Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Persian Gulf, With a postscript on The 1997/98 Iraqi Crisis 

Bjørn Møller ^*

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

Paper for the 27th General Conference of the
International Peace Research Association (IPRA)
on Meeting Human Needs in a Cooperative World 
23-26 June 1998, Durban, South Africa ^**

Contents

1. Introduction: The Concept of 'Region'

2. The Persian Gulf Region

What is 'The Persian Gulf Region'

The Dramatis Personae 

Structural Features

3. The Security Dilemma in the Persian Gulf

Arms Build-up and the Changing Balance of Power

The US Role

4. Resolving the Security Dilemma?

The Philosophy of Common Security

Non-Offensive Defence

Formulae for Regional Stability

5. Defensive Restructuring in the Persian Gulf

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Conventional Military Restructuring

Conventional Arms Control?

Controlling Arms Transfers

Conclusion

Postscript, March 1998: The 1997/98 Iraqi Crisis

International Law and the Iraqi Crisis

The Size and Urgency of the Problem

The Strategy of the Planned Campaign

Implications of an Attack

The Future of Dual Containment

Abstract

The paper is introduced by an analysis of the concept of region, followed by an application of this analytical framework to the Persian Gulf region. Several problems in this region are identified, including a seemingly open-ended arms race and a significant risk of war. As a possible remedy to these problems, the author proposes a policy of Common Security, intended to satisfy the legitimate security problems of all states in the region. As a consequence, he recommends efforts to ensure the strictly defensive nature of the military postures of regional states, to be implemented unilaterally as well as by means of arms control negotiations and regulations of the international arms trade. The paper concludes with a Postscript on the Iraqi crisis of 1997/98.

I. Introduction: The Concept Of `Region'

A region is a subset of the international system. However, the delimitation of such a subset is always a problem, if only because several criteria might be applied, each yielding a different result. None of them is, of course, more `correct' than the others: ¹

• The most obvious criterion of `regionness' is probably that of geographical proximity, as a region is usually held to consist of contiguous states. This does, however, beg the question of where to draw the outer limit, unless there happen to be clear natural boundaries (such as oceans). Are Afghanistan or Yemen, for instance, part of the Persian Gulf region? Also, in the world of international relations `proximity' is not so much a matter of distance as a function of topography, infrastructure and technology. What used to be insurmountable barriers may, for example, cease to be so as a result of a technological breakthrough. In some cases water divides, while in others (e.g. in the Persian Gulf) it unites, whereas vast deserts tend to divide. ²

• An alternative criterion of delimitation is the geographical distance from a centre, as in the ancient (but recently rediscovered) notion of empires. An empire or region may thus be understood as a set of concentric circles. ³ This does, however, presuppose that there is a centre which is obvious as such to everybody, but this may be politically very controversial, and it is entirely possible that there may not be one, but several such centres. There is no a priori reason why the financial, economic, political, cultural, and religious centres of a region should be identical. ⁴ Some regions may thus have a `variable geometry' rather than forming concentric circles.

• To the extent that one is interested in environmental issues (including `environmental security'), the notion of ecosystem (characterized, e.g., by shared rivers and or other sources of water supplies, etc.) may be the appropriate delimitation criterion. ⁵

• A convenient political or legal criterion of delimitation might be membership of institutions defined as `regional', e.g. by the UN. ⁶ However, in many parts of the world (e.g. the Middle East and the Persian Gulf) the density of institutions is much lower than in Europe. Furthermore, even in that most thoroughly institutionalized part of the world no institutions are all-inclusive. ⁷ In the Persian Gulf, moreover, no institutions exist that comprise all states (usually regarded as) belonging to the region, and nobody else (see table 3 below).

• A `softer' criterion may be that of cultural affinity. This is, indeed, the distinguishing feature of the `civilizations', between which Samuel Huntington foresees a clash. ⁸ However, cultural homogeneity is usually greater seen from the outside (where it is viewed as `otherness') than from the inside. <sup>9</sup> Cultural differences between islamic states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Indonesia are, for instance, no less significant that those between, say, Denmark, Greece and the United States. <sup>10</sup> Furthermore, `culture' has many aspects (e.g. religious, ideological, and ethnic) which do not automatically yield the same delimitation.

• Related to this notion of cultural community is that of regions as `imagined communities', in analogy with nations. Like the latter they may be constituted by the members `imagining' themselves as belonging together, and the rest of the world acknowledging them as such, regardless of whether either has any `objective' foundation. <sup>11</sup> In some parts of the world, however, a prevailing cosmopolitian orientation may cast doubt on such `attitudinal regionness'.

• Regions might also be identified as such by a greater-than-average intensity of trade and/or other forms of economic interaction. This would, however, lead to a disregard of not only rather autharchic states, but also of states that produce mostly for the world market, i.e. which are not economically oriented towards any region, like the oil-exporting countries in the Persian Gulf. ¹²

• Finally, regions might be defined by an above-average intensity of security political and military interaction--either benign, as in alliances or regional collective security systems, or malign, as in arms races or wars. Barry Buzan has suggested the term `security complex' for such a region, defined as `a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another'. ¹³

I shall take this latter criterion as my point of departure as it has the merit of singling out that particular aspect of interaction with which I am concerned on this occasion. It does, however, have three odd implications, and needs to be modified in one respect:

• It either presupposes a narrow (i.e. `traditional') concept of security, or it implies that the borders of a security complex depend on which issues are `securitized' and `desecuritized'. This may differ both between regions, and within regions over time. ¹⁴

• `Security communities' (between the members of which war has ceased to be regarded as a possibility, and where the attitude to military matters is one of benign neglect) cannot count as regions in this sense--even though a security community is usually seen as the starting point for regional integration. ¹⁵

• In some parts of the world states may be so preoccupied with domestic (`security') matters, and have so insignificant power projection capabilities that states can constititute neither friends nor enemies to each other. Parts of Africa surely fall into this `security complex-free' category. ¹⁶

• It makes little sense to draw (as Barry Buzan does) fixed borders between security complexes so as to rule out overlap and prevent states from being parts of more than one security complex. This presupposes defining those states that seemingly transcend these borders (the United States, Russia, Turkey, and China, for instance) as `buffers', where the term `transmission cords' seems a much more appropriate metaphor. ¹⁷

We have thus seen that the very concept of `region' is not as clear as one might wish. The following analysis of the Persian Gulf region will only underline this lack of clarity, thereby pointing to the need for further research, both theoretical and empirical.

II. The Persian Gulf Region

Just as is the case for many of the world's other regions, the borders of the Persian Gulf region are not easily drawn, regardless of which criterion one applies. ¹⁸ The situation is further complicated by the fact the name itself is hotly disputed: the Arab states resent the use of the term `Persian' as they see this as reflecting Iranian hegominial ambitions, whereas both the Iranians and most of the rest of the world are quite comfortable with the term, underlining that `Persian' is not the same as `Iranian'. In the following, I shall perfer the term Persian, but without prejudice with regard to Arab-Iranian territorial disputes in the Gulf.

A. What Is `The Persian Gulf Region'?

Almost inevitably one has to acknowledge a certain overlap between the Persian Gulf region and, at least, four adjacent regional systems, namely the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and the Red Sea/Horn of Africa region-as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Overlapping Regions	Persian Gulf	Middle East	Other regions
Iran	X	x	Central Asia South Asia
Iraq	X	X	-
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Quatar, UAE	X	x	(Red Sea)
Saudi Arabia	X	x	Red Sea
Yemen	X	x	Red Sea
Egypt	X	x	Maghreb
Syria	X	x	-
Turkey	x	x	(Europe) (Central Asia)
Others	(Central Asian States) (Afghanistan) Pakistan (India)	Israel Palestine Jordan Lebanon (Turkey)	Legend: X: Central member x or (): peripheral

Even though there is thus no `correct' delimitation of the region, borders nevertheless have to be drawn, both for political and analytical purposes.

The Persian Gulf Region 

In the following I shall therefore, rather arbitrarily, define `The Persian Gulf Region' as encompassing the states marked in Figure 1: Iran and Iraq plus the states belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council, i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Quatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As the following analysis will, hopefully, bring out, all of these states interact with each other in security matters more than they do with other states (except the United States, more about which later). Yemen is, of course, part of the picture, but its security concerns do not relate directly to the Gulf, wherefore I have not counted it as part of the region. Thus defined the region qualifies as a security complex, but it also constitutes a region according to several of the other possible criteria listed above: the `contiguity', `centre', and ecological criteria as well as that of `imagination and recognition'.

B. The Dramatis Personae 

One might, of course, limit one's perspective to international, i.e. inter-state relations (in conformity with 'Realism'), ¹⁹ but one thereby risks missing important elements of the picture. It is simply impossible to understand regional dynamics in the security sphere as state-centred and enogenous, i.e. without taking into account both internal and external actors, only some of which are states. Moreover, as a result of these dynamics, states definitely do not behave as 'like units'.

One may subdivide the dramatis personae  into at least six categories of relecant actors. First of all, three sets of state actors:

1. Regional great powers, above all Iraq and Iran, but in certain respects also Saudi Arabia.

2. Regional small powers: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Quatar and the UAE. For the reasons set out above, I have excluded Yemen.

3. External powers, above all the United States and, until recently 1991, the Soviet Union. While Russia no longer plays much of a role, some of the other successors to the USSR do. The same is the case, in certain respects, for countries such as Britain and France, India and Turkey. Egypt and Syria have also recently played a role, albeit only a passing and secondary one.

   At least three categories of non-state actors have to be taken into account:

4. Substate and `nonstate' collective actors such as ethnic and religious groups (e.g. Kurds, Palestinians and Shi'ites), ruling elites, clans, religious communities and leaders, and the military.

5. Regional organizations such as the GCC and the Arab League (vide infra ). The EU also plays a role as an external regional organization, as does the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

6. Global organizations, such as the United Nations (inter alia in `administring' Iraq) and its subsidiaries, among which the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency, responsible for monitoring compliance with the NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty). Economic organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and, more recently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) also play a role, e.g. by significantly affecting the economies of the Gulf states (hence also their ability to purchase military hardware), as does OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and its Arab counterpart OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleoum Exporting Countries).

We thus have to transcend the narrow understanding of the `Realists' in order to get a realistic picture of regional dynamics: by looking both inside states to comprehend the motivational factors underlying their international behaviour, and beyond states to take into account the growing role of international and supranational organizations. In the following I shall nevertheless, place the focus on the interaction among states.

C. Structural Features

In trying to come to grips with a region such as the Persian Gulf, the following questions are central:

• Is the region dominated by endogenous dynamics, or is it `overlaid' by external conflicts?

• Is it anarchical or hierarchical? If the former, does it nevertheless contain elements of order beyond that of self-help?

• What is the nature of its polarity? Is it unipolar, bipolar, multipolar or perhaps `non-polar'?

• What is the predominent pattern of behaviour: balancing (if so: against power or threat?) or bandwagoning?

• What role, if any, do international organizations play?

  On the following pages I shall venture some inevitably brief, superficial and tentative answers to these questions.

1. External Penetration and/or Overlay?

During the Cold War, the bipolar rivalry between the two superpowers resulted in a certain involvement by both the United States and the USSR in regional security matters, i.e. a certain 'penetration', or 'external transformation' in the terminology of Barry Buzan. The question is whether the effect thereof was strong enough to count as 'overlay', where the external dynamics displace region-internal ones, as was the case in Europe during the Cold War. ²⁰ A brief account of the history of superpower involvement in the Persian Gulf region may shed some light on this question.

The first instance of competition commenced with the Soviet reluctance to withdraw from Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945/46, which developed into something of a crisis, yet without any major US involvement. ²¹ Indeed, no countries in the Middle East or Persian Gulf were on the list of the sixteen countries of the greatest importance to US national security in 1947, even though Iran ranked as number four on the list of countries in urgent need of assistance. ²² The spread of 'domino beliefs' in the USA, ²³ however, resulted in a perceived need to 'contain' the USSR anywhere. ²⁴ Hence, a relentless quest for alliances from the late 1940s through the 1950s, partly justified in the name of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' (alongside the 'massive retaliation' nuclear strategy): NATO, OAS, ANZUS, etc. ²⁵ The Persian Gulf manifestation thereof was the Baghdad Treaty. However, it proved very short-lived (1955-58), and after the Ba'ath revolution in Iraq, it effectively ceased to be. ²⁶ In its place came a set of bilateral relations between the western powers and individual states in the region.

The British withdrawal from east of the Suez was followed by a growing US involvement. This involvement was guided, as elsewhere, by what one might call 'the four cardinal rules of amity and enmity': (1) one's friend's friends are one's friends; (2) one's friend's enemies are one's enemies; (3) one's enemy's friends are one's enemies; and (4) one's enemy's enemies are one's friends. ²⁷

The only qualification was that the Soviet Union did not have many friends in the region or its immidiate neighbourhood. Moreover, the few it had were either too insignificant (South Yemen and Somalia, subsequently 'exchanged' with Ethiopia) ²⁸ or too unreliable (Syria, Iraq and, until around 1972, Egypt), or both to really count for much. What the USSR achieved was little more than some port access rights and temporary access to airfields (in South Yemen, Syria, Iraq and, for a while, Egypt), a certain political influence, and the 'right' to provide arms to selected clients, above all Iraq and Syria. ²⁹ The US policy nevertheless followed the logic that the USSR's friend Iraq was an enemy (according to rule 3), whereas Iraq's enemy Iran was a friend of the US (rule 4). There was, however, a significant anomaly, as the USSR's other friend in the region, Syria, was Iraq's enemy and a partial friend of Iran.

From the late 1960s through the 1970s, US policy toward the region was guided by the so-called 'Nixon doctrine' (also known as the 'Guam doctrine') which envisaged a hierarchical form of world order: At the pinnacle would, needless to say, be the USA. As an alternative to direct intervention (viz. the Vietnam syndrome), however, the USA would rely on 'regional policemen' (or 'subordinate regional hegemons') whom it would entrust to uphold regional 'order' and assist and equip for the job. Iran under the Palavi rule was cast in this role, ³⁰ which, among other benefits, gained it complete access to US military technology-with nuclear weapons as the only exception. In a context where steeply rising oil revenues boosted Iran's purchasing power, this 'license to buy' resulted in an unprecedented arms build-up. ³¹

After the 1979 revolution the United States was, of course, forced to reconsider this strategy. The Iranian revolution nearly coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which, it was believed in Washington, presaged a Soviet 'quest for the warm waters' and a future threat to the oil supplies of the West. ³² Hence, to disengage was not regarded as an option. The review resulted in a renewed emphasis on direct intervention with the so-called Carter Doctrine, e.g. by means of the Rapid Deployment Force, subsequently CENTCOM. ³³ The ill-fated 1980 attempt to rescue the US hostages in Tehran, however, tempered this interventionist impulse considerably. ³⁴

During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the United States remained officially neutral, yet leaned more to the Iraqi than the Iranian side and supported the 1988 ceasefire, which was generally regarded as an Iranian defeat. ³⁵ The USSR, in its turn, was too preoccupied in Afghanistan to really play much of a role in the rest of the region, ³⁶ apart from continuing arms supplies to Iraq-interrupted only by a short-lived embargo imposed in the immediate wake of Baghdad's attack. ³⁷

The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, of course, changed everything. It elevated Iraq from the status of a 'proxy enemy' of the West to an enemy in its own right (an image that was underpinned with rather far-fetched analogies with Nazi Germany) ³⁸ -a position that Iraq continues to enjoy. A corollary thereof has been increased Western (and especially U.S.) support for the GCC, including a (not particularly succesful) quest for basing rights ³⁹ and massive arms sales (vide infra ). However, Iran has not (yet) been accepted by the West, as one might have expected. The Islamic Republic remains in the category of 'rogues', hence the U.S. strategy of 'dual containment' of both Iran and Iraq. ⁴⁰ As a logical consequence thereof one might expect a rapprochement between these two former enemies, but this has yet to materizalize.

Throughout the post-war period there has thus been a significant penetration of the Persian Gulf region by the two rival superpowers. However, the bipolar logic at no point determined regional patterns of amity and enmity to anywhere near the extent it did in Europe, hence it would be overshooting the mark to label it 'overlay'. Security dynamics were primarily endogenous, leading us to the second question of how to characterize these endogenous dynamics and the regional structure.

2. Anarchy and/or Order?

The Gulf regions is definitely anarchic in the sense that there is no political authority over and above the states. Such anarchy, however, may take several different forms, some of which are more orderly than others as set out in Table 2). ⁴¹

Table 2: Phases Of Anarchy	Structure	Pol. relations	Mitigating factors	Interaction	War?
Pre-anarchic (`Premodern')	Unsettled	State building Non-recognition		Low	None or Small-scale
Anarchic (`Modern')	Westphalian	Recognition Sovereignty Non-interference	Balance-of-power	Higher	Frequent Conflict formation
	Mature	State-centred Int. society	Regimes	Interdependence	Rare Cold War
	Security Community		Cooperation	Very High	Inconceivable
Post-anarchic (`Postmodern')	Integration	Transfer of legitimate authority	Growing together	Domestic	Inapplicable

Along a spectrum of `maturity' or modernity, the Persian Gulf clearly ranks quite low: Most states are of very recent vintage and the state as an institution has not fully established itself as the supreme authority. State-building has thus not come to completion yet, and all states remain what Buzan calls `weak states', lacking in internal cohesion. Hence the predominance of domestic threats to state security--even though some of these have an inherent propensity to transcend borders, i.e. to become internationalized ⁴² --the Kurdish problem being merely the most serious of a wealth of such problems. ⁴³ In some cases, militarization and war may even be integral parts of the very state-building process. ⁴⁴ The global spread of democracy has also not quite reached the Persian Gulf yet--not least because of the weakness of civil societies and persistent conflict between `secularizers' and `islamizers'. ⁴⁵ Hence, even though there are some encouraging signs, the presumed peace-promoting effect of democracy is not to be relied upon. ⁴⁶

As a regional system, the Persian Gulf has just entered the `Westphalian stage', where mutual recognition of sovereignty is not yet all-encompassing. <sup>47</sup> The region thus remains a `conflict formation' ⁴⁸ where war is entirely conceivable (perhaps even likely) between states--as evidenced by the recent wars and other armed conflicts in which regional states have been involved: ⁴⁹

• The Iran-Iraq war (1980-88);

• the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 1990, followed by

• the UN coalition's war against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait;

• the Yemen secessionist war of 1994;

• the Yemen-Saudi Arabian clashes in 1995;

• repeated US air strikes against Iraq (1993 and 1996), and

• repeated Turkish incursions into Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish insurgents.

There are no immediate prospects of the region's developing into a security community, i.e. a group of states among which war has ceased to be regarded as an option. ⁵⁰ Part of the explanation is that there are so many outstanding territorial claims and ill-defined borders, reflecting the recent emergence of most of the states of the region. ⁵¹

There are, of course, certain factors that mitigate the rivalry among the states, i.e. certain patterns of restraint, including a certain cultural, religious and linguistic affinity among most states--with the partial exception of Iran. They thus share a commitment to important values, to which comes a certain commitment among all states to the survival of all; and an embryonic institutional framework. While this may make the label `international society' appropriate, it would surely be overstating the point if one were to claim that the implicit restraints amounts to a genuine `security regime'. ⁵²

3. Forms of Polarity

There are different types of polarity. ⁵³ Systems may thus be either unipolar (where states differ mainly according to the closeness of their relations with a hegemonic power); bipolar (where states tend, more or less consistently and tightly, to divide into two opposing camps); or tripolar, when there are three competing poles, each having the option of joining forces with one of the others against the third. Tripolarity may thus be merely a subcategory of multipolar system-a label befitting most balance-of-power systems. ⁵⁴ Finally, there may be no polarity to speak of, say when states are largely self-contained and interact only little with each other. This might be called a 'diffused' or 'nonpolar' system-or it may not even deserve the label 'system' at all.

It is difficult to envision a stable balance-of-power among the states of the Persian Gulf region, in either of these traditional forms. The region is definitely not unipolar in the sense of having one internal pole, even though it may be under the influence of global unipolarity, i.e. the alleged pax americana . However, not only is this unipolarity questionable and, almost certainly, of a passing nature, at best; it is also too weak to produce a similar structure on a regional scale. ⁵⁵

A reimposition of some new form of global bipolarity on the Persian Gulf region also seems inconceivable. The apparently so far most succesful attempt at forging a new global divide has been Samuel Huntington's infamous 'the West against the rest'. However, even if Huntington should be right (which he, almost certainly, is not) this would tend to pit all of the Persian Gulf region against the West, i.e. serve as a unifying factor that might even supersede the Sh'ia/Sunni division. This is, however, a very unlikely prospect-even though there were signs thereof during the Western 'ganging up' against Saddam Hussein in the early months of 1998 (see the Postscript).

Nor does regional bipolarity seem at all likely. Even though the region has several dividing lines, it lacks a single over-riding fault-line:

• While the division between Sh'ia and Sunni is salient enough to produce frequent clashes between adherents of the two branches of Islam, ⁵⁶ it is much too weak to serve as a rallying point for alignment within either. Even if it were, the two islamic groupings are far too intermingled for this criterion to produce a bipolar pattern among states.

• The division between democratic and dictatorial regimes is too weak to divide the region, if only because of the predominance of shades of gray: No regimes are really totalitarian and none are perfect democracies.

• A rich-versus-poor division might make sense, but it strains the imagination to envision the poor lining up against the prosperous, at the state level at least.

A tripolar structure seems more conceivable, as the region has three obvious poles: Iran, Iraq and Saudi-Arabia. Not only is the balance of power between these three regional great powers `delicate', it is also highly asymmetrical. Rank-ordering Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia according to different yardsticks (all of which are important) thus yields quite different results (see table 3).

Table 3: Rank Order	Population	Wealth	Military	Friends
Iraq	2	3	2	3
Iran	1	2	1	2
Saudi Arabia	3	1	3	1

While Iran is clearly in the lead with regard to population (i.e. mobilizable military manpower), Saudi Arabia leads in terms of wealth (i.e. ability to purchase military hardware), and friends, i.e. allies. Iraq is in a tenuous position, the military balance-of-strength vis-á-vis Iran being `delicate'. Perhaps paradoxically, such an asymmetric balance may be more stable than a symmetrical one (in which the disparities are not too large) as the various strengths may even out each other without being truly commensurable. ⁵⁷ On the other hand, it might also be less stable because it may invite miscalculations of strength.

While temporary alignments between either two of these three powers against the third do not seem unlikely (in a medium-to-long term perspective at least), such alignments will probably prove fragile--as in a `classical' balance-of-power system. The fragility of possible alignments may be illustrated by the options available to the regional great powers.

• Saudi Arabia certainly fears Iraq, but not quite enough to make for any stable alignment with Iraq's enemies: Iran is also a threat and Syria is too far off as well as too unreliable to really count. ⁵⁸

• Iraq fears Iran and its partial ally Syria ⁵⁹ as well as Turkey ⁶⁰ (and almost everybody else) but not quite enough to make aligments with anybody else seem worthwhile.

• Iran fears everybody else, but perhaps especially Iraq. However, not only does Iran's ostrachism preclude its alignment with states that are not in a similar situation; Iran is also on a collision course with Saudi Arabia and the smaller oil-producing countries with regard to oil pricing. Furthermore, all the small Gulf states seem fearful of a resurgent Iran, hence unlikely to join forces with it. Even if they did, they would be too small to make much of a difference.

Tripolarity thus seems unlikely to assume the stable form that some scholars have claimed it might. Rather, it will produce shifting patterns of ad hoc alignments that may well be interrupted by hot wars. Furthermore, the regional balance-of-power will almost certainly be open-ended rather than self-contained, inter alia because all three states also have to guard against threats from other directions. ⁶¹ What might, for instance, push Iraq towards Saudi Arabia would be a Syrian resurgence--say after a peace treaty with Israel that left Damascus with most of its military might intact, now available against Iraq. What might tilt Iran towards Iraq would be a more aggressive form of US `containment' (vide infra ); and what might effect a temporary Iran-Saudi Arabian alignment would be a lifting of UN constraints on Iraq, that might produce a resurgent as well as revengeful Iraq seeking regional hegemony.

4. Balancing or Bandwagoning?

What form the balance-of-power will assume also hinges on assumptions about state behaviour. Most analysts seem to agree with Waltz and other neorealists that 'balancing' is a stronger inclination for states that 'bandwagoning', i.e. that states tend to join forces against a major power before the latter becomes too superior, rather than joining forces with the rising great power. ⁶²

On the other hand, this needs to be qualified somewhat, in order to account for anomalies such as the small Gulf states' teaming up in the GCC with their larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia, rather than balancing against it. The balance-of-threat analysis developed by Stephen Walt may thus be better at explaining state behaviour in the Gulf than traditional balance-of-power theory. The small states in the Gulf joined forces (i.e. bandwagoned with) Saudi Arabia in the GCC rather than balancing against it, simply because they feared the Iranian and/or Iraqi threat more than the (much more alike) Saudi Arabia. ⁶³

5. The Role of Organizations

A manifestation of both balancing and bandwagoning may be the establishment of international organisations. The existence, growth and strengthening of international organizations may, furthermore, be the key to transform regional systems from conflict formations to mature anarchies or security communities. ⁶⁴ However, the record of the Gulf region is far from impressive in this respect.

