From the CIAO Atlas Map of Middle East 

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Three Futures for Israel and Palestine

Bjørn Møller

January 1999

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

It is usually regarded as more “scientific” to write about the past and present than about the future, if only because they provide access to a wealth of empirical data, whereas the future is inevitably somewhat nebulous and shrouded in uncertainty. However, it does not follow that it is impossible to say anything meaningful about the future, if only predictions are firmly based on available data from the past and present, and if predictions are falsifiable, at least in the “time will tell” sense. 1 Indeed, present actions are nearly always influenced by “the shadow of the future”, 2 hence involve prediction, which can be undertaken in a perfectly rational manner. The further we attempt to glance into the future, however, and the more complex the setting, the dimmer the picture.


1. The Future is Still Open

In the present paper, an attempt shall be made at comparing three different futures for the Israel-Palestine nexus. This is, indeed, very complex, if only because it involves a large set of actors, most of which cannot reasonably be treated as unitary. One has to look at the different groupings within both the Israeli and Palestinian camps, at their (likewise pluralistic) friends and foes in what is a multipolar and open-ended region. 3 One further needs take into account external actors such as the United States and the European Union, 4 including their national and sub-national component parts (the “Jewish link”, “Islamic link”, etc.). 5 Only a small part of these complexities will be addressed in the following.

The “baseline future” is a simple extrapolation of present trends, including the peace process--or what is left of it after the reign of Benjamin Netanyahu which was, by the time of writing, hopefully, gradually coming to an end. There is, for obvious reasons, no such thing as a “status quo” in a process, which requires progress and momentum. It may be stalled for a short while, but it cannot stand still for long and certainly not indefinitely.

It may still be possible to salvage the peace process, say if the Labour Party should return to power after the elections, scheduled for 17 May 1999. However, it seems, at least, equally likely that the process will come to a halt, or even be reversed. We may thus be approaching a juncture where two divergent paths lead into different futures. For some time after this juncture, it may still be possible to reverse course, but it will become increasingly difficult and costly until a point of no return is reached. 6

Two different “generic futures” appear conceivable, along with an indefinite number of variations. One is a regress to a more conflictual relationship in several different versions that are all based on self-help and unilateralism. The other and more appealing future entails a more cooperative relationship based on a reciprocal respect for basic security concerns.

Even though only the latter future would be stable, it is entirely conceivable that there is no path leading from here to there. Important though this problem of implementation (including sequencing) certainly is, it has been largely omitted as falling beyond the scope of the present paper. On the other hand, a brief enumeration of the basic problem seems indispensable as an introduction to the main analysis.


2. The Roots of the Problem

One might describe the foundations of the Israel-Palestine conflict as an instance of the well-known security dilemma which, according to neo-realist analysis, affects relations in any anarchic setting, i.e. where independent actors confront each other. 7

When two actors, be they states, nations, or even individuals, have come to regard each other as potential enemies, both of them tend to take steps for their own protection which (however inadvertently) make them appear threatening to the other side, who responds in a similar fashion. A vicious circle often results which may manifest itself in arms racing, pre-emptive strikes, preventive wars--or in a growing oppression that spurs rebellious action which may well become violent and nasty, “requiring” even more severe oppression, etc.

Ever since the birth of Israel in 1948 (or even before that) we have seen this security dilemma at work between the states and other actors in the region, manifesting itself in the civil war-like struggle under the British mandate and the wars of 1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973, as well as in the state of “virtual war” that prevailed for most of the interludes. 8 Israel has consistently felt surrounded by enemies, the combined strength of which has been perceived as surpassing Israel’s in several important dimensions such as territory, natural resources and population. Hence the Jewish state’s perceived need for a military strategy of pre-emption (at least until quite recently), for conducting wars offensively (i.e. on enemy ground) 9 , and for underpinning conventional military strength with a nuclear deterrent--the so-called “bomb in the basement”. 10

Regardless of the underlying defensive motivation, this offensive posture has understandably been viewed as threatening by Israel’s neighbours, who have responded by similar means, i.e. with pre-emption (e.g. in the 1973 Yom Kippur War), offensiveness (inter alia manifested in ballistic missile proliferation) and a quest for (mostly chemical) weapons of mass destruction. 11 The result is an unstable stand-off, promising possible victory for whoever strikes first and defeat to the side that is caught off-guard by a surprise attack. 12

For most of the period, the Palestinians have been little more than “pawns” in this Arab-Israeli conflict, to the interests of whom the Arab states have paid lip-service, but little more. Occasionally, the Arab states have even turned against the Palestinians, as when Jordan occupied the West Bank in 1948, or when they launched the military campaign against the PLO fedayeen in (what the PLO refer to as) the “Black September” of 1970. 13

Even though peace agreements have been signed between Israel and Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), at least the former remains a distinctly “cold peace” that has, at best, mitigated but not eliminated the security dilemma. 14 That the security dilemma is at work, however, does not mean that the interests of the two sides are necessarily incompatible. Quite a strong case can actually be made that the present (almost) zero-sum conflict might be turned into a positive-sum one, where absolute gains accruing from collaboration could come to outweigh relative gains considerations 15 , hence that a mutually advantageous relationship is conceivable ( vide infra ). 16 The security dilemma simply implies that it is risky, hence difficult, to get from here to there.

The situation of an Israeli settlement is a microcosmic version of the security dilemma. It represents a piece of Israel situated on occupied territory, i.e. an environment that is perceived as distinctly hostile--uncomfortably similar to the situation of the Jewish ghettos in Europe and elsewhere in the past. Hence the need for an armed protection which is, in its turn, viewed as threatening by the Palestinians. When the latter resort to hostile acts against settlers or their armed guardians, this is usually viewed as an ex post facto validation of the need for the armed presence, or even used as an argument for strengthening it 17 --whence may easily develop a vicious circle of escalating violence.

One might even argue that the very identities of the two sides are mutually incompatible, hence may provide sufficient grounds for conflict, even in the absence of conflicting interests. First of all, some would argue that “identity” presupposes “otherness” (i.e. that ego is inconceivable without alter), and that this Other is (automatically, or at least usually) seen as a hostile, rather than merely different, Other. 18

Secondly, to the extent that nationhood is based on attachment to (and even more so when it requires possession of) a particular piece of land, 19 Palestinian and Israeli/Jewish identities easily become mutually exclusive. The more politically Jewish (as opposed to religiously or culturally) the Israelis become, the less capable are they of acknowledging another nation’s right to the land that is a constitutive element of (this form of) national identity. And the more the Palestinians see themselves as a nation in their own right (as opposed to one segment of the larger Arab nation), the more their identity comes to presuppose possession of Palestine, including thee present Israel. 20 That identities are incompatible does not imply that they are necessarily politicized, “securitized” or “violized”. It often happens, however. 21

The security dilemma is not easily resolvable, hence the predominant assumption is that is perennial, leaving the parties with no viable alternative to unilateral power politics. One might, indeed, argue that an adequate response to the security dilemma is for one party to become sufficiently strong, militarily or otherwise. If one party to a conflict is superior enough to the other(s), and certain to remain so, it may be able to subdue any opposition to its rule indefinitely, thereby obtaining durable security. The weaker side may, however reluctantly and unwillingly, see no alternative to acquiescence, which would leave the security dilemma in place, but “dormant” and without significant consequences. However, while this may be a viable strategy in certain cases, it surely is not in the Israel-Palestine case, where enduring and unchallengeable predominance is not within reach for either side. The only remedy is thus an accommodation by each side of the respective other’s basic security and other needs, i.e. a policy of “common security” ( vide infra ).


3. Baseline Future: “Back on Track”

The term “peace process” has become increasingly misleading. It was initiated by the Israeli Labour leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, and produced some fairly significant results in the first couple of years. 22

A peace treaty was signed with Jordan in 1994 to supplement that signed with Egypt of 1979, and negotiations were started with the rest of the Arab community of states on a number of issues in a complex set of interlocking bilateral and multilateral talks. 23 As far as relations between Israel and the Palestinians were concerned, the following was accomplished:

Since the election of Benjamin Netanyahu, however, the process has been (deliberately) stalled and obstructed, probably even rolled back. Even the involvement of Israel’s main ally, the United States, in the process has been to no avail. The 1998 Wye Agreement was thus merely a compromise that should help implement what had already been agreed, and in a truncated form. The agreed-upon transfer of 13 percent of the West Bank to the PNA was a far cry from what had been envisioned in Oslo, Washington and Cairo, but maybe just enough to uphold the illusion of progress. 26 However, at the time of writing, the implementation of the Wye accords had even been suspended until after the Israeli elections.

