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CIAO DATE: 6/00
The UN, the USA and NATO: Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Kosovo *
September 1999
Table of Contents
| I. | U.S. Neo-Interventionism | ||
| II. | NATO Interventionism? | ||
| III. | Humanitarian Intervention in Theory and Fukuyama | ||
| IV. | The Path from “Westphalia” to “Cosmopolis”: a Proposal | ||
| V. | Humanitarian Intervention in Practice: The Kosovo Debacle | ||
| 1. | The Results Thus Far | ||
| 2. | What Did NATO Do Wrong? | ||
| 3. | What Should Have Been Done? | ||
| 4. | The Alternative to the Bombardments | ||
| 5. | The Legal Situation | ||
| VI. | Conclusion | ||
| VII. | Postscript, 2 September 1999 | ||
| 1. | The Military Strategy | ||
| 2. | The Ethical Case | ||
| 3. | The Future | ||
| VIII. | Appendices | ||
| 1. | Rambouillet Accord (Excerpts) | ||
| 2. | U.N. Security Council Resolution no. 1244, 10 June 1999 | ||
| 3. | Kosovo Military Technical Agreement, 9 June, 1999 (Excerpts) | ||
| 4. | Sarajevo Summit Declaration | ||
The end of the Cold War presented unique opportunities for the United Nations to, at long last, play the role envisioned for it at its inception. As demonstrated in the Kuwait Crisis, the Security Council was no longer automatically deadlocked by the East-West conflict, as the five permanent members had arrived at compatible, if not identical, views on a wide range of problems.
In Europe the 1990s also presented unprecedented opportunities for transcending the former divisions, inter alia by welcoming former enemies into formerly western institutions such as the European Union and NATO—in a piecemeal fashion, but with the prospects for all states to eventually join institutions which would thus gradually become pan-European.
These unique opportunities have largely been squandered by the West in general, and the United States in particular, by their assertive neo-interventionism, driven by a combination of hubris and (partly sincere, but profoundly counterproductive) concerns with human rights and an accompanying disrespect for the “rules of the game”, especially the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. The contours of the nemesis which tends to follow in the footsteps of hubris are already visible in the form of exacerbated tensions, new global faultlines and a growing lawlessness, both globally and regionally, while the intended improvement of human rights standards may prove ephemeral at best, and illusory at worst.
The leading power in this development has been the United States, followed closely, albeit somewhat reluctantly, by its NATO allies.
In the light of the presumed lessons of the 1991 war against Iraq, 1 the US managed to partly escape the constraints of the “Vietnam Syndrome” that had for decades constrained its international assertiveness. 2 The belief rapidly spread that the (alleged) Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA, mostly associated with information technologies) 3 would allow for “wars without tears”. The dismal fate of the (UN-flagged) US intervention in Somalia 4 did not really temper the interventionist impulse, but merely led to its perversion. While the incidents in Mogadishu convinced both the White House and Capitol Hill of the need to avoid casualties, the US came to believe that it would be possibile to wage wars (euphemistically called “campaigns” or “interventions”) entirely from the air without any commitment of ground troops. This would presumably allow for the winning of wars without running any significant risks and with an exit route remaining open throughout the “campaign”.
Even though historical evidence clearly militates against such a strategy, 5 it has nevertheless produced a staggering (and growing) number of attacks against foreign countries, both deliberate, accidental and “legal” (foreign embassies), especially over the last nine months, when the US has attacked no less than eleven sovereign states ( sic!!). 6 The list below may not even be complete:
Some of the above cases may well have been, at least partly, motivated by the best of intentions. All of them are, however, instances of aggression according to the UN General Assembly Resolution no. 3314 (1974), in that they represent a “use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State”. 7 By such acts, the United States undermines the authority of the United Nations and the general respect for international law. 8 Article 2 of the UN Charter is quite unequivocal in its prohibition of use of force:
This prohibition was made unconditional for the simple reason that the founders of the world organization (first among whom was the United States) wanted to proscribe wars of aggression, in continuity with the endeavours of the League of Nations and the 1928 Kellogg-Brian Pact, and as a contribution to civilizational progress. 9 This is unambiguously asserted in article 1 of the Charter:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
- To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
As a means to this end, UN members states relinquished their right to use force to the UN Security Council. The only exception to the rule that only the Security Council could mandate the use of force was the right of self-defence mentioned in Art. 51, but even this was rather narrowly circumscribed and made conditional upon ex post facto Security Council approval:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
While the United States may thus see itself as a global policeman (“globocop”) this is misleading, as a policeman is supposed to operate within the law. By operating in blatant disregard of the law, US interventionism could more appropriately be likened to the role played by Batman—with the UK of Tony Blair cast in the role as Robin, the faithful companion of the caped crusader. 10
Besides Britain, the United States also sought to make the rest NATO its accomplices, by refunctionalizing NATO from a defensive into an all-purpose alliance that could be used for interventions beyond NATO area of responsibility. 11
In preparation of the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, U.S. Senator William Roth, in his capacity as President of the North Atlantic Council, in October 1998 published a report NATO in the 21st Century which undoubtedly reflected the American vision for NATO. 12 It contained, inter alia, the following recommendations:
NATO’s purpose is to defend values and interests, not just territory (...)NATO must preserve its freedom to act: The Allies must always seek to act in unison, preferably with a mandate from the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the framework for collective security in Europe. Even though all NATO member states undoubtedly would prefer to act with such a mandate, they must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed. All NATO actions should nonetheless be based on appropriate legal authority.
The last sentence is somewhat baroque, as there is no institution other than the UN Security Council which has the authority to mandate the use of force. Indeed, the primacy of the Security Council is clearly formulated in both the UN Charter and in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 ( sic!).
The UN Charter’s Art. 103 thus states unequivocally that
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
Should NATO obligations violate UN rules, the latter would thus prevail. As it happens, however, there is no contradiction, as the NATO Treaty’s Art. 7 states that
The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Moreover, the same treaty obliges its members to refrain from the threat or use of force in terms very similar to those of the UN Charter. The preamble and article 1 thus read:
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
- The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
In spite of the illegality thereof, from the autumn of 1998 until the launcing of the attack on 24 March 1999, all NATO members appeared prepared to go along with first the threat and subsequently the actual use of force against Yugoslavia. The only positive thing that might be said about the war against Yugoslavia is that the Alliance’s poor performance seemed to have tempered the interventionist urge considerably by the time of the anniversary summit in Washington, 23-24 April 1999. Even though some of the ideas and formulations of the Roth Report were retained in the documents from this meeting, the general tenor was somewhat more moderate. In the Washington Declaration, 13 it was thus solemnly proclaimed that
- We reaffirm our faith, as stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reiterate our desire to live in peace with all nations, and to settle any international dispute by peaceful means.
The new Strategic Concept that was decided on the same occasion 14 went a bit further in the direction of the Roth Report with formulations such as the following:
- In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance’s forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defence missions. (...)
The so-called “non-article 5” operations are, of course, a neologism for interventions. On balance, however, the decisions were more moderate than might have been feared, also because both documents contained references to the UN’s supreme authority:
We reaffirm our faith, as stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reiterate our desire to live in peace with all nations, and to settle any international dispute by peaceful means. ( The Washington Declaration, art 4)In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations.(...)
The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. ( The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, articles 10, 11 and 15)
III. Humanitarian Intervention in Theory and Fukuyama
What NATO embarked upon with its war against Yugoslavia has been labelled “humanitarian intervention”, i.e. intervention motivated by humanitarian concerns. There is, indeed, a lot to be said in favour of such activities, but there are also numerous pitfalls. 15
The world of sovereign states committed to non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs is quite an imperfect one. This present world order has been aptly described as a “westphalian system”—so named after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia where the principle of cujus regio, eius religio was codified, implying a sharp distinction between the “inside” and the “outside”. Unfortunately, as not all states are nice and democratic, not everything that happens “inside” may conform to the norms held by the “outside”, i.e. by other states forming the “world community”. As a consequence of the non-interference principle, however, it would be “none of their business”. For other states to make it their business would be tantamount to giving precedence to “justice” over the “order” that holds the “international society” of sovereign states together. 16
A “Kantian world” would be cosmopolitan and its overriding norm would be that of human rights. As a consequence, states would be mere custodians of universal human rights, who would forfeit their rights, hence their sovereignty, in cases of gross violations of these rights. In such cases, the rest of the world community would have to interfere, if need be by military means, i.e. in the form of humanitarian interventions. 17 This presupposes, of course, that there is a certain consensus about basic values (e.g. as enshrined in the human rights conventions or, as an absolute minimum, in that on genocide 18 ), as it has been argued by Francis Fukyama, whose proposition is that mankind has reached “the end of history” with the general acceptance of the norms of liberal pluralism. 19
Existing international law is predominantly “westphalian”, i.e. it gives precedence to the rights of states over those of individuals. Nevertheless, even the UN Charter is ambiguous in mentioning under the purposes of the UN in Art. 1:
- To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (...)
While this might appear to favour the individuals over the states, article 2 points in exactly the opposite direction:
- Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.
Even before the end of the Cold War, there were, of course, instances of such interventions into domestic affairs, some of which might be labelled “humanitarian interventions”. The post-Cold War period has seen (at least partly humanitarian) interventions in Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, which might indicate that international law is in flux. This impression was strengthened with the UN Secretary General’s 1992 report on an Agenda for Peace, 20 in which the door was opened slightly towards the possibility of humanitarian intervention:
- The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.
Granting that the “cosmopolitan” is preferable to the “westphalian” world order we are left with the question whether there is any path leading from the latter to the former.
IV. The Path from “Westphalia” to “Cosmopolis”: A Proposal
We can easily dismiss as very slim the chances of finding a legal path between the westphalian and the cosmopolitan world orders, as it stands to reason that those states against which the move would be directed would oppose any relinquishment of their sovereign rights. Just as one cannot make an omelet without breaking some eggs, one cannot establish a new world order without violating at least some of the rules of the old one. It just might be worth it, however. If so, it will inevitably be a matter of the strong enforcing a new set of rules on the weak, i.e. a matter of power.
The West does, indeed, possess a military superiority without precedents in world history, as shown in the table below. However, even though the world may thus have become largely unipolar, this unipolarity is very unlikely to last as it will provoke a countervailing alignment of opposing forces. Hence the present world order is not truly unipolar, but perhaps rather “uni-multipolar”, as Samuel Huntington calls it. In such a less-than-unipolar world, the exercize of power cannot be unrestrained without thereby becoming counter-productive, i.e. it must assume the form of hegemony rather than domination. 21
Table 1: World Military Expenditure
(US $mil., constant 1995 prices) 221997 Share Cumulative United States 258,963 36.8% 36.8% Rest of “old” NATO 192,037 27.3% 64.1% Hungary, Poland, Czech Rep. 4,345 0.6% 64.7% Israel, Japan, ROK, Australia, New Zealand 157,240 22.3% 87.0% Others 91,415 13.0% n.a. Total 704,000 100.0% n.a.
This would point towards a blend of persuasion with power such as in the following proposed sequence of steps leading towards a new world order:
Both 1 and 2 should be formulated in universal terms, i.e. in the form of a set of rules applying equally to all instances satisfying the criteria. “Double standards” should not be allowed.
Even in the case of 6c), individual states and/or alliances may deem situations to constitute “extreme emergencies”. A genocide in progress such as that in Rwanda might be a case in point. In such cases states would be legally prohibited from acting, but they would feel ethically compelled to do so. 25 If they are strong enough (as in the case of NATO) they probably will act. In that case they would be well-advised to seek to maintain the “moral high ground”, e.g. by proceeding as if 6a or 6b had been the case, and being prepared to defend their case ex post facto before the appropriate legal authority, such as the International Court of Justice ( vide infra ).
This suggested path from the “Westphalia” of unlimited sovereignty to the “Cosmopolis” of human rights may seem both long and thorny. What speaks in favour of it is, among other things, the previous experience with unilateral humanitarian interventions which have, more often than not, exacerbated rather than alleviated human suffering. An additional reason for proceeding with extreme caution is the disaster produced by NATO’s war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
V. Humanitarian Intervention in Practice: The Kosovo Debacle
After repeated threats of intervention against Yugoslavia, a ceasefire monitored by the OSCE, and negotiations in Rambouillet followed by renewed threats to enforce a signature to the Rambouillet accords, 26 NATO on 24 March 1999 launched its first-ever war of aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After ten weeks of war there was finally, by the time of writing (3 June) some light to be seen at the end of the tunnel with the Serb parliament’s agreeing (with 136 votes against 74) to a peace deal brokered by envoys Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin, seemingly along the lines of the G8 proposal ( vide infra ). 27
1. The Results Thus FarUntil this juncture, however, NATO’s accomplishments with “Operation Allied Force” had been meagre, to say the very least 28 :
Whether to judge the war a success or not depends, of course, on its goals, about which NATO has been quite ambiguous. The originally proclaimed goal of stopping the flight of refugees was superseded by the demand for their safe return; and the initial justification of forcing President Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet accords, but this was subsequently dropped. In its place came vague references to “relieving the plight of the refugees”, “allowing the refugees to return”, “weakening the FRY militarily”, etc.—none of which are really falsifiable, much less empirically verifiable.