First of all, there are no truly regional organizations in the sense of institutions comprising all states in the region and nobody else. Membership is either too broad or too narrow, or both (see Table 4). Secondly, most institutions are either too weak to really matter, or they only deal with security matters indirectly, or not at all. In principle, security might be attained by indirect means, say by weaving a web of peace-furthering economic and other interdependence, pointing towards integration (as was the case with the European institutions). However, neither the record nor the prospects for the future are encouraging in this respect, as economies are far too similar to be complementary. Hence, institutions would probably have to deal with security directly.

Table 4: Membership Of International Organizations	Bahrein	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Oman	Quatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Other Members?
Arab League	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
GCC	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
OAPEC	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
OIC	Y 4: Membership Of International Orga	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
OPEC	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Legend: GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council OAPEC: Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

There has, to be sure, been one noteworthy attempt at institutionalized security cooperation, namely the GCC. Unfortunately, rather than seeking to involve the adversaries Iran and Iraq, the GCC has (so far) merely sought to provide defence and deterrence against them. This is, moreover, a task for which the GCC (rightly or wrongly) considers itself inadequate. Hence the organization's main rationale may be to serve as a vehicle for ensuring the desired US support. ⁶⁵ As I shall try to show below, however, this is probably both too pessimistic (with regard to the regional balance of power) and too optimistic in the implicit hopes for US commitments.

III. The Security Dilemma In The Persian Gulf

The preliminary assumption that the Persian Gulf region is unstable thus seems to have been confirmed by the above analysis--even without taking military developments into account. This is the topic to which I shall now turn.

A. Arms Build-Up And The Changing Balance Of Power

One of the most striking features about the Persian Gulf has been the general arms build-up through the 1990s until very recently, which has set the region apart from most of the rest of the world, where military exenditures have been steadily declining. ⁶⁶ We may be witnessing an classical arms race which may or may not have a saturation point. However, as the entire topic is infected by questionable counting, flawed logic and the use of double standards, a closer look at this arms build-up is required before passing judgement. Such a closer look has to look beyond the mere volume of recent purchases and take into account what is being acquired, the baseline from which this happens, and the possible motives behind the purchases (i.e. the strategic and doctrinal views justifying them), the military options being provided by the new weapons-and the perception thereof by neighbouring countries.

The war between Iraq and the UN coalition for the liberation of Kuwait (henceforth 'the Gulf War' for short) ⁶⁷ dramatically affected the regional balance-of-power by reducing and 'bracketing' Iraq's military strength. This, in turn, may have raised the ambitions of other states in the region, including Iran, ⁶⁸ which bodes ill for stability. While it is questionable whether 'balance' is stabilizing if understood as 'rough equality', it is generally agreed that rapid and profound changes in the balance of power have a negative impact on stability. Not only do they hamper a realistic assessment of strength; they also provide declining powers with a motive for preventive war and rising ones with incentives to speed up their ascent by means of war. ⁶⁹

1. Iraq

Iraq has since 1990 been cast in the role as the main military threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf, and its military potential may certainly warrant this view.

During the Cold War, Iraq benefitted from the Soviet desire for a counterweight to US influence in the region, and was a major recipient of Soviet weapons of all kinds: tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and SCUD ballistic missiles. ⁷⁰ This provided Bagdad with a considerable offensive striking power, which Iraq sought to further enhance by the development of WMD (weapons of mass destruction). While it did assemble a large stockpile of chemical weapons, and actually used some against its own Kurdish population during the war with Iran, ⁷¹ it did not succeed in building nuclear weapons. However, thanks to a concerted clandestine effort, it was a close shot, as evidence uncovered after Iraq's 1991 defeat has made clear. ⁷² Saddam Hussein also launched a biological weapons programme, producing both anthrax and botulinum toxin. ⁷³ For an update on this issue, readers are referred to the Postscript.

The motives behind this build-up are not quite as obvious as they might seem. In retrospect, one could take the 1980 Iraqi attack against Iran and that against Kuwait a decade later as incontrovertible evidence of inherent aggression, but this may be too simplistic. The 1980 attack may, on closer analysis, have been produced by a combination of 'windows of threat and opportunity' which may have appeared all the more tempting as well as imperative because of the dictatorial form of government. Dictatorships are notoriously prone to both paranoic fears and illusions of grandeur, i.e. they tend to exaggerate both threats to their rule (i.e. 'windows of vulnerability') and their own ability to redress the situation, hence to jump through presumed 'windows of opportunity'. ⁷⁴

On the one hand, Iraq had clearly been surpassed by the frantic Iranian arms build-up during the 1970s (vide infra ) and may have been worried about a possible Iranian aggression, or at least about Iran's assuming a hegemonic role with a 'right' to intervene in the internal affairs of other regional states. The prospects of the latter must have appeared frightening in view of Iraq's Shi'ite majority and 'Kurdish problem'. On the other hand, the 1979 islamic revolution and the accompanying severance of the US link produced a temporary weakening of Iran that Iraq may have wanted to exploit by means of a war that should have been short and decisive. ⁷⁵

This, of course, proved to be a monumental miscalculation, and the ensuing war depleted Iraq's resources, militarily, financially and otherwise-while its neutral neighbours prospered. Hence perhaps the felt need to 'redress the balance' with the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which Saddam Hussein may have regarded as a rather trivial venture, unlikely to attract much attention. ⁷⁶ This, too, proved to be a miscalculation of gargantuan proportions, as it incurred the wrath of the rest of the world (with a few exceptions) and especially of the USA. Hence Operation Desert Shield that averted a hypothetical further Iraqi expansion, and the subsequent Desert Storm that inflicted a crushing defeat on Iraq. ⁷⁷

In the aftermath of the war, with UNSCR (United Nations Security Council Resolution) 687 Iraq has been subjected to the most intrusive and rigid constraints ever imposed on a sovereign state since those imposed on the vanquished after WWII: Not only has Iraq lost its 'right' to entire categories of weaponry that were regarded by its adversaries as particularly threatening (WMD and ballistic missiles). ⁷⁸ It has also temporarily lost control over part of its national territory by the creation of 'safe havens' and the imposition of 'no fly zones' in the northern and southern parts of the country-as a result of the first recorded instance of multilateral 'humanitarian intervention'. ⁷⁹ Most of Iraq's conventional military strength survived, however; and since nobody seems to want the elimination of Iraq as a state it is bound to reemerge, at some stage, as a major player, also in military terms.

Regardless of what motives Iraq may have had for its arms build-up and aggressions, however, they are rightly seen by its neighbours as a threat that can only be ignored at their peril. ⁸⁰ Hence, Iraq's military strength inevitably spurs a similar build-up in neigbouring states.

2. Iran

As mentioned above, Iran was the Third World's number one spender on arms in the 1970s, partly as a consequence of the role envisioned for it by the USA as a regional hegemon. ⁸¹ The Palavi regime bought just about everything, with WMD as the only exception. Another explanation of this massive arms build-up was, of course, Iran's vastly expanded purchasing power as a result of Tehran's rising oil revenues.

After the 1979 revolution, however, sources of supply rapidly dried out. The war with Iraq, furthermore, rapidly exhausted the stocks-indigenous production and some clandestine supplies notwithstanding-with the result that Iran by 1988 had a much depleted military arsenal as well as a severely damaged economy and a weakened political basis. ⁸² Iranian military planners may also have drawn the lesson from the lost war that their strategy simply did not work, hence that their military posture (or what was left of it) was obsolete. ⁸³ The 1988 ceasefire was thus, understandably, followed by a build-up which some observers regard as excessive, others even take as evidence of aggressive intentions.

While one cannot entirely discount the hypothesis of Iranian expansionist designs, the facts also lend themselves to a more 'innocent' interpretation. First of all, Iran has not yet made up for its wartime losses, and its military strength thus remains inferior to what it was at a time when it was regarded (by the United States at least) as a stabilizing factor. Secondly, the arms acquisitions of the Islamic Republic as well as its military expenditures remain well below those of the GCC (see Table 5). Thirdly, most of Iran's arms acquisitions have been entirely consistent with defensive intentions. In such an evaluation, one must, in all fairness, take into account that the country must remain fearful of an eventually resurgent Iraq; that it has long borders facing unstable countries such as Afghanistan and some former Soviet republics; and that it must be worried about the new American assertiveness that might even lead to intervention (say, in the name of 'counter-proliferation'). ⁸⁴

There are, of course, also worrisome elements in the Iranian build-up: The purchase of 'Kilo' submarines from Russia which may pose a threat to the shipping of the GCC countries and Iraq, especially when combined with anti-ship missiles deployed on Abu Mussa; and the acquisition of SCUD-type ballistic missiles from awkward ('rogue') suppliers such as China and North Korea, and the indigenous production of the IRAN-130 missile (vide infra ). ⁸⁵

There are also allegations of a nuclear weapons programme, based on the (IAEA-monitored) Bushehr nuclear reactors, and the apparent quest for nuclear technology. On the other hand, the pursuit of a nuclear power capability may be perfectly innocent-i.e. a means to reduce domestic oil consumption so as to ensure export earnings in the future-and Iran has so far complied fully with IAEA rules. The evidence thus seems so weak that Iran probably deserves the 'benefit of the doubt'. If the US government has access to more solid evidence, it would serve its own case better by divulging this. In any case, an Iranian breakout from the NPT regime is most unlikely to occur within the next 8-10 years, according to former CIA Director R. James Woolsey; and several measures appear likely to demotivate Iran from a breakout in the longer term-a matter to which I shall return in due course. ⁸⁶

In conclusion, Iran's military spending does not appear excessive, nor does the general level of armaments seem incompatible with defensive intentions. With the possible partial exception of the alleged nuclear weapons programme and the ballistic missiles, the 'Iranian threat' is thus not so much a military threat ⁸⁷ as something sui generis , namely a threat of terrorism (to which all countries are vulnerable) and one of 'ideological contagion'. Serious though they may certainly be, neither of these threat varieties warrants a reciprocal arms build-up that will not help at all. Also, there are many indications that Iranian foreign and defence policy has entered, since around 1988 or 1989, a more pragmatic phase, and that the terrorist element has been down-played considerably. ⁸⁸ The continued containment of Iran may thus have become counterproductive. ⁸⁹ As argued by Jamal S. al-Suwaidi of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies,

The potential concequences of isolating Iran may adversely affect the security and stability of the region ... the outlines of a comprehensive regional security regime cannot take shape until tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbors give way to a progressive rapprochement that builds upon mutual interests ⁹⁰

I shall return to the implications thereof in the next chapter as well as in the Postscript.

3. The GCC States

Both Saudi Arabia and the smaller GCC countries have embarked upon an intense arms build-up, that has included the purchase of both armoured vehicles (MBT, APC and others), artillery, SAMs and Patriot ATBMs, as well as a range of warships (frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, etc.), to which may perhaps be added submarines (contemplated by the UAE). Above all, however, the GCC states have bought sophisticated aircraft in large batches.

The arms purchases are probably spurred by two different sets of motives: A desire to enhance indigenous defence capabilities, yet not so much that the US would feel that it could disengage completely; and a wish to please the US by appearing to do whatever could reasonably be expected from from, and do so by buying weaponry 'Made in the USA'. Arms deals may thus be just as much a reflection of 'burden-sharing' concerns as of actual defence planning-as was the case with much of NATO-Europe's planning during the Cold War. Nevertheless, arms acquisitions produce military options, especially when pooled as in the GCC. ⁹¹ They may therefore lead to reciprocal steps by the GCC's adversaries, in casu both Iran and Iraq, regardless of the 'innocent' motives behing them.

4. Militarization and Arms Racing?

Whatever may be said about arms purchases through the 1990s, on balance the Persian Gulf does not seem excessively militarized-with the very small states as the only partial exception. ⁹²

Table 5: Militarization	Bahrn.	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Oman	Quatar	Saudi A	UAE
Population (1000)	568	63,370	19,161	1,698	1,644	499	17,615	2,657
Act. Armed Forces (1000)	11	513	383	15	44	12	105	65
Reserves (1000)	0	350	650	24	0	0	0	0
Paramilitary (1000)	0	120	50	5	4	0	57	0
Total Armed forces (1000)	11,259	983	1,083	44	47	12	162	65
Active forces/population	1.9%	0.8%	2.0%	0.9%	2.6%	2.4%	0.6%	2.4%
Total forces/population	2.0%	1.6%	5.6%	2.6%	2.9%	2.4%	0.9%	2.4%
GDP (1995) (m USD)	5,000	62,500	18,300	26,700	12,200	7,400	125,000	39,000
Def. exp. (1995) (m USD)	256	2,500	2,700	3,100	1,800	326	13,200	1,900
Def. exp./GDP	5.1%	4.0%	14.8%	11.6%	14.8%	4.4%	10.6%	4.9%

Table 5 shows that most states in the region have only a very modest proportion of their total population under arms, hence that the label `garrison states' is not at all appropriate. Nor do they spend a particularly high percentage of their total wealth on the military. The troops available to defend the national territories of the states in the region also do not seem extravagant at all. On the contrary, force-to-space ratios are surprisingly low, as shown in table 6.

Table 6: Force-to-Space	Bahrn.	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Oman	Quatar	Saudi A.	UAE
Act. Armed F. (1000)	11	513	383	15	44	12	105	65
Land area (km2)	620	1,636,000	432,162	17,820	212,460	11,000	1,960,582	75,581
Troops per km2	17.74	0.314	0.885	0.859	0.205	1.073	0.054	0.853
Total border (km)	161	7,880	3,689	963	3,466	623	7,055	2,185
Troops per km border	110.198	0.040	0.240	0.892	0.059	1.722	0.008	0.391

The same may be said about the `weapons density', i.e. the number of main weapons systems per square kilometre, or per kilometre of border, which are way below those of Europe during the Cold War--and even today (see table 7).

Table 7: Equipment Density	Bahrn.	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Oman	Quatar	Saudi A.	UAE
Land area (km2)	620	1,636,000	432,162	17,820	212,460	11,000	1,960,582	75,581
Land border (km)	0	5,440	3,631	464	1,374	60	4,415	867
MBT	106	1,440	2,700	215	91	24	1,055	201
AIFV/APC	13	950	2,900	351	63	212	2,820	918
Artillery	49	2,284	1,950	59	97	40	448	185
Major equipment per km2	0.271	0.003	0.017	0.035	0.001	0.025	0.002	0.017
Major equipment per km border	n.a.	0.859	2.079	1.347	0.183	4.600	0.979	1.504

Even though the present level of armament thus does not warrant the kind of alarmist response from the (much more heavily armed) North that one frequently encounters, it may nevertheless be a cause of concern for the countries in the region themselves. The latter is especially the case, if the present build-up continues, which depends on whether we are witnessing an arms race without saturation point, or merely a replenishment of depleted stocks and `business-as-usual' modernization that will reach a saturation point sooner or later.

It is very difficult to verify or falsify, in any rigorous manner, the hypothesis that the military build-up we are witnessing constitutes an actual arms race. It does have a considerably inherent plausibility, however. The very concept of an `arms race' is also ambiguous as it covers, at least, three types of `race'. They are, by their very nature, quite different, even though they may be difficult to distinguish empirically:

• a `catching up' race, where everybody is spurred by perceived inferiority and the purpose of which is not to `come in second';

• a `race to win', where all contestants strive for superiority, i.e. for `coming in first';

• a `mixed motive' race, where one runner tries to win, but the others are content with a tie.

It is important to realize the conceivability of the first, entirely defensive, type of racing-- a matter to which I shall return at some length in the concluding chapter. Because of conceptual biases, however, such a race does not automatically have any saturation point, where everybody feels ensured not to lose. Because of a (from a military point of view entirely rational) penchant for `worst case analysis', states tend to overestimate their opponents' strength and to underrate their own, implying that they will regard actual equality as inferiority, hence strive for actual superiority. ⁹³ In that case, the build-up may continue indefinitely.

5. Implications

There are two major problems with arms races: They divert resources needed elsewhere, and they tend to jeopardize stability.

First of all, even 'catching up' races may develop into what one might call 'Red Queen races', named after a character in Lewis Carroll's famous novel Through the Looking Glass .

`Well, in our country', said Alice, still panting a litte, `you'd generally get to somewhere else--if you ran very fast for a long time, as we've been doing'. soone

`A slow sort of country!' said the Queen. `Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!' ⁹⁴

One might argue that the states in the Persian Gulf region have, indeed, been running very fast for a long time without getting anywhere, i.e. just maintaining the same rough balance of power, only at a higher general level of armaments. If so, the negative economic implications of the arms build-up should be a matter of some concern, also because economic development may be a precondition for domestic stability and security. ⁹⁵ Of course, the really big spenders are also those states that can afford it, but military expenditures nevertheless represent a drain on their total resources--especially as by far the major parts of arms acquisitions are imported. There have, to be sure, been some progress in the development of indigenous arms industries in both Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, but neither state is capable of producing major weapons systems--with the partial and conditional exception of missiles. ⁹⁶

Secondly, if the present build-up continues, the region may end up in a situation of fragile balance, i.e. a situation where everybody (at least the three great powers) are in a position to hurt everybody else (including the small powers), but where neither side is capable of defending itself against a determined surprise attack, i.e. what one might call a `mutual offensive superiority' stance. We may put this on a formula, where O stands for offensive strength and D for defensive capabilities, GCC for the states in the Gulf Cooperation Council, In for Iran and Iq for Iraq.

Formula 1a: O_Iq > D_In & O_Iq > D_GCC

Formula 1b: O_In > D_GCC & O_In soone> D_Iq

Formula 1c: O_GCC > D_Iq & O_GCC > D_In

All three major states may thus be able to retaliate after any attack, which may provide a stability of sorts, like that between three gunfighters holding each other at gunpoint. Even though neither of them will be inclined to initiate a fight, however, such a stalemated situation is only stable up to a point, namely when one of the actors moves (in either direction), in which case a small move may well produce a chain reaction:

• If one of the three states lowers its guard (say, by a partial demobilization), the incentive of (one or both of) the others to exploit the window of opportunity may prove irresistible.

• If either one steps up (say, by a mobilization or just a large-scale military exercize) one or both of the others may fear an impending surprise attack, hence strike preemptively. ⁹⁷

The `ballistic misile problem' is a good illustration of such instability. States in possession of missiles with sufficent ranges to target each other's territories are thereby made capable of reciprocal surprise attacks against which there is no effective defence (more about which in the next chapter). This is exactly the situation in the Persian Gulf, where the three major states all possess missiles of that range (seeTable 8). ⁹⁸

Table 8: Ballistic Missiles (range > 100 km)	Designation	Producer	Range (km) (lo-hi est)	Payload (kg) (lo-hi est)	Warhead
Iran	SCUD B SCUD C IRAN 130 CSS-8	N.Korea Iran China	300-340 500-650 120-200 130-150	1000 500 ? ?	conv/chem conv/chem conv.?
Iraq (-1991)	SCUD B AL HUSAYN AL ABBAS	USSR Iraq Iraq	280-300 600-640 900	1000 135-500 135-350	conv/chem conv/chem conv/chem
Saudi Arabia	CSS-2	China	2000-2800	1500-2000	conv.

On the one hand, the missile threat is, in the present author's opinion, much exaggated. Without nuclear (or possibly biological) warheads, the payload of missiles such as those listed above is much too small for them to be able to inflict much damage (even with chemical warheads), regardless of whether they are used in a counterforce or countervalue mode, especially in view of the low accuracy. Aircraft are much more of a problem, because of their ability to fly multiple sorties, carrying a greater payload on each, and hitting the designated target with a greater precision. On the other hand, as long-range missiles have no defensive utility whatsoever, and because of the psychological (`V2-scare') effect, their proliferation is surely a problem--also because they give states an incentive to go nuclear or acquire biological weapons in order to make their ballistic missiles cost-effective. As an anonymous commentator put it, `using them merely to dump a little high explosive is like bying a Ferrari to collect groceries'. ⁹⁹

I shall return, in due course, to alternatives to ballistic missile and WMD proliferation as well as to offensive balancing in general. Before this, however, we must examine the impact of an `external balancer', for which role only the United States today seems conceivable.

B. The US Role

As described above, the United States has been deeply involved in the Persian Gulf region since the 1950s-both economically and militarily, via shifting alliances, and plans for direct intervention, most recently in the war against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait. This has been followed by a forging of ties with individual GCC countries and support for the GCC as a combined anti-Iraqi and anti-Iranian alliance. ¹⁰⁰

However, it has also been followed by contingency plans for new (if need be unilateral) interventions, for instance in the name of 'counter-proliferation'. While the latter programme involves mainly arms control initiatives and the provision of incentives to possible proliferants, the possibility of 'pre-emptive' strikes against nuclear facilities has also been contemplated. ¹⁰¹ The prime envisaged target thereof has been North Korea, but strikes against a resurgent Iraq or Iran also seem conceivable-probably at least to these two countries.

The military lessons that the US has drawn from the victorious Gulf War may also point in the direction of a new assertiveness and interventionism. ¹⁰² Many observers have drawn the conclusion from this experience that we are witnessing a fully-fledged 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), also labelled the Military-Technological Revolution (MTR). ¹⁰³ These theories are based on the following beliefs, which the present authors regards as myths, even though they certainly contain a grain of truth:

• Air power can be decisive, in the sense that future wars may be fought almost entirely from the air.

• Information dominance may be decisive.

• Technological supremacy is decisive, hence `the best weapons win'.

• Surgical precison is achievable, especially with air strikes, so that collateral damage can be minimized and wars waged in full conformity with just war criteria.

• Determined offensives, initiated by air strikes, can break through all defences.

One should, however, bear in mind that there are strong vested interests in the dissemination of the myth (if so it is) of the RMA/MTR:

• If everybody believes that `the best weapons win', and that the best are those that are `Made in the USA', the United States will ensure its dominance of the (rapidly shrinking) global arms market, thereby securing the survival of at least most of the US arms industry.

• If the US Congress believes that the US armed forces can win future wars, it is less likely to further reduce the funds available for them.

• If everybody else believes that the US believes it can win wars, they may also believe that the US will be more assertive in the future--which may have a significant deterrent effect. ¹⁰⁴ Ideally, this assertiveness may never be put to the test, much less the actual US ability to prevail in war.

The assumption that such, partly economical, partly power-political motives have played a role is supported by the spectacle of the US quest for enemies after the demise of the Soviet Union. To qualify for this role, states should be characterized by conspicuous `otherness' and apparent `rogueness'--and their size and strength should be just right: large enough to justify the maintenance of (roughly) undiminished `countervailing' US military power, but not so large as to make countervailing impossible. Iran and Iraq meet these criteria, at least if viewed as members of a `rogues' club' that also includes, among others, North Korea. ¹⁰⁵

While the United States may thus play the traditional (stabilizing) role as `balancer' in the future, it appears unwise to count upon it. Also, a precondition for playing such a role is a certain impartiality, which is incompatible with singling out, rather arbitrarily, some states as `rogues' that are dangerous because of their very nature.

To some extent, the United States' allies in Europe have simply `followed their leader', by providing some support to US-led ventures. To the extent that the Europeans have had their own policies towards the region, however, these have tended to act as a tempering factor. As a general rule, European states have placed a lesser emphasis on military strength, have been more prepared for a dialogue with the `rogues', and less inclined to contain them by military or economic means. ¹⁰⁶ However, in view of the fact that the European countries do not, so far at least, play any central role in the region, I shall largely disregard their effect in the following.

IV. Resolving The Security Dilemma?

Having thus painted a far from rosy picture of the security political situation prevailing in the Persian Gulf region, I shall in this chapter advance some suggestions for an improvement, i.e. stabilization. Not because stability and order is always a good thing, ¹⁰⁷ but because changes of the status quo by violent means are almost always worse. Ideally, the situation should be stabilized and relaxed to such an extent that modifications of the status quo (politically, economically, perhaps even territorially) become possible by peaceful means.

A. The Philosophy Of Common Security

The theory (or even philosophy) of Common Security was developed in the early 1980s against the background of a severe, systemic, ideological and seemingly enduring conflict, in casu that between East and West. The regional features of the conflict(s) in the Persian Gulf region bear a striking resemblance to this (vide supra) . Hence, if Common Security was a valid approach to the East-West conflict, if might also, mutatis mutandis , be relevant to the Gulf.

As formulated by the Palme Commission in its 1982 report, ¹⁰⁸ the `Common Security approach' acknowledged the conflict as genuine (contrary to certain peace research theories), and only suggested alternative means to the same ends, i.e. national security in a hostile environment. The point of departure in the development of a political strategy of Common Security was the interactive nature of international relations: States respond to each other's moves, as they see each other as opponents, hence are predisposed to view their opponent's actions as (potentially) hostile. What states do in response, moreover, becomes a stimulus for response, i.e. spurs a counter-reaction from their adversaries. This can easily develop into a spiral of malign interaction, as defensive reactions tend to be interpreted as offensive proactive moves. <sup>109</sup> This is illustrated in figure 2, where no distinction is made between action and reaction, which is always a `chicken and egg problem'.

