institute of Europe, depicts a mysterious urban world of post-perestroika Moscow representing a mixture of Soviet and capitalist, Russian and Western, values and modes of living. 231 Even 'realist' Vladimir Lukin admits that the world has stepped into a new stage of its development which essentially differs from the previous one. Explaining why the old realism-idealism debate is no longer relevant, he writes: "The modern world, more diverse and multifaceted than ever before, is a world of postmodern global interdependence and medieval neanderthal geopolitics; of secular rationality and religious fundamentalism; of integrated economics, information, and even ideology (free markets and democracy) and sharply differing standards of living." 232

It should be noted, however, that for many Russian academics postmodernism is simply a sort of 'intellectual game' or 'entertainment'. When dealing with security issues, experts still turn to more traditional theories.

At the same time, postmodernist thought has begun to influence Russian foreign policy discourse - at least in areas such as modelling the new world order, Russia's place in world civilisation, defining national interests, and so on.

For example, some Russian postmodernists implement the grammatological civilisational model borrowed from the Western poststructuralists to explain the causes of conflict between different nations and civilisations. This model has pretensions to be more accurate than the notorious Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' theory.

According to this model, a system of writing is a more important civilisational connecting link between members of a nation than, say, religion or culture. Present-day Russia, for instance, is a rather loose formation from a religious point of view, but, in terms of writing (Cyrillic alphabet), is far more homogeneous. Chinese dialects differ so greatly that language functions as a common vehicle only in writing. 233

There is a 'war of alphabets' in the world: most of the peoples and groups now at war use different systems of writing, that is, they belong to different civilisations. Some groups either waging war or involved in some other conflict include: Serbs (Cyrillic alphabet; Orthodoxy) - Croats (Latin alphabet; Catholicism), common language, Serbo-Croatian; Nagorny Karabakh (Armenian alphabet, Armenian Church) - Azerbaijan (switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet; Islam); Greek Cypriots (Greek alphabet; Orthodoxy) - Turkish Cypriots (Latin alphabet; Islam); Russians (Cyrillic alphabet; Orthodoxy) - Chechens (who in 1992 began switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet).

Also, there are parties to conflicts professing a common religion but using different alphabets: (1) Orthodoxes: Moldavians (Latin alphabet) - Transdniestr Republic composed of Russians and Ukrainians (Cyrillic alphabet); Abkhazians (Cyrillic alphabet) - Georgians (Georgian alphabet); Georgians (Georgian alphabet) - South Ossetes (Cyrillic alphabet); Greeks (Greek alphabet) - Macedonians (Cyrillic alphabet); (2) Muslims: central Tajik government (Cyrillic alphabet) - guerrillas (Arabic alphabet), etc. 234

'Small' civilisations used to be a source of tensions in international relations because they struggle for their survival. They wage wars against more powerful civilisations, thereby making history. Postmodernists are very sceptical with regard to the capabilities of international organisations to cope with the destabilising potential of 'small' civilisations.

Adherents of the grammatological model, however, have found it difficult to convince many Russian scholars that a system of writing is the main source of intra- and international conflicts. This model, they argue, describes the symptoms of conflict rather than its causes. Indeed, contrary to the grammatological explanation, one can find numerous examples of conflicts both between and inside nations using the same alphabet: intra-Arab conflicts, Latin America, China-Taiwan, wars between the European nations, civil wars (from American to Russian), etc. At the same time, the grammatological model can be heuristically valuable for understanding the history of, and current border-lines between, various civilisations.

As to security issues, Russian postmodernists argue that Russia should not base its policy on the concept of national interests. The latter, they believe, is, first, 'heuristically non-productive'; second, 'theoretically weak'; and, third, 'politically harmful.' 235

The postmodernists have 'deconstructed' the national interests concept in order to demonstrate its lack of meaning. For them, this concept is a mere camouflage for parochial interests. In reality, so-called 'national interests' do not reflect either a state's or a nation's interests. That, in fact, they are interests of the elite which runs the government. By imposing its perception of national interests on society, the ruling elite tries to legitimise its dominance and control over both state and society. Each stratum or group has its own version of 'national interests', but only the most powerful group's version becomes officially recognised doctrine. This, however, does not mean that the successful of any particular concept necessarily corresponds to the real interests of the majority of the country's population. For that reason, foreign policy based on quasi-national interests can be detrimental to a significant part of society. 236

While the national interests concept was useful and productive during the early modernity, today it represents merely a 'conservative utopia'. The postmodernists have categorised this concept and the revival of realism in Russia and other countries as a 'primitive communitarian response' to the dominance of universalism in the age of modernity. According to a postmodernist reading, the national interests concept tends to protect 'speciality' (or even 'exceptionalism') against 'universality' which was imposed on humankind by the Enlightenment. But this extreme leads followers of the national interests concept to an intellectual and political dead-end. Theoretically, to prove your uniqueness or special rights over something you should - one way or another - use some universal matrix. Otherwise you have no criterion with which to compare different objects. Politically, by defending only its national interests a country could provoke an endless confrontation with other international actors.

The postmodernists have argued that the concept became obsolete in the age of transnational economy, information and communications. It does not fit into a new world order which presupposes that states give up a substantial part of their national sovereignty in favour of supranational organisations (including security matters).