It remains possible that the process will come “back on track”, particularly if a new Labour government is installed that is as committed to the process as the Rabin/Peres government. However, it seems (at least) equally likely that a right-wing government will be formed that will formally abrogate previous agreements.

Even if the peace process does come back on track, it remains to be seen where this track actually leads. By simple (but optimistic) extrapolation from the past, one might expect Israel to gradually relinquish more and more occupied territory on the West Bank; to halt the settlement drive and maybe even abandon some, but not all, of the existing settlements; to allow the PNA to become increasingly independent and state-like; to permit the return of a significant number of Palestinians from their diaspora; to contribute to devising and implementing viable arrangements for linking the two halves of the Palestinian “entity” with each other, etc.

In the fullness of time, Israel may even consent to a Palestinian statehood that entails formal sovereignty, even if the freedom of action of Palestine may be narrowly circumscribed, at least militarily ( vide infra ). Even more important, Israelis and Palestinians (as opposed to their respective political bodies) may eventually come to accept each other and may, in the fullness of time, even come to appreciate each others’ existence and live in harmony--at least in the sense that other divisions come to supersede the ethno-religious one. It will be a long journey, but it just may yield a satisfactory final solution. Even in the absence of some radical break-through, there is thus some hope for peace among the two nations.


4. Alternative Future 1: Towards the Abyss

It is all too easy to imagine what might go wrong, and which could even transform the above scenario into a nightmare. Moreover, this may well come sooner rather than later. The triggering events or developments that might set in motion one, or even several interlinked, vicious circles include the following on the Israeli side:

The Palestinian side might also trigger similar developments, for instance by the following steps:

Tempting though it might appear to try, neither side has any realistic prospects of winning a decisive victory. The Palestinians stand no chance of becoming preponderant in the foreseeable future, for several reasons: They are presently dispersed in their diaspora, hence weakened; Israel is in a position to regulate their return; they do not have access to all the implements of power that statehood may afford; and their prospects of international support are very limited, except for rhetoric. None of this is likely to change in the short or medium term, and any major change presupposes Israeli consent.

The Israelis might, at first glance, appear to stand a better chance. However, they are numerically inferior and bound to become increasingly so because of higher Arab/Palestinian birth rates. 29 The danger of becoming a minority in their own homeland looms large in the Israeli minds, 30 and none of the conceivable remedies are adequate: Additional Jewish immigration will be hard to ensure and will put greater strains on already scarce natural resources, above all water. 31 Moreover, it can, at best, be achieved in the form of oriental Jews ( sephardim), which will exacerbate the combined social and ethnic cleavages in Israeli society and/or tip the balance against the ashkenazim.

This demographic problem would become even more pronounced in case of a (hypothetical) annexation of the West Bank; and/or a return of the Palestinian refugees from their diaspora, which would double the number of non-Jews. Both developments would “tip the balance”, hence place Israel at the horns of a dilemma: either remain a democracy, but one dominated by the Palestinian majority; or remain a Jewish state by abolishing democracy, but thereby forfeiting Israel’s position as “the democratic (or even “European”) island in the sea of (Oriental) despotism”. 32

Another reason why unilateralism is not really an option is that the Palestinians might resort, once again, to an asymmetrical strategy of either (largely) non-violent resistance (as during the Intifada) 33 or terrorism. Against both forms of struggle, Israel’s military preponderance would be ineffective, and the use of the IDF (Israeli Defence Force) to combat insurgents is likely to have a damaging effect on morale. As aptly put by military historian Martin Van Creveld of the Hebrew University:

By the mid-1990s the effect of trying to put down the Intifada has become plain for all to see. The fighting power of Israel’s once-heroic army steeply declined in front of opponents who are numerically and materially incomparably less powerful that itself but, as they have repeatedly proven, determined to the point that there is no shortage of volunteers ready to commit suicide for their cause. Given the lamentable state to which the army has been reduced, there is no prospect of the old fighting spirit reasserting itself 34

Other means of waging the struggle against another Intifada might be a closure of the “territories”, as happened several times during the first Palestinian uprising. However, not only does this also negatively affect the Israeli economy, there are also absolutely no signs that the Palestinians can be “starved into submission”. On the contrary, attempt at this simply tend to strengthen the extremists, including Hamas, thereby exacerbating rather than solving the problem. 35


5. Alternative Future 2: Towards Stable Peace

Neither side will thus be able to defeat the other decisively. Unfortunately, this does not mean that the conflicting sides realize the futility of their quest for victory. As long as victory seems achievable, if only as a dim prospect for the distant future, there will be a temptation to fight on, if only as a way of justifying the “sunk costs” of previous years of (futile) struggle.

Conversely, a precondition for a resolution of a conflict may be the recognition of the impossibility of decisive victory, which may mark the moment of “ripeness”, i.e. the juncture when conflict resolution comes within reach. Unfortunately, it is much easier to identify such a moment of ripeness retrospectively (endowed with “20-20 hindsight”) than predictively, even though prediction would be infinitely more useful. 36 By implication, however, the Oslo and Washington accords would seem to imply that the moment was ripe in the early 1990s, i.e. that the (at least some of) the conditions for conflict resolutions were present. Some of them may have survived the reign of Netanyahu.

A stable peace presupposes that all sides to the previous conflict regard its resolution as satisfactory. A necessary, albeit not sufficient, precondition is that both Israeli and Palestinian security concerns are met, which recommends the notion of “common security” as an appropriate guideline. 37 This is not tantamount to unselfish behaviour, but is entirely compatible with a pursuit of national interests, if only these are not “defined in terms of power”, but rather of security, and if a short-term perspective is discarded in favour of a medium or long-term perspective. 38 Whatever a state (or other actor) gains at its respective opponent’s expense is simply unlikely to last, because the other side will react, thereby negating short-term gains.

5.1 What Does “Security” Mean?

Even if we reject as illusory such goals as “absolute security”, we are still faced with a wide spectrum of goals and ambitions--if only because “security” is “an essentially contested concept”, as argued by Barry Buzan. Hence, a certain matter is not one of security, but it may be made so , i.e. it may be “securitized” or “descuritized”, as aptly put by Ole Wæver. If a problem is securitized it is generally held to warrant “extraordinary measures” by virtue of its urgency and “existential” nature. However, as nobody holds an uncontested monopoly on (de)securitization, this will also be a matter of political controversy, where numerous vested interests can play a role. 39

Different Meanings of “Security”
Referent Objects Connotation Possible Threats (Examples)
Regimes Power, Privilege Opposition, Subversive activities
States Sovereignty, Territorial integrity, Power Military Attack
Collectives (e.g. Nations, ethnies) Identity, Autonomy “Cultural Imperialism” Religious Fundamentalism, Migration
Individuals Survival, Quality of Life, Property Terrorism, Economic Reprisals
Ecosystem(s) Sustainability Environmental threats

Moreover, it is contested to whom (or what) “security” can refer, i.e. what the term’s appropriate “referent object” is. Traditionalists want to reserve the term for the state’s security which is often misleadingly labelled “national security”, and sometimes used as a cover for what is really “regime security”, i.e. a particular group’s political domination. Others (mostly “communitarians” of various categories) are prepared to extend it to (some) human collectives such as ethnies or nations, even stateless ones. Still others (of a more cosmopolitan persuasion) insist that the ultimate referent object is the individual, regardless of political, ethnic or national affiliations. At least one author has even rejected all of the above as anthropocentric and advocated a “ecocentric” orientation. In the following, however, I shall disregard both this and “regime security” and concentrate on the three remaining referents.

Finally, there is a controversy over what it means to be “secure”, i.e. the connotation, as the term can obviously not mean the same when applied to a state and an individual. Only states can be sovereign and they alone have a territorial integrity to preserve, while only collectives have a collective identity that could conceivable be threatened, etc. 40

In the following, I shall apply the above taxonomy to a very tentative and sketchy analysis of Israeli and Palestinian security requirements in order to identify a meaningful set of minimum requirements. 41 I shall relegate the question of separation or not to the next section, presupposing in the following a certain de facto separation between Israel and “Palestine”.

5.2 Israeli Security Requirements

The Israelis are notoriously prone to securitization, which is quite understandable in view of the historical Jewish experience (above all the Holocaust). As admitted by Ben Gurion,

“I am not capable of seeing anything now other than through the prism of security... Security is involved in all branches of life” 42

Such an attitude bodes ill for reconciliation with any opposing party that also has security requirements. It is therefore necessary to not accept views such as the above as “natural” or inevitable, but to “distil” a set of minimum security requirements, based on an extrapolation from what other states and nations would find acceptable.

