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Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare: What Is the Problem? What Could Be Done?

Bjørn Møller

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

Paper for the conference on
Anthropological Perspectives on the Roots of Conflict
in the Eastern Mediterranean

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
Foundation for International Studies,
University of Malta
Valetta, Malta
4-5 October 1996

Preliminary version
Not for quotation
Comments welcome *

About the author

The author is Ph.D. & MA, Senior Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research); Associate professor of International Relations, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen; Project director of the Global Non-Offensive Defence Network (funded by the Ford Foundation); editor of NOD and Conversion; Secretary General (elect) of the International Peace Research Association; member of the UNIDIR Expert Group on Confidence-Building in the Middle East. He is the author of the following books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense (1995).


A theoretical revolt against mainstream International Relations theory in general, and Realism in particular, is long overdue. Their main assumptions are increasingly out of touch with the post-Cold War realities, especially their conception of the international system as consisting almost entirely of states, in their turn understood as unitary and amoral actors pursuing their 'national interests, defined in terms of power'.

That mainstream IR theory is in crisis, however, does not mean that each and every challenger will or should prevail against it. One of the challengers to realist orthodoxy is so-called 'critical theory' in its several varieties: postmodernism, post-structuralism, constructivism, deconstructivism, etc. I shall, for the sake of convenience, lump all of them together under the rubric 'postmodernist theory'.

Postmodernism is trendy, even though its appeal is strongest among the younger generation within IR theory and the social sciences in general. Its claim to constitute a theory is disputed, to say the least; its connotations are unclear; and its explanatory value remains to be proven, to put it mildly. The present author is thus far from being a postmodernist, and would undoubtedly be scornfully ostrachized, should he seek admission into the postmodernist club-something he has absolutely no intention of doing.

Nevertheless, the postmodernists appear to have posed some pertinent questions overlooked by mainstream theory as well as to have discovered (however inadvertently) some truths about (post)modern society, both nationally and globally. This nucleus of truth may be well worth salvaging from postmodernism's cauldron of epistemological obscurity, terminological opacity and theoretical fuzziness. To make an attempt at this is one of the main purposes of the present paper.

It looks first at the question what postmodern warfare might mean, finding the term as used to be rather obscure. Some sense might, however, be made of it when applied to violent intrastate conflicts. Here, postmodernist theory is also far more succesful in explaining the roots of conflicts than mainstream theory, which has long entailed a 'closure' (in postmodern parlance) against themes such as 'identity', be it national, ethnic or religious. Also, postmodernism provides some clues to understanding the actual waging of such 'wars' (if so they are) in contrast to Realism which has absolutely no comprehension of such 'irregular warfare'.

When it comes to the question of what to do about such conflicts, neither of the two theoretical schools has much to contribute. Mainstream theory not because it does not understand the problem, and postmodernism not because of its profound agnosticism and ethical nihilism. For the very tentative and sketchy suggestions, the author has thus drawn, in an shamelessly eclectic manner, from the findings of peace research and conflict resolution theory.


In this chapter, I shall provide a very tentative introduction to some of the main themes in postmodernist theory 1 -accompanied by an identification of some of the precursors of the fashionable thinkers of today. Among these ancestors one could count the presocratic philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus (to whom few postmodernists pay tribute) and the 19th Century German thinker Friedrich Nietzsche (to whom they do). Readers are warned that the author is not only far from an expert on the topic, but also very critical, and that part of his motivation for writing this chapter is a slightly diabolic wish to show how part of the postmodernist achievement is tantamount to a 'reinvention of the wheel'.

The Postmodern Condition

First of all, postmodernism sets itself apart from orthodoxy by accusing the latter of being ahistoric and of refusing to acknowledge the ephemeral nature of the present order of the world. To the extent that orthodox theory has a conception of history, it is charicatured as 'grand narratives' that are to be discarded.

Rather, the postmodernist conception of history seems to be one of perpetual flux, almost in the sense of Heraclitus of Ephesus:

Upon those that step into the same rivers different and different waters flow ... It scatters and ... gathers ... it comes together and flows away .. approaches and departs. Heraclitus somewhere says that all things are in process and nothing stays still, and likening existing thing to the stream of a river he says that you would not step twice into the same river. 2

This onthology was replicated by Friedrich Nietzsche, who wrote about

... das rasend unbedachte Zersplittern und Zerfasern aller Fundamente, ihre Auflösung in ein immer fließendes und zerfließendes Werden, das unermüdliche Zerspinnen und Historisieren alles Gewordenen durch den modernen Menschen 3

We find a similar view of the world in the writing of modern postmodernists who see not only the past but also the present as characterized by flux:

... the very foundation of postmodernity consists of viewing the world as a plurality of heterogeneous spaces and temporalities ...Post-histoire as the dominant temporality of the postmodern condition... 4

Secondly, postmodernism advocates a 'de-essentialization' of concepts, that have no 'correct' meaning, for the simple reason that 'there is nothing outside the text', with which to compare them. Their significance depends on the 'language game' being played. In this endeavour they draw inspiration from Nietzsche who also spoke ironically about the very concept of truth, in which respect he came close to the profound agnosticism of modern postmodernists:

Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem Gebrauch einem Volke fest, kanonish und verbindlich dünken; die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, daß sie welche sind... 5

Among the concepts that have been de-essentialized are such as play an important role in our present context, including 'nation', 'ethnic identity' or 'race' 6 . Language and its utilization for, e.g., scholarly endeavours is not seen as a more or less accurate reresentation of reality, but as a game. In this, there is some continuity with Wittgenstein 7 , but also with some of the more radical Nominalists in the medieval, scholastic controversy over the status of universals 8 .

The logical implication is a profound (probably both inescapable and untranscendable) agnosticism, i.e. an epistemological pessimism, which is reminiscent of the Sceptics and Cynics in ancient Greece. One is reminded of the three radically agnostic theorems of Gorgias of Leontini that: nothing exists; even if it did, we would not be able to know it; and even if we could, we would be unable to impart that knowledge to others. 9

Even though postmodernists sometime criticize 'orthodoxy' for its amoral character, they themselves seem logically predestined to a profound 'anything goes' nihilism. If the world is in perpetual flux, and we can anyhow never come to grips with it in our perceptions and, even if we could, would be unable to describe it, then ethical values are bound to be equally ephemeral 10 . The ethical nihilism is echoed in, and, and probably the result of, a pervasive feeling of (almost Kierkegaardian, or at least existentialist) anxiety. 11

Of course, this neither means that postmodernists (or the existentialists) are personally amoral, nor that their theory precludes thinking about, for instance, global governance-in fact some of the most prominent postmodernists have written valuable works on this topic 12 . It only means that this concern for the world is a benign non sequitur. It cannot possibly be inferred from the critique of Realism's critique of 'idealism', which is a 'double negation' rather than an actual assertion of anything. An ethical approach requires a voluntaristic ('heroic') choice that may go either way:

We are witnessing the same Janus-faced relationship between politics and morality as is evident in every other aspect of the postmodern political condition. If total moral relativism, which is undeniably one of the options of postmodernity, gains the upper hand, even the assessment of mass deportation and genocide becomes a matter of taste. 13

Another reflection of the mistrust and disdain for rationalism in postmodern society is the apparent renaissance of religion. Whereas modernity could be seen as a piecemeal secularization (represented, for instance, by protestant theology and ethics), the postmodern condition has been characterized by a regress to primitive forms of religous beliefs and practices 14 . Religious pluralism is growing, almost to the point of 'private religions': If 'anything goes', and reason is not to be trusted, the why not believe in astrology, crystals, pendulums, flying yogis, earth waves, or other 'postmodern' forms of animism and totemism? Individuals suffering from the postmodern Angst might, alternatively, seek consolation in what one might call an 'anti-religion' such as satanism, or remain within their 'hereditary' religion, only in more fundamentalist varieties thereof-a phenomenen that is not at all restricted to Islam, but which may, in any cases, contribute to the uncontrollable and violent nature of conflicts (vide infra) by investing them with other-worldly qualities.

Postmodernist International Relations Theory

Postmodernist theory has primarily been applied to theories of culture, and to some extent to sociology 15 , and its application to International Relations in comparatively underdeveloped 16 . Analyses have concentrated on, first of all, identifying some of the 'closures' (i.e. blilnd spots) of orthodox IR theory, e.g. via discourse analysis and deconstruction.

Inside and/or Outside

For our present purposes, Rob Walker's elaborate deconstruction of the conception of the state and the international system is especially relevant. According to Walker, IR orthodoxy (and especially Realism) is founded on a distinction between an inside and an outside 17 . The inside was originally a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes, but it was subsequently pacified in a national order dominated by the State, whether conceived of as the Leviathan of Hobbes himself or as a contractual social construction as envisaged by Rousseau 18 . The outside, however, was predestined to remain anarchic, since this was the realm of the States, depicted as sovereign entities operating as individuals in the state of nature, only 'writ large'. By implication, it was futile to look inside states, since states were unitary actors; but it was also unpromising to look beyond the system of states, say to transnational or supranational actors, since there was no way the states would ever relinquish their sovereignty.

This was, indeed, a 'grand narrative', according to postmodern authors, only a wrong and profoundly ahistoric one. In truth the state is a historical construct 19 that has been under constant evolution (i.e. in flux) since its emergence. Furthermore, several (categories) of actors on the international stage have made their appearance, only remain excluded from orthodox/Realist analysis, e.g. via its terminological closures. By (presumed) implication, if only IR theory can escape the Procrustean bed of these closures, nothing would speak against analyzing possibilities for various forms of global (or regional, for that matter) governance. This might result in a relegation of the state to merely one among a heterogeneous group of actors alongside, for instance, international organizations, transnational civil society, etc. 20 . Some of these forms of governance may, in fact, hold some promise of solving ethnic conflicts, a matter to which I shall return in due course.

To 'Securitize' or Not to Securitize, That Is the Question

Another prevalent theme in postmodernist IR writing has been that of 'security' in general and national security in particular.

Traditionalists, and especially Realists, have been (rightly) criticized for not even bothering to define this term, its centrality in their theory notwithstanding 21 . Their, more or less implicit, conception has further been criticized for its narrowness: First of all, for an almost exclusive focus on military threats by one state against another-a critique that is partly, but not entirely, justified. Some self-proclaimed (neo)realists have expanded their concept of security to include intrastate threats and non-military threats to and against non-state entities 22 . Secondly, orthodox IR has been charged with a preoccupation with conflict, and a resultant closure against more cooperative forms of security. This accusation is also a bit unfair since both neorealists and neoliberals have produced analyses of how to achieve 'cooperation among adversaries' and occasionally even advocated policies of common or cooperative security 23 .

Postmodernists have typically argued in favour of widening and/or re-focusing the security discourse. The concept of security should be less state-centric, say by also encompassing 'societal security', i.e. the security of non-state entities such as nations or ethnies, or even individuals 24 -which is, indeed, a sine qua non of applied the concept of security to ethnic conflict. Moreover, 'security' should be expanded to also include, perhaps even focus on, 'environmental security' 25

Taking discourse analysis as their point of departure, some have, however, warned against the dangers of 'securitizing' excessively 26 . In fact, as we shall see below, such securitization may be one of the few promising political strategies for defenders of the old order who want to avoid disarmament. If 'security' remains the business of the military (as was previously the case), then the more issue areas are securitized, the more will fall within their purview, the greater the share of society's resources to which the military will be entitled, and the abler will the armed forces be to fend off demands for arms build-down. If one favours disarmament, it may thus be more promosing to take serious all these pertinent issues (environmental protection, for instance), but to argue against their being 'securitized'. If they are desecuritized, they may still receive adequate attention, and the military may or may not be put in charge of them-whatever seems more cost-effective.


We have thus seen that what I have called postmodern theory (but for which others might prefer the terms post-structuralist, deconstructivist or ...) is a very heterogenous phenomenon and of very uneven quality. Some of it appears to be little more than old wine in new bottles, i.e. a repetition of old truths. Moreover, these old verities are typically presented in a form that defies rigorous analysis, inter alia because it does not satisfy traditional criteria for scientific or scholarly writing. The extensive use of metaphors, as well as the nebulous and cryptic style in general, makes it difficult to discern the actual propositions included in the postmodernist discourse; and these propositions rarely live up to Popperian standards of falsifiability 27 .

In all fairness, however, it should be remembered that the author, as an avowed old-fashioned rationalist, may have given a too biased account of postmodernism.It also has to be acknowledged that postmodernist authors have put their fingers on some important holes in 'traditional theory', thus opening important new paths of scholarly analysis. Among these new themes are the security discourse, the question of (national, ethnic or religious) identity 28 , to which I shall return in chapter IV, and the new phenomena of 'postmodern war' to which I shall now turn.

The Postmodern Military and Postmodern War(fare)

The application of postmodern theories to the study of war is a fairly recent phenomenon 29 , and what has been produced to date does not by far adds up to any coherent theory. Most postmodernists, in line with their deconstructivist predisposition, have confined themselves to analyzing the language games entailed by the dominant discourse as well as the phenomenon of simulacre-but have written next to nothing about actual wars under postmodern conditions. I shall try to fill this gap with a tentative sketch of 'postmodern warfare'.

The Postmodern Military

Some (including non-postmodernists) have written about the 'postmodern military', analyzing the evolving social position and/or tasks of the military in postmodern society 30 .

Miles Protector

Most analysts acknowledge something of a crisis in civil-military relations in most countries 31 -inter alia because of what has been called a 'legitimacy crisis' 32 . Various authors have nevertheless coined chivalric neologisms for the new military such as 'miles protector' or 'knights in white armour' for the land warriors 33 . For their air force collegeagues, the image of Icharus has been used, while the navies have been referred to (ironically) as 'globocop' and their ships as 'lawships' 34 .

The postmodern military men, according to these conceptions, are not so much be fighters as protectors, peacekeepers, and technicians; usually professionals rather than conscripts; and a very large proportion of them are not actually soldiers but civilians. Finally, postmodern soldiers may be 'post-heroic', i.e. no longer be expected to put their lives at stake, for whatever cause-to the extent that they will nevertheless have to fight, they should do so in a risk-free way, i.e. fight 'wars without tears' 35 .

The military in several countries have enthusiastically embraced the above-mentioned expanded concepts of security. If the military's original mission of defending the fatherland has been accomplished to the extent of having made it redundant, it does indeed make sense to find something else do do: To receive new tasks is certainly preferable to having military budgets shrink to the point where it begins to hurt, i.e. where it necessitates forced early retirement of officers. Obvious new tasks have included policing and other constabulary functions, environmental protection, various forms of disaster relief, etc.

Something similar to this 'refunctionalization' of the military had previously been proposed by peace movements and other avowed antimilitarists 36 -perhaps as a reflection of their reluctance to admit that military might ever be needed for defence. Realizing that it was unlikely to 'go away' anytime soon, it appeared to the 'peacenics' as a lesser evil to have the military perform relatively harmless tasks. However, these ideas are now returning with the vengeance that the very rationale for a military defence is not even questioned.

Bottom(s) Up

It would, indeed, have been rational to undertake a genuine 'bottom up review' (as opposed to a fake one, as that undertaken by the Pentagon 37 ) after the end of the Cold War, i.e. to conduct an unbiased analysis along the following lines 38 :

  • Who, if any, are our likely enemies? This is an almost exclusively political analysis, for which the military is no better equipped than the proverbial 'man in the street'.
  • What might these enemies do, and what is the estimated likelihood thereof? This is a combination of capabilities analysis (for which only the military has the means) and political analysis.
  • What should we do to prevent this, i.e. what should be our strategy, operational plans and tactics for a finite number of scenarios? This is a combined task for military and civilian (strategic studies) analysts.
  • What means are required to these ends? How many troops, with what types and numbers of weapons and support systems, deployed where, at which level of readiness, etc.? This is primarily a military task, even though several civilian analysts also excel in such knots-and-bolts force design.
  • One should not be surprised if some such analyses might reveal that certain countries have no enemies, or that their only potential enemies would be extremely unlikely to be able to do anything serious to them. In such cases the 'how much is enough' question should indeed be answered by 'nothing', and the armed forces be disbanded as a consequence thereof-with the exception of a sufficent number of troops (with equipment) to make a decent contribution to multilateral military operations. The world's strongest military power, the United States, would, mirabile dictu, appear to fall into this category.

    In other cases, the answer might be that hedges would be needed against unlikely, but not entirely inconceivable, eventualities-which would point to the need for remobilization (or 'reconstitution') capabilities 39 . In such cases, where some armed forces should be kept in place, even though they will probably never perform defence tasks, it will, of course, make perfect sense to have them do something useful in the meantime, including some of the aforementioned civilian tasks. The same would be the case, only to a lesser extent, for countries will acual defence needs.

    The rationale for such 'civilian soldiers' is thus debatable and there are several pitfalls to beware of. Furthermore, with the possible exception of a few privileged countries, it is surely premature to equate the 'postmodern soldier' with such a 'guardian angel'. In several less fortunate countries, there is a much darker side to what one might call the postmodern military to which I shall return in due course: phenomena such as child soldiers, mercenaries and terrorists.

    Postmodern Virtual War: War Without Tears?

    A few authors have used the term 'postmodern war', with referrence to the virtual, i.e. surreal, features of the Gulf War. It has, for instance, been described by Jean Baudrillard, who did not actually use the term 'postmodern war', but who did seem to imply it, at least according to his critics (who do use the term) 40 . A postmodern war, in this sense, is one that does not actually happen because it cannot: What can occur is, for instance, anorexic war which can no longer devour an enemy because it is incapable of conceiving the enemy as worthy of being challenged or annihilated ... and thus devours itself. ... It is the bellicose equivalent of safe sex: make war like love with a condom! 41

    In the place of war, we may have virtual war. A virtual war is one in which the enemy is not even acknowledged as such, i.e. as one's equal; and it is a war of make-believe, i.e. a war that does not happen but which could, at least theoretically.

    One might, however, question to what extent this is new. Was make-believe not, in the final analysis, what deterrence was all about. Bernard Brodie already argued along these lines with his famous saying:

    Thus far the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose 42 .

    The entire Cold War could be seen as a gigantic chess game, where the contestants competed via potential next moves that none of them wished to make, i.e. where military moves (alignments, deployments, mobilizations, arms acquisitions, etc.) were really nothing but signals, i.e. a form of 'body language writ large' 43 . The fact that much of the writings of the 'classics' of deterrence (Schelling, Kahn, etc.) was couched in the terminological garments of game 'theory' points in the same direction 44 .

    Still, postmodern observers do have a point when they warn against the blurring of distinctions between games and 'the real thing', as video games become increasingly realistic, actual war increasingly 'stage managed', and the media coverage more and more massive and instantaneous:

    With this war, cyberspace came out of the research labs and into our living rooms. The written word lost out to the video of a video of a bomb that did not need books to be smart ....; to a hyperreal Gulfspeak that 'attrited' all critics .... For six weeks and one hundred hours we were drawn into the most powerful cyberspace yet created, a technically reproduced world-text that seemed to have no author or reader, just enthusiastic participants and passive viewers 45

    The bright side of this form of postmodern war is that it is relatively bloodless, because nothing happens: Nobody (or, at worst, only very few people) get killed 46 , since the bombs are never detonated, or if some are (as in the Gulf War) they are so surgically precise that collateral damage is minimal. Not only do We (the good guys) not suffer any casualties, but neither do They (the bad guys)-not because they do not deserve it, but thanks to Our magnanimity. Thus envisaged as unreal, i.e. a game, postmodern war lends itself nicely to all forms of 'critical analysis', e.g. to being analyzed as a '(body) language game'.

    However, there is a darker side to even this form of postmodern war: First of all, something might have gone wrong with nuclear deterrence, in which case it would most likely have gone catastrophically wrong, i.e. brought about a thermonuclear conflagration, perhaps even 'nuclear winter' 47 But it did not. Secondly, beyond the confines of the central conflict the two superpowers fought each other by means of proxies in wars that were far from sanitary or bloodless-even though there were made to look trivial by means of terms such as 'peripheral wars', 'small wars', 'low-intensity conflict' or 'regional conflicts' 48 .

    Postmodern Warfare: The Really Dark Side

    The last point brings is to the really dark side of postmodern warfare, namely a new form of violent conflicts that are all too real, encompassing phenomena such as guerilla and civil wars-occasionally also featuring 'ethnic cleansing' and other atrocities of genocidal proportions. These are violent armed conflicts fought (for the most part or exclusively) within state borders (vide infra), by non-regular warriors (sometimes kids), and often against civilian targets-or at least in a way that ensures that the casualties are predominantly civilians. I shall argue that this is the dominant mode of postmodern warfare, and that it is only in our (media-shaped) perceptions that the former version of postmodern war looms the largest.