From the aforementioned NATO Summit in Washington (23-24 April), a statement on Kosovo was issued, 32 containing a new set of five goals and/or demands:
In return, NATO promised to “suspend” its air strikes and to work for a UN Security Council resolution,
requiring the withdrawal of Serb forces and the demilitarisation of Kosovo and encompassing the deployment of an international military force to safeguard the swift return of all refugees and displaced persons as well as the establishment of an international provisional administration of Kosovo under which its people can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY.
These demands were both more and less radical than those of the Rambouillet accords: More in requiring a (seemingly complete) demilitarization of Kosovo, less in not insisting that the international forces should be under NATO command.
Since the summit and until the breakthrough on 3 June, the air strikes were not only continued, but escalated (with additional “collateral” civilian damage as the inevitable result); and various negotiation teams had unsuccesfully sought to mediate between Yugoslavia and NATO. On 6 May, however, the “G8” (including both Russia and the major NATO states) came forward with a peace plan, the gist of which has now apparently been accepted, in principle at least, by President Milosevic and the Serb parliament. 33 The “G8 Plan” envisaged:
By the time of writing there were some signs that the relentless diplomatic efforts of Russia might be about to succeed in saving Yugoslavia from total destruction and NATO from humiliation, but a happy ending still seemed far from certain. The Serb parliament thus 3 June approved the following agreement, very similar to the G8 Plan. 34
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
- Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
- Deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
- The international security presence, with substantial Nato participation, must be deployed under unified command and control, and authorised to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, as part of the international civil presence, under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy a substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life of all inhabitants in Kosovo.
- After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
- Liaison with international civil mission and international security presence
- Marking/clearing minefields
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
- Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organisations.
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarisation of the KLA. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilisation of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
- Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.* A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo.
* Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn.
Returning Personnel Equipment associated the returning personnel. Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities. Timetable for their return. Delineation of their geographical areas of operation. Rules governing their relationship to international security presence and international civil mission.
Other required elements Rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals meaning, for example 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25km mutual safety zone within 48 hours. Return of personnel for the functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands). Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals. The discussion and achieving of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.**A second footnote refers to the composition of the international force, as follows: It is understood that Nato considers an international security force with “substantial Nato participation” to mean unified command and control and having Nato at the core. This in turn means a unified Nato chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-Nato force contributors. All Nato countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. Nato units would be under Nato command. It is understood that Russia’s position is that the Russian contingent will not be under Nato command and its relationship to the international presence will be governed by relevant additional agreements.
Even though NATO seems to have succeded in creating the illusion that this was what it had all along demanded, hence that it had prevailed and that its strategy (if so it was) had been vindicated. However, with their emphases on the role of the United Nations, as well as the explicit demand for the disarmament of the UCK, both the G8 Plan and the resultant agreement were in fact just as close to the policies of Milosevic and/or Russia as to what NATO had provided as justification for launching the war. Just as in Bosnia, NATO thus seems to have used military power (this time much more massively) to force Milosevic to accept more or less what he had already himself consented to ( sic!).
This raises three sets of questions: What did NATO do wrong? What should have been done before the war was launched? What was the alternative to the bombardements, to which NATO should resort if present peace negotiations fail?
2. What Did NATO Do Wrong?
Even though the war was legitimated with (probably sincere) reference to humanitarian motives, these motives did not guide NATO’s actual waging of the war. Rather, NATO appears to have given priority to the avoidance of casualties from among its own ranks over the assistance of civilians in Kosovo.
The war has thus been waged in a what has aptly been called a “post-heroic” (some would even say cowardly) manner, 35 as is evident from several facts:
Moreover, the pattern of NATO bombing raids has clearly reflected this post-heroic attitude to war, as illustrated in the table below, showing how ethics can be measured in meters.
By its non-herioic form of war, NATO has clearly violated some of the “just war” criteria, both those of jus ad bellum (by launching war of aggression) and jus in bello. It is less clear whether the laws of war (authoritatively codifying just war criteria) have been violated. 36 The verdict of the ICJ (International Court of Justice) in the case of Yugolavia versus NATO might have clarified this, but did not ( vide infra ).
The principle of “civilian immunity” has clearly been violated. Among selected targets (as opposed to those accidentally hit) have been, for instance, the power supply, bridges, oil raffinaries, television stations, cigarette factories, etc., which are clearly not military targets. Virtually everything could, of course, be construed as “dual use” (some soldiers smoke cigarettes, for instance), but doing so completely defies the purpose of the civilian immunity rule.
Table 2: The Ethics of Flight Patterns Flying altitude Opportunities for/
Risks of:6,000 m.
(e.g. bomber)600 m.
(e.g. A-10)60 m.
(helicopter)Military hits Low Medium/High High Collateral civilian deaths High Medium/Low Low Own casualties Very low Medium High
The use of certain weapons could also be criticized as being inherently non-discriminating: Cluster bombs such as the British “BL 755” or the U.S. “CBU87B” are essentially area-impact munitions; the graphite bombs have not only destroyed military, but also civilian power grids; and the depleted uranium shells used by the A-10 aircraft cause long-lasting radioactive contamination. 37
As far as the collateral (i.e. unintended) damage associated with strikes against (alleged and real) mililary targets is concerned, the “proportionality rule” also appears to have been violated. What matters is not (as sometimes alleged by NATO spokesmen) the ratio of accidents to the total number of sorties, but that between the “good” that is achieved and the “bad” collateral damages. The bottom line is that NATO has not salvaged a single refugee (i.e. has achieved no good) by its war whilst causing very massive intentional as well as collateral damage, inter alia because of the above “post-heroic” flight patterns.
Serious doubts have also been cast on NATO’s humanitarian motivation by the refusal of all NATO states to accept more than quite insignificant numbers of refugees into their own countries. Had NATO’s sympathy for the Kosovars been serious, it could have established an “air bridge” between Albania and Macedonia and the western countries to fly out refugees in large numbers. The conditions that could have been offered them in Western Europa and the United States might not have been ideal (hotels, conference centres, military barracks, public buildings, and the like), but they would surely have been preferably to those in the camps in the Albania and Macedonia. Once the war was over, the refugees could have been flown back to, and repatriated in Kosovo, thus not (as sometimes alleged) becoming pawns in Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing game.
3. What Should Have Been Done?
NATO’s gravest mistake was probably to realize the problem much too late, and to postpone dealing with it even beyond that. It is always least painful to deal with a problem preventatively, i.e. in the form of preventive diplomacy. 38
NATO ignored several warnings of an impending crisis in Kosovo, 39 which had been awaited since Milosevic’s abrogation of the autonomy status in 1989, and which had become increasingly inevitable with the progressive dissolution of Yugoslavia. 40 During the Dayton negotiations, for instance, the problem was deliberately brushed aside in order not to complicate the resolution of the Bosnian problem.
When the problem had to be addressed in the course of 1998, crisis management was hampered by the very unclear division of responsibility between the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the EU. 41 This problem was exacerbated by NATO’s arrogant demands for supremacy and its repreated military threats against the Serb side to the conflict which made its potential role as “honest broker” rather illusory. There is thus little doubt that the UCK counted on NATO support for their guerilla struggle, even after the signing of the October 1998 ceasefire accords. 42 This and the Serb counter-moves produced a spiral of escalating violence. That there was thus an element of action-reaction in developments in Kosovo from October 1998 to March 1999 does not, of course, mean that culpability is evenly divided between the two sides to the conflict. Even though the “jury” is formally still out ( vide infra ), there is little doubt that most of the blame falls on the Serb side in general and on President Milosevic in particular. It is not entirely black-and-white, however.
The fact that NATO had so obviously sided with the UCK inevitably had a negative effect on the negotiations at Rambouillet, where the Serb side initially agreed to the political accord, which was then rejected by the Kosovars. Subsequent bilateral US-UCK talks produced an agreement on a revised draft which the Serb side (predictably) rejected. After this stage, however, NATO refused to re-open the “package” for renewed negotiations and preferred to put growing pressure on Milosevic to sign. 43 However much can be said in favour of the political elements of the Rambouillet Accords, the sections devoted to their implementation were such that no sovereign state could possibly have signed up to them. Chapter 7 (Implementation II) thus contained the following provisions:
Article I: General Obligations
- (b) The Parties agree that NATO will establish and deploy a force (hereinafter “KFOR”) which may be composed of ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations, operating under the authority and subject to the direction and the political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command. The Parties agree to facilitate the deployment and operations of this force and agree also to comply fully with all the obligations of this Chapter.
Article VIII: Operations and Authority of the KFOR
- The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall have the right:
(a) to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this Chapter and to respond promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required (...)
Even more offensive was the accord’s Appendix B devoted the “Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force”, containing the following clauses that compromize Yugoslav sovereignty, not only over Kosovo but also over the rest of the FRY:
Upon actually reading the Rambouillet document (a month or so after having voted for a war to enforce it), certain western politicians have admitted (off the record, of course) that this went to far with regard to the national humiliation of the Serbs.
4. The Alternative to the Bombardments
In the assessment of the present author most of the damage that could be done has already been done—to the respect for international law, the relationship with Russia, stability in the Balkans, etc. Were this not the case, the following proposal would have deserved to be dismissed as profoundly counter-productive. Also, it will, of course, not be relevant if the negotiations on the messy and complicated details of the 3 June agreement are conducted successfully, and hold. Should the peace negotiations fail and widespread violence erupt again, however, it may still be the least bad solution. It would require NATO to immediately do the following, which should have been done much earlier instead of the bombings:
Points 5, 6 and 8 remain relevant in any case. The negotiated end to the hostilities does not ex post facto justify NATO’s aggression.
5. The Legal Situation
Even though its ambiguities have often been (deliberately) exaggerated, international law is less clearly defined than domestic law. One means of clarifying the rules is to have cases tried before appropriate legal autorities. Steps in this direction have been taken, which should be welcomed, regardless of whether one agrees with the verdicts or not and of the inevitable negative political repercussions on the on-going pre-negotiations.
Yugoslavia on 29 April raised charges against NATO at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The claims were directed against the implicated NATO countries one by one, rather than against NATO as such. In so far as the United States was concerned, the claim was that: 46
The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
- by taking part in the bombing of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the United States of America has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use force against another State;
- by taking part in the training, arming, financing, equipping and supplying terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called “Kosovo Liberation Army”, the United States of America has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of another State;
- by taking part in attacks on civilian targets, the United States of America has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects; (...)
- The United States of America is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the above obligations vis-a-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- The United States of America is obliged to provide compensation for the damage done to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its citizens and juridical persons.
The Court published its ruling on 2 June, rejecting (by twelve votes to three) the claim for an immediate stop to the bombings on the grounds that it “manifestly lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case”. One reason given was that the United States had attached reservations to its ratification (in 1988) of the 1948 Genocide Convention ( sic!), hence could not be judged by its standards without its expressed consent, which it refused to give. This did little to enhance the moral authority of the “leader” of the western alliance who would, moreover, probably have been acquitted from charges of genocide, had it consented to having its case tried before the court.
In its order, the ICJ did, however, state that it was “profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia”, which “under the present circumstances [which] raises very serious issues of international law”. It also “deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties before it must act in conformity with their obligations under the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, including humanitarian law”. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Vereshchetin went further, arguing that
The Court should have promptly expressed its profound concern over the unfolding human misery, loss of life and serious violations of international law which by the time of the request were already a matter of public knowledge. It is unbecoming for the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, whose very raison d’être is the peaceful resolution of international disputes, to maintain silence in such a situation.
Much more attention has been focused on the indictment of President Milosevic (along with four others) before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague for “crimes against humanity” as well as “violations of the laws or customs of war”. 47 Even though this indictment was clearly at odds with the attempts at reaching a peace agreement (as it gave Milosevic additional disincentives to sign, only to face criminal proceedings), it nevertheless pointed in the direction of the aforementioned “Cosmopolis”, where not even leaders or heads of states are immune from prosecution for violations of universal human rights. It would have been an even more promising step in the right direction if the (humanitarian) aggressors had also been prepared to defend their case before the appropriate legal authority.