The postmodernists warn that the search for 'Russian national interests' may divert the country away from its path towards democracy. In a global sense, this can lead to confrontation with other powers who deny universal values and pursue only 'national interests'. For them, liberal democracy versus Islamic fundamentalism, one ethnic nationalism against another, exemplifies such a confrontation.

The only way out is to get rid of the both extremes - universalism and communitarianism. The old universalities which proved either to be wrong or anti-democratic should be abandoned. Instead, new universal norms should be discovered. based on multi-culturalism, tolerance, self-criticism, and a dialogue culture. 237 At the same time, however, the postmodernists have avoided building concrete models of security either for Russia or the world.

It is hard to believe that the postmodernists could become an influential school in Russia in the foreseeable future. There are at least three main obstacles to the growth of their influence. First, Russia is still at the stage of trying to define its own national identity, and, therefore, realist concepts, such as 'national interests', 'national security', 'power balance', and so forth., will remain attractive both for academics and policy planners for many years. Second, the postmodernists, by limiting themselves to 'deconstruction' will be unable to produce any new theory (opposing the very idea of theorising). Finally, Western science has already passed the peak of postmodern discourse (late 1980s-early 1990s) while Russia was still relatively isolated from these discussions. Thus, Western postmodernists probably missed their best opportunity to gain a following in Russia.

Nonetheless, as Russia continues to progress with its reforms and opens up to greater international co-operation, it will inevitably face the postmodern problematique. Responses to postmodern challenges will not necessarily be given by the Western-like postmodernists; although perhaps they could be found by some other schools of thought. But, these challenges should be met somehow; otherwise Russia may never be competitive and prosperous again.

 

A foreign policy consensus?

Along with the polarisation of Russian foreign policy elites and public opinion, there was a clear tendency towards consensus on foreign policy from 1994-96. 238 This development reflects relative economic and political stabilisation in the country. In addition, the discussions of 1991-93 resulted in defining some common principles on which the major schools have agreed upon. Contours of an emerging consensus could be describes as follows:

  1. Realism and geopolitics became widely recognised theoretical concepts regardless of the schools' political and ideological orientations.
  2. The priority of Russia's national interests; the secondary role of 'all-human' or cosmopolitan values.
  3. Russia should remain a great power with a major voice in the international community.
  4. Other goals should not be given priority in Russia's foreign policy over the country's domestic needs. Foreign policy should serve these needs rather than be a goal in itself (as it was often in the Soviet time).
  5. Russia's main national interest consists of ensuring the country's security and territorial integrity.
  6. In the present-day world security includes not only military and geopolitical but societal, environmental, cultural and other dimensions vital to the individual and society.
  7. Russia should not be biased in favour of either the West or the East. Instead, its policy should be even-handed and oriented to co-operation with all countries. In fact, a moderate version of 'Eurasianism' was tacitly accepted by the Russian foreign policy elites. As Zagorsky put it, "This [foreign policy] consensus is going to take shape around the concept of Eurasianism or one of its versions since the concept itself is heterogeneous, being represented by diverse political trends, and much will depend on the actual balance of political forces. Personally I do not support this concept but am compelled to reckon with the existence of a certain movement of this nature and the fact that it already had its effect on Russian politics in 1993." 239
  8. Among the Moscow's regional priorities, the 'near abroad' is the most important one.
  9. Russia has special geopolitical, strategic, economic and humanitarian interests in the post-Soviet geopolitical space and should be recognised as an unchallenged leader in this area.
  10. NATO's eastward expansion is the most serious security challenge facing Russia in Europe. Russian diplomacy should prevent NATO enlargement, or at least minimise its effects, by excluding the Baltic states from the list of potential members, delaying the process for several years, and concluding an agreement between Brussels and Moscow to guarantee the security of the latter.
  11. Russia should be more assertive in voicing its specific interests in relations with the West. It should not hesitate to differ with Western views if the Russia's vital interest is at stake.
  12. Moscow should be more realistic in assessing the West's attitudes to Russia, in particular its position on Russia's admittance to the Western economic, political and military institutions.

This consensus has made it possible to produce a number of governmental concepts and doctrines such as the foreign policy concept and military doctrine (both adopted in 1993) as well as the draft of the Law on National Security (1995).

It should be noted, however, that a consensus has been reached mainly on those issues dealing with Russia's immediate security needs. While many schools are able to identify threats to the country's security, they are still not ready to go beyond negativism and construct a positive security concept for the future.

Russian foreign policy schools continue to differ on many important theoretical and practical issues: the meaning of Russia's national interests and security; the correlation between 'hard' and 'soft' security; the future of national sovereignty; the role of the international organisations in ensuring national and international security; civilisational orientations; the use of military force in international relations; functional and regional priorities; particular ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts, etc. (Figure 1 characterises similarities and dissimilarities in various schools' positions.)

The Russian discourse on security still aims at responding to the fundamental question: what is Russia about? This discourse is a way to nation-building rather than to defining the country's future security agenda. This is hardly surprisingly given Russia's newly born polity, culture and even boundaries, as well as its unfinished reforms. It is understandable why fairly old-fashioned theories such as 'Eurasianism', realism, and geopolitics could come to dominate Russian security debates. As these concepts refer to 'national interest', 'national security', 'national sovereignty' and territory, they seem a reliable theoretical basis in searching for a national identity. Russian and other countries' experience shows that these concepts may provide both society and the political elites with some intellectual support for building a foreign policy consensus. Moreover, as Margo Light notes, "Pragmatic Nationalism represents the standard view one might expect the foreign policy ╩lite to hold in any country. ... the robust identification and defence of the national interest is normal, in the sense of being in accord with political realist practice." 240 However, as a country departs modernity and faces the challenges of postmodernity, many quasi-reliable paradigms (including realism/geopolitics) do not work.