5.2.1 State Security

As far as state security is concerned, Israel’s minimum requirements surely include an absence of (serious) threats to the very survival of the Israeli state, or to its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. This has largely ceased to be a problem, even though Israel has yet to acknowledge the fact. However, because of Iraq’s defeat in 1991, the collapse of the USSR as the main supporter of Syria, the peace treaty with Jordan, and the budding alliance with Turkey, the Arab-Israeli balance of power has tilted tremendously in Israel’s favour through the 1990s. It has especially done so along the “Eastern front”, for which Palestine is relevant. Even when measured against a (highly unlikely) maximum alliance comprising Syria, Jordan and an Iraq that has miraculously escaped UN sanctions Israel is in a dramatically better situation than a decade ago. 43 The table below merely captures some of the quantitative changes, while the qualitative side would probably show an even greater improvement for Israel. While Syria’s and Iraq’s previous sources of supplies for high-tech weaponry have dried up, Israel’s have improved.

According to some analyses, this may even allow Israel to return the Golan heights to Syria (to which she is, of course, legally obliged) without any major security problems. 44 Even though the strategic depth afforded by the occupation of the West Bank remains of some importance (not least because of Israel’s reliance on a call-up of reserves), it is no longer indispensable, and especially not if its use as a forward staging area for (very hypothetical) Syrian and Jordanese forces poised for an attack against Israel is ruled out ( vide infra ).

Israeli state security in the “normal” sense thus seems entirely achievable without the continuing breach of international law that a clinging to the occupied territories constitutes. This is clearly not the case for the territorial integrity of Eretz Israel , i.e. the historical/mythical “Land of Israel”, which could only be had at the expense of its neighbours, at least by holding on to what has already been conquered as a “first instalment” of the “promised land”.

Force Comparison, Israel’s Eastern Front  45 Israel Syria Jordan Iraq Isr/ Syria Isr./ S+J+Iraq
MILEX 1997 (US$m) 11,143 2,217 496 1,250 5.03 2.81
MILEX 1985 (US$m) 7,196 4,961 857 18,328 1.45 0.30
Change +55% -55% -42% -93% +247% +843%
Manpower 1997 (1000) 175 320 104 388 0.55 0.22
Manpower 1985 (1000) 142 403 70 520 0.35 0.14
Change +23% -20% +48% -25% +55% +51%

This brings us directly to the level of collectives, as Eretz Israel is not so much a territorial concept (even though it assumes spatial form) as it is part and parcel of certain understandings of what it is to be an Israeli, namely to be a Jew and as such endowed with God-given rights. Fortunately, this is not the concept of nationhood or national identity to which most citizens of Israel subscribe.

5.2.2 Societal Security

Societal security, defined as an absence of threats to collective (e.g. national or ethnic) identity, is a complicated matter. As argued above, it is, for instance, possible for the Jews in Israel to see the very existence of Palestinians as a threats to their jewishness (however defined), and the more so the more the two nations (if so they are) are intermingled.

The only answer to this is probably to cultivate something like a “dialogue of civilizations” that would allow the two sides to view each other as a “different Other” rather than a hostile one. This would allow the two (or even more) cultures to coexist peacefully (perhaps even amicably), thereby preventing a securitization of the identity issue. However, as identities are socially constructed or deconstructed over time, this will undoubtedly be a protracted process.

A contribution to such peaceful coexistence would be a strengthening of the secular and political over the religious and ethnic features of Israeli national identity. One might even argue that the IDF makes an important contribution to this, serving as a “melting pot” for the diverse (ethnic and other) strata of Israeli society. The quickest way to build a nation may be to build an army. David Ben-Gurion in 1952 expressed this in the following words:

We do not have hundreds of years [to build a nation], and without the institution of the military, a compulsory, educating, unifying institution, we will not become a nation in time. We cannot rely on a historical process only ... We must direct the historical process, speed it up, channel it to our goals. Through the Israeli Defence Force we can do in a short time things that would otherwise require dozens of years...

Paradoxically, this might eventually even become the IDF’s main contribution to Israeli security, as the threat of military attack recedes to the background. 46

There are, however, other ways of forging national unity that do not to the same extent require enemy images, lead to arms races and trigger violence. For instance, the Jewish nation has a wealth of historical accomplishments from the realms of culture and science that could well serve as rallying points and which would be an ideal point of departure for the aforementioned civilizational dialogue with the Palestinians as representatives of the, equally rich, Arab civilization. Even though Samuel Huntington may believe so, cultures and civilizations do not automatically clash, but are able to live peacefully side by side and mutually enrich each other. 47

5.2.3 Individual Security

Were one to expand the concept of “security” to encompass individual security, a whole range of other (still “minimum”) security requirements might emerge. Among these, one looms particularly large in the Israeli minds (and in government policy), namely personal security against terrorist attacks.

In crude numbers, terrorism is not much of a problem. Even though Israel is one of the world’s most terrorist-ridden countries in the world, the actual number of victims is not particularly alarming. Since September 1993, the Israeli government has thus recorded a “mere” 233 fatalities in Israel. 48 However, the psychological factor has to be taken into account, if only because this (at least in a democracy such as Israel) is what will decide whether the question becomes securitized, allowing the government to use “extraordinary measures”.

There does indeed seem to be support for such extraordinary measures, regardless of their violation of international law and human rights conventions. In 1993, 79 percent thus declared themselves in favour of the destruction of the houses of people hiding (i.e. presumed to hid) terrorists; and 77 percent supported a deportation of people (presumed to be) in contact with terrorists. A significant minority of 27 percent were even in favour of deporting all residents of villages from which terror attacks (were presumed to) originate, and 21 percent favoured destroying the villages. 49 The desirable de-securitization of the terrorism issue is thus not within sight yet.

What might help would be a distinction between Israel and the occupied territories. While it is indisputable that Israeli citizens have the right to (a reasonable degree of) personal security in their own country, it is less obvious that this also has to apply to the settlers. First of all, their very presence is illegal, hence provocative; and secondly, they are heavily armed and protected by Israeli security forces. Efforts to solve their problems almost inevitably become parts of the problem itself rather than contributions to its solution.

5.3 Palestinian Security Requirements

The Palestinians are a nation to the same extent as the Israelis. As such they must be acknowledged as endowed with the same rights to state, societal and individual security. 50

5.3.1 State Security

The so-called “State of Palestine” that was declared in 1988 51 is a complete fiction, mainly because this entity is only recognized by a small number of states, none of which are very important. 52 Hence the following discussion of state security for Palestine is hypothetical, as it deals with a potential future Palestinian state.

Statehood presupposes ( de jure ) sovereignty in the formal sense of recognition as the supreme authority within a demarcated territory. Such sovereignty may be relinquished, either completely or in a piecemeal fashion (as EU member states do to the EU), but it cannot be achieved incrementally by a simple cumulation of powers and prerogatives. Either one is sovereign or not, and Palestine presently is not.

To make Palestine into a state presupposes a “heroic leap”, where sovereignty is solemnly declared and subsequently recognized by other states. 53 While it is easy to envision the Palestinians making such a heroic leap (for instance on 4 May 1999), it strains the imagination to envisage Israel recognizing it. In the absence of such recognition, most Western countries, above all the United States, would probably withhold their diplomatic recognition. This would make the new state just as fictitious as its predecessor.

Certain constraints on the subsequent exercise of sovereign powers may, however, help make Palestinian sovereignty more palatable to Israel, hence more likely to be achieved. Relevant constraints might include a Palestinian commitment to neutrality along with certain qualitative as well as quantitative limitations of her permitted armaments. There is, at least, one international precedent for such linkage and conditionality: The Austrian State Treaty of 1955, where Austria was granted formal independence (i.e. sovereignty) on 15 May in return for the “Moscow Memorandum” (signed 15 April) wherein Austria committed herself to neutrality as well as to various arms limitations. 54 Formal sovereignty was not compromised, but its exercise was made acceptable to neighbouring countries--a formula that just might be applicable to Palestine as well, especially if the commitments were to be underpinned by international guarantees.