It now seems likely that the Kosovo conflict is over or that it will, at least, be “put on hold” until the end of the “interim period”. This makes it important to draw the right lessons from the experience of recent events, lest simplistic readings of the facts are allowed to produce myths which will, in their turn, come to guide policies in the next millennium. 48 Unfortunately, it is still premature to determine conclusively who won the war and how, and even more difficult to assess the chances of the presumed alternatives. The above has thus simply provided a possible reading of the lessons, which is open for falsification when all the fact are revealed and properly digested and analyzed.
VII. Postscript, 2 September 1999
All of the above was written while the war was still raging, the final touch being given almost simultaneously with the signing of the agreement. Now, in the beginning of September 1999, seems to be an appropriate time for reflection about the lessons and the future.
Events in the period since the end of the bombings have raised a number of questions, such as
1. The Military Strategy
While NATO, for rather obvious reasons, sought to avoid discussions about the military strategy during the war, its aftermath has seen a certain debate about the effectiveness of the chosen means—also within NATO circles. 49
The main critique has been that NATO simply did not significantly weaken the FRY military forces in the region, and that the “strategic bombing” was poorly planned and executed. Not only were there too many inadvertant hits, but the damage inflicted on the targets that were actually hit as planned was not substantial enough to really matter. NATO managed to hurt the Yugoslav society severely, but far from enough to make the population rise to topple Milosevic. Additional critique has been raised, albeit not officially, of the use of such weapons as cluster bombs and depleted unarium shells, which are likely to cause severe health problems for the civilian population for years to come. 50
One of the most prominent dissenting voices has been that of former NATO Secretary General (1984-88) Lord Carrington, who in March had warned against the bombings. In August he concluded that
I think what NATO did by bombing Serbia actually precipitated the exodus of the Kosovo Albanians into Macedonia and Montenegro. (...) What we did made things much worse. I think it is a mistake to intervene in a civil war. 51
The author of the monumental four-volume Lessons of Modern War, Anthony Cordesman has recently published a comprehensive military analysis of the Kosovo War, in which he, inter alia, demolishes several myths. 52 It is worth quoting at some length: On the myth of “surgical precision” warfare:
Only 35 percent of the roughly 23,000 bombs and missiles used over the full course of the 78-day campaign, were precision guided. The rest were unguided weapons that were precisely dropped into small areas such as oil refineries, ammunition storage sites, and troop staging areas (p. 23)
On the myth that the strategy was the reflection of a rational “grand strategy”:
Rightly or wrongly, the US government effectively blundered into U.S. involvement in the war. In the process, it again became obvious that the US Executive Branch and the Congress have no clear way to decide whether to go to war, to provide legislative approval of the conflict, or to reach any formal consensus on the scale of military action. The US could not even call the war a “war”. (...)
- It may be that one of the lessons of modern war is that war can no longer be called war. It may also be that the US must muddle into war, muddle through it, and muddle out without any clear consensus or formal legal procedures to authorize a conflict.
- At the same time, this system of blundering in only works as long as everything goes relatively well.. As Somalia warns if anything goes wrong, no one is firmly committed or responsible at the political level.
- Any consensus is also remarkably vulnerable to the media and one bad event (p. 33)
On the myth that the aerial bombardments were decisive:
Serbia was forced to withdraw from Kosovo for a variety of reasons other than the effectiveness of air and missile power:
- Serbia’s acute economic weakness at the start of the war.
- Serbia alienated most of the world by its ethnic cleansing activities and lost all meaningful outside political support. Once Russia joined NATO in pressing for a peace settlement on terms that offered Serbia no hope of outside aid or that the world would tolerate ethnic cleansing.
- The total failure of Serbian forces to defeat the KLA in the planned 5-6 days, and Serbia’s inability to defeat the ground operations of the Kosovo Liberation Army without exposing its forces to devastating air attack, and,
- The presence of the substantial NATO ground force already in the region (...), and the deployment of Task Force Hawk and the growing political debate over the need for a NATO ground option created the possibility that NATO would pursue a ground option if NATO air and missile power did not achieve decisive results. (p. 40)
On the myth that no alternative strategy was available:
No one can ever determine what would have happened if:
- NATO had not repeatedly ruled out a ground option and had not signaled Serbia that it had freedom of action in Kosovo. Regardless of whether NATO would have used such an option, NATO failed to preserve an important political and strategic lever that might have contributed to an earlier termination of the conflict. While strategic ambiguity is not an ideal lesson for every conflict, it is often a powerful tool. In this case, NATO politics meant that NATO”s leaders spent more time trying to reassure their own peoples than they did in trying to influence the enemy. (...)
- NATO entered the air and missile war having planned for an option other than the success of the initial negotiations or Serbian acceptance of these terms after a limited number of strikes. NATO went to war without serious planning for key options or readiness for a major war.
- NATO had planned from the start to deal with the risk of a dramatic increase in ethnic cleansing and ethnic warfare, rather than had had to adapt to the reality of these events once air strikes began. NATO threatened war without having a clear contingency plan to deal with the very problem that led it to threaten air strikes in the first place.
- NATO had immediately escalated to strategic bombing of Serbia when massive ethnic cleansing began, and had been willing to attack targets vital to the functioning of civilian life. NATO’s strategic bombing campaign did not reply to ethnic cleansing in kind. (...)
- NATO had been willing to take added casualties and losses in return for added effectiveness. (...)
- NATO had planned to deal with the refugee problem in humanitarian terms by creating military safe havens (pp. 46-47)
Perhaps even more important, the myth that NATO reduced ethnic cleansing, rather than exacerbated the problem:
The end result was thousands of dead and over 1.5 million refugees. (...) NATO did end the air and missile campaign with a seeming victory, but virtually all Serbian ethnic cleansing occurred during the course of the air and missile campaign. While some wartime estimates of mass killings and the hardships suffered by the Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo may be exaggerated, it still seems clear that ethnic cleansing reached the point by mid-May where it affected so much of the Kosovar Albanian population. It also seems clear that at least 80% of the people NATO attempted to protect suffered grievously during the war. NATO totally failed to meet its initial goal of putting an “immediate end to ethnic cleansing” unless immediate is defined as 11 weeks. (p. 48)
On the myth of the “bloodless war” without significant collateral damage:
NATO and the governments of member countries conducted major propaganda campaigns during the air and missile war. (...) The cumulative impact of the briefings, however, was to create expectations for nearly “perfect” or “bloodless” wars. (...) The briefings did not lie, but they were massive exercises in spin control, carefully tailored facts, and carefully chosen omissions (p. 51)
On the myth that the publics in NATO countries, and especially in the US, would not have tolerated any war that would would have produced casualties:
The problem with this success is that it is another factor creating that may create unrealistic expectations and demands for “perfect” or “bloodless” war. It is far from clear that the American public really does demand little or no casualties. Public opinion polls strongly suggest that Americans will accept casualties if they believe in the war or peacekeeping mission, the quality of its leadership, and that American men and women are properly equipped and supplied. Somewhat ironically, American politicians and the media seem to be more sensitive to casualties per se than the public (p. 54)
2. The Ethical Case
Judging by the public debate in Denmark, there is a widespread belief that the post-war findings of mass graves and the like in Kosovo 53 somehow provides ex post facto ethical justification of NATO’s war against the likely perpetrators.
The implicit “logic” seems to be that as these findings prove “the Serbs” (or at least Milosevic) to be “evil”, his opponents, in casu NATO, must be good; hence their actions must also be so. By alleged implication, whoever opposed the NATO air campaign was almost an accomplice to genocide. Against this line of argumentation, however, speaks several considerations:
| Table 3: Refugees from Kosovo 55 | ||||
| 23 March | 4 April | 23 April | 14 May | |
| in Albania | 18,500 | 170,000 | 362,000 | 431,500 |
| in Macadonia | 16,000 | 115,000 | 133,000 | 233,300 |
| in Bosnia | 10,000 | 0 | 32,600 | 18,500 |
| in Montenegro | 25,000 | 32,000 | 66,500 | 64,300 |
| Other | 0 | 0 | 17,929 | 44,525 |
| Total | 69,500 | 317,000 | 612,029 | 792,125 |
The latter problem also has implications for the future, when not only Kosovo, but also Serbia have to face the problems of the long-term consequences of the war.
3. The Future
Having (according to its own version) won the war, NATO faced the short-term problem of bringing actual fighting to an end and facilitating the safe return of the refugees. It also had to address the long-term question how to ensure a stable peace for the region as a whole.
As far as the first short-term problem was concerned, NATO experienced considerably difficulties with mustering the required forces—even though it might have started preparing for this simultaneously with launching the first air strikes. They were, after all, intended precisely to secure access for “an international military presence”. It also proved problematic to find a sensible division of responsibility with the Russian contingent in KFOR, 56 and to ensure the disarmament of the UCK. 57
Quite understandably, the UCK saw themselves as victors, perhaps even more so than NATO. 58 Combined with the equally understandable resentment towards “the Serbs”, the first months after the “victory” were characterized by widespread acts of revenge against the Serbian civilians in Kosovo, the total effect of which was tantamount to an “ethnic cleansing in reverse”. 59 KFOR was unable to prevent this from happening, even though it is, of course, impossible to tell what would have occurred in its absence.
The second short-term problem virtually solved itself. While both NATO and the UN initially sought to ensure a controlled and piecemeal return of the refugees from Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, 60 the flow of returnees soon escaped their control. By mid-July, virtually all the refugees had left the neighbouring countries, while the West hurried to send those few back who had sought refuge there.
To its credit, the EU took the lead with regard to the long-term problems. On its initiative a summit meeting was called in Sarajevo, where a “Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe” was launched. 61 (For the full text, see Appendix 4). Somewhat ironically the very same countries that has launched the attack against the FRY on 24 March by adopting the Pact reaffirmed their “shared responsibility to build a Europe that is at long last undivided, democratic and at peace”. They further pledged to “work together to promote the integration of South Eastern Europe into a continent where borders remain inviolable but no longer denote division and offer the opportunity of contact and cooperation”. The Pact further entailed (vaguely formulated) promises of future integration with the rest of Europe, including the EU.
A donor conference was convened, 28 July 1999, were promises were given for both immediate humanitarian assistance, post-war reconstruction and further development. As far as the “bottom line” was concerned, however, several countries —including traditionally generous ones such as Denmark—effectively transferred the funds from even more needy recipients in the Third World to Kosovo ( sic!).
The FRY was neither eligible for reconstruction assistance (to say nothing of reparations) nor invited to the summit, even though the participants expressed their “strong wish that all the countries of the region work together in a spirit of cohesion and solidarity through the Stability Pact to build a common, prosperous and secure future”. A precondition for Yugoslav membership would, however, be Belgrade’s acceptance of the principles enshrined in the Pact. More concretely, the FRY would have to “embrace democratic change and to work actively for regional reconciliation”.
By the time of this writing, there were encouraging signs from the FRY that the opposition was both growing and uniting. Hence the reign of Slobodan Milosevic may finally be approaching its end, but who will succeed him remains to be seen. It cannot be taken for granted that his successors will be democrats with a western orientation—even though one is allowed to hope for this.
1. Rambouillet Accord (Excerpts)
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo
The Parties to the present Agreement,
Convinced of the need for a peaceful and political solution in Kosovo as a prerequisite for stability and democracy,
Determined to establish a peaceful environment in Kosovo,
Reaffirming their commitment to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, as well as to OSCE principles, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe,
Recalling the commitment of the international community to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Recalling the basic elements/principles adopted by the Contact Group at its ministerial meeting in London on January 29, 1999,
Recognizing the need for democratic self-government in Kosovo, including full participation of the members of all national communities in political decision-making,
Desiring to ensure the protection of the human rights of all persons in Kosovo, as well as the rights of the members of all national communities,
Recognizing the ongoing contribution of the OSCE to peace and stability in Kosovo,
Noting that the present Agreement has been concluded under the auspices of the members of the Contact Group and the European Union and undertaking with respect to these members and the European Union to abide by this Agreement,
Aware that full respect for the present Agreement will be central for the development of relations with European institutions,
Have agreed as follows:
FRAMEWORK
Article I: Principles
1. All citizens in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination, the equal rights and freedoms set forth in this Agreement.
2. National communities and their members shall have additional rights specified in Chapter 1. Kosovo, Federal, and Republic authorities shall not interfere with the exercise of these additional rights. The national communities shall be legally equal as specified herein, and shall not use their additional rights to endanger the rights of other national communities or the rights of citizens, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or the functioning of representative democratic government in Kosovo.
3. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equality of citizens and national communities.
4. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic self-government through legislative, executive, judicial, and other institutions established in accordance with this Agreement. They shall have the opportunity to be represented in all institutions in Kosovo. The right to democratic self-government shall include the right to participate in free and fair elections.
5. Every person in Kosovo may have access to international institutions for the protection of their rights in accordance with the procedures of such institutions.