The problem is that Russia has to cope with postmodernity while the programme of its reforms and dominant social ideal are oriented to modernity: nation-building, the market economy, civil society, the rule of law, the separation of powers, developing democratic institutions, individualism, human rights, and so on. Meanwhile, the fundamental question still remains unanswered: will Russia enter directly into a postmodern phase jumping over the classic modernist period, or should it first of all be modernised? Moreover, someone may wonder: is a Western-oriented modernity-postmodernity scheme applicable to Russia (as well as to many other countries)? Does an effort to bring a postmodern problematique to Russia represent another attempt to Westernise this country? If this is true, it may impede Russia's search for its own way and may again evoke a new wave of anti-Western sentiments.

What can easily be predicted, however, is that Russian security debates will not stop with the reaching of a consensus on realist/geopolitical basis. It is the starting point rather than the end of these debates. With the achievment of a certain level of socio-economic and political stability, new concepts with emphasis on individual and societal security will likely challenge collectivist and state- or nation-oriented theories. The entire landscape of the Russian discourse on security will be even more diverse in the years to come. Plurality rather than unification and consensus- building will probably become a major characteristic of this discourse. A completely different set of priorities could be the focus of future security debates: ensuring domestic stability and territorial integrity, preventing the rise of hostile powers and alliances may be replaced by concerns such as the environment, mass disease, international terrorism and narco-business, migration, the increasing vulnerability of economic and information networks, and so on.

 

Notes

*: This paper has been prepared with the assistance of the fellowship research grants from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and Research Support Scheme. I am grateful to my COPRI colleagues who have read this paper and provided me with comments. I express my special thanks to Prof. Håkan Wiberg and Dr. Pertti Joenniemi whose comments have been especially valuable. Back.

Note 1: Suzanne Crow, The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia under Yeltsin (Munich/ Washington, DC: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, 1993), p.2. Back.

Note 2: Dimitri Simes, 'Reform Reaffirmed', Foreign Policy, No.90 (Spring 1993), pp.48-53. Back.

Note 3: Alexei G. Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', International Security, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall 1993), pp.9-14. Back.

Note 4: Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.34. Back.

Note 5: A.Rahr, '"Atlanticists" versus "Eurasians" in Russian Foreign Policy', RFE/RL Research Report 29 May 1992, pp.17-22; Alexander A. Sergounin, Russian Foreign Policy Thinking: Redefining Conceptions (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace & Conflict Research, 1993) (Working Paper No. 11, 1993); Neil Malcolm, 'New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe', Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? (London and New York: Pinter Publishers for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), pp.151-174; Hannes Adomeit, 'Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality', International Affairs, vol.71, no.1, 1995, pp.58-59. Back.

Note 6: Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika. New Thinking for our Country and the World (London: Fontana/Collins, 1988), pp.140-141. Back.

Note 7: Ibid., p.137. Back.

Note 8: Ibid., p.142. Back.

Note 9: Ibid., p.143. Back.

Note 10: Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 1980, no.2, p.145. Back.

Note 11: Gorbachev, Perestroika, p.137. Back.

Note 12: George G. Weickhardt, 'Democratization and Glasnost in the Soviet Armed Forces', Report on the USSR, vol.1, no.20, 1989, pp.10-15; Gerhard Wettig, '"New Thinking" on Security and East-West Relations', Problems of Communism, vol.XXXVII, March-April 1988, p.1. Back.

Note 13: Sergei A. Karaganov, 'Towards a New Security System in Europe', Vilho Harle and Jyrki Iivonen (eds.), Gorbachev and Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p.42. Back.

Note 14: Malcolm, 'New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe', p.152; The Gorbachev Challenge and European Security. A Report from the European Strategy Group (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988), pp.95-99. Back.

Note 15: Gorbachev, Perestroika, pp.197-198. Back.

Note 16: Ibid., pp.190-205; Karaganov, 'Towards a New Security System in Europe', pp.46-50. Back.

Note 17: Hannes Adomeit, 'The Atlantic Alliance in Soviet and Russian Perspectives', Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation?, p.38. See also Jyrki Iivonen, 'Soviet Foreign Policy Doctrine in Transition', Harle and Iivonen (eds.), Gorbachev and Europe p.28. Back.

Note 18: Cited in: Malcolm, 'New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe', pp.158-159. See also Sergei Kurginyan et al., Postperestroika: Kontseptual'naya Model' Razvitiya Nashego Obshchestva, Politicheskikh Partii i Obshchestvennykh Organizatsii (Postperestroika: a Conceptual Model for Development of Our Society, Political Parties and Social Organisations) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990) (in Russian). Back.

Note 19: Malcolm, 'New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe', pp.160-161. Back.

Note 20: Cited in: Ibid., p.161. Back.

Note 21: Cited in: Ibid., p.163. Back.

Note 22: Ibid., p.164. Back.

Note 23: Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', pp.9-10; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 July 1992, pp.1,3; 27 March 1993, p.1 (in Russian). See also Crow, The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia under Yeltsin, pp.22-23. Back.