    There are other terms for what seems to be basically the same concept: 'nontrinitarian war' (Martin Van Creveld) or 'transitional war' (William R. Thompson) 49 . The present author has not yet stumbled over the term used in the present paper, namely 'postmodern warfare'. The position of being the first to use a specific terms carries with it the privilege of defining it, in casu along the lines above, i.e. as a a form of actual war waged under 'postmodern conditions'. What may warrant the label 'postmodern' are the following features:

  • such wars are predeminated by flux and uncontrollability;
  • they are 'about' something entirely different from the objectives of 'modern' wars;
  • they are often non-binary, i.e. they pit more than two sides against each other, which opens up possibilities for shifting alignments as well as risks of a regress to a situation of 'everybody against everybody else';
  • the political setting is distinctly 'non-Westphalian';
  • the war has shed its last 'duel-like' (i.e. Clausewitzian) features and become asymmetrical to the point of incommensurability;
  • the warring sides use both modern and postmodern weapons;
  • the characteristic vulnerabilities of postmodern/postindustrial society are exploited to their fullest.
  • One of the intellectual precursors of the modern postmodernists was Nietzsche, some of whose writings appear (at first glance at least) as a glorification of war as an antidote to the dismal state of modern society:

    ....eine solche hochkultivierte und daher notwendig matte Menschheit, wie die des jetzigen Europas ... der größten und furchtbarsten Kriege-also zeitweiliger Rückfälle in die Barbarei-bedarft, um nicht an den Mitteln der Kultur ihrer Kultur und ihr Dasein selber einbüßen (Menschliches Allzumenschliches, vol. 1)

    Matt und erbärmlich werdenden Völkern mag der Krieg als Heilmittel anzuraten sein: falls sie nämlich durchaus noch fortleben wollen: denn es gibt für die Völkerschwindsucht auch eine Brutalitätskur (Menschliches Allzumenschliches, vol. 2)

    Ihr sollt den Frieden lieben als Mittel zu neuen Kriegen. Und den kurzen Frieden mehr als den langen. ... Ihr sagt, die gute Sache sei es, die sogar dem krieg heilige? Ich sage euch: der gute Krieg ist es, der jede Sache heiligt. Der Krieg und der Mut haben mehr große Dinge getan als die Nächstenliebe (Also sprach Zarathustra) 50 .

    In these bellicose views, Nietzsche resembled his precursor Heraclitus, who went even further in his eulogy of the constitutive function of war:

    It is necessary to know that war is common and right is strife, and that all things happen by strife and necessity, or .... War is the father of all and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men, some he makes slaves, others free 51 .

    To say that postmodernism is bellicose would, however, be overshooting the mark. The argument here is simply that the modern discourse is incapable of grasping the actual phenomena of intense, suicidal internecine war. Rather than looking at war merely at its political level (with the conceptual 'tool-box' of IR theory) it is necessary to look beneath it. Here the toolboxes of sociology, anthropology, psychology or even psychoanalysis may be more useful 52 -as implied by postmodernist writers.

    Trifurcation of War?

    'War' may have ceased to be single phenomenon, if it ever was. A trifurcation seems to have occurred into the following categories, which have very little in common:

  • 'Modern wars', i.e. international wars of aggresion and national defence. This category used to be the main one, but it has now become practically empty. SIPRI thus counted 30 armed conflicts in 25 locations in 1995 (32/28 in 1994 as compared with 36/32 in 1989) none of which were conflicts between states 53 .
  • 'Collective wars', i.e. wars waged by inter- or even supranational institutions, e.g. in the form of collective security campaigns 54 or humanitarian interventions 55 .
  • Civil wars, i.e. intrastate wars, to which I have devoted most of the present paper, and for which I reserve the label 'postmodern wars'. To the extent that others get involved, they tend to be waging what is euphemistically called 'operations other than war' (OOTW), e.g. in the form of peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance (vide infra). For the participants, however, they are all too war-like, and labels such as 'low intensity conflict' or 'small war' are clearly misnomers 56 . Examples include the Palestinian struggle against Israel in its various forms: (largely) nonviolent Intifada, terrorism amd quasiregular attrition warfare 57 ; or the several wars in former Yugoslavia 58 .

    Enduring and Variable Factors in War

    The main distinguishing feature of postmodern warfare is, however, that is is neither modern nor pre-modern, i.e. archaic, even though it shares several features with the latter. This is, e.g. the cases of 'failed states', where a regress occurs to an antediluvian pre-state stage of a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes:

    ...a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition .... continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. 59

    Table 1: Premodern, Modern and Postmodern War 60
    Pre-modern Modern Post-modern
    Who? Mercenaries
    On Whose Behalf? Clan or tribe
    Feudal rulers
    The State Nation, ethnie, religious group
    Against whom? Soldiers Soldiers Civilians Civilians
    Why? Economic ends:
    Political ends:
    territory, sovereignty
    Individual and group ends
    Where? Inside/Outside Outside Inside/Outside
    How? Disorderly Principles of war Guerilla warfare
    To Which Extent? Low intensity
    No rules, but chivalry
    High intensity
    Laws of war
    High intensity
    'Anything goes'
    By Which Means? Primitive weapons Conv. weapons
    Small arms
    Non-lethal weapons
    Inf. systems

    The differences are summed up in table 1 above, in which I have divided the distinguishing features into the questions Who does the fighting?; on whose behalf?; against whom?; why is the war waged?; where does it take place?; how is it waged, i.e. according to which strategic principles, if any; to which extent, i.e. within which limits, and with which intensity is the war fought?; and by which means? (weapons and other). For an elaboration, readers are referred to Appendix I.


    What one might call postmodern war is thus a multifacetted phenomenon (which in itself is a postmodern feature). It ranges from surreal or virtual wars to all-too-real ones; from medieval wars fought with modern weapons to postmodern wars fought with premodern weaponry. In any case, it is an epiphenomenon that can only be fully understood on the basis of an analysis of the underlying causes, to which I shall now turn.

    Ethno-National Conflicts

    One of the reasons why traditional IR and strategic studies theories have found it hard to come to grips with postmodern war is that it is usually about something new, at least compared with the Cold War and most of the peripheral wars that were fought in its shadow. The common thread running through the majority of the aforementioned 30 wars in 25 locations in 1995 is that they are, in one way or the other, about 'identity'. In this chapter I shall (briefly and inevitably superficially) look at the distinguishing features of this type of conflicts-with a special eye for postmodernist theory's potential contribution to their understanding 61 .

    Crisis of the State?

    A partial explanation of the phenomenon of postmodern war is that the State is no longer quite what it used to be. It does not seem premature to speak of a crisis of the State which is reflected, among other things, in an inability to control war.

    First of all, the State has run into a supply-side problem. It is increasingly being acknowledged that the division of the world in general, and Europe in particular, into separate states may be (or soon become) an anachronism since their performance is leaves much to be desired. States as traditionally conceived are defined within territorial boundaries that separate the inside from the outside (vide supra). The trouble is that these delimitations of authority correspond less and less to the problems requiring authoritative decisions.

    The ecological challenges facing Mankind, for instance, cannot possibly be solved by individual states, not even if all agree that the problems must be solved since they are all operating under the well-described dilemmas of 'tragedy of the commons', 'stag hunt', and 'prisoner's dilemma' 62 . Moreover, when states try to solve such problems (e.g. with water supplies) unilaterally, the result may be war 63 . Most likely this will do absolutely nothing to solve the problem, but leave both (or all) sides worse off. As an alternative, demands are being raised for various forms of global governance, i.e. for the institution of political authorities over and beyond the State. The actual development of, as well as the plenitude of proposals for reforms of the UN, EU and various regional institutions illustrate this growing interest 64 . Such political institutions should be empowered to do something about border-transcending problems-of which there are several catagories besides that of the environment: global empoverishment, migration flows, etc.

    Secondly, the State is facing a serious demand-side problem, in the sense that practically everybody seems to be demanding a state for themselves. Trivial though this might have been in a state-free setting (where states could be created 'from scratch'), it is bound to cause problems in the present situation where nearly the entire territory of the globe is 'inhabited' by states. New states can thus only emerge on the ruins of, or at the very least at the expence of, older ones. When the latter are unwilling (or incapable, for whatever reason) to meet the demands, the stage is set for wars about state building. Such wars tend to be distinctly 'messy' and horrendously bloody, if only because at least one of the warring sides is a non-state actor, operating under more permissive rules than states tend to do.

    This demand-side phenomenon has to do with the resurgence of nationalism that most parts of the globe have experienced in recent years, and to which I shall now turn.

    The Rise of Nationalism

    One of the most disturbing features of the post-Cold War period has been the rise of extreme forms of nationalism that has led to violent conflict in several locations 65 . The rapidly growing number of books on subjects such as nationalism and ethnicity is, unfortunately, not matched by conceptual clarity and certainly by no consensus among the central analysts or even a convergence of views 66 . A postmodernist explanation thereof may be that the subject matter, because of its very nature, defies definition. In this assessment, the postmodernists may well be right.

    Nations, (Divided) States and Wars

    Since nationalist demands are usually couched in statist terms, one might define nationalism as a set of ideas about the proper relationship between nation and state, e.g. as an ideology demanding that states should be nationally homogeneous as well as exhaustive, i.e. all-inclusive. There should thus be an overlap between 'the sentimental nation [and] the functional state', as aptly put by Charles Kupchan 67 . In the real world, such an overlap is often missing, either because nations are subdivided among several states, or because they form part of multinational states. Genuine nation-states do, of course, exist. but they are the exception rather than the rule (see Figure 1).

    The case of multinational states may give rise to secessionist wars, where 'entrapped nations' demand emancipation in the sense of seceding from the 'empire' and forming their own nation-state. This was what happed in the course of the 1848-9 European revolutions, e.g. within the multinational Austro-Hungarian empire, and which happened again with the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. The case of part-nation states, i.e. divided states, often gives rise to claims to a merging of previously disparate political entities, such as the small German of Italian principalities in the 19th century 68 .

    States may argue such claims for (re)unification with reference to their having, at some stage in their history, been wrongfully divided, in which case they are merely out to 'right a wrong'. However, even this historical claim raises several questions, such as how far back into history one should go? Many territories have successively belonged to different states, implying that more than one can make a historical claim to it 69 . Furthermore, it is not necessarily so that the one with the most recent claim is in the right, since the acquisition giving rise to the claim may have been wrongful in the first place. Hence a second question, namely what 'wrongful' is supposed to mean-something that becomes increasingly murky the further back into history one ventures.

    Armed conquest by means of aggressive wars is now regarded as wrongful, but this is a fairly recent development. In fact most of the European states acquired their present shape and size via conquest, and territorial aggrandizement was regarded as a perfectly legitimate endeavour for states. By implication, most of today's borders are the product of wars that would today be regarded as impermissible. So would colonialism, as result of which the borders of most of (what is today known as) the Third World were drawn 70 . Logically, most of today's states might thus claim to be 'divided' in the sense of having lost parts previously belonging to them by means that are today regarded as wrongful.

    This is also the case for the alternative mode of division, namely secession, which is usually regarded as illegitimate. The international system is skewed in favour of existing states (regardless of how they came into being in the first place), thus placing the burden of proof on the party demanding or struggling for secession. On the other hand, to secede is surely not always wrongful-in which case we would have to speak of Yugoslavia as a wrongfully divided state and deny recognition to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia. A result of such 'wrongful division' may be irredentist struggles, where part-nation states fight for (re)unification with the motherland (as is the case of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, even though the Greeks are more outspoken with their demand for enosis 71 ), or where the motherland fights for the reconquest of its lost parts.

    Figure 1: State and Nation Terminology from Buzan: op. cit. (note 22), pp. 72-77.

    Ideologies of nationalism further complicate the matter, since states that are the nominal motherland of a nation may raise claims to include all of this nation, i.e. argue that they should be exhaustive and all-inclusive, regardless of whether they have ever previously been so. This, of course, raises the question of what constitute a nation, to which I shall return shortly. Sufffice it, at this stage, to say that it is not much of a problem in cases where the nation is conceived of as comprising the citizens of a particular state-as the French typically conceive of nationhood 72 . In this case, however, the nationalist argument becomes tautological and circular: A state should comprise the whole nation, defined as all its citizens-regardless of their race, language, religious beliefs, etc. ('The more the merrier').

    It may, however, be a serious problem when nations are conceived in other terms, say in those of language, culture or religion, in which case there may be pressure to bring the 'nationals' living abroad 'back home', e.g. 'heim ins Reich' as the National Socialists put it 73 in their particularly repugnant 'Blut und Boden' conception of nationhood 74 .

    Finally, secessionism and irredentism may be combined, in the case of entrapped part-nations, who want to secede only to merge with their 'mother country' (that also wants them 'home') as is undoubtedly the case of the Bosnian Serbs today-underneath the thin veil of the Dayton accord.

    Nations: Objective or Subjective?

    Nationalism may thus be conflict-prone because it raises questions of secession and/or irredentism as ways of making state borders fit those of nations. This leaves us with the question what constitutes a nation. May any group call itself a nation and invoke a right to statehood, or are there any objective criteria of nationhood? Are nations, for instance, to be defined by a common language (L)? Or a shared religion (R)? Or a long history (H)? Or common culture (C)? Or by belonging to the same race or other ethnic subset (E)? Or by any combination of some or all of these features? Many of the definitions suggested in the academic literature are mere pseudo-definitions, listing some or all these defining characteristics, yet without clarifying the 'boolean operators': Does the alleged nation comprise everybody with at least one of the required features, or merely those who combine them all. The choice is between an 'exclusive' and an 'inclusive' definition (see table 2), the former of which excludes as many as possible by means of the boolean operator 'and', while the latter includes more by virtue of its use of 'or'.

    Table 2: Definitions of nationhood
    Exclusive definition:
    Inclusive definition:
    Legend: L: language; R: religion; H: history; C: culture; E: Ethnicity

    The exclusive definition makes for very small nations and points towards a definition of nation states which practically no existing states would meet. It thus gives rise to several paradoxes, i.e. groups of people generally regarded as nations that should not qualify as such. What, for instance, about the inhabitants of multilingual states such as Switzerland, Belgium, Canada or South Africa? or of multi-religious states such as India, Japan, Korea or the USA; or multicultural states (a label that would fit practically all states); or multi-racial ones, such as the USA or South Africa? The inclusive definition is much more tolerant of diversity, requiring only that one should possess some of the significant distinguishing features, but not all of them. It is thus a matter of what Ludwig Wittgenstein called 'family resemblances', i.e. 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and cris-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail' 75 . It allows for such phenomena as buddhist Danes, black Jews or hispanic North Americans-and seems more in line with the postmodernist society described above.

    Imagined Communities

    In view of the above complexities, it is probably wiser to accept that there are no objective criteria 'out there', but that nationhood is a matter of perceptions, attitudes and emotional ties, i.e. that nations are 'imagined communities' 76 that are constructed via social (and perhaps even textual) practice. Culture and shared memories plays particularly important roles in this identity formation, which makes postmodernist theory quite relevant 77 .

    That 'nations' were thus far from objective was already argued by Nietzsche:

    Das, was heute in Europa 'Nation' genannt wird ... ist in jedem Falle etwas Werdendes, Junges, Leichtverschiebbares .... (Jenseit von Gut und Böse) 78

    Present-day postmodern authors use similar expressions when analyzing nationhood: Jacques Derrida's conception of national culture is thus very fluid and (dialectically) self-contradictory:

    ..le propre d'une culture, c'est de n'être pas identique à elle-même. Non pas de n'avoir pas d'identité, mais de ne pouvoir s'identifier, dire ''moi'' ou ''nous'', de ne pouvoir prendre la forme du sujec que dans la non-identité à soi ou, si vous préférez, la difference avec soi. Il n'y a pas de culture ou d'identité culturelle sans cette difference avec soi 79

    Nationhood is thus about 'identity' which, in its turn, is incomprehensible without reference to its opposite, namely 'otherness' 80 . This is certainly no discovery of the postmodernists, but the same notion is already to be found in Heraclitus or Kant 81 . The notion of mutually constitutive opposites, i.e. self and other, is, however, primarily associated with Hegel, who in his Phänomänologie des Geistes showed how self-consciousness (i.e. identity) presupposed positing the Other to serve as a kind of mirror: The self could only become conscious of itself via recognition by an entity recognized as its equal:

    Das Selbstbewußstsein ist an und für sich, indem, und dadurch, daß es für ein Anderes an und für such ist; d.h. es ist nur als ein Anerkanntes ... Sie anerkennen sich, als gegenseitig sich anerkennend. 82

    By implication, nations may thus be 'imagined', but they are only able to imagine themselves by also imagining other nations as such, and by enjoying their recognition 83 . There is, of course, some circularity to this argument, since the claim of the latter nations rests on recognition by the other nations, the claims of which rest on the same foundations, etc. ad infinitum. Even though this is technically an infinite regress, in the real world nothing speaks against the sustainability of such an arrangement that is based entirely on subjective, i.e. political, judgement and fiat.

    Nations may, of course, find iy useful to adopt 'objective' criteria for their judgements, which would certainly have several advantages. Nationhood implies certain, albeit vaguely formulated, rights to 'national selfdetermination', which may or may not include the right to secede and form a separate state contiguous with the nation. Several self-proclaimed nations have thus declared independence of, i.e. sovereign statehood for, the territory under their effective control and apllied for international recognition, e.g. in the form of UN membership 84 -most recently the farcical declaration of independence for the North Italian region 'Padania' by Umberto Bossi of the Liga Nord 85 .

    The international community have vacillated in its attitude, however, sometimes granting and sometimes denying recognition, seemingly without any clear criteria. There is not even much of a pattern in this behaviour. However, the impression that they might gain recognition may motivate national leaders to 'up the ante', e.g. by vying for a statehood than they may not get rather than for a more limited form of autonomy that might be obtainable. Were it clear in advance who would be entitled to recognition and who would not, some conflicts might thus be avoided, or the escalatory momentum of some ongoing conflicts more easily containable 86 . In any case, the vacillation of the international (and especially European) community vis-à-vis Slovenia and Croatia did very little to avert the subsequent war(s) 87 .

    Ethnicity and Nationhood

    Even though nationhood may thus be defined in many different terms, one of the most common is that of 'ethnicity'. On closer analysis, however, it reveals itself as at least as fuzzy as that of nationhood 88 . Anthony Smith's definition seems as good as any:

    a named culture-community whose members have a myth of common origins, shared memories and cultural characteristics, a link with a homeland and a measure of solidarity 89

    Several of the terms in this definition are fuzzy and hard to operationalize. Furthermore, the author has to subdivide ethnic communities into ethno-linguistic, ethno-religious and ethno-political ones. It thus seems that ethnies are no more 'objective' than nations, but that they are also imagined communities, perhaps in the sense that nationalism is a subset of ethnicity. Definitions of nations such as Anthony Smith's, however, seems too narrow:

    a named community occupying a recognized homeland and possessing shared myths and memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and uniform legal rights and duties 90

    This definition would make nations by definition contiguous with states, which leaves not only unanswered but also unasked the pertinent question of the impact of nationalism on state-building. Can there be a nation prior to the establishment of 'its' state?

    Religion and Nationalism

    Religion rarely simplifies matters. First of all, religious factors often enter into the aforementioned fuzzy concepts of nationality and ethnicity. Indeed, some have argued that religious identification is becoming more decisive than such traditional features of nationhood as ethnicity, race language, history and culture 91 .

    Secondly, even when kept conceptually distinct from the notion of nationhood, religion may complicate already complex problems. If a nation believes its territorial claims to be founded on divine authority, it tends to see them as unnegotiable. In fact any state that has received or been promised a piece of territory 'from above' is inclined to fight for this 'with divine sanction'. Hence, for instance, the aversion of some orthodox jews (and most of the Likud) to any 'land for peace' settlement of the conflict in the Middle East 92 . Hence also the worries of Israel's neighbours who have sincere doubts whether Israel is a saturated power.

    Thirdly, even in cases where religious identity is not linked to any particular piece of land, problems may arise when states see themselves as the natural home of all members of a particular creed, either universally or within a particular region. This is, for instance, the case of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the very raison d'être of which is to be a (or the) state of all Indian muslims. However, the entire population of Pakistan is dwarfed by the number of muslims living in India, which sees itself as a secular state (even though some want to emphasize political hinduism). Since some parts on the fringes of India are predominantly muslim, the incompatible Indian and Pakistani conceptions of statehood easily translate into territorial dispute-as is the case of Jammu and Kashmir that has already triggered two wars 93 . One explanation of this conflict-proneness is that both states see themselves as divided: Pakistan because it does not encompass (as it ideally should, in the Pakistani view) all the muslim parts of the sub-continent, and India because of what it sees as the 'illegitimate' secession of Pakistan for irrelevant reasons.


    Overlaying all these conceptual problems is one that has (at least partly) to do with the nature of the state as we know it, in casu its definition and delimitation in territorial terms 94 .

    A state is only identifiable-at least within the modern discourse-as 'the sovereign authority within specified spatial coordinates, where it enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 95 . Moreover, there seems to be an implicit international norm circumscribing how states may be spatially configured, namely that states should have what one might call, 'a neat shape and appropriate size'. This is really a pragmatic consideration, based on the view that states should be able to establish actual control over their territory, which may be impossible for states with very 'odd shapes' and/or 'wrong sizes'. Even though a criterion of national or ethnic homogenity might, for instance, point towards 'patchwork states', this would violate the 'neat shape' criterion-as well as cause numerous practical problems of how to politically unite what is spatially separate. On the other hand, the interim arrangements for Palestinian self-government on the West Bank, and to some extent the Dayton agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina do seem to intimate that the homogeneity criterion may be about to override that of neat shape 96 . I shall return to this matter in the next chapter.

    Regardless of shape, however, the territorial constitution of states poses a further problem. To the extent that ethnies and nations are (self)defined by their claim to sovereign statehood, they become mutually exclusive: only one group can rule the land (or a particular piece of land), and cohabitation almost inevitably comes to presuppose a relationship of subordination. I shall return, in the concluding chapter, to some suggestions for peaceful cohabitation.

    Conflict Dynamics

    A subdivision of the underlying causes of an ethno-national conflict into permissive conditions and proximate causes 97 may help in comprehending how a conflict got started, hence also provide a clue to how it might have been averted, and how similar conflicts may be avoided in the future. However, this is not the same as understanding the conflict's inherent dynamics, much less to know how to bring it to an end. One started, a conflict gains a life of its own, as do wars that are easy to start but difficult to terminate 98 . As I shall return to this question in the concluding chapter, suffice it to point out that the conflict-perpetuating momentum has a rational as well as an emotional dimension.