6. The Parties accept that they will act only within their powers and responsibilities in Kosovo as specified by this Agreement. Acts outside those powers and responsibilities shall be null and void. Kosovo shall have all rights and powers set forth herein, including in particular as specified in the Constitution at Chapter 1. This Agreement shall prevail over any other legal provisions of the Parties and shall be directly applicable. The Parties shall harmonize their governing practices and documents with this Agreement.
7. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with all international organizations working in Kosovo on the implementation of this Agreement.
Article II: Confidence-Building Measures
End of Use of Force
1. Use of force in Kosovo shall cease immediately. In accordance with this Agreement, alleged violations of the cease-fire shall be reported to international observers and shall not be used to justify use of force in response.
2. The status of police and security forces in Kosovo, including withdrawal of forces, shall be governed by the terms of this Agreement. Paramilitary and irregular forces in Kosovo are incompatible with the terms of this Agreement.
Return
3. The Parties recognize that all persons have the right to return to their homes. Appropriate authorities shall take all measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of persons, including issuing necessary documents. All persons shall have the right to reoccupy their real property, assert their occupancy rights in state-owned property, and recover their other property and personal possessions. The Parties shall take all measures necessary to readmit returning persons to Kosovo.
4. The Parties shall cooperate fully with all efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international and non-governmental organizations concerning the repatriation and return of persons, including those organizations, monitoring of the treatment of persons following their return.
Access for International Assistance
5. There shall be no impediments to the normal flow of goods into Kosovo, including materials for the reconstruction of homes and structures. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall not require visas, customs, or licensing for persons or things for the Implementation Mission (IM), the UNHCR, and other international organizations, as well as for nongovernmental organizations working in Kosovo as determined by the Chief of the Implementation Mission (CIM).
6. All staff, whether national or international, working with international or non-governmental organizations including with the Yugoslav Red Cross, shall be allowed unrestricted access to the Kosovo population for purposes of international assistance. All persons in Kosovo shall similarly have safe, unhindered, and direct access to the staff of such organizations.
(...)
Detention of Combatants and Justice Issues
(...)
13. All Parties shall comply with their obligation to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
(a) As required by United Nations Security Council resolution 827 (1993) and subsequent resolutions, the Parties shall fully cooperate with the international Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its investigations and prosecutions, including complying with its requests for assistance and its orders.
(b)The Parties shall also allow complete, unimpeded, and unfettered access to international expertsincluding forensics experts and investigators to investigate allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Independent Media
14. Recognizing the importance of free and independent media for the development of a democratic political climate necessary for the reconstruction and development of Kosovo, the Parties shall ensure the widest possible press freedoms in Kosovo in all media, public and private, including print, television, radio, and Internet.
CHAPTER I: CONSTITUTION
Affirming their belief in a peaceful society, justice, tolerance, and reconciliation,
Resolved to ensure respect for human rights and the equality of all citizens and national communities,
Recognizing that the preservation and promotion of the national, cultural, and linguistic identity of each national community in Kosovo are necessary for the harmonious development of a peaceful society,
Desiring through this interim Constitution to establish institutions of democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded in respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from this Agreement, from which the authorities of governance set forth herein originate,
Recognizing that the institutions of Kosovo should fairly represent the national communities in Kosovo and foster the exercise of their rights and those of their members,
Recalling and endorsing the principles/basic elements adopted by the Contact Group at its ministerial meeting in London on January 29, 1999,
Article I: Principles of Democratic Self-Government in Kosovo
1. Kosovo shall govern itself democratically through the legislative, executive, judicial, and other organs and institutions specified herein. Organs and institutions of Kosovo shall exercise their authorities consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
2. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equality of citizens and national communities.
3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has competence in Kosovo over the following areas, except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement: (a) territorial integrity, (b) maintaining a common market within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which power shall be exercised in a manner that does not discriminate against Kosovo, (c) monetary policy, (d) defense, (e) foreign policy, (f) customs services, (g) federal taxation, (h) federal elections, and (i) other areas specified in this Agreement.
4. The Republic of Serbia shall have competence in Kosovo as specified in this Agreement, including in relation to Republic elections.
5. Citizens in Kosovo may continue to participate in areas in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia have competence through their representation in relevant institutions, without prejudice to the exercise of competence by Kosovo authorities set forth in this Agreement.
6. With respect to Kosovo:
(a) There shall be no changes to the borders of Kosovo;
(b) Deployment and use of police and security forces shall be governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement; and
(c) Kosovo shall have authority to conduct foreign relations within its areas of responsibility equivalent to the power provided to Republics under Article 7 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
7. There shall be no interference with the right of citizens and national communities in Kosovo to call upon appropriate institutions of the Republic of Serbia for the following purposes:
(a) assistance in designing school curricula and standards;
(b) participation in social benefits programs, such as care for war veterans, pensioners, and disabled persons; and
(c) other voluntarily received services, provided that these services are not related to police and security matters governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement, and that any Republic personnel serving in Kosovo pursuant to this paragraph shall be unarmed service providers acting at the invitation of a national community in Kosovo. The Republic shall have the authority to levy taxes or charges on those citizens requesting services pursuant to this paragraph, as necessary to support the provision of such services.
8. The basic territorial unit of local self-government in Kosovo shall be the commune. All responsibilities in Kosovo not expressly assigned elsewhere shall be the responsibility of the communes.
9. To preserve and promote democratic self-government in Kosovo, all candidates for appointed, elective, or other public office, and all office holders, shall meet the following criteria:
(a) No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any office; and
(b) All candidates and office holders shall renounce violence as a mechanism for achieving political goals; past political or resistance activities shall not be a bar to holding office in Kosovo.
Article II: The Assembly
General
1. Kosovo shall have an Assembly, which shall be comprised of 120 Members.
(a) Eighty Members shall be directly elected.
(b) A further 40 Members shall be elected by the members of qualifying national communities.
(i) Communities whose members constitute more than 0.5 per cent of the Kosovo population but less than 5 per cent shall have ten of these seats, to be divided among them in accordance with their proportion of the overall population.
(ii) Communities whose members constitute more than 5 per cent of the Kosovo population shall divide the remaining thirty seats equally. The Serb and Albanian national communities shall be presumed to meet the 5 per cent population threshold.
(...)
Powers of the Assembly
5. The Assembly shall be responsible for enacting laws of Kosovo, including in political, security, economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural areas as set out below and elsewhere in this Agreement. This Constitution and the laws of the Kosovo Assembly shall not be subject to change or modification by authorities of the Republics or the Federation.
(...)
Article III: President of Kosovo
1. There shall be a President of Kosovo, who shall be elected by the Assembly by vote of a majority of its Members. The President of Kosovo shall serve for a three-year term. No person may serve more than two terms as President of Kosovo.
2. The President of Kosovo shall be responsible for:
(i) Representing Kosovo, including before any international or Federal body or any body of the Republics;
(ii) Proposing to the Assembly candidates for Prime Minister, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and other Kosovo judicial offices;
(iii) Meeting regularly with the democratically elected representatives of the national communities;
(iv) Conducting foreign relations and concluding agreements within this power consistent with the authorities of Kosovo institutions under this Agreement.Such agreements shall only enter into force upon approval by the Assembly;
(v) Designating a representative to serve on the Joint Commission established by Article 1.2 of Chapter 5 of this Agreement;
(vi) Meeting regularly with the Federal and Republic Presidents; and
(vii) Other functions specified herein or by law.
Article IV: Government and Administrative Organs
1. Executive power shall be exercised by the Government. The Government shall be responsible for implementing the laws of Kosovo, and of other government authorities when such responsibilities are devolved by those authorities. The Government shall also have competence to propose laws to the Assembly.(a) The Government shall consist of a Prime Minister and Ministers, including at least one person from each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph 1(b)(ii) of Article II. Ministers shall head the Administrative Organs of Kosovo.
(...)
Article V: Judiciary
General
1. Kosovo shall have a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, District Courts, and Communal Courts.
2. The Kosovo courts shall have jurisdiction over all matters arising under this Constitution or the laws of Kosovo except as specified in paragraph 3. The Kosovo courts shall also have jurisdiction over questions of federal law, subject to appeal to the Federal courts on these questions after all appeals available under the Kosovo system have been exhausted.
(...)
Constitutional Court
5. The Constitutional Court shall consist of nine judges. There shall be at least one Constitutional Court judge from each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph 1(b)(ii) of Article II. Until such time as the Parties agree to discontinue this arrangement, 5 judges of the Constitutional Court shall be selected from a list drawn up by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.
6. The Constitutional Court shall have authority to resolve disputes relating to the meaning of this Constitution. That authority shall include, but is not limited to, determining whether laws applicable in Kosovo, decisions or acts of the President, the Assembly, the Government, the Communes, and the national communities are compatible with this Constitution.
(...)
Article VI: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1. All authorities in Kosovo shall ensure internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Kosovo. Other internationally recognized human rights instruments enacted into law by the Kosovo Assembly shall also apply. These rights and freedoms shall have priority over all other law.
3. All courts, agencies, governmental institutions, and other public institutions of Kosovo or operating in relation to Kosovo shall conform to these human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Article VII: National Communities
1. National communities and their members shall have additional rights as set forth below in order to preserve and express their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities in accordance with international standards and the Helsinki Final Act. Such rights shall be exercised in conformity with human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. Each national community may elect, through democratic means and in a manner consistent with the principles of Chapter 3 of this Agreement, institutions to administer its affairs in Kosovo.
3. The national communities shall be subject to the laws applicable in Kosovo, provided that any act or decision concerning national communities must be nondiscriminatory. The Assembly shall decide upon a procedure for resolving disputes between national communities.
(...)
7. Every person shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as belonging to a national community, and no disadvantage shall result from that choice or from the exercise of the rights connected to that choice.
(...)
Article IX: Representation
1. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to participate in the election of:
(a) At least 10 deputies in the House of Citizens of the Federal Assembly; and
(b) At least 20 deputies in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.
(...)
CHAPTER 2: POLICE AND CIVIL PUBLIC SECURITY
Article I: General Principles
1. All law enforcement agencies, organizations and personnel of the Parties, which for purposes of this Chapter will include customs and border police operating in Kosovo, shall act in compliance with this Agreement and shall observe internationally recognized standards of human rights and due process. In exercising their functions, law enforcement personnel shall not discriminate on any ground, such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national community, property, birth or other status.
2. The Parties invite the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) through its Implementation Mission (IM) to monitor and supervise implementation of this Chapter and related provisions of this Agreement. The Chief of the Implementation Mission (CIM) or his designee shall have the authority to issue binding directives to the Parties and subsidiary bodies on police and civil public security matters to obtain compliance by the Parties with the terms of this Chapter. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with the IM and to comply with its directives. Personnel assigned to police-related duties within the IM shall be permitted to wear a uniform while serving in this part of the mission.
3. In carrying out his responsibilities, the CIM will inform and consult KFOR as appropriate.
4. The IM shall have the authority to:
(a) Monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement activities, personnel, and facilities, including border police and customs units, as well as associated judicial organizations, structures, and proceedings;
(...)
(g) Dismiss or discipline public security personnel of the Parties for cause; and
(h) Request appropriate law enforcement support from the international community to enable IM to carry out the duties assigned in this Chapter.
5. All Kosovo, Republic and Federal law enforcement and Federal military authorities shall be obligated, in their respective areas of authority, to ensure freedom of movement and safe passage for all persons, vehicles and goods. This obligation includes a duty to permit the unobstructed passage into Kosovo of police equipment which has been approved by the CIM and COMKFOR for use by Kosovo police, and of any other support provided under subparagraph 4(h) above.
(...)
6. The Parties undertake to provide one another mutual assistance, when requested, in the surrender of those accused of committing criminal acts within a Party’s jurisdiction, and in the investigation and prosecution of offenses across the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY. The Parties shall develop agreed procedures and mechanisms for responding to these requests. The CIM or his designee shall resolve disputes on these matters.
7. The IM shall aim to transfer law enforcement responsibilities described in Article II below to the law enforcement officials and organizations described in Article II at the earliest practical time consistent with civil public security.
(...)
Article VI: Security on International Borders
1. The Government of the FRY will maintain official border crossings on its international borders (Albania and FYROM).
(...)
Article IX: Final Authority to Interpret
The CIM is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Chapter and his determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.
CHAPTER 3: CONDUCT AND SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS
Article I: Conditions for Elections
1. The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fair elections, which include but are not limited to:
a) freedom of movement for all citizens;
b) an open and free political environment;
c) an environment conducive to the return of displaced persons;
d) a safe and secure environment that ensures freedom of assembly, association, and expression;
e) an electoral legal framework of rules and regulations complying with OSCE commitments, which will be implemented by a Central Election Commission, as set forth in Article III, which is representative of the population of Kosovo in terms of national communities and political parties; and
f) free media, effectively accessible to registered political parties and candidates, and available to voters throughout Kosovo.