Note 24: NATO Review (February 1993), p.3. See also Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, pp.44-45. Back.

Note 25: Andrei Zagorski, Anatoli Zlobin, Sergei Solodovnik, Mark Khrustalev, 'Russia in a New World', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.7 (July 1992), pp.6-7. Back.

Note 26: 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38 (April-May 1992), p.86. Back.

Note 27: Ibid., pp.87-88. Back.

Note 28: Pravda, 23 December 1991; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 5 March 1992 (in Russian). In his letter addressed in December 1991 to the first meeting between NATO foreign ministers and those of the former Warsaw Pact in Brussels, President Yeltsin wrote: "Today, we are raising the question of Russia's membership in NATO, regarding it, however, as a long-term political aim" (cited in Adomeit, 'The Atlantic Alliance in Soviet and Russian Perspectives', p.48). Back.

Note 29: Vladimir Kozin, 'New Dimensions of NATO', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.39, No.3 (March 1993), p.57. Back.

Note 30: Zagorski et al., 'Russia in a New World', p.11. Back.

Note 31: B. Litera, 'The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian variation on the Monroe Doctrine', Perspectives (Winter 1994/95), pp.45-52. Back.

Note 32: On the domestic and external causes of change in Russian foreign policy see in detail: Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, pp.81-88. Back.

Note 33: Alexei Arbatov, , 'Imperiya ili Velikaya Derzhava?' ['Empire or the Great Power?'], Novoye Vremya (December 1992), no.49, pp.16-18; no.50, pp.20-23; and Sergei Goncharov, 'Osobye Interesy Rossii - Chto Eto Takoye?' ['Special Interests of Russia - What They Are?'], Izvestiya, 25 February 1992, p.3 (in Russian). Back.

Note 34: The 'Eurasianist' theme has initially appeared in the late Gorbachev period but mainly as a search for a new Russia's historical identity rather than security concept (see 'Dom Evraziya' ('Eurasia Home'), Vek XX i mir, vol.32, no.6, 1989, pp.22-27; Viktor Krivorotov, 'Russkiy Put'' ('Russian Way'), Znamya, vol.60, no.8, 1990, pp.140-164; no.9, pp.184-200 (in Russian)). Perhaps Vladimir Lukin and Alexander Bovin with their idea for a European community from the Atlantic to the Urals which was developing within the group of the 'New Thinking Radicals' were close to 'Eurasianism' (Aleksandr E. Bovin and Vladimir P. Lukin, 'Perestroika Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy - Puti i Podkhody' ('Perestroika in International Relations: Methods and Approaches'), Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, vol.33, no.1, pp.58-70 (in Russian)). Back.

Note 35: Iskhod k Vostoku (Exit to the East) (Sofia, Bulgaria: Rossiisko-Bolgarskoe Knigoizdatelstvo, 1921); G.P. Fedotov, Sudba i Grekhi Rossii [Russia's Destiny and Sins] (St. Petersburg, 1991), vol.1-2.; Ivan Solonevich, Narodnaya Monarchiya [People's Monarchy] (Moscow, 1991) (in Russian). Back.

Note 36: Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p.49. Back.

Note 37: Lena Jonson, 'In Search of a National Interest: the Foreign Policy Debate in Russia', The Nationalities Papers (forthcoming). Back.

Note 38: 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', p.100. Back.

Note 39: Cited in Jonson, 'In Search of a National Interest'. See Stankevich's path-breaking article 'Derzhava v Poiskakh Sebya' ('The Power in Search of Itself') in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 March 1992, p.4. English translation: 'Russia in Search of Itself', The National Interest (Summer 1992), pp.47-51. Back.

Note 40: Konstantin Pleshakov, 'Russia's Mission: the Third Epoch', International Affairs (Moscow) (January 1993), pp.22-23. Back.

Note 41: Sergei Stankevich, 'Toward a New "National Idea"', Stephen Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Washington. DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p.24. Back.

Note 42: Ibid., pp.31-32. Back.

Note 43: Ibid., pp.28. Back.

Note 44: Nikolai Travkin, 'Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe', Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests, pp.34-35. Back.

Note 45: Ibid., pp.36-38; Malcolm, 'New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe', p.170. Back.

Note 46: John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.293-294. See also Jemal Surmanidze, 'The Hopes of Russia. The United States of Eurasia', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.8 (August 1992), pp.109-117. Back.

Note 47: Stankevich, 'Toward a New "National Idea"', p.26. Back.

Note 48: Vladimir P. Lukin, 'Russia and Its Interests', Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests, p.109. Back.

Note 49: Travkin, 'Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe', p.38. Back.

Note 50: Konstantin Sarkisov, 'Russia and Japan', Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outide World (Washington/London: Brassey's, Inc., 1994), p.262 Back.

Note 51: Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, Sino-Russian Military Co-operation and Evolving Security System in East Asia (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1996), pp.3-8; Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, 'Indo-Russian Military Co-operation: Russian Perspective', Asian Profile (February 1996), pp.24-27; Vladimir S. Miasnikov, 'Russia and China', Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outide World, pp.228-238. Back.

Note 52: Lukin, 'Russia and Its Interests', p.110. Back.

Note 53: Ibid. Back.

Note 54: A.D. Bogaturov, M.M. Kozhokin, K.V. Pleshakov, 'Vneshnyaa Politika Rossii' ['Russia's Foreign Policy'], USA: economics, politics, ideology, 1992, no.10, p.31 (in Russian). Back.