Even though the term “Austrianization” might thus recommend itself as a formula for Palestinian statehood, the present author prefers “Finlandization”. In the 1947 Paris Treaty with Finland and the subsequent Friendship and Mutual Cooperation agreement with the USSR, Finland not only committed herself to neutrality, but also accepted the obligation to prevent, to the best of her abilities, an attack against the Soviet Union via Finland. 55 For Palestine to likewise commit herself to armed neutrality and to help prevent the use of the West Bank for an attack against Israel from Syria and its possible allies would make perfect sense. Not only would it help shield Israel, thereby “compensating” her for the loss of strategic depth implicit in a withdrawal from the West Bank. It would also provide the Palestinian state with a modicum of traditional state sovereignty. At the very least, it would surely be preferable to such an Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank in case of an impending war as is presently planned for. 56

Hence, the Palestinian armed forces should be strictly defensive and armed, deployed and trained for defensive (counter-mobility) operations. Thus configured, equipped and deployed, they would both contribute to protecting Palestine against an Israeli reoccupation or an attack from, say, Syria, and shield Israel against attack by an Arab coalition via the West bank. 57 By implication, the IDF could safely be completely (albeit perhaps gradually) withdrawn from the entire West Bank territory.

Presupposing the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, the question of “actual (i.e. de facto ) sovereignty” becomes important, i.e. how to maintain real control over the sovereign domain. Even though it is preferable to possess a contiguous territory, it is not an absolute sine qua non , as the world knows several examples of states that include enclaves (West Berlin in East Germany during the Cold War, or Lesotho in South Africa today) and exclaves (Alaska, for instance). However, in view of the legacy of recent intense hostility, it seems unlikely that a “patchwork state” would be satisfactory to the Palestinians, implying that means of linking the West Bank and Gaza have to be found.

5.3.2 Societal Security

Palestinian societal security would seem to presuppose at least two minimum requirements: A right for the refugees to return from their diaspora; and equal religious, cultural, economic and social rights with the Israeli/Jewish population, unless the two nations are separated ( vide infra ).

Even though it is legally indisputable, 58 the right of return poses genuine problems that cannot be ignored. First of all, a return of all diaspora Palestinians would might well overtax the absorption capacity of Palestinian society. The Gaza strip is already densely populated, and the West Bank can only accommodate a limited number of immigrants--even if Jewish settlers are evicted. Secondly, a large influx of immigrants would put great strains on the natural resources of the land, not least its scarce water supplies.

Thirdly, one might question (and a large portion of the Israelis undoubtedly would) the ethics, if not the legality, of evicting young Jewish settlers to make room for returning Palestinians. In some cases, the former may have been born in the settlement, while the latter may never have set foot there. To thus create a “moral fait accompli ” is, of course, part of the Israeli rationale for the settlements, hence a very strong argument for putting a stop to the settlement drive. Once the settlers have been there for more than a generation, however, they do have a moral case to make.

What might help would be a degree of reciprocity. It is adding insult to injury when the Israeli government denies the right of return for Palestinians while upholding the “right” of all Jews to immigrate to Israel, regardless of whether they have no real personal links to the country and even reside in countries where they are just as safe as everybody else. 59

For Israel to abrogate this law would not merely relieve the demographic pressure, but might also have a significant psychological impact, by signalling that the two nations regard each other as equals. A link between Jewish and Palestinian immigration (including return) quotas would turn the present zero-sum into a collaborative “game”. The more Jews the Israeli authorities would want to attract, the more Palestinians would they have to allow, and vice versa. In view of the different living conditions of diaspora Jews and Palestinians, however, the proportions would have to be skewed in favour of Palestinians, say with a 1:3 ratio.

Mutual recognition such as implied by the above is also an indispensable element of societal security for the Palestinian nation and for its development of a sense of national identity that is not a “victim identity” (like that of the Jews after the Holocaust). However, it probably has to be accompanied by economic and social measures that will allow the Palestinians to be the actual equals of the Jews.

An abolition of the “apartheid system” that has developed for the occupied territories 60 is thus indispensable, but there may also be a need for foreign assistance to accelerate the indispensable “levelling of the playing field”, entailing an evening out of living standards, levels of education, etc. between the two nations. By benefitting the Palestinians, this would tend to facilitate Palestinian state-building and further democratization--including the growth of civil society--thereby also help allay Israeli security concerns. 61

5.3.3 Individual Security

Just as Palestinian terrorism is a threat to the individual security of the Jews, the presence of armed settlers and security forces in the midst of Palestinian society is a threat to the individual security of the Palestinians--to say nothing of the threat posed by terrorist extremists such as Baruch Goldstein, or the (illegal) reprisals by Israeli security forces against Palestinian civilians.

A minimum security requirement is a disarming of all non-state forces: Jewish settlers as well as Palestinian civilians and paramilitary militias. As all other “modern” and civilized societies, Palestinian society is better off with its state enjoying a “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” within its territory. 62 Even though the ownership of firearms may afford the individual a certain immediate (sense of) security, the resultant proliferation of guns adds to the total problem.

5.4 Can the Two Be Combined?

Even though Israeli and Palestinian security concerns remain far apart, the above analysis has, hopefully, shown that there is some scope for compromise. For both sides to the conflict, meaningful minimum security requirements can be identified which are mutually compatible. To the extent that “securitization” of problems proceeds beyond minimum towards the maximalist end of the scale, the two positions soon become impossible to reconcile.


6. The Question Of Statehood

Having already touched on the question of statehood, it seems appropriate to conclude with a comparison of the various available options, especially with a view to the longer-term future.

6.1 The Available Options

To have two states exercising sovereign power over the same territory is a contradictio in adjecto , as sovereignty is exclusive. This leaves, in principle, the following as possible solutions: 63

  1. A continuation of the status quo, with Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and without Palestinian statehood.
  2. Annexation of the West Bank and Gaze, i.e. their de jure incorporation into Israel
  3. Partition, i.e. a division of the available territory, leaving Israel with sovereign powers over one part, the Palestinian state over the rest.
  4. Binationalization, where formal sovereignty continues to resides in the state as such, while “actual sovereignty” is divided among the two nations, either in the form of “consociationalisation”, 64 or of regional autonomy.
  5. Internationalization, where sovereignty over the combined Israel-Palestine territory is transferred to a supranational authority such as the United Nations (e.g. in form of a “trusteeship”) which subdelegates actual power to local Palestinian and Jewish communities according to the population pattern.
  6. A blend of the former models which one might call Integration- cum-expansion, where in the two sides are transformed into constituent parts of a larger whole through integration such as a confederation.

Very little speaks in favour of I, as argued above, the main problem being that it contains no concessions to the Palestinians who would remain in “limbo”: without citizenship of any state, hence facing numerous practical problems.

In some respects, II holds greater promise for the Palestinians, but it also entails grave dangers for the Israelis. Upon annexation, the residents of the Gaza and West Bank would become Israeli citizens. Soon they would even become a majority of the population. This does however raise the dilemma mentioned above for Israel: either to remain democratic, but predominantly Arab/Palestinian; or remain Jewish but undemocratic.

In favour of option III speaks the explicit demand of the Palestinians for a sovereign state, to which they appear just as entitled as most of the world’s other nations. To establish this state on the West Bank and Gaza would be the most obvious way of achieving this. Against partition speaks the fact that it would necessitate a choice between two rather unattractive options, because it would inevitably leave pockets of minorities within each state; or require a large-scale “resident swap”. Partition would further have to tackle the thorny question of Jerusalem: 65 Either the city would also have to be (re-)divided; or it would remain in the possession of Israel--which would be just as unacceptable to the Palestinians as it would be to the Israelis to hand it over to Palestine.

In favour of IV speaks the fact that an undivided but binational state it would be economically viable, and that it might even draw advantage from the various synergies between Israelis and Palestinians--or, at the very least, make the best of the inescapable interdependence. Against it speaks the fact that any power-sharing formula would be vulnerable to the demographic differences. Unless fertility patterns change significantly (which is highly unlikely) Arabs would eventually come to constitute the majority of the population, which would allow them to amend, by entirely democratic means, the agreement. For obvious reasons, the Jewish then-minority would not feel comfortable with this.

In favour of V (internationalization) speaks the fact that it would avoid most of the problems above. However, it would place great strains on the international system, which would have to be (and be seen as) both more effective and more legitimate than is presently the case for the United Nations.

6.2 “Daytonization” And Neomediaevalism

The author’s preferred solution is VI, i.e. a form of integration- cum-enlargement that combined elements of the above-and with an undeniable resemblance to the vision of Simon Peres for “The New Middle East”. 66 One could, for instance imagine, a “Chinese boxes” arrangement, where Palestine and Jordan establish a federation (or confederation) 67 which then merges with Israel into a confederation. The resultant confederation might, in due course, become a constituent part of an even larger political entity, including Lebanon and/or Syria (probably presupposing a change of regime in Damascus).