    Rationally, national leaders are faced with a growing problem of 'sunk costs', making war termination on terms less favorable than victory increasingly hard to justify. Since one can only justify unspeakable suffering with a really spectacular victory, leaders have an incentive to press on for the 'jackpot', even if the probability of winning rapidly approaches zero. Even though this may well be perfectly rational for individuals (or for groups such as political parties or ruling cliques) it is far from rational from the point of view of the community as whole.

    As far as the rank-and-file are concerned, something similar may be the case. Having lived the life of a warrior for some time is often tantamount to having lost whatever one owned or cherished before the fighting started: home, land, possessions, family, job, etc. There may thus be no normalcy to return to, and no improvement of one's condition to hope for, unless one's side prevails and can divide the spoils of conquest among themselves. So the fighters might just as well carry on the struggle.

    Emotionally, there are sunk costs as well, on all sides of the conflict: Relatives and kinsmen that have been killed by the enemy and are now crying out for revenge; atrocities committed that are best kept secret and not thought about, etc. Also, some may even have grown accumstomed to 'living on the edge' as warriors do, with all the excitement and 'male bonding' it involves 99 .

    One of the postmodern features of ethnic conflicts is that they are about identity, in more than one respect.

  • The very act of fighting, with the accompanying putting one's life at stake, may be a precondition for the development of a 'we-feeling', and for separating 'us' from 'them', i.e. 'Self' from 'Other' 100 . It has been argued that universal military service was an indispensable companion of nation building and democracy by serving as a 'melting pot' wherein diverse social strata were blended to form a nation 101 . In the same way combat duties (however irregular) help for emergent nations in their (Andersonian) 'imagination of their community'. In some cases, an actual history is at hand which may be resurrected from oblivion in order to provide (preferably heroic) symbols for nation building-as in the former Yugoslavia where the collective memories of the internecine war between chetniks and ustashi have been upgraded 102 . When there are no such collective memories, new ones may be created by war.
  • Putting up a struggle may be a precondition for recognition as an identity by the Other, hence indirectly also for self-identification. The taking of lives may thus be as important as winning.
  • Open, and preferably violent, heroic and spectacular, conflict may force third parties to take a stand, whereby they may also have to acknowledge both sides as political entities. One might certainly argue that the PLO achieved as much by their terrorist activities.
  • Explainable though the violent nature of ethnic conflict may thus be, it would be cynical to simply accept is an inevitable-if only because such wars tend to become uncontrollable and horribly destructive, not least for the civilians.


    We have thus seen that ethnic conflicts tend to take on many of the features that were above identified as postmodern: uncontrollable, fluid and bloody. They tend to become even more so the more modern or postmodern the environment in which they take place, if only because such societies tend to be extremely vulnerable. We have also seen that the 'modern narrative' of Clausewitzian wars fought by states against their like for political ends is utterly inapplicable to such ethnic conflicts.

    What is the Problem, What Can be Done?

    In this, concluding chapter, I shall abandon all pretences of being a genuine world citizen and stand by my origins as a citizen of the North, i.e. of the privileged zone of peace (and prosperity). Hence the unabashed use of the terms we and us versus they and them.

    If There Is a Problem, Is It Our Problem?

    Cynically speaking, most of the intrastate wars mentioned above have only affect the country in which they take place and its neighbours, hence need not be of grave concern for anybody else. Gone are definitely the days when minor conflicts somewhere might act as catalysts of global conflagration 103 . Hence, if you are so fortunate to live in the 'zone of peace', you need not worry (too much or at all) about the problems of the 'zones of turmoil' 104 . True though this may be, the rest of the world nevertheless gets involved in internal conflicts there, albeit more often than not with too little and too late. It calls for an explanation why not all countries always opt to stand aloof of something of which they could.

    One is that it is in 'our' best (self)interest to contribute to preventing civil wars, genocides and other nastiness in far-away places. Some have e.g. argued that it is an integral part of our security to do so, because if we do not, we will be flooded by waves of refugees 105 . However, this is generally not true because of the prohibitive distances from zones of turmoil to those of peace. Refugees tend to flee on foot and to end up elsewhere in their own country (as 'internally displaced persons' 106 ) or as refugees in neighbouring countries. These are the refugees that cost, whereas those who are in a position to purchase air tickets and end up in our countries are those who can earn their own living. In fact, they could be seen as contributing to the general brain drain from the South to the North. Also, to the extent that 'undesirable' expatriates should seek access, it would surely be within our powers to deny them this, if only we could cast all ethical considerations aside. Nothing could be easier for a state armed to its teeth (as most countries in the North) than to shoot trespassers, especially if they happen to be unarmed women and children.

    Others have appealed to our selfishness (i.e. greed) by holding up the promise of future beneficial economic links with the countries presently embroiled in internecine strife. Once they 'get their act together', if need be with our help, they will lie open to an expansion of our economic network-as will benefit them, but us as well. Rational though this argument may sound, it probably does not stand up to scrutiny. Even though there may be future benefits from economic links with Bosnia, Cyprus or a Palestinian state yet to be, there is very little of value to anybody else in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia or Mozambique. If there were, and if we had no morals qualms about it, we could simply go there and take it, something that could be done virtually unopposed. Generally we do not do so, but on the contrary provide at least some assistance to such crisis-ridden countries with a view to strengthening their political system-i.e. to enable them to better defend themselves against predators.

    We thus seem to be stuck with the, theoretically perhaps unsatisfactory, need to acknowledge that moral considerations do play a role in international affairs. Neither is man necessarily as evil and selfish as claimed by Niebuhr and others, nor do states always pursue merely their 'national interest defined in terms of power' 107 . States have to be acknowledged as moral entities 108 , whose conceptions of right or wrong reflect, among other things, those of their citizens and the dominant ideas 109 . Since most people dislike the spectacle of human suffering to which they are subjected via television, their moral abhorrence and all-too-human feeling that 'something must be done' reverberates through the political system and influences the behaviour of their respective states 110 .

    There is nothing strange about this, it is no different from the (bounded, but nevertheless real) empathy and solidarity that citizens of Tuscany may feel for those of Sicily, or those of California for their fellow countrymen in Florida. To a greater or lesser degree, we are all 'closet comsmopolitans' 111 . Hence, even though civil wars and other violent intrastate conflicts in the zones of turmoil are not our problems, we make them so-which might perhaps count as a postmodern approach to international ethics.

    Something Should Be Done. This Is Something, So Let's Do It

    From a feeling shared by many people that something should be done it does not follow that something could be done which would actually help. In some cases, the involvement of external powers, no matter how well-intended, may do more harm than good, for instance if it is seen by one or all sides as interference rather than assistance. Furthermore, in the real world of scarce resources one involvement usually comes at the cost of several non-involvements, hence the need for establishing priorities.

    A sensible point of departure may be the threefold distinction suggested by Thomas Weiss between 'who needs no help, who cannot be helped, and who can and must be helped' 112 . For obvious reasons, I shall skip the first category of cases where the warring sides are able to achieve a solution by themselves. Also it makes very little sense to dwell on the cases in the second category, even though is is essential to identify them as such insoluble problems before dismissing them. Mozambique and Cambodia may be examples of problems that came dangerously close to dismissal as insoluble, but which were nevertheless handled with considerable success-while Afghanistan may be an example of a problem that was dismissed, but which might have been soluble 113 .

    What is most interesting is, however, the third category. Here, it seems warranted to commence with several caveats, i.e. admonitions about what not to do, and warnings against all-too-common misunderstandings:

  • Quick fixes are a the rare exeption to the general rule that everything takes time. The main defect of the Dayton agreement may thus be its much too tight time schedule, and the (in the precent author's opinion absolutely indecent) US determination to withdraw 114 .
  • The main problem is very rarely a shortage of arms. Even though the distribution of weapons may be uneven, it is usually not a good idea to provide the disadvantaged side with additional weapons, which only tends to escalate the fighting 115 .
  • Just bombing something or somebody (as seems to have been the instinctive US approach to the Bosnian debacle) often exacerbates the problem, rather than solving it. First of all, the notion of punishment stems from an analogy with crime fighting within countries-where it also has very little, if any, effect. Secondly, as argued above, unclear lines of authority makes it wellnigh impossible to find those actually deserving punishment. Thirdly, even if the actual culprits are duly punished they tend to lack the power to bring the punishable behaviour of their notional subordinates to a halt-because of the postmodern political condition described above, and especially the accompanying 'crisis of the state'.
  • If individual states, or the international community as a whole, are unwilling to pay the price of involvement in blood, they had better stay out. Since intrastate wars are characterized by everybody killing everybody else, it is a dangerous illusion to believe in a casualty-free involvement (as the United States seem to), and indecent and irresponsible to withdraw when the illusion of clean and bloodless warfighting is revealed as such.
  • With these caveats in mind, I shall proceed with enumerating some short and longer-term measures that the international community might take to contribute to bringing such postmodern wars to an end as can be ended.

    Short-term Measures

    The violent struggle is mainly (but, as argued above, not only) a symptom of underlying problems. However, it is almost always necessary to deal with this symptom before proceeding to curing the illness itself. Hence, a necessary, if far from sufficient precondition for ending wars is to stop the fighting and prevent a resumption thereof. This gargantuan task may be subdivided into political and military tasks-albeit with the qualification that the two often overlap.

    The Political Element

    The first step is to convince the warring parties that a truce will not harm their interest, i.e. that it will not be exploited by the respective opposing side. Third party mediation and various guarantees may be extremely valuable in this phase, where the goal is simply to achieve a truce. In most cases, however, successfully brokering a cease-fire presupposes that a point of saturation has been reached, where neither side believes it has any realistic chance of achieving more by continued fighting 116 .

    A complicating factor in postmodern conflicts is that it may not be at all clear who speaks for whom, i.e. who are the relevant interlocutors, and whether they have the power to actually implement a truce, if one should be aggreed upon. Since it tends to deepen mutual suspicions, a broken truce may be worse than none at all. Another complication is that the warring parties very often do not recognize each other at all, or at least not as legitimate spokespersons for anybody, but see each other as usurpers or bandits. In such cases, however, the parties may eventually arrive at the point of mutual recognition via skillful diplomacy on the part of third parties, serving as mediators 117 .

    Peacekeeping and Arms Control

    Because the parties at this very early stage most emphatically mistrust each other, external guarantees are important. This may actually be the main rationale for peacekeeping operations. Also, there has to be an 'arms control' element in a truce, albeit usually amounting to little more than a disarming of the warring parties, the weaponry of which will have to be placed in safe custody. For an elaboration on the military element therein, readers are referred to Appendix II.

    Conflict Resolution

    Bringing the figting to an end is, of course, only a necessary but far from a sufficient precondition for lasting peace, which requires a resolution of the underlying conflict 118 .

    Mutual Recognition and Collaboration

    A precondition of, and a first step toward, conflict resolution seems to be mutual recognition by the two or several parties to a conflict. The parties may either recognize each other as states or as something else, as a minimum as legitimate interlocutors.

    If as states, the parties recognize each other as sovereign entities, implying a renunciation of their right to interfere in each other's domestic affairs 119 -which, in its term presupposes a territorial delimitation separating the outside from the inside, i.e. a drawing of borders. This is a complicated matter, also because it has both macro- and microlevel effects: A border that is fair an equitable, seen from a macro-level perspective may be deeply unjust by cutting right through villages or making their communication lines run through 'enemy' territory; it may necessitate expropriation of privately owned land, thereby giving rise to civil law suits, etc.

    Be that as it may, the result of such state-building and mutual recognition will be 'normal' international relations, which may be characterized by amity or enmity, or (more often) a blend thereof. States at least recognize each other's existence as states, establish diplomatic relations, permit direct travel, etc. They may be each other's competitors, occasionally even enemies, and they may even go to war against each other-but at least they acknowledge each other's existence. It may not be much, but it is something.

    In such a 'Westphalian setting', states may gradually come to appreciate the need for empathy, if only because the working of such an anarchic system is governed by the security dilemma and the powerful reciprocity principle 120 . States thus respond to, and retaliate against, each other's every move in a manner that may leave both sides worse off after than before each interactive cycle. Hence the advisability of pursuing only such policies as are acceptable to the respective other side, i.e. which do not provoke a malign response.

    As a reflection of such a maturation of their relationship states and other entities may develop what Robert Jervis called a 'security regime', where both sides show restraint in anticipation of reciprocal restraint by their adversaries 121 . Elements of collaboration may thus develop among entities that remain adversaries, implying that shared interests are upgraded, even beyond the elementary one of avoiding mutual annihilation. This is, indeed, the underlying philosophy of what has become associated with the notion of 'common security' (promulgated by the Palme Commission in 1982 122 ) and which has recently experienced a renaissance under the term 'cooperative security' 123 . It seems to be applicable not only to state actors in an international setting, but also to the parties to intrastate conflicts.


    At some stage in such a process, what Karl Deutsch called a 'security community' will have become a reality, i.e. the states (entities) in question will have ceased to regard war as conceivable 124 . This is entirely compatible with their remaining independent agents, in which case the security community remains pluralistic. This will be a very favourable point of departure for a piecemeal amalgamation, i.e. integration-or in the case of former states that have become divided through civil strife reunification. The actors may either deliberately embark upon thus path, or they may inadvertently find themselves set on such a trajectory. Federalists envision integration as primarily a political process decided by the appropriate political authorities, albeit often responding to popular demands. Functionalists and neo-functionalists, on the other hand, see integration more as a result of functional, i.e. technical and economic, collaboration which gradually 'spills over' into the political field. As neo-functionalists have gradually and reluctantly come to realize, this does not happen automatically. In EU-type integration 125 , the constituent states thus relinquish authority to supranational bodies, but in a piecemeal, haphazard and partly reversible manner. Also the trend toward centralization is tempered by an application of the principle of subsidiarity 126 .

  • The first stage of political amalgamation may be the formation of a confederation, implying a retention of sovereign rights by the merging political units, including the right of secession 127 . Typically, certain issue areas are placed under the authority of supranational organs (foreign and defence policy, for instance), while others remain the exclusive domain of the parties to the confederation.
  • The second stage may be a federation, where the time for secession has passed, but where the constituent parts retain various rights, even though none of them amount to sovereignty 128 . In a federation, the main political authority is vested in the federal government, but power is nevertheless shared with constituent states, typically manifested in a bicameral parliamentary structure. A 'point of no return' has thus been passed in legal terms. However, even federations do break up, either by mutual consent or violently, as the Yugoslav example illustrates. Also, there is no guarantee that political integration will ever proceed beyond the federal stage, as illustrated by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany-neither of which seem likely to ever be transformed into 'ordinary' states.
  • Some do, however, proceed to the third stage of a unified statehood, but some states retain vestiges of their federal past, e.g. in the form of extensive rights for minorities, regardless of their origin. This feature is captured in the term 'consociation', implying a certain division of power among groups, however defined-each with something approaching veto powers over decisions of vital importance 129 .
  • The fourth and 'final' stage of statehood is the creation of a unified and centralized state, where everybody is supposed to see themselves primarily as citizens of the state, rather than as belonging to sub-groupings. This may, of course, be combined with extensive protection of minorities, only not in the shape of special political rights. A unicameral parliament fits such a state nicely since there is no longer rationale for special sub-state representation.
  • Proceeding to the third and fourth stage would simply reproduce a 'Westphalian' system, only with fewer but larger constituent parts. All of them would be sovereign states recognizing each others as such. This might provide the starting point for a new round of integration, proceeding through all four stages and ending up with still larger states, etc.

    Forms of Governance

    The final result of this process might be one unitary state encompassing the entire globe, i.e. some form of world government-a notion that has certainly always had a certain attraction 130 , but which also has drawbacks.

    On the positive side, it would provide a form of global governance that seems increasingly needed in view of, for instance, the border-transcending and global environmental problems 131 . On the negative side is the likelihood that what are today international conflicts would simply be reproduced in a different shape, i.e. as struggles for supremacy within the supranational 'super-Leviathan' 132 . There is no reason whatsoever to expect such struggles to be any less violent and bloody than modern international or postmodern civil wars; nor are there any guarantees against one side's winning them, which might result in secession and a break-up of the world state. Back to square one!

    However, there may be alternative paths to some form of global governance, which may entail proceeding beyond (i.e. transcending) the third and fourth stages to something qualitatively different. There have thus been speculations about an emerging 'neo-Medievalism' (at least in Europe) 133 . This would imply a transfer of authority from the state level upwards to supranational political institutions, as well as downwards to regional and local powers. The state as we know it might thus be reduced to one amongst several layers of political authority (say, in conformity with the subsidiarity principle). By thus reducing the salience of borders, such a development might conceivable help in the resolution of ethnic and other presently intra-state conflicts. Another conceivable development is what has been called (by Ole Wæver) 'neo-Sumerianism', i.e. a hegemonical system. In such a system, according to Adam Watson,

    'some power or authority in a system is able to ''lay down the law'' about the operation of the system, that is to determine to some extent the external relations between member states, while leaving them domestically independent' 134

    Confederal and federal arrangements also have their attraction, for exactly the same reason that they make borders less important, i.e. contribute to a deterritorialization of governance. One might, for instance, conceive of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict along suich lines. confederation between Israel, Jordan and a Palestinean state (or an even larger one, comprising Syria and Lebanon as well) or via other forms of internationalization. Such an arrangement might solve several sets of problems for all three founding parties: The Palestinians would enjoy a statehood of sorts. Israel would be relieved of the fear of Arab irredentism and of the 'internal', yet existential, threat represented by the Intifada (which is surely going to continue otherwise). The Hashemite Kingdom, finally, would be relieved of its present fears of an odd Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement that would put the very survival of Jordan at serious risk. In the confederation, domestic policy, including control of the police force, would remain the prerogative of the three constituent parts, while foreign and defence policy should be that of the confederate authorities. In addition, the control of the water resources would perhaps be best managed by the confederation.

    Territorial solutions

    There is thus a pressing need to think creatively about unorthodox solutions to the territorial problem. To expect ethnic and national conflicts to be resolvable through the establishment of traditional states with 'neat shapes and appropriate sizes' is, at best, a recipe for failure. At worst it is one for disaster, since bad (presumed) solutions may be worse than none at all.

    Since most of the postmodern conflicts are about ethnic and national identity and 'togetherness', there is much to be said in favour of giving precedence to the national homogeneity criterion over than of neat shape. One may, for instance, have to accept 'patchwork states' in those cases where nations happen to be intermingled-or the international community may have to find ways to accomodate (to a greater extent than today) the notion of territory under the sovereignty of no state 135 . This is not entirely without precedents. If one looks closely, today's world already contains a number of territorial anomalies such as enclaves and exclaves, some of which seem perfectly viable.

    An exclave (1) is a part of a state that is physically separated from the rest by (part of) another country. An example thereof is Alaska which is separated from the rest of the USA by Canada; or the Russian enclave Kaliningrad. An exclave (2) is a variation on the former, where the exclave forms part of an island, the rest of which is a separate state. Examples are Malaysia and the UK (with Northern Ireland). An exclave (3) is something as common as an island belonging to a mother country. An example is Sicily-or (as China sees it) Taiwan. Exclaves of type 4 are, likewise, islands, yet with the added twist that one state's island exclaves are intermingled with those of another state (or other states). An example is the intermingling of Greek and Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea-or the competing and intermingling claims to the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea 136 .

    An enclave is a whole country that is completely surrounded by another state. Examples include Lesotho (surrounded by South Africa) and the Holy See (surrounded by Italy). A semi-enclave is a country that is surrounded on three sides by another state, i.e. whose only outlet is to the sea. An example is Gambia. An enclaved exclave is an exclave belonging to one country, but completely surrounded by another. An example was West Berlin during the Cold War.

    Some such 'oddly shaped states' have not lasted but have disintegrated, as it happened to Pakistan with the secession of (what is now) Bangladesh; or have been integrated into larger political entities including all pieces of the puzzle within a single frame (as it happened with German unification); or what was seen as a wrongful division has been terminated by the absorption of the exclave by the surrounding state. In other cases, however, the states involved have learned to live with the anomaly.

    The Military Implications

    At each stage of the conflict resolution process it will be imperative that all sides feel secure, which has impolications for the appropriate military arrangements. In this connection, the ideas of defensive restructuring to a posture of non-offensive defence may be very relevant 137 . In fact, they could be best understood as simply the application of the aforementioned principles of common security to the military sphere.