Note 55: Lukin, 'Russia and Its Interests', p.115. Back.

Note 56: Ibid. Back.

Note 57: Cited in Malcolm, 'New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe', p.167. Back.

Note 58: Stankevich, 'Toward a New "National Idea"', pp.25-26. Back.

Note 59: Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.200-201. Back.

Note 60: Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests. Back.

Note 61: 'Kontseptsiya Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoi Federatsii' ('Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation'), Special Issue of Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik (January 1993), pp.3-23 (in Russian). Back.

Note 62: Anita I. Singh, 'India's Relations with Russia and Central Asia', International Affairs, vol. 71, no.1, 1995, p.71. Back.

Note 63: Elgiz Pozdnyakov, 'Russia is a Great Power', International Affairs (Moscow) (January 1993), p.6. Back.

Note 64: Elgiz Pozdnyakov, 'Russia Today and Tomorrow', International Affairs (Moscow) (February 1993), p.30. Back.

Note 65: Andrey Zagorski, 'Russia and Europe', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.39, No.1 (January 1993), p.49. Back.

Note 66: See, for example, Aleksandr Rutskoi, 'Ya - Tsentrist, Derzhavnik i Liberal' ('I am Centrist, Derzhavnik and Liberal'), Argumenty i Facty, No.37 (October 1992), p.2 (in Russian). Back.

Note 67: Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', p.12. Back.

Note 68: This term has no relation to its old meaning in the late 1980s. As John B. Dunlop observes, 'gosudarstvenniki' was a term to describe a conservative coalition of neo-Stalinists, National Bolsheviks, and nationalists who opposed Gorbachev's perestroika (see Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp.123-130). Back.

Note 69: Alexander Vladislavlev and Sergey Karaganov, 'The Idea of Russia', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.12 (December 1992), p.31. Back.

Note 70: 'Russia's National Interests', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.8 (August 1992), p.135. Back.

Note 71: Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, pp.20-21. Back.

Note 72: Vladislavlev and Karaganov, 'The Idea of Russia', p.34. Back.

Note 73: Cited in: Ibid., p.36. Back.

Note 74: Ibid., p.35. Back.

Note 75: 'Russia's National Interests', p.136. Back.

Note 76: 'What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.39, No.2 (February 1993), p.9. Back.

Note 77: Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, p.19. Back.

Note 78: Rutskoi, 'Ya - Tsentrist, Derzhavnik i Liberal', p.2; 'Strategy for Russia: Report of the Council for Military and Defense Policy', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 August 1992, p.5 (in Russian). Back.

Note 79: Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, pp.22-23. Back.

Note 80: 'What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue', p.9. Back.

Note 81: Vladislavlev and Karaganov, 'The Idea of Russia', p.34. Back.

Note 82: Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, p.23. Back.

Note 83: Ibid., pp.19-20. Back.

Note 84: Sergei Karaganov, 'Fifty Years After Victory', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.41, Nos.4-5 1995, pp.63-64. Back.

Note 85: 'What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue', p.9. Back.

Note 86: On political re-alignment in 1993-94 see in detail: Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, pp.70-73. Back.

Note 87: Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 January 1994 (in Russian); Litera, 'The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine', pp.45-52. Back.

Note 88: Adomeit, 'Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality', p.59. Back.

Note 89: Peter Stupavsky, 'Zahranicná politika Ruska v ére Jel'cina' ('Russia's Foreign Policy in the Yeltsin's era'), Mezinárodni vztahy (Prague), No.3, 1996, p.10 (in Czech). Back.

Note 90: 'What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue', p.6. Back.

Note 91: On the Council see in detail: Oksana Antonenko, New Russian Analytical Centers and Their Role in Political Decisionmaking (Cambridge, Mass.: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996), pp.39-41. Back.

Note 92: See, for example, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, 'A Security Concept for Russia', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.39, No.10 (October 1993), p.11. Back.

Note 93: 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.42, No.2 (February 1996), p.8. Back.

Note 94: Ibid., p.9. Back.

Note 95: Shaposhnikov, 'A Security Concept for Russia', pp.14-15; Vadim Lukov, 'Russia's Security: the Foreign Policy Dimension', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.41, No.5, 1995), pp.5-7. Back.

Note 96: Shaposhnikov, 'A Security Concept for Russia', pp.15-18. Back.

Note 97: 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', pp.9-10. Back.

Note 98: Sergey Rogov, 'A National Security Policy for Russia', James E. Goodby and Benoit Morel (eds.), The Limited Partnership: Building a Russian-US Security Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.76. Back.

Note 99: Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.41, Nos.11-12, 1995, pp.18-20. Back.

Note 100: Alexei Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, pp.64-67. Back.

Note 101: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.19. Back.

Note 102: Ibid., p.20. Back.

Note 103: Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', p.71. Back.

Note 104: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.21. Back.

Note 105: Rogov, 'A National Security Policy for Russia', p.76. Back.

Note 106: Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', p.72. Back.

Note 107: Ibid.; S. Trush, 'Prodazha Rossiyskogo Oruzhiya Pekinu: Rezony i Opaseniya' ['Russian Arms Sales to Beijing: Pro and Contra'], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 April 1996 (in Russian). Back.

Note 108: Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', p.72. Back.

Note 109: Ibid., p.73. Back.

Note 110: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.22. Back.