A consequence of this action-reaction phenomenon is that states find themselves in a `security dilemma', the two `horns' of which are not to respond (thereby risking vulnerability to whatever the other side might do), or to respond with (re)actions that the other side may find threatening, thereby perhaps provoking the other side to do precisely what the defensive response was intended to avert--or something even worse. ¹¹⁰ In the words of Kenneth Waltz:

If each state, being stable, strove only for security and had no designs on its neighbours, all states would nevertheless remain insecure; for the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened ¹¹¹

This security dilemma manifests itself in several action-reaction patterns:

• In arms races, where a state with merely defensive intentions acquires weapons merely to defend itself, but by so doing creates the impression that it may be preparing for an attack and thereby spurs a reciprocal arms build-up by its adversaries. ¹¹² As argued above, the build-up of armaments in the Persian Gulf region may well fall into this category of `catching up' or `Red Queen' races.

• In mobilization races, where each side mobilizes or otherwise readies itself for war out of fear that the respective other side will otherwise do do first, thus catching it unprepared. In the worst of cases, this might result in a preventive war (as may have been the case of the Iraq/Iran war, vide supra ) or a spiral of `reciprocal fears of surprise attack' that gets out of hand and leads to war. ¹¹³

• In `alliance races', where each side seeks to enlist other states as allies, primarily in order to prevent its opponents from doing so first, ¹¹⁴ as in the quest for US and Soviet allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf described above.

Common Security may simply be understood as an admonition to take such behavioural patterns into account, i.e. to always consider how the respective other side may view the actions one is contemplating. Neither side can achieve security at the respective other's expence, but a precondition for the security of either side is that the respective other also feels secure.

This general rule seems perfectly applicable to the Persian Gulf, where it is probably unwise and shortsighted of the smaller states to seek unilateral security at the expence of either Iraq or Iran (or both), if only because the potential of these two regional great powers may eventually manifest itself in military superiority. It is more likely to do so, the more either state feels threatened by its neighbours or others. Should it do so, it will surely be to the smaller states' advantage to have a peaceful rather than a revengeful Iran or Iraq in their vicinity.

Common Security in its original formulation did not presuppose actual negotiations or agreements, but might be implemented in a `tacit coordination mode', i.e. as a form of `cooperation among adversaries'. ¹¹⁵ However, if security can only be obtained by two adversaries simultaneously, it will surely facilitate matters if they can actually exchange views and reach aggreements--and even more so if there are institutional frameworks ready at hand for such direct collaboration. This is envisaged by the reinvigorated concept of `common security for the nineties and beyond', namely `Cooperative Security'. ¹¹⁶

A cooperative security approach to the regional conflict(s) in the Persian Gulf would have to involve both Iran and Iraq as directly as possible, i.e. integrate rather than contain the two perceived main threats to regional stability. ¹¹⁷ One implication might be the forging of economic ties, preferably pointing in the direction of an interdependence that would give all states a stake in maintaining peace. ¹¹⁸ An obstacle to this is, however, the above-mentioned lack of complementarity between the economies of the region.

It would also imply discussions on security-related matters, which may or may not take the form of actual negotiations. More realistically, such discussions may take a form similar to those held under the auspices of the ASEAN Regional Forum, i.e. informal, non-binding discussions. This would allow participants to deal with a comprehensive agenda, including all aspects of an expanded concept of security--which will be particularly useful if it is true that the `Iranian threat' is primarily an ideological one.

Cooperative security, however, would also have to deal with military matters. One implication thereof might be a series of regional seminars on military doctrines, similar to those held in Europe under the auspices of the CSCE, but which also have their (less formal or official) counterparts in the ASEAN. ¹¹⁹ They might provide a venue for a frank and open, yet in no way binding, exchange of opinions on reciprocal threat perceptions, hence of dismantling unwarranted threat misperceptions. However, divulging military doctrines and strategies and illuminating military postures obviously only have such a benign effect if what is being revealed is actually non-threatening.

B. Non-Offensive Defence

This is precisely what non-offensive defence (NOD) is all about, a concept that is is also known as 'structural inability to attack' (SIA), 'defensive defence' (DD), 'non-provocative defence' (NPD) or 'confidence-building defence' (CBD). While all these terms refer to a (more or less hypothetical) end-point, 'defensive restructuring' refers to the path leading in this direction, i.e. a simultaneous build-down of offensive and upgrading of defensive capabilities. In the following I shall describe at some length what NOD is all about, ¹²⁰ on the assumption that it will be relevant for the Persian Gulf region.

1. Objectives

While they may disagree on the means to achieve them, almost all NOD proponents agree on the ends, most important among which are the following:

• Disarmament, which is favoured both as a contribution to the ends below and as a means to free resources for civilian consumption. Generally, NOD advocates have little faith in arms control by negotiation and tend to prefer a combination of unilateralism and gradualism. Regardless of the method, however, what matters most is to reduce the element of mutual threat in arms acquisitions so as to escape the action-reaction pattern. To the extent that a state's armaments are strictly defensive, they will pose no threat to a its enemies, who are thus under no pressure to respond. Not only does an escape thus become possible from the arms race, it may even be possible to reverse the dynamics. To the extent that a state's adversaries are also running a `catching up' race at great expense, they will be eager to opt out of the race as well. A way of doing so would be to emulate a defensive restructuring of the armed forces, whence might ensue a `restructuring and disarmament race'.

• War prevention, as NOD will make certain wars well-nigh inconceivable without increasing the risk of other forms of war. If states possess merely such forces as cannot be used for attack, their respective adversaries will have no incentive to start preventive wars or launch pre-emptive attacks. They will stand a better chance of prevailing if they wait for the respective other side to attack. Against premeditated attack, on the other hand, an NOD-type defence should possess undiminished strength as a form of `deterrence by denial': the country should be difficult to invade and even harder to occupy. ¹²¹ A state with an NOD-type defence would, however, benefit from the clarity provided by the defensive nature of its forces: They could be mobilized and readied for combat upon early warning without risk of thereby provoking an otherwise avoidable war.

• Defensive strength is required for war prevention. Some NOD advocates believe that a civilian-based defence would be adequate for dissuasion of an aggressor, as it could make occupation costly and unrewarding. Most disagree and believe that military forces are required, but that they may do without offensive capabilities (vide infra ).

• Damage limitation is to be achieved by stemming or reversing nuclear proliferation, by making states secure without nuclear weapons.

• Détente and confidence-building would benefit from a defensive restructuring of the armed forces. NOD can help dismantle enemy images by removing their foundations, as well as by enhancing transparency; and it may serve as a confidence-building measure in its own right. ¹²²

To achieve these objectives by means of NOD, however, presupposes that meaningful distinction can be made between `offensive' and `defensive', and that defence is somehow superior to offence.

2. The Offence/Defence Distinction

Many suggestions have been made for how to distinguish between offence and defence, yet most suffer from serious flaws and inconsistencies, above all because distinctions of universal validity have been sought through generalization rather than abstraction. Also, analysts have sought the answer at the wrong level of analysis. In the following, I shall try to shed some light on the subject by analyzing the pros and cons of distinctions along a continuum of levels of analysis. They range from individual weapons to political intentions, via intermediate levels of military formations and total postures, and from tactical and operational to strategic and 'grand strategic' conceptions.

The most common misunderstanding about NOD (to which a few NOD proponents have, admittedly, contributed) is that it envisages a ban on 'offensive weapons' in favour of 'defensive weapons'. ¹²³ Not only is such a distinction utterly meaningless, to attempt it in practice may also be harmful. This was was, for instance, the case with the League of Nations' 1932 World Disarmament Conference, where states sought to conceal their quest for supremacy with proposals for banning 'offensive weapons', which tended to be precisely those categories in which their opponents were superior. ¹²⁴ Both offensive and defensive operations require a whole panoply of weapons categories, many of which are identical: Tanks may, for instance, be very valuable for a defender, just as anti-tank weapons are indispensable for an attacker. Mines may not only be of use to a defender, but also to an attacker (to say nothing of their other nasty features). ¹²⁵ Indeed, even fortifications (such as the Great Wall of China or the Maginot Line) may facilitate attack, simply because they free forces for offensive use that would otherwise be required for defensive duties.

Weapons nevertheless matter. Under concrete historical and geographical circumstances, weapons are useful or indispensable to different degrees for attackers and defenders. In a European context anno somewhere between 1945 and today, for instance, tanks were indispensable for prospective aggressors, whereas defenders could not no without anti-tank weapons. Military formations (e.g. divisions) may thus differ with respect to their offensive capabilities depending on their weapons mix. Surely, the GCC states as well as Iran are pleased with the changes in Iraq's weapons mix resulting from UNSCR 687, even though they might have preferred even stricter constraints on Saddam Hussein's offensive might.

A meaningful offence/defence distinction can therefore only be made at the level of postures, e.g. by assessing the relative weight of predominantly offensive and largely defensive units. A relevant parameter is also the strategic reach provided by the totality of the armed forces (including logistics, etc.). An offensive posture is one with a longer reach than a defensive one, for the obvious reason that an attack is about conquering ground whereas defence takes place on the defender's home territory. However, what should count as 'long' or 'short' depends on context since distances are relative: Whereas only truly long-range mobility matters between, say, Russia and Ukraine, some countries in the 'crowded' Persian Gulf region may well be concerned about their respective adversaries' ability to traverse much shorter distances. But states also differ in other geostrategical respects: Island states, for obvious reasons, only need to worry about enemies in possession of navies (and/or long range air forces), whereas land-locked states need not worry too much about naval powers, etc.

These analytical complexities notwithstanding, complete agnosticism is not warranted, and 'everything is not in the eyes of the beholder'. For a particular region at a particular point in time, informed expert opinion will generally have no trouble with reaching agreement on at least the basic criteria. Hence, for instance, the consensus among the states participating in the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) negotiations on a focus on reductions of MBTs, ACVs, artillery, subsequently also combat aircraft and helicopters-a focus that may, but need not, be appropriate for other regions, such as the Persian Gulf (vide infra). ¹²⁶

What ultimately matters is, of course, what states do with their military might, i.e. whether they have offensive or defensive intentions and political ambitions. So long as states feel confident that their neighbours are peaceful and defensively minded, they will not care about their armaments at all-just as, for instance, Denmark does not care about Sweden's military superiority, or Canada about that of the USA. Except for such 'security communities', however, states tend to worry about their neighbours' intentions and to be much more comfortable when their neighbours are saturated and status quo-oriented (i.e. defensive) than if they are 'revisionist', irredentist, or expansionist (see table 9).

Table 9: Levels Of Ambition	Spatial continuum	Temporal continuum
Strictly defensive	Defence of: - National territory	Reactive defence
Rather defensive	- Overseas possessions - Nationals abroad	Direct defence
Moderately offensive	- Overseas economic interests	Pre-emption
Rather offensive	Extended defence perimeter	Preventive war
Strictly offensive	Expansion	Aggression

Intentions, however, are not immediately observable, but have to be inferred from circumstantial, but tangible, evidence that is almost always open to different interpretations--as illustrated by the above speculations about Iran's and Iraq's motives. Such evidence is available in different forms. Military postures may, for instance, be seen as `frozen strategies': They reflect how states intend to fight a future war--or rather (because of the considerable and differential time-lag) how they intended so, at some point(s) in the past when the choice(s) resulting in the present posture was (were) made. Fortunately, because of the revolutionary progress in information technologies, the main feastures of military postures are already today observable by various `national technical means', and they can be made even more transparent by agreements such as the Open Skies Treaty. ¹²⁷

Another reflection of strategies is the pattern of exercises. A state that, for instance, never trains its forces for break-through operations probably does not plan to be on the offensive in a future war, and it will almost surely not succeed with improvising such operations in the `fog of war'. Hence the rationale for making military manoeuvres transparent, as intended by various confidence-building measures (CBMs), that have been negotiated in Europe under the auspices of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). ¹²⁸

Finally, states may willingly reveal their military doctrines and war plans in doctrinal seminars such as mentioned above. ¹²⁹ Such revelations do, of course, lend themselves to deception. If a state plans to attack others, it will try hard to conceal this, e.g. by claiming to have a strictly defensive military doctrine. However, it will surely be unmasked if the `pieces of the puzzle' do not fit together, i.e. if its posture and/or its manoeuvre practices contradict the proclaimed intensions.

It is thus possible to discern (the outline of) the war plans of other states, with the implication that a distinction between offensive and defensive strategies, operational concepts and tactics is possible. This leaves us with the question where to 'draw the line', i.e. at which level to demand strict defensiveness. This is mainly a matter of the timing and scale of counter-offensive operations. ¹³⁰ Here, a very clear line of demarcation recommends itself to distinguish between offensive and defensive levels of ambition, namely the international border: A strictly defensive, NOD-type defence needs the ability to forcefully evict an invader (presupposing that the forward defence has been penetrated) and restore the status quo ante bellum . Also, it may require capabilities for occasional `hot pursuits' across the border. However, it surely does not need the ability to pursue the invader to his national capital in order to enforce an unconditional surrender.

Large-scale (`strategic') counter-offensives should thus be ruled out, both for this purpose and for punitive reasons. `Punishment' as a strategic objective is neither defensive, nor likely to achieve other objectives than revenge--which one may, of course, regard as a form of `justice'. The present author, however, does not. Whatever `punishment' may be required should be administred by international authorities in accordance with international law, and would usually consist of reparations.

3. Defensive Strength

Even though meaningful distinctions can thus be made between offensive and defensive strategies and postures, it does not follow that the two can actually be disentangled without detrimental effects on defence efficiency. Moreover, if the relinquishment of offensive capabilities inevitably comes at the expense of defensive strength many states will be well-advised not to adopt NOD as their guideline.

Fortunately, as a general rule (with allowance for possible exceptions), it is in fact possible to strengthen one's defences while building down offensive capabilities, simply because the defensive form of combat is inherently the strongest, as already pointed out by Clausewitz-and as sometimes formulated in the rule-of-thumb that it takes a three-to-one superiority to break through a prepared defence. ¹³¹ To make it actually stronger, however, requires skills and specialization, which is what NOD is all about:

• There are capabilities which a `pure' defender no longer needs, or at least needs much less. To relinquish them will (in the medium-to-long term, at least) allow for savings that may be utilized for enhancing defensive strength: Examples of such largely superfluous capabilities are long-range mobility (including logistics), the ability to move about under enemy fire (requiring armour, mobile air defence, etc.), and long-range striking power (including C³I systems, etc.). Since such capabilities happen to be among the most costly, quite a lot of defensive strength (anti-tank and air defence weapons, for instance) may be purchased from the savings.

• A number of material `force multipliers` will be available to a defender, representing `home ground advantages': Interior lines of communications and supply; the option of relying on distributed depots for munitions, POL, etc.; of building various types of fortifications and of constructing barriers; and even of a certain landscaping. ¹³²

• The `moral' advantages are also considerable: The defenders will enjoy the support (morally, materially and otherwise) of the population, which may be easier mobilized for defensive than for aggressive purposes.

• Defenders are able to exercise under more realistic conditions, since they know exactly where they will have to fight.

• Command structures may be decentralized, thereby made more robust than the very hierarchical ones on which an aggressor tends to rely. ¹³³

• Certain trends in the development of modern weapons technologies tend to benefit the defender disproportionately: The revolutionary development in micro-electronics, for instance, allows for miniaturization which, in its turn, may render the large weapons platforms superfluous for defensive purposes, while they remain indispensable for offensive operations. Even though it is certainly premature to write off the tank or the major surface combatants as obsolete, they may nevertheless be facing obsolescence (in the sense of declining cost-effectiveness) in the coming decades. ¹³⁴

4. The Span of Models

How effective NOD will be depends, of course, on which particular model (or mixture of models) is selected for implementation in which particular context. ¹³⁵ The following list captures most proposals to be found in the international literature: ¹³⁶

1. Area-covering territorial defence as in the `spider and web' concept of the Study Group Alternative Security Policy (SAS, to which the present author belongs). It envisages a combination of an area-covering defence web with mobile forces (`spiders'), including tanks and other armoured vehicles. Even though the latter are per se  suitable for offensive operations, they are made dependent on the web, hence very agile within, but virtually not immobilized beyond it, i.e. on enemy ground. ¹³⁷

2. Stronghold defence, as suggested by members of the SAS group for the Middle East and other regions with low force-to-space ratios and/or long borders (such as most countries in the Persian Gulf). ¹³⁸ This implies concentrating the defence on certain areas that are politically important (typically the approaches to the national capital or other major populations centres) and/or which allow for a cohesive defence. The fire coverage afforded by the units in the strongholds will, at least, channel the attack, thereby making it more manageable for the mobile forces.

3. Forward defence, for instance by means of `fire barriers' or fortifications and fixed obstacles along the border. Without mobile ground forces that are capable of taking and holding ground, such a defence may be entirely non-offensive even if long-range striking power (aircraft, missiles) is included.

4. The `inverted synergy' (or `missing link') approach, according to which an otherwise offensive force posture may become strictly defensive by the absence of one or several components, for instance long-range and/or mobile air defence capability, mobile anti-tank defence, or river-crossing equipment--depending on context.

5. Disengagement, implying the withdrawal of certain forces (usually the most offensive-capable ones) from the border area to rearward locations, combined with a forward defence by strictly defensive means: typically tantamount to a tank-free zone in the border region, to be defended by infantry armed with anti-tank weaponry, or otherwise. Such a scheme would hamper surprise attack and contribute to confidence-building, as the depletion zone would serve as an early warning device. One side's deployment of proscribed weapons and forces into the zone will alert the other, thereby allowing him to mobilize and prepare for combat.

6. `Stepping down' is intended for the same purpose. It implies reducing the general level of readiness of forces (e.g. by a switching to a reserve army system).

However, the advantages resulting from disengagement as well as from `stepping down' should be weighed against the risk of malign interactions in a crisis period. If the forces withdrawn from the forward line are those with the greatest offensive capability (as in most proposals), to redeploy them into the zone for defensive purposes in an intense political crisis could easily be misinterpreted as preparations for an attack. Counter-intuitive though it may seem, stability may thus require offensive-capable forces to be stationed close to their planned combat positions and in a high state of readiness, while the defensive forces may safely be cadred and stationed in the rear.

5. Status

NOD is an idea that has been debated in Europe since the late 1970s. It was first rejected by the Western states and ignored completely by the East. Around 1986/87, however, it was unexpectedly endorsed by the new party leadership in the USSR, which even took some steps to implement it with a certain build-down of offensive capabilities. Another reflection of the idea was the agreed mandate for the CFE negotiations (vide supra ): to build down 'capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action' via reductions of major weapons systems. These negotiations in 1990 produced the CFE Treaty, pursuant to which both sides (but especially the Soviet Union) embarked upon such large-scale conventional disarmament that the 'threat from the East' would have been effectively dismantled, even without the (by coincidence almost simultaneous) demise of communism.

The main military problem in Europe has thus been solved, inter alia by means of defensive restructuring, which also removed most of the raison d'être  of nuclear weapons. Their main rationale, seen from NATO's point of view, had all along been to counter-balance the (more or less genuine) Soviet conventional superiority. They could thus safely be built down in the absence thereof, leaving behind, at most, a small residual arsenal for deterrence of 'the unforeseen'. As an ironic result of this success the concept of NOD has been nearly forgotten by European policy-makers and independent analysts. This is understandable, but not quite justified.

NOD would still seem relevant for several sets of remaining conflicts in Europe, such as those between the new states of the former Soviet Union, between the new ex-Yugoslav republics, between the would-be new members of NATO and Russia, and between Greece and Turkey. The main focus of the NOD debate has, however, shifted to other parts of the world, where traditional wars remain a real threat, such as the Korean Peninsula and East Asia in general, South Asia (the India-Pakistan conflict) and the Middle East (Israel v. Syria). ¹³⁹ The Persian Gulf region also appears an obvious setting for defensive restructuring.

C. Formulae For Regional Stability

As argued above, the Persian Gulf region is the locus of several conflicts for which NOD would be relevant, including those between Iran and Iraq and between these two and the GCC. What we are looking for is a stable sitaution, in which all three corners of the triangle might feel secure, preferably even without external assistance. The appropriate formula would be the exact opposite of that described above as 'mutual offensive superiority' (Formulae 1a-c), namely one of 'mutual defensive superiority'. This notion has traditionally been applied only to bipolar settings, but becomes much more complicated and demanding under conditions of multipolarity. ¹⁴⁰ In its most demanding version this would require each of the three parties to be able to successfully defend themselves against an attack by the other two combined.

Formula 2a: D_GCC > O_In + O_Iq

Formula 2b: D_In > O_GCC + O_Iq

Formula 2c: D_GCC > O_Iq + O_In

Fortunately, living up to this is almost prohibitely demanding standard is probably not required, as it seems extremely unlikely that Iran and Iraq would team up against the GCC states, or that the latter (individually or jointly) would `bandwagon' with either Iran or Iraq as a putative aggressor against the respective other, however much they may disapprove of the victim. More likely is the, much less demanding, situation where an aggressor would risk having to fight the two others, i.e. where the combined strength of the two should surpass the offensive strength of the third:

Formula 3a: D_GCC + D_In > O_Iq

Formula 3b: D_Iq + D_GCC > O_In

Formula 3c: D_In + D_Iq > O_GCC

Such a situation might be described as a `collective security scenario', where `balancing behaviour' would predominate, as it was argued above that it tends to do. States would team up, but only for defensive purposes, whereas an aggressor would be on its own. The reason why this is more likely scenario than the other is that neither Iran nor Iraq would be confortable with the other's establishment of a hegemony through aggression--in view of their long history of rivalry. At worst, either the GCC, Iran or Iraq would try to remain neutral (as Iran did during the Gulf War) in a war between the respective two other sides of the triangle. This would modify the formula to the following, which does not appear particularly alarming either:

Formula 4a: D_GCC > O_Iq & D_GCC > O_In

Formula 4b: D_In > O_Iq & D_In > O_GCC

Formula 4c: D_Iq > O_In & D_Iq > O_GCC

It further seems likely that the rest of the world would get involved in a renewed war of aggression (as in the Gulf War), regardless of who would start it--albeit most likely with either of the two `rogues' cast in the role of the aggressor. In the following formulas external assistance to the defender is called X. It is unknown, but surely larger than Y, i.e. the external assistance upon which the aggressor could count.

Formula 5a: D_GCC + X > O_Iq + Y & D_GCC + X > O_In + Y

Formula 5b: D_In + X > O_Iq + Y & D_In + X > O_GCC + Y

Formula 5c: D_Iq + X > O_In + Y & D_Iq + X > O_GCC + Y

Putting the balance of forces on such abstract terms seems to point towards quite optimistic conclusions, which are not contracticted by the actual figures (see table 10).

Table 10: Force Comparison	GCC		Iran		Iraq		Total
Def. exp. (1995) m USD	20,582	80%	2,500	10%	2,700	10%	25,783
Armed Forces (Active) 1.000	251	22%	513	45%	383	33%	1,147
Armed Forces (Reserves) 1.000	24	2%	350	34%	650	63%	1,024
Paramilitary 1.000	66	28%	120	51%	50	21%	237
Total armed forces 1.000	341	14%	983	41%	1,083	45%	2,407
MBT	1,692	29%	1,440	25%	2,700	46%	5,833
AIFV/APC	4,377	53%	950	12%	2,900	35%	8,228
Artillery	878	17%	2,284	45%	1,950	38%	5,113
Navy pers. 1.000	24	54%	18	41%	3	6%	45
Major surface	9	60%	5	33%	1	7%	16
Minor surface	101	50%	88	43%	14	7%	204
Submarines	0	0%	2	100%	0	0%	3
Air Force pers. 1.000	32	34%	30	33%	30	33%	92
Combat Aircraft	558	48%	295	25%	310	27%	1,164
Armed Helicopters	100	100%	0	0%	?	0%	100
SSMs	16	31%	35	69%	?	0%	52

The balance is asymmetrical, but still a balance of sorts. The only percentage share that looks really alarming is Iran's in terms of manpower. However, even Iran has probably lost its former faith in `human wave'-type attacks. This optimism, however, needs to be qualified with the following considerations:

• It all presupposes that the GCC remains in force and that it will withstand the strains of a war (which may be a big if). ¹⁴¹ The assistance of the smaller GCC states may not be decisive for Saudi Arabia, but the opposite is certainly the case, especially on the pessimistic assumtion that no outside help may be forthcoming.

• It also presupposes that aggressors will not gang up against victims. Even though this seems a realistic assumption, unlikely events sometimes happen.

• It all presupposes that analytical distinctions can be made between offensive and defensive strength--not only in abstracto  but also concretely. Should concrete analysis reveal that, say Kuwait's tanks are defensive, but those of Iran offensive, whatever arms control packages are negotiated would have to be very asymmetrical in order to address the problem.

• As deterrence is only in the mind of a potential aggressor, perceptions have to be factored into the equations. What matters for war prevention is not whether, say, the GCC could actually defend itself against Iraq or Iran, but whether the latter believe so or not. If not, an aggressor would stand to lose the war initiated by itself, but this would be rather cold comfort for the victims.Finally, both Iran and Iraq probably fear a US attack, especially one undertaken with regional support from (all or some of) the GCC states. They may therefore see their national requirements in the following terms (where U stands for the USA):

Formula 6a: D_In > O_GCC + O_U

Formula 6b: D_Iq > O_GCC + O_U

Put on simple numerical terms, these requirements would be impossible to meet because of the US military preponderance. However, factoring in the political element helps considerably:

It is true that the United States has contingency plans to wage two (or even two-and-a-half) MRCs (major regional conflicts) simultaneously, and to do so offensively with a view to winning swiftly and decisively. However, it is also true that the American public would not allow the Pentagon to get their way--especially not in the form of unprovoked US attacks that would cost (more than a few) American lives. ¹⁴² By implication, both Iran and Iraq should be relatively safe if they combine non-provokation with the ability to exact a significant price from an aggressor, e.g. the United States. This is precisely what NOD seeks to accomplish.