2. The Parties request the OSCE to certify when elections will be effective under current conditions in Kosovo, and to provide assistance to the Parties to create conditions for free and fair elections.
3. The Parties shall comply fully with Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document, which are attached to this Chapter.
(...)
CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC ISSUES
Article I
1. The economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with free market principles.
(...)
CHAPTER 4 A: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1. In parallel with the continuing full implementation of this Agreement, urgent attention must be focused on meeting the real humanitarian and economic needs of Kosovo in order to help create the conditions for reconstruction and lasting economic recovery. International assistance will be provided without discrimination between national communities.
2. The Parties welcome the willingness of the European Commission working with the international community to co-ordinate international support for the parties’ efforts. Specifically, the European Commission will organize an international donors’ conference within one month of entry into force of this Agreement.
3. The international community will provide immediate and unconditional humanitarian assistance, focusing primarily on refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their former homes. The Parties welcome and endorse the UNHCR’s lead role in co-ordination of this effort, and endorse its intention, in close co-operation with the Implementation Mission, to plan an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugees and displaced persons in conditions of safety and dignity.
4. The international community will provide the means for the rapid improvement of living conditions for the population of Kosovo through the reconstruction and rehabilitation of housing and local infrastructure (including water, energy, health and local education infrastructure) based on damage assessment surveys.
5. Assistance will also be provided to support the establishment and development of the institutional and legislative framework laid down in this Agreement, including local governance and tax settlement, and to reinforce civil society, culture and education. Social welfare will also be addressed, with priority given to the protection of vulnerable social groups.
6. It will also be vital to lay the foundations for sustained development, based on a revival of the local economy. This must take account of the need to address unemployment, and to stimulate the economy by a range of mechanisms. The European Commission will be giving urgent attention to this.
7. International assistance, with the exception of humanitarian aid, will be subject to full compliance with this Agreement as well as other conditionalities defined in advance by the donors and the absorptive capacity of Kosovo.
CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION I
Article I: Institutions
Implementation Mission
1. The Parties invite the OSCE, in cooperation with the European Union, to constitute an Implementation Mission in Kosovo. All responsibilities and powers previously vested in the Kosovo Verification Mission and its Head by prior agreements shall be continued in the Implementation Mission and its Chief.
Joint Commission
2. A Joint Commission shall serve as the central mechanism for monitoring and coordinating the civilian implementation of this Agreement. It shall consist of the Chief of the Implementation Mission (CIM), one Federal and one Republic representative, one representative of each national community in Kosovo, the President of the Assembly, and a representative of the President of Kosovo. Meetings of the Joint Commission may be attended by other representatives of organizations specified in this Agreement or needed for its implementation.
3. The CIM shall serve as the Chair of the Joint Commission. The Chair shall coordinate and organize the work of the Joint Commission and decide the time and place of its meetings. The Parties shall abide by and fully implement the decisions of the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission shall operate on the basis of consensus, but in the event consensus cannot be reached, the Chair’s decision shall be final.
4. The Chair shall have full and unimpeded access to all places, persons, and information (including documents and other records) within Kosovo that in his judgment are necessary to his responsibilities with regard to the civilian aspects of this Agreement.
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Article II: Responsibilities and Powers
1. The CIM shall:
(a) supervise and direct the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement pursuant to a schedule that he shall specify;
(b) maintain close contact with the Parties to promote full compliance with those aspects of this Agreement;
(c) facilitate, as he deems necessary, the resolution of difficulties arising in connection with such implementation;
(d) participate in meetings of donor organizations, including on issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction, in particular by putting forward proposals and identifying priorities for their consideration as appropriate;
(e) coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and agencies in Kosovo assisting in the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, respecting fully their specific organizational procedures;
(f) report periodically to the bodies responsible for constituting the Mission on progress in the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement; and
(g) carry out the functions specified in this Agreement pertaining to police and security forces.
2. The CIM shall also carry out other responsibilities set forth in this Agreement or as may be later agreed.
Article III: Status of Implementation Mission
1. Implementation Mission personnel shall be allowed unrestricted movement and access into and throughout Kosovo at any time.
2. The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the Implementation Mission, including by the provision of assistance as requested with regard to transportation, subsistence, accommodation, communication, and other facilities.
3. The Implementation Mission shall enjoy such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions under the laws and regulations of Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia. Such legal capacity shall include the capacity to contract, and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property.
4. Privileges and immunities are hereby accorded as follows to the Implementation Mission and associated personnel:
(a) the Implementation Mission and its premises, archives, and other property shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as a diplomatic mission under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
(b) the CIM and professional members of his staff and their families shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and
(c) other members of the Implementation Mission staff and their families shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by members of the administrative and technical staff and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Article IV: Process of Implementation
General
1. The Parties acknowledge that complete implementation will require political acts and measures, and the election and establishment of institutions and bodies set forth in this Agreement. The Parties agree to proceed expeditiously with these tasks on a schedule set by the Joint Commission. The Parties shall provide active support, cooperation, and participation for the successful implementation of this Agreement.
Elections and Census
2. Within nine months of the entry into force of this Agreement, there shall be elections in accordance with and pursuant to procedures specified in Chapter 3 of this Agreement for authorities established herein, according to a voter list prepared to international standards by the Central Election Commission. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shall supervise those elections to ensure that they are free and fair.
3. Under the supervision of the OSCE and with the participation of Kosovo authorities and experts nominated by and belonging to the national communities of Kosovo, Federal authorities shall conduct an objective and free census of the population in Kosovo under rules and regulations agreed with the OSCE in accordance with international standards. The census shall be carried out when the OSCE determines that conditions allow an objective and accurate enumeration.
(a) The first census shall be limited to name, place of birth, place of usual residence and address, gender, age, citizenship, national community, and religion.
(b) The authorities of the Parties shall provide each other and the OSCE with all records necessary to conduct the census, including data about places of residence, citizenship, voters’ lists, and other information.
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Article V: Authority to Interpret
The CIM shall be the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as binding on all Parties and persons.
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CHAPTER 7: IMPLEMENTATION II
Article I: General Obligations
1. The Parties undertake to recreate, as quickly as possible, normal conditions of life in Kosovo and to cooperate fully with each other and with all international organizations, agencies, and non-governmental organizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement. They welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the region a force to assist in the implementation of this Agreement.
(a) The United Nations Security Council is invited to pass a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter endorsing and adopting the arrangements set forth in this Chapter, including the establishment of a multinational military implementation force in Kosovo. The Parties invite NATO to constitute and lead a military force to help ensure compliance with the provisions of this Chapter. They also reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
(b) The Parties agree that NATO will establish and deploy a force (hereinafter “KFOR”) which may be composed of ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations, operating under the authority and subject to the direction and the political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command. The Parties agree to facilitate the deployment and operations of this force and agree also to comply fully with all the obligations of this Chapter.
(c) It is agreed that other States may assist in implementing this Chapter. The Parties agree that the modalities of those States’ participation will be the subject of agreement between such participating States and NATO.
The purposes of these obligations are as follows:
(a) to establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Other than those Forces provided for in this Chapter, under no circumstances shall any armed Forces enter, reenter, or remain within Kosovo without the prior express consent of the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR). For the purposes of this Chapter, the term “Forces” includes all personnel and organizations with military capability, including regular army, armed civilian groups, paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local, Special, Riot and Anti-Terrorist Police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by COMKFOR. The only exception to the provisions of this paragraph is for civilian police engaged in hot pursuit of a person suspected of committing a serious criminal offense, as provided for in Chapter 2;
(b) to provide for the support and authorization of the KFOR and in particular to authorize the KFOR to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Chapter and the protection of the KFOR, Implementation Mission (IM), and other international organizations, agencies, and nongovernmental organizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement, and to contribute to a secure environment;
(c) to provide, at no cost, the use of all facilities and services required for the deployment, operations and support of the KFOR. 3. The Parties understand and agree that the obligations undertaken in this Chapter shall apply equally to each Party. Each Party shall be held individually responsible for compliance with its obligations, and each agrees that delay or failure to comply by one Party shall not constitute cause for any other Party to fail to carry out its own obligations. All Parties shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by the KFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo and the protection of the KFOR, IM, and other international organizations, agencies, and non governmental organizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement.
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Article VIII: Operations and Authority of the KFOR
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5. KFOR operations shall be governed by the following provisions:
(a) KFOR and its personnel shall have the legal status, rights, and obligations specified in Appendix B to this Chapter;
(b) The KFOR shall have the right to use all necessary means to ensure its full ability to communicate and shall have the right to the unrestricted use of the entire electromagnetic spectrum. In implementing this right, the KFOR shall make reasonable efforts to coordinate with the appropriate authorities of the Parties;
(c) The KFOR shall have the right to control and regulate surface traffic throughout Kosovo including the movement of the Forces of the Parties. All military training activities and movements in Kosovo must be authorized in advance by COMKFOR;
(d) The KFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement by ground, air, and water into and throughout Kosovo. It shall in Kosovo have the right to bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, training, and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable. Neither the KFOR nor any of its personnel shall be liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of duties related to the implementation of this Chapter. Roadblocks, checkpoints, or other impediments to KFOR freedom of movement shall constitute a breach of this Chapter and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with this Chapter.
6. The Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the KFOR and the IM, and to carry out the responsibilities listed in this Chapter. The Parties shall comply in all respects with KFOR instructions and requirements.
7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, the Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR has the right and is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the COMKFOR determines such Forces, weapons, or activities to constitute a threat or potential threat to either the KFOR or its mission, or to another Party. Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threatening activities following such a demand by the KFOR shall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance, consistent with the terms set forth in Article I, paragraph 3.
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APPENDIX B: STATUS OF MULTI-NATIONAL MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION FORCE
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2. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities under this Appendix, all NATO personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic, Kosovo, or other, insofar as compliance with those laws is compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate and shall refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of the operation.
3. The Parties recognize the need for expeditious departure and entry procedures for NATO personnel. Such personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and the registration requirements applicable to aliens. At all entry and exit points to/from the FRY, NATO personnel shall be permitted to enter/exit the FRY on production of a national identification (ID) card. NATO personnel shall carry identification which they may be requested to produce for the authorities in the FRY, but operations, training, and movement shall not be allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests.
4. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, and NATO personnel may possess and carry arms if authorized to do so by their orders. The Parties shall accept as valid, without tax or fee, drivers, licenses and permits issued to NATO personnel by their respective national authorities.
5. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national flags of its constituent national elements/units on any NATO uniform, means of transport, or facility.
6. (a) NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal.
(b) NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties’ jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in the FRY. The Parties shall assist States participating in the operation in the exercise of their jurisdiction over their own nationals.
(c) Notwithstanding the above, and with the NATO Commander’s express agreement in each case, the authorities in the FRY may exceptionally exercise jurisdiction in such matters, but only in respect of Contractor personnel who are not subject to the jurisdiction of their nation of citizenship.
7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY. NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shall immediately be turned over to NATO authorities.
8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.
9. NATO shall be exempt from duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections and custom regulations including providing inventories or other routine customs documentation, for personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the territory of the FRY in support of the Operation.
10. The authorities in the FRY shall facilitate, on a priority basis and with all appropriate means, all movement of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, or supplies, through or in the airspace, ports, airports, or roads used. No charges may be assessed against NATO for air navigation, landing, or takeoff of aircraft, whether government-owned or chartered. Similarly, no duties, dues, tolls or charges may be assessed against NATO ships, whether government-owned or chartered, for the mere entry and exit of ports. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft used in support of the operation shall not be subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance.
11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not, however, claim exemption from reasonable charges for specific services requested and received, but operations/ movement and access shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for such services.
12. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the Parties on the salaries and emoluments received from NATO and on any income received from outside the FRY.
13. NATO personnel and their tangible moveable property imported into, acquired in, or exported from the FRY shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections and custom regulations.
14. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export, free of duty, taxes and other charges, such equipment, provisions, and supplies as NATO shall require for the operation, provided such goods are for the official use of NATO or for sale to NATO personnel. Goods sold shall be solely for the use of NATO personnel and not transferable to unauthorized persons.
15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications channels is necessary for the Operation. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own internal mail services. The Parties shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including broadcast services, needed for the operation, as determined by NATO. This shall include the right to utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to communicate, and the right to use all of the electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost. In implementing this right, NATO shall make every reasonable effort to coordinate with and take into account the needs and requirements of appropriate authorities in the FRY.
16. The Parties shall provide, free of cost, such public facilities as NATO shall require to prepare for and execute the Operation. The Parties shall assist NATO in obtaining, at the lowest rate, the necessary utilities, such as electricity, water, gas and other resources, as NATO shall require for the Operation.