Note 111: Rogov lamented in 1995 that "Russia is being pushed onto the perifery of US geostrategic interests" (Sergei Rogov, 'Russia and the United States: a Partnership or Another Disengagement', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.41, No.7 (July1995), p.8). Back.

Note 112: Ibid., p.5; Rogov, 'A National Security Policy for Russia', p.76. Back.

Note 113: Rogov, 'Russia and the United States: a Partnership or Another Disengagement', pp.5-8. Back.

Note 114: Ibid., p.9. Back.

Note 115: Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', p.71. Back.

Note 116: Alexei Arbatov, 'The Future of European Security: Split or Unity?', Visions of European Security - Focal Point Sweden and Northern Europe (Stockholm: The Olof Palme International Center, 1996), pp.248-249; 'Rossiya i NATO' ('Russia and NATO'), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 June 1995 (in Russian). Back.

Note 117: Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', p.70-71; Alexei Arbatov, 'NATO and Russia', Security Dialogue, vol.26, No.2, 1995, p.146; Rogov, 'Russia and the United States: a Partnership or Another Disengagement', pp.10-11; Dmitri Trenin, 'NATO: How to Avoid Confrontation', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.41, No.7 (July 1995), pp.20-26. Back.

Note 118: Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary (Moscow, 1983), p. 291 (in Russian). Back.

Note 119: Leonid Medvedko, 'History and Geopolitics', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.12, 1995, p.68. Back.

Note 120: Elgiz Pozdnyakov (ed.), Geopolitika: Teoriya i Praktika (Geopolitics: Theory and Practice) (Moscow, 1993) (in Russian); Elgiz Pozdnyakov, Filosofiya Politiki (Philosophy of Politics) (Moscow, 1994), Vol.2 (in Russian); Konstantin Pleshakov, 'The Geoideological Paradigm', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.41, Nos.4-5, 1995, pp.101-107. Back.

Note 121: Vladimir Razuvayev, Geopolitika Postsovetskogo Perioda (The Geopolitics of the Post-Soviet Period) (Moscow: Institute of Europe, 1993) (in Russian); V. Kudrov, Mesto Novoi Rossii v Mire (The Role of the New Russia in the World) (Moscow: Institute of Europe, 1994) (in Russian); Konstantin Sorokin, 'Geopolitika Sovremennogo Mira i Rossiya' ('Contemporary Geopolitics and Russia'), Politicheskie Issledovaniya, No.1, 1995 (in Russian). Back.

Note 122: Elgiz Pozdnyakov, 'The Geopolitical Collapse and Russia', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.9 (September 1992), p.4. Back.

Note 123: Ibid., p.7; Alexei Podberezkin, 'Geostrategicheskoe Polozhenie i Bezopasnost Rossii' ('Russia's Geostrategic Position and Security'), Svobodnaya Mysl, No.7, 1996, pp.86-90 (in Russian). Back.

Note 124: Pozdnyakov, 'The Geopolitical Collapse and Russia', p.7. Back.

Note 125: Pozdnyakov, 'The Geopolitical Collapse and Russia', p.12. Back.

Note 126: Konstantin Pleshakov, 'The Geoideological Paradigm', p.102. Back.

Note 127: Ibid., pp.102-104. Back.

Note 128: Ibid., p.107. Back.

Note 129: Podberezkin, 'Geostrategicheskoe Polozhenie i Bezopasnost Rossii', pp.90-94; Razuvayev, Geopolitika Postsovetskogo Perioda; Vladimir Razuvayev, 'Russia and the Post-Soviet Geopolitical Area', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.39, No.8 (August 1993), pp.109-116. Back.

Note 130: The Economist, 28 October 1995, p.39; Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Programme of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) (Moscow: Informpechat, 1995) (in Russian). Back.

Note 131: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.7. Back.

Note 132: Ibid. Back.

Note 133: Ibid. See also: Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Back.

Note 134: Podberezkin, 'Geostrategicheskoe Polozhenie i Bezopasnost Rossii', p.86. Back.

Note 135: Ibid., p.88. Back.

Note 136: Ibid. Back.

Note 137: Alexei Podberezkin, 'Cherez Dukhovnost - k Vozrozhdeniyu Otechestva' ('Restoring Motherland Through Spirituality'), Svobodnaya Mysl, No.5, 1995, p.89 (in Russian). Back.

Note 138: Gennady Zyuganov, Za Gorizontom [Over the horizon] (Orel: Veshnie vody, 1995), p.86 (in Russian); Alexei Pushkov, 'Chinese Mirage', Moscow News, No.22, 1995, p.4. Back.

Note 139: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', pp.7-8. Back.

Note 140: Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda, 'Democratization and Russian Foreign Policy', International Affairs, Vol.72, No.3, 1996, p.544. Back.

Note 141: Pushkov, 'Chinese Mirage', p.4. Back.

Note 142: Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', pp.60-67. Back.

Note 143: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.8. Back.

Note 144: Ibid., p.7. Back.

Note 145: Ibid., p.8. Back.

Note 146: Ibid., pp.8-9. Back.

Note 147: Ibid. Back.

Note 148: Podberezkin, 'Geostrategicheskoe Polozhenie i Bezopasnost Rossii', p.90. Back.

Note 149: Ibid., pp.95-97. Back.

Note 150: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.9. Back.