There are precedents for such an arrangement, albeit from other parts of the world. The “new Bosnia” created by the 1995 Dayton Agreement is exactly such a confederation of one state (Republica Srbska) with a Croat-Muslim federation. 68 One might even regard the European Union such a “super-confederation”, including both unitary states and federations (e.g. Germany). 69 This entails a certain division of powers between confederate, federate, state, local and perhaps regional political authorities. Which level would the supreme authority would reside would differ from one issue-area to the next, preferably according to the principles of “subsidiarity”. Some might even be functional (within the total territory) as opposed to territorially defined (religious authority over, for instance, all Christians, Jews or Muslims), which illustrates the similarity with medieval system, hence the term “neo-Medievalism”. 70

In such a confederate structure, borders would be less important. They would be internal, administrative borders, rather than dividing lines between sovereign political entities. Hence, they would be less likely to provide a possible casus belli . They could, furthermore, be “softer” and more permeable, thus allowing for a freer flow of labour, goods and capital, thereby allowing for synergies and economies of scale that would promise medium to long-term benefits for all involved.

The suggested scheme also offers a possible solution to the thorny, but inescapable, question of Jerusalem. Within the larger political framework, and with both the Israeli and Palestinian political authorities “demoted” from sovereign to more administrative units, it would be less of a problem to envision the city serving as a dual, or even triple, capital. It could be the capital, and host the government of, both Israel and Palestine, just as it might be the home of the confederal authorities--just like Brussels is both the capital of Belgium and the centre of the European Union. Religious matters, such as the maintenance of, and regulation of access to, the holy sites, could be handled by an ecumenical authority, while each half could have its own (half-)city councils in charge of administrative matters. 71


7. Conclusion

We have thus seen that the future is still open. Least likely (albeit not excluded) is a continuation of present trends, i.e. of the peace process without any major course changes. More likely, but least desirable, is a return to open conflict that could well get very nasty, almost to the point of a civil war.

The main point of the paper is, however, that another, and much more appealing future, may also be within reach--even though it requires some “heroic” breaks with the past. Based on a mutual recognition of each other’s legitimate security interests, the Israeli and Palestinian nations should be able to coexist peacefully and, in the longer run, even come to benefit from each other. The concrete steps towards this goal are based on an integrative approach, envisioning a “Daytonization” of Israel/Palestine combined with a “Finlandization” of the latter.



Note 1: Popper, Karl R.: The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959); idem: Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963). See also Nicholson, Michael: Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). On the peace process see Weber, Steven: “Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process”, Security Studies , vol. 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 167-179.  Back.

Note 2: The term is taken from Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).  Back.

Note 3: On the multipolar regional system see Pervin, David J.: Building Order in Arab-Israeli Relations: “From Balance to Concert”, in David A. Lake & Patrick M. Morgan (eds.): Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 271-295. On the risks of spill-over from intra-state to international conflicts, see Bronson, Rachel: “Cycles of Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa”, in Michael E. Brown (ed.): The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 205-234.  Back.

Note 4: Sorokin, Gerard L.:“ Patrons, Clients, and Allies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 20, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 46-71. On US support for Israel see Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.): U.S.-Israeli Relations at the Crossroads (Newbury Park: Frank Cass, 1997), passim; and Neff, Donald: Fallen Pillars. U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995). For comparisons of European and US attitudes and behaviour see Pelletreau, Robert H.: “Proche-Orient: la coopération entre l’Europe et les États-Unis”, Politique Étrangère , vol. 63, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 271-283; Olson, Robert K.: “Partners in the Peace Process: The United States and Europe”, Journal of Palestine Studies , vol. 26, no. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 78-89; Haas, Richard N.: “The United States, Europe and the Middle East Process”, in Robert D. Blackwill & Michael Stürmer (eds.): Allies Divided. Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 61-78; Perthes, Volker: “Europe, the United States, and the Middle East Process”, ibid., pp. 79-100. On a possible new Russian role see Dannreuther, Roland: “Is Russia Returning to the Middle East?”, Security Dialogue , vol. 29, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 345-358.  Back.

Note 5: On the role of domestic factors in US support for Israel see Beloff, Max: “The Diaspora and the Peace Process", in Efraim Karsh (ed.): Peace in the Middle East. The Challenge for Israel (London: Frank Cass, 1994). pp. 27-40; and Lipson, Charles: “American Support for Israel", in Sheffer (ed.): op. cit. (note 4), pp. 128-146; Wald, Kenneth D. et al.: “Reclaiming Zion: How American Religious Groups View the Middle East", ibid., pp. 147-168; Hertzberg, Arthur: “Israel and the Diaspora: A Relationship Reexamined", ibid., pp. 169-183; Talhami, Shibley & Jon Krosnick: “U.S. Public Attitudes Toward Israel: A Study of Attentive and Issue Publics", ibid., pp. 109-127. See also Barnett, Michael N.: “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East", in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.): The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 400-447. On the islamic link", see Guazzone, Laura (ed.): The Islamist Dilemma. The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995), especially Barghouti, Iyad: The Islamists in Jordan and the Palestinian Occupied Territories" (pp. 129-160). On the implications for the involvement of Western powers see Fuller, Graham E. & Ian O. Lessler: A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Boulder: Westview, 1995); Hibbard, Scott W. & David Little: Islamic Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).  Back.

Note 6: Comparable analyses of European futures are Buzan, Barry, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer & Ole Wæver: The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990); Hyde-Price, Adrian: European Security Beyond the Cold War. Four Scenarios for the Year 2010 (London: Sage, 1991).  Back.

Note 7: The classical works on the security dilemma, see e.g. Herz, John M.: Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), passim; idem: Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", World Politics , vol. 2, no. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180; Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-93; idem: Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World Politics , vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Buzan, Barry: People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era , 2nd Ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 294-327. A comprehensive analysis is Collins, Alan: The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War (Edinburg: Keele University Press, 1997). See also Posen, Barry R.: The Security Dilemma of Ethnic Conflict", Survival, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47; Lawson, Fred A.: Neglected Aspects of the Security Dilemma", in Baghat Korany, Paul Noble & Rex Brynan (eds.): The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 100-126. A comparable analysis, deriving the security dilemma from anarchy, is Wendt, Alexander: Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", International Organization , vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 391-425.  Back.

Note 8: See, for instance, Reich, Bernard (ed.): An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Aldwych Press, 1996). On the mandate years see Uri Ben-Eliezer: The Making of Israeli Militarism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 19-144; Creveld, Martin Van: The Sword and the Olive. A Critical Story of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), pp. 5-62; Tessler, Mark: A History of the Israeli-Palestinean Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 123-268. On the subsequent wars see O’Ballance, Edgar: The Arab-Israeli War 1948 (London: Faber, 1972); idem: The Sinai Campaign (London: Faber, 1959); idem: The Third Arab-Israeli War (London: Faber, 1972); idem: No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978); Korn, David A.: Stalemate. The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).  Back.

Note 9: On conventional military strategy see Levite, Ariel: Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Boulder: Westview, 1990). On pre-emption see Beres, Louis René: Striking Preemptively: Israel’s Post-Gulf War Options Under International Law", in Avi Beker (ed.): Arms Control Without Glasnost: Building Confidence in the Middle East (Jerusalem: Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 1993), pp. 129-160; Naveh, Simon: The Cult of Offensive Preemption and Future Challenges for Israeli Operational Thought", in Karsh (ed): op. cit. (note 5), pp. 168-187. See also the May 1991 speech by Yitzhak Rabin: Deterrence in an Israeli Security Context", in Aharon Klieman & Ariel Levite (eds.): Deterrence in the Middle East. Where Theory and Practice Converge (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 6-15, in which he expressis verbis rules out pre-emption, albeit on pragmatic grounds (p. 8), while maintaining the need for an offensive strategy (p. 10). On more recent developments see Levran, Aharon: Israeli Strategy After Desert Storm. Lessons of the Second Gulf War (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Marcus, Jonathan: Israel’s Defense Policy at a Strategic Crossroads", The Washington Quarterly , vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 33-48.  Back.

Note 10: Aronson, Shlomo (with Oded Brosh): The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991. An Israeli Perspective (Albany: State University of New York, 1992); Evron, Yair: Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma (London: Routledge, 1994); Shahak, Israel: Open Secrets. Israeli Foreign and Nuclear Policies (London: Pluto Press, 1997); Cochran, Edwin S.: Deliberate Ambiguity: An Analysis of Israel’s Nuclear Strategy", The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 19., no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 321-342.  Back.