V. Defensive Restructuring In The Persian Gulf

Having thus sketched the rationale for NOD and the standards to which it should live up, what remains is to concretize the implications, both as far as arms control endeavours and unilateral defence planning are concerned.

A. Weapons Of Mass Destruction

One might, of course, argue (as some self-proclaimed Realists do) that a certain proliferation would improve stability by virtue of the caution-installing functions of nuclear weapons. However, even if one were to welcome, say German or Japanese nuclear weapons, ¹⁴³ would any sane person really prefer a nuclear-armed Iraq or Iran to the same countries with 'only' conventional weapons? Surely not.

1. Non-, Anti- or Counterproliferation?

The danger of proliferation of WMD is worth taking seriously, for two reasons: First of all, it will be a problem if any state breaks out of the NPT regime (as Iraq tried), as this could draw the others along. Secondly, such proliferation (or the perceived danger thereof) risks justifying (in the eyes of the US Congress and public opinion, at the very least) interventions in the name of counter-proliferation, while a successful break-out would probably prevent it. An incentive is thereby created to 'beat the counter-proliferationists to it', the prospect of which may, in its turn, may make even more premature pre-emptive counterproliferation strikes appear necessary, etc. The proliferation-counterproliferation race may thus accellerate beyond control.

Hence the need to address the proliferation risk in a non-confrontational way. In principle, there are two ways of handling non-proliferation, namely supply and demand-side measures. The former seek to deny would-be nuclear proliferants access to nuclear-related materials and technology, whereas the latter seek to demotivate such states from going nuclear. The two may, of course, be combined. Indeed, one might argue that they are logically inseperable, as a very effective way to demotivate a state from acquiring nuclear weapons would be to assure it that its adversaries are denied access to whatever it takes to build them.

In the category of direct supply-side measures, a strengthening of the NPT safeguards would be most welcome, as some of its inherent weaknesses were revealed by the IAEA's failure to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programmes. The proposals for a cut-off of production of fissionable material would also serve to hamper, as would the various export regulations under the Zangger Committee and the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group). The recently negotiated CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) is also a significant step in the same direction, India's abstention notwithstanding. ¹⁴⁴

Chemical weapons are often seen as a possible substitute for nuclear ones, hence the need to also stem the proliferation of these 'poor man's weapons of mass destruction'. Unfortunately, here it may rather be a matter of reversing a proliferation that has already occurred, as both Iran and Iraq are credited by most observers with having chemical weapons, even though the latter's may now have been destroyed. The Chemical Weapons Convention (which will enter into force in 1997) helps considerably, as do the Australia Group's regulation of the transfer of 'precursor chemicals'. The same may be the case for biological weapons, that Iraq definitely tried to build, and which Iran may actually have built (according to US sources). ¹⁴⁵

One way of addressing the problem may be to 'lump everything together' in a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. ¹⁴⁶ On the one hand, this would take into account that Arab and Iranian chemical and biological weapons are motivated by, or at least justified by, Israel's nuclear weapons, and vice versa. On the other hand, simply adding items to the agenda (desirable though they may be) risks stading in the way of realizing it.

As WMD without suitable means of delivery are of little use, it may also help to deny prospective proliferants access to such means of delivery. The MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) falls into this category of indirect supply-side antiproliferation measures with its restrictions on the transfer of both assembled missiles and various technologies for producing missiles with ranges exceeding 300 kilometres and payloads over 150 kilos. ¹⁴⁷ What is conspicuous by is complete absence is, however, any set of restrictions on the acquisition of the most suitable means of delivery of all, namely aircraft-probably for two reasons: First of all, contrary to ballistic missiles aircraft are very effective for conventional as well as for nuclear missions; hence to deny states access to aircraft is seens as tantamount to denying them means of national defence. Applying an offensive-defence distintion, however, will reduce the strength of this argument considerably (vide infra). Secondly, the global airframe industry is in severe crisis, hence the strong economic motives for continuing to sell to whoever is able to pay. ¹⁴⁸

2. A Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone

Nuclear-weapons free zones might both be categorized as demand and supply side measures, as they prohibit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states within a designated zone as well as the stationing of nuclear weapons by other states. Such NWFZ have been proliferating considerably in recent years: To the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty (covering Latin America) and the 1986 Raratonga Treaty (for the South Pacific) have recently been added a decision by ASEAN to make Southeast Asia a NWFZ, and one by the OAU about a similar zone for Africa. That NWFZs have thus obviously been placed on the international agenda makes it even more urgent to address the question of modalities. ¹⁴⁹ The central questions are how to cover what and whom:

1. What to cover is not as obvious as it might seem: Only fully assembled nuclear weapons, or possible components thereof? If the latter, what about dual-use items? Or both weapons and means of delivery, such as aircraft and missiles? Once again: what about dual-capable systems? Should the prohibition on acquisition and deployment merely pertain to nuclear weapons or to all weapons of mass destruction?

2. Whom to cover is also not always obvious, as it entails a 'slippery slope' problem. Should, for instance, a Persian Gulf zone merely include the states in the region, narrowly defined; or should it also encompass Israel (a de facto nuclear power that may be a source of insecurity for all states in the region) ¹⁵⁰ and/or a threshold state like Pakistan, as might make perfect sense seen from Iran's point of view? If so, the zone would also have to include India, which would undoubtedly insist on also taking China into account. Beijing would surely not dismantle its nuclear weapons without an inclusion of Russia and the United States, perhaps even Britain and France. Regional efforts thus tend to become global, which would be a good thing, were it not because that would also tend to make such proposals non-starters. A further question is whether to include merely territory under the sovereign control of the states parties to the treaty or also surrounding seas--as in several of the treaties listed. If the latter, how would that affect the UNCLOS-II and the general mare liberum  principle?

3. How to cover what should be covered involves a plethora of technical and other questions such as: How to monitor treaty compliance? What kind of reciprocal obligations to demand from the nuclear powers: only `negative seurity guarantees, or positive ones as well? Should they be part of the treaty itself, or relegated to additional protocols? And what should be the modalities of entry into force? Should there be escape clauses?

There are, of course, no `correct' answers to questions such as the above. It is all a matter of political expediency and pragmatism; and of comparing a less-than-perfect zone which may become a reality with a perfect one that will remain on the drawing board. It is perhaps helpful to acknowledge that a NWFZ is primarily a political declaration of intent. Regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, what matters is whether states regard themselves as bound by it. Hence a `deficient' NWFZ treaty may anyhow be just as effective as the `ideal' one, but it may have the additional benefit of contributing politically to the creation of a common or cooperative security framework in the Persian Gulf region.

This would speak in favour of a treaty encompassing merely Iran, Iraq and the GCC. Declared as well as actual (Israel) and suspected nuclear powers (India and Pakistan) within striking range of the region should, however, be asked for negative security guarantess (phrased in a manner that allows for maintaining opacity), i.e. for relinquishing their `right' to use nuclear weapons against states parties to the treaty. As a corollary thereof they should be urged to detarget regional states. The treaty itself should be limited to national territories, but the nuclear powers should be urged to abstain from entering the Persian Gulf with warships with nuclear weapons on board. As far as national territories are concerned, the treaty should allow for intrusive verification measures, say in the form of a stipulated number of challenge on-site inspections, to assess the findings of which a crisis prevention centre could be established (or a `nuclear weapons free zone inspection agency') that would not merely monitor treaty compliance, but also provide a venue for informal talks to avoid misunderstandings.

Even more important than such zones may, however, be demand-side measures that reduce the perceived need for nuclear weapons by making countries secure without them (as most of the world's countries are).

B. Confidence-Building Measures

A valuable contribution to making states secure in this sense is to change reciprocal perceptions. To the extent that their threat perceptions are unfounded, simply clearing away misunderstandings may be enough to remove incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. This is where CBMs may prove useful, and where the European experience may contain valid lessons for the Persian Gulf.

Transparency might be enhanced both with regard to military holdings and activities, simply by divulging them, which may speak for the following types of measures:

1. Pre-notification of (inter alia  in the form of an annual calender) and invitation of observers to military manoevres above a certain size. Contrary to Europe, however, this should preferably pertain to all manoeuvres rather than merely those on land. Also, in order to allay Iranian and Iraqi fears it should include the United States, at least when collaborating with the GCC states. If what the US plans is really innocent and defensive, there should be no reason not to let others in on it.

2. The aforementioned seminars on military doctrines (and strategies) would be the ideal forum for exchanging information on military planning in general.

3. Full compliance with the UN Register of Conventional Arms would be very helpful. Ideally, it should be supplemented with a more detailed register of regional scope that should also provide data on military holdings.

Most of these measures would also have the added advantage of acquainting military personnel with each other--which might contribute to dismantling enemy images. None of the above, however, would require states to change their practices, as transparency-enhancing measures merely illuminate what is already there. One might, however, also want to modify practices via `functional arms control', i.e. CSBMs (confidence and security-building measures) that proscribe or regulate certain activities. Relevant CSBMs would be the following:

1. A prohibition against exercizes not listed in the annual calender.

2. A prohibition against military manouvres above a certain size in border areas.

3. Limits on the annual number of exercizes, inter alia  in order to prevent circumvention (by substituting many small for fewer large manoeuvres).

Such regulations should, among other things, rule out the (real or imagined) possibility that a state might conceal attack preparations as large-scale manoeuvres, thus providing some insurance against surprise attacks. ¹⁵¹

Even though the literature tends to focus on negotiated and bi- or multilateral CBMs and CSBMs, nothing speaks against unilateral confidence-building. A state with merely defensive intentions may find it to be in its own best interest to allay its neighbours' unfounded fears simply by divulging its military plans and activities, even without formal reciprocity. To do so would, moreover, put some indirect pressure on the others to emulate unilateral C(S)BMs, so that the end result would be a general enhancement of mutual transparency.

C. Conventional Military Restructuring

The same logic seems to apply to military restructuring, in casu to more defensive posture. The best is, of course, that everybody does so, but it may also serve the national interests of a state to do so unilaterally-at least if is merely defensively motivated, i.e. has no plans to alter the status quo by military means.

For such a state to specialize on defence of the national territory at the expence of offensive capabilities (for which it has no real need) does not have to be seen as a unilateral concession to 'undeserving' adversaries. It could also be viewed as a reflection of national prudence. Furthermore, it may have the added advantage of allaying fears in one's neighbours, who may or may not reciprocate. If they are also defensively motivated, they may well do so. If they do not, they thereby confirm the suspicions of their neighbours, who will then be better informed than before. Hence, there is no a priori reason why states should make defensive restructuring conditional on negotations.

Unilateralism is usually not a matter of investing in an entirely different military posture, which would indeed by prohibitively expensive, even for wealthy states. Rather, it is a matter of amending strategic conceptions and draw the consequences thereof in terms of deployments and weapons acquisitions. This might, e.g. entail redeploying certain forces and/or not buying certain types of weapons, neither of which is expensive, certainly not in comparison with the sums currently being spent on arms.

However, neither is an article such as this the right place, nor is the present author the right person to advance concrete suggestions for modified defence plans for each and every state in the Persian Gulf region. Suffice it therefore to address a few question in abstracto: how to structure the ground forces; what kind of air force; how to deal with maritime threats; and what to do about the ballistic missile problem.

For the ground forces, an appropriate guideline would seem to be the aforementioned 'spider-and-web' model that would also be suitable for integrating the United States: Local forces in the GCC states might be deployed as a web, within which US forces (or, even better, United Nations forces) could operate in an emergency, either in a (Desert Shield-type) preventive deployment or in a mission to liberate conquered territory.

Such a web would not necessarily have to cover all of the vast territory of Saudi Arabia, but might take the form of a 'stronghold defence' as mentioned above. In any case, they should emphasize anti-tank defence, e.g. be heavy on anti-tank weapons and artillery, but light on tanks and other heavy armoured vehicles. There would also be a need for tanks, armed helicopters and other 'indigenous spiders'-also because Saudi Arabia might need a defensive shield vis-‡-vis both Iran or Iraq and against Yemen. The fielding of such mobile forces would not, however, inevitably be tantamount to an offensive capability vis-‡-vis either, especially not if they were made dependent on a more stationary web. Countries in a more exposed position, such as Kuwait, would probably be well-advised to explore barrier-type technologies, combined with ordinary or MLRS-type artillery, while there would be little need for mobile forces such as tanks.

The situation is a little more complicated for both Iran and Iraq, since neither state has any outside support to rely on and as both may have to defend themselves against extra-regional states, including the United States. This is both a matter of preventing small-scale armed incursions (like the ones undertaken by Turkey against Iraq) and of being able to dissuade a fully-fledged invasion. Not because the present author believes that such an invasion will ever occur, but because both Iran and Iraq may nevertheless fear such an eventuality, and because they have the same right as other sovereign states to put up a defence against it.

It may not be possible to prevent small-scale incursions entirely, but much can be done to make them costly (militarily as well as, just as important, politically) by means of a good surveillance system and a sufficient number of (lightly armed) border guards combined with some light agile forces.

A reliable defence against large-scale attack can best be had by making the country difficult to invade (by means of forward defence) as well as 'hard to digest' by means of an ability to wage a protracted war on one's own territory. ¹⁵² Making an invasion costly, especially in terms of lives, is much more effective vis-a-vis the 'US threat' than to have counter-attack capabilities that would only make the US Congress and public more casualty-tolerant. These consideration would, once again, seem to point towards a 'spider-and-web' posture, with the highest priority given to light and and only tactically mobile forces, yet with a certain internal reinforcement capability in terms of armoured forces (but much fewer than today), helicopters and CAS aircraft.

As far as seawards threats to their national territories are concerned, only Bahrain, Iran and Iraq seem to have much to worry about: Bahrain about a possible Iranian attack by the growing (yet still predominantly defensive) Iranian navy, that has also exercized amphibious landings. The two others mainly have to be comcerned about US 'from the sea' operations, inter alia by means of 'Tomahawk' ballistic missiles. ¹⁵³ The oil-exporting countries would further have grounds for concern about their SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication), in casu about a possible blocking of the strait of Hormuz.

The former task of defence against seaward attack is primarily a matter of defence against aircraft as well as ballistic missiles. While the former can be accomplished by means of capable SAMs (surface-to-air missiles), the latter is probably infeasible, hence had better not be attempted at all (vide infra). The SLOC defence task will be complicated, as it is almost entirely a question of defence against, very unlikely, US SLOC severance attempts. In the present author's opinion, the alleged Iranian submarine threat is not particularly serious (also because Iran is more vulnerable to SLOC severance that all the rest). Should a defence against it nevertheless be deemed indispensable, it is probably best done by means of a convoy-with-escorts system, featuring frigate-size escorting vessels optimized for anti-submarine tasks. ¹⁵⁴ Another possibility is that of a temporary blocking of seaways by means of mines (as happened during the Gulf War), which calls for a mineclearing capability. As demonstrated after the Gulf War, however, this does not necessarily have to be a national one, as international help will undoubtedly be forthcoming. The oil-importing West is definitely not interested in having the oil flows interrupted with negative repercussions on prices as a result.

As already mentioned much of the air defence task may be performed by means of SAMs, but a fleet of interceptor aircraft is probably also required. However, just as important as the performance and sophistication of the aircraft may be the availability of dispersal airstrips and/or the possession of VSTOL (vertical/short take-off/landing) aircraft. ¹⁵⁵ The worst type of airforce would seem to be one with substantial offensive capabilties that makes the destruction of the aircraft imperative, combined with a high concentration that makes it easy, as illustrated by the swift whiping out of Iraq's airforce,

Even though, as argued above, the ballistic missile threat seems exaggerated, it does not mean that it can be ignored. It may, however, be addressed in two ways: by fielding a ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missile) defence, or via arms control. The performance of 'Patriot' in the Gulf War was questionable as far as SCUDs were concerned, ¹⁵⁶ albeit not against aircraft. Hence it seems ill-advised to invest much effort in an ATBM defence that may anyhow not work-or the success rate of which is such as to invite the respective opponent to raise the stakes in the measure-countermeasure context, say by arming the missiles with chemical, biological or even nuclear warheads. A much better way of dealing with the TBM (tactical ballistic missile) threat, however, is to make the missiles go away by means of arms control, to which I shall now turn.

D. Conventional Arms Control?

Arms control is always easier the smaller the number of participants, the more symmetrical their military postures, and the shorter the list of items on the agenda. Hence, nuclear arms control between the two rival superpowers was comparatively easy, while the MBFR was tough. On the other hand, the experience with the CFE negotiations shows that complications can be overcome if the political will is there.

The multipolar setting in the Persian Gulf complicates matters, especially because of the region's 'openendedness'. For instance, would parity between Iraq and Saudi Arabia be fair, considering Iraq's need to also defend itself against Turkey and Iran? On the other hand, if all states accept that they have nothing to gain from war, they may also come to realize that an arms race does not serve their national interests, hence be willing to opt out of if, if only the terms are right.

However, arms control agreements will have to be quite asymmetrical for them to make any sense. Indeed, seemingly symmetrical deals may be deeply schewed because of the initial asymmetry. One may therefore have to think about, for instance, bartering away tanks for aircraft, conventional strength for WMD, structural for functional arms control measures, national for alignment options, deployment for maneouvre constraints, etc. It matters more that there is something in the 'package' for all sides, than whether this 'something' is actually comparable. The 'package' of arms control and other measures in table 11 is thus only meant as an illustration.

Table 11: `Package Deal'	Country/Grouping
Category	Iran	Iraq	GCC	USA
Political	No `state terrorism' Observer status in GCC	Renunciation of territorial claims Observer status in GCC	No permanent US bases Opening up of GCC	Abandon containment
Economic	Agreement on oil pricing Free trade arrangements
Military	Non-aggression treaties
WMD	Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention			Security guarantees
Ground forces	Tank reductions	Tank reductions	None	Export regulations
Air forces	Ceiling on long-range fighter-bombers			Export regulations
Ballistic Missiles	Prohibition on missiles with range > 100 km			MTCR
Navies	No submarines			Export regulations
C(S)BMs	Regional arms transfer and holdings register Seminar(s) on military doctrines No manoeuvres in border areas Crisis Prevention Centre			No manoeuvres in border areas

It is one thing to `wrap a package' that will be attractive for all participants. It is quite another to devise the appropriate sequencing of successive steps. Ideally, no party should feel that they are conceding too much for too long before receiving reciprocal concessions from the opposing side. However, as such sequencing is a truly monumental task, I shall bypass this problem on this occasion.

E. Controlling Arms Transfers

There is little doubt that the most effective way of limiting the flow of arms into a region is to reduce the demand for weapons, to which end defensive restructuring and NOD would be means. However, it certainly also helps if the supply of weaponry is simultaneously regulated ¹⁵⁷ -also because some of the flow may be supply-driven, as argued above. To hamper the access of regional states to certain technologies may not succeed in keeping them completely out foreever, but it may certainly slow down the process as well as limit the total volume of weapons.

Granted that supplier restraint is desirable, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf would be obvious places to start, both because these regions contain some of the main recipients of arms, and because the arms are quite lkely to be used here. Indeed, the spectacle of wars fought with weapons from the North, e.g. in the horrendously bloody Iran-Iraq war, has served as a political incentive to attempt regulation. ¹⁵⁸ The record of supplier constraints so far is, however, not at all impressive. This may be due, among other factors, to what one might call the 'arms exports prisoner's dilemma' (table 12):

Table 12: No manoeuvres in borde The Arms Trade Prisonners' Dilemma I: Short Term, no import constraints		B
		Export constraints	No export constraints
A	Export constraint	+1,+1	-1,+2
	No export constraints	+2,-1	0,0

If A bans his arms exports, while other supplier(s) do not, A's ban will have no significant effect on stability. The other(s), however, will be able to take over his market share (value +2), leaving A at an economic disadvantage (value -1). If the other(s) impose a ban on arms exports, they will lose market shares (value -1), unless the ban is 100 percent effective, since A is able to step in (value +2). If everybody continues to sell, neither will stability improve, nor will anybody be able to increase their market shares (value zero). The unattractiveness of this outcome notwithstanding, this is what rational actors will tend to produce.

Even if everybody were to agree on, and actually comply with, a ban on exports, the outcome would be uncertain. The vulnerability to arms embargoes differs considerably between the states in the region: Countries with easy access to hard currency and/or indigenous skills (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia) are generally less vulnerable than countries lacking these assets. Furthermore, in the entire region there is quite a large indigenous production which would undoubtedly be strengthened by a supplier-imposed embargo. This would not necessarily improve stability significantly, indeed it might even damage it by a resultant proliferation of `dirty bombs' and various unsafe technologies. Moreover, the former suppliers would clearly lose lucrative foreign sales, without much prospect of making up for this in terms of civilian exports, since militarization would continue. Since everybody would stand to lose, and nobody to gain, such a supplier-imposed arms export ban is probably a non-starter.

Table 13: The Arms Trade Prisonners' Dilemma II: Long Term, with import constraints		B
		Export constraints	No export constraints
A	Export constraints	+2,+2	0,0
	No export constraints	0,0	0,0

The payoff structure would, however, be significantly different in a long-term supplier-plus-recipient arms trade control regime, i.e. a regime regulating not merely exports (the supply side), but also the demand side, i.e. imports (see table 13). Everybody (but more than anybody else the regional states) would stand to gain from the improved stability. The former suppliers would, of course, lose their arms exports (value -1), but they would not have to worry about losing shares in a no longer existent market. Moreover, a replacement of the revenues from arms sales with those from civilian exports for development purposes would be a distinct possibility (value +2).

Even in the context of a combined supplier and recipient regime, arms trade regulations must be based on a consensus about what to limit and to what extent. Here, the desirability of limiting arms transfers have to be weighed against respect for the legitimate need of states to defend themselves. Logically, there are two main approaches to arms transfer regulations: the discriminatory and the non-discriminatory.

Discriminatory arms trade regulations might, for instance, consist of a ban on the trade in weapons of mass destruction, such as already implied by the NPT and the Australia Group's regulations. The MTCR regulates the transfer of long-range and high payload surface-to-surface missiles and technologies to produce them. This might be extended to an integrated `transfer regime' covering both ballistic missiles and advanced strike aircraft. It has also been suggested to use the CFE's categorization of tanks, artillery, APCs, combat aircraft and helicopters as the matrix for arms trade regulations. ¹⁵⁹ The curtailment of the trade in such especially destabilizing weapons would be combined with unconstrained supplies of more defensive types of armaments, such as anti-tank and sea mines, ATGMs, air defence weapons and the like.

Pessimists have questioned the practicality of such regulations, and recommended more `blunt instruments', such as an across-the-board moratorium on arms transfers to the entire region. <sup>160</sup> There are, however, certain precedents for disriminatory regulations, such as the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 between the USA, France and the UK to the effect that they would only supply arms for self-defence purposes. <sup>161</sup> Also, there seems to be a growing recognition among the major suppliers of, first of all, the need for curtailing the arms trade and, secondly, for giving first priority to such weapons as contribute to offensive capabilities. This was reflected, inter alia , in the `P5 Initiative' of 1991, wherein it was stated that

... the transfer of conventional weapons, conducted in a responsible manner, should contribute to the ability of states to meet their legitimate defence, security and national sovereignty requirements .... They recognized that indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability ... They also recognize that a long term solution to this problem should be found in close consultation with the recipient countries.

In the subsequent communique from the meeting in London, 18 October 1991, the Five singled out the following categories of weapons as requiring mutual information: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, military aircraft and helicopters, naval vessels and certain missile systems. More generally, they pledged to `avoid transfers which would be likely to ...be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient state'. ¹⁶²

This, perhaps gradually emerging, arms tranfer regime has been helped along with the establishment of the UN Conventional Arms Transfer Register that enhances transparency considerably with regard to the same weapons categories (plus warships). Even though very few states in the Persian Gulf report, because of supplier reports the picture does get clearer each year of who sells what to whom, out of which also emerges an picture of who has what, even though domestic sales are not reported. ¹⁶³

There is, however, the problem of the `rogue channel', i.e. exports by (what the West regards as) `rogue suppliers` (e.g. China, North Korea, Russia, other former Soviet republics, and South Africa) and imports by `rogue recipients', who are placed in the category by being subjected to embargoes: states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and to some extent Syria. Even though the problem cannot be ignored, the way it is presented by the United States appears exaggerated, as the total volume of `rogue transfers' is dwarfed by that of that between `respectable' exporters and importers.

The best way of dealing with it may be to abolish the `rogue' label entirely and acknowledge that there is nothing wrong in, e.g. North Korea supplying Iran with such weaponry as merely serves national defence purposes, while there may be something wrong with the trade between respectable countries if it consists of such weapons that constitute a latent threat to the neighbours of the recipients.

VI. Conclusion

We have thus seen that the Persian Gulf is inherently unstable and that the risk of another war cannot be discounted entirely. Rather that continuing the `dual containment' of Iran and Iraq, regional and extraregional states should seek to integrate them in a cooperative security framework, which requires taking their security concern seriously.