Note 151: Karaganov, 'Fifty Years After Victory', pp.63-64; Dmitri Trenin, 'NATO: How to Avoid Confrontation', International Affairs (Moscow), No.7 (July 1995), pp.20-26. Back.

Note 152: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.9; Pushkov, 'Chinese Mirage', p.4. Back.

Note 153: Zuganov, Za Gorizontom, p.87. Back.

Note 154: Oleg T. Bogomolov, 'Russia and Eastern Europe', Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, p.142. Back.

Note 155: Nikolai Kolikov, 'Rossiya v Kontekste Globalnykh Peremen' ('Russia in the Context of Global Transition'), Svobodnaya Mysl,Nos.2-3, 1994, p.12 (in Russian). Back.

Note 156: Yuri Krasin, 'Natsionalnye Interesy: Mif ili Realnost? ('National Interests: Myth or Reality?'), Svobodnaya Mysl, No.3, 1996, p.5 (in Russian). Back.

Note 157: 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', p.6. Back.

Note 158: Anatoly Utkin, 'Natsionalizm i Buduschee Mirovogo Soobschestva' ('Nationalism and the Future of the World Community'), Svobodnaya Mysl, No.3, 1995, pp.78-86 (in Russian); Anatoly Utkin, Rossiya i Zapad: Problemy Vzaimnogo Vospriyatiya i Perspektivy Stroitelstva Otnosheniy (Russia and the West: Mutual Perceptions and Prospects for Building Partnership) (Moscow: Russian Research Foundation, 1995), pp.51-52 (in Russian). Back.

Note 159: Krasin, 'Natsionalnye Interesy: Mif ili Realnost?, p.9. Back.

Note 160: Ibid., pp.11-12; Kolikov, 'Rossiya v Kontekste Globalnykh Peremen', p.9. Back.

Note 161: Krasin, 'Natsionalnye Interesy: Mif ili Realnost?, p.12. Back.

Note 162: Georgi Shakhnazarov, 'Vostok i Zapad: Samoidentifikatsiya na Perelome Vekov' ('East and West: In Search for Identity on the Turn of the Century'), Svobodnaya Mysl, No.8, 1996, p.79 (in Russian). Back.

Note 163: Vladimir Dakhin, 'Kontury Novogo Mira' ('The Contours of a New World'), Svobodnaya Mysl, No.4, 1995, p.85 (in Russian). Back.

Note 164: Kolikov, 'Rossiya v Kontekste Globalnykh Peremen', p.13. Back.

Note 165: Ibid., p.5; Mikhail Gorbachev, 'Epilogue', Bento Bremer (ed.), Europe by Nature (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1992). Back.

Note 166: Igor Orlik, 'Russia and Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.8 (August 1992), p.28. Back.

Note 167: Bogomolov, 'Russia and Eastern Europe', p.142. Back.

Note 168: Karen Brutents, 'Russia and the East', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.40, Nos.1-2, 1994, p.44. Back.

Note 169: Alexei Voskresenskiy, 'Veter s Zapada ili Veter s Vostoka? Rossiya, SShA, Kitai i Mirovoe Liderstvo' ('Is There Wind From the West or East? Russia, the USA, China, and World Leadership'), Svobodnaya Mysl, No.10, 1996, p.99. Back.

Note 170: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.11. Back.

Note 171: Ibid., pp.11-12; FBIS-WEU-93-244, 22 December 1993, p.6. Back.

Note 172: Komsomolskaya Pravda, 22 January 1994. Back.

Note 173: FBIS-SOV-93-240, 16 December 1993, p.17. Back.

Note 174: James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist (Washington: National Defense University, 1994), p.109. Back.

Note 175: Ibid., pp.108-109; The Washington Post, 15 December 1993, p.A23; 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.12. Back.

Note 176: Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist, p.117-118. Back.

Note 177: Ibid., p.122. Back.

Note 178: Cited in: Ibid., p.100. Back.

Note 179: Ibid., pp.100-101; The Washington Times, 14 December 1993, p.A14; and 15 December 1993, p.A12. Back.

Note 180: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.12. Back.

Note 181: Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Poslednyi Brosok na Yug [Last Dash for South] (Moscow: LDPR, 1993). Back.

Note 182: Izvestiya, 21 January 1994. Back.

Note 183: Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist, p.125. Back.

Note 184: Ibid., pp.110-111. Back.

Note 185: 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', p.13. Back.

Note 186: FBIS-SOV-94-005, 7 January 1994, p.10. Back.

Note 187: The Washington Times, 14 January 1994, p.A12. Back.

Note 188: Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist, pp.114-115. Back.

Note 189: Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, p.158. Back.

Note 190: Victor Petlyuchenko, 'The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.39, No.3 (March 1993), p.63. Back.

Note 191: 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', p.19. Back.

Note 192: Cited in Petlyuchenko, 'The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy', p.66. Back.

Note 193: 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', p.20. Back.

Note 194: Ibid., p.64; 'What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue', p.10. Back.

Note 195: Petlyuchenko, 'The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy', pp.64-65; Novoye Vremya, No.22, 1991, p.13. Back.

Note 196: 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', p.19. Back.

Note 197: Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp.158-159. Back.

Note 198: Petlyuchenko, 'The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy', p.65. Back.

Note 199: 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', p.19. Back.

Note 200: Petlyuchenko, 'The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy', p.67. Back.

Note 201: Ibid., p.68. Back.

Note 202: 'What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue', p.10. Back.