Note 11: Navias, Martin: Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East (London: Brassey’s, UK, 1993); Levite, Ariel: Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Causes and Consequences", in Götz Neuneck & Otfried Ischebeck (eds.): Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Arms Control (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), pp. 221-227; Karp, Aaron: Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East: Realities, Omens and Arms Control Options", in Efraim Inbar & Shmuel Sandler (eds.): Middle East Security: Prospects for an Arms Control Regime (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 111-129.  Back.

Note 12: Cordesman, Anthony H.: After the Storm. The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 1-31, 51-82, 176-375; idem: Perilous Prospects: the Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder: Westview, 1996), pp. 30-31 & passim; Kemp, Geoffrey & Robert E. Harkavy: Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Brooking Institution Press, 1997), pp 303-315 & passim. For possible remedies, see Møller, Bjørn: Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East" in idem, Gustav Däniker, Shmuel Limione & Ioannis A. Stivachtis: Non-Offensive Defense in the Middle East (New York: UN and Geneva: UNIDIR, 1998), pp. 3-90.  Back.

Note 13: See, for instance, Sela, Avraham: The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997), where Arab politics is described as one dominated by the states, and where the pan-Arabist ideology that would mandate support for the Palestinians is dismissed as empty rhetoric. On Jordan’s take-over of the rest of Palestine see Mazzawi, Musa: Palestine and the Law. Guidelines for the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997), pp. 262-271. On its subsequent relations with the Palestinians see Al-Khazendar, Sami: Jordan and the Palestine Question. The Role of Islamic and Left Forces in Foreign Policy-Making (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996); Tal, Lawrence: Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan", Survival, vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 139-156. On the Black September", see Tessler: op. cit. (note 8), pp. 456-464.  Back.

Note 14: On the Israel-Egypt peace, see Quandt, William B.: Peace Process. American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993), especially pp. 255-326 on the negotiations and 466-475 on the treaty. On the peace with Jordan see Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain & Neil Caplan: Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace. Patterns, Problems, Possibilities (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 90-102 on the negotiation, and pp. 217-228 on the treaty.  Back.

Note 15: On the absolute versus relative gains problem see, for instance, Stein, Arthur A.: Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); or David A. Baldwin (ed.): Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).  Back.

Note 16: El-Naggar, Said & Mahamed El-Erian: The Economic Implications of a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East", in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik & Elias Tuma (eds.): The Economics of Middle East Peace. Views from the Region (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 205-226; Diwan, Ishac & Nick Papandreou: The Peace Process and Economic Reforms in the Middle East", ibid., pp. 227-255; Clawson, Patrick: The Limited Scope for Economic Cooperation in the Contemporary Levant", in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.): The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 81-101; Fischelson, Gideon: Regional Economic Cooperation in the Middle East", ibid., pp. 103-120; Anani, Jawad: Areas of Potential Economic Cooperation in the Context of the Middle East Peace Process", ibid., pp. 121-125.  Back.

Note 17: On the Israeli settlement policy, see e.g. Tessler, Mark & Ann Mosley Lesch: Israel’s Drive into the West Bank and Gaza", in Ann Mosley Lesch & Mark Tessler (eds.): Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians. From Camp David to Intifada (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 194-222; Efrat, Elisha: Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past, Present, and Future", in Karsh (ed.): op. cit. (note 5), pp. 135-148. See also Bar-Tal, Daniel, Dan Jacobsen & Tali Freund: Security Feelings among Jewish Settlers in the Occupied Territories: A Study of Communal and Personal Antecedents", The Journal of Conflict Resolution , vol. 39, no. 2 (June 1995), pp. 353-377.  Back.

Note 18: Neumann, Iver B.: Self and Other in International Relations", European Journal of International Relations , vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 139-175.  Back.

Note 19: Anthony D. Smith, for instance, defines a nation as a named community occupying a recognized homeland and possessing shared myths and memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and uniform legal rights and duties". See his Ethnie and Nation in the Modern World", Millennium, vol. 14, no. 2 (1985), p. 135. See also Dudney, Daniel: Ground Identity: Nature, Place, and Space in Nationalism", in Yosef Lapid & Friedrich Kratochwill (eds.): The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 129-145.  Back.

Note 20: On different versions of Jewish/Israeli identifies see Sandler, Shmuel: The State of Israel, the Land of Israel. The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993); Evron, Boas: Jewish State or Israeli Nation? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). On Palestinian identity see Khalidi, Rashid: Palestinian Identity. The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). See also Frisch, Hillel: Ethnicity, Territorial Integrity, and Regional Order: Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel", Journal of Peace Research , vol. 34, no. 3 (August 1997), pp. 257-269; Lustick, Ian S.: Unsettled States, Disputed Lands. Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 385-438.  Back.

Note 21: On securitization of identity questions see Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup & Pierre Lemaitre: Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993); and Williams, Michael E.: Identity and the Politics of Security", European Journal of International Relations , vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 204-225. On violization" see Neumann, Iver B.: Identity and the Outbreak of War", International Journal of Peace Studies , vol. 3, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 7-22. On conflict cycles, see Kriesberg, Louis: Constructive Conflicts. From Escalation to Resolution (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 59-61.  Back.

Note 22: Good overviews of the process are Joffe, Lawrence: Keesing’s Guide to the Middle East Peace Process . 1st Edition (London: Cartermill, 1996); and the chapters in the SIPRI Yearbooks : Kemp, Geoffrey & Geremy Pressman: The Middle East: Continuation of the Peace Process", SIPRI Yearbook 1995 , pp. 171-210; Jones, Peter: The Middle East Peace Process", SIPRI Yearbook 1996 , pp. 161-202; idem: The Middle East Peace Process", SIPRI Yearbook 1997 , pp. 83-102; idem & Gunilla Flodén: The Middle East Peace Process", SIPRI Yearbook 1998 , pp. 91-107. See also King, John: Handshake in Washington. The Beginning of Middle East Peace (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1994); Corbin, Jane: The Norway Channel. The Secret Talks that Led to the Middle East Peace Accord (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994); Makovsky, David: Making Peace With the PLO. The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accords (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Giacaman, George & Dar Jørund Lønning (eds.): After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems (London: Pluto Press, 1998); Kimche, David: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process", Security Dialogue , vol. 27, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 135-148; Khouri, Rami G.: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Lessons from the Five Years Since Oslo", ibid., vol. 29, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 333-344.  Back.

Note 23: A good overview is Peters, Joel: Pathways to Peace. The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/European Commission, 1996); or Steinberg, Gerald M.: Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security", Survival, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 126-141.  Back.

Note 24: Korman, Sharon: The Right of Conquest. The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 250-267 & passim. On Israeli attitudes see Lehman, Pedi: Land for Peace. On the Inner-Israeli Controversy over Peace in the Middle East", Aussenpolitik. English Edition , vol. 47, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1996), pp. 165-174.  Back.

Note 25: On post-Oslo settlement policies see Jong, Jan de: The Geography of Politics: Israel’s Settlement Drive after Oslo", in Giacama & Lønning (eds.): op. cit. (note 22), pp. 77-120. On the attitudes to this settlement policy see Arian, Asher: Security Threatened. Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 154-155, 251-252. On the legal status of settlements, Art. 49 of the Geneva Convention IV on the Protection of Civilians in Times of War (1949) clearly states that The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies". See Falk, Richard: World Order Conceptions and the Peace Process in the Middle East", in Elise Boulding (ed.): Building Peace in the Middle East. Challenges for States and Civil Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 189-196 (quote from p. 196). See also McCoubrey, H. & N.D. White: International Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 279-294. On Israeli opposition to the settlements see Bar-On, Mordechai: In Pursuit of Peace. A History of the Israeli Peace Movement (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), passim.  Back.

Note 26: The Wye River Memorandum is available at  Back.

Note 27: On the settlements in Jerusalem see Aronsen, Geoffrey: Israeli Settlements in and around Jerusalem" in Ghada Karmi (ed.): Jerusalem Today. What Future for the Peace Process? (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996), pp. 75-82.  Back.

Note 28: Usher, Graham: The Politics of Internal Security: The Palestinian Authority’s New Security Services", in Giacama & Lønning (eds.): op. cit. (note 22), pp. 146-161.  Back.

Note 29: While Jews beget, on average, 2.6 children per woman, Muslims (largely synonymous with Arabs) beget 4.6 children. See Central Bureau of Statistics: Israel in Figures at  Back.

Note 30: Arian: op. cit. (note 25), pp. 209-230.  Back.

Note 31: Beschorner, Natasha: Water and Instability in the Middle East", Adelphi Papers , no. 273 (London: IISS/Brassey’s, 1992/93), pp. 8-26; Gleick, Peter H.: Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security", International Security , vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; Lowi, Miriam R.: Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of West Bank Water", ibid., pp. 113-138; Rouyer, Alwyn R.: The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process", Survival, vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 57-81; Morris, Mary E.: Water Scarcity and Security Concerns in the Middle East", The Emirates Occasional Papers , no. 14 (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1998).  Back.