  • In the 'ceasefire stage', it will be very important that neither side is able to go beyond the terms of the truce, say by forcefully shifting the cease-fire demarcation line in their favour. Disengagement arrangements (such as the establishment of demilitarized zones, with or without the interpositioning of peacekeeping forces) will be valuable safeguards against this. Whereas they cannot prevent a resumption of hostilities they can delay it, i.e. prevent surprise attacks and provide both sides with extended warning wimes, thereby facilitating demobilization.
  • In the 'Westphalian stage', where the formerly warring parties have established (at least de facto) states recognizing each other as such and, at least temporarily, abandoned their plans for reestablishing the lost unity by forceful means, all sides are likely to assign a high priority to national security against military threats. By implication, everybody will be well-advised to emphasizing defensive over offensive missions and requisite capabilities; and all will be interested in achieving reciprocation from the respective adversaries. Hence the attraction of arms control arrangements that might also enhance predictability of military activities, which may allow everybody to feel more secure.
  • In the 'rapprochement stage' it is important to build mutual trust, inter alia by demonstrating defensive intentions. This is also best done by having no military means to offensive ends such as invasion or border-crossing aggression in general-yet without sacrificing defensive potential.
  • In the 'reintegration stage', characterized by confederal or federal political arrangements, it will be important for the integrating parties to prevent reciprocal threat perceptions that might spiral out of control. It will no longer make sense to plan for large-scale counter-offensives onto each other's territory, nor to contemplate major punitive strikes. The integrating sides may also have to thave to take the perceptions of their neighbours into account, if only because the impending merging of two (or more) armies may have quite dramatic implications for regional military equations: Not only may the total strength of the resultant entity grow, but all of it will suddenly become available for 'external use', once the integrating sides no longer have to defend themselves against each other. Regional arms races might conceivably be the result 138 .
  • If only because of this scenario, external powers will be well-advised to resist the temptation to reap temporary profit from arms sales to the formerly warring sides. Not that arms may not be needed, at each stage in the process, to fill up depleted stock of weapons required for defensive purposes. But external power should be discriminatory in their arms sales, selling only weapons for which there is a legitimate defensive need, but not such as will most likely be used to upset the peace 139 .


    We have thus seen that ending 'postmodern' ethnic, i.e. intra-state, wars is a complicated endeavour-albeit one of which the international community of states cannot (and should not) stand aloof. The provision of peacekeepers may be needed, some of which may be killed, and lucrative profits may have to be foregone for the sake of bringing a former warring zone to peace.


    The very fuzzyness of postmodern topics such as those dealt with on the preceding pages almost precludes conclusion. Indeed, not to draw any generalizing conclusions (i.e. derive a 'grand narrative' from the small narratives) would seem in line with the 'anything goes' philosophy described as a distinctive feature of postmodernism. Also, the lack of conclusion may reinforce what is intended to be the main message of this paper: that matters are a good deal more complicated than often assumed; and that there are no easy solutions to such complex problems.

    A real-life illustration of this complexity is the extremely tense situation in the Israeli-occupied territories on the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem that has developed after the Likud government's opening of tunnels under the Arab part of Jerusalem, as a response to which the Intifida flared up again. The bloody events were all transmitted in almost real-time by the CNN, BBC World News and others, thus accompanying the author's writing the last pages of the paper in an almost uncanny way.

    The conflict aptly illustrates that postmodern conflicts such as that between Jews and Palestinians defies solution by traditional military means. Of course, the Israeli soldiers may shoot at Palestinian rock-throwing demonstrators, but this will exacerbate rather than solve the problem. Nor does the throwing of rocks or other acts of violence on the part of the Palestinians solve their problem by giving them a state. What is required seems to be a reciprocal recognition by the two sides, followed by an exercise in empathy that would allow each side to understand the respective other's security and identity concerns as genuine, including the symbolic and religious aspects thereof. Ernest Gellner's (postmodernist) 'rationalist fundamentalist' recommendations may be well worth taking seriously:

    The attractive solution, it seems to me, is what might be called constitutional religion, on the analogy of constitutional monarchy (an institution which works fairly well in a certain number of polities) ... The viable compromise, the equivalent of constitutional monarchy in the sphere of conviction, is a kind of double authority, with the separation of their respective zones left deliberately obscure and ambiguous. In the sphere of legitimation of social arrangements, the old pities are retained in the social lithurgy; in the sphere of serious cognition, they are ignored. 140

    Enduring and Variable Factors in War

    In the following, I have generalized to an outrageous (but in this context inevitable) extent. The only excuse for this, besides the appeal to necessity, is that several grand strategists and/or military historians have, likewise, written about the longue durée in a similarly generalizing manner 141 . As in table 1, I have divided the distinguishing features into the questions Who does the fighting?; on whose behalf?; against whom?; why is the war waged?; where does it take place?; how is it waged, i.e. according to which strategic principles, if any; to which extent, i.e. within which limits, and with which intensity is the war fought?; and by which means? (weapons and other).


    Whereas archaic wars were fought primarily by professionals (Landsknechte, musketeers, etc.), i.e. what we would today call mercenaries or soldiers of fortune), 'modern' war has tended to assume the form of an orderly levée en masse. Most contries have thus relied on conscription based on universal (with the exception of Israel only male) compulsory military service 142 . The exceptions have been countries with complete (Switzerland) or partial (Austria, Finland, former Yugoslavia, for example) militia forms of recruitment 143 ; and countries with all-volunteer armed forces like the USA (after the abolition of the draft), or the UK 144 . In most cases, however, countries have used a blend of all three. The goal has, however, been to make the army an integral, yet at the same time distinct, element of society: 'Civilized' in the 'like everybody else' sense, yet performing a specialized task for which the military has been trained, like everybody else 145 ; and the task being not so very different from those of most other professions, since actual fighting is quite rare.

    Postmodern warfare, on the other hand, tends to be waged by whoever is around, including women and children-and to be so in a highly irregular, sporadic and spasmodic fashion, where occasional acts of war blend in with everyday life. The division of labour between warriors and the productive segments of society has thus broken down. Another reappearing phenomenon is that of various forms of mercenaries, i.e. guns for hire. Some have even feared that the ex-Soviet armed forces, because of their hapless situation, will flood the market with not only guns, but also 'brains for hire', e.g. in the form of nuclear or other WMD specialists.

    These phenomena to some extent reflect a tendential 'privatization of security': If, as a consequence of its general crisis, the State loses its credibility as a provider of individual security, its citizens may resort to self-help, as in the Hobbesian 'state of nature' 146 .


    As elaborated upon by Martin Van Creveld, modern warfare is 'trinitarian', i.e. waged by armies on behalf of the trinity of people, army and government. In effect war was a form of interaction among states. To be sure, there were instances of 'nontrinitarian' wars, e.g. the Spanish guerilla war against Napoleon 147 . On the whole, however, wars were trinitarian, and they became even more symbiotically so with the advent of nationalism, democracy and universal conscription 148 . Some have even argued that the evolution of the State and war were inextricably intertwined, to the extent that one was inconceivable without the other 149 .

    Postmodern warfare, in contrast, is often waged on behalf of very diverse entities, such as clans, ethnies, religious communities (personified in priesthoods), warlords, or the like-and in some cases on behalf of nobody at all, except the lone warrier himself, operating in a post-apocalyptic 'Mad Max setting'. This is, for instance, the tragic fate of many of those child soldiers (perhaps especially, but not in Africa) who constitute one of postmodern war's darkest features 150 .


    In premodern war, the weapons were usually directed against the other side's troops-with the qualification that soldiers, understandably, avoided engagements and battles to the greatest possible extent, as did the mercenary captains, eager to preserve their 'capital', i.e. the troops. Hence many wars were wars of disengagement 151 . Civilians suffered, of course, if only because of the pillaging (and occasional rape) that followed in the trail of the armies moving about. This was, however, 'collateral damage' rather than direct war damage; mostly paid in the coinage of material values rather than blood; and usually of a limited and/or very localized scale.

    Modern war, in contrast, became increasingly directed against civilians, with the Allied (conventional and nuclear) bombings of Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki standing out as prototypical examples 152 . Nothwithstanding the occasional planning for city avoidance and counterforce targetting, nuclear war planning pointed in the same direction, only with even more pronounced genocidal implications 153 .

    The scale of mobilization, on the other hand, also multiplied military battle deaths, with the carnage in the trenches along the Western front in the First World War as the best known example, described so graphically in Erich Maria Remarque's novel Im Westen Nichts Neues:

    Die Tage gehen hin, und jede Stunde ist enbegreiflich und selbstverständlich. Die Angriffe wechseln mit Gegenangriffen, und langsam häufen sich auf dem Trichterfeld zwischen den Gräben die Toten. Die Verwundeten, die nicht sehr weit weg liegen, können wir meistens holen. Manche aber müssen lange liegen, und wir hören sie sterben .... Trommelfeuer, Sperrfeuer, Gardinenfeuer. Minen, Gas, Tanks, Maschinengewehre, Handgranaten - Worte, Worte, aber sie umfassen das Grauen der Welt. 154

    In postmodern warfare, most casualties and fatalities are civilians, for at least two reasons: Because the distinction between combatants and civilians has been blurred (vide supra), and because of the location of the war, which is often fought in densely populated areas ('concrete jungle warfare', for instance), with massive collateral damage as the inevitable result. With the intention of crippling the enemy economically and socially, rather than defeating him militarily, agriculture and/or infrastructure are often targetted, e.g. by means of landmines. Chemical and biological weapons could have similar effects, as could, ironically, some computer vira and other so-called 'non-lethal weapons' if used against postmodern and post-industrial societies that are extremely vulnerable (vide infra).


    Modern wars are typically fought for political ends, as most succinctly put by Clausewitz:

    ... der Krieg nicht bloß ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführung dessselben mit anderen Mitteln .... Das Unterordnen des politischen Gesichtspunktes unter den militärischen wäre widersinnig, denn die Politik hat den Krieg erzeugt; sie ist die Intelligenz, der Krieg aber bloß das Instrument, und nicht umgekehrt. Es bleibt also nur das Unterordnen des militärischen Gesichtspunktes unter dem politischen möglich 155 .

    The use of military means for political ends was originally entirely possible and instrumentally rational: there were certainly political goals worth fighting for, i.e. which warranted risking whatever the use of the military means might entail, even in the worst of cases. However, with the First and Second World Wars and, even more so, with the nuclear revolution, a point was reached where the destructive (and indeed suicidal) potential embedded in the means was out of proportion with the ends: Was the possible annihilation of the entire society of not only the vanquished, but also the victor (the prospect of global thermonuclear war) really a reasonable price to pay for any political goal? Surely not.

    The steady growth of global interdependence (trade etc.) only magnified the unbridgeable gab between ends and means, since states now had even more to lose from a severance of trade routes as would result from even minor wars-as well as more to gain by staying at peace with each other. Some have even argued that war has become so utterly dysfunctional among 'trading states' as to make it wellnigh inconceivable 156 .

    A further factor pointing in the same direction is the global spread of democracy. This form of government is inherently peaceful, at least in the sense that democracies very rarely, if ever, go to war against other democracies 157 . By implication, the number of state dyads among which war remains conceivable is rapidly shriking, while the global 'zone of peace' expands 158 . Finally, the very fact that states have previously waged (trinitarian or Clausewitzian) wars to no avail, and at mind-boggling costs, may in itself serve as a powerful inhibition against any repetition thereof. War-weariness may thus have proliferated and intensified to such an extent as to make large-scale war obsolete 159 .

    Postmodern wars are different, however. They are not fought for political goals, at least not exclusively, and they are thus no longer (only or mainly) a continuation of politics. War as such may thus serve a purpose, regardless of who wins, at least at the level of individual warriors, but perhaps also at that of collectives, e.g. nations (vide supra).


    While archaic wars, at least in the Middle Ages, were rather fluid wars of disengagement because of deliberate battle avoidance, modern wars have tended to be fixed and of an ever-expanding spatial scope and magnitude-albeit with a twist: The expanding size of armies, on the one hand, intensified destruction and expanded the battlefield. On the other hand, the increasing destructive power embedded in the weapons used forced a gradual dispersion of forces-pointing towards the 'empty battlefield' 160 -which would indeed by a postmodern phenomenon. Nevertheless, modern war has tended to remain fixed in the sense that a significant distinction remained between front and rear. However, the introduction of long-range bombers and ballistic missiles, combined with theories of air power that advocated bombing of civilian targets, gradually made this distinction doubtful 161 . Still, as argued in chapter two above, the wars that might have involved such large-scale nuclear bombardments of the respective enemy's rear were never fought, but remained virtual and make-believe. Had this not been the case, the limitations on warfare to which I shall return shortly, might have made war next to impossible to wage.

    Postmodern wars are mostly civil wars that take place within state borders-even though the mismatch between nation and state borders, or the involvement of external actors may lead to a spread across borders 162 . The very concepts of front and rear tend to loose their meaning-along with the distinction between combatants and civilians. Some such wars already feature urban guerilla fighting (e.g. snipers shooting at randon at civilians, as was seen in Sarajevo). Others may be (semi)-'post-territorial' by being directed against another country's citizens or possessions, regardless of their location. Airlines and their passengers would be (and already are) an obvious target-as they have been for the PLO, and especially its radical left such as the PFLP 163 .

    Other varieties of postmodern wars are assuming increasingly virtual and post-territorial features, i.e. have almost entirely shed their territorial garments. Everybody acknowledges the growing importance of 'information dominance', i.e. of being able to see without being seen and hear without being heard by the enemy, all in real time. Some have argued that this is, in fact, the distinguishing feature of the much talked about Military Technological Revolution (MTR) or Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the first glimpses of which we saw during the Gulf War 164 . However, the impressive performance of these 'magnificent men in their flying machines' notwithstanding, the alleged lessons of the Gulf War for future armed conflicts should be taken cum grano salis. First of all, the setting of the war was classical, and close to ideal; secondly, the enemy hardly fought back at all; thirdly, virtually no attempt was made by Iraq to devise or use countermeasures against the US technologies.

    In the future, one might envision wars fought entirely in cyberspace (i.e. in an electromagnetic no-mans-land without any spatial coordinates) 165 , between 'hacker terrorists' and states (or firms); or wars featuring a race between information and disinformation attempts, that might be called 'epistemic wars'.


    Modern war is orderly, and modern European strategists have all along envisaged war as proceeding according to plan, in some cases even in a 'geometrical fashion' 166 . Hence, for instance, the Principles of War (conceived by Antoine de Jomini, but first codified in approximately their present formulation by Fuller 167 ) that were presumably of perrenial validity. Some strategic thinkers allowed room for 'the fog of battle' 168 , but basically war was an activity to plan for, and one that was expected to proceed (largely) according to plan. This was, indeed, a precondition for strategy, defined rather narrowly by Clausewitz as 'die Lehre vom Grebrauch der Gefechte zum Zweck des Krieges' and by modern strategists in similar, albeit slightly broader terms: 'the distribution and application of military means to fulfil the ends of politics' (Liddell Hart), or 'l'art de faire concourir la force a atteindre let buts de la politique' (Beaufre) 169 .

    Postmodern warfare, on the other hand, is disorderly. There may be tactics of cyberwar or urban guerilla warfare, but a strategy thereof is hardly conceivable. At most, it would be a 'grand strategy' envisaging disorganization of the respective adversary. Moreover, against enemies who wage war in a postmodern fashion, conventional strategy leads nowhere. This phenomenon was already visible in the Vietnam War, where Robert MacNamara's 'technowar' (based on the systems analyses of his Harvard 'wizz kids'), was to no avail, simply because the enemy was too intangible and refused to play 'by the rules' 170 . Indeed, the same was the case in the desert warfare described by Lawrence of Arabia who likened the use of conventional means against the intangible guerilla to 'eating soup with a knife' 171 .

    Postmodern warfare waged against modern adversaries might thus be seen as an 'ultra-indirect' approach to strategy, taking Liddell Hart further than he envisaged venturing himself 172 . Postmodern guerillas might attempt to turn the technological sophistication and complexity of their modern adversaries into liabilities rather than an assets. Just consider how immensely vulnerable (post)modern societies are to any severance of their power supplies, or to computer vira. For instance, the money supply, on which nearly all exchange of goods depends, is rapidly becoming completely immaterial, i.e. electronic. Even though numerous technical safeguards may be devised, it will remain a measures-versus-countermeasures game in which that side will prevail that possesses the structural advantage; and to disrupt is simply structurally less demanding than to protect. The modern protectors may thus be fighting a losing battle against the postmodern disruptors.

    Postmodern wars may also become increasingly fictional, yet with all too real implications. As was illustrated by Stanley Kubrick's Doctor Strangelove, the worst 'doomsday bomb' is the one which does exist, but is unknown by the enemy. The ideal bomb would not exist at all. However, the respective enemy would believe it did (or even that it might), which would produce all the deterrent and/or compellent (e.g. blackmail) effect one could wish for. To the extent that 'cyber warriors' could disseminate disinformation to such an effect, they would possess very powerful weapon indeed-without actually having any.

    To Which Extent?

    Contrary to some readings of Clausewitz, modern war is not the absolute war with a boundless escalatory momentum that he described in Vom Kriege 173 . It is limited, above all by the political ends as a means to which war is conceived. First of all, a war for political ends thus has to observe certain limitations, beyond which is ceases to be a rational endeavour. Secondly, politics (and the underlying ethics) have proscribed an increasingly broad range of conceivable casus belli as well as ways and means of waging war: The jus ad bellum and jus in bello bodies of international law 174 .

    What is left is a rather narrow range of reasons for which a state may go to war, which boil down to (national or collective) self-defence and collective security operations; and a rather circumscribed range of permissible forms of warfare and legitimate weapons: No warfare against civilians, no use of chemical or biological (or, after the World Court ruling, nuclear 175 ) weapons at all, etc.

    It is, of course, debatable to what extent (if at all) such regulations are mere window-dressing or actually contribute to 'civilizing war' 176 . The question what belligerents refrain from doing out of respect for the regulations is counter-factual, hence impossible to answer with any certainty. The present author, however, believes that such regulations do exert a significant restraining influence on warring parties, both as far as states and individual combatants are concerned-at least in most cases, inter alia because soldiers have been socialized with a certain code d'honneur, and because of the risk of punishment for war crimes. In any case, strong states seem to be a necessary, even if they are no sufficient condition for 'civilization of war'.

    Postmodern warfare, in comparison, is unregulated, hence tendentially boundless, if only because of who is waging it. The laws of war are laws for states, whereas there are few, if any, laws regulating the behaviour of individuals or bands of mercenaries that are roaming wild 177 . Moreover, the above-mentioned psychological factors tend to imbue postmodern warfare with a rage that may transcend all bounds-and which may degenerate into blood feud-like vicious circles of revenge. To the extent that political leaders want to limit figting, they often lack the authority to do so.

    By Which Means?

    It is not so much the invention of individual weapons that determines the evolution of warfare as their introduction on a mass scale. Moreover, the decisive factor is usually not weapons at all, but rather society's general technological state, as reflected, inter alia, in its infrastructure (in the widest sense of the word) 178 . Just think of the impact of (civilian) railway system on pre-WWI defence planning 179 .

    Archaic and medieval war featured weapons based on quite primitive technologies, with limited lethality and fairly short range. The resultant limitation on the scale and intensity of warfare was reinforced by other technological and societal factors such as the limited transport capacity and the difficulties with mobilizing large forces for more than very short periods.

    Modern war, in contrast, is preconditioned on a higher level of productivity that makes sizable numbers of otherwise productive people dispensable from their productive duties without this having serious detrimental effects on overall production. Not only did industrialization accomplish this feat, its cost-effective methods of production also allowed states to equip mass armies with state-of-the-art weapons possessing a growing range and destructive power.

    The lethality of weapons grew tremendously, with the introduction of thermonuclear weapons since 1951 as the culmination. The development of railways, steamships etc. produced a quantum jump in the reach of such armies, i.e. provided states with a both massive and long-range power projection capability-as compared with the long but 'thin' power projection of Alexander the Great or Genghis Khan 180 .

    The advent of truly long-range aircraft and ballistic missiles further meant that the power to inflict serious damage on an enemy (some would even argue, to defeat him 181 ) became independent of the actual movement of troops. Some analysts thus hold that distances have lost their importance, while others would maintain that the 'loss of strength gradient' (according to which theory military strength is inversely correlated with distance) remains a significant limitation on strategic reach 182 .

    In postmodernity all the benefits that were to reaped from the above developments have already been reaped: Distances have ceased to be insurmountable obstacles and become, at worst, mere impediments; and, in a curious post-Einsteinian way, space and mass are being mirrored in time. The only sensible measure of space (e.g. distance) may now be the time required to traverse (or otherwise 'cover') it. This is even more true to when what is transported is not material objects (such as projectiles or aircraft carriers) but immaterial stuff such as information, as is the most characteristic feature of postmodern 'information war'.

    While in modern war what mattered was 'who gets there the fastest with the mostest', in the postmodern age it has have become more important who knows what first, i.e. who is best at gathering, analyzing and disseminating information. All data on the disposition of the respective enemy are available in 'real time'; the most important weapons are no longer those that are best as killing the enemy, but those that blind, deafen or otherwise confuse him the most thoroughly, thereby incapacitating him. The time has thus come to make the most of Liddell Hart's indirect approach:

    To cut an army's lines of communication is to paralyze its physical organization. To close its line of retreat is to paralyze its moral organization. And to destroy its lines of intercommunication-by which orders and reports pass-is to paralyse its sensory organization, the essential connection between brain and body. (...) To paralyse the enemy's military nerve-system is a more economical form of operation than to pound his flesh. 183

    It may even have become undesirable to kill the enemy, hence the attraction of such 'non-leathal' weapons as are presently being researched in the Pentagon and elsewhere-including computer vira and weapons intended to sever power grids 184 .

    An optimistic reading thereof might be that we are rapidly approaching a 'war without tears', i.e. one in which neither We (the good guys) nor They (the bad guys) come to any serious harm. If believed in, such as (hyper- or) postmodernist vision would go a long way towards removing the inhibitions against going to war in the first place. War might actually be fun, or at least harmless.

    The optimists are almost certainly wrong, however. First of all, because the non-lethality of the aforementioned non-lethal weapons is debatable. They may produce fewer direct battle fatalities, but some of them produce just as many indirect, and mostly civilian, casualties and fatalities. Secondly, once a war has started (say, because of a sanguine view about how it would be waged), the 'fog of war' may set in. In this fog, it is highly likely that temporary military set-backs would be responded to with the introduction of 'old-fashioned', i.e. deliberately lethal, weapons. In conclusion, war may become more likely as well as equally destructive.