The region might be stabilized by means of such political steps as well as by striving for a more defensive nature of military strategies and postures. This might be achieved through a combination of unilateral restructuring, regional arms control and the establishment of a combined supplier-recipient arms transfer regime.

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Note 1: For various approaches, see Falk, Richard & Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.): Regional Politics and World Order  (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973). Among the modern classics, one might mention Cantori, Louis J. & Steven L. Spiegel (eds.): The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach  (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Haas, Ernst B.: International Political Communities  (New York: Anchor Books, 1966); Nye, Joseph S.: Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization  (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971); Russett, Bruce: International Regions and the International System  (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967). More recent studies include Taylor, Paul: International Organization in the Modern World. The Regional and the Global Process  (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 7-23; Wriggins, Howard (ed.): Dynamics of Regional Politics. Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Daase, Christopher, Susanne Feske, Bernhard Moltmann & Claudia Schmid (eds.): Regionalisierung der Sicherheitspolitik. Tendenzen in den internationalen Beziehungen nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993); Lawrence, Robert Z.: Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration  (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996); Holm, Hans-Henrik & Georg Sørensen (eds.): Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Singer, Max & Aaron Wildawsky: The Real World Order. Zones of Peace / Zones of Turmoil  (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); Tow, William T.: Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde: The New Security Studies: A Framework for Analysis  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 9-20, 42-45 & passim ; Fawcett, Louise & Andrew Hurrell (eds.): Regionalism in World Politics  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), passim ; Lake, David A. & Patrick M. Morgan (eds.): Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World  (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Keating, Michael & John Loughlin (eds.): The Political Economy of Regionalism  (Newbury Park: Frank Cass, 1997). Back.

Note 2: See Ward, Michael Don (ed.): The New Geopolitics  (Philadelphia & Reading: Gordon and Breach, 1992), especially Diehl, Paul F.: `Geography and War: A Review and Assessment of the Empirical Literature' (pp. 121-137); and Gichman, Charles S.: `Interstate Metrics: Conceptualizing, Operationalizing, and Measuring the Geographic Proximity of States Since the Congress of Vienna' (pp. 139-158). On the importance of proximity for war-proneness see Goertz, Gary & Paul F. Diehl: Territorial Changes and International Conflict  (London: Routledge, 1992); Siverson, Randolph & Harvey Starr: The Diffusion of War. A Study of Opportunity and Willingness  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). Back.

Note 3: On Europe, see Buzan, Barry, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer & Ole Wæver: The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era  (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 206-210. This notion is related to that of empires, bound together by relations of suzerainty, and gradually fading out towards the periphery. See Wæver, Ole: `Imperial Metaphors: Emerging European Analogies to Pre-Nation-State Imperial Systems', in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev & Victoria Einagel (eds.): Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe  (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 59-93; idem: `Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security', in Rick Fawn & Jeremy Larkins (eds.): International Society after the Cold War. Anarchy and Order Reconsidered  (Houndsmills, Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 220-260. See also Watson, Adam: The Evolution of International Society  (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-4 & passim . Back.

Note 4: On the Islamic conception of `religious geopolitics' see, for instance, Fuller, Graham E. & Ian O. Lessler: A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West  (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 137-149 & passim . See also Charnay, Jean-Paul: `Representation stratégique de l'Islam', pp. 7-18. Paper for the Colloque Prospective des Ménaces  (Paris: Centre d'Étudues et de Prospective, 1996). Back.

Note 5: Gleick, Peter H.: `Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security', International Security , vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; Boulding, Elise: `States, Boundaries and Environmental Security', in Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe (eds.): Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 194-208. For an application of this concept to the Baltic Sea region see Westing, Arthur (ed.): Comprehensive Security for the Baltic. An Environmental Approach  (London: Sage, 1989). Back.

Note 6: On the role of regional organizations within the UN, see Gaer, Felice D.: `The United Nations and the CSCE: Cooperation, Competition, Confusion?', in Michael R. Lucas (ed.): The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation  (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 161-206; Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe & Rogert A. Coate (eds.): The United Nations and Changing World Politics  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 33-36. Back.

Note 7: Clarke, Douglas: `A Guide to Europe's New Security Architecture', European Security , vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 126-132; Rotfeld, Adam Daniel: `Europe: Towards New Security Arrangements' (with appendices), SIPRI Yearbook 1996 , pp. 279-324. Back.

Note 8: Huntington, Samuel: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 26-27 & passim . The nine civilizations are the Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese. An earlier, and much less xenophobic version of the `cultural approach' is Wallerstein, Immanuel: Geopolitics and Geoculture. Essays on the Changing World-System  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 139-237. Back.

Note 9: Lapid, Yosef & Friedrich Kratochwill (eds.): The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). See also Neumann, Iver B.: `Self and Other in International Relations', European Journal of International Relations , vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 139-175. Back.

Note 10: A good overview is Said, Abdul Aziz: `Beyond Geopolitics: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict Elimination in the Middle East and North Africa', in Phebe Marr & William Lewis (eds.): Riding the Tiger: the Middle East Challenge After the Cold War  (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 163-186. Back.

Note 11: Adler, Emanuel: `Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations', Millennium. Journal of International Studies , vol. 26, no. 2 (1997), pp. 249-278. On nations as imagined comminities see Anderson, Benedict: Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism  (London: Verso, 1991); Stargardt, Nicholas: `Origins of the Constructivist Theory of the Nation', in Sukumar Periwal (ed.): Notions of Nationalism  (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 83-105; Wæver, Ole: `Identities', in Judit Balázs SIPRI Yearbook 1996 , pp. 27& Håkan Wiberg (eds.): Peace Research for the 1990s  (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993), pp. 135-150. Back.

Note 12: Ramsey, William C.: `Oil in the 1990s: The Gulf Dominant', in Marr & Lewis (eds.): op. cit.  (note 10), pp. 39-59. Back.

Note 13: Buzan, Barry: `A Framework for Regional Security Analysis', in idem, Rother Rizwi & al. : South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers  (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 3-33; idem: People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era , Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 186-229, quotation from p. 190. The delimitation of security complexes is illustrated by the map on p. 210. For an update see idem, Wæver & de Wilde: op. cit.  (note 1), pp. 15-19 & passim . For a critique, see Haftendorn, Helga: `Das Sicherheitspuzzle: Die Suche nach einem tragfähigen Konzept Internationaler Sicherheit', in Daase & al.  (eds.): op. cit.  (note 1), pp. 13-38, especially pp. 29-30. Back.

Note 14: On the expansion of the security concept see Nye, Joseph E. & Sean M. Lynn-Jones: `International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field', International Security , vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27; Lynn-Jones, Sean M.: `The Future of International Security Studies', in Desmond Ball & David Horner (eds.): Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives , Series `Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence', vol. 89, (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1992), pp. 71-107; Fischer, Dietrich: Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach  (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993); Møller, Bjørn: `Security Concepts: New Challenges and Risks', in Antonio Marquina & Hans Günter Brauch (eds.): `Confidence Building and Partnership in the Western Mediterranean. Tasks for Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Avoidance', AFES-PRESS Reports , no. 51 (Mosbach: AFES-PRESS, 1994), pp. 3-49. On `securitization' see Wæver, Ole: `Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.): On Security  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86; idem: Concepts of Security  (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997); or Buzan & al.: op. cit.  1997 (note 1), passim . Back.

Note 15: On security communities see Deutsch, Karl W. et al. : Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). On integration see Haas, Ernst B.: International Political Communities  (New York: Anchor Books, 1966); Hansen, Roger: `Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts', in Michael Hodges (ed.): European Integration. Selected Readings  (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 184-199; Kahler, Miles: International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration  (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Some of the most (politically and theoretically) important texts are reprinted in Nelsen, Brent F. & Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.): The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994). Back.

Note 16: Ayoob, Mohammed: The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Back.

Note 17: For an analysis along these lines see Møller, Bjørn: `The Nordic Regional Security Complex. A Preliminary Analysis', in Leif Ohlson (ed.): Case Studies on Regional Conflicts and Regional Conflict Resolution  (Gotenburg: Padrigu Peace Studies), pp. 45-82. Back.

Note 18: See Gause, F. Gregory II: `Gulf Regional Politics: Revolution, War, and Rivalry', in Wriggins (ed.): op. cit.  (note 1), pp. 25-88. Back.

Note 19: An example is Waltz, Kenneth N.: Theory of International Politics  (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), especially pp. 93-97. See also his critique of the alternatives in idem: Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 80-123. For a moderately state-centric analysis see Buzan: op. cit.  (note 13), pp. 146-185 & passim ; and idem: `Rethinking System and Structure', in idem, Charles Jones & Richard Little: The Logic of Anarchy. Neorealism to Syructural Realism  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 19-80. Back.

Note 20: Buzan: op. cit.  1991 (note 13), pp. 219-221; idem & al. 1990, pp. 15-16, 36-41. Back.

Note 21: On the episode and its background see Rubin, Barry: Paved With Good Intentions. The American Experience and Iran  (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 17-53; or Weisberger, Bernard A.: Cold War, Cold Peace. The United States and Russia since 1945  (New York: American Heritage, 1984), pp. 53-54. Back.

Note 22: Joint Strategic Survey Committee: `United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security' (JCS 1769/1, 29 April 1997), reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.): Containment. Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 71-84. On the US strategy for the Middle East as a whole see Cohen, Michael J.: Fighting World War Three from the Middle East. Allied Contingency Plans 1945-1954  (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 29-61. Back.

Note 23: MacDonald, Douglas J.: `The Truman Administration and Global Responsibilities: The Birth of the Falling Domino Principle', in Robert Jervis & Jack Snyder (eds.): Dominoes and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 112-144. See also Jervis, Robert: `Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour', ibid. , pp. 20-50. For a critique of the domino image, based on an analysis of Soviet perceptions, see Hopf, Ted: `Soviet Inferences from the Victories in the Periphery: Visions of Resistance or Cumulating Gains', ibid. , pp. 145-189; and idem: Peripheral Visions. Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). Back.

Note 24: On the birth of containment see Etzold & Gaddis: op. cit.  (note 22). See also Gaddis, John Lewis: Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy  (New York 1982: Oxford University Press), passim ; Kennan, George F.: `Reflexions on Containment', in Terry L. Deibel & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.): Containing the Soviet Union. A Critique of US Policy  (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), pp. 15-19. Thompson, Kenneth W.: Cold War Theories, vol. 1: World Polarization, 1943-1953  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), pp. 118-178. Back.

Note 25: On nuclear strategy see Rosenberg, David Alan: ```A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours'': Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55', International Security , vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 3-38; idem: `The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960', ibid. , vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71. See also Gaddis: op. cit.  (note 24), pp. 127-164. An the search for allies see Deibel, Terry L.: `Alliances for Containment', in idem & Gaddis (eds.): op. cit.  (note 24), pp. 100-119. Back.

Note 26: Walt, Stephen M.: The Origins of Alliances  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 50-103; idem: `Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition', in Jervis & Snyder (eds.): op. cit.  (note 23), pp. 51-84. Se also Cohen: op. cit.  (note 22), pp. 298-323. Back.

Note 27: On the general logic see, for instance, George, Alexander L.: `Superpower Interests in Third Areas', in Roy Allison & Phil Williams (eds.): Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 107-120. On the regional implications see Chubin, Shahram: `The Superpowers and the Gulf', ibid. , pp. 144-165; and Allison, Roy: `The Superpowers and Southwest Asia', ibid. , pp. 165-186; Kuniholm, Bruce R.: `Great Power Rivalry and the Persian Gulf', in Robert F. Helms II & Robert H. Dorff (eds.): The Persian Gulf Crisis. Power in the Post-Cold War World  (Westport: Praeger, 1993), pp. 39-56; idem: `The U.S. Experience in the Persian Gulf', ibid. , pp. 57-69. Back.

Note 28: On this curious instance of `ally swapping' see Selassie, Bereket Habte: Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa  (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980). Back.

Note 29: On Soviet naval and airforce facilities see Harkavy, Robert E.: Bases Abroad. The Global Foreign Military Presence  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 50-59, 88-92. On Soviet arms sales see Pierre, Andrew: The Global Politics of Arms Sales  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 142-154; Brzoskka, Michael & Thomas Ohlson: Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85  (Stockholm: SIPRI and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 38-46, 191-195, 252-255, 275-276. On the (lack of) political influence on Iraq see Chubin, Shahram: Security in the Persian Gulf, vol. 4: The Role of Outside Powers  (London: IISS and Aldershot: Gower, 1982), pp. 74-109. Back.

Note 30: Chubin: op. cit.  1982 (note 29), pp. 9-36. For a critique of the US strategy see Rubin: op. cit.  (note 21), pp. 124-189 & passim ; Halliday, Fred: Iran. Dictatorship and Development , 2nd edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 251-257; Garthoff, Raymond: Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan  (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 74-75; Hooglund, Eric: `Iran', in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.): Intervention into the 1990s. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World . 2nd Edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 303-320; idem: `The Persian Gulf', ibid.  pp. 321-342; Sherry, Michael S.: In the Shadow of War. The United States Since the 1930s  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 307-334. On the Vietnam syndrome see Rodman, Peter W.: More Precious Than Peace. The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World  (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994), pp. 128-140. On its legal implications see Ely, John Hart: War and Responsibility. Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 31: See, for instance Sampson, Anthony: The Arms Bazar  (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1978), pp. 238-256; Pierre: op. cit.  (note 29), pp. 142-154; Klare, Michael: American Arms Supermarket  (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), pp. 108-126; Brzoskka & Ohlson: op. cit.  (note 29), pp. 16-19, 187-191. Back.

Note 32: For a critique see Johnson, Robert H.: `The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategy: A Skeptical View', International Security , vol. 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 122-160; Halliday, Fred: Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa  (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 63-80. On the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf for the USSR see MccGwire, Michael: Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy  (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 185-195. Back.

Note 33: Klare, Michael: Beyond the `Vietnam Syndrome'. US Interventionism in the 1980s  (Washington D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981); Epstein, Joshua M.: `Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent', International Security , vol. 6, no. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 126-158. See also `President Carter's State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980', in Leila Meo (ed.): U.S. Strategy in the Gulf: Intervention Against Liberation  (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1981), pp. 119-126; and Stork, Joe: `The Carter Doctrine and US Bases', MERIP Reports , no. 90 (September 1990), pp. 3-14; Paine, Christopher: `On the Beach: The RDF and the Arms Race', ibid. , no. 111 (January 1983), pp. 3-11. Back.

Note 34: On the rescue attempt see, e.g. Ronzitti, Natalino: Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity  (Dordrecht; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp. 41-49; Daggett, Stephen: `Government and the Military Establishment', in Schraeder (ed.): op. cit.  (note 30), pp. 193-207, especially pp. 203-206. Back.

Note 35: A good account of the international, and especially US and UN, role in the war, written by a US Foreign Service Officer is Hume, Cameron R.: The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq. How Peacemaking Changed  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), passim . See also Toussi, Reza Ra'iss: `Containment and Animosity: The United States and the War', in Farhang Rajaee, (ed.): Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War  (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1997), pp. 49-61. Back.

Note 36: A good account of the Afghan war is Urban, Mark: War in Afghanistan  (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988). On the eventual withdrawal and its aftermath see Rubin, Barnett R.: The Search for Peace in Afghanistan. From Buffer State to Failed State  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). On the eventual Soviet acquiescence with US dominance, see Saivetz, Carol R.: `Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Gorbachev's Imprint', in Roger E. Kanet, Tamara J. Resler & Deborah N. Miner (eds.): Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 196-216. Back.

Note 37: Sajjadpour, Kazem: `Neutral Statements, Committed Practice: The USSR and the War', in Rajaee (ed.): op. cit.  (note 35), pp. 29-38. See also Brzoska, Michael & Frederic S. Pearson: Arms and Warfare. Escalation, De-escalation and Negotiation  (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 134-159; Back.

Note 38: Campbell, David: Politics Without Principle. Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 21 & passim . On the representation of the war as one between good and evil see also Baudrillard, Jean: The Gulf War Did Not Take Place  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Der Derian, James: Antidiplomacy. Spies, Terror, Speed and War  (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 173-202; Norris, Christopher: Uncritical Theory. Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War  (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992). On the psychological need for such an image see Wayne, Stephen J.: `President Bush Goes to War: A Psychological Interpretation from a Distance', in Stanley A. Renshon (ed.): The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict  (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 29-48. Back.

Note 39: See Jane's Defence Weekly , 17 January 1996, p. 14, 11 September 1996, p. 4 and 18 September 1996, p. 3. Back.

Note 40: On the characterization as `rogues' see Klare, Michael: Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy  (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp. 142-146. On dual containment see Milward, William: `Containing Iran', Commentary. A Canadian Security Intelligence Service Publication , no. 63 (November 1995), pp. 1-14. Back.

Note 41: The table is is inspired by, but differs from, the conceptions of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. See Buzan, Barry: op. cit.  1991 (note 13), pp. 218-219; idem: `International Society and International Security', in Fawn & Larkins (eds.): op. cit.  (note 3), pp. 261-287. Back.

Note 42: Ayoob: op. cit.  (note 16), passim; Buzan: op. cit.  1991 (note 13), pp. 57-111; Bromley, Simon: Rethinking Middle East Politics  (London: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 46-85; Lawson, Fred A.: `Neglected Asoects of the Security Dilemma', in Baghat Korany, Paul Noble & Rex Brynan (eds.): The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World  (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 100-126. Back.

Note 43: See, for instance, Sheikhmous, Omar: `The Kurdish Question: Conflict Resolution Strategies at the Regional Level', in Elise Boulding (ed.): Building Peace in the Middle East. Challenges for States and Civil Society  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 147-161; Entessar, Nader: Kurdish Ethnonationalism  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992). Back.

Note 44: Giddens, Anthony: The Nation-State and Violence  (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995). On Iraq see Davis, Eric: `State-building in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf Crisis', in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.): The Internationalization of Communal Strife  (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 69-92; Farouk-Slulett, Marion & Peter Sluglett: `Iraq and the New World Order', in Tareq Y. Ismael & Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.): The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations in the Middle East  (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 265-292; idem & idem: Iraq since 1958. From Revolution to Dictatorship  (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 87-106, 262-268 & passim ; Krause, Keith: `Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: The Middle Eastern Case', European Journal of International Relations , vol. 2, no. 3 (1996), pp. 319-354. Back.

Note 45: On the global spread of democracy see Fukyama, Francis: The End of History and the Last Man  (New York: The Free Press, 1992); and Singer, Max & Aaron Wildawsky: The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil  (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993). On (the absence of) civil society see Ibrahim, Saad Eddin: `Civil Society and Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World', in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.): Civil Society in the Middle East  (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 27-54; Crystal, Jill: `Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf', ibid. , vol. 2, pp. 259-286. On the two `rogues', see Katouzian, Homa: `Islamic Government and Politics: The Practice and Theory of the Absolute Guardianship of the Jurisconsult', in Charles Davies (ed.): After the War: Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf  (Chichester: Carden Publications, 1990), pp. 255-286; and Tripp, Charkes: `The Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi State', in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow & Thomas Koszinowski (eds.): Iraq. Power and Society  (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), pp. 91-115. Back.

Note 46: On the democracy-peace linkage see Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Brown, Michael E., Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.): Debating the Democratic Peace  (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996). A more pessimistic analysis is Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder: `Democratization and War', Foreign Affairs , vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 79-97. On the incipient democratization is the Arab world see Amjad-Ali, Charles: `Democratization in the Middle East from an Islamic Perspective', in Boulding (ed.): op. cit.  (note 43), pp. 69-77; Osseiran, Sanàa: `The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East', ibid. , pp. 79-90; Nakhleh, Emile A.: `The Arab World After the Gulf War: Challenges and Prospects', ibid. , pp. 111-120; Abed, Shukri B: `Islam and Democracy', in David Garnham & Mark Tessler (eds.): Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 116-132; Sayyid, Mustapha K. El: `The Third Wave of Democratization in the Arab World', in Dan Tschirgi (ed.): The Arab World Today  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 179-189; Gause, F. Gregory, III: `Saudi Arabia: Desert Storm and After', in Robert O. Freedman (eds.): The Middle East After Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait  (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), pp. 207-234. Back.

Note 47: Krasner, Stephen D.: `Westphalia and All That', in Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane (eds.): Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutional, and Political Change  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 235-264; Watson: op. cit.  (note 3), pp. 182-213; Spruyt, Hendrik: The Sovereign State and Its Competitors  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 48: Väyrynen, Raimo: `Regional Conflict Formations: An Intractable Problem of International Relations', Journal of Peace Research , vol. 21, no. 4 (1984), pp. 337-59. Back.

Note 49: Cordesman, Anthony H.: After the Storm. The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East  (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 7-8; Faour, Muhammad: The Arab World After Desert Storm  (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1993), pp. 90-93; Karsh, Ephraim: `The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis', Adelphi Papers , no. 220 (London: IISS, 1987); Bruce, James: `Troops Clash in Saudi-Yemen Border Dispute', Jane's Defence Weekly , 14 January 1995, pp. 4-5; `Clashes Between US-led Allies and Iraq Since the 1991 Gulf War', ibid. , 9 september 1996, p. 5; `US Navt Launches Tomahawk Strikes at Iraq', Jane's Navy International , 1 October 1996, p. 8. Back.

Note 50: See note 15 above. Back.

Note 51: See, for instance, Blake, Gerald H.: `International Boudaries of Arabia: The Peaceful Resolution of Disputes', in Nurit Kliot & Stanley Waterman (eds.): The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace  (London: Belhaven Press, 1991), pp. 153-165; Walker, Julian: `Boundaries in the Middle East', in M. Jane Davis (ed.): Politics and International Relations in the Middle East. Continuity and Change  (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 61-72. On the Iraq-Kuwait border see Rahman, H.: The Making of the Gulf War. Origin's of Kuwait's Long-standing Territorial Dispute with Iraq  (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997). Back.

Note 52: On `international society' see Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics . Second Edition (Houndsmills, Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1995), passim. On security regimes see Jervis, Robert: `Security Regimes', International Organization , vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378. Back.

Note 53: The distinctions are inspired by, but differ them those of, Kaplan, Morton A.: System and Process in International Politics  (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1957). Back.

Note 54: See, for instance, Gulick, Edward Vose: Europe's Classical Balance of Power  (1955. Reprint: New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1967), passim ; Wolfers, Arnold: `The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice', in idem: Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics  (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Paperbacks, 1965), pp. 117-131; or Haas, Ernst B.: `The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?', in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed.): Politics and the International System , second edition (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott Co., 1972), pp. 452-480; Bull: op. cit.  (note 52), pp. 97-121; Sheehan, Michael: The Balance of Power. History and Theory  (London: Routledge, 1996); Kegley, Charles W. & Gregory A. Raymond: A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the 21st Century  (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 67-120. Back.

Note 55: On the fragility of (global) unipolarity see Layne, Christopher: 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise', International Security , vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Waltz, Kenneth N.: `The Emerging Structure of International Politics', ibid. , vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79. On the implications for the Middle East/Persian Gulf and South Asia see Sundarji, K.: The World Power Structure in Transition from a Quasi Unipolar to a Quasi Multipolar State and Options of a Middle Power in this Millieu . USI National Security Lectures (New Delhi: USI, 1993); Hansen, Birte: Unipolarity and the Middle East  (Ph.D. dissertation, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1995). Back.

Note 56: See, for instance, Kramer, Martin: `Tragedy in Mecca', in Daniel Pipes (ed.): Sandstorm. Middle East Conflicts and America  (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 241-267. Back.

Note 57: For a similar comparison of of strengths in ASEAN, see Emerson, Donald K.: `Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore: A Regional Security Core?', in Richard J. Elllings & Sheldon W. Simon (eds.); Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium  (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 34-88. Back.

Note 58: Chubin, Shahram & Charles Tripp: `Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order', Adelphi Papers , no. 304 (London: IISS/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Al-Mani, Saleh A.: `Gulf Security and Relations with Our Neighbours. A Rejoinder', Security Dialogue , vol. 27, no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 295-301. Back.

Note 59: On the fragile alliance see Agha, Hussein & Ahmed Khalidi: Syria and Iran. Rivalry and Cooperation  (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995); Ehteshami, Anoushiravan & Raymond A. Hinnebusch: Syria and Iran. Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System  (London: Routledge, 1997). Back.

Note 60: Picard, Elizabeth: `Relations between Iraq and its Turkish Neighbour: from Ideological to Geostrategic Constraints', in Hopwood, Ishow & Koszinowski (eds.): op. cit.  (note 45), pp. 341-356. See also Barkey, Henri J.: Reluctant Neighbour. Turkey's Role in the Middle East  (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Winrow, Gareth: Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia  (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995); Sezer, Duyugu Bazoglu: `Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region', in Vojzech Mastny & R. Craig Nation (eds.): Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 71-96. Back.

Note 61: Kemp, Geoffrey (with Shelley A. Stahl): The Control of the Middle East Arms Race  (New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991), pp. 15-16. Back.

Note 62: Waltz: op. cit.  1979 (note 19), pp. 125-128; Sheehan: op. cit.  (note 54), pp. 162-167; Lieshout, Robert H.: Between Anarchy and Hierarchy. A Theory of International Politics and Foreign Policy  (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 135-138; Jervis & Snyder (eds.): op. cit.  (note 23), passim ; Walt, Stephen M.: `Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power", International Security , vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43; idem: op. cit.  (note 26), pp. 27-33: Labs, Eric J.: `Do Weak States Bandwagon?', Security Studies , vol. 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 283-416; Walt, Stephen M.: `Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs', ibid. , pp. 448-482; Kauppi, Mark V.: `Strategic Beliefs and Intelligence: Dominoes and Bandwagons in the Early Cold War', ibid. , vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1994), pp. 4-39. Back.