Note 32: Some of these dilemmas are elaborated upon in Shmoona, Sammy: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution: National Security and the Arab Minority", in Avner Yaniv (ed.): National Security and Democracy in Israel (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 105-127; and Kumaraswamy, P.R.: Political Legitimacy of the Minorities: Israeli Arabs and the 1996 Knesset Elections", The Emirates Occasional Papers , no. 20 (1998). See also Peretz, Don: Palestinians, Refugees, and the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1993), pp. 11-17. On the right of return see Mazzawi: op. cit. (note 13), pp. 172-197; Alpher, Joseph & Khalil Shikaki: The Palestinian Refugee Problem and the Right of Return (Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1998).  Back.

Note 33: McDowall, David: Palestine and Israel. The Uprising and Beyond (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989); Lockman, Zachary & Jopel Beinin (eds.): Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990); Hunter, F. Robert: The Palestinian Uprising. A War By Other Means (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Tessler: op. cit. (note 8), pp. 677-752; Smith, Charles D.: Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Third Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 291-308; Sayigh, Yezid: Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 607-638; Robinson, Glenn E.: Building a Palestinian State. The Incomplete Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 132-173.  Back.

Note 34: Creveld: op. cit. (note 8), p. 352. See also Liebes, Tamar & Shoshana Blum-Kulka: Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada", Armed Forces and Society , vol. 21, no. 1 (Fall 1994), pp. 45-68; Barzilai, Gad & Efraim Inbar: The Use of Force: Israeli Public Opinion on Military Options", ibid., vol. 23, no. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 49-80.  Back.

Note 35: See, for instance, Roy, Sara: The Gaza Strip. The Political Economy of De-Development (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 291-308; Robinson: op. cit. (note 33),pp. 132-173.  Back.

Note 36: Zartman, I. William: Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts", in idem (ed.): Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 3-29; Kriesberg, Louis: International Conflict Resolution. The US-USSR and Middle East Cases (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 144-146; Berkovitch, Jacob & Allison Houston: The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence", in Jacob Berkovitch (ed.): Resolving International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 11-35; Wallensteen, Peter: Från krig till fred. Om konfliktlösning i det globala systemet (Stockholm: Almquist och Wicksell, 1994), pp. 274-287.  Back.

Note 37: Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). See also Väyrynen, Raimo (ed.): Policies for Common Security (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985); or Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1986); Møller, Bjørn: Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).  Back.

Note 38: The former concept is that of Morgenthau, Hans J.: Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace , 3rd Ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 5 & passim. The latter is that of Waltz, Kenneth N.: Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 134 & passim. See also Schweller, Randall L.: Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma", in Benjamin Frankel (ed.): Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 90-121.  Back.

Note 39: Buzan: op. cit. (note 7), passim (quote from p. 7); idem, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde: Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), passim; Wæver, Ole: Securitization and Desecuritization", in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.): On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86.  Back.

Note 40: The distinction between communitarians and cosmopolitans is elaborated upon in Brown, Chris: International Relations Theory. New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). On societal security" see Wæver, Buzan et al .: op. cit. (note 21). The ecocentric approach is suggested by Eckersley, Robyn: Environmentalism and Political Theory (London: UCL Press, 1992). On the various types of threat see also Fischer, Dietrich: Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993).  Back.

Note 41: Sources of inspiration include the following works that are all the products of expert group meetings or other instances of track two diplomacy": Boutwell, Jeffrey & Everett Mendelsohn: Israeli-Palestinian Security: Issues in the Permanent Status Negotiations (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of the Arts and Sciences, 1995); Lesch, Ann Mosley: Transition to Palestinian Self-Government. Practical Steps toward Israeli-Palestinian Peac e (Bloomington: Indiana University Press/AAAS, 1992); Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East", in Boulding (ed.): op. cit. (note 25), pp. 7-66; Jones, Peter: Towards a Regional Security Regime for the Middle East: Issues and Options (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1998). See also Bowker, Robert: Beyond Peace: The Search for Security in the Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Johannsen, Margaret & Claudia Schmid (eds.): Wege aus dem Labyrinth? Friedenssuche im Nahost (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997); Saikal, Amin & Geoffrey Jukes (eds.): The Middle East. Prospects for Settlement and Stability (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 1995); Karsh, Efraim & Yezid Sayigh: A Cooperative Approach to Arab-Israeli Security", Survival, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 114-125; Heller, Mark A.: Towards a Palestinian State", ibid., vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 5-22; Nejad, Hassan Mahamadi: The Middle East CBuilding a Community of Nations", Bulletin of Peace Proposals , vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1992), pp. 159-167; Ragioneri, Rodolfo: International Constraints and National Debates in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process", Quaderni Forum , vol. 11, no. 1 (Florence: 1997); Ragionieri, Rodolfo: The Peace Process in the Middle East: Israelis and Palestinians", International Journal of Peace Studies , vol. 2, no. 2 (July 1997), pp. 49-65.  Back.

Note 42: Quoted in Ben-Eliezer: op. cit. (note 8), p. 207.  Back.

Note 43: Cordesman: op. cit. 1996 (note 12), passim. See also Waxmann, Dov: Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East?", The Washington Quarterly , vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 25-32.  Back.

Note 44: Bar-Joseph, Uri: Israel’s Northern Eyes and Shield: The Strategic Value of the Golan Heights Revisited", Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 21, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 46-66. For a more cautious view see Duncan, Andrew: Land for Peace: Israel’s Choices", in Karsh (ed.): op. cit. (note 5), pp. 59-72; Lemke, Hans-Dieter, Volker Peres & Annette van Edig: Der Golan und der israelisch-syrische Friedensprozess. Politische, militärische und wirtschaftliche Aspekte", SWP-AP (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1996), no. 2958. For a contrarty view see Levran: op. cit. (note 9), pp. 150-154.  Back.

Note 45: Calculated on the basis of data from International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: IISS, 1998), p. 296.  Back.

Note 46: The quote is from Porter, Bruce: War and the Rise of the State (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 18, a work that also theoretically illuminates the role of armies in state and nation-building; as does Holsti, Kalevi J.: The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). On the role of the IDF in state-building see Ben-Eliezer: op. cit. (note 8), pp. 1-15 & passim; Barnett, Michael N.: Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 153-209, 225-243; Etzioni-Halevy, Eva: Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites’ Connection in Israel", Armed Forces and Society , vol. 22, no. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 401-418; Lissak, Moshe: Civilian Components in the National Security Doctrine", in Yaniv (ed.): op. cit. (note 32), pp. 55-80; Creveld, Martin Van: Conscription Warfare: the Israeli Experience", in Roland G. Foerster (ed.): Die Wehrpflicht. Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), pp. 227-240. For an interesting historical analogy see Wallach, Jehuda L.: Wehrpflicht und Berufsarmee im Alten Testament", ibid., pp. 15-26.  Back.

Note 47: An elaborate argument for such an approach is Senghaas, Dieter: Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998). It is partly directed against Huntington, Samuel: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). See also Jabri, Vivienne: Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 144-171. An attempt at highlighting the peaceful elements of the two cultures is Smock, David R.: Perspectives on Pacifism. Christian, Jewish and Muslim Views on Nonviolence and International Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995). On binationalism see Tutunki, Jenab & Kamal Khaldi: A Binational State in Palestine: the Rational Choice for Palestinians and the Moral Choice for Israelis", International Affairs , vol. 73, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 31-58.  Back.

Note 48: According to the Israeli government, a total of 233 Israeli citizens (soldiers as well as civilians) have been killed in terrorist attacks in Israel since the accord with the PLO in September 1993. See gopher:// The Middle East as a whole ranks high on the global scale. According to the US State Department, casualties have from 1992 to 1997 been 236, 178, 256, 445, 1097, and 480 for the region as a whole (including Algeria that accounts for a large part). See On terrorism as a phenomenon see also Gilbert, Paul: Terrorism, Security and Nationality. An Introductory Study in Applied Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1994); Kushner, Harvey W. (ed.): The Future of Terrorism. Violence in the New Millennium (London: Sage, 1998); Derian, James Der: The Terrorist Discourse: Signs, States, and Systems of Global Political Violence", in Michael Klare & Daniel C. Thomas (eds.): World Security. Trends and Challenges at Century’s End (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 237-265.  Back.

Note 49: Arian: op. cit. (note 25), pp. 66-68.  Back.