Note 203: Petlyuchenko, 'The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy', pp.69-70. Back.

Note 204: Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp.159-160. Back.

Note 205: Petlyuchenko, 'The Orthodox Church and Foreign Policy', p.69. Back.

Note 206: Podberezkin, 'Cherez Dukhovnost - k Vozrozhdeniyu Otechestva', p.89. Back.

Note 207: On the Russian environmentalist movement see Lisa Van Buren, 'Citizen Participation and the Environment in Russia', Joan DeBardeleben and John Hannigan (eds.), Environmental Security and Quality after Communism: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Successor States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp.127-135. Back.

Note 208: 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', p.98. Back.

Note 209: Law on National Security of the Russian Federation: Draft (Moscow: State Duma, 1995). Back.

Note 210: Lassi Heininen and Jurki Käkkönen (eds), Arctic Complexity: Essays on Arctic Interdependence (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1991), pp.129-149 (TAPRI Occasional Papers; No.44). Back.

Note 211: Gail Osherenko and Oran R. Young, The Age of the Arctic. Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.125-126. Back.

Note 212: 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', p.96. Back.

Note 213: See for example Pyotr Deinichenko, 'Karel Culture and Forest Go Together', Moscow News, 28 March-3 April 1996, p.10. Back.

Note 214: 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', p.96. Back.

Note 215: Ibid. Back.

Note 216: Mare Kukk, Sverre Jervell, and Pertti Joenniemi, The Baltic Sea Area: A Region in the Making (Oslo: Europa-programmet, 1992), p.114. Back.

Note 217: International Challenges, 1992, vol.12, no.4, p.36. Back.

Note 218: 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', p.97. Back.

Note 219: Izvestiya, 1993, April 20; International Herald Tribune, 1993, April 28. See also Peter Gizewski, 'Military Activity and Environmental Security: The Case of Radioactivity in the Arctic', DeBardeleben and Hannigan (eds.), Environmental Security and Quality after Communism, pp.25-41. Back.

Note 220: Viktor Tereshkin, 'Environmentalist or Spy?', Moscow News, 4-10 April 1996, p.6. Back.

Note 221: Ibid.; Michael R. Gordon, 'Officer Charged as Spy is Treated Soviet-Style', International Herald Tribune, 29 November 1996, p.6. Back.

Note 222: Osherenko and Young, The Age of the Arctic, pp.131-132. Back.

Note 223: 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', p.97. Back.

Note 224: Ibid., p.98. See also Anatoliy Gorelov, 'Ekologicheskaya Ideologiya i Budushee Rossii' ('Ecological Ideology and Future of Russia'(, Svobodnaya Mysl, No.1, 1995, pp.47-57. Back.

Note 225: Evgeniy Plimak, 'Glavnye Alternativy Sovremennosti' ['Main Alternatives of Our Time'], Svobodnaya Mysl, No.8, 1998, pp.42-52. Back.

Note 226: Vadim Burlak, 'Humankind Needs a Programme for Survival', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.1 (January 1992), pp.16-24. Back.

Note 227: Viktor Belkin and Vyacheslav Storozhenko, 'Ot Vyzhyvaniya k Ustoichivomu Razvitiyu' ['From Survival to Sustainable Development'], Svobodnaya Mysl, No.5, 1995, pp.32-41. Back.

Note 228: Burlak, 'Humankind Needs a Programme for Survival', pp.20-21. Back.

Note 229: V.P. Vizgin, 'Mishel Fuko - Teoretik Tsivilizatsii Znaniya' ['Michael Foucault is a Theorist of Civilisation of Knowledge'], Voprosy Filosofii, No.6, 1995, pp.116-126; D.E. Kharitonovich, 'Poisk Novykh Metodov v Istoricheskoi Nauke' ['The Search for New Methods in the Historical Science'], Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya, No.4, 1995, pp.248-250 (in Russian). Back.

Note 230: Andrey S. Makarychev and Alexander A. Sergounin, 'Postmodernism i Zapadnaya Politicheskaya Nauka' ['Postmodernism and Western Political Science'], Sotzialno-politichesky zhurnal (Moscow), No.3, 1996, pp.151-168 (in Russian). Back.

Note 231: Irina M. Busygina, 'Postmodernism v Moskve' ['Postmodernism in Moscow'], Polis, No.6, 1995, pp.5-9. Back.

Note 232: Lukin, 'Russia and Its Interests', p.113. Back.

Note 233: Arthur Kuznetsov, 'A New Model for Traditional Civilisations', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.41, Nos.4-5, 1995, pp.98-99. Back.

Note 234: Ibid., p.97. Back.

Note 235: Boris Kapustin, '"Natsionalnyi Interes" kak Konservativnaya Utopiya' ['"National Interest" as Conservative Utopia'], Svobodnaya Mysl, No.3, 1996, p.13. Back.

Note 236: Ibid., pp.16-19 Back.

Note 237: Ibid., p.28. Back.

Note 238: Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, pp.53-55; Malcolm and Pravda, 'Democratization and Russian Foreign Policy', pp.159-160; Aivars Stranga, 'Russia and the Security of the Baltic States: 1991-1996', Atis Lejins and Daina Bleiere (eds.), The Baltic States: Search for Security (Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p.159. Back.

Note 239: 'Russia and the West', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.41, No.2 (February 1995), p.38. Back.

Note 240: Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p.87. Back.