17. NATO and NATO personnel shall be immune from claims of any sort which arise out of activities in pursuance of the operation; however, NATO will entertain claims on an ex gratia basis.
18. NATO shall be allowed to contract directly for the acquisition of goods, services, and construction from any source within and outside the FRY. Such contracts, goods, services, and construction shall not be subject to the payment of duties, taxes, or other charges. NATO may also carry out construction works with their own personnel.
19. Commercial undertakings operating in the FRY only in the service of NATO shall be exempt from local laws and regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment and licensing and registration of employees, businesses, and corporations.
20. NATO may hire local personnel who on an individual basis shall remain subject to local laws and regulations with the exception of labor/employment laws. However, local personnel hired by NATO shall:
(a) be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity;
(b) be immune from national services and/or national military service obligations;
(c) be subject only to employment terms and conditions established by NATO; and
(d) be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by NATO.
21. In carrying out its authorities under this Chapter, NATO is authorized to detain individuals and, as quickly as possible, turn them over to appropriate officials.
22. NATO may, in the conduct of the operation, have need to make improvements or modifications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility systems. Any such improvements or modifications of a non-temporary nature shall become part of and in the same ownership as that infrastructure. Temporary improvements or modifications may be removed at the discretion of the NATO Commander, and the infrastructure returned to as near its original condition as possible, fair wear and tear excepted.
23. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with the regard to the interpretation or application of this Appendix shall be settled between NATO and the appropriate authorities in the FRY.
24. Supplementary arrangements with any of the Parties may be concluded to facilitate any details connected with the Operation.
25. The provisions of this Appendix shall remain in force until completion of the Operation or as the Parties and NATO otherwise agree.
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2. U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 1244, 10 June 1999
A. Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,
B. Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,
C. Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,
D. Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,
E. Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,
F. Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,
G. Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
H. Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, Annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper,
I. Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other states of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and document S/1999/649, Annex 2,
J. Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
K. Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,
L. Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decided that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles of Annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in Annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin/complete verifiable phased withdrawals from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with Annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations-auspices, of civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint in consultation with the Security Council a Special Representative to control the implementation of the civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of Annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfill its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early development of effective international civil and security presences in Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
a) deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a cease-fire, ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of Annex 2;
b) demilitarizing of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
c) establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established and humanitarian aid can be delivered;
d) ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;
e) supervising de-mining until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;
f) supporting as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;
g) border monitoring duties as required;
h) ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence and other international organizations;
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; this interim administration will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the civil presence will include:
a) promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of Annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords;
b) performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;
c) organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;
d) transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;
e) facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords;
f) in a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;
g) supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;
h) supporting in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
i) maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and, meanwhile, through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;
j) protecting and promoting human rights;
k) assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donor’s conference particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia;
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence, in consultation with the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General;
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related material for the use of the international civil and security presences;
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;
19. Decides that the civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leadership of the civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
ANNEX 1: Petersberg Principles, 6 May 1999
1. The G8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:
* Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
* Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
* Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
* Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
* The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
* A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;
* Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.
ANNEX 2
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
1. Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under U.N. auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial NATO participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
* Liaison with international civil mission and international security presence
* Marking/clearing minefields
* Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
* Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
9. Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below. (1) A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:
WITHDRAWAL
* Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed scheduled and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn.
RETURNING PERSONNEL
* Equipment associated with returning personnel
* Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
* Timetable for their return
* Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
* Rules governing their relationship to international security presence and international civil mission
(1) Other required elements:
* Rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals meaning, e.g. seven days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometer mutual safety zone within 48 hours.
* Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence, and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands).
* Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals.
* The discussion and achieving of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.
3. Kosovo Military Technical Agreement, 9 June, 1999 (Excerpts)
Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.
Article I: General Obligations
1. The parties to this agreement reaffirm the document presented by President Ahtisaari to President Milosevic and approved by the Serb Parliament and the federal government on June 3, 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under U.N. auspices of effective international civil and security presences. The parties further note that the U.N. Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced, regarding these presences.
2. The state governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force (KFOR) will deploy following the adoption of the UNSCR referred to in paragraph 1 and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. They further agree to comply with all of the obligations of this agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force.
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4. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:
a. To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any forces of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia enter into, re-enter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and the Air Safety Zone (ASZ) described in paragraph 3, Article I without the prior express consent of the international security force (KFOR) commander. Local police will be allowed to remain in the GSZ.
The above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of FRY and Serbian personnel, which will be the subject of a subsequent separate agreement as provided for in paragraph 6 of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
b. To provide for the support and authorization of the international security force (KFOR) and in particular to authorize the international security force (KFOR) to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this agreement and protection of the international security force (KFOR), and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organizations, agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (details in Appendix B).
Article II: Cessation of hostilities
1. The FRY forces shall immediately, upon entry into force (EIF) of this agreement, refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against any person in Kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such activities. They shall not encourage, organize or support hostile or provocative demonstrations.
2. Phased withdrawal of FRY forces (ground): The FRY agrees to a phased withdrawal of all FRY forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo. FRY forces will mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. As they withdraw, FRY forces will clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions, booby traps, obstacles, and charges. They will also mark all sides of all minefields. International security forces (KFOR) entry and deployment into Kosovo will be synchronized. The phased withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence outlined below:
a. By EIF plus one day, FRY forces located in Zone 3 will have vacated, via designated routes, that zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the agreement). Once it is verified that FRY forces have complied with this subparagraph and with paragraph 1 of this article, NATO airstrikes will be suspended. The suspension will continue provided that the obligations of this agreement are fully complied with, and provided that the UNSC adopts a resolution concerning the deployment of the international security force (KFOR) so rapidly that a security gap can be avoided.
b. By EIF plus six days, all FRY forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 1 (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the agreement). Establish liaison teams with the KFOR commander in Pristina.
c. By EIF plus nine days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 2 (depicted on map at Appendix A to this agreement).
d. By EIF plus 11 days, all FRY forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 3 (depicted on map at Appendix A to this agreement).
e. By EIF plus 11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have completed their withdrawal from Kosovo (depicted on map at Appendix A to this agreement) to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo, and not within the 5 km GSZ. At the end of the sequence (EIF plus 11), the senior FRY forces commanders responsible for the withdrawing forces shall confirm in writing to the international security force (KFOR) commander that the FRY forces have complied and completed the phased withdrawal. The international security force (KFOR) commander may approve specific requests for exceptions to the phased withdrawal. The bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of FRY forces as provided under Article II. The international security force (KFOR) shall retain, as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this agreement.
f. The authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia will cooperate fully with international security force (KFOR) in its verification of the withdrawal of forces from Kosovo and beyond the ASZ/GSZ.
g. FRY armed forces withdrawing in accordance with Appendix A, i.e. in designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not be subject to air attack.
h. The international security force (KFOR) will provide appropriate control of the borders of FRY in Kosovo with Albania and FYROM (Turkey recognizes Macedonia by its constitutional name) until the arrival of the civilian mission of the U.N.
4. Sarajevo Summit Declaration
of the Heads of State and Government of the participating and facilitating countries of the Stability Pact and the Principals of participating and facilitating International Organisations and Agencies and regional initiatives
1. We have gathered in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999 to endorse the purposes and principles of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, initiated by the European Union, adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999, and subsequently placed under the auspices of the OSCE. We affirm our collective and individual readiness to give concrete meaning to the Pact by promoting political and economic reforms, development and enhanced security in the region. We confirm our commitment to overcome the tragedies which have afflicted South Eastern Europe during this decade and pledge our continued support to the Dayton/Paris and Kosovo peace processes.
2. Sarajevo is a city which has taken its place in the history of our century. It is a symbol of the will to emerge from the depths of conflict and destruction as well as a symbol of multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural respect and tolerance. From Sarajevo, we affirm our determination to work together towards the full achievement of the objectives of democracy, respect for human rights, economic and social development and enhanced security to which we have subscribed by adopting the Stability Pact. We reaffirm our shared responsibility to build a Europe that is at long last undivided, democratic and at peace. We will work together to promote the integration of South Eastern Europe into a continent where borders remain inviolable but no longer denote division and offer the opportunity of contact and cooperation.
3. Those countries in the region who seek integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, alongside a number of other participants of the Sarajevo Summit, strongly believe that the Pact and implementation of its objectives will facilitate this process. We reaffirm that the EU Member States and other participating countries and international organisations and institutions commit themselves to making every effort to assist them to make speedy and measurable progress along this road. We also reaffirm the inherent right of each and every state participating in the Pact to be free to choose or change its security and association arrangements, including treaties of alliance as they evolve.
4. It is our strong wish that all the countries of the region work together in a spirit of cohesion and solidarity through the Stability Pact to build a common, prosperous and secure future. We regret that we were not able to invite the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to be present today as a full and equal participant in the Stability Pact. All participants must respect the principles and objectives of this pact. We appeal to the people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to embrace democratic change and to work actively for regional reconciliation. In order to draw this country closer to this goal, respecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, we will consider ways of making the Republic of Montenegro an early beneficiary of the pact and reaffirm our support to all democratic forces. In this connection, we support the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244 regarding Kosovo, FRY. We also support UNMIK and KFOR in their efforts to ensure peace, democracy and security for all inhabitants of Kosovo. We reiterate the importance of the preservation of the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo, where the rights of all citizens and the rule of law are respected. We welcome the encouraging results of the 28 July 1999 donor conference for immediate humanitarian and other assistance.
5. The countries of the region are the owners of the stabilisation process and their full efforts in and commitments to this undertaking are critical to its success. We welcome the progress the countries of South Eastern Europe have made in building regional cooperation and the commitments they have undertaken on bilateral and regional levels to promote and implement the objectives of the Stability Pact. Regional initiatives, organisations and cooperative structures will be of particular benefit to this effort.
6. Regional cooperation will serve as a catalyst to the aspirations of the countries in the region to integrate themselves into broader structures. We welcome common proposals and projects of cross-border or regional character by the countries of South Eastern Europe and other countries of the Stability Pact as an important contribution to translating the Pact’s objectives into swift and specific actions. These proposals should be referred to the Regional Table and the relevant Working Tables of the Stability Pact.
7. We will work together to accelerate the transition in the region to stable democracies, prosperous market economies and open and pluralistic societies in which human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, are respected, as an important step in their integration into euro-atlantic and global institutions. We welcome the undertakings of countries of the region to continue to promote democracy, reconciliation, economic reform, good governance, security cooperation and confidence-building, which constitute a solid basis for our efforts to stabilize and transform the region. Our shared objective is the development of peaceful and good neighbourly relations. Full implementation by all parties of the Dayton/Paris Accords, as envisaged by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in Madrid, is also an integral element of regional stabilisation. The partners undertake fully to support the countries of the region in their effort to achieve these goals.
8. The Stability Pact process will concentrate on the areas of democracy and human rights, economic development and cooperation as well as security.
9. Democracy and Human Rights: Deep-rooted democratic habits and a vibrant civil society constitute the foundation upon which the achievement of the objectives of the Pact can be built. We will work together to encourage cooperation, including among countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of South Eastern Europe that have valuable practical experience to share, on promoting human rights and attitudes and practices of democratic accountability, personal responsibility, freedom of expression and the rule of law. We commit ourselves to continue to cooperate to restructure civil administration and to bolster the freedom of political activity and independent media throughout the region. We affirm that we are accountable to our citizens and responsible to one another for respect for OSCE norms and principles. We emphasise the important role of the Council of Europe in the implementation of the Stability Pact. We also reaffirm the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return freely and safely to their homes. We reconfirm our pledge to cooperate towards preserving the multinational and multiethnic diversity of countries in the region and protecting minorities. Established ethnic, cultural and linguistic identities and rights should be consistently protected in accordance with relevant international mechanisms and conventions. We welcome the initiative by countries of the region to develop a dialogue and consultations on human rights issues.
10. Economic Development and Cooperation: We underline the importance of enhanced economic relations of countries in the region with the European Union and of their integration into the global trading system, including WTO membership. We affirm that economic reform and the creation of a healthy business environment are necessary prerequisites for economic progress, integration and job creation. We commit ourselves to work together to remove policy and administrative obstacles to the free flow of goods and capital, in order to increase economic cooperation, trade and investment in the region and between the region and the rest of Europe and the world, and also to improve basic regional infrastructure. Countries of the region pledge to take concrete action to improve the investment climate. In turn, we will work together with the international financial institutions to develop appropriate vehicles to mobilise private finance and mitigate risk. We recognise the great economic benefit to the region of providing unilateral trade preferences for South Eastern Europe, and we commit to pursue such concrete measures to catalyse development and growth in the region. Countries in the region will continue and where necessary intensify efforts to create a predictable and fair business environment, fight corruption and crime and press on with market-oriented reforms, including privatisation. Partners will work systematically and in a coordinated way to assist them in this endeavour, drawing on their expertise and resources. In that context, we will develop specific means to allow active participation of firms from South Eastern Europe in procurement for reconstruction and development in the region. Subject to this objective, such procurement should be done through fair and transparent competition according to multilaterally agreed principles. The international financial institutions will make best efforts to assist the countries of South Eastern Europe to achieve rapid and effective economic development. We ask that proposals, including from countries in the region, on economic development and cooperation of a regional character be evaluated, as appropriate, in the EC-World Bank donor coordination process and in the Stability Pact Economic Working Table, working in close consultation with one another. Where appropriate, additional financing for regional projects could be sought from donors. Italy has offered to host a conference for this purpose.