Note 63: Priess, David: `Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study', Security Studies , vol. 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996), pp. 143-171. See also Walt: loc. cit.  (note 62); Walt: op. cit.  (note 26), pp. 269-273. See also O'Reilly, Marc J.: `Omnibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future', The Middle East Journal , vol. 52, no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 70-84. Back.

Note 64: Keohane, Robert O. & Lisa L. Martin: `The Promise of Institutionalist Theory', International Security , vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp, 39-51. For a sceptical view see Mearsheimer, John J.: `The False Promise of International Institutions', ibid.  vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49. Back.

Note 65: Graz, Liesl: `The GCC as Model? Sets and Subsets in the Arab Equation', in Charles Davies (ed.): After the War: Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf  (Chichester: Carden Publications, 1990), pp. 2-24; Nonneman, Gerd: `Iraq-GCC Relations: Roots of Change and Future Prospects', ibid. , pp. 25-76; Faour: op. cit.  (note 49), pp. 55-97; Perthes, Volker: `Innerarabische Ordnungsansätze', in Albrecht Zunker (ed.): Weltordnung oder Chaos? Beiträge zur internationalen Politik  (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 347-360; Awad, Ibrahim: `The Future of Regional and Subregional Organization in the Arab World', in Dan Tschirgi (ed.): The Arab World Today  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994). pp. 147-160; Hollis, Rosemary: ```Whatever Happened to the Damascus Declaration?'': Evolving Security Structures in the Gulf', in Davis (ed.): op. cit.  (note 51), pp. 37-60; Tow, William T.: Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 45-56 & passim . Back.

Note 66: George, Paul & al.: `Military Expenditure', in SIPRI Yearbook 1996 , pp. 325-380. Back.

Note 67: An excellent political and military analysis of the crisis and war is Freedman, Lawrence & Efraim Karsh: The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991. Diplomacy and War in the New World Order  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). A view from Saudi Arabia is found in Munro, Alan: An Arabian Affairs. Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War  (London: Brassey's, 1996). See also Gow, James (ed.): Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community  (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1993); Record, Jeffrey: Hollow Victory. A Contrary View of the Gulf War  (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1993). See also notes 77 and 102 below. Back.

Note 68: Cordesman: op. cit.  (note 49), pp. 386-427; Lewis, William: `The Military Balance: Change or Stasis?', in Marr & Lewis (eds.): op. cit.  (note 10), pp. 61-89; Ehteshami, Anopushiravan: `The Arab States and the Middle East Balance of Power', in Gow (ed.): op. cit.  (note 67), pp. 55-73. Back.

Note 69: Levy, Jack S.: `Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War', World Politics , vol. 40, no. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107; Gilpin, Robert: War and Change in World Politics  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), passim ; Kugler, Jacek & Douglas Lemke (eds.): Parity and War. Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), passim . Back.

Note 70: See also note 37 above. Back.

Note 71: McNaugher, Thomas L.: `Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War', International Security , vol. 15, no. 1 (Fall 1990), pp. 5-34; Swain, Michael: `Nonproliferation and Iraq: Lessons for the Chemical Weapons Convention', Working Paper , no. 120 (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, ANU, 1992); Zanders, Jean Pascal: `Towards Understanding Chemical Weapons Proliferation', in Efraim Inbar & Shmuel Sandler (eds.): Middle East Security: Prospects for an Arms Control Regime  (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 84-110. For a curious (almost indecent) description of Iraq's use of chemical weapons see Mushtak, Hazim T.: `Arms Control and the Proliferation of High-Technology Weapons in the Middle East and South Asia: An Iraqi View', in Shelley A. Stahl & Geoffrey Kemp (eds.): Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia  (New York: St. Martin's Press & the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 113-119, especially p. 16, where the author argues that `they were used in a purely defensive stance and posture'. Back.

Note 72: Samore, Gary: `Iraq', in Mitchell Reiss & Robert S. Litwak: Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War  (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 15-32; Barnaby, Frank: How Nuclear Weapons Spread. Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s  (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 86-93; Fischer, David: Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The Past of the Prospects  (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 66-67; idem, Wolfgang Köttner & Harald Müller: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 132-136; Bailey, Kathleen C.: Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation  (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 28-35; Klare: op. cit.  1995 (note 40), pp. 41-51; Kokoski, Richard: Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 97-146; Kelley, Robert E.: `The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs. The Importance of Management', Security Dialogue , vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 27-38. On the implications see Posen, Barry R.: `U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World (Or: What If Iraq Had Had Nuclear Weapons', Security Studies , vol. 6, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 1-31. Back.

Note 73: Jane's Defence Weekly , 22 July 1995, p. 18, 19 June 1996, p. 28. On the danger of biological weapons see Dando, Malcolm: Biological Warfare in the 21st Century  (London: Brassey's, 1994). Back.

Note 74: Lebow, Richard Ned: `Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?', International Security , vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 147-186. Back.

Note 75: Balta, Paul: `Relations between Iraq and Iran', in Hopwood, Ishow & Koszinowski (eds.): op. cit.  (note 45), pp. 381-397; Koszinowski, Thomas: `Iraq as a Regional Power', ibid. , pp. 283-301; Cigar, Norman: `Iraq's Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprint for Defeat', Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 15, no. 1 (March 1992), pp. 1-29. Back.

Note 76: On the resons for the Iraqi invasion and the unsuccesful (or never attempted) deterrence see Stein, Janice Gross: `Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?', International Security , vol. 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 147-179; idem: `Threat-Based Strategies of Conflict Management: Why Did They Fail in the Gulf?', in Renshon (ed.): op. cit.  (note 38), pp. 121-153; Karsh, Efraim: `Reflections on the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict', The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 19., no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 303-320; idem: `Rethinking the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict', Diplomacy and Statecraft , vol. 7, no. 3 (November 1996), pp. 729-769; Freedman & idem: op. cit.  (note 67), pp. 19-63; Tripp, Charles: `Iraq and the War for Kuwait', in Gow (ed.): op. cit.  (note 67), pp. 16-33; Record: op. cit.  (note 67), pp. 15-42. See also Chatelus, Michael: `Iraq and its Oil: Sixty-five Years of Ambition and Frustration', in Hopwood, Ishow & Koszinowski (eds.): op. cit.  (note 45), pp. 141-169; Ishow, Habib: `Relations between Iraq and Kuwait', ibid. , pp. 303-318; Nakhjavani, Mehran: `Resources, Wealth and Security: The Case of Kuwait', in Korany, Noble & Brynan (eds.): op. cit.  (note 42), pp. 185-204. Back.

Note 77: Freedman, Lawrence & Efraim Karsh: `How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War', International Security , vol. 16, no. 2 (Autumn 1991), pp. 5-41; Dannreuther, Roland: `The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis', Adelphi Papers , no. 264 (1991/92); McCausland, Jeffrey: `The Gulf Conflict: A Military Analysis', ibid. , no. 282 (1993). See also notes 67 above and 102 below. Back.

Note 78: Molander, Johan: `The United Nations and the Elimination of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Implementation of a Cease-Fire Condition', in Fred Tanner (ed.): From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States  (New York: United Nations/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1992), pp. 137-158; Sur, Serge: `Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair: Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace', Research Papers , no. 12 (New York: UNIDIR); idem (ed.): Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations. Problems of Compliance and Enforcement  (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 63-80; Weller, M. (ed.): Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath . Cambridge International Documents, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1993), pp. 8-12, 494-536. On the possible retention of SCUDs see Jane's Defence Weekly , 17 April 1996, p. 40 and 30 October 1996, p. 3. Back.

Note 79: Stromseth, Jane E.: `Iraq's Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Challenges', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.): Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts  (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 77-118. On humanitarian intervention see further Rodley, Nigel (ed.): To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights  (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Reed, Laura W. & Carl Kaysen (eds.): Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention. A Collection of Essays from a Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences  (Cambridge, MA: Commitee on International Security Studies, AASS, 1993); Roberts, Adam: `Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights', International Affairs , vol. 69, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 429-450; Weiss, Thomas G.: `Triage. Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era', World Policy Journal , vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 59-68. Back.

Note 80: See Bruce, James: `Iraq Will Invade Again, Warns Crown Prince', Jane's Defence Weekly , 7 October 1995, p. 4; or the interview with the Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, ibid. , 22 May 1996, p. 40. For a more sanguine view see the report by the UN arms inspector Rolf Ekeus, referred ibid. , 2 September 1995, p. 21. Back.

Note 81: See note 30 above. Back.

Note 82: Mofid, Kamram: `Iran: War, Destruction and Reconstruction', in Charles Davies (ed.): After the War: Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf  (Chichester: Carden Publications, 1990), pp. 117-142; Hunter, Shireen T.: `Iran from the August 1988 Cease-fire to the April 1992 Majlis Elections', in Freedman (ed.): op. cit.  (note 46), pp. 183-206. Back.

Note 83: Chubin, Shahram: `Iran and the Lessons of the War with Iraq: Implications for Future Defense Policies', in Stahl & Kemp (eds.), op. cit.  (note 71), pp. 95-112; Karsh, Efraim: `Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War', in Pipes (ed.): op. cit.  (note 56), pp. 219-240. Back.

Note 84: Spector, Leonard S.: `Neo-Nonproliferation', Survival , vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85; Daneshkhu, Scheherazade: `Iran and the New World Order', in Ismael & Ismael (eds.): op. cit.  (note 44), pp. 293-316. See also Bruce, James: `Iran Warns of ``Massive War'' with USA in Gulf', Jane's Defence Weekly , 9 October 1996, p. 25; idem: `Iran Warns USA to ``Think Twice'' about an Attack', ibid. , 12 June 1996, p. 27. Iran has also warned it will retaliate against an Israeli attack against its nuclear sites. See ibid. , 14 October 1995, p. 18. Back.

Note 85: See Jane's Defence Weekly , 1 April 1995, p. 2 (on chemical weapons); 1 May 1996, p. 3 and 9 May 1996, p. 4 (on alleged tunnels for ballistic missiles); 27 March 1996, p. 14 (on naval build-up in general); and 27 November 1996, p. 18 (on submarines). Back.

Note 86: Albright, David: `An Iranian Bomb?', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 51, no. 4 (July-August 1995), pp. 21-26; Spector, Leonard S., Mark G. McDonough (with Evan S. Medeiros): Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995  (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), pp. 119-124; Leeuwen, Marianne van: `Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East', in idem (ed.): The Future of the International Non-Proliferation Regime  (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 125-154, especially pp. 136-141; Barnaby: op. cit.  (note 72), pp. 114-117. Back.

Note 87: For an excellent analysis, see Chubin, Sharam: Iran's National Security Policy. Capabilities, Intentions and Impact  (Washington, D.C: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994). See also Ehteshami, Anopushiravan: `Iran's National Strategy. Striving for Regional Parity or Supremacy?', International Defense Review , vol. 27, no. 4 (April 1994), pp. 29-37. For a much more alarmist analysis, based partly on questionable sources (which the author does not question) see also Ritcheson, Philip L.: `Iranian Military Resurgence: Scope, Motivations, and Implications for Regional Security', Armed Forces and Society , vol. 21, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 573-592. See also Katzman, Kenneth: `The Politico-Military Threat from Iran', in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (ed.): Iran and the Gulf. A Search for Stability  (Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research and London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 195-210; Cordesman, Anthony H.: `Threats and Non-Threats from Iran', ibid. , pp. 211-286; Arnett, Eric: `Iran is not Iraq', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 64, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 12-14. Back.

Note 88: Hunter, Shireen T.: `Iran after Khomeini', The Washington Papers , no. 156 (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1992); Clawson, Patrick: `Iran after Khomeini: Weakened and Weary', in Pipes (ed.): op. cit.  (note 56), pp. 269-276; Kupchan, Charles A.: `Iran after Khomeini: Ready to Talk', ibid. , pp. 277-284; Rundle, Christopher: `Iran: Continuity and Change since the Revolution--Carrying Water in a Sieve?', in Davis (ed.): op. cit.  (note 51), pp. 105-117; Mahtasham, Elahe: `An Iranian Perspective', in Gow (ed.): op. cit.  (note 67), pp. 107-120. See also Kazemi, Farhad: `Review Article: Models of Iranian Politics, the Road to the Islamic Revolution, and the Challenge of Civil Society', World Politics , vol. 47, no. 4 (July 1995), pp. 555-574. For an excellent analysis of Iran's evolution from a revolutionary to a `normal' state, see Walt, Stephen M.: Revolution and War  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 210-268. Back.

Note 89: Gerges, Fawaz A.: `Washington's Misguided Iran Policy', Survival , vol. 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 5-15; Chubin, Sharam: `US Policy Towards Iran Should Change--But It Probably Won't', ibid. , pp. 16-19; al-Suwaidi, Jamal S.: `Gulf Security and the Iranian Challenge', Security Dialogue , vol. 27, no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 277-294. Back.

Note 90: Al-Suwaidi: loc. cit.  (note 89), p. 278 and 287. Back.

Note 91: Cock, Nick: `GCC Air Forces', Jane's Defence Weekly , 24 April 1996, pp. 18-19. On Saudi Arabia see the `Country Briefing', ibid. , 6 May 1995, pp. 21-28; and Bruce, James: `Build-up to Continue Despite Revenue Drop', ibid. , 10 July 1996, pp. 30-31. On Kuwait see `Market Briefing', ibid. , 29 July 1995, pp. 15, 26-27, 34-35. On the UAE see ibid. , 18 March 1995, p. 53. On Oman see Kechichian, Joseph A.: Oman and the World. The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy  (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995); Jane's Navy International , 1 Jan 1996, pp. 345-35; Jane's Defence Weekly , 30 September 1995, p. 34. On Bahrain see Lestapis, Jacques de: `Seeking Low Cost Modernization', ibid. , p. 32. On Quatar see ibid. , 27 November 1996, p. 17. See also Kramer, Mark: `The Global Arms Trade After the Persian Gulf War', Security Studies , vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 260-309; Cordesman, Anthony: `Current Trends in Arms Sales in the Middle East', in Shai Feldman & Ariel Levite (eds.): Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 19-60. See also Steinberg, Gerald: `The Middle East and the Persian Gulf: An Israeli Perspective', in Andrew J. Pierre: Cascade of Arms. Managing Conventional Weapons Proliferation  (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 227-252; Aly, Abdyl Monem Said: `The Middle East and the Persian Gulf: an Arab Perspective', ibid. , pp. 263-284. Back.

Note 92: The following tables are all based in figures from IISS: The Military Balance 1996-1997 . Back.

Note 93: >On the general effect of misperceptions see Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). On the arms race implications see Møller, Bjørn: `Non-Offensive Defence, the Armaments Dynamics, Arms Control and Disarmament', in Burkhard Auffermann (ed.): `NOD or Disarmament in the Changing Europe?', Research Reports , 40 (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1990), pp. 43-102. Back. Note 94: Quoted from Carroll, Lewis: Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass  (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 216. Back.

Note 95: See also Sadowski, Yahya M.: SCUDs or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East  (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 25-38. For a more sanguine analysis see Looney, Robert E. & David Winterford: Economic Causes and Consequences of Defense Expenditures in the Middle East and South Asia  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 135-160 (on Iran), 161-176 (on Iraq) and 177-192 (on Saudi Arabia). An excellent study of the general relationship between military expenditures and economic development is Ball, Nicole: Security and Economy in the Third World  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). On the implications for security see Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal: `Dilemmas of Security and Development in the Arab World: Aspects of Linkage', in Korany, Noble & Brynan (eds.): op. cit.  (note 42), pp. 76-90. Back.

Note 96: Sayigh, Yesid: Arab Military Industry. Capability, Performance and Impact  (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992), pp. 103-130 (on Iraq) and 131-143 (on Saudi Arabia). On the production of ballistic missiles see Navias, Martin: Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East  (London: Brassey's, UK, 1993), pp. 90-126; Bermudez, Joseph S. Jr.: `Iran's Missile Development', in William C. Potter & Harlan W. Jencks (eds.): The International Missile Bazaar. The New Suppliers Network  (Boulder: Westview, 1994), pp. 47-74; Kagan, Mark H.: `Iraq's Case: The International Missile Trade and Proliferation', ibid. , pp. 181-200; Bruce, James: `Iran Claims It Is Self-sufficient', Jane's Defence Weekly , 14 October 1995, p. 21; Foss, Christopher F.: `Iran: Building an Armour Industry', ibid. , 23 October 1996, p. 23. On Iraq's arms industry see ibid. , 6 March 1996, p. 5. On the general problems of `third tier arms producers' see Krause, Keith: Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 153-181. Back.

Note 97: The classical work on `The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack' is Schelling, Thomas: The Strategy of Conflict  (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 207-229. On the general linkage between arms races and war see Wiberg, Håkan: `Arms Races--Why Worry?', in Nils Petter Gleditsch & Olav Njølstad (eds.): Arms Races. Technological and Political Dynamics  (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 352-375. For an empirical as well as theoretical analysis, see Hammond, Grant T.: Plowshares into Swords. Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991  (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Back.

Note 98: Based on Navias: op. cit.  (note 96), pp. 33-35; Kemp & Stahl: op. cit.  (note 61), pp. 186-190; Cordesman: op. cit.  (note 49), pp. 52-65. `Lo-hi est.' gives the range of estimates found in these sources. Iraq's inventory was affected by the SC 687, that prohibited Iraq from possessing missiles with a range over 150 km. See also Hartman, J. Lise: `Controlling the Proliferation of Missiles', in Feldman & Levite (eds.): op. cit.  (note 91), pp. 209-221; Karp, Aaron: `Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East: Realities, Omens and Arms Control Options', in Inbar & Sandler (eds.): op. cit.  (note 71), pp. 111-129; Nolan, Janne E.: Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World , (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991), pp. 74-91; Bermudez: loc. cit.  (note 96); Kagan: loc. cit.  (note 96). Back.

Note 99: Quote from Nolan: op. cit.  (note 98), p. 10. On the limited conventional value of missiles see ibid. , pp. 64-73; Cordesman: op. cit.  (note 49), p. 65; Navias: op. cit.  (note 96), pp. 7-18; Kemp & Stahl: op. cit.  (note 61), pp. 191-195; Harvey, John R.: `Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness', International Security , vol. 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 41-83. Back.

Note 100: Khalilzad, Zalmay: `The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony', Survival , vol. 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 95-120. On the forging of ties during the Gulf crisis see Freedman & Karsh: op. cit.  (note 67), pp. 95-109; Gebhard, Paul R.S.: `Not by Diplomacy or Defense Alone: The Role of Regional Security Strategies in U.S. Proliferation Policy', in Brad Roberts (ed.): Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s  (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 199-211. Back.

Note 101: Chellaney, Brahma: `Naiveté and Hypocrisy: Why Antiproliferation Zealotry Does Not Make Sense', Security Studies , vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 779-786; Goldring, Nathalie J.: `Skittish on Counterproliferation', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 50, no. 2 (March-April 1994), pp. 12-14; Neuneck, Götz & Jörg Wallner: `Nonproliferation und Counterproliferation', S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden , vol. 13, no. 3 (1995), pp. 141-148; Roberts, Brad: `From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation', International Security , vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173; Spector: loc. cit.  1995 (note 84). Back.

Note 102: More or less official US accounts of the war include Aspin, Les & William Dickinson: Defense for a New Era. Lessons of the Persian Gulf War  (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's US, 1992); Friedman, Norman: Desert Victory. The War for Kuwait  (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Scales, Robert S. Jr.: Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War  (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1994); Keaney, Thomas A. & Eliot A. Cohen: Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf  (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995); Vuono, Carl E.: `Desert Storm and the Future of Conventional Forces', Foreign Affairs , vol. 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 49-68; For a critique see Mueller, John: `The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War', Security Studies , vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 77-117; Posen, Barry R.: `Military Mobilization in the Persian Gulf Conflict', SIPRI Yearbook 1991 , pp. 640-654; idem: `Military Lessons of the Gulf War-- Implications for Middle East Arms Control', in Feldman & Levite (eds.): op. cit.  (note 91), pp. 61-77; Lebovic, James H.: Foregone Conclusions. U.S. Weapons Acquisition in the Post-Cold War Transition  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 80-87; Biddle, Stephen: `Victory Misunderstood. What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflicts', International Security , vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179; Record: op. cit.  (note 67), pp. 133-153; Ganyard, Stephen T.: `Strategic Air Power Didn't Work', US Naval Institute Proceedings , vol. 121, no. 8 (August 1995), pp. 31-35; Press, Daryl G.: `Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology', International Security , vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 137-147; Mahnken, Thomas G. & Barry D. Watts: `What the Gulf War (and cannot) Tell Us about the Future of Warfare', ibid. , pp. 151-162; Biddle, Stephen: `The Gulf War Debate Redux : Why Skill and  Technology Are the Right Answer', ibid. , pp. 163-174. See also the monumental analysis by Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham R. Wagner: The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 4: The Gulf War  (Boulder: Westview, 1996), especially pp. 1-32, 98-102, 209-210, 266-270, 352-359, 432-433, 539-542, 762-764, 829-830, 940-964. On the Russian view of the lessons see Petersen, Charles C.: `Lessons from the Persian Gulf War: The View from Moscow', The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 17, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 238-254. A good example of the political mythology of the clean and virtuous war see Moore, John Morton: Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the Rule of Law  (New York: Oceana Publications, 1992); and for a critique therefor see Clark, Ramsey: The Fire This Time. U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf  (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992); Roberts, Adam: `The Laws of War in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict', International Security , vol. 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 134-181. Back.

Note 103: See, for instance, Cohen, Eliot A.: `A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs , vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54; Allard, C. Kenneth: `The Future of Command and Control: Toward a Paradigm of Information Warfare', in L. Benjamin Ederington & Michael J. Mazarr (eds.): Turning Point. The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 161-192; Cushman, John H.: `Implications of the Gulf War for Future Military Strategy', ibid. , pp. 79-101; McKitrick, Jeffrey et al.: `The Revolution in Military Affairs', in Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.): Battlefield of the Future. 21st Century Warfare Issues. Air War College Studies in National Security, No. 3  (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1995), pp. 65-97; Stein, George: `Information War--Cyberwar-- Netwar', ibid. , pp. 153-179; Davis, Paul (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough  (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994). The ideas are inspired by Toffler, Alvin & Heidi Toffler: War and Antiwar: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century  (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993). On the new forms of war see also Møller, Bjørn: `Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare. What Is the Problem? What Could Be Done?', Working Papers , no. 12 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI, 1996). Back.

Note 104: Jervis, Robert: `What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?', in Ederington & Mazarr (eds.): op. cit.  (note 103), pp. 117-136. For a critique of this reasoning see Mercer, Jonathan: Reputation and International Politics  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Back.

Note 105: Klare: op. cit.  1995 (note 40), pp. 12-34, 97-168. Back.

Note 106: On Europe's role see, e.g. Buettner, Friedemann & Martin Landgraf: `The European Community's Middle Eastern Policy: The New Order of Europe and the Gulf Crisis', in Ismael & Ismael (eds.): op. cit.  (note 44), pp. 77-115; Niblock. Timothy: `Regional Cooperation and Security in the Middle East', ibid. , pp. 116-131. Back.

Note 107: Cf. the discussion of order versus justice in Bull: op. cit.  (note 52), pp. 74-94. Back.

Note 108: Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). See also Väyrynen, Raimo (ed.): Policies for Common Security  (London: Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, 1985); or Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit  (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1986). Back.

Note 109: Jervis: op. cit.  1976 (note 93). Back.

Note 110: On the security dilemma, see e.g. Herz, John M.: Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities  (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), passim; idem: `Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', World Politics , vol. 2, no. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180; Jervis: op. cit.  1976 (note 93), pp. 58-93; cf. idem: `Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics , vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Buzan: op. cit.  1991 (note 13), pp. 294-327; Collins, Alan: `The Security Dilemma', in Jane M. Davis (ed.): Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 181-195. The first account of a security dilemma is the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War , Translated by Rex Warner With an Introduction and Notes by M.I. Finley (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 80. It is also described in Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan , Edited With an Introduction By C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 184-185; or in a modern classic on Realism: Morgenthau, Hans J.: Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace , Third Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 54, 63-64, 67. Back.

Note 111: Waltz: op. cit.  1979 (note 19), p. 64. Back.

Note 112: On arms race stability see Rathjens, George: `The Dynamics of the Arms Race', in Herbert York (ed.): Arms Control. Readings from the Scientific American  (San Fransisco: Freeman, 1973), pp. 177-187. For competing explanations of the armament dynamics, see Gleditsch & Njølstad (eds.): op. cit.  (note 97) passim , but especially Wiberg, Håkan: `Arms Races, Formal Models and Quantitative Tests', pp. 31-57. Back.

Note 113: Schelling: op. cit.  (note 97); idem: Arms and Influence  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 221-259. See further Frei, Daniel (with Christian Catrina): Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War  (Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun/UNIDIR, 1983), pp. 31-36. For a comprehensive analysis of alternative `paths to war', see Vasquez, John A.: The War Puzzle  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 114: Snyder, Glenn H.: `The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', World Politics , vol. 36, no. 4 (1984), pp. 461-495. Back.

Note 115: See, for instance, Milner, Helen: `Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', World Politics , vol. 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496; Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of Cooperation  (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Stein, Arthur A.: Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); idem & Robert A. Keohane: `Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', in David A. Baldwin (ed.): Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 85-115. On tacit coordination see Ramberg, Bennett (ed.): Arms Control Without Negotiation. From the Cold War to the New World Order  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993). Back.

Note 116: Nolan, Janne E. et al.: `The Concept of Cooperative Security', in idem (ed.): Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century  (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 3-18; or Steinbruner, John D.: `Business as Usual? The Redesign of National Security', The Brookings Review , vol. 10, no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 12-15. Back.

Note 117: >Kemp, Geoffrey: `Cooperative Security in the Middle East', in Nolan (ed.): op. cit.  (note 116), pp. 391-418. Back. Note 118: Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye: Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition  (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Wilde, Jaap de: Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex Interdependence  (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991). Back.

Note 119: See, for instance, Acharya, Amitav: `A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era', Adelphi Paper , no. 279 (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1993); Findlay, Trevor: `South-East Asia and the New Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue', in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 , pp. 125-148; Manning, Robert A.: `The Asian Paradox: Toward a New Architecture', World Policy Journal , vol. 10, no. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 55-64; Strassner, Renate: `ASEAN--Motor for a New Security System', Aussenpolitik. English Edition , vol. 45, no. 3 (3rd Quarter 1994), pp. 289-298; Cunha, Derek da (ed.): The Evolving Pacific Power Structure  (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996). Back.

Note 120: The most comprehensive works on the topic are Møller, Bjørn: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence  (London: Brassey's, 1991); idem: Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); idem: Dictionary of Alternative Defense  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Back.

Note 121: Snyder, Glenn: Deterrence and Defense  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961). Back.

Note 122: Møller, Bjørn & Håkan Wiberg: `Nicht-offensive Verteidigung als Vertrauensbildende Maßnahme? Probleme und Konzepte', in Schweizerische Friedensstiftung (ed.): Blocküberwindende Vertrauensbildung nach dem europäischen Herbst '89  (Bern: Schweizerische Friedensstiftung, 1990), pp. 39-79. Back.

Note 123: Attempted distinctions between `offensive and defensive weapons' are found in Galtung, Johan: There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security  (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), pp. 172-176; and Quester, George: `Security and Arms Control', in idem: The Future of Nuclear Deterrence  (Lexington MA: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), pp. 1-25; and idem: `Avoiding Offensive Weapons and Strengthening the Defensive', ibid. , pp. 229-250. See also Lynn-Jones, Sean M.: `Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', Security Studies , vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691. Back.

Note 124: Borg, Marlies ter: `Reducing Offensive Capabilities-the Attempt of 1932', Journal of Peace Research , vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 145-160. Back.

Note 125: A very comprehensive work on landmines is: The Arms Project & Physicians for Human Rights: Landmines. A Deadly Legacy  (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). See also Cornish, Paul: Antipersonnel Mines. Controlling the Plague of `Butterflies'  (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Security Programme, 1994). On the attempts to ban anti-personnel landmines see Wurst, Jim: `Land Mines: Inching Toward a Ban', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 52, no. 2 (March-April 1996), pp. 10-11. Back.

Note 126: Paoloni, Jerome: `CFE as a Model for Arms Control in the Middle East', in Feldman & Levite (eds.): op. cit.  (note 91), pp. 145-153. On the CFE see Sharp, Jane M.O.: `Conventional Arms Control in Europe', in SIPRI Yearbook 1991 , pp. 407-474 (with appendices, including the treaty itself). Back.

Note 127: Kokoski, Richard: `The Treaty on Open Skies', SIPRI Yearbook 1993 , pp. 632-634. The treaty itself is appended ibid. , pp. 653-671. Back.

Note 128: Among the best analyses of CBMs are still two classics: Alford, Jonathan: `Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects', Adelphi Papers , no. 149 (1979), pp. 4-13; and Holst, Johan Jørgen: `Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', Survival , vol. 25, no. 1 (Jan-Feb. 1983), pp. 2-15. See also Borawski, John: From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference  (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1988); Ghebaldi, Victor-Yves: `Confidence --Building Measures Within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes', Research Paper , no. 3 (New York/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1989). Back.

Note 129: Krohn, Axel: `The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar', SIPRI Yearbook 1991 , pp. 501-511; Lachowski, Zdzislaw: `The Second Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrine', SIPRI Yearbook 1992 , pp. 496-505. See also Hamm, Manfred R. & Hartmut Pohlman: `Military Strategy and Doctrine: Why They Matter to Conventional Arms Control', The Washington Quarterly , vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 185-198. Back.

Note 130: See Kokoshin, Andrei A. & Valentin Larionov: `Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic Interrelations', in Marlies ter Borg & Wim Smit (eds.): Non-provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies  (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989), pp. 35-44. Back.

Note 131: Clausewitz, Carl von (1832): Vom Kriege , Ungekürzter Text nach der Erstauflage (1832-1834) (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1980), pp. 360-371 (Book VI.1-3), especially p. 361. See also Gat, Azar: `Clausewitz on Defence and Attack', Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 11, no. 1 (1988), pp. 20-26. On the 3:1 rule see Mearsheimer, John J.: `Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance', International Security , vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185; idem: `Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics', ibid.  vol. 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; Epstein, Joshua M.: `The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies', ibid. , pp. 90-127; Posen, Barry R., Eliot A. Cohen & John J. Mearsheimer: `Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment', ibid. , pp. 128-179; Dupuy, Trevor N.: `Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule', ibid. , vol. 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 195-201. Back.

Note 132: On the effect of barriers, see e.g. Epstein, Joshua M.: Conventional Force Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment  (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), pp. 67-72; Simpkin, Richard E.: Race to the Swift. Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare  (London: Brassey's, 1986), pp. 57-77; Gupta, Raj: Defense Positioning and Geometry. Rules for a World with Low Force Levels  (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993). Back.

Note 133: Grin, John: Military-Technological Choices and Political Implications. Command and Control in Established NATO Posture and a Non-Provocative Defence  (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990). Back.

Note 134: It was, in fact, the good performance of anti-tank PGMs in the 1973 Yom Kippur war that spurred interest in NOD in the mid-1970s. See e.g. Digby, James: `Precision-Guided Munitions', Adelphi Papers , no. 118 (1975). See also Canby, Steven L.: `Weapons for Land Warfare', in Bjørn Møller & Håkan Wiberg (eds.): Non-Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 74-84; Ischebeck, Otfried: `Evolution of Tanks and Anti-Tank Weapons: Assessment of Offence-Defence Dynamics and Arms Control Options', in Wim A. Smit, John Grin & Lev Voronkov (eds.): Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a Changing World. Politically Assessing and Influencing Weapon Innovation and Military Research and Development  (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), pp. 177-196; Simpkin, Richard E.: `Tank Warfare. The Last Decades of the Dinosaurs', in Ken Perkins (ed.): Weapons and Warfare. Conventional Weapons and Their Role in Battle  (London: Brassey's, 1987), pp. 165-192. Back.

Note 135: For a comparison of various NOD-type force components with traditional military units, see e.g. Hofmann, Hans W., Reiner K. Huber & Karl Steiger: `On Reactive Defense Options. A Comparative Systems Analysis of Alternatives for the Initial Defense against the First Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe', in Reiner K. Huber (ed.): Modelling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe. Assessment of Improvement Options  (New York: Plenum, 1986), pp. 97-140; Huber, Reiner K. & Hans Hofmann: `The Defence Efficiency Hypothesis and Conventional Stability in Europe: Implications for Arms Control', in Anders Boserup & Robert Neild (eds.): The Foundations of Defensive Defence  (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 109-132. Back.

Note 136: For documentation see Møller: op. cit.  1991 (note 120); and idem: op. cit.  1995 (note 120). Back.

Note 137: Unterseher, Lutz: `Defending Europe: Toward a Stable Conventional Deterrent', in Henry Shue (ed.): Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, Critical Choices for American Strategy  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 293-342; Grin, John & idem: `The Spiderweb Defense', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 44, no. 7 (August 1988), pp. 28-31. The most recent version, applied to the former Warsaw Pact states is SAS & PDA (Project on Defense Alternatives): Confidence-building Defense. A Comprehensive Approach to Security and Stability in the New Era. Application to the Newly Sovereign States of Europe  (Cambridge, MA: PDA, Commonwealth Institute, 1994). Back.

Note 138: Conetta, Carl, Charles Knight & Lutz Unterseher: `Toward Defensive Restructuring in the Middle East', Bulletin of Peace Proposals , vol. 22, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 115-134. Back.

Note 139: Regional studies by the present author include the following. (Unless otherwise indicated, the numbers refer to the series of Working Papers from the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen; from 1996 onwards called Copenhagen Peace Research Institute). On the Middle East: Møller, Bjørn: `Non-Offensive Defence and the Arab-Israeli Conflict', (no. 7/1994, revised version forthcoming as a UNIDIR Research Report . On South Asia: `A Common Security and NOD Regime for South Asia?' (no. 4/1996). On Korea: `Non-Offensive Defence and the Korean Peninsula' (no. 4/1995); `Common Security and Non-Offensive Defence: Are They Relevant for the Korean Peninsula?', in Hwang, Bypong-Moo & Yong-Sup Han (eds.): Korean Security Policies Toward Peace and Unification , KAIS International Conference Series, no. 4 (Seoul: Korean Association of International Studies, 1996), pp. 241-291. On China: `The Unification of Divided States and Defence Restructuring. China-Taiwan in a Comparative Perspective' (no. 9/1996), abridged version forthcoming in idem (ed.): Security, Arms Control and Defensive Restructuring in East Asia  (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997/98). On the Asia-Pacific: `A Common Security and Non-Offensive Defence Regime for the Asia-Pacific?' (no. 8/1995), abridged version forthcoming in Pacifica Review  (1997). On South America: `The Decalogue of Mon-Offensive Defence Revisited. Five Years Later and in a Different Part of the World' (no. 16, 1994); `Defensa no-ofensiva y fomento de confianza en Sudamerica', Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad , vol. 10, no. 3 (July-September 1995), pp. 12-19. On Southern Africa: `The Concept of Non-Offensive Defence: Implications for Developing Countries with Specific Reference to Southern Africa', in M. Hough & A. du Plessis (eds.): `Conference Papers: The Future Application of Air Power with Specific Reference to Southern Africa', Ad hoc Publication , no. 32 (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 1995), pp. 48-128; Cawthram Gavin & idem (eds.): Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa  (Aldershot: Dartmouth, forthcoming 1997). See also idem: `Non-Offensive Defence as a Strategy for Small States?' (no. 5/1995). Forthcoming in Efraim Inbar (ed.): The National Security of Small States in a Changing World  (London: Frank Cass, 1997). Back.

Note 140: On the bipolar version see Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von: Wege in der Gefahr. Eine Studie über Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kriegsverhütung  (1976) (München: dtv, 1979), pp. 150, 116, 165-166; Boserup, Anders: `Non-offensive Defence in Europe', in Derek Paul (ed.): Defending Europe. Options for Security  (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 194-209; Møller: op. cit.  1992 (note 120), pp. 84-89. On the implications of multipolarity see idem: `What is Defensive Security? Non-Offensive Defence and Stability in a Post-Bipolar World', Working Papers , no. 10 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1992). Huber, Reiner K.: `Military Stability of Multipolar International Systems: An Analysis of Military Potentials in Post-Cold War Europe' (Neubiberg: Institut für Angewandte Systemforschung und Operations Research. Fakultät für Informatik. Universität der Bundeswehr München, June 1993); idem & Rudolf Avenhaus: `Problems of Multipolar International Stability', in idem & idem (eds.): International Stability in a Multipolar World: Issues and Models for Analysis  (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 11-20. For an interesting analysis of multipolarity in the former eastern bloc, see idem & Otto Schindler: `Military Stability of Multipolar Power Systems: An Analytical Concept for Its Assessment, exemplified for the Case of Poland, Byelarus, the Uraine and Russia', ibid. , pp. 155-180. Back.

Note 141: See the pessimistic reports from recent GCC summits in Jane's Defence Weekly , 18 March 1995, p. 62 and 3 March 1996, p. 14 Back.

Note 142: See, for instance, Luttwak, Edward N.: `A Post-Heroic Military Policy', Foreign Affairs , vol. 75, no. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44. Suggestions for various `asymmetrical counters' to US-type attack are to be found in Garrity, Patrick J.: `Implications of the Persian Gulf War for Regional Powers', in Roberts (ed.), op. cit.  (note 100), pp. 39-56. Se also Record, Jeffrey: `Force Projection/Crisis Response', in Ederington & Mazarr (eds.): op. cit.  (note 103), pp. 137-160. Back.

Note 143: An advocate of such controlled proliferation is Mearsheimer, John J.: `Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security , vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-52. Hos views are based on Waltz, Kenneth N.: `The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better', Adelphi Papers , no. 171 (1981). For a debate on the pros and cons see Sagan, Scott D. & idem: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate  (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). On the adequacy of other stabilizers, above all the general war-weariness, see Mueller, John: `The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World' (1988), in Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller & Stephen Van Evera (eds.): Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management. An  International Security Reader  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 3-27. Back.

Note 144: Simpson, John: `The Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime after the NPT Review and Extension Conference', in SIPRI Yearbook 1996 , pp. 561-589; Kile, Shannon & Eric Arnett: `Nuclear Arms Control', ibid. , pp. 611-655, esp. pp. 625-626; Anthony, Ian & Thomas Stock: `Multilateral Military-Related Export Control Measures', ibid. , pp. 537-551, esp. pp. 537-542. On the CTBT see Jane's Defence Weekly , 18 Sept. 1996, p. 5; ibid. , 2 Oct. 1996, p. 3. On Iraq see also note 72 above. See also Cohen, Avner: `The Nuclear Issue in the Middle East in a New World Order', in Inbar & Sandler (eds.): op. cit.  (note 71), pp. 49-69; idem & Marvin Miller: `How to Think About--and Implement--Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East', in Roberts (ed.): op. cit.  (note 100), pp. 361-373; Dunn, Lewis A.: `The Nuclear Agenda: The Middle East in Global Perspective', in Feldman & Levite (eds.): op. cit.  (note 91), pp. 229-242. Back.

Note 145: On CWC ratification and entry into force see Jane's Defence Weekly , vol. 24, no. 19 (11 Nov. 1996), p. 5; and ibid. , no. 21 (20 Nov. 1996), p. 22 (according to which Saudi Arabia and Oman were the only states in the Persian Gulf to have ratified). On the treaty see Robinson, Julian Perry, Thomas Stock & Ronald G. Sutherland: `The Chemical Weapons Convention: the Success of Chemical Disarmament Negotiations', SIPRI Yearbook 1993 , pp. 705-734. The convention itself is appended on pp. 734-756; Stock, Thomas, Maria Haug & Patricia Radler: `Chemical and Biological Weapon Developments and Arms Control', SIPRI Yearbook 1996 , pp. 661-706. See also Robinson, Julian Perry: `The Australia Group: A Description and Assessment', in Hans Günter Brauch, Henny J. van der Graaf, John Grin & Wim A. Smit (eds.): Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology. Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the 1990s  (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), pp. 157-176; Roberts, Brad: `The Strategic Implications of Chemical Weapons Proliferation', in Stahl & Kemp (eds.): op. cit.  (note 71), pp. 27-44. Back.

Note 146: On regional measures see Roberts, Brad: `Chemical and Biological Weapons and Regional Arms Control', in Stahl & Kemp (eds.): op. cit.  (note 71), pp. 187-196. A recent proposal to this effect is Prawitz, Jan & Jim Leonard: A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East , publication no. UNIDIR/96/24 (Geneva: UNIDIR and New York: UN, 1996). Back.

Note 147: Anthony, Ian: `The Missile Technology Control Regime', in idem (ed.): Arms Export Regulations  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 219-227; Karp, Aaron: `Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the MTCR', in Götz Neuneck & Otfried Ischebeck (eds.): Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Arms Control  (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1992), pp. 171-184; Kniest, N.: `Export Controls and the Missile Technology Control Regime', ibid. , pp. 185-196; Pike, John & Eric Stambler: `Constraints on the R&D and Transfer of Ballistic Missiles Defence Technology', in Brauch, van der Graaf, Grin & Smit (eds.): op. cit.  (note 145), pp. 157-176; Shuey, Robert: `Assessment of the Missile Technology Control Regime', ibid. , pp. 177-190. Back.

Note 148: Pike, John & Christopher Bolkcom: `Prospects for an International Control Regime for Attack Aircraft', in Brauch et al.  (eds.): op. cit.  (note 145), pp. 313-328; Forsberg, Randall (ed.): The Arms Production Dilemma. Contraction and Restraint in the World Aircraft Industry  (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994). Back.

Note 149: Redick, John R.: `Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones', in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament , vols. 1-3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 1079-1091; Lodgaard, Sverre & Marek Thee (eds.): Nuclear Disengagement in Europe  (London: Taylor & Francis, 1983), passim ; United Nations: `A Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in all Its Aspects', United Nations Document  A/10027/Add. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1976. Sales no. E.76.1.7); Robles, Alfonso Garcia: `The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)', in SIPRI Yearbook 1969/70 , pp. 218-256; Fry, Greg E.: `The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone', in SIPRI Yearbook 1986 , pp. 499-522. On the African and Southeast Asian zones see Simpson: loc. cit.  (note 144), pp. 573-575, with the treaties excerpted ibid.  pp. 593-608. Back.

Note 150: See, e.g., Evron, Yair: `Israel', in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.): Security With Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security  (London: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1991), pp. 277-297; idem: Israel's Nuclear Dilemma  (London: Routledge, 1994); Schilling, Walter: `Israel's Nuclear Strategy in Transition', Aussenpolitik. English Edition , vol. 46, no. 4 (4th Quarter 1995), pp. 319-326; Aronson, Shlomo & Oded Brosh: The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991. An Israeli Perspective  (Albany: State University of New York, 1992); Cohen, Avner: `Nuclear Weapons, Opacity, and Israeli Democracy', in Avner Yaniv (ed.): National Security and Democracy in Israel  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 197-226; idem: `Stumbling into Opacity: The United States, Israel, and the Atom, 1960-63', Security Studies , vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 195-241; Beres, Louis Rene: `Israel's Bomb in the Basement: A Second Look', in Efraim Karsh (ed.): Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security  (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 112-136. Back.

Note 151: Recent years have witnessed a series of large-scale manoeuvres in the Persian Gulf region, by both Iran, Iraq and the GCC states, some of them in border regions. See Jane's Defence Weekly , 1 January 1996, p. 12 and 1 July 1996, p. 4 (on Iran); ibid.  1 April 1996, p. 10 (on Saudi Arabia); ibid.  27 March 1996, p. 16, 1 April 1996, p. 8; 24 April 1996, p. 13, 7 July 1996, p. 17; and 1 November 1996, p. 3 (on US exercizes with GCC states). Back.

Note 152: On the deterrent effect of the ability to wage protracted war see Mearsheimer, John J.: Conventional Deterrence  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Back.

Note 153: See, for instance, `...From the Sea. Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century' (US Navy, September 1992); and Breemer, Jan S.: `Naval Strategy Is Dead', US Naval Institute Proceedings , vol. 120, no. 2 (February 1994), pp. 49-53. Back.

Note 154: On defensive SLOC defence see Møller, Bjørn: `Restructuring the Naval Forces Towards Non-Offensive Defence', in Borg & Smit (eds.): op.cit.  (note 130), pp. 189-206. See also Booth, Ken: `NOD at Sea', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): op. cit.  (note 134), pp. 98-114. Back.

Note 155: Møller, Bjørn: `Air Power and Non-Offensive Defence. A Preliminary Analysis', Working Papers , no. 2 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1989); Hagena, Hermann: `NOD in the Air', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): op. cit.  (note 134), pp. 85-97. Back.

Note 156: On the pros and cons see Postol, Theodore A.: `Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot', International Security  16:3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 119-171; Stein, Robert M.: `Patriot Experience in the Gulf War', ibid.  vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 199-225; Postol, Theodore A.: `Correspondence: The Author Replies', ibid. , pp. 225-240. Back.

Note 157: On arms trade regulations in general, see e.g. Anthony (ed.): op. cit.  (note 147), passim; Krause, Keith R.: `Controlling the Arms Trade Since 1945', in Burns (ed.): op.cit.  (note 149), vol. 2, pp. 1021-1039; Taylor, Trevor & Ryukichi Imai: The Defence Trade. Demand, Supply and Control  (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/IIPS Institute for International Policy Studies, 1994); Hartung, William D.: `Curbing the Arms Trade: From Rhetoric to Restraint', World Policy Journal , vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 219-247; Keller, William W.: `International Defense Business and Restraint of Conventional Arms Transfers to the Middle East', in Feldman & Levite (eds.): op. cit.  (note 91), pp. 192-208. Back.

Note 158: Klare, Michael: `Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 47, no. 1 (Jan-Febr. 1991), pp. 19-26; Kemp & Stahl: op.cit.  (note 61), pp. 54-62. Back.

Note 159: Kemp & Stahl: op.cit.  (note 61), pp. 140-142, 178-182; Platt, Alan: `Arms Control in the Middle East', in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.): The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 139-150, especially pp. 144-146. Back.

Note 160: Heller, Mark: `Middle East Security and Arms Control', in Spiegel (ed.): op. cit.  (note 159), pp. 129-137. Back.

Note 161: `Tripartite Arms Declaration (1950)', in Burns (ed.): op.cit.  (note 149), vol. 3, p. 1432. Back.

Note 162: `Big Five Initiative on Arms Transfer and Proliferation Restraints (1991)', in Burns (ed.) op.cit.  (note 149), vol. 3, pp. 1481-1483. See also Brzoska, Michael: `Prospects for a Common Arms Transfer Policy from the European Union to the Middle East', in Inbar & Sandler (eds.): op. cit.  (note 71), pp. 14-33; Harvey, Mark: `Arms Export Control: An Analysis of Developments Since the Gulf War', RUSI Journal , vol. 137, no. 1 (February 1992), pp. 35-41. Back.

Note 163: All states in the region have boycotted reporting in 1996. See Deen, Thalif: `Mid East Missing from UN Arms Buys Register', Jane's Defence Weekly , vol. 24, no. 16 (16 October 1996), pp. 4-5. Back.

VIII. Postscript, March 1998: The 1997/98 Iraqi Crisis

Beginning in the autumn of 1997 and lasting until late February 1998 the world saw an intense international dispute over Iraq, which came dangerously close to the brink of a new war, albeit on a smaller scale than that in 1991. The crisis also raised a number of principled questions that will be addressed in the following postscript.

A. International Law And The Iraqi Crisis

There is little doubt that Iraq was in blatant violation of the ceasefire agreement in general and of the famous UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991) in particular, in which the extent and modalities of the disarmament of the defeated aggressor were detailed: ^ps1

The Security Council .....

8. Decides  that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres...

34. Decides  to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.

The main issue of controversy became that of `international supervision', as Iraq refused access to the UN's appointed representatives, i.e. the inspectors of UNSCOM. In response, the United States began threatening, as well as materially planning for, a military campaign against Iraq.

Prior Iraqi violations notwithstanding, these threats represented a clear violation of international law, in casu  nothing less than the UN Charter. This states unequivocally that not merely the actual use of force, but also the mere threat of using force is illegal, regardless of the underlying intentions. The only institution with the right to use, or mandate the use of, force is the UN Security Council, as clearly stated in the Charter. ^ps2

Article 24(1)

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

The Charter is supplemented by the General Assembly's 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty , which was adopted with only one abstention (the UK, but not the United States), and in which it was stated:

No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned ^ps3

The advocates of military intervention (the United States, followed by the UK and various other countries, including Denmark) argued that prior Security Council resolutions entailed an implicit authorization to use force, referring primarily to UNSCR 678 (29 November 1990):

The Security Council .....

2. Authorizes  Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements ... the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990)b and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.

4. Requests  the States concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution.

This reading of the resolution, however, does not seem tenable, above all because it clearly refers to a previous resolution (UNSCR 660 of 2 August 1990), which had nothing to do with the disarmament of Iraq, but only with a condition that had already been met, namely the restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait.

The Security Council .....

2. Demands  that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all of its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.

The world was thus heading towards a clear breach of international law by two of the Security Council's permament members. This threatened to seriously undermine the UN's authority, as there would be very little the rest of the UN could do, if only because the US and UK would be able to veto any condemnation in the Security Council, to say nothing of actual repraisals.

Fortunately, however, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan managed to `snatch victory from the claws of defeat'. His negotiations in Baghdad produced a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 23 February 1998, between Iraq and the UN, in which Iraq pledged to `cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)', in return for `the commitment of all Member States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq'. Concretely, Iraq promised `to accord to UNSCOM and IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access', but the UN promised to `respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity', which was to be ensured by having the controversial eight Presidential Sites inspected by a special group headed by a Commissioner appointed by the Secretary-General. The UN further promised to bring the matter of a lifting of sanctions `to the full attention of the members of the Security Council.'

After some haggling in the Security Council, with the United States and Britain pushing for a resolution that would make the use of force an almost automatic response to Iraqi non-compliance, a compromise resolution (UNSCR 1154) was passed on 2 March 1998.

The Security Council,

3. Stresses  that compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations, repeated again in the memorandum of understanding, to accord immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the IAEA in conformity with the relevant resolutions is necessary for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991), but that any violation would have the severest consequences for Iraq;

5. Decides , in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter, to remain actively seized of the matter, in order to ensure implementation of this resolution, and to ensure peace and security in the area.

While threatening `the severest consequences' of any breach of the agreement, the resolution clearly left the decision of how to respond to the Security Council--an interpretation that is not merely logical, but which has also been explicitly advocated by Secretary General Anan. ^ps4 In any case, there is no doubt that the Security Council is the supreme authority on the interpretation of its resolutions, which cannot even be overruled by the ICJ (International Court of Justice), much less by individual states, however powerful. ^ps5

B. The Size And Urgency Of The Problem

The crisis had thus seen some very 'creative' attempts at reinterpretation of international law, as well as quite explicit threat of disregarding it completely. However, all of this might (perhaps) have been justified, if the prevailing assesssment of the severity of the problem had been true, in which case a bending or breach of the rules might have been thought necessary. ^ps6 Unfortunately, this does seem to be the case.

The crux of the matter was Iraq's refusal of access for UNSCOM to various presidential sites, where it was believed it might conceale either actual weapons of mass destruction or production facilities for WMDs, i.e. for either chemical or biological weapons, or both. The question is whether the implicit danger was serious enough to warrant a breach of international law.

Chemical weapons, to be sure, certainly have some very unappealing features. Except for very unlikely scenarios (such as very accurate strikes against very dense congregations of unprotected victims), however, the damage they can produce is fairly modest. In other words, quite large quantities are required for chemicall weapons to really deserve the label 'weapons of mass destruction'-quantities which it would be hard for Iraq to conceal, and even harder to deliver to the envisaged target. Ballistic missiles generally have too limited throw-weights to be suitable for such missions, while aircraft are better, albeit less sure to be able to penetrate an air defence array. Finally, a wide range of protective measures are available, that are cumbersome but quite efffective.

Biological weapons are, in principle at least, true weapons of mass destruction, ^ps7 as some of them (anthrax, for instance) can cause infections of epidemic proportions. Moreover, the small quantities required makes it easy to conceal them-the more so, the less stringent the safety precautions taken by the possessor. There are, however, several drawback to any use of biological weapons:

• Their impact is very difficult to control, hence their use may also affect the country using them, including its (invading or occupying) armed forces. The collateral damage would also be considerable, and those segments of the population that might have been singled out as supporters would not be immune. For instance, an Iraqi biological weapons attack against Israel would inevitably have a large toll of Palestinian casualties besides the intended (Jewish) victims.

• While vaccines are available that may project against some agents, mass inoculations would surely be detected, which would alert the envisaged target country, to which the same vaccines might be available. ^ps8

• Certain agents have too long incubation times to make them suitable for supporting a surprise attack.

• Certain agents may be difficult to deliver, for instance, by means of ballistic missiles, as the micro-organisms would be killed either during the boost or impact phase.

There have been speculations about genetic engineering to overcome some of these problems, but this would surely require a level of sophistication beyond that available to a country such as Iraq, especially when under close and intrusive supervision. ^ps9

Even if Iraq should succeed in producing signifiicant stockpiles of chemical and/or biological weapons, it is hard to fathom what would be their possible utility, even in the hands of a ruthless dictator like Saddam Hussein. A few possibilities immediately spring to mind, but none of them (with the possible exception of no. 1) seem to make much sense:

1. As a `defensive deterrent', i.e. intended to protect Iraq against an attack with unlimited objectives, posing an `existential' threat to the country or regime. This would, however, only be relevant in case such a threat exists.

2. As an `offensive detterrent', under the projection of which Iraq might launch a conventional attack, taking advantage of its possession of WMDs to neutralize the deterrent effects of WMDs in the hands of the victim of aggression or its allies. This would, however, only really matter against conventionally inferior opponents, while Iraq would undoubtedly be up against a crushing conventional superiority in the event of a renewed attack against Kuwait or other neighbours.

3. As a means of `offensive compellence', where Iraq would use the threat of strikes with WMDs (i.e. `WMD blackmail') to compel another state to concessions. The entire case for such blackmail is, however, extremely vague and could probably safely be dismissed as a figment of the imagination. ^ps10

4. As a political `bargaining chip', which Saddam might `cash in' for concessions such as, for instance, a complete lifting of sanctions--perhaps in analogy with what may have been the North Korean strategy underlying its threat to withdraw from the NPT. ^ps11 As such a lifting of sanctions is preconditionen on Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 687, however, any cladestine development that would automatically be labelled as non-compliance would seem to defeat its purpose.

While all of the above might make some strategic sense, the purpose most often alluded to would not, namely terror bombardments against neighbouring countries. The stigma that is attached to biological weapons would deprive the country using them of all, or at least most, international support. It might further help lifting the taboo against nuclear first-use, implying that a biological attack could provoke nuclear retaliation--as has been intimated by both Israel and the United States. Why should the deterrence strategy on which the national security of both the United States and NATO was premised throughout the Cold War not work against a foe such as Iraq that is, afterall, much less of a threat than the mighty Soviet Union?

While it would thus be cynical to trivialize B and C weapons, they cannot really compare with the actual  nuclear weapons that are deployed by, inter alia , the United States, the UK and Israel, but which have been almost completely forgotten in the uproar over potential  Iraqi WMDs. Moreover, to the extent that B and C weapons are regarded as a serious danger, the most promising approach to solving the problem would be negotiatons on the establishment of a zone free of WMDs covering the entire Middle East/Persian Gulf region. ^ps12 This would surely be much preferable to an attack in breach of international law.

C. The Strategy Of The Planned Campaign

That a new military intervention against Iraq was thus (for the time being at least) averted was very fortunate, not only because of the negative repercussions it would have had on the respect for international law. The planned campaign would most likely not have accomplished its objective. Even though it was never made entirely clear what this objective was, four possibilities seem to have been in the minds of US decision-makers:

1. destroying Iraq's WMDs;

2. hampering Iraq's production of WMD's;

3. compelling Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN's requests;

4. deposing Saddam Hussein.

ad 1) A destruction of the presumed Iraqi stocks of biological and/or chemical weapons would be virtually impossible, even with the high-precision concrete-penetrating missiles shown in the media, as surgical strikes presuppose the availability of accurate and reliable target coordinates. While such would be available for possible production sites for nuclear weapons (viz the Israeli atttack against the Ossirac nuclear reactor), production sites for the national security B and C weapons could be much more dispersed and easily moved. In fact, this was exactly what the US accused Sadam of doing: delaying access for the inspection teams and in the meantime move the prohibited materials to other locations. Finally, even in the hypothetical event that the attacks should actually succee in destroying all existing stocks and production facilities, there could never be any complete certainty thereof.

ad 2) Striking at the presumed locations might be partically succesful, but would have to be followed up with renewed strikes ad infinitum . This would be a form of gradual attrition and would surely do something to hamper and postpone any Iraqi access to WMDs, but there would also be drawbacks:

• First of all, an inevitable collateral damage which Saddam might deliberately increase by placing production sites in densely populated areas (viz his usage of hostages during the Kuwait crisis).

• Secondly, the costs to the United States would be substantial, especially as such an open-ended campaign would, most likely, not be able to count on Arab support indefinitely. The strikes would thus have to be undertaken from aircraft carriers on station in the Gulf, which are extremely costly.

ad 3) It was surely conceivable that one or several series of air strikes against important targets in Iraq might compel Iraq into submission. However, what if it did not, but Sadddam remained recalcitrant in the face of attack that would, by definition, be massive but not fatal? It does not appear that the United States had any strategy to guide its air strike tactics, as this would have to entail plans for several rounds of moves and counter-moves.

• Would the US simply continue the strikes? If so, for how long?

• Or discontinue them after a `decent interval', yet without having accomplished what they were intended to achieve--with an inevitable loss of face as a result?

• Or gradually escalate the attacks until the goal was reached? If so, would escalation be sought by quantitative or qualitative means--i.e. by simply increasing the intensity of the strikes, or by proceeding to more important targets, or by using more destructive means of attack, perhaps even WMDs? ^ps13

The strategy of gradual escalation was attempted by both the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations during the Vietnam War, but to absolutely no avail. Eventually the United States had to withdraw and accept victory for North Vietnam, leaving behind it a trail of destruction of both Vietnamese society and environment (viz Agent Orange). ^ps14 This is surely not a strategy for emulation.

ad 4) It might be possible to depose Saddam, either by means of succesful surgical strikes against his presumed wherabout (the Presidential palaces, for instance) or by marching all the way to Baghdad. Indeed, several observers have argued that it was a mistake not to have proceeded to the Iraqi capital in 1991--but better late than never! ^ps15

• First of all, however, there are surely more effective ways of doing this than through air bombardments or AirLand Battle-type operations, e.g. by means of special forces or agents `with a licence to kill', which would have the advantage of being more `discrete'. Even though such an assasination of Saddam, or an instigated coup against him, would be unlawful as well as unethical, such activities would at least be deniable. At worst, a country would have to sack a few high-ranking officials (as happed to the Mossad chief), but it need not be officially implicated in a breach of international law, hence would create no unfortunate precedents.

• Secondly, an attack `to get Saddam' would be an even more blatant violation of international law than an attack to ensure compoliance with UN resolutions. ^ps16

• Thirdly, such an operation would presuppose that there would be somebody ready to take the place of Saddam Hussein, e.g. a group of rebellious officers. Their prospects of being accepted as legitimate by the Iraqi population would, however, be jeopardized by their being seen (correctly) as the agents of foreign powers. Were they to be regarded as illegitimate by (all or large parts of) the population, continuing discord and turmoil would be the most likely consequence.

D. Implications Of An Attack

Even if successful according to the above criteria, an attack would have had severe negative repercussions, both regionally and globally.

First of all, an attack (without UNSC authorization) would have been a blatant violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 as well as of the UN Charter and other elements of international law. International law explicitly proscribes war, and does so in the form of a general prohibition with certain explicit exceptions: Only wars of self-defence and of collective security are permitted, and in both cases the legitimacy is conditional upon Security Council approval, either ex ante  or ex post . ^ps17 The entailed outlawing of war constitutes one of the most significant advances in the progressive civilizing of international relations. Just compare the present situation with that of the 19th century when war was a matter of expediency: If the prospects of success were high enough, it was regarded as perfectly legitimate (perhaps even imperative) to go to war for political goals, such as territorial expansion.

A violation of these rules would contribute to making war, once again, a legitimate means to political ends, and the more so as it would most likely not even have been condemned by the United Nations (if only because of US and British vetos), whereby a most unfortunate precedent would have been set.

Secondly, the assembled anti-Iraqi coalition differed markedly from that of 1990/91. There were few attempts at (and definitely no success with) creating a regional coalition that might have constituted a regional collective security system in embryo . Instead, the coalition consisted almost exclusively of states from Europe and North America, which must have looked very much like a real-life manifestation of the Huntingtonian vision of a war of 'the West against the rest' ^ps18 -yet with the added complications that the West would have assumed the role of the aggressor, and that Israel would be seen as part of the West.

This would undoubtedly have fuelled anti-western sentiments in the Arab and muslim world, a likely manifestation of which would be a growth of radical islamist parties and groupings. As several of the regimes in the region have a fragile basis, it is quite conceivable that some of them (Saudi Arabia, for instance) would be overturned in favour of islamist rule-or, even worse, would be replaced by stateless chaos. One could also envisage endagered regimes adopting more repressive means of government (or switching to military rule) as a safeguard against democratic victories for the radicals (as happened in Algeria). A renaissance for pan-Arabist or pan-Islamist policies would also seem a possibility, even though the plethora of rivalries would probably prevent this from proceeding from rhetoric to actual politics.

A worst-case scenario would involve a virtual dissolution of Iraq, for instance as a result of the aforementioned political instability caused by a Western attack aimed at dethroning Saddam which might escalate to civil war. The Shi'ites in the southern parts of Iraq might secede in order to merge with Iran; and the Kurds in northern Iraq might secede to create an independent Kurdistan-which would put further pressure on the other states hosting large Kurdish minorities: Syria, Iran and Turkey. ^ps19 Both eventualities would put severe strains on the already extremely delicate balance of power in the Persian Gulf region, especially if combined with political instability in Saudi Arabia.

E. The Future of Dual Containment

None of the above scenarios would appear to be in the best interests of neither the West in general, nor the United States in particular, which would thus seem well advised to revise their policies. This is especially the case for the US strategy of dual containment described and criticized in the paper, which has recently been questioned, especially as far as relations with Iran have been concerned. ^ps20

As a matter of fact, Iran has been steadily developing into a 'normal' state since the mid-1980s, and especially after the end of the war with Iraq and the death of Imam Khomeini. Even though serious problems with regard to human righths persists, Iran is today not only the most democratic but also one of the most modern societies in the region. ^ps21 This is also reflected in Teheran's foreign policy which has shed most of its previous ideological traits in favour of moderation and attempts at accommodation with neighbours. ^ps22 Militarily as well, Iran's behaviour seems very moderate, both with regard to its conventional and (alleged) nuclear programmes, the latter of which are, at worst, intended for deterrence. ^ps23 Finally, it should not be (but is often) forgotten that Iran was the innocent victim of the 1980 attack from Iraq, largely aided and abetted by the West, albeit to different degrees-something which has produced some resentment on the Iranian side. ^ps24

While these facts seem to have gradually dawned on US and other Western powers, what may prove to be the decisive factor in the impending policy shift was the presidential elections in 1997, which brought to power the moderate Mohammed Khatami. In an interview with CNN on 7 January 1998, he sent out some very important new signals, that did not go unnoticed in the West. ^ps25

First of all, Khatami expressed sympathy and respect for Christianity in general and the US civilization in particularly:

Once again I would like to present my felicitations to all the followers of Jesus Christ, to all human beings, and particularly to the American people. I have said earlier that I respect the great American people. (...) The American civilization is worthy of respect.

Secondly, he reminded the audience of both the shared values (republicanism, democracy, and freedom) and the historical similarities, including the clash between religion and liberty:

In my opinion, one of the biggest tragedies in human history is this confrontation between religion and liberty which is to the detriment of religion, liberty, and the human beings who deserve to have both .... the Anglo-American approach to religion relies on the principle that religion and liberty are consistent and compatible. I believe that if humanity is looking for happiness, it should combine religious spirituality with the virtues of liberty. And it is for this reason that I say I respect the American nation because of their great civilization.

Thirdly, he expressed a desire for inter-civilizational dialogue:

In terms of the dialogue of civilizations, we intend to benefit from the achievements and experiences of all civilizations, Western and non-Western, and to hold dialogue with them. The closer the pillars and essences of these two civilizations are, the easier the dialogue would become. (...) The Islam which we know and practice and founded our revolution on recognized the right of all human beings to determine their own destiny. It declares that relations among nations must be based on logic and mutual respect. Such Islam is enemy to no nation, enemy to no religion. It seeks dialogue, understanding and peace with all nations.

Fourthly, he exhibited signs of self-criticism with regard to Iranian excesses in the past, including the hostage crisis:

With regard to the hostage issue which you raised, I do know that the feelings of the great American people have been hurt, and of course I regret it. (...) in the heat of the revolutionary fervor, things happen which cannot be fully contained or judged according to usual norms. This was the crying out of the people against humiliations and inequities imposed upon them by the policies of the U.S. and others, particularly in the early days of the revolution. With the grace of God, today our new society has been institutionalized and we have a popularly elected powerful government, and there is no need for unconventional methods of expression of concerns and anxieties.

Fifthly and finally, the President went out of his way to dispel whatever impressions of Iranian `rougueness' might remain:

Today we are in the period of stability, and fully adhere to all norms of conduct regulating relations between nations and governments. With the grace of God, today all the affairs of country are being conducted within the framework of law (...) Terrorism should be condemned in all its forms and manifestations; assassins must be condemned. Terrorism is useless anyway and we condemn it categorically. Those who level these charges against us are best advised to provide accurate and objective evidence, which indeed does not exist.

The American response was cautious, but definitely positive:

We listened with interest to President Khatami's interview on CNN. We welcome the fact that he wants a dialogue with the American people and welcome his appreciation of the fundamental principles that form the foundation of our nation. But, we continue to believe that the way to address the issues between us is for our two governments to talk directly. ^ps26

There thus seem to be realistic hopes for a revision, maybe even abandonment, of the dual containment policy, which would open the way to a more collaborative approach to regional stability in the Persian Gulf region, maybe along the lines described in the original version of this paper.

---

Note *: The author holds an MA in History and a Ph.D. in International Relations, both from the University of Copenhagen. Since 1985, he has been (senior) research fellow, subsequently project director and board member at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research). He is, furthermore, external lecturer of International Relations at the Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen; project director of the Global Non-Offensive Defence Network; editor of NOD and Conversion ; Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA); and member of the UNIDIR Expert Group on Confidence-Building in the Middle East. In addition to being the editor of several books and author of numerous articles, he is the author of the following books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence  (1991); Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective  (1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense  (1995). Back.

Note **: Previously presented to the conference on Security Concerns and Security Proposals in the Middle East  (6-15 March 1997 in Aman, Jordan, organized by the Centre for Research on Arms Control and Security and ISODARCO); and to the Eigth Persian Gulf Seminar on Regional Approaches in the Persian Gulf  (24-25 February 1998, in Tehran, Iran, organized by the Institute for Political and International Studies). A revised version has appeared as `Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Gulf Region', The Emirates Occasional Papers , no. 9 (Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997). Back.

Note ps1: Molander, Johan: `The United Nations and the Elimination of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Implementation of a Cease-Fire Condition', in Fred Tanner (ed.): From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States  (New York: United Nations/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1992), pp. 137-158; Sur, Serge: `Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair: Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace', Research Papers , no. 12 (New York: UNIDIR); idem (ed.): Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations. Problems of Compliance and Enforcement  (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 63-80; Weller, M. (ed.): Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath . Cambridge International Documents, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1993), pp. 8-12, 494-536. Back.

Note ps2: For an otherwise quite `permissive' (Israeli) interpretation of the Charter to the same effect see Dinstein, Yoram: War, Aggression and Self-Defence . Second Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 83-97. Back.

Note ps3: Murphy, John F.: `Force and Arms', in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United Nations Legal Order , Vols. 1-2 (American Society for International Law and Cambridge: Grotius Publications/Cambridge University Press, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 247-317, especially pp. 251-265, 277-292 (quotation from p. 248). Back.

Note ps4: CNN: World News , 8 March 1998, reporting from ABC's broadcast This Week . Back.

Note ps5: Sohn, Louis B.: `The UN System as Authoritative Interpreter of Its Law', in Schachter & Joyner (eds.): op. cit.  (note 3), pp. 169-230. Back.

Note ps6: See, e.g., the chapter on `Supreme Emergency' in Walzer, Michael: Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations  (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 251-268. Back.

Note ps7: See, for instance, Dando, Malcolm: Biological Warfare in the 21st Century  (London: Brassey's, 1994). See also Bailey, Kathleen: `Responding to the Threat of Biological Weapons', Security Dialogue , vol. 26, no. 4 (December 1995), pp. 383-397; Thränert, Oliver: `Responding to the Threat of Biological Weapons', ibid. , pp. 399-403; Nixdorff, Kathryn: `Gefährdungen durch biologische Agenzien', S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden , vol. 15, no. 4 (1997), pp. 233-240. Back.

Note ps8: Geissler, Erhard & John P. Woodall (eds.): Control of Dual-Threat Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Programme . SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, no. 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Back.

Note ps9: Geissler, Erhard: `Implications of Genetic Engineering for Chemical and Biological Warfare', SIPRI Yearbook 1984 , pp. 421-454. Back.

Note ps10: On compellence, see Schelling, Thomas C.: The Strategy of Conflict  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 195-199; idem: Arms and Influence  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69-91. On blackmail see Betts, Richard K.: Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance  (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987). Back.

Note ps11: Mazarr, Michael J.: North Korea and the Bomb. A Case Study in Nonproliferation  (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Reiss, Mitchell: Bridled Ambitions. Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities  (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 231-319; Kihl, Young Whan: `Confrontation or Compromise? Lessons from the 1994 Crisis', in idem & Peter Hayes (eds.): Peace and Security in Northeast Asia. The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula  (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 181-204. Back.

Note ps12: See, for instance, Prawitz, Jan & Jim Leonard: A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East , publication no. UNIDIR/96/24 (Geneva: UNIDIR and New York: UN, 1996). Back.

Note ps13: The most systematic analysis of this is the herostratically famous 44-rung `escalation ladder', developed by Kahn, Herman: On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios  (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 50-51, 194-195. Similar ideas influenced air power doctrines in the interwar years. See, e.g. Douhet, Giulio: The Command of the Air  (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942); Warner, Edward: `Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare', in Edward Mead Earle (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler  (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 485-503; MacIsaac, David: `Voices From the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists', in Peter Paret (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age  (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 624-647; Brodie, Bernard: Strategy in the Missile Age  (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 71-106. Back.

Note ps14: Gibson, James William: The Perfect War. The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did.  (New York: Vintage Books, 1988); Clodfelter, Mark: The Limits of Air Power. The American Bombing of North Vietnam  (New York: The Free Press, 1989). On the impact of defoliants such as Agent Orange see Westing, Arthur: `The Environmental Aftermath of Warfare in Viet Nam', SIPRI Yearbook 1982 , pp. 363-392. Back.

Note ps15: On this debate see Doowdy, William L. & Barry R. Schneider: `On to Baghdad? Or Stop at Kuwait? A Gulf War Question Revisited', Defense Analysis , vol. 13, no. 3 (December 1997), pp. 319-327. Back.

Note ps16: It would, for instance, constitute a breach of the above-mentioned Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention , which states that `no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state'. See Murphy: loc. cit.  (note 3), pp. 248. Back.

Note ps17: Baratta, Joseph Preston: `The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War', in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament , vols. I-III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), vol. II, pp. 695-705. See also Rapoport, Anatol: Peace. An Idea Whose Time Has Come  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992). Back.

Note ps18: Huntington, Samuel: `The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs , vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49; idem: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), especially pp. 328-321. On Middle Eastern perceptions of the West see Fuller, Graham E. & Ian O. Lessler: A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West  (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 27-46. Back.

Note ps19: See, for instance, Entessar, Nader: Kurdish Ethnonationalism  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992). Back.

Note ps20: See, for instance, Sicherman, Harvey: `America's Alliance Anxieties. The Strange Death of Dual Containment', Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs , vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 223-240; Sick, Gary: `Rethinking Dual Containment', Survival , vol. 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-32; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Brent Scowcroft & Richard Murphy: `Differentiated Containment', Foreign Affairs , vol. 76, no. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 20-30; Wright, Robin & Shaul Bakhash: `The U.S. and Iran: An Offer They Can't Refuse?', Foreign Policy , vol. 108 (Fall 1997), pp. 124-137; Baghat, Gawdat: `Beyond Containment: US-Iranian Relations at a Crossroads', Security Dialogue , vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1997), pp. 453-464. Back.

Note ps21: Baktiari, Bahman: `The Governing Institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Supreme Leader, the Presidency, and the Majlis', in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (ed.): Iran and the Gulf. A Search for Stability  (Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research and London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 47-69; Noorbaksh, Mehdi: `Religion, Politiocs, and Ideological Trends in Contemporary Iran', ibid. , pp. 15-46; Fairbanks, Stephen C.: `Theocracy versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties', The Middle East Journal , vol. 52, no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 17-31. Back.

Note ps22: See, for instance, Sadri, Hounan A.: Revolutionary States, Leaders, and Foreign Relations. A Comparative Study of China, Cuba and Iran  (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Press, 1997), pp. 87-114; Milani, Mahsen M.: `Iran's Gulf Policy: From Idealism and Confrontation to Pragmatism and Moderation', in al-Suwaidi (ed.): op. cit.  (note 21), pp. 83-98; Bill, James A.: `The Geometry of Instability in the Gulf: The Rectangle of Tension', ibid. , pp. 99-117; Kemp, Geoffrey: `The Impact of Iranian Foreign Policy on Regional Security: An External Perspective', ibid. , pp. 118-135. For an explanation of the past excesses see Conge, Patrick J.: From Revolution to War. State Relations in a World of Change  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 65-88; Walt, Stephen M.: Revolution and War  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 211-268. Back.

Note ps23: Katzman, Kenneth: `The Politico-Military Threat from Iran', in al-Suwaidi (ed.): op. cit.  (note 21), pp. 195-210; Cordesman, Anthony H.: `Threats and Non-Threats from Iran', ibid. , pp. 211-286; Arnett, Eric: `Iran is not Iraq', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 64, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 12-14. Back.

Note ps24: Naghibzadeh, Ahmad: `Collectively or Singly: Western Europe and the Iran-Iraq War', in Farhang Rajaee, (ed.): Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War  (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1997), pp. 39-48; Toussi, Reza Ra'iss: `Containment and Animosity: The United States and the War', ibid. , pp. 49-61. Back.

Note ps25: `Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami January 7, 1998', to be found on the CNN website: http://cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html. Back.

Note ps26: `Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman', January 7, l998, available from the CNN website at the address http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998/ps980107.html. Back.