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The Post-Cold War (Ir)Relevance of Non-Offensive Defence *

Bjørn Møller **

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

Paper for the IMA Conference on
Modelling International Conflict
13-15 April 1997, Oxford



The paper features a general introduction to the concept of non-offensive defence (NOD) with a special emphasis on the offence/defence distinction and criteria of 'defensive sufficiency'. It is concluded with an assessment of the the post-Cold War relevance of NOD for various regions around the world.

1. The Scientific Approach-An Outsider's View

Contrary to most papers presented at the present conference, this one is not couched in mathematical terms or formulae, for two reasons:

First of all, its author is not a mathematician. Far from it, in fact, his mathematical skills are probably inferior to (and certainly more 'rusty' than) those of most university students. Secondly, the author is generally unconvinced of the merits of the 'scientific approach' to the study of defence and security problems. In fact, he is a die-hard adherent of what Hedley Bull called 'the classical approach', 1 which most 'scientificists' would regard as frivolous speculation, and the findings of which the label 'truths' is usually more appropriate than 'facts' or 'laws'.

In the author's view, it is an exception rather than the rule when the relevant 'units' or variables under study in international relations or strategic studies are quantitative or easily quantifiable. 2 When they happen to be so, it would of course be foolish to miss the opportunity to count, measure, calculate and correlate. However, generally the relevant variables are events, intentions, perceptions, etc. which are not, by their very nature, quantitative. Hence, the application of mathematical formulae requires moulding the subject matter into quantitative terms, which is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. When dealing with 'correlates of war', for instance, should one count the Second World War as one or several wars; and how does one assign relative weights to, e.g., WWII and the 1969 'Football War': in terms of number of battle or war-related deaths, duration, spatial parameters, or ...? 3

Because of this combination of incompetence and methodological persuasion, the paper and presentation are limited to a general introduction to the concept of non-offensive defence (acronym NOD), albeit with a special emphasis on those aspects of the topic that would seem (to a layman such as the author, at least) to lend themselves to mathematical treatment, perhaps even modelling. 4

2. Non-Offensive Defence: The Concept

The theory of NOD (also known as 'non-provocative defence', 'non-aggressive defence', 'confidence-building defence', 'defensive defence' or 'structural inability of attack', all of which are synonyms) is based on that of Common Security, promulgated by the Palme Commission in its 1982 report. 5

The basic idea is that it is possible to somehow resolve, transcend or circumvent the security dilemma that has been described by Thucydides, Hobbes and modern (neo)realists. 6 Under its influence what states do for the sake of their national security tends to undermine it: Not being privy to the inner thoughts of other states, states in an anarchical setting tend to regard each other as potential adversaries. When seeking security against others, moreover, states usually do so in a manner that constitutes a threat to these adversaries, who tend to reciprocate in a manner that constitutes a threat to the first state, etc. ad infinitum. This security dilemma manifests itself in, inter alia, arms races, 7 preventive wars and pre-emptive attacks (resulting from low crisis stability 8 ) and in competitive alliance building. 9 It may thus lead to excessive military spending, to wars that might otherwise be avoidable, to escalation and more intense destruction in such wars and, at least tendentially, to a bipolar division of the world into two opposing camps.

Presumably, the security dilemma may be resolved by taking the security concerns of the respective adversaries into due consideration and to prefer such means to the end of national security as do not harm the security of others. Translated into military terms, this means having a defence that combines sufficient defensive capabilities (because other states might attack) with as little offensive strength as possible because the other states might not attack premeditatedly, in which case it is imperative not to provoke an attack.

To the extent that the overall military posture is strictly defensive, it is also confidence-inspiring, as other states need not fear being attacked, even if a peaceful state should turn bellicose, i.e. if intentions should change (say, after a coup d'êtat). To the extent that a state's arms acquisitions do not produce offensive capabilities, other states need not reciprocate, as they are facing no amplified threat; and if a defensively armed and structured state feels the need to mobilize its forces in (what it regards as) an emergency, this will not be perceived by other states as possible attack preparations, against which they would have to be prepared. 10

A switch to NOD thus promises to improve both arms race and crisis stability as well as what might be called 'general stability', i.e. the general certainty on the part of states that they are secure, i.e. live in a stable and secure environment where nobody seriously contemplates attacking anybody else: A situation well worth striving for that has already been attained in parts of the world, and which has been labelled, alternatively, 'stable peace' or 'security community'. 11

There are several competing definitions of NOD. One of the best known is that of Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker:

The size, weapons, training, logistics, doctrine, operational manuals, war-games, manoeuvres, text-books used in military academies, etc. of the armed forces are such that they are seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense without any reliance on the use of nuclear weapons, yet incapable of offense. 12

However, an 'etc.' is hardly appropriate in a definition. Rather than listing how various measures might make armed forces non-offensive, a definition should define, in abstract terms, what is meant by non-offensiveness, relegating to the subsequent analysis the question of how to achieve this. While one might, of course, define NOD as the end point of an inevitably protracted process of restructuring (i.e. as an all-or-nothing question), it is, for most purposes, more fruitful to define it in process terms:

NOD is a military strategy, materialized in a military posture, that maximizes defensive strength while minimizing offensive options of cross-border attack.

This defines a process leading towards, but perhaps never quite reaching, an end-state that might be called 'reciprocal aggression incapability', i.e. where all states are incapable of attacking each other. 13 The competition and rivalry among states may continue, but cannot take the form of war as long as this condition is met.

Such inability of attack need not be military, of course. States may, for instance, have a political system that hampers aggression (viz. the 'democracies never attack other democracies' theorem 14 ), or strong inhibitions may be built into the constitution or legislation (as in Germany or Japan 15 ); or a country's location may be such as to almost automatically rule out aggression (the case of New Zealand). Military non-offensiveness (for which I shall reserve the term 'NOD') is thus only relevant where other inhibitions against aggression are non-existing or regarded (by the respective adversaries) as inadequate.

The entire theory of NOD is based on two basic assumptions: That 'offensive' and 'defensive' are distinguishable, and that the defence is stronger so that one can safely dismantle the former without damaging the latter. I shall take a closer look at the implications of these assumption, with some tentative ideas about the feasibility of operationalization. After this 'digression', I shall conclude with some (inevitably superficial) considerations about the possible application of NOD to various parts of the world.

3. The Offence/Defence Distinction

In principle, there are several ways of distinguishing between 'offensive' and 'defensive', which may be categorized as functional and structural distinctions, the former referring to what states intend to or actually do, and the latter to what they have and/or what they are.