11. Security: We pledge to work towards ending tensions and creating peaceful and good neighbourly relations in order to strengthen a climate of security throughout the region. We commit ourselves to full implementation of existing arms control and confidence-building measures and to efforts for their improvement. We will also promote civilian control of the armed forces and effective measures against organised crime, terrorism and problems caused by landmines and small arms proliferation. We will cooperate to promote transparency and accountability in defense and security matters and military spending. In this regard, we welcome the decision of Bosnia and Herzegovina to reduce its military expenditures and personnel. We furthermore welcome the recommitment of signatories present to fulfilling their Dayton arms control obligations.
12. We welcome and support the appointment of Mr. Bodo Hombach as the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact by the Council of the European Union, as endorsed by the Chairman in Office of the OSCE. We pledge our full cooperation to the Special Coordinator in the achievement of our objectives.
13. We expect the South Eastern Europe Regional Table to establish an effective coordination framework for the Pact’s activities. We welcome the intention of the Presidency of the EU to convene the first meeting of the Regional Table in September 1999. We welcome the intention of the Special Coordinator to present a Work Plan in advance of that first meeting, together with proposals on the chairs of the Working Tables to be established at this meeting. We welcome the intention of participants and facilitators and other interested countries to contribute proposals to be included in the Work Plan covering the activities of the Working Tables. We support convening of the meetings of the Working Tables within one month after the Regional Table meeting at dates and locations to be decided at the Regional Table.
14. We welcome the intention expressed by all present to translate the objectives of the Pact into concrete action, tailored to the individual needs of the countries in the region, and taking into account recommendations made by them. Operating on the basis of equality, transparency and efficiency, the Regional Table and the Working Tables will be instrumental in giving further substance to and monitoring the implementation of our commitments.
15. We call on all participants and facilitators and other interested countries to continue to participate generously in this process of transformation, economic development and reconstruction of South Eastern Europe upon which we are embarking with today’s solemn gathering. We call on all to align themselves with the objective of extending the area of stability, democracy, peace and prosperity to all the peoples of South Eastern Europe.
Endnotes
*: Discussion paper for the conference on Mit der NATO ins 21. Jahrhundert. Perspektiven europäischer Sicherheit Lauenburg, 4-6 June 1999 and for the seminar at COPRI, 13 September 1999, on The Lessons of Kosovo Last revised 10 June 1999, but with a postscript, 2 September 1999 Back.
Note 1: More or less official US accounts of the war include Aspin, Les & William Dickinson: Defense for a New Era. Lessons of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s US, 1992); Friedman, Norman: Desert Victory. The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Scales, Robert S. Jr.: Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, US, 1994); Keaney, Thomas A. & Eliot A. Cohen: Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995); Vuono, Carl E.: “Desert Storm and the Future of Conventional Forces”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 49-68. For a critique see Mueller, John: “The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War”, Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 77-117; Posen, Barry R.: “Military Mobilization in the Persian Gulf Conflict”, SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 640-654; Biddle, Stephen: “Victory Misunderstood. What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflicts”, International Security, vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179; Ganyard, Stephen T.: “Strategic Air Power Didn’t Work”, US Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 8 (August 1995), pp. 31-35. Back.
Note 2: Ely, John Hart: War and Responsibility. Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). Back.
Note 3: See, for instance, Cohen, Eliot A.: “A Revolution in Warfare”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54; Allard, C. Kenneth: “The Future of Command and Control: Toward a Paradigm of Information Warfare”, in L. Benjamin Ederington & Michael J. Mazarr (eds.): Turning Point. The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 161-192; Cushman, John H.: “Implications of the Gulf War for Future Military Strategy”, ibid., pp. 79-101; McKitrick, Jeffrey et al.: “The Revolution in Military Affairs”, in Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.): Battlefield of the Future. 21st Century Warfare Issues. Air War College Studies in National Security, no. 3 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1995), pp. 65-97; Stein, George: “Information War-Cyberwar—Netwar”, ibid., pp. 153-179; Davis, Paul (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), passim; O’Hanlon, Michael: “Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?”, Foreign Policy, vol. 113 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 72-86. For a comparison of the various theories see Biddle, Stephen: “The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare”, Security Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998), pp. 1-74. Back.
Note 4: On this “Operation Restore Hope” see Hirsch, John L. & Robert B. Oakley: Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995); Lyons, Terrence & Ahmed I. Samatar: Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Sahnoun, Mohamed: Somalia. The Missed Opportunities (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); Clark, Jeffrey: “Debacle in Somalia: Failure of Collective Response”, in Lori Fisher Damrosch (ed.): Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 205-240; Sapir, Debarati G. & Hedwig Deconick: “The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance and Military Intervention in Somalia”, in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.): The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 127-150; Lalande, Serge: “Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping”, in Daniel Warner (ed.): New Dimensions of Peacekeeping (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 69-99; Bennett, Andrew: “Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti: What Went Right, What Went Wrong”, in Joseph Lepgold & Thomas G. Weiss (eds.): Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 133-155; Daniel, Donald C.F., Brad Hayes & Chantall de Jonge Ouddraat: Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 79-112. Back.
Note 5: Pape, Robert A.: Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). On World War II, see the official British study; Webster, Charles & Noble Frankland: The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1933-1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961); and its US counterpart: Craven, Wesley Frank & James Lea Cate (eds.): The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volumes 1-5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948-1953). On the strategic thinking behind strategic bombing see Warner, Edward: “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare”, in Edward Mead Earle (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (1941, reprint New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 485-503; and MacIsaac, David: “Voices From the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists”, in Peter Paret (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 624-647. On the Vietnam experience see Gibson, James William: The Perfect War. The War We Couldn’t Lose and How We Did (New York: Vintage Books, 1988); Clodfelter, Mark: The Limits of Air Power. The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989). Back.
Note 6: Glennon, Michael: “The New Interventionism”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 2-7. Back.
Note 7: Quoted in Dinstein, Yoram: War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Second Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 127. Back.
Note 8: This is elaborated in Møller, Bjørn: “The Slippery Slope of Authority Eroded: A Rejoinder”, Security Dialogue, vol. 30, no. 1 (March 1999), pp. 87-90; and idem “The Never-ending Iraqi Crisis”, Working Papers, no. 7/1999 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1999). Back.
Note 9: Baratta, Joseph Preston: “The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War”, in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, vols. I-III (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), vol. II, pp. 695-705. Back.
Note 10: I am indebted to my colleague Ole Wæver for this metaphor. Back.
Note 11: The literature on NATO’s post-Cold War debates is enormous. On the question of functions see, for instance: Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler & F. Stephen Larrabee: “Building a New NATO”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4 (September-October 1993), pp. 28-40; Bailes, Alyson J.K.: “European Defence and Security. The Role of NATO, WEU and EU”, Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 55-64; Bertram, Christoph: “NATO on Track for the 21st Century?”, Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 1 (March 1995), pp. 65-71; Bonvicini, Gianni, Murizio Cremasco, Reinhardt Rummel & Peter Schmidt (eds.): A Renewed Partnership for Europe. Tackling European Security Challenges by EU-NATO Interaction (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Carpenter, Ted Galen (ed.): The Future of NATO (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Chernoff, Fred: After Bipolarity. The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Cornish, Paul: Partnership in Crisis. The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997); Duffield, John S.: Power Rules. The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Goldstein, Walter (ed.): Security in Europe. The Role of NATO after the Cold War (London: Brassey’s, 1994); Gordon, Philip H. (ed.): NATO’s Transformation. The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Joseph, Robert: “Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and NATO”, Survival, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 111-130; Kamp, Karl-Heinz: “A Global Role for NATO?”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 7-11; Krause, Joachim: “Proliferation Risks and their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO”, Survival, vol. 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 135-148; Lepgold, Joseph: “NATO’s Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem”, International Security, vol. 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 78-106; Levine, Robert A. (ed.): Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Crane Russak, 1992); McCalla, Robert B.: “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International Organization, vol. 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445-475; Papacosma, S. Victor & Mary Ann Heiss (eds.): NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does It Have a Future? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Winrow, Gareth: “NATO and Out-of-Area: A Post-Cold War Challenge”, European Security, vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 617-638; Yost, David: “The New NATO and Collective Security”, Survival, vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 135-160; idem: NATO Transformed. The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington, D.C.: The United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998). On the question of enlargement, see note 28 below. Back.
Note 12: www.naa.be/docu/1998/argen-e.html. Back.
Note 13: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm. Back.
Note 14: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. Back.
Note 15: The dilemmas involved are set out in an exemplary fashion in Moore, Jonathan (ed.): Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). See also Rodley, Nigel (ed.): To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1992); Dorman, Andrew M. & Thomas G. Otte (eds.): Military Intervention. From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention (Aldershot: Datmouth, 1995); Reed, Laura W. & Carl Kaysen (eds.): Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention. A Collection of Essays from a Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Commitee on International Security Studies, AASS, 1993); Lyons, Gene M. & Michael Mastanduno (eds.): Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); Roberts, Adam: “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights”, International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 429-450; Phillips, Robert L. & Duane L. Cady: Humanitarian Intervention. Just War Versus Pacifism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Pape, Matthias: Humanitäre Intervention. Zur Bedeutung der Menschenrechte in den Vereinten Nationen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997); McDermott, Anthony (ed.): “Sovereign Intervention”, PRIO Report, no. 2/99 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1999). Back.
Note 16: Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. Second Edition (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995). For a critique see Walker, R.B.J.: Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Back.
Note 17: Kant, Immanuel: Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (1795/1796, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam Jun., 1963); Piepmeier, Rainer: “Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Friede als Ziel der Geschichte”, in Christiane Rajewsky & Dieter Riesenberger (eds.): Wider den Krieg. Große Pazifisten von Immanuel Kant bis Heinrich Böll (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1987), pp. 17-25; Ostsee-Akademie (eds.): Kant und der Frieden in Europa. Ansätze zur geistigen Grundlegung künftiger Ost-West-Beziehungen, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1992); Bohman, James & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.): Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Franke, Mark F.N.: “Immanuel Kant and the (Im)Possibility of International Relations Theory”, Alternatives, vol. 20, no. 3 (July-September 1995), pp. 279-322. On cosmopolitanism see also Archibugi, Daniele & David Held (eds.): Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Falk, Richard: On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1995); Camilleri, J.A. & Jim Falk: The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (London: Edward Elgar, 1992); Simai, Mihaly: The Future of Global Governance (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); Rochester, J. Martin: Waiting for the Millennium. The United Nations and the Future of World Order (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Back.
Note 18: See, e.g. Newman, Frank C. & David Weisbrodt: International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process. 2nd edition (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1996); idem & idem: International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process. Selected International Human Rights Instruments and Bibliography for Research on International Human Rights Law. 2nd edition (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1996); The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1995. The United Nations Bluebook Series, Vol. VII (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995); Farer, Tom J. & Felice Gaer: “The UN and Human Rights”, in Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury (eds.): United Nations, Divided World. The UN’s Role in International Relations, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 240-296; Hannum, Hurst: “Human Rights”, in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United Nations Legal Order, Vols. 1-2 (American Society for International Law and Cambridge: Grotius Publications/Cambridge University Press, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 319-348. On genocide see Rotberg, Robert I. & Thomas G. Weiss (eds.): From Massacres to Genocide. The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution and The World Peace Foundation, 1996); Strozier, Charles B. & Michael Flynn (eds.): Genocide, War, and Human Survival (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996). Back.
Note 19: Fukyama, Francis: The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Back.
Note 20: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: “An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992”, in Roberts & Kingsbury (eds.): op. cit. (note 17), pp. 468-498. Back.
Note 21: Huntington, Samuel P.: “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999), pp. 35-49. See also Layne, Christopher: “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, International Security, vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; Waltz, Kenneth N.: “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, ibid., vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; Mastanduno, Michael: “Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War”, ibid., vol. 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88. For a proposal for a “soft” form of persuasion see Singer, Max & Aaron Wildawsky: The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993). Back.
Note 22: Data from Sköns, Elisabeth & al.: “Tables of Military Expenditure” , SIPRI Yearbook 1998, pp. 222-227. Back.
Note 24: Brandt Commission: North-South: A Programme for Survival. Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980); Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and Development): Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Commission on Global Governance: Our Global Neighbourhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Back.
Note 25: On the problem of “extreme emergencies” see Walzer, Michael: Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977). Back.
Note 26: Even though the accord has long been available on-line, few politicians have apparently read it. The Danish Foreign Minister has even declared that it is secret, and that the Danish government does not have the text ( sic!). See Funch, Søren: “Den hemmelige fredsaftale”, Morgenavisen Jyllandsposten, 23 May 1999, Section 1, p. 9. The full text of the treaty is available (also to foreign ministers) at www.balcanaction.org/pubs/kia299.html or jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm. Lengthy extracts are translated in Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 44, no. 5 (May 1999), pp. 611-630. Back.
Note 27: “Serbia accepts peace plan”, news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/ news_ id359000/359803.stm. Back.
Note 28: See, for instance, the list of “NATO’s Bombing Blunders” (20 May 1999), at news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_340000/340966.stm. Back.
Note 29: See, e.g. “Did NATO Miscalculate” (23 April 1999), at news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ world/europe/newsid%5F326000/326864.stm. Back.
Note 30: On the pros and cons of enlargement see Averre, Derek: “NATO Expansion and Russian National Interests”, European Security, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 10-54; Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler & F. Stephen Larrabee: “NATO Expansion: The Next Steps”, Survival, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 7-33; Brown, Michael E.: “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion”, ibid., pp. 34-52; Calleo, David: “NATO Enlargement as a Problem for Security in Europe”, Aussenpolitik, vol. 49, no. 1 (3rd Quarter 1998), pp. 24-27; Carpenter, Ted Galen & Barbara Conry (ed.) NATO Enlargement. Illusions and Reality (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1997); Eyal, Jonathan: “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision”, International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4 (October 1997), pp. 695-720; Gareev, M.: “The Expansion of NATO Does Not Solve, but Aggrevates Security Issues”, International Affairs. A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, vol. 42, no. 3 (1996), pp. 141-147; Haglund, David G. (ed.): Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 1996); idem, S. Neil MacFarlane & Joel S. Sokolsky (eds.): NATO’s Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Hanson, Marianne: “Russia and NATO Expansion: The Uneasy Basis of the Founding Act”, European Security, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 13-29; Kamp, Karl-Heinz: “The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion”, Foreign Policy, vol. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 116-129; Kay, Sean: “The ““New NATO”” and the Enlargement Process in Europe”, European Security, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 1-16; Kuzio, Taras: “NATO Enlargement: The View from the East”, ibid., no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 48-62; Lynch, Allen C.: “Russia and NATO: Expansion and Coexistence?”, The International Spectator, vol. 22, no. 1 (Jan-March 1997), pp. 81-91; Mandelbaum, Michael: “Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 9-13; MccGwire, Michael: “NATO Expansion: ““A Policy Error of Historic Importance”””, Review of International Studies, vol. 24, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 23-42; Møller, Bjørn: “Preconditions for NATO Enlargement from a Common Security Point of View”, Working Papers, no. 6 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997); Perlmutter, Amos & Ted Galen Carpenter: “NATO’s Expensive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 1 (Jan-Febr. 1998), pp. 2-6; Schwarz, Benjamin: “Permanent Interests, Endless Threats. Cold War Continuities and NATO Enlargement”, World Policy Journal, vol. 14, no. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 24-30; Sergounin, Alexander: “Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to Damage Limitation”, European Security, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 55-71; Solomon, Gerald B.: The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). Back.
Note 31: The document is reprinted in Yost: op. cit. (note 10), pp. 313-323 (quote from p. 315). Back.
Note 32: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-062e.htm. Back.
Note 33: See the statement from the meeting between Russian envoy Chernomyrdin and President Milosevic, 28 May 1999, at news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/monitoring/ newsid_35000/355664.stm. The G8 plan is available from news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/ europe/newsid_336000/336979.stm. Back.
Note 34: news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_360000/360507.stm. Back.
Note 35: Luttwak, Edward N.: “A Post-Heroic Military Policy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44. See also Gentry, John A.: “Military Force in an Age of National Cowardice”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 179-191; Walt, Stephen M.: “Musclebound: The Limits of U.S. Power”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 55, no. 2 (March-April 1999), pp. 44-48. Back.
Note 36: There are many different formulations of the just war “doctrine”, but there is general uananimity on the criteria mentioned. See, for instance, Walzer op. cit. (note 23); Johnson, James Turner: Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. A Moral and Political Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); idem: The Quest for Peace. Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Elshtain, Jean Bethke (ed.): Just War Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Nardin, Terry (ed.): The Ethics of War and Peace. Religious and Secular Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Smock, David R. (ed.): Religious Perspectives on War. Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force After the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992). On the laws of war see Best, Geoffrey: Humanity in Warfare. The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts (London: Methuen, 1980); De Lupis, Ingrid Detter: The Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Green, L.C.: The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopolous & Mark R. Schulman (eds.): The Laws of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); McCoubrey, H. & N.D. White: International Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992); Dinstein: op. cit. (note 6); Murphy, John F.: “Force and Arms”, in Schachter & Joyner (eds.): op. cit. (note 17), pp. 247-318; Shaw, Malcolm N.: International Law. Third Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1991), pp. 681-740. See also Guicherd, Catherine: “International Law and the War in Kosovo”, Survival, vol. 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 19-34. Back.
Note 37: Rogers, Paul: “High-tech War in Kosovo”, published by the BBC, 7 May 1999 (news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/special_report/1998/kosovi/newsid_337000/337679.stm). See also Morehouse, David A.: Nonlethal Weapons. War Without Death (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); Lewer, Nick & Steven Schofield: Non-Lethal Weapons: A Fatal Attraction? (London: Zed Books, 1997). Foster, Gregory D.: “Non-Lethality: Arming the Post-Modern Military”, RUSI Journal, vol. 142, no. 5 (October 1997), pp. 56-63, 82; Starr, Barbara: “Pentagon Maps Non-Lethal Options”, International Defense Review, vol. 27, no. 7 (July 1994), pp. 30-32; Lewer, Nick: “Non-Lethal Weapons”, Medicine and War, vol. 11 (1995), pp. 78-90. Back.
Note 38: On preventive diplomacy in general see Lund, Michael S.: Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1996); Väyrynen, Raimo: “Toward Effective Conflict Prevention: A Comparison of Different Instruments”, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 1-18; Carment, David & Patrick James (eds.): Peace in the Midst of Wars. Preventing and Managing International Ethnic Conflicts (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998); Schirch, Lisa: Keeping the Peace. Exploring Civilian Alternatives in Conflict Prevention (Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute, 1995); Dixon, William J.: “Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement”, International Organization, vol. 50, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 653-681; Cortright, David (ed.): The Price of Peace. Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). On the case of Macedonia see Stefanova, Redoslava: “Preventing Violent Conflict in Europe: The Case of Macedenia”, The International Spectator, vol. 32, no. 3/4 (July-Dec 1997), pp. 99-120. Back.
Note 39: On the background see Veremis, Thanos & Evangeloss Kofos (eds.): Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998); Heraclides, Alexis: “The Kosovo Conflict and Its Resolution. In Pursuit of Ariadne’s Thread”, Security Dialogue, vol. 28, no. 3 (September 1997), pp. 317-331; Miall, Hugh: “Kosovo in Crisis: Conflict Prevention and Intervention in the Southern Balkans”, Peace and Security, vol. 30 (June 1998), pp. 4-13; Juda, Tim: “Kosovo’s Road to War”, Survival, vol. 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-18. Back.
Note 40: Good works on the process are Ramet, Sabrina P.: Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd edition (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992); ida: Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War. Second Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1996); Mojzes, Paul: Yugoslav Inferno. Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum Press, 1994); Cohen, Lenard J.: Broken Bonds. Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition. 2nd Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1995); Bianchini, Stefano & Paul Shoup (eds.): The Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balkans: How to Achieve Security? (Ravenna: Longo Editore Ravenna, 1995); Akhavan, Payam & Robert Howse (eds.): Yugoslavia, the Former and Future. Reflections by Scholars from the Region (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution and The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1995). Back.
Note 41: See the chapters on the various organizations in Chayes, Abram & Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.): Preventing Conflicts in the Post-Communist World (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1996); or Anderson, Stephanie: “EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe’s New Security Architecture”, European Security, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 328-353. On the UN-NATO interaction see Greco, Ettore: “UN-NATO Interaction: Lessons from the Yugoslav Experience”, The International Spectator, vol. 32, no. 3/4 (July-Dec 1997), pp. 121-136; Schulte, Gregory L.: “Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO”, Survival, vol. 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 19-42; Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge: “Bosnia”, in Daniel, Hayes & Oudrat: op. cit. (note 4), pp. 41-78. Back.
Note 42: CNN: “NATO, Yugoslavs sign air surveillance accord” (16 October 1998). See cnn.com/ world/europe/9810/16/kosovo.01/index.html. On the UCK see Hedges, Chris: “Kosovo’s Next Masters”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 24-42. Back.
Note 43: For a critique of the negotiations see Øberg, Jan: “Rambouillet—A Process Analysis”, PressInfo, no. 56 (Lund: Transnational Foundation, 20 February 1999). See also Weller, Marc: “The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo”, International Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (April 1999), pp. 211-253. Back.
Note 44: On the unclear rules pertaining to secession see, e.g., Halperin, Morton & David J. Scheffer: Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Brookings Books, 1992); Müllerson, Rein: International Law, Rights and Politics. Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS (London: Routledge, 1994); Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W.: “Self-Determination”, in Schachter & Joyner (eds.): op. cit. (note 17), pp. 349-389. Back.
Note 45: Mintchev, Emil: “Friedensordnung nach dem Kosovo-Krieg. Eine integrative Strategie für den Balkan”, Internationale Politik, vol. 54, no. 5 (May 1999), pp. 55-62. Back.
Note 46: All the documents are available from: www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iyus/ iyusframe.htm. Back.
Note 47: The full text of the indictment is available at www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/24-05-99milo.htm. Back.
Note 48: A good analysis of the role of myths is Buffet, Cyril & Beatrice Heuser (eds.): Haunted by History. Myths in International Relations (Oxford: Berghan Books, 1998). Back.
Note 49: On the debate within NATO, for instance, Butcher, Tim & Patrick Bishop: “NATO Admits Air Campaign Failed”, Daily Telegraph, 22 July 1999; or BBC: “NATO’s Inner Kosovo Conflict”, 20 August 1999, available at news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/ newsid_425000/ 425468.stm. Back.
Note 50: See, for instance, Krusewitz, Knut: “Ein Umweltkrieg in humaner Absicht? Ökologische und humanitäre Folgen des Krieges gegen Jugoslawien”, Antimilitarismus Information, vol. 29, no. 7 (1999), pp. 103-115. Back.
Note 51: BBC News, 26 August 1999, quoting from the monthly Saga. Back.
Note 52: Cordesman, Anthony: “The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo”. Report to the USAF XP Strategy Forum, 8 July 1999, updated 3 August and available from www.csis.org/kosovo/Lessons.html. Back.
Note 53: See, for instance, “Shocked Kosovo War Crimes Team Expects More Indictments”, Central Europe Online, 25 June 1999; “Seized Serb Documents link Milosevic to Mass Killings”, The Observer, 27 June 1999. Back.
Note 54: See, for instance, a letter to the editor by a Brookings Institution fellow: Kuperman, Alan J.: “NATO Move May Widen War”, USA Today, 9-11 October 1999. Back.
Note 55: Figures from UNHCR, cited by Cordesman: loc. cit. (note 4), p. 182. Back.
Note 56: See “Russian Troops Moving Towards Kosovo”, BBC Online Network, 11 June 1999; “Russians Push for Separate Sector in Kosovo Peace Force”, CNN Interactive, 10 June 1999; “Russia Accused in Kosovo”, BBC Online Network, 10 August 1999. Back.
Note 57: Wood, Paul: “KLA Sticks to Its Guns”, BBC Online Network, 10 June 1999, Back.
Note 58: Hedges, Chris: “Kosovo’s Next Masters”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 24-42. Back.
Note 59: By 1 September, the UNHCR estimated that around 200,000 Serbs and Roma had fled, mostly to Serbia. See Kosovo Crisis Update, at www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm. Back.
Note 60: A good example of the intentions is the UNHCR’s Kosovo Return Plan, 11 June 1999, available at www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosret2.htm. Back.
Note 61: Similar ideas had been advanced by Mintchev, Emil: “Friedensordnung nach dem Kosovo-Krieg. Eine integrative Strategie für den Balkan”, Internationale Politik, vol. 54, no. 5 (May 1999), pp. 55-62. Back.
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