Note 50: On Palestinian security concerns, see the excellent article by Khalidi, Ahmad S.: Security in a Final Middle East Settlement: Some Components of Palestinian National Security", International Affairs , vol. 71, no. 1 (1995), pp. 1-18.  Back.

Note 51: Sayigh: op. cit. (note 33), pp. 623-624; Tessler: op. cit. (note 8), pp. 721-722; Mazzawi: op. cit. (note 13), pp. 272-274.  Back.

Note 52: The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States thus laid down four criteria of statehood, including d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states. See Shaw, Malcolm N.: International Law , 3rd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 138-142. See also Müllerson, Rein: International Law, Rights and Politics. Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 117-136; and Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W.: Self-Determination", in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United Nations Legal Order , vols. 1-2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 349-389.  Back.

Note 53: Fowler, Michael Ross & Julie Marie Bunck: Law, Power, and the Sovereign State. The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). For a genealogy of this concept, see Walker, R.B.J.: Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Spruyt, Hendrik: The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). See, however, for various qualifications of this traditional concept of sovereignty; Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno (eds.): Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), passim; Lugo, Luis E. (ed.): Sovereignty at the Crossroads. Morality and International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Dillon, Michael: Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the >New World Order"" to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order", Alternatives, vol. 20, no. 3 (July-September 1995), pp. 323-368; Camilleri, J.A. & Jim Falk: The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (London: Edward Elgar, 1992); Ryan, Christopher M.: Sovereignty, Intervention, and the Law: A Tenuous Relationship of Competing Principles", Millennium, vol. 25, no. 1 (1997), pp. 77-100; Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild & I. William Zartman: Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996). On Palestinian sovereignty see Sayigh, Yezid: Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and Security of the Palestinian State", Journal of Palestine Studies , vol. 24, no. 96, pp. 5-19.  Back.

Note 54: Hinteregger, Gerald: Some Misconceptions about Austrian Neutrality", in Joseph Kruzel & Michael H. Haltzel: Between the Blocs. Problems and Prospects for Europe’s Neutrals and Non-Aligned States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 269-276; Vetschera, Heinz: Der Weg zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität", Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift , vol. 23, no. 3 (1985), pp. 223-228; idem: Die Rüstungsbeschränkungen des Österreichischen Staatsvertrages aus rechtlicher und politischer Sicht", ibid., vol. 24, no. 6 (1986), pp. 500-505; idem: Armament Limitations of the Vienna State Treaty", in Fred Tanner (ed.): From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States", UNIDIR 92/70 (Geneva: UNIDIR and New York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 115-136; Hakovirta, Harto: East-West Conflict and European Neutrality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 59-60 & passim.  Back.

Note 55: I first used the term in 1994. The paper is published as Møller: loc. cit. 1998 (note 12), p. 54. On the Finnish brand of neutrality see Allison, Roy: Finland’s Relations With the Soviet Union, 1944-84 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985); Joennini, Pertti: The Underlying Assumptions of Finnish Neutrality", in Kruzel & Haltzel (eds.): op. cit. (note 54), pp. 133-160; Järvenpää, Pauli: Finland: Peace Treaty of 1947", in Tanner (ed.): op. cit. (note 54), pp. 55-70. On the military aspects of this policy see Ries, Tomas: Cold Will. The Defence of Finland (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988), passim.  Back.

Note 56: Alpher, Joseph: Security Arrangements for a Palestinian Settlement", Survival, vol. 34, no. 4 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 49-67.  Back.

Note 57: This is elaborated upon in Møller: loc. cit. (note 12). A further elaboration on such non-offensive defence" is: Møller, Bjørn: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1991); idem: op. cit. 1992 (note 37); and idem: Dictionary of Alternative Defence (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).  Back.

Note 58: Mazzawi: op. cit. (note 13), pp. 172-197.  Back.

Note 59: Law of Return", 5710-1950, passed on 5 July 1950, granted all Jews the right to come to Israel as olehs" (Jewish immigrants). In 1970, it was amended ( Amendment no. 2", 5730-1970) to allow for the immigration with oleh status to children and grandchildren as well as their spouses, Jew" being defined as anyone born by a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism.  Back.

Note 60: See, for instance, Roy: op. cit. (note 35), passim.  Back.

Note 61: On the democracy-peace linkage see Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Brown, Michael E., Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.): Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); Elman, Miriam Fendius: Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Ray, James Lee: Democracy and International Conflict. An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995). On the implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict see Amjad-Ali, Charles: Democratization in the Middle East from an Islamic Perspective", in Boulding (ed.): op. cit. (note 25), pp. 69-77; Osseiran, Sanàa: The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East", ibid., pp. 79-90; Nakhleh, Emile A.: The Arab World After the Gulf War: Challenges and Prospects", ibid., pp. 111-120; Sahliyeh, Emile F.: Democracy Among the Palestinians", in David Garnham & Mark Tessler (eds.): Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 116-132; Craissati, Dina: Neue soziale Bewegungen in Palästina: Zivilgesellschaft und Demokratie", in Johannsen & Schmid (eds.): op. cit. (note 41), pp. 122-145; Muslih, Muhammad: Palestinian Civil Society", in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.): Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 243-268; Roy, Sara: Civil Society in the Gaza Strip: Obstacles to Social Reconstruction", ibid., vol. 2 (1996), pp. 221-258. On the bifurcation of civil society in Israel see Doron, Gideon: Two Civil Societies and One State: Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel", ibid., pp. 193-220. For a critique of the PNA as undemocratic see Usher, Graham: Palestine in Crisis . Revised Edition (London: Pluto Press, 1997), pp. 61-83.  Back.

Note 62: Weber, Max: Politics as Vocation" (1918), in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (eds.): From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Galaxy Books, 1958), pp. 77-128, quote from p. 78. See also Tilly, Charles: Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 68-70 & passim.  Back.

Note 63: An excellent comparison of various models, with real-life examples, is Lapidoth, Ruth: Autonomy. Flexible Solutions to Intrastate Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).  Back.

Note 64: Lijphart, Arend: Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).  Back.

Note 65: See, for instance, Karmi (ed.): op. cit. (note 27), passim; Albin, Cecilia: Negotiating Intractable Conflicts. On the Future of Jerusalem", Cooperation and Conflict , vol. 32, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 29-77; Emmett, Chad F.: The Status Quo Solution for Jerusalem", Journal of Palestine Studies , vol. 36, no. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 16-28.  Back.

Note 66: Peres, Simon (with Arye Naor): The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1993), pp. 163-179 & passim.  Back.

Note 67: An elaborate argumentation against confederation is provided by Braizat, Musa S.: The Jordanian-Palestinian Relationship. The Bankrupcy of the Confederal Idea (London: British Academic Press, 1998).  Back.

Note 68: Borden, Anthony & Richard Caplan: The Former Yugoslavia: the War and the Peace Process", SIPRI Yearbook 1996 , pp. 203-231, with the Dayton Peace Agreement appended on pp. 232-250.  Back.

Note 69: Burgess, Michael: Federalism and European Union. Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987 (London: Routledge, 1989). See also Wilke, Marc & Helen Wallace: Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-sharing in the European Community", RIIA Discussion Papers , no. 27 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990).  Back.

Note 70: Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics . Second Edition (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 254-266; Ruggie, John Gerard: Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", in Robert O. Keohane (ed.): Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 131-157. For an elaboration and revision of these ideas see Wæver, Ole: Imperial Metaphors: Emerging European Analogies to Pre-Nation-State Imperial Systems", in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev & Victoria Einagel (eds.): Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 59-93; idem: Europe’s Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security", in Rick Fawn & Jeremy Larkins (eds.): International Society after the Cold War. Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (Houndsmills, Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 220-260; Linklater, Andrew: The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 193-195 & passim. On the related concept of fluidity", see also the chapter on For a Different Type of Arab-Israeli Peace", in Mallat, Chibli: The Middle East into the 21st Century (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996), pp. 26-57.  Back.

Note 71: For elements of the proposed arrangement see Albin, Cecilia: Negotiating Intractable Conflicts. On the Future of Jerusalem", Cooperation and Conflict , vol. 32, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 29-77; Emmett, Chad F.: The Status Quo Solution for Jerusalem", Journal of Palestine Studies , vol. 36, no. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 16-28; Odeh, Adnan Abu: Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem", Foreign Affairs , vol. 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 183-188; Prawitz, Jan: A Vatican Solution for Jerusalem", Security Dialogue , vol. 25, no. 3 (1994), pp. 355-356. See also Hassassian, Manuel: Models of Sovereignty and the Question of Jerusalem: Towards a Comprehensive Perspective", available as a special report ( on the PNA’s official website.   Back.