    The even darker side of postmodern weaponry is that its lethality is undiminished, while its production costs are falling, making them available in meaningful quantities to both minor military powers and to non-state warring parties. Even disregarding the weapons that are presently being sold at dumping prices or otherwise 'leaking' from the ex-Soviet Union, the weapons supply may also be rising from clandestine production. The weapons categories that are usually considered the most worrisome are WMDs, i.e. weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, toxin and nuclear weapons.

  • Chemical weapons have been proscribed by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention 185 , but they are so easy to produce that it strains the imagination to envisage their just going away for good.
  • Biological weapons have so far largely been discounted as too unwieldy to be of much use to anybody, hence negligible. However, genetic engineering (a distinctly postmodern craft) may make them just wieldy enough to be usable, especially to postmodern warriors, whose mission may be to destroy and disrupt rather than to conquer anything in a functioning state 186 .
  • Nuclear weapons have become more difficult to produce, e.g. as a result of the tightening of the NPT regime that resulted from the revelations about Iraq 187 . Their purchase may, on the other hand, become easier as a reflection of ordinary supply and demand mechanisms. Hence, we may be looking at future risks of nuclear-armed terrorists and other sub-state actors 188 .
  • Whereas the much spoken-of threat of fairly long-range ballistic missiles in the hands of unpredictable Third World rulers 189 (i.e. people different from us, the good guys, who may safely be trusted with such weapons) is much exaggerated, they would certainly warrant serious consideration if they might be armed with such WMD warheads and fall into the hands of adversaries who refuse to wage war according to (our) rules. While you cannot win a war by means of ballistic missiles and/or WMDs, you can surely sour the other side's victory considerably by means of them.

    All of the above types of weaponry are distinctly modern or postmodern, which have made some observers characterize a postmodern wars such as those in the former Yugoslavia as 'medieval wars fought with modern weapons' 190 . However, another frequent phenomenon in postmodern wars is the use of modern or even premodern weaponry, above all various forms of small arms. What is disturbing about this is the fact that they are proliferating so widely and uncontrollably, hence are available in such quantities that the supply itself contributes to the aforementioned 'privatization of security' 191 . Some of these are so unsophisticated that they can easily be produced by many high school student. This is, for instance, the case of antipersonnel landmines 192 . According to the UN Secretary General, as many as 110 million anti-personnel landmines presently lie scattered around in a handful or so of countries (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, and others), inevitably exacting a heavy toll of civilian casualties (around 25,000 a year), demonstrating an inherently 'dirty' and indiscriminatory nature 193 .

    Peace Support Operations

    Recent years have seen not only a quantitative expansion of the UN's military tasks but also a qualitative one 194 : operations have become both more numerous, diverse than was previously the case, as well as generally more demanding. UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority, Cambodia), UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) and IFOR (Implementation force, delegated to NATO) 195 are thus unprecedented in the history of peace-keeping 196 . The new form of operations are usually lumped together under the heading of 'peace (support) operations' 197 —not all of which are new, to be sure. They have also become known at 'Operations Other Than War', OOTW 198 .

    Agenda(s) for Peace

    UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali outlined various OOTW in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, where he listed three sets of tasks 199 :

  • Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
  • Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
  • Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.
  • The Agenda for Peace also mentioned 'post-conflict peace-building', described as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'. In a longer-term perspective, the objective would be to forge cooperative relations, but in the short term it might involve such activities as

    ...disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

    In his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali highlighted the shift of emphasis in 'peace support operations' that had occurred since 1988: Whereas at that time, only one out of five peace-keeping operations had related to an intra-state conflict, thirteen of the 21 operations established since then had concerned such conflicts-albeit, in the case of ex-Yugoslavia, with some international ramifications 200 .

    Postmodern Peace Operations

    Such (postmodern) conflicts pose new challenges to the peace-keepers: the combatants are not so much regular soldiers as 'militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of command' (in fact an astounding number of combatants are children, vide supra); the battlefield is often vast (comprising large parts of the country in question) and without any clear fronlines; moreover, it is often filled with refugees and/or internally displaced persons; and state institutions have frequently broken down completely, exacerbating already severe humanitarian emergencies. The entire setting is thus distinctly postmodern in the 'postapocalyptic' sense. Finally, 'peace-keeping' is often a misnomer, since there is no genuine peace to keep, but only a temporary (and sometimes only partial) truce. Peacekeepers are thus at constant risk.

    The humanitarian emergencies also imply a need for protection to be afforded to humanitarian relief operations. While this problem is universally acknowledged, however, there is serious disagreement about the solution, e.g. about the advisability of 'humanitarian interventions' (in the narrow sense). Some hold that the very involvement of military forces hampers the provision of humanitarian aid 201 , whereas others see no alternative to military protection of supply lines. The latter may even advocate the establishment ot protected zones, i.e. 'safe havens', as happened (without much success, to be sure) in the former Yugoslavia 202 .

    While the above categorization refers to the political effects of the peace opertion, one might also distinguish between the military missions. The most common dichotomy is here between 'peace-keeping' and 'peace enforcement'. According to the US Army's Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations the principled distinction is threefold: consent, force, and impartiality. While peace-keeping presupposes consent, enforcement does not; hence the need for using force beyond mere self-defence in the latter, which is superfluous (as well as harmful) in the former. The very use of force damages impartiality in peace enforcement, whereas peace-keeping can and should remain impartial.


    Table 4 enumerates the various (military) forms of peace support operations. The order does not reflect prioritization. I have omitted such missions as are, by their very nature, civilian, even though they may on occasion be performed by armed forces: election monitoring, etc. Whereas some of these functions are 'traditional' in the sense of conforming to the peace-keeping criteria (consent, impartiality, no use of force except in self-defence), others are new in the sense of being non-consensual, of involving a taking of sides and actual combat.

    Most observers agree that 'mission creep' is dangerous, say when traditional peacekeeping forces are assigned to enforcement tasks. It tends to destroy their image of impartiality, thus preventing them from performing their original tasks. On the other hand, situations on the ground do develop, often beyond what could reasonably have been foreseen and planned in advance. In such circumstances, the only alternative to mission creep might be to withdraw the forces and dispatch new ones, with a different mandate and tailored for that mandate-something that is very time-consuming and may even exact a toll of lives, if UN forces have to be evacuated under hostile fire.

    Three task deserve special mentioning, namely disarmament, demining and the somewhat cryptic 'show of force'.

    A disarmament of the warring parties is of obvious importance for preventing fighting from flaring up again, once the peacekeepers depart 203 . It is, however, a gargantuan task, since we are here primarily dealing with small arms that are exceedingly difficult to control 204 . Indeed, in certain parts of the world (Southern Africa, for instance) AK-47s and other small arms have become a commonly accepted means of barter trade-just as American cigarettes were in the aftermath of WWII. In a setting where it may be virtually impossible to patrol all borders, it is next to impossible to prevent the flow of small arms. The only solution may be for the international community to control, as best they can, the main entry points (ports and airports) to prevent the inflow of weapons, and to buy as many as possible of those already in the country/region for destruction.

    The control of small arms is also hampered by attitudinal factors, i.e. by the pervasiveness of a 'gun culture' (reminiscent of the American one, only even worse). Some have aptly characterized this situation as a 'privatization of security' 205 : When guns are abundant, at least among thugs and gangs, and when the police and other domestic security institutions are unreliable, even peaceful and law-abiding citizens tend to resort to self-help, e.g. in the form of private security services or in personal firearms. This, of course, only exacerbates the problem, since the supply of arms increases, some of which inevitably end up in the wrong hands. A true Hobbesian homo homini lupus situation develops, from which it is hard to escape.

    Table 4: Peace Support Operations
    Supervision Monitoring compliance with arms control agreements
    Observer missions for confidence-building
    Observer missions for early warning
    Exchange of POWs, etc.
    Disengagement Forcible separation of belligerents
    Enforcement of exclusion zones (e.g. no fly-zones)
    Patrolling ceasefire lines or demilitarized zones
    Interpositioning of forces between belligerents
    Preventive deployment, with the consent of all or one side to the conflict
    Disarmament Disarming warring factions
    Custody of weapons
    Protection Protection of humanitarian assistance
    Establishment and defence of protected zones ('safe havens')
    Sanctions Interdiction of supplies by air, sea or land
    Deterrence 'Show of force to dissuade a potential aggressor'

    A precondition for peace is a return to normal working conditions, also in agriculture. This presupposes a removal of the tens of thousands (or even millions) of antipersonnel landmines that are typically scattered across the countryside (vide supra). Even though clearing mines is infinitely more demanding than laying them, it is absolutely indispensable.

    If the reader gets the impression that the 'show of force' (as it is euphemistically termed by the US Army 206 ) does not really belong on the list above, (s)he is absolutely right. It is really nothing but a repetition of the Cold War concepts deterrence and compellence 207 , in a new setting where they make even less sense. Not that bombing something or someone is never called for. It certainly may be warranted to bombard (or otherwise destroy) artillery positions and the like, but this is not showing but using force. Showing force means sending a signal, i.e. it is a means of communication ('body language'), but this tends to backfire for the reasons listed above under the slightly disrespectful heading of 'just bombing somebody'. In a certain sense, however, such signalling works, namely if it is a matter of impressing an audience back home (say, if a presidential election is pending) who may have the impression that you are a 'whimp'. But this is hardly a suitable guideline for peace support operations.


    Note *: For her valuable comments at various stages of writing this paper the author is grateful to his friend and colleague, Mrs. Ulla Holm. Readers should be grateful to her for persuading the author that parts of his paper were too boring to be included in the main text. For nevertheless retaining these parts, albeit relegated to the appendices (the reading of which is optional), the author alone is to blame, as he is for all the remaining errors. Back.

    Note 1: Good introductions are Featherston, Mike: 'In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An Introduction', Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 5, nos. 2-3 (June 1988), pp. 195-215; and Heller, Agnes & Ferenc Fehér: The Postmodern Political Condition (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988). Back.

    Note 2: Quoted from Kirk, G.S. & J.E. Raven: The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 196-197 (fragments 217 and 218). Back.

    Note 3: Nietzsche, Friedrich: 'Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben', part two of Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen (1873-76), in idem: Gesammelte Werke (München: Goldmann Verlag), vol. 2, p. 126. Back.

    Note 4: Heller & Fehér: op. cit. (note 1), pp. 1 and 3. Back.

    Note 5: Nietzsche, Friedrich: 'Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischem Sinne' (1873), in idem: op. cit. (note 3), p. 379. Back.

    Note 6: Rattansi, Ali: 'Just Framing: Ethnicities and Racism in a ''postmodern'' Framework', in Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman (eds.): Social Postmodernism. Beyond Identity Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 250-286; Doty, Rozanne Lynn: 'The Bounds of ''Race'' in International Relations', Millennium, vol. 22, no. 3 (Winter 1993), pp. 443-462. Back.

    Note 7: Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Philisophische Untersuchungen (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953). Back.

    Note 8: Leff, Gordon: Medieval Thought. St Augustine to Ockham (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1958), pp. 104-114; Copleston, Frederick: A History of Philosophy, vol. 2, 'Mediaeval Philosophy. Part I: Augustine to Bonaventure' (New York: Image Books, 1962), pp. 157-176. On one of the most radical nominalists, Ockham, see idem: op. cit., vol. 3 ('Late Mediaeval and Renaissance Philosophy. Part I: Ockham to the Speculative Mystics'), pp. 61-73. See also Abelard, Peter: 'On Universals', in John F. Wippel & Allan B. Wolter (eds.): Medieval Philosophy. From St Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 190-203. Back.

    Note 9: Copleston: op. cit. (note 8), vol. 1 (Greece and Rome, Part I), pp. 115-116. On the sceptics and cynics (i.e. the followers of Pyrrhos), see ibid.., Part II, pp. 182-189; or Sextus Empiricus: 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism', excerpted in Jason L. Saunders (ed.): Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 152-182. Back.

    Note 10: Inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche. See, for instance, his Jenseitz von Gut und Böse (1885) in idem: Gesammente Werke (München: Goldmann Verlag), vol. 8; and idem: Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887), ibid.., vol. 9. For a postmodern use of Nietzsche see Saurette, Paul: '''I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them'': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory', Millennium, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-28. For an attempted rebuttal of the charges against postmodernism see George, Jim: 'Realist ''Ethics'': International Relations and Post-modernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy Thematic', ibid.., vol. 24, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 195-223. Back.

    Note 11: In existentialism see, for instance, Sløk, Johannes: Eksistentialisme (Copenhagen: Berlingske Forlag, 1964); or Næss, Arne: Moderne Filosoffer. Filosofiens nyeste historie (Copenhagen: Vintens Forlag, 1970), pp. 145-218 (on Heidegger) and pp. 219-296 (on Sartre). Back.

    Note 12: Good examples are Mendlowitz, Saul H. & R.B.J. Walker (eds.): Towards a Just World Peace (London: Butterworths, 1987); Walker, R.B.J.: One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1988); Falk, Richard: On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1995); Griffin, David Ray & idem (eds.): Postmodern Politics for a Planet in Crisis. Policy, Process, and Presidential Vision (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). On the morality of the existentialists see, for instance, Sartre, Jean-Paul: L'existentialisme est une humanisme (Paris: Les Editions Nagel, 1946). Back.

    Note 13: Heller & Fehér: op. cit. (note 1), p. 9. Back.

    Note 14: See Tawney, R.H.: Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926, reprint Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973); Gellner, Ernest: Postmodermism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992). Back.

    Note 15: Bauman, Zygmunt: 'Is There a Postmodern Sociology?', Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 5, nos. 2-3 (june 1988), pp. 217-237; Kellner, Douglas: 'Postmodernism as Social Theory: Some Challenges and Problems', ibid.., pp. 239-269. Back.

    Note 16: George, Jim: Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Vasquez, John A.: 'The Post-positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall', in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.): International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 217-240. Back.

    Note 17: Walker, R.B.J.: Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Back.

    Note 18: Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan, Edited With an Introduction By C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968); Rousseau, Jean Jacques: Du Contrat Social (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966). On the implications of Rousseau's ideas see, e.g., Waltz, Kenneth N.: Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 165-186; or the chapter on 'Rousseau on War and Peace', in Hoffmann, Stanley: The State of War. Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 54-87. Back.

    Note 19: This is suppoorted by the historical analysis of Spruyt, Hendrik: The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Back.

    Note 20: See, for instance, for an advocacy of 'cosmopolitan democracy': Linklater, Andrew: 'Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 2, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 77-103; or Archibugi, Daniele & David Held (eds.): Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). Back.

    Note 21: The closest Hans Morgenthau came to a definition was: 'National security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions', in Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 562. In another connection, he added 'culture' to the list, emphasizing that the 'survival of a political unit in its identity' (i.e. 'security') constitutes 'the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis other units'. See 'The Problem of the National Interest' (1952), in idem: Politics in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 204-237 (quote from p. 219). A much better analysis is found in Wolfers, Arnold: 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', in idem: Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 147-165. Back.

    Note 22: Examples are Buzan, Barry: People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Brown, Neville: The Strategic Revolution. Thoughts for the Twenty-First Century (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Souchon, Lennart: Neue deutsche Sicherheitspolitik (Herford: Mittler Verlag, 1990); Ayoob, Mohammed: The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995). See also Møller, Bjørn: 'Security Concepts: New Challenges and Risks', in Antonio Marquina & Hans Günter Brauch (eds.): 'Confidence Building and Partnership in the Western Mediterranean. Tasks for Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Avoidance', AFES-PRESS Reports, no. 51 (Mosbach: AFES-PRESS, 1994), pp. 3-49; Ullman, Richard: 'Redefining Security', International Security, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-177; Nye, Joseph E. & Sean M. Lynn-Jones: 'International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field', International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27; Lynn-Jones, Sean M.: 'The Future of International Security Studies', in Desmond Ball & David Horner (eds.): Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Series 'Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence', vol. 89, (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1992), pp. 71-107. Back.

    Note 23: Milner, Helen: 'Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', World Politics, vol. 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496; Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Stein, Arthur A.: Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); idem & Robert A. Keohane: 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', in David A. Baldwin (ed.): Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 85-115; Møller, Bjørn: Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner and London: UCL Press, 1992); Nolan, Janne E. et al.: 'The Concept of Cooperative Security', in idem (ed.): Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 3-18. Back.

    Note 24: Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre et al.: Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993). For a critique see McSweeney, Bill: 'Security and Identity: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', Review of International Studies, vol. 22, no. 1 (1996), pp. 81-93. For an individual-centred approach see Booth, Ken: 'Human Wrongs and International Relations', International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 103-126. Back.

    Note 25: Dalby, Simon: 'Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse', Alternatives, vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 95-134; Græger, Nina: 'Review Essay: Environmental Security', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 109-116; Eckersley, Robyn: Environmentalism and Political Theory (London: UCL Press, 1992); Renner, Michael: 'National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions', Worldwatch Paper, no. 89 (Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1989); Brock, Lothar: 'Security Through Defending the Environment: An Illusion?', in Elise Boulding (ed.): New Agendas for Peace Research. Conflict and Security Reexamined (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 79-102; Mische, Patricia: 'Security Through Defending the Environment: Citizens Say Yes!', ibid.. pp. 103-120; and Oswald, Ursula: 'Ecodevelopment: What Security for the Third World', ibid.. pp. 121-126; Prins, Gwyn: 'Politics and the Environment', International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 4 (1990), pp. 711-730; idem: 'A New Focus for Security Studies', in Ball & Horner (eds.): op. cit. (note 22), pp. 178-222. Back.

    Note 26: For a mixed neorealist/poststructuralist analysis see Wæver, Ole: 'Security, the Speech Act. Analyzing the Politics of a Word', Working Papers, no. 19 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1989); and idem: 'Securitization and Desecuritization', ibid.., no. 5, 1993. See also Campbell, David: Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). Back.

    Note 27: Popper, Karl R.: The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959); idem: Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963). Back.

    Note 28: Lapid, Yosef & Friedrich Kratochwill: 'Revisiting the ''National'': Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism', in idem & idem (eds.): The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 105-126. Back.

    Note 29: A good example is Coker, Christopher: 'Post-Modernity and the End of the Cold War: Has War Been Disinvented?', Review of International Studies, vol. 18 (1992), pp. 189-195; idem: War and the 20th Century. The Impact of War on the Modern Consciousness (London: Brassey's, UK, 1994). Back.

    Note 30: See, for instance, Moskos, Charles C. & James Burk: 'The Postmodern Military', in James Burk (ed.): The Military in New Times. Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World (Boulder: Westview, 1994), pp. 141-162; Williams, Rocklyn: 'Non-Offensive Defence and South Africa: Considerations on a Post-modern Military, Mission Redefinition and Defensive Restructuring', NOD & Conversion, no. 36 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1996), pp. 28-53. Revised version forthcoming in Gavin Cawthra & Bjørn Møller: Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). Back.

    Note 31: Sarkesian, Sam C. & John Allen Williams (eds.): The U.S. Army in a New Security Era, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Sarkesian, Sam C. & John Mead Flanagin (eds.): U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994); Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams & Fred B. Bryant: Soldiers, Society, and National Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Snider, Don & Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (eds.): U.S. Civil-Military Relations. In Crisis or Transition? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995). On the even deeper crisis in former socialist countries see Danapoulos, Constantine P. & Daniel Zirker (eds.): Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Nichols, Thomas M.: The Sacred Cause. Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Davenport, Brian A.: 'Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Soviet State: ''Loose Coupling'' Uncoupled?', Armed Forces and Society, vol. 21, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 175-194; Kipp, Jacob: 'Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', Military Review, vol. 72, no. 12 (December 1992), pp. 27-35. Back.

    Note 32: Barnes, Rudolph C. Jr.: Military Legitimacy. Might and Right in the New Millennium (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Vogt, Wolfgang R.: 'The Crisis of Acceptance of the Security Policy With Military Means in the Federal Republic of Germany', in Hans Günter Brauch & Robert Kennedy (eds.): Alternative Conventional Defence Postures for the European Theater. Vol.1: The Military Balance and Domestic Constraint (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990), pp. 165-188; Shaw, Martin: Post-Military Society. Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century (London: Polity Press, 1992). Back.

    Note 33: Bellamy, Christopher: Knights in White Armour. The New Art of War and Peace (London: Hutchinson, 1996); Däniker, Gustav: 'The Guardian Soldier: On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces', Research Paper, no. 36 (New York & Geneva: UNIDIR, 1995, UNIDIR/95/28). Back.

    Note 34: Builder, Carl H.: The Icarus Syndrome. The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Booth, Ken: 'NOD at Sea', in Bjørn Møller & Håkan Wiberg (eds.): Non-Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 98-114. Back.

    Note 35: Luttwak, Edward N.: 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44. Back.

    Note 36: An example is Bahr, Hans-Eckehard (ed.): Von der Armee zur europäischen Friedenstruppe (München: Knaur, 1990). Back.

    Note 37: On US defence planning in the post-Cold War period see Blair, David: 'Criteria for Planning the Transition to Lower Defense Spending', in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (ed.): 'New Directions in U.S. Defense Policy', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 517 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, September 1991), pp. 146-156; Davis, Paul K. (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994); Pohling-Brown, Pamela & Barbara Starr: 'Aspin's Game Plan. Pentagon Ponders Roles and Missions', International Defense Review, vol. 26, no. 7 (July 1993), pp. 547-551; Zakheim, Dov S.: 'A Top-Down Plan for the Pentagon', Orbis, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 173-187. For a moderate critique see Kaufmann, William W.: Assessing the Base Force. How Much Is Too Much? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992); O'Hanlon, Michael: Defense Planning for the Late 1990s. Beyond the Desert Storm Framework (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Korb, Lawrence J.: 'Our Overstuffed Armed Forces', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 6 (November-December 1995), pp. 22-34. For a radical one see Klare, Michael: Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). Back.

    Note 38: An early example of such analysis is that of the Boston Study Group: The Price of Defense. A New Strategy for Military Spending (New York: Times, 1979). Back.

    Note 39: An excellent analysis of mobilization and demobilization is Betts, Richard K.: Military Readiness. Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). On implications for the arms industry, see Møller, Bjørn: 'Conversion: A Comprehensive Agenda', Working Papers, no. 19 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1990), in which the author argues in favour of a deliberately reversible conversion. Back.

    Note 40: Baudrillard. Jean: The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); criticized by Norris, Christopher: Uncritical Theory. Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992) pp. 11-31, especially p. 25 for the use of the term 'postmodern war'. For a comparable postmodern analysis see also Campbell, David: Politics Without Principle. Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1994); or Der Derian, James: Antidiplomacy. Spies, Terror, Speed and War (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 173-202. Back.

    Note 41: Baudrillard: op. cit. (note 40), p. 26. Back.

    Note 42: Brodie, Bernard (ed.): The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), p. 76. Back.

    Note 43: For an analysis of the nuclear/maritime competition along these lines, see Tunander, Ola: Cold Water Politics. The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front (London: Sage, 1989). For a similar analysis see Joxe, Alain: Le cycle de la dissuasion (1945-1990), Essai de stratégie critique (Paris: Éditions la Découverte/Fondation pour les Études de Défense Nationale, 1990); or Klein, Bradley S.: Strategic Studies and World Order. The Global Politics of Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); idem: 'After Strategy: The Search for a Post-Modern Politics of Peace', Alternatives, vol. 13, no. 3 (July 1988), pp. 293-318; Luke, Timothy W.: 'On Post-War: The Significance of Symbolic Action in War and Deterrence', ibid.., vol. 14, no. 3 (July 1989), pp. 343-362. A modern classic on the same theme is Jervis, Robert: The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). Back.

    Note 44: See, e.g. Kahn, Herman: On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); idem: Thinking the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962); cf. -: Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); idem: On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965). On Kahn as a person, see the chapter 'Dr. Strangelove' in Kaplan, Fred: The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 220-231. See also Schelling, Thomas: The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). On the application of game theory to more peaceful tasks, see Brams, Steven J. & D. Marc Kilgour: Game Theory and National Security (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Güth, Werner & Eric van Damme: 'Gorby-Games. A Game Theoretical Analysis of Disarmament Campaigns', in Rudolf Avenhaus, Hassane Karkar & Michel Rudnianski (eds.): Defense Decision Making. Analytical Support and Crisis Management (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1991), pp. 215-240; Rapoport, Anatol: Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974); idem (ed.): Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution (Dorcrecht: Reidel, 1970). Based on a single slip of Norman Schwartzkopf's tongue, Der Derian makes the point that US military planners saw the Gulf War as a game. See op. cit. (note 40), p. 183. Back.

    Note 45: Der Derian: op. cit. (note 40), pp. 174-175. Back.

    Note 46: For a very (perhaps too) sanguine view see, e.g., Heidenreich, John G.: 'The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died', Foreign Policy, no. 90 (Spring 1993), pp. 108-125. Back.

    Note 47: For an early, i.e. 'pre-postmodern' critique of nuclear deterrence see Green, Philip: Deadly Logic. The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966); or Rapoport, Anatoli: 'Critique of Strategic Thinking', in Naomi Rosenbaum (ed.): Readings on the International Political System (Englewoood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 201-227. For the theory of the nuclear winter see Ehrlich, Paul, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy & Walter Orr Roberts: The Cold and the Dark. The World After Nuclear War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984); for a critique thereof: Wohlstetter, Albert: 'Between an Unfree World and None', Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 5 (Summer 1985), pp. 962-994. Back.

    Note 48: See, for instance, Allison, Roy & Phil Williams (eds.): Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rodman, Peter W.: More Precious Than Peace. The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Hopf, Ted: Peripheral Visions. Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Mesbahi, Mohiaddin (ed.): Russia and the Third World in the Post-Soviet Era (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994). Back.

    Note 49: Van Creveld, Martin: The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 57-62; Thompson, William R.: 'The Future of Transitional Warfare', in Burk (ed.): op. cit. (note 30), pp. 63-92. Back.

    Note 50: Nietzsche, Friedrich: Menschliches Allzumenschliches. Ein Buch für freie Geister, vol. 1 (1876-77, reprint in Gesammente Werke (München: Goldmann Verlag), vol. 3, p. 309; ibid.., vol. 2, in ibid.., vol. 4, p. 270; idem: Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für alle und keinen (1883, reprint Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag 1969), p. 49. Back.

    Note 51: Fragments 214 and 215, in Kirk & Raven: op. cit. (note 2), pp. 194-195. Back.

    Note 52: For an overview of psychological approaches to peace research see Rapoport, Anatol: The Origins of Violence. Approaches to the Study of Conflict (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 3-96. See also, Berkowitz, Leonard: 'Biological Roots: Are Humans Inherently Violent?', in Betty Glad (ed.): Psychological Dimensions of War (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 24-40; Kull, Stephen: 'War and the Attraction to Destruction', ibid.., pp. 41-55; Kellett, Anthony: 'The Soldier in Battle: Motivational and Behavioral Aspects of the Combat Experience', ibid.., pp. 215-235; LeShan, Lawrence: The Psychology of War. Comprehending its Mystique and its Madness (Chicago: Noble Press, 1992); Johnson, Paula B., Andy Handler & Julia E. Criss: 'Beliefs Related to the Acceptance of War', in Knud S. Larsen (ed.): The Social Psychology of Conflict (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 225-240; Gould, Benina Berger: 'Gender Psychology and Issues of War and Peace', ibid.., pp. 241-249; Middleton, Hugh: 'Some Psychological Bases of the Institution of War', in Robert A. Hinde (ed.): The Institution of War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 30-46. For anthropological perspectives see Gellner, Ernst: 'An Anthropological View of War and Violence', ibid.., pp. 62-80; Leslie E. Sponsel & Thomas A Gregor (eds.): The Anthropology of Peace and Violence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), passim. For a philosophical treatment along the same lines see Gelven, Michael: War and Existence. A Philosophical Inquiry (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1994), pp. 186-209 & passim. Back.

    Note 53: Sollenberg, Margareta & Peter Wallensteen: 'Major Armed Conflicts', in SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 15-30. See also Wallensteen, Peter & Margareta Sollenberg: 'The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1989-95', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33, no. 3 (August 1996), pp. 353-370. Back.

    Note 54: For a historical account of collective security see Claude, Inis L.: Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 4th edition (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 21-40; Bennett, A. LeRoy: International Organizations. Principles and Issues. 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp. 8-14; Downs, George W.: 'Beyond the Debate on Collective Security', in idem (ed.): Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 1-13; Lipson, Charles: 'Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?', ibid.., pp. 105-131. Examples of the post-Cold War resurgence of the collective security debate are Kupchan, Charles A. & Clifford A. Kupchan: 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; idem & idem: 'The Promise of Collective Security', ibid.., vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.): Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Butfoy, Andrew: 'Themes Within the Collective Security Idea', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 490-510; Cusack, Thomas R. & Richard J. Stoll: 'Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 33-59; Downs (ed.): op. cit.. For a more sceptical view, see Joffe, Josef: 'Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends', Survival, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 36-50; Betts, Richard K.: 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', International Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Clark, Mark T.: 'The Trouble with Collective Security', Orbis, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 237-258. Back.

    Note 55: On humanitarian intervention see Rodley, Nigel (ed.): To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Olmstedt, Nick: 'Humanitarian Intervention?', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May 1995), pp. 96-102; Reed, Laura W. & Carl Kaysen (eds.): Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention. A Collection of Essays from a Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Commitee on International Security Studies, AASS, 1993); Lyons, Gene M. & Michael Mastanduno (eds.): Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); Roberts, Adam: 'Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights', International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 429-450; Weiss, Thomas G.: 'Triage. Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era', World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 59-68. Back.

    Note 56: On the various terms see Beaumont, Roger: 'Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions', in W.M.J. Olson (ed.): 'Small Wars', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 541 (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 20-35. On OOTW see Field Manual 100-20: Operations Other Than War (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1995); Taw, Jennifer Morrison & Bruce Hoffman: 'Operations Other Than War', in P.K. Davis (ed.): op. cit. (note 37), pp. 223-250. Back.

    Note 57: Tessler, Mark: A History of the Israeli-Palestinean Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Smith, Charles D.: Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Third Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Lockman, Zachary & Jopel Beinin (eds.): Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990); Hunter, F. Robert: The Palestinian Uprising. A War By Other Means (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Lesch, Ann Mosley & Mark Tessler (eds.): Israel, Egyps and the Palestinians. From Camp David to Intifada (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); McDowall, David: Palestine and Israel. The Uprising and Beyond (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989); Venter, J.: 'Hezbollah Defies Onslaught', Jane's International Defense Review, vol. 29, no. 6 (June 1996), pp. 81-86. Back.

    Note 58: Good analyses included the following: Brown, J.F.: Nationalism, Democracy and Security in the Balkans (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992); Ramet, Sabrina P.: Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd edition (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992); Akhavan, Payam & Robert Howse (eds.): Yugoslavia, the Former and Future. Reflections by Scholars from the Region (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution and The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1995); Mojzes, Paul: Yugoslav Inferno. Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum Press, 1994); Bianchini, Stefano & Paul Shoup (eds.): The Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balkans: How to Achieve Security? (Ravenna: Longo Editore Ravenna, 1995); Kipp, Jacob & Timothy Thomas: 'International Ramifications of Yugoslavia's Serial Wars: The Challenge of Ethno-National Conflicts for a Post-Cold War European Order', European Security, vol. 1, no. 4 (Winter 1992), pp. 146-192; Jacobsen, C.G.: 'Yugoslavia's Successor Wars Reconsidered', ibid.., vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 655-675, Zabkar, Anton: 'Analyses of the Conflicts in Former Yugoslavia', Studies and Reports. National Defence Academy Series, no. 2 (Vienna: National Defence Academy, 1994); Borden, Anthony & Richard Caplan: 'The Former Yugoslavia: the War and the Peace Process', SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 203-231, with the Dayton Peace Agreement appended on pp. 232-250. On the role of the military in particular see Gow, James: Legitimacy and the Military. The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992). Back.

    Note 59: Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan, Edited with an introduction by C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 186. On failed or collapsed states see Zartmann, William I. (ed.): Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Back.

    Note 60: The table is inspired by, but rather different from, that in Moskos & Burk: loc. cit. (note 30), p. 147. Back.

    Note 61: Parts of this chapter are based on the author's 'The Unification of Divided States and Defensive Restructuring: China-Taiwan in a Comparative Perspective', Working Papers, no. 9 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1996). Back.

    Note 62: See Nicholson, Michael: Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 63-103; or Lieshout, Robert H.: Between Anarchy and Hierarchy. A Theory of International Politics and Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 74-88; Denardo, James: The Amateur Strategist. Intuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Arms Race (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Back.

    Note 63: See, for instance, Beschorner, Natasha: 'Water and Instability in the Middle East', Adelphi Papers, no. 273 (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1992/93), pp. 8-26; Gleick, Peter H.: 'Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security', International Security, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; Lowi, Miriam R.: 'Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of West Bank Water', ibid.., pp. 113-138. Back.

    Note 64: On UN reform see Barnaby, Frank (ed.): Building a More Democratic United Nations (London: Franc Cass, 1991); Müller, Joachim W. (ed.): The Reform of the United Nations, vols. 1-2 (New York: Oceana Publications, 1992); Saksena, K.P.: Reforming the United Nations. The Challenge of Relevance (New Delhi and London: Sage, 1993); Archibugi, Daniele: 'The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitican Democracy: A Critical Review', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 30, no. 3 (August 1993), pp. 301-315. On CSCE-like processes for the Middle East see Schimmelfennig, Frank: 'The CSCE as a Model for the Third World? The Middle East and African Cases', in Michael R. Lucas (ed.): The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 319-334. See also Marks, John: 'A Helsinki-Type Process for the Middle East', in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.): The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 71-77; Zartmann, I. William: 'The Negotiation Process in the Middle East', ibid.., pp. 63-70, especially pp. 68-69. Similar proposals for the Mediterranean are to be found in Badini, Antonio: 'Efforts at Mediterranean Cooperation', in John W. Holmes (ed.): Maelstrom. The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean (Cambridge, MA: The World Peace Foundation, 1995), pp. 103-124; Aliboni, Roberto: 'Collective Political Co-Operation in the Mediterranean', in idem, George Joffé & Tim Niblock (eds.): Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 51-64; Marquina, Antonio & Hans Günter Brauch (eds.): 'Confidence Building and Partnership in the Western Mediterranean. Tasks for Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Avoidance', AFES-PRESS Report, no. 51 (Mosbach, FRG: AFES-PRESS, 1994). Back. .

    Note 65: For a good overview see Griffiths, Stephen Iwan: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Back.

    Note 66: See, for instance, Gellner, Ernst: Nations and Nationalism (London: Basil Blackwill, 1983); idem: 'Introduction', in Sukumar Periwal (ed.): Notions of Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 1-7; Hall, John A.: 'Nationalisms, Classified and Explained', ibid.., pp. 8-33; Armstrong, John: 'Towards a Theory of Nationalism: Consensus and Dissensus', ibid.., pp. 34-43; Stargardt, Nicholas: 'Origins of the Constructivist Theory of the Nation', ibid.., pp. 83-105; Smith, Anthony D.: 'Ethnie and Nation in the Modern World', Millennium, vol. 14, no. 2 (1985), pp. 127-142; idem: 'The Formation of National Identity', in Henry Harris (ed.): Identity. Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 129-153; Haas, Ernst B.: 'Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction', Millennium, vol. 22, no. 3 (1993), pp. 505-545; Mayall, James: 'Nationalism and the International Order', Millennium, vol. 14, no. 2 (1985), pp. 143-158; Phillips, Peter D. & Immanuel Wallerstein: 'National and World Identities and the Interstate System', ibid.., pp. 159-171; Pearton, Maurice: 'Notions in Nationalism', Nations and Nationalism, vol. 2, no. 1 (1996), pp. 1-15; Anderson, Benedict: Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991); Brass, Paul: Nations and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison (London: Sage, 1991); Kellas, James G.: The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1991); Wæver, Ole: 'Identities', in Judit Balázs & Håkan Wiberg (eds.): Peace Research for the 1990s (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993), pp. 135-150; idem & al.: op. cit. (note 24); Iivonen, Jyrki (ed.): The Future of the Nation State in Europe (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993); Posen, Barry R.: 'The Security Dilemma of Ethnic Conflict', Survival, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47. Back.

    Note 67: Kupchan, Charles: 'Introduction: Nationalism Resurgent', in idem (ed.): Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe. A Council of Foreign Relations Book (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 1-14, definition on p. 2. Back.

    Note 68: For a historical account, see Hobsbawn, E.J.: Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality. 2nd, revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); idem: The Age of Revolution 1789-1848 (New York: Mentor Books, 1962), pp. 163-177; idem: The Age of Capital 1848-1875 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1975), pp. 82-97; Seton-Watson, Hugh: Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (London: Methuen, 1977), pp. 89-192; Keating, Michael: State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics and the European State (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), pp. 25-120; Vossler, Otto: Die Revolution von 1848 in Deutschland (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974); Stadelman, Rudolph: Social and Political History of the German 1848 Revolution (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1970), pp. 119-142 & passim; Schulze, Hagen (ed.): Nation-Building in Central Europe (Leamington Spa, U.K.: Berg, 1987). Back.

    Note 69: See. e.g. Murphy, Alexander B.: 'Territorial Ideology and International Conflict: The Legacy of Prior Political Formations', in Nurit Kliot & Stanley Waterman (eds.): The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace (London: Belhaven Press, 1991), pp. 126-141; Lustick, Ian S.: Unsettled States, Disputed Lands. Britain and Ireland, France and Algerie, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Forsberg, Tuomas (ed.): Contested Territory. Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995); Sandler, Shmuel: The State of Israel, the Land of Israel. The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993). Back.

    Note 70: On the gradual delegitimation of colonialism and the accompanying emergence of the national self-determination norm, see Crawford, Neta: 'Decolonization as an International Norm; The Evolution of Practices, Arguments, and Beliefs', in Reed & Kaysen (eds.): op. cit. (note 55), pp. 37-62; Emerson Rupert: From Empire to Nation. The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 295-359. See also Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W.: 'Self-Determination', in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United Nations Legal Order, vols. 1-2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 349-389. Back.

    Note 71: On the Cyprus conflict see, for instance, McDonald, Robert: 'The Problem of Cyprus', Adelphi Papers, no. 234 (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1989); Rothman, Jay: 'Conflict Research and Resolution: Cyprus', in William I. Zartmann (ed.): 'Resolving International Conflicts: International Perspectives', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 518 (November 1991), pp. 95-109; Hampson, Fen Osler: Nurturing Peace. Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 27-52; Papadakis, Yiannis: 'Nationalist Imaginings of War in Cyprus', in Robert A. Hinde & Helen E. Watson (eds.): War: A Cruel Necessity? The Bases of Institutionalized Violence (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 37-53. On the UN involvement see Birgisson, Karl Th: 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus', in William J. Durch (ed.): The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 219-236. Back.

    Note 72: For an excellent 'post-structuralist reflective and discursive' analysis along these lines, see Holm, Ulla: 'The French Garden is no Longer What It Used to Be', in Knud-Erik Jørgensen (ed.): A Reflectivist Approach to European Union (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1996). Back.

    Note 73: On fascist nationalism see Linz, Juan B.: 'Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective', in Walter Laqueur (ed.): Fascism. A Reader's Guide (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 13-78; and Sternhell, Zeev: 'Fascist Ideology', ibid.., pp. 325-406. Back.

    Note 74: A (much more benign) philosophical version of 'Blut und Boden' is Herder, Johann Gottfried: 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit', in idem: Schriften, edited by Karl Otto Conrady (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1968), pp. 140-208; idem: Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1966), pp. 104-112. See also Wæver, Ole: 'With Herder and Habermas: Europeanization in the Light of German Concepts of State and Nation', Working Papers, no. 16/1990 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1990). See also Longerich, Peter (ed.): ''Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?'' Dokumente zur Frage der deutschen Einheit 1800-1990 (München: Piper, 1990); Weidenfeld, Werner (ed.): Die Identität der Deutschen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1983); idem (ed.): Nachdenken über Deutschland. Materialien zur politischen Kultur der Deutschen Frage (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985). Back.

    Note 75: Wittgenstein: op. cit. (note 7), p. 22. Back.

    Note 76: Anderson: op. cit. (note 66). Back. .

    Note 77: Kratochwil, Friedrich: 'Is the Ship of Culture at Sea or Returning?', in Lapid & idem (eds.): op. cit. (note 28), pp. 201-221; Dudney, Daniel: 'Ground Identity: Nature, Place, and Space in Nationalism', ibid.., pp. 129-145. Back.

    Note 78: Nietzsche, Friedrich: Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft (1885, in idem: Gesammente Werke (München: Goldman Verlag), vol. 8, p. 139. Back.

    Note 79: Derrida, Jaques: L'autre cap (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1991), p. 16. Back.

    Note 80: Neumann, Iver B.: 'Self and Other in International Relations', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 139-175. Back.

    Note 81: See fragments 203-205 in Kirk & Raven (eds.): op. cit. (note 2), pp. 189-190.'The path up and down is one and the same'; 'Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest'; 'And as the same thing there exists in us living and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and old; for these things having changed around are those, and those things having changed around are these'. The 'antinomies of pure reason' analyzed by Kant fall into the same category. See Kant, Immanuel: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787, reprint Stuttgart: Reclam, 1966), pp. 449-520. Back.

    Note 82: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), with a postscript by Georg Lukács (Frankfurt: Ullstein Verlag, 1970), pp. 113, 115. See also on the 'negation of the negation' in idem: Wissenschaft der Logik (1812, reprint Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 37-38. Back.

    Note 83: For an application of Hegelian principles to IR see Fukyama, Francis: The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Back.

    Note 84: Müllerson, Rein: International Law, Rights and Politics. Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS (London: Routledge, 1994). Back.

    Note 85: See interview with the leader of the secessionist 'government' Giancaro Pagliarini, in Der Spiegel, no. 38 (16 September, 1996), pp. 170-172. Back.

    Note 86: See, e.g. Halperin, Morton & David J. Scheffer: Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Brookings Books, 1992). Back.

    Note 87: Anderson, Stephanie: 'EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture', European Security, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 328-353. For an excellent, and very critical, analysis see also Woodward, Susan L.: Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Back.

    Note 88: Recent works on ethnicity include: Brass, Paul R.: Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 18-40 & passim; Kellas, James G.: The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 8-19 & passim; Lindholm, Helena: 'Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion', in idem (ed.): Ethnicity and Nationalism. Formation of Identity and Dynamics of Conflict in the 1990s (Göteborg: Nordnes, 1993), pp. 1-39; Gurr, Ted Robert & Barbara Harff: Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1994). Older works include Parsons, Talcott: 'SomeTheoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trends of Change in Ethnicity', in Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.): Ethnicity. Theory and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 53-83; Gordon, Milton M.: 'Toward a General Theory of Racial and Ethnic Group Relations', ibid.., pp. 84-110; Horowitz, Donald L.: 'Ethnic Identity', ibid.., pp. 111-140. Back.

    Note 89: Smith: loc. cit. 1995 (note 66), p. 133. Back.

    Note 90: ibid.., p. 135. Back.

    Note 91: Huntington, Samuel: 'The Clash of Civilizations' (Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993), here quoted from the slightly more 'academic' version in Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper & Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.): The International Systems After the Collapse of the East-West Order (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp. 7-27. Back.

    Note 92: See, e.g. the interview with Netanyahu's political advisor, Dore Gold to Yediot, 4 June 1996, supplied by the Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem. Back.

    Note 93: Ganguly, Sumit: The Origins of War in South Asia. Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Malik, Iftikhar H.: 'The Continuing Conflict in Kashmir: Regional Detente in Jeopardy', in Peter Janke (ed.): Ethnic and Religious Conflicts. Europe and Asia (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 203-228. On India's problems with managing diversity see Kohli, Atul: Democracy and Discontent. India's Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Chatterjee, Partha: 'History and the Nationalization of Hinduism', in Vashuda Dalmia & Heinrich von Stietencron (eds.): Representing Hinduism. The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity (New Delhi: Sage, 1995), pp. 103-128; Rupesinghe, Kumar & Khawar Mumtaz (eds.): Internal Conflicts in South Asia (London: Sage, 1996). On Pakistan see Hyman, Anthony: 'Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State', in Janke (ed.): op. cit., pp. 169-202. Back.

    Note 94: Ruggie, John Gerard: 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-174; Coakley, John: 'Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict', in idem (ed.): The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 1-22. Back.

    Note 95: Väyrynen, Raimo: 'Territory, Nation State and Nationalism', in Iivonen (ed.): op. cit. (note 66), pp. 159-179. See also Walker: op. cit. (note 17); Forsberg, Tuomas: 'Theories on Territorial Disputes', in idem (ed.): op. cit. (note 69), pp. 23-41; Paasi, Anssi: 'Constructing Territories, Boundaries and Regional Identities', ibid.., pp. 42-61; Chisholm, Michael & David M. Smith (eds.): Shared Space, Divided Space. Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Jacobsen, John R. (ed.): The Territorial Rights of People. Essays from the Baltic Issues Forum (Lewiston: Edwin Mellem Press, 1990); Mellor, Roy E.H.: Nation, State, and Territory (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 70-73; Rumley, Dennis & Julian V. Minghi (eds.): The Geography of Border Landscapes (London: Routledge, 1991); Lustick: op. cit. (note 69). Back.

    Note 96: See the maps of the West Bank and of Bosnia in SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 170 and 223. Back.

    Note 97: Brown, Michael E.: 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in idem (ed.): The International Dimension of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 571-601. pp. 571-601. Back.

    Note 98: This is a very under-researched topic. See, however, Iklé, Fred Charles: Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); and Cimbala, Stephen J. & Keith A. Dunn (eds.): Conflict Termination and Military Strategy. Coercion, Persuasion, and War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). Back.

    Note 99: For a good analysis of the emotional strains and attractions of the life of warriors see Hansen, J.T., A. Susan Owen & Michael Patrick Madden: Parallels. The Soldiers' Knowledge and the Oral History of Contemporary Warfare (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992). Back.

    Note 100: Gelven: op. cit. (note 52), p. 50. Back.

    Note 101: Posen, Barry R.: 'Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power', International Security, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124. Back.

    Note 102: See, for instance, Mojzes: op. cit. (note 58), pp. 45-63. Back.

    Note 103: On the rish thereof during the Cold War see Nincic, Miroslav: How War Might Spread to Europe (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985); Fuuyama, Francis: 'Escalation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf', in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds.: Hawks, Doves and Owls. An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War, (New York: Norton, 1985), pp. 54-79; Lodgaaard, Sverre: 'Threats to European Security: The Main Elements', in idem & Karl Birnbaum (eds.): Overcoming Threats to Europe: A New Deal for Confidence and Security, (Oxford 1987: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1987), pp. 3-36. Back.

    Note 104: The terms are from Singer, Max & Aaron Wildawsky: The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993). Back.

    Note 105: See, for instance, Lellouche, Pierre: Le nouveau monde. De l'ordre de Yalta au désorde des nations (Paris: Grasset, 1992), pp. 261-305. Back.

    Note 106: On the scope of this, often disregarded, problem see Deng, Francis M.: Protecting the Dispossessed. A Challenge for the International Community (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993). Back.

    Note 107: Morgenthau, Hans J.: Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. Third Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 33; idem: 'The Escape from Power', in idem: Politics in the Twentieth Century, Abridged Edition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971), pp. 3-9; or idem: 'Love and Power', ibid.., pp. 189-196. On Niebuhr, see Smith, Michael Joseph: Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), pp. 99-133. See also Griffiths, Martin: Realism, Idealism and International Politics. A Reinterpretation (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 35-76. Back.

    Note 108: See, for instance, Bonanate, Luigi: Ethics and International Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Keal, Paul (ed.): Ethics and Foreign Policy (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1992); Nardin, Terry & David R. Mapel (eds.): Traditions in International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); McElroy, Robert W.: Morality and American Foreign Policy. The Role of Ethics in International Affairs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Brilmayer, Lea: American Hegemony. Political Morality in a One-Superpower World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Back.

    Note 109: Goldstein, Judith & Robert O. Keohane (eds.): Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutional, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Back.

    Note 110: Rotberg, Robert I. & Thomas G. Weiss (eds.): From Massacres to Genocide. The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution and The World Peace Foundation, 1996). Back.

    Note 111: For a comparison on communitarian and cosmopolitan traditions see Brown, Chris: International Relations Theory. New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). Back.

    Note 112: Weiss, Thomas G.: 'The United Nations and Civil Wars at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century', in idem (ed.): The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 193-216, quote from p. 193. Back.

    Note 113: On Cambodia see Findlay, Trevor: Cambodia. The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC. SIPRI Research Report, no. 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Heininger, Janet E.: Peacekeeping in Transition. The United Nations in Cambodia (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994); Ratner, Steven R.: 'The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution of Internal Conflicts?', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.): Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 241-273; Doyle, Michael & Ayaka Suzuki: 'Transitional Authority in Cambodia', in Weiss (ed.): op. cit. 1995 (note 112), pp. 127-150. On Mozambique see Hume, Cameron: Ending Mozambique's War. The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1994). On Afghanistan see Mendelson, Sarah E.: 'Internal Battles and External Wars. Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan', World Politics, vol. 45, no. 3 (April 1993), pp. 327-360; Rubin, Barnett R.: The Search for Peace in Afghanistan. From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Back.

    Note 114: There may be a slight opening on this issue. In a panel discussion 25 September 1996, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Ralston thus hinted that a follow-on force might remain in Bosnia after IFOR's withdrawal in December (Press communique, US Inf. Service). Back.

    Note 115: Brzoska, Michael & Frederic S. Pearson: Arms and Warfare. Escalation, De-escalation and Negotiation (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994). Back.

    Note 116: Smith, James D.D.: Stopping Wars. Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). Back.

    Note 117: Princen, Thomas: Intermediaries in International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Druckman, Daniel & Christopher Mitchell (eds.): 'Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 542 (November 1995); Sisk, Timothy D.: Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996). On the technique and tactics of negotiatiobns see Cohen, Raymond: Negotiating Across Cultures. Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: US Institute for Peace, 1991); Johnson, Ralph A.: Negotiation Basics. Concepts, Skills, and Exercises (London: Sage, 1992); Hall, Lavinia (ed.): Negotiation. Strategies for Mutual Gain (London: Sage, 1993). Back.

    Note 118: The literature on conflict resolution is vast. Good recent examples include Sandole, Dennis J.D. & Hugo van der Merwe (eds.): Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Vasquez, John, James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe & Linda Stamato (eds.): Beyond Confrontation. Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995); James, David A. (ed.): Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution (New Brunswick: Centre for Conflict Studies, 1994); Zartman, I. William (ed.): Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Kriesberg, Louis: International Conflict Resolution. The US-USSR and Middle East Cases (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1992); Berkovitch, Jacob (ed.): Resolving International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Wallensteen, Peter: Från krig till fred. Om konfliktlösning i det globala systemet (Stockholm: Almquist och Wicksell, 1994); idem & Karin Axell: 'Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 31, no. 3 (August 1994), pp. 333-350; Last, David M.: 'Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques', Armed Forces and Society, vol. 22, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 187-210; Kaufmann, Chaim: 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', International Security, vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; Sisk, Timothy D.: Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996); Lund, Michael S.: Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1996). Back.

    Note 119: A similar commitment was the main point in the Arias Plan for Central America, which proved succesful. See Moreno, Dario: The Struggle for Peace in Central America (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994); and Child, Jack: The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1991. Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1992). Back.

    Note 120: On the security dilemma see Herz, John M.: Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), passim; idem: 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 3, no. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180; Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-93; idem: 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Collins, Alan: 'The Security Dilemma', in J.M. Davis (ed.): Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 181-195. On reciprocity see, e.g., Grieco, Joseph M.: 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', in Charles W. Kegley (ed.): Controversies in International Relations: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 151-171. Back.

    Note 121: Jervis, Robert: 'Security Regimes', International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378. Back.

    Note 122: Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). See also Väyrynen, Raimo (ed.): Policies for Common Security (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985); Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1986). Back.

    Note 123: Nolan, Janne E. et al.: 'The Concept of Cooperative Security', in idem (ed.): Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 3-18. Back.

    Note 124: On the concept of security community, see Deutsch, Karl W. et al.: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 3-9. Back.

    Note 125: On the various theories on integration see Haas, Ernst B.: International Political Communities (New York: Anchor Books, 1966); idem: 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', in Richard Falk & Saul Mendlowitz (eds.): Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1973), pp. 455-468; and Hansen, Roger: 'Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts', in Michael Hodges (ed.): European Integration. Selected Readings (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 184-199; Kahler, Miles: International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Burgess, Michael: Federalism and European Union. Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987 (London: Routledge, 1989). Some of the most important texts are reprinted in Nelsen, Brent F. & Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.): The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994). Back.

    Note 126: On subsidiarity see Jachtenfuchs, Markus: 'Die EG nach Maastricht. Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip und die Zukunft der Integration', Europa-Archiv, vol. 47, no. 10 (25 May 1992), pp. 279-287; Newcombe, Hanna: 'Subsidiarity', in idem (ed.): Hopes and Fears. The Human Future (Toronto: Science for Peace/ Samuel Stevens, 1992), pp. 92-96; Wilke, Marc & Helen Wallace: 'Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-sharing in the European Community', RIIA Discussion Papers, no. 27 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990). Back.

    Note 127: For a comparative study see Ok, Tae Hwan: 'A Case Study of Confederations', The Korean Journal of National Unification, Vol. 3 (Seoul: Research Institute for National Unification, 1994), pp. 275-292. Back.

    Note 128: See Jeffrey, Charlie & Roland Sturm: Federalism, Unification and European Integration (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Borchmann, Michael 1991: 'Dobbelter Föderalismus in Europa. Die Forderungen der deutschen Länder zur Politischen Union', Europa-Archiv, vol. 46, no. 11 (10.06.91), pp. 340-348. For an analysis of the application of the federal principle to World Government, see Glossop, Ronald J.: World Federation? A Critical Analysis of Federal World Government (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1993). Back.

    Note 129: McRae, K. (ed.): Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1974); Taylor, Paul: International Organization in the Modern World. The Regional and the Global Process (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), pp. 80-94. On the Afrikaaner interest in consociation as a means of preserving privileges see Ottaway, Marina: South Africa. The Struggle for a New Order (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 90-99; Humphries, Richard, Thabo Rapoo & Steven Friedman: 'The Shape of the Country. Negotiating Regional Government', in Steven Friedman & Doreen Atkinson (eds.): South African Review 7: The Small Miracle. South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994), pp. 148-181. Back.

    Note 130: See, e.g. Neumann, Leo D.: 'World Government', in Joseph S. Nye Jr., Graham T. Allison & Albert Carnesale (eds.): Fateful Visions. Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 197-214; Suganami, Hidemi: The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Back.

    Note 131: On global governance see Commission on Global Governance: Our Global Neighbourhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Camilleri, J.A. & Jim Falk: The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (London: Edward Elgar, 1992); Archibugi, Daniele & David Held (eds.): Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Simai, Mihaly: The Future of Global Governance (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); Falk, Richard: On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1995); Gurtov, Mel: Global Politics in the Human Interest, second edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); Rochester, J. Martin: Waiting for the Millennium. The United Nations and the Future of World Order (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Back.

    Note 132: For a critique see Claude, Inis L. Jr.: Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 255-271. Back.

    Note 133: Wilde, Jaap de: '(Neo)Medieval (Dis)Integration in Europe. Lessons from the Thirteenth Century', Working Papers, no. 22/1994 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994). The theoretical background is, above all, Ruggie, John Gerard: 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.): Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 131-157. Back.

    Note 134: Watson: op. cit. (note 53), p. 15. For the term 'neo-Sumerianism' see Wæver, Ole: 'Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security', forthcoming in Rick Fawn, Jeremy Larkins & Robert Newmann (eds.): International Society After the Cold War (London: Macmillan, 1996). The Sumerian system is described in Watson: op. cit., pp. 24-32. This concept of hegemony is related to, but slightly different from, the more economic one of 'hegemonic stability' theory, such as in Keohane, Robert O.: After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); or Gilpin, Robert: The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 72-80, 85-92. Back.

    Note 135: For a relevant critique of the IR theory's closure to unorthodox solutions, captured by the term 'Balcanization' (with distinctly pejorative connotations) see Der Derian: op. cit. (note 40), pp. 146-159. On territories beyond national sovereignty ('sui generis territorial entities'), according to international law see Shaw, Malcolm N.: International Law. Third Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1991), pp. 156-166. One example is Antarctica. See Joyner, Christopher C. : 'The Antarctic State Treaty. 1959 to the Present', in Richard Dean Burns (ed. ): Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), vol. II, pp. 817-825; 'Antarctic Treaty (1959)', ibid.. , vol. III, pp. 1339-1341. Back.

    Note 136: Cloughley, Brian: 'No Need for War in South China Sea', International Defense Review, vol. 28, no. 6 (June 1995), pp. 22-26; Leifer, Michael: 'Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection', Survival, vol. 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-59; Salameh, Mamdouh G.: 'China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict', ibid.., no. 4 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 133-146; Valencia, Mark J.: 'China and the South China Sea Disputes', Adelphi Paper, no. 298 (London: IISS, Oxford University Press, 1995). Beaver, Paul: 'Spratly Tensions Flare Again', Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 23, no. 8 (25 February 1995), p. 15; Gallagher, Michael G.: 'China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea', International Security, vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194. Back.

    Note 137: The most comprehensive account of non-offensive defence is Møller, Bjørn: Dictionary of Alternative Defense (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). See also idem: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (London: Brassey's, 1991); and idem: op. cit. 1992 (note 23). Back.

    Note 138: For an analysis thereof see Møller: loc. cit. 1996 (note 61); and idem: 'Common Security and Non-Offensive Defence: Are They Relevant for the Korean Peninsula', in Bypong-Moo Hwang & Yong-Sup Han (eds.): Korean Security Policies Toward Peace and Unification, KAIS International Conference Series, no. 4 (Seoul: Korean Association of International Studies, 1996), pp. 241-291. Back.

    Note 139: On arms trade regulations in general, see e.g. Anthony, Ian (ed.): Arms Export Regulations (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1991); Taylor, Trevor & Ryukichi Imai: The Defence Trade. Demand, Supply and Control (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/IIPS Institute for International Policy Studies, 1994); Hartung, William D.: 'Curbing the Arms Trade: From Rhetoric to Restraint', World Policy Journal, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 219-247; Saferworld: Proliferation and Export Controls. An Analysis of Sensitive Technologies and Countries of Concern (Chertsey Surrey: Deltac Limited, 1996); Boutwell, Jeffrey, Michael T. Klare & Laura W. Reed (eds.): Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Harkavy, Robert E. & Stephanie G. Neuman (eds.): The Arms Trade: Problems and Prospects in the Post-Cold War World, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 535 (London: Sage, 1994). Back.

    Note 140: Gellner: op. cit. (note 14), pp. 91-92. Back.

    Note 141: Examples of works on the long lines in military history include Jones, Archer: The Art of War in the Western World (London: Harrap, 1988); Creveld, Martin Van: Technology and War from 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1989); Dupuy, Trevor N.: The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (London: Jane's, 1980); Ropp, Theodore: War in the Modern World, Second, revised edition (New York: Collier Books, 1962); Howard, Michael: War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); McNeill, William H.: The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Johansson, Alf W.: Europas Krig. Militärt tänkande, strategi och politik från Napoleontiden till andra världskrigets slut (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1988); Kaiser, David: Politics and War. European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1990); Addington, Larry H.: The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Kolko, Gabriel: (New York: New Press, 1994); Paret, Peter: Understanding War. Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Modern Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); and a reader: Chaliand, Gerard (ed.): The Art of War in World History. From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1994). Back.

    Note 142: Foerster, Roland G. (ed.): Die Wehrpflicht. Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag/Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1994); Klein, Paul (ed.): Wehrpflicht und Wehrpflichtige heute, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1991); Giller, Joachim: Demokratie und Wehrpflicht (Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 1992); Boëne, Bernard & Michel Louis Martin (eds.): Conscription et Armée de Métier (Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1991). Back.

    Note 143: Fuhrer, H. R.: 'Austria and Switzerland: the Defense Systems of Two Minor Powers', in L.H. Gann (ed.): The Defense of Western Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 95-125; Cramer, Benedict: 'Dissuassion infra-nucléaire. L'armée de milice suisse: mythes et realités stratégiques', Cahiers d'Études Stratégiques, no. 4 (Paris: CIRPES, 1984); Ries, Thomas: Cold Will. The Defence of Finland (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989); Phillips, Brian: 'The Institution of Conscription: the Case of Finland', in Robert A. Hinde (ed.): The Institution of War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 229-243; Lukic, Reneo: 'La dissuassion populaire yougoslave', Cahiers d'Études Stratégiques, no. 5, 1984; Roberts, Adam: Nations in Arms. The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 124-217; Bebler, Anton A.: 'The Yugoslav People's Army and the Fragmentation of a Nation', Military Review, vol. 73, no. 8 (August 1993), pp. 38-51; Gow, James: Legitimacy and the Military. The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992); Remington, Robin Alison: 'The Yugoslav Army: Trauma and Transition', in Constantine P. Danapoulos & Daniel Zirker (eds.): Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 153-173; Isakovic, Zlatko & Constantine P. Danopoulos: 'In Search of Identity: Civil-Military Relations and Nationhood in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)', ibid.., pp. 175-194; Beblerm Anton: 'Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia', ibid.., pp. 195-211; Zunec, Ozren: 'Dermocracy in the ''Fog of War'': Civil-Military Relations in Croatia', ibid.., pp. 213-230; Kyriakou, Dimitrios: 'Civil Society and Civil War in Bosnia', ibid.., pp. 233-255. Back.

    Note 144: For a critique see Booth, Ken: 'Strategy and Conscription', in John Baylis (ed.): Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 154-190. Back.

    Note 145: An example is the (West) German notion of 'Staatsbürger in Uniform'. See, for instance, Borkenhagen, Franz H.U. (ed.): Bundeswehrdemokratie in Oliv. Streiträfte im Wandel (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1986); Steinweg, Reiner (ed.): Unsere Bundswehr? Zum 25-jährigen Bestehen einer umstrittenen Institution (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986); Abenheim, Donald: 'The Citizen in Uniform: Reform and Its Critics in the Bundeswehr', in Stephen F. Szabo (ed.): The Bundes-wehr and Western Security (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 31-51. Back.

    Note 146: Botha, Chris: 'Soldiers of Fortune or Whores of War?: The Legal Position of Mercenaries with Specific Reference to South Africa', Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 15, no. 2 (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 1993), pp. 75-91. On privatization see Cock, Jacklyn: 'The Cultural and Social Challenge of Demilitarization', NOD & Conversion, no. 36 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1996), pp. 2-27. Revised version forthcoming in Gavin Cawthra & Bjørn Møller: Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). Back.

    Note 147: One of the best analyses is that of Hart, Basil Liddell: Strategy. The Indirect Approach, second revised, edition (1967, reprint New York: Signet Books, 1974), pp. 110-119. Contemporary analyses include those of Von Valentini and De Corvay, excerpted in Laqueur, Walter (ed.): The Guerilla Reader. A Historical Anthology, (London: Wildwood House, 1978), pp. 25-29 and 62-65. Jomini analyzed the phenomenon as well, e.g. in his 'Précis de l'Art de Guerre', ibid.., pp. 42-44; as did Carl von Clausewitz in the chapter on 'people's war' (Book 6) in Vom Kriege. Ungekürzter Text nach der Erstauflage (1832-1834), (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein Materialien, 1980), pp. 521-528. See also Hahlweg, Werner: 'Clausewitz and Guerilla Warfare', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 9, no. 2-3 (1986), pp. 127-133. A modern analysis is Gates, David: The Spanish Ulcer. A History of the Peninsular War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986). Back.

    Note 148: Posen, Barry R.: 'Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power', International Security, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124. Back.

    Note 149: Krippendorff, Ekkehardt: Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984); Giddens, Anthony: The Nation-State and Violence (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995); Shapiro, Michael J.: 'Warring Bodies and Bodies Politic: Tribal Warriors versus State Soldiers', in idem & Hayward R. Alker (eds.): Challenging Boundaries. Global Flows, Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 455-480. See also Porter, Bruce: War and the Rise of the State (New York: The Free Press, 1994); Reyna, S.P.: 'A Mode of Domination Approach to Organized Violence', in idem & R.E. Downs (eds.): Studying War. Anthropological Perspectives. War and Society, vol. 2 (Longhorn: Pennsylvania: Gordon & Breach,1994), pp. 29-65. Back.

    Note 150: On this uncanny subject see Goodwin-Hill, Guy & Ilene Cohn: Child Soldiers. The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Back.

    Note 151: Howard: op. cit. (note 1), pp. 20-37. Back.

    Note 152: Webster, Charles & Noble Frankland: The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1933-1945, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961); Seward, Dudley: Victory Denied. The Rise of Air Power and the Defeat of Germany 1929-45, (London: Buchan & Enright, 1985). See also the enormous material gathered in Craven, Wesley Frank & James Lea Cate (eds.): The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1953), especially Fagg, John E.: 'The Climax of Strategic Operations', in Vol. 3 (Europe: Argument to V-E Day. January 1944 to May 1945), pp. 715-755; and Cate, James Lea & James C. Olson: 'Urban Area Attack', in Vol. 5 (The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki June 1944 to August 1945), pp. 608-645; and Cate, James Lea & Wesley Frank Craven: 'Victory', ibid.., pp. 703-758. Back.

    Note 153: Ball, Desmond: 'The Development of SIOP, 1960-1983', in idem & Jeffrey Richelson (eds.): Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 57-83; Richelson, Jeffrey: 'Population Targeting and U.S. Strategic Targeting', ibid.., pp. 234-249; Cattell, David T. & George H. Quester: 'Ethnic Targeting: Some Bad Ideas', ibid.., pp. 267-284; Pringle, Peter & William Arkin: SIOP. Nuclear War From the Inside (London: Sphere Books, 1983). Back.

    Note 154: Remarque, Erich Maria: Im Westen nichts Neues (1929, reprint Frankfurt: Ullstein Bücher, 1968), pp. 92 and 99. Back.

    Note 155: Clausewitz: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 34 and 677 (Part I.I.I, and Part III.8.6). Back.

    Note 156: A survey of these theories is provided by Mansfield, Edward D.: Power, Trade and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). On complex interdependence see Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye: Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Wilde, Jaap de: Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex Interdependence (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991); Tromp, Hylke: 'Interdependence and Security: the Dilemma of the Peace Research Agenda', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 19, no. 2 (1988), pp. 151-158; Haas, Ernst B.: 'War, Interdependence and Functionalism', in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.): The Quest for Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures and States (London: Sage, 1987), pp. 108-127; Barbieri, Katherine: 'Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 29-49; Copeland, Dale C.: 'Economic Interdependence and War. A Theory of Trade Expectations', International Security, vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41; Gupta, Rakesh: 'Interdependence and Security Among States in the 1990s', Strategic Analysis, vol. 18, no. 1 (April 1995), pp. 91-110. Back.

    Note 157: Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also the debate in Brown, Michael E., Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.): Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996). Back.

    Note 158: Singer & Wildawsky: op. cit. On the Middle East see Ray, James Lee: 'The Future of International War: Global Trends and Middle Eastern Implications', in David Garnham & Mark Tessler (eds.): Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 3-33. Back.

    Note 159: Mueller, John: Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York 1989: Basic Books). Back.

    Note 160: Dupuy: op. cit. (note 1), pp. 309-315. Back.

    Note 161: Douhet, Giulio: The Command of the Air (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942); cf. Warner, Edward: 'Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare', in Edward Mead Earle (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (1942, reprint New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 485-503; MacIsaac, David: 'Voices From the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists', in Peter Paret (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 624-647; cf. on 'the heritage of Douhet' in the nuclear age: Brodie, Bernard: Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 71-106. On the US nuclear strategy in the early post-war years see Rosenberg, David Allen: '''A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours''. Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War With the Soviet Union, 1954-1955', International Security, Vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 3-38; and idem: 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960', ibid.., vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71. Back.

    Note 162: See, for instance, the many case studies in Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.): The Internationalization of Communal Strife (London: Routledge, 1992); or Siverson, Randolph & Harvey Starr: The Diffusion of War. A Study of Opportunity and Willingness (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). Back.

    Note 163: For a postmodernist analysis thereof see Derian, James Der: 'The Terrorist Discourse: Signs, States, and Systems of Global Political Violence', in Michael Klare, & Daniel C. Thomas (eds.): World Security. Trends and Challenges at Century's End (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 237-265. See also Gilbert, Paul: Terrorism, Security and Nationality. An Introductory Study in Applied Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1994); Laqueur, Walter: 'Postmodern Terrorism', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75-no. 5 (September-October 1996), pp. 24-36. Back.

    Note 164: Cohen, Eliot A.: 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54; Keaney, Thomas A. & Eliot A. Cohen: Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995); Allard, C. Kenneth: 'The Future of Command and Control: Toward a Paradigm of Information Warfare', in L. Benjamin Ederington & Michael J. Mazarr (eds.): Turning Point. The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 161-192; McKitrick, Jeffrey et al.: 'The Revolution in Military Affairs', in Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.): Battlefield of the Future. 21st Century Warfare Issues. Air War College Studies in National Security, No. 3 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1995), pp. 65-97. Works supporting this reading of the war include Friedman, Norman: Desert Victory. The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Scales, Robert S. Jr.: Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1994); Aspin, Les & William Dickinson: Defense for a New Era. Lessons of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's US, 1992). More critical analyses include Record, Jeffrey: Hollow Victory. A Contrary View of the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1993); and Mueller, John: 'The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War', Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 77-117. Back.

    Note 165: Stein, George: 'Information War-Cyberwar-Netwar', in Schneider & Grinter (eds.): op. cit. (note 24), pp. 153-179. The ideas are based on Toffler, Alvin & Heidi Toffler: War and Antiwar: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993). See also the chapter on 'Cyberwar, Videogames, and the Gulf War Syndrome', in Der Derian, James: Antidiplomacy. Spies, Terror, Speed and War (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 173-202. Back.

    Note 166: For several examples thereof, see Gat, Azar: The Origins of Military Thought. From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 56-135. Back.

    Note 167: Jomini, Antoine-Henri de: Traite des grandes operations militaires, 2nd edition (Paris: Magimel. Librairie pour l'art militaire, 1811), vol. 4, pp. 275-286. On the subsequent evolution see Schneider, Barry R.: 'Principle of War for the Battlefield of the Future', in idem & Grintner (eds.): op. cit. (note 24), pp. 1-42; or Sude, Gertmann: 'Principles of War', in Trevor N. Dupuy (ed.): International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, vol. 1-6 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1993), vol. 5, pp. 2183-2185. Back.

    Note 168: Clausewitz: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 77-79 (Part I.I.17). Back.

    Note 169: Clausewitz: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 84 (Book II.1); Liddell Hart: op. cit. (note 7), p. 321; Beaufre, André: Introduction a la Strategie (Paris: Librairie Armand Collin, 1963), p. 16. Back.

    Note 170: Gibson, James William: The Perfect War. The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York: Vintage, 1988). Back.

    Note 171: Lawrence, Thomas Edward: The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935), pp. 192-193. See also Hart, Basil Liddell: T.E. Lawrence-in Arabia and After (London: Faber, 1934). Back.

    Note 172: Hart: op. cit. (note 7), passim. For a comparable analysis of war see Luttwak, Edward N.: Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). Back.

    Note 173: Clausewitz: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 18-21 (Part I.I.I). Back.

    Note 174: On the ethical foundations of just war theory see, e.g., Walzer, Michael: Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977); Johnson, James Turner: Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. A Moral and Political Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); idem: The Quest for Peace. Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).Elshtain, Jean Bethke (ed.): Just War Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Nardin, Terry (ed.): The Ethics of War and Peace. Religious and Secular Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); idem & David R. Mapel (eds.): Traditions in International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Smock, David R. (ed.): Religious Perspectives on War. Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force After the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992). On the laws of war see Best, Geoffrey: Humanity in Warfare. The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts (London: Methuen, 1980); De Lupis, Ingrid Detter: The Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Green, L.C.: The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopolous & Mark R. Schulman (eds.): The Laws of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); McCoubrey, H. & N.D. White: International Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992); Dinstein, Yoram: War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Second Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1994); Murphy, John F.: 'Force and Arms', in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United Nations Legal OrderInternational Law. Third Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications/Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 681-740; Baratta, Joseph Preston: 'The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War', in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, vols. I-III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), vol. II, pp. 695-705. Back.

    Note 175: Moore, Mike: 'World Court Says Mostly No to Nuclear Weapons', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 39-42. Back.

    Note 176: Santoni, Ronald E.: 'Nurturing the Institution of War: ''Just War'' Theory's ''Justifications'' and Accomodations', in Hinde (ed.): op. cit. (note 3), pp. 99-120; Greenwood, Christopher: 'In Defence of the Laws of War', ibid.., pp. 133-147. Back.

    Note 177: O'Brien, William V.: 'The Rule of Law in Small Wars', in W.M.J. Olson (ed.): 'Small Wars', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 541 (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 36-46. Back.

    Note 178: For slightly more weapons-oriented analysis of the long lines of military history see Dupuy: op. cit. (note 1), passim. For a technology-oriented analysis see Creveld: op. cit. (note 1); or idem: Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). For a more society-oriented analysis see McNeill,: op. cit. (note 1). Back.

    Note 179: Taylor, A.J.P.: War by Time-Table. How the First World War Began (London: MacDonald, 1969). See also Creveld, Martin Van: Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Back.

    Note 180: Bellamy, Christopher: The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 191-237. Back.

    Note 181: Warden, John A. III: 'Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century', in Schneider & Grintner (eds.): op. cit. (note 24), pp. 103-124. Back.

    Note 182: Boulding, Kenneth: Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper, 1962). See also Siverson, Randolph & Harvey Starr: The Diffusion of War. A Study of Opportunity and Willingness (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Diehl, Paul F.: 'Geography and War: A Reveiw and Assessment of the Empirical Literature', in Michael Don Ward (ed.): The New Geopolitics (Philadelphia & Reading: Gordon and Breach, 1992), pp. 121-137; and Gichman, Charles S.: 'Interstate Metrics: Conceptualizing, Operationalizing, and Measuring the Geographic Proximity of States Since the Congress of Vienna', ibid.., pp. 139-158; Goertz, Gary & Paul F. Diehl: Territorial Changes and International Conflict (London: Routledge, 1992). Back.

    Note 183: Liddell Hart: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 183, 219. Back.

    Note 184: See Starr, Barbara: 'Pentagon Maps Non-Lethal Options', International Defense Review, vol. 27, no. 7 (July 1994), pp. 30-32; Alexander, John B.: 'Shoot, But Not Kill. Non-lethal Weapons Have Yet to Establish a Military Niche', Jane's International Defense Review, vol. 29, no. 6 (June 1996), pp. 77-78; Lewer, Nick: 'Non-Lethal Weapons', Medicine and War, vol. 11 (1995), pp. 78-90. See also Creveld, Martin Van: 'High Technology and the Transformation of War. Part I-II', RUSI Journal, vol. 137, nos. 5 and 6 (Oct. and Dec. 1992), pp. 76-81, and 61-64, 74. Back.

    Note 185: Robinson, Julian Perry, Thomas Stock & Ronald G. Sutherland: 'The Chemical Weapons Convention: the Success of Chemical Disarmament Negotiations', SIPRI Yearbook 1993, pp. 705-734. The convention itself is appended on pp. 734-756. See also Thraenert, Oliver: 'The International Chemical Weapons Convention-Problems Involved', Aussenpolitik. English Edition, vol. 44, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 222-231; Stock, Thomas, Maria Haug & Patricia Radler: 'Chemical and Biological Weapon Developments and Arms Control', SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 661-708. Back.

    Note 186: Dando, Malcolm: Biological Warfare in the 21st Century (London: Brassey's, 1994); Ranger, Robin (ed.) & Amy Thuesdell (rapp.): 'The Devil's Brew I: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Their Delivery Systems', Bailrigg Memorandum, no. 16 (Lancaster: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, 1996); Mayer, Terry N.: 'The Biological Weapons: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction', in Schneider & Grintner (eds.): op. cit. (note 24), pp. 205-226; Kadlec, Robert P.: 'Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare', ibid.., pp. 227-250; idem: 'Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare', ibid.., pp. 251-266. Back.

    Note 187: Simpson, John: 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime after the NPT Review of Extension Conference', SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 561-610. See also Molander, Johan: 'The United Nations and the Elimination of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Implementation of a Cease-Fire Condition', in Fred Tanner (ed.): From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States (New York: United Nations/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1992), pp. 137-158; Sur, Serge: 'Security Council Resolution 687 og 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair: Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace', Research Papers, no. 12 (New York: UNIDIR); idem (ed.): Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations. Problems of Compliance and Enforcement (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 63-80; Samore, Gary: 'Iraq', in Mitchell Reiss & Robert S. Litwak: Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 15-32; Spector, Leonard S.: 'Neo-Nonproliferation', Survival, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85; Kelley, Robert E.: 'The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs. The Importance of Management', Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 27-38. Back.

    Note 188: On leakage from the FSU see Allison, Graham T., Owen R. Coté, Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath & Steven E. Miller: Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy. Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Blair, Bruce: The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993). For an optimistic view about nuclear terrorism see Kamp, Karkl-Heinz: 'An Overrated Nightmare', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 30-34. Back.

    Note 189: Neuneck, Götz & Otfried Ischebeck (eds.): Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Arms Control (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1992); William C. Potter & Harlan W. Jencks (eds.): The International Missile Bazaar. The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Findlay, Trevor (ed.): Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Denoon, David B.H.: Ballistic Missile Defense in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Nolan, Janne E.: Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991); Navias, Martin: Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East (London: Brassey's, UK, 1993); Fetter, Steve: 'Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?', International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5-42; Carus, W. Seth: 'Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Threat and Response', The Washington Papers, no. 146 (New York: Praeger, 1990). Back.

    Note 190: Tromp, Hylke: 'On the Nature of War and the Nature of Militarism', in Robert A. Hinde & Helen E. Watson (eds.): War: A Cruel Necessity? The Bases of Institutionalized Violence (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 118-131, quote from p. 122. Back.

    Note 191: Cock: loc. cit. (note 6); Rama, Swadesh: 'Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts', Research Paper, no. 34 (New York and Geneva: United Nations, UNIDIR/95/15); Karp, Aaron: 'The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms', in Brad Roberts (ed.): Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 57-69; Boutwell, Jeffrey, Michael T. Klare & Laura W. Reed (eds.): Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Mills, Greg: 'Small Arms Control-Some Early Thoughts', in African Defence Review. A Working Paper Series, no. 15 (Halfway House, RSA: Institute for Defence Policy, 1994); Smith, Christopher: 'The International Trade in Small Arms', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 9 (September 1995), pp. 427-430; Prokosch, Eric: The Technology of Killing. A Military and Political History of Antipersonnel Weapons (London: Zed Books, 1995). Back.

    Note 192: The Arms Project & Physicians for Human Rights: Landmines. A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); Roberts, Shawn & Jody Williams: After the Guns Fall Silent. The Enduring Legacy of Landmines (Washington, D.C.: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995); Cornish, Paul: Anti-Personnel Mines. Controlling the Plague of the 'Butterflies' (London: RIAS, 1994). On the endevours for a ban see Goldblat, Jozef: 'Land-mines and Blinding Laser Weapons: the Inhumane Weapons Convention Review Conference', SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 753-768; Wurst, Jim: 'Landmines: Bobbled Ban', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 11-14. Back.

    Note 193: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'The Land Mine Crisis. A Humanitarian Disaster', Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 5 (September-October 1994), pp. 8-13. Back.

    Note 194: Part of the following is drawn from the author's 'UN Military Demands and Non-Offensive Defence. Collective Security, Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Support Operations', Working Papers, no. 7 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI, 1996). Back.

    Note 195: On UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force), see Steinberg, James B.: 'International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.): Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 27-76; Freedman, Lawrence: 'Bosnia: Does Peace Support Make Any Sense?', NATO Review, vol. 43, no. 6 (November 1995), pp. 19-23; Gow, James: 'Nervous Bunnies: The International Community and the Yugoslav War of Dissolution, the Politics of Military Intervention in a Time of Change', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.): Military Intervention in European Conflicts (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 14-33; Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Appeasement, Intervention and the Future of Europe', ibid.., pp. 34-55; Ghebaldi, Victor-Yves: 'UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia: The Misuse of Peacekeeping and Associated Conflict Management Techniques', in Daniel Warner (ed.): New Dimensions of Peacekeeping, (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 13-40; Marcuse, Elie: 'The Former Yugoslavia: NATO's Role', ibid.., pp. 173-179; Eknes, Åke: 'The United Nations' Predicament in the Former Yugoslavia', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.): The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 109-126. On IFOR (Implementation Force), see Solana, Javier: 'NATO's Role in Bosnia: Charting a New Course for the Alliance', NATO Review, vol. 44, no. 2 (March 1996), pp. 3-6; Julwan, George A.: 'SHAPE and IFOR: Adapting to the Needs of Tomorrow', ibid.., pp. 6-9; Lightburn, David: 'NATO and the Challenge of Multifunctional Peacekeeping', ibid.., pp. 10-14; Eide, Espen Barth & Per Erik Solli: 'From Blue to Green. The Transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Working Papers, no. 539 (Oslo: NUPI, 1995); Nicholls, D.V.: 'Bosnia: UN and NATO', RUSI Journal, vol. 141, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 31-36; Portillo, Michael: 'Bosnia-Implementing the Peace Agreement', ibid.., pp. 27-30. For the Dayton Agreement which IFOR is supposed to help implement, see 'General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Review of International Affairs, vol. 47, no. 1041, passim; or Borden, Anthony & Richard Caplan: 'The Former Yugoslavia: the War and the Peace Process', SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 203-231, with the Dayton Peace Agreement appended on pp. 232-250. Back.

    Note 196: For an elaborate comparative account of previous missions see Durch, William J. (ed.): The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Diehl, Paul F.: International Peacekeeping (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993). General analyses of 'new peace-keeping', include Roper, John, Masashi Nishihara, Olara A. Ottunu & Enid C.B. Schoettle: Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping. A Report to the Trilateral Commission (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1993); Ratner, Steven R.: The New UN Peacekeeping. Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press and Council of Foreign Relations, 1995); Warner (ed.): op. cit. (note 2), passim; Berdal, Mats R.: 'Whither UN Peacekeeping. An Analysis of the Chganging Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping With Proposals for Its Enhancement', Adelphi Papers, no. 281 (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1993); Biermann, Wolfgang: '''Old'' UN Peacekeeping Principles and ''New'' Conflicts. Some Ideas to Reduce the Troubles of the Post-Cold War Peace Missions', Working Papers, no. 18 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994); James, Alan: 'Internal Peace-Keeping. A Dead End for the UN?', Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 44 (December 1993), pp. 359-368; Kühne, Winrich: Blauhelme in einer Turbulenten Welt. Beiträge internationaler Experten zur Fortentwicklung des Völkerrechts und der Vereinten Nationen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993); Meacham, James: 'From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking. United Nations Facing a Changing Role', International Defense Review, vol. 25, no. 3 (1992), pp. 217-221; Findlay, Trevor: 'Armed Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution', SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 31-74 with the appendix 'Multilateral Observer, Peacekeeping and Electoral Operations, 1995', by Olga Hardardóttir??, pp. 75-90. Back.

    Note 197: The US Army prefers the term 'peace operations', whereas the British seem to prefer 'peace support operations'. See Field Manual 100-20: Operations Other Than War (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1995) for the US; and 'Wider Peacekeeping', RUSI Journal, vol. 141, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 45-50, for the Britsh terminology. Back.

    Note 198: Taw, Jennifer Morrison & Bruce Hoffman: 'Operations Other Than War', in Paul K. Davis (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), pp. 223-250. Back.

    Note 199: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992', in Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury (eds.): United Nations, Divided World. The UN's Role in International Relations, New Expanded Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 468-498. Back.

    Note 200: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'Supplement to An Agenda For Peace. Report of the Secretary-general on the Work of the Organization', 3 January 1995, UN Documents, A/50/60-S/1995/1; also in SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 91-100. Back.

    Note 201: Dobbie, Charles: 'Alms Under Arms: Military Support for Humanitarian Operations', Draft of an Adelphi Paper, forthcoming 1996. See also Doel, M.T.: 'Military Assistance in Humanitarian Aid Operations: Impossible Paradox or Inevitable Development?' RUSI Journal, vol. 140, no. 5 (October 1995), pp. 26-32. Back.

    Note 202: Freedman, Lawrence & David Boren: '''Safe Havens'' for Kurds in post-War Iraq', in Nigel Rodley (ed.): To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992), pp. 43-92. Back.

    Note 203: Berdal, Mats R.: 'Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars', Adelphi Papers, no. 203 (London: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996). See also the findings of the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project of UNIDIR: 'Managing Arms in Peace Process: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe', UNIDIR/95/41 (New York: United Nations and Geneva: UNIDIR; 'Managing Arms in Peace Process: Somalia', UNIDIR/95/30. 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina', UNIDIR/96/7 (New York: United Nations and Geneva: UNIDIR, 1996); 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique', UNIDIR/96/22; 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia', UNIDIR/96/17; 'Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa', UNIDIR/96/21; 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia', UNIDIR/96/32. Back.

    Note 204: See appendix I, note 51. Back.

    Note 205: See appendix I. Back.

    Note 206: Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994), Chapter 1B. Back.

    Note 207: A classical formulation is Schelling, Thomas C.: The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 53-80, 119-161, 187-203; idem: Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), passim. See also Craig, Gordon & Alexander George: Force and Statecraft. Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 179-228; George, Alexander L.: Forceful Persuasion. Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).Cimbala, Stephen J.: Military Persuasion. Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park, CA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 165-198. Back.