3.1. Functional Distinctions

What ultimately matters is, of course, what states intend to do with their military might, i.e. whether they have offensive or defensive political intentions and ambitions. So long as states feel confident that their neighbours are peaceful and defensively minded, they will not care about their armaments at all. Intentions, however, are not immediately observable, but have to be inferred from circumstantial, but tangible, evidence. One manifestation of whether states are politically defensive or offensive is their conception of 'vital national interests', in defence of which their military power is envisaged to be used. This is a central element in their 'grand strategy' or 'military doctrine', in the modern parlance. 16

One might rank such conceptions spatially, i.e. according the required military reach: the longer, the more offensive. The most defensive level of ambition is to defend only territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Slightly more offensive is the inclusion of overseas possessions (such as colonies), the defence of which may require global reach. The same is the case for a defence of nationals abroad, even though their defence (or rescue) will usually call for, at most, long-range expeditionary forces. It is even more offensive to envisage a defence also of overseas 'economic interests', to which states may have no legal entitlement, but the 'defence' of which may require quite a formidable, indeed global, military reach. Equally offensive is it to envisage what might (euphemistically) be called an 'extended perimeter defence', encompassing a 'buffer zone' that comprises other states (like the Russian 'near abroad'). Most offensive of all are, of course, ambitions of territorial aggrandizement, such as those of the Third Reich or of Iraq vis-a-vis Kuwait.

Security political intentions might also be rank-ordered temporally, i.e. according to the envisaged timing of military operations. It is thus clearly more offensive to launch a premeditated attack than to defend oneself, but the intermediate stages also matter: Preventive war should thus be reckoned as offensive, no matter how defensively motivated it may be. Likewise, it is more offensive to defend oneself in an anticipatory mode (i.e. by pre-empting an attack-as has been Israeli policy until recently) than to merely respond to an attack ex post facto. An active, direct defence commencing at the border, however, is entirely defensive, but one might even go one step further in the defensive direction: to a reactive defence that only responds to the attacker's actions at each successive step of the war.

Important though they certainly are, neither political ambitions nor grand strategies are ever completely transparent. States therefore tend to mistrust each other's declared intentions and to prefer more tangible evidence, say in the form of military strategies and operational concepts. Even though these are not immediately visible either, their contours may be drawn on the basis of 'circumstantial evidence'. Military postures may, for instance, be seen as 'frozen strategies'. They reflect how states intend to fight a future war-or rather (because of the considerable differential time-lag 17 ) how they intended so when the decisions producing the present posture was were made. However, as military postures are 'structural', I shall return to them in due course.

Another reflection of strategies is the pattern of exercises, as the very purpose of manoeuvres is to rehearse what one intends to do 'for real' under other circumstances. A state that, for instance, never trains its forces for break-through operations probably does not plan to be on the offensive in a future war, and improvisation in the 'fog of war' will almost certainly fail. Hence the rationale for making military manoeuvres transparent, as is part of the rationale for the wide range of confidence-building measures (CBMs) that have been negotiated under the auspices of the CSCE and OSCE. 18 Because they bring together military professionals from opposing countries, such CBMs may further contribute to dismantling enemy images.

Finally, states may willingly reveal their military doctrines, strategies and war plans, as was the very purpose of the Vienna Seminars held under the auspices of the CSCE. 19 Such revelations do, of course, lend themselves to deception. If a state has plans to attack others, it will try hard to conceal this, e.g. by claiming to have a strictly defensive military doctrine. However, it will surely be unmasked if the 'pieces' do not fit together, i.e. if its posture and/or its manoeuvre practices appear to contradict the proclaimed intensions. If was thus precisely because the pieces did fit together, i.e. formed a coherent pattern, that the West eventually came to believe that the USSR had in fact adopted a defensive doctrine. 20

It is thus possible to discern (the outline of) the war plans of other states, with the implication that a distinction between offensive and defensive strategies, operational concepts and tactics is possible. This leaves us with the question where to 'draw the line', i.e. at which level to demand strict defensiveness: a question that is surrounded by confusion and (deliberate or inadvertent) misunderstandings, above all because of 'fallacies of division'. 21 Offensive tactics or even strategies is not tantamount to planning for wars of aggression. Indeed, politically entirely defensive states may want very offensive contingency plans pertaining to the tactical, operational or even strategic level. Just as one cannot, for instance, conclude from the offensive contingency war plans that were developed by NATO and the United States in the early Cold War years that the Western alliance was aggressive, one cannot conclude that the Warsaw Pact or the USSR were planning a war against the West just because the recent opening of GDR archives have brought to light military plans for very offensive operations. 22

'Pure defence', i.e. a renunciation of even tactically offensive operations, is close to a contradiction in terms-and in any case unlikely to be effective as it would leave all initiative to the other side. However, this is not at all what is being suggested by NOD advocates. On the contrary, in the tactical sense of initiating a greater number of individual engagements, a NOD strategy may allow defenders to fight more rather than less offensively.

Defensiveness is thus largely a matter of the timing and scale of counter-attack and other counter-offensive operations. 23 Here, a very clear line of demarcation recommends itself to distinguish between offensive and defensive levels of ambition, namely the international border: A strictly defensive, NOD-type strategy must envisage forcefully evicting any invader in order to restore the status quo ante bellum. Also, it may plan for occasional 'hot pursuits' across the border, but it is surely too offensive to pursue an evicted invader all the way to his national capital in order to enforce an unconditional surrender. NOD would thus rule out large-scale ('strategic') counter-offensives both for deterrent and punitive purposes. 'Punishment' as a strategic objective is neither defensive, nor likely to achieve other objectives than revenge. Some may, of course, regard punishment as a form of 'justice', but the present author does not; and it further violates both just war criteria and international law.

3.2. Structural Distinctions

In the realm of structures, the most common misunderstanding about NOD (to which a few NOD proponents have, admittedly, contributed) is that should envisage a ban on 'offensive weapons' in favour of 'defensive weapons'. 24 Such a distinction is utterly meaningless, event though it has sometimes been attempted (e.g. in the framework of the League of Nations' 1932 World Disarmament Conference 25 ). Both 'offensive weapons' in the sense of weapons than can only be used for offence, and 'defensive weapons' (useful only for defence) are mere figments of the imagination. Neither have there ever been such gadgets, nor are they ever likely to be invented. To define NOD is such hypothetical terms is thus utterly unpromising.

Both offensive and defensive operations require a whole panoply of weapons categories, many of which are identical. Tanks may, for instance, be very valuable for a defender, just as anti-tank weapons may be indispensable for an attacker. Landmines may be of use not only to a defender, but also to an attacker (to say nothing of their other nasty features). Indeed, even immobile fortifications (such as the Great Wall of China or the French Maginot Line) do not deserve the label 'strictly defensive', as they may facilitate attack, simply because they free forces for offensive use that would otherwise be required for defensive duties. Weapons nevertheless matter. Under concrete historical and geographical circumstances, different types of weapons are useful or indispensable to different degrees for attackers and defenders. In a European context anno somewhere between 1945 and today, for instance, tanks were indispensable for prospective aggressors, whereas defenders could not do without anti-tank weapons.

Military formations (e.g. divisions) may thus differ with respect to their offensive capabilities depending on their weapons mix (something that could perhaps be translated into operational definitions that might lend themselves to modelling). However, an attack not merely requires heavy, mechanized and armoured formations, suitable for breakthrough operations, but also infantry-heavy units by means of which to 'mop up' bypassed pockets of defending forces, defend conquered ground, etc. Likewise, a defender needs some heavy armoured forces to forcefully evict an invader, only fewer of them (and perhaps of a slightly lighter type) than an attacker. Also, a defender with international obligations (say, for collective security obligations) cannot dispense completely with offensive-capable forces or force components.

A meaningful structural offence/defence distinction can thus only be made at the level of military postures, e.g. by assessing the relative weight of predominantly offensive and largely defensive units. A relevant parameter is the strategic reach (i.e. power projection capability) of the armed forces in their totality (including logistics, etc.). This is, in its turn, a matter of distance, time and 'weight', i.e. (to paraphrase an American general) of 'getting the furthest the fastest with the mostest'. Generally speaking, an offensive posture is one with the longer reach, for the obvious reason that an attack is about conquering ground whereas defence takes place on the defender's home territory.

What should count as 'long' or 'short', however, depends on context, since distances are relative. Whereas only truly long-range mobility matters between, say, Russia and Ukraine, some countries in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf or Southeast Asia may well be concerned about their respective adversaries' ability to traverse much shorter distances. For instance, while Russia would need several wings of long-range combat aircraft to 'cover' its own airspace, the same aircraft taking off from Israel or Singapore would almost instantaneously be above foreign territory. The strategic depth (measured in the distance between the frontier and the capital or major population centres) of Israel is, for instance, less than 50 kms., whereas that of Russia is in the range of 1,000 kms. But states differ even more than this geostrategically: Island states, for obvious reasons, only need to worry about enemies in possession of navies (and/or long range air forces), etc., whereas land-locked states need not worry too much about naval powers.

For members of alliances, the appropriate level of analysis may even be that of the alliance as a whole. Here (as well as on lower levels of analysis) various factors other than the weapons mix determine the overall offensive capabilities: NATO's organizational structure as well as the intermingling of different national force contingents along the Central Front thus undoubtedly detracted from the Alliance's offensive capability-as does its post-Cold War emphasis on multinationality. 26 The structure of the Warsaw Pact was more suitable for offensives: with the NSPFs (non-Soviet Pact forces) tightly integrated with, and clearly subordinated to, the Soviet armed forces, deployed well forward, etc. 27

These numerous analytical complexities notwithstanding, complete agnosticism is not warranted, and 'everything is not in the eyes of the beholder'. For a particular region at a particular point in time, 'informed expert opinion' will generally have no trouble reaching agreement on at least the basic criteria, i.e. on what might make a certain military posture less offensive-capable. Hence, for instance, the consensus among the states participating in the CFE negotiations on a focus on reductions of MBTs, ACVs, artillery, subsequently also combat aircraft and helicopters 28 -a focus which may, but need not, be appropriate for other regions around the world.

For modelling purposes, variables need to be concrete and quantitative, of course. Hence, it would be convenient to have lists of items that are predominantly offensive or defensive that might allow for assigning offensive and defensive values to various formations, hence also for categorising national or alliance postures as offensive or defensive. The US Army did so in 1974 (but may well have revised this list since then), when it gave tanks the value 64 for offence and 55 for defence. The figures for armoured personnel carriers were 13/6, for antitank weapons 27/46, for artillery 72/85, for mortars 37/47 and for armed helicopters 33/44. 29 It should, however, be borne in mind that, first of all, the listed values hold true (if at all) merely for a specific geographical and historical context; secondly that several other factors (manpower, logistics, etc.) are also of importance; and that only army weapons systems are included, even though both air forces and (to an increasing extent, in certain contexts) navies may influence the land battle.

A NOD-type defence would tend to differ from a 'traditional', i.e. dual-capable military posture, inter alia in terms of its weapons profile. The table above lists of the types of weapons and other equipment that would be either proscribed, reduced or expanded as a corollary of an adoption of NOD as the defence planning guideline. It may give a rough idea of the difference, but it should be taken with more than just one grain of salt. 30

4. (Proto-)Models and Design Principles

To which extent the table above adequately describes the weapons profile of an NOD posture depends, apart from the context, on which particular design principle is adopted. There are several different such designs available-sometimes referred to as 'models', but perhaps better labelled 'proto-models'. They fall into the following categories 31

Both disengagement and stepping down, however, should be implemented with caution, lest they cause more damage than good. While they will improve peacetime stability by eliminating options (and fears) of surprise attack, they may damage crisis stability. If the units withdrawn from forward positions and/or cadred are the most offensive-capable ones, to move them forward and/or ready them in a period of crisis may send the wrong signals. Hence, it may be preferable to reduce or eliminate such units, but to keep what is deemed the indispensable minimum at full combat strength and at their envisaged combat locations.

Neither of the above are, needless to say, adequate substitutes for concrete defence plans. Nor are they the kind of 'models' that would fit into a computer, but all are several stages removed from computer simulations. For such simulations to make any sense, however, one also needs a 'setting' that is concretely defined in terms of relative strength, geography and topography, etc. The above are merely abstract design principles that might be applied (mutandis mutatis) to concrete settings, for which they may or may not be suitable. In-depth territorial defence is, for instance, not suitable for a country such as Israel, nor is forward defence of the entire border really an option for a country such as Chile, etc. If one NOD design should not fit a particular setting, however, one should not conclude that NOD as such (defined in abstract terms as above) is not appropriate. It may still be possible to find another (modified) NOD design that would provide an adequate defence. This takes us to the question of determining 'adequacy' or sufficiency.

5. Criteria of Sufficiency and Efficiency

The concept of 'sufficiency' lends itself to different interpretations, as became apparent, when the USSR under Gorbachev adopted the well-intended but ill-defined term 'reasonable sufficiency' as the defence planning guideline.

While the military fought for high standards of sufficiency, those of the instituchiki were not only lower, but also of a somewhat different nature. The military vacillated between a specific force-to-force ratio between East and West (i.e. parity) and a sufficiency criterion defined in terms of capabilities for large-scale counter-offensives ('a crushing rebuff'), etc. Civilian analyst tended to dismiss the parity criterion entirely, or to 'blur' it with terms such as 'approximate balance'. They also tended to have a lower level of ambition in terms of what options should be available, by underlining that the armed forces should be able to defend only the national territory, implying a criterion of 'defensive sufficiency'. 37

Sufficiency is generally assessed in terms of either force-to-force or force-to-space ratios. I shall take a brief look at both types of measurement with a special focus on their inherent pitfalls.

5.1. Force Comparisons

In favour of a force-to-force emphasis speaks the fact that a country facing no enemies whatsoever obviously needs no defence at all. Defence requirements must thus somehow be correlate with the kind and size of attack that a state may be up against and thus may need the ability to fend off. The question is what ratios would be acceptable, i.e. sufficient.

'Traditionalist' have tended to prefer numerical parity as the yardstick, which does, admittedly, have a certain ring of 'fairness' to it. Closer analysis, however, reveals it to be almost a recipe for failed arms control negotiations and/or arms races without other points of saturation than the exhaustion (economically or otherwise) of the racing states. First of all, prudent defence planning has to assume that the other side attacks first, hence enjoys a certain mobilization lead. 38 Parity when the battle commences thus requires the defender's peacetime strength to surpass the attacker's. If both sides calculate in this manner, then both need to be the stronger in peacetime, which is patently absurd. Secondly, there is inevitably some uncertainly about the reliability and performance of both equipment, personnel and allies. As military prudence requires worst-case planning, it has to assume the worst performance of one's own military compared to the enemy's at its best. Once again, the quest for parity translates into one for superiority. 39 Thirdly, in multipolar settings, the very notion of parity becomes obscured, especially if the states are not of equal size to begin with: Who should have just as much as whom? What happens if two parties team up against the third (as it perfectly conceivable, but entirely unpredictable)? 40

NOD advocates have tended to dismiss the notion of balance in the sense of parity and to prefer what has aptly been called a 'balance of imbalances'. Ideally, the force-to-force ratio should be such that neither side is able to successfully attack the other, i.e. that each side's defensive strength is superior to the other's offensive abilities (DA > OB and DB > OA, where A and B are two states and D and O stands for defensive and offensive strength, respectively). 41

This formula presupposes that 'the defence is inherently the stronger form of combat', as argued by Clausewitz. 42 This point about defensive supremacy has occasionally been couched in terms of the presumed 'Three-to-One rule', according to which an attacker will need a superiority in excess of 3:1 in order to break through prepared defences. 43 Its probably validity notwithstanding, the relevance and applicability of this 'rule of thumb' is debatable. At best, it pertains to a certain type of engagements or battles, where the surprise factor plays a negligible role. It neither holds true for other types of engagements or for wars or campaigns.

The formula also presupposes the feasibility of offence/defence distinctions. While it was argued above that such distinctions are possible in principle, in practice it may be next to impossible to operationalise the 'Ds' and 'Os': How should one, for instance, weigh various anti-tank weapons against each other; or against tanks; or air defence weaponry against aircraft, and anti-ship missiles against warships. It is a worthy task for modellers, however, and it is by no means a problem that only affects NOD theorizing. 'Traditionalists' have the same problem if they want to define parity, unless the states have exactly identical defence postures. If not, they will have to somehow compare incommensurable types of equipment, or military formations with each other. 44 There are, of course, aggregated units of measurement such as ADEs (armoured division equivalents) that are designed to measure actual combat strength. Such aggregates are probably as good as they come, but not ideal and inevitably context-dependent. Some renowned military specialists have therefore argued in favour of 'blunt instruments' such as airlift weight as a better measure of strength than the more complex ones. 45

Formulae of stability, hence sufficiency, become even more complex under multipolar conditions (i.e. in most of the world's regions), where account is taken for the possibility that two or several states might team up against a single state. Should the latter have the ability to defend itself against a combined attack by all the rest without the ability to attack even the weakest state in the system and even when assisted by other strong states? This is a well-nigh prohibitive standard of sufficiency, but it may also be seriously overshooting the mark. If one adds the (quite realistic) assumption that states tend to balance rather than bandwagon 46 (i.e. at worst stay neutral) the standard becomes much more manageable, at least for states of approximately even size.

Unfortunately, however, states come in many different sizes, which complicates the matter, as large states obviously need greater armed strength than small one, as well as a longer reach, merely to defend their national territory. This takes us to the second category of sufficiency criteria.

5.2. Force-to-space

Force-to-space ratios come in two varieties: Either one measures the armed forces with the total territory they have to cover, or one assumes a forward defence, hence compares them with the length of either the total border or merely of that part which needs to be defended, because it faces enemies and/or is not otherwise blocked (by mountains, for instance).

In this field there are certain rarely contested assumption about the length of frontage that, e.g., divisions are able to defend. Such assumptions provided a convenient fall-back position for some arms control opponents during the CFE negotiations. They argued that NATO's forces were already 'spread too thin' for the Western alliance to have any margin at all for reciprocation of the requested Warsaw Pact build-down. 47 This was, needless to say, not a particularly fruitful approach to arms control.

In their turn, critics pointed out that, first of all, some build-down was a conditio sine qua non of progress in negotiations-hence that a 1:10 NATO-Warsaw Pact reduction ratio was preferable to a 0:5 ratio. 48 Secondly, they argued that modified divisions (or other units) might be able to defend more than generally assumed; and/or that the parts of the front might be defended partly by means of barrier-type technologies, thus requiring fewer forces; hence that NATO might have a certain margin for reduction-cum-restructuring after all. 49 Others pointed out how force-to-space ratios were not independent of force-to-space ratios, hence that if the Soviet Union were to build down, NATO would need less to prevent a breakthrough, especially if this Soviet build-down were to be accompanied with a dismantling of the most offensive-capable elements-or merely by a certain redeployment and subdivision of forces. 50

Still others had already pointed out that force-to-space ratios worked both ways, i.e. that there was also a limit to the amount of force that could be brought to bear on a kilometre of frontage, both for a defender and an aggressor 51 -the so-called 'crossing the T' phenomenon. Above a certain force-to-space ratio invading forces would tend to clot up and would have to be echeloned, which would makes them vulnerable to long-range interdictions. Furthermore, only a fraction of the firepower of the attacker could be brought to bear against the defenders, whereas defenders using long-range indirect fire weapons from shielded positions would be able to cover a large frontage plus follow-up forces without being deployed at the FEBA (forward edge of battle area) at all, as envisioned under NATO's FOFA doctrine. 52

The yardstick of sufficiency used in such arguments has usually been the depth of penetration that a unit can achieve before it is attrited to such an extent that it is no longer fit for combat (which is, once again, not an entirely 'objective' measure). Computer simulations, e.g. conducted at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, have, for instance, compared 'traditional' with both more defensive and more offensive units in terms of their ability to halt penetration attempts by attacking forces. 53

5.3. What Really Matters

Regardless of their findings, however, and without questioning their validity, the relevance of such studies is debatable, as they measure combat abilities at a level that is only conditionally relevant.

What really matters is, of course, whether a national defence (along with other measures) is sufficient to preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This depends, above all, on the war prevention capabilities of the armed forces. War fighting capabilities, including the ability to bring an invasion to a halt at a not too great distance from the border, may certainly help, especially if the prospective invader is made aware of this ability ex ante as a means of 'deterrence by denial'. 54 However, war-fighting capabilities are only means to an end, not an end in themselves. To demonstrate the defensive abilities ex post is the second best, as it may be a precondition for first stopping and then evicting an aggressor (even though these two tasks differ in many respects).

War prevention may also, according to some analyses, depend on 'deterrence by punishment', i.e. on the ability to inflict harm on the aggressor. Presumably, a prospective attacker might be deterred by the likelihood of a retaliation, the damage inflicted by which would outweigh whatever gains an attack might bring. Usually, this retaliatory capability has been seen as presupposing nuclear weapons (and the seeming readiness to use them, which was much harder to achieve), but some analysts have also flirted with the notion of conventional retaliation. Samuel Huntington, for instance, has proposed long-range conventional offensive thrusts into Eastern Europe as a better NATO deterrent than that of (incredible) nuclear strikes. 55 A few NOD advocates have also been fascinated by the notion of 'conditional offensive superiority', by which they have meant the ability of the defenders to launch large-scale counter-offensives against an aggressor who had been attrited by the defence. 56

The seeming attractions of such deterrence by retaliation should, on the one hand, be weighed against the possible provocative effects of the ability to retaliate. On the other hand, the lack of retaliatory capabilities in a genuine NOD-type defence posture should be weighed against its confidence-building and non-provocative effects. How to do this 'weighing' is, however, an extremely complex, if not impossible, task as we are dealing with incommensurable entities.


We have thus seen that 'NOD' may be easy to define but much more complicated to design or measure. However, the benefits accruing from a switch to NOD (arms race and crisis stability, sufficient defence at lower costs, and the promise of a future 'stable peace') should make this endeavour well worth-while. This brings us to the question of where NOD might be relevant and where not, and which lacunae remain in the accumulated knowledge of NOD. This is the topic of the final chapter.

6. NOD: Where, When, How?

NOD originated in the divided Europe of the Cold War, and was, from the very beginning, conceived as an escape from its quandary. Indeed, the NOD debate was intimately linked with the fate of Germany, in the sense that most NOD proponents were German, while most of those who were not nevertheless had Germany in mind as their target. 57

What placed NOD on the international agenda was, however, the unexpected endorsement of the idea by the Soviet Union in 1986/87, as one element in the 'new political thinking' of Gorbachev. This Soviet (and subsequently Warsaw Pact) endorsement of the NOD idea placed the topic on the East-West agenda. Inter alia, it paved the way for a Soviet acceptance of the Western approach to conventional force reductions, as eventually manifested in the mandate for the CFE talks: to 'reduce the capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action', i.e. roughly what NOD advocates had urged for several years (except for the unfortunate exclusion from negotiations of maritime and nuclear forces).

The resultant CFE Treaty of 1990 was thus viewed as a success for the NOD idea, with its reductions of tanks, APCs, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters. 58 In fact, this treaty alone would have sufficed for solving NATO's security problems to such an extent as to make further NOD-type measures superfluous. A fortiori, according to certain analyses, NOD became quite irrelevant for Europe when first the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet union collapsed, thereby ending the East-West conflict. 59

First of all, however, even in the absence of this conflict, NOD would seem relevant for several sets of remaining as well as new problems in Europe. Secondly, it may be very relevant for various parts of the world that have hitherto been overshadowed by the European problems, at least in the minds of European NOD proponents. Not much has thus been written about defensive restructuring in regions beyond Europe, or by authors who are neither European nor American. It was in recognition of this limitation that the present author in 1993 founded the 'Global NOD Network' (with the generous support of the Ford Foundation). The purpose was to 'plant' the idea in regions where it might presumably be relevant, and to explore the relevance, and the need for modifications, in these places via a dialogue with regional experts. The experience so far allows the conclusion that there are, indeed, both a need and political opportunities for defensive restructuring in several of the countries and regions singled out for investigation.

6.1. NOD for Post-Cold War Europe?

Even without the East-West conflict, there are quite enough conflicts left in Europe for which NOD might be relevant. I shall limit myself to briefly enumerating them, accompanied by some tentative ideas and recommendations for problems that remain unresolved and stand in need of further research:

6.2. NOD for Other Regions?

Even though NOD would thus be relevant for Europe, it is probably both true and entirely justified that the focus of the NOD debate has moved to other parts of the world:

As the regions listed above encompass most of the globe, one might conclude by paraphrasing Mark Twain that 'the rumours of NOD's irrelevance are much exaggerated'.


*: Preliminary version. Not for quotation. Comments welcome. Back.

**: The author is Ph.D. & MA, senior research fellow, project director and board member at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research); associate professor of International Relations, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen; project director of the Global Non-Offensive Defence Network (funded by the Ford Foundation); editor of NOD and Conversion; and secretary general (elect) of the International Peace Research Association. He is the author of the following books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense (1995). Back.

Note 1: Bull, Hedley: 'International Theory. The Case for a Classical Approach', in Klaus Knorr & James N. Rosenau (eds.): Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 20-38. Back.

Note 2: For an argument to the contrary, see Mueller, John E. (ed.): Approaches to Measurement in International Relations. A Non-Evangelical Survey (New York: Maridith Corporation, 1969), where the editor claims that 'any adequately conceptualized variable can be measured' (p. 3). Back.

Note 3: The most monumental product of this kind of research is, of course, the Correlates of War project of Singer and Small, described in Singer, J. David: 'The Correlates of War Project: Interim Report and Rationale', World Politics, vol. 24, no. 2 (1972), pp. 243-270. More recent examples of quantitative analyses of 'war' are Siverson, Randolph & Harvey Starr: The Diffusion of War. A Study of Opportunity and Willingness (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Arquilla, John: Dubious Battles. Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, D.C.: Crane Russak, 1992); Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.): Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1993); Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Vasquez, John A.: The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also the encyclopedic work by Bremer, Stuart & Thomas Cusack (eds.): The Process of War. Advancing the Scientific Study of War (Luxemburg: Gordon & Breach Publishers, 1995), including a comprehensive bibliography: idem & idem: 'The Scientific Study of Interstate Conflict: A Bibliography', ibid., pp. 275-336. Back.

Note 4: For a more elaborate treatment, readers are referred to Møller, Bjørn: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (London: Brassey's, 1991); idem: Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner and London: UCL Press, 1992); and idem: Dictionary of Alternative Defense (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner and London: Adamantine Press, 1995). Back.

Note 5: Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). See also Väyrynen, Raimo (ed.): Policies for Common Security (London: Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, 1985); or Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986); idem & idem (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Disziplinen. Bd.2: Zu rechtlichen, ökonomischen, psychologischen und militärischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987). Back.

Note 6: Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, Translated by Rex Warner With an Introduction and Notes by M.I. Finley (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 80. See also Bagby, Laurie M. Johnson: 'Thucydidean Realism: Between Athens and Melos', in Benjamin Frankel (ed.): Roots of Realism (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 169-193. The dilemma is also described in Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan, Edited With an Introduction By C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 184-185. It is further an integral part of Realism's and Neorealism's view of the world. See, for instance, Morgenthau, Hans J.: Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, Third Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 54, 63-64, 67; or Waltz, Kenneth N.: Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 64. For more elaborate analyses, see e.g. Herz, John M.: Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), passim; idem: 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180; Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-93; cf. idem: 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Buzan, Barry: People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 294-327; Collins, Alan: 'The Security Dilemma', in Jane M. Davis (ed.): Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 181-195; Schweller, Randall L.: 'Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?', in Benjamin Frankel (ed.): Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 90-121. Back.

Note 7: A classical statement of the theory of the 'action-reaction phenomenon' is Rathjens, George: 'The Dynamics of the Arms Race', in Herbert York (ed.): Arms Control. Readings from the Scientific American (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973), pp. 177-187; or Huntington, Samuel P.: 'Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results', in Mueller (ed.): op. cit. (note 2), pp. 5-14. For a historical as well as theoretical analysis, see Hammond, Grant T.: Plowshares into Swords. Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). On the 'arms race mathematics' see Nicholson, Michael: Formal Theories in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 147-166; Wiberg, Håkan: 'Arms Races, Formal Models and Quantitative Tests', in Nils Petter Gleditsch & Olav Njølstad (eds.): Arms Races. Technological and Political Dynamics (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 31-57; Smoker, Paul: 'Artificial Intelligence Models of Arms Races', ibid., pp. 78-86; Intrilligator, Michael D. & Dagobert L. Brito: 'Arms Race Modelling: A Reconsideration', ibid., pp. 58-77; idem & idem: 'Richardsonian Arms Race Models', in Midlarsky (ed.): op. cit. (note 3), pp. 219-236; Sandler, Todd & Keith Hartley: The Economics of Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 73-109. Back.

Note 8: On crisis stability, see e.g. Holsti, Ole R., Richard A. Brody & Robert C. North: 'The Management of International Crisis: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations', in Dean G. Pruitt & Richard C. Snyder (eds.): Theory and Research on the Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 62-79; Wohlstetter, Albert: 'The Delicate Balance of Terror', in Henry Kissinger (ed.): Problems of National Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 34-58; Schelling, Thomas: The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 230-255; Lebow, Richard Ned: Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 7-13; Frei, Daniel (with Christian Catrina): Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War (Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun/UNIDIR, 1983), pp. 31-36. For a more mathematical treatment of the subject see Brecher, Michael, Jonathan Wilkenfeld & al.: Crisis, Conflict and Instability (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989). Back.

Note 9: Snyder, Glenn H.: 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4 (1984), pp. 461-495. See also Nicholson: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 116-146; Sandler & Hartley: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 19-51. Back.

Note 10: Møller: op. cit. 1992 (note 4); Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Konventionelle Stabilität. Bd. 3: Zu den militärischen Aspekten Struktureller Nichtangriffsfähigkeit im Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988). Back.

Note 11: Deutsch, Karl W. & al.: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Wheeler, Nicholas J. & Ken Booth: 'Beyond the Security Dilemma: Technology, Strategy and International Security', in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.): The Uncertain Course. New Weapons, Strategies, and Mindsets (Oxford: Oxford University Press & SIPRI, 1987), pp. 313-337. See also Boulding, Kenneth: Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978). Back.

Note 12: Barnaby, Frank & Egbert Boeker: 'Non-Nuclear, Non-Provocative Defence for Europe', in P. Terrence Hopmann & Frank Barnaby (eds.): Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 135-145, quotation from p. 137. Back.

Note 13: Afheldt, Horst: Atomkrieg. Das Verhängnis einer Politik mit militärischen Mitteln, second edition (München: dtv, 1987), p. 67. Back.

Note 14: Russett: op. cit. (note 3); Brown, Michael E., Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.): Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996). Back.

Note 15: Watanabe, Wakio: 'Japan's Postwar Constitution and Its Implications for Defense Policy: A Fresh Interpretation', in Ron Matthews & Keisuke Matsuyama (eds.): Japan's Military Renaissance? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 35-49; Gow, Ian: 'Civilian Control of the Military in Postwar Japan', ibid., pp. 50-68; Lutz, Dieter S.: 'Zu den verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit nach dem Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Bahr & idem (eds.): op. cit. 1987 (note 10), pp. 85-104.. Back.

Note 16: On the concept 'grand strategy', see Hart, Basil Liddell: Strategy. The Indirect Approach, second revised edition, 1967 (New York: Signet Books, 1974), pp. 321-322, 352-360. See also Luttwak, Edward N.: The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976); idem: The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). On the Soviet terminology see Lider, Julian: 'Die sowjetische Militärwissenschaft. Beschreibung und kritische Bestandaufnahme', Østerreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 21, no. 2 (1983), pp. 143-153. Back.

Note 17: For excellent analyses of Soviet strategy based on this methodology, see MccGwire, Michael: Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987); idem: Perestroika and Soviet National Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991). Back.

Note 18: Among the best analyses of CBMs are still two classics: Alford, Jonathan: 'Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects', Adelphi Papers, no. 149 (1979), pp. 4-13; and Holst, Johan Jørgen: 'Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', Survival, vol. 25, no. 1 (Jan-Feb. 1983), pp. 2-15. See also Borawski, John: From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1988); idem: Security for a New Europe. The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures 1989-90, and Beyond (London: Brassey's, 1992); Brauch, Hans Günter (ed.): Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und Europäische Abrüstungskonferenz. Analysen, Dokumente und Vorschläge (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1987); Lutz, Dieter S. & Erwin Müller (eds.): Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen. Zur Theorie und Praxis einer sicherheitspolitischen Strategie (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1982); Desjardin, Marie-France: 'Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures', Adelphi Papers, no. 397 (1996). Back.

Note 19: Krohn, Axel: 'The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar', SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 501-511; Lachowski, Zdzislaw: 'The Second Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrine', SIPRI Yearbook 1992, pp. 496-505. See also Hamm, Manfred R. & Hartmut Pohlman: 'Military Strategy and Doctrine: Why They Matter to Conventional Arms Control', The Washington Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 185-198. Back.

Note 20: On the Soviet defensive doctrine, see e.g. Holden, Gerald: Soviet Military Reform. Conventional Disarmament and the Crisis of Militarized Socialism (London: Pluto, 1991); Garthoff, Raymond: Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); MccGwire: op. cit. 1991 (note 17); Snel, Gerard: From the Atlantic to the Urals. The Reorientation of Soviet Military Strategy, 1981-1990 (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1996); Bluth, Christoph: New Thinking in Soviet Military Policy (London: Pinter Publishers/RIIA, 1990); Wettig, Gerhard: Changes in Soviet Policy Towards the West (London: Pinter, 1991); cf. Diehl, Ole: Die Strategiediskussion in der Sowjetunion. Zum Wandel der sowjetischen Kriegsführungskonzeption in den achtziger Jahren (Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 1993). Back.

Note 21: For the terminology see Rescher, Nicholas: Introduction to Logic (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 70, where it is defined as being committed 'when the premise that a collective whole has a certain property is improperly used to infer that a part of that whole must also exhibit this property'. Back.

Note 22: Rühl, Lothar: 'Die ''Vorwärtsverteidigung'' der NVA und der sowjetischen Streitkräfte in Deutschland bis 1990', Østerreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 29, no. 6 (November-December 1991), pp. 501-508; Bluth, Christoph: 'Offensive Defence in the Warsaw Pact: Reinterpreting Military Doctrine', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 18, no. 4 (December 1995), pp. 55-77. Several US plans from the 1940s are reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.): Containment. Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). Back.

Note 23: See Kokoshin, Andrei A. & Valentin Larionov: 'Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic Interrelations', in Marlies ter Borg & Wim Smit (eds.): Non-provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989), pp. 35-44. For a terminological clarification see Reid, Brian Holden: 'The Counter-Offensive: a Theoretical and Historical Perspective', in idem & Michael Dewar (eds.): Military Strategy in a Changing Europe (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 143-160; Mackenzie, J.J.G.: 'The Counter-Offensive', ibid., pp. 161-180. Back.

Note 24: Examples are Galtung, Johan: There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), pp. 172-176; Fischer, Dietrich: Preventing War in the Nuclear Age (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), pp. 47-62; Quester, George: The Future of Nuclear Deterrence (Lexington MA: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), p. 23 and 229-250. See also Lynn-Jones, Sean M.: 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691. Back.

Note 25: See e.g. Noel-Baker, Philip J.: The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932-33 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979); Neild, Robert: An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 137-144; Borg, Marlies ter: 'Reducing Offensive Capabilities-the Attempt of 1932', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 145-160. Back.

Note 26: On NATO's 'layer-cake' deployment during the Cold War see Löser, Jochen: Weder rot noch tot. Überleben ohne Atomkrieg: Eine Sicherheitspolitische Alternative (München: Olzog Verlag, 1981), pp. 259-266. On present multinationalism see Miller, David: 'Multinationality: Implications of NATO's Evolving Strategy', International Defense Review, vol. 24, no. 3 (March 1991), pp. 211-213; Lowe, Karl & Thomas-Durell Young: 'Multinational Corps in NATO', Survival, vol. 33, no. 1 (Jan-Feb. 1991), pp. 66-77; Mackinlay, John: 'Improving Multifunctional Forces', ibid., vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 149-173; Barry, Charles: 'NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice', ibid., vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81-97. Back.

Note 27: Jones, Christopher D.: 'National Armies and National Sovereignty', in David Holloway & Jane M.O. Sharp (eds.): The Warsaw Pact. Alliance in Transition (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 87-110; Johnson, Alfred Ross, Robert W. Dean & Alexander Alexiev: East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier (Santa Monica: RAND, 1980); MacGregor, Douglas: The Soviet-East German Military Alliance (Cambridge: University Press, 1989).. Back.

Note 28: Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Conventional Arms Control in Europe', in SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 407-474 (with appendices, including the treaty itself); Kelleher, Catherine McArdle, Jane M.O. Sharp and Lawrence Freedman (eds.): The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Koulik, Sergey & Richard Kokoski: Conventional Arms Control. Perspectives on Verification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Hartmann, Rüdiger, Wolfgang Heydrich & Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut: Der Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Vertragswerk, Verhandlungsgeschichte, Kommentar, Dokumentation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994); Zellner, Wolfgang: Die Verhandlungen über Konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle, die neue politische Lage in Europa und die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994); Croft, Stuart (ed.): The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. The Cold War Endgame (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994); Akçapar, Burak: The International Law of Conventional Arms Control in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Falkenrath, Richard A.: Shaping Europe's Military Order. The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994). Back.

Note 29: William Mako, quoted in Snyder, Jack: 'Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options' (International Security, vol. 12, no. 4), in Steven E. Miller & Sean Lynn-Jones (eds.): Conventional Forces and American Defence Policy. An International Security Reader, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), p. 292-321 (quote on p. 312.) Back.

Note 30: On air forces and NOD see Møller, Bjørn: 'Air Power and Non-Offensive Defence. A Preliminary Analysis', Working Papers, no. 2 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1989); Hagena, Hermann: Tiefflug in Mitteleuropa. Chancen und Risiken offensiver Luftkriegsoperationen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990); idem: 'NOD in the Air', in Bjørn Møller & Håkan Wiberg (eds.): Non-Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 85-97; Hatchett, Ron: 'Restructuring the Air Forces for Non-Provocative Defence', in Borg & Smit (eds.): op. cit. (note 23), pp. 177-187; Boserup, Anders & Jens Jørn Graabaek: 'A Zonal Approach to the Neutralisation of Airpower in Europe', in Anders Boserup & Robert Neild (eds.): The Foundations of Defensive Defence (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 159-165; Jean, Carlo: 'Airpower and Conventional Stability', ibid., pp. 151-158; Konovalov, Alexander A.: 'Possible Ways to Stabilize the Balance in Tactical Aviation on the European Continent', ibid., pp. 166-170. A very radical (but also untenable) proposal is that of Lutz, Dieter S.: 'Alles, was fliegt, muß weg? Luftstreitkräfte, Strukturelle Angriffsfähigkeit und Abrüstung', S+F, Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 7, no. 3 (1989), pp. 145-150. On naval or maritime forces and NOD see Møller, Bjørn: 'Restructuring the Naval Forces Towards Non-Offensive Defence', in Borg & Smit (eds.): op. cit. (note 23), pp. 189-206; Bebermeyer, Hartmut & Lutz Unterseher: 'Wider die Großmannssucht zur See: Das Profil einer defensiven Marine', in SAS (Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik): Vertrauensbildende Verteidigung. Reform deutscher Sicherheitspolitik (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1989), pp. 165-187; Boserup, Anders: 'Maritime Defence Without Naval Threat: The Case of the Baltic', in idem & Neild (eds.): op. cit., pp. 179-184; Booth, Ken: 'NOD at Sea', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): op. cit., pp. 98-114. Back.

Note 31: For elaboration see Møller: op. cit. 1991 (note 4); and idem: op. cit. 1995 (note 4). Back.

Note 32: Afheldt, Horst: Verteidigung und Frieden: Politik mit militärischen Mitteln (München/Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1976); idem: Defensive Verteidigung (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1983); SAS: op. cit. (note 30); idem & PDA (Project on Defense Alternatives): Confidence-building Defense. A Comprehensive Approach to Security and Stability in the New Era. Application to the Newly Sovereign States of Europe (Cambridge, MA: PDA, Commonwealth Institute, 1994). Back.

Note 33: Conetta, Carl, Charles Knight & Lutz Unterseher: 'Toward Defensive Restructuring in the Middle East', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 22, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 115-134. Back.

Note 34: Hannig, Norbert: Abschreckung durch konventionelle Waffen: Das David-und-Goliath Prinzip (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag Arno Spitz, 1984). Back.

Note 35: Müller, Erwin: 'Dilemma Sicherheitspolitik. Tradierte Muster westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik und Alternativoptionen: Ein Problem- und Leistungsvergleich', in idem (ed.): Dilemma Sicherheit. Beiträge zur Diskussion über militärische Alternativkonzepte (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), pp. 53-170; idem: 'Konventionelle Stabilität durch Strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit', in idem & Götz Neuneck (eds.): Abrüstung und Konventionelle Stabilität in Europa (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), pp. 75-80. Back.

Note 36: Examples of such disengagement models are Afheldt, Eckhardt: 'Verteidigung ohne Selbstmord. Vorschlag für den Einsatz einer leichten Infanterie', in Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (ed.): Die Praxis der defensiven Verteidigung (Hameln: Sponholz, 1984), pp. 41-88; Bülow, Andreas: 'Defensive Entanglement: An Alternative Strategy for NATO', in Andrew J. Pierre (ed.): The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations), pp. 112-151; idem: 'Vorschlag für eine Bundeswehrstruktur der 90er Jahre. Auf dem Weg zur konventionellen Stabilität', in idem, Helmut Funk & Albrecht A.C. von Müller: Sicherheit für Europa (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1988), pp. 95-110; Löser: op. cit.; Barnaby & Boeker: loc. cit. (note 12); Müller, Albrecht A.C. von: 'Integrated Forward Defence. Outline of a Modified Conventional Defence for Central Europe', in Hylke W. Tromp (ed.): Non-Nuclear War in Europe. Alternatives for Nuclear Defence (Groningen: Polemological Institute, 1986), pp. 201-224; Lodgaard, Sverre & Per Berg: 'Disengagement in Central Europe', in Joseph Rotblat & Sven Hellman (eds.): Nuclear Strategy and World Security. The Annals of Pugwash 1984 (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 242-259. Back.

Note 37: Bellamy, Christopher: '''Civilian Experts'' and Russian Defence Thinking: The Renewed Relevance of Jan Bloch', RUSI Journal, vol. 137, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 50-56; Conner, Albert Z. & Robert G. Poirier: 'The Institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences: An Examination of Their Roles in Soviet Doctrine and Strategy', The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 62-86. Back.

Note 38: This is the notion underlying the force generation, or 'dynamic', analyses, of which an example is Epstein, Joshua M.: The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis Without Lanchester Theory (Washington. DC: Brookings, 1985); idem: 'Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe', International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 154-165; idem: Conventional Force Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1990). Back.

Note 39: Møller, Bjørn: 'Non-Offensive Defence, the Armaments Dynamics, Arms Control and Disarmament', in Burkhard Auffermann (ed.): 'NOD or Disarmament in the Changing Europe?', Research Reports, no. 40 (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1990), pp. 43-102; Neild, Robert: 'The Case Against Arms Negotiations and For a Reconsideration of Strategy', Arms Control, vol. 7, no. 2 (1986), pp. 133-155. Back.

Note 40: Møller, Bjørn: 'Multinationality, Defensivity and Collective Security', in Jörg Calließ (ed.): Rüstung-Wieviel? Wozu? Wohin?, Loccumer Protokolle, no. 63/93 (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1994), pp. 251-290. See also Huber, Reiner K.: 'Military Stability of Multipolar International Systems: An Analysis of Military Potentials in Post-Cold War Europe' (Neubiberg: Institut für Angewandte Systemforschung und Operations Research. Fakultät für Informatik. Universität der Bundeswehr München, June 1993); idem: 'Multipolare Sicherheitssysteme für Europa. Systemanalytische Überlegungen zu einer militärischen Ausgestaltung', Østerreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, no. 5, 1990, pp. 412-418; idem & Rudolf Avenhaus (eds.): International Stability in a Multipolar World: Issues and Models for Analysis (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993). Back.

Note 41: Afheldt: loc. cit. (note 13); Boserup, Anders: 'Non-offensive Defence in Europe', in Derek Paul (ed.): Defending Europe. Options for Security (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 194-209. The same idea is to be found in Glucksmann, André: Le Discours de la Guerre (Paris: l'Herne, 1967), pp. 42-43; and in Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von: Wege in der Gefahr. Eine Studie über Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kriegsverhütung (1976) (München: dtv, 1979), pp. 150, 116, 165-166. See also Møller: op. cit. 1992 (note 4), pp. 84-89. Back.

Note 42: Clausewitz, Carl von (1832): Vom Kriege, Ungekürzter Text nach der Erstauflage (1832-1834) (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1980), pp. 360-371 (Book VI.1-3), especially p. 361; pp. 357-366/358 in the English translation: On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Gat, Azar: 'Clausewitz on Defence and Attack', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (1988), pp. 20-26; Aron, Raymond: Clausewitz. Philosopher of War (London: Routledge, 1983), pp. 144-171. Back.

Note 43: Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance', International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185; idem: 'Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics', ibid. vol. 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89. For a critique, see Epstein, Joshua M.: 'The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies', ibid., pp. 90-127; Posen, Barry R., Eliot A. Cohen & John J. Mearsheimer: 'Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment', ibid., pp. 128-179; Dupuy, Trevor N.: 'Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule', ibid., vol. 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 195-201; Davis, Paul K.: 'Aggregation, Disaggregation, and the 3:1 Rule in Ground Combat' (National Defense Research Institute, Project Air Force, Arroyo Center, June 1995). Back.

Note 44: See, for instance, the debate in International Security on how to measure the European balance: Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Manoeuvre, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front', International Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 104-122; idem: 'Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe', ibid., vol. 7, no. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; idem: 'Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance', ibid., vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185; Cohen, Eliot A.: 'Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance', ibid., vol. 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89; Epstein: loc. cit. 1988 (note 38); Posen, Barry R.: 'Measuring the European Conventional Balance. Coping With Complexity in Threat Assessment', ibid., vol. 9, no. 3 (Winter 1984/84), pp. 47-88; idem: 'Is NATO Decisively Outnumbered?', ibid., vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 186-202; idem, Eliot A. Cohen & John J. Mearsheimer: 'Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment', ibid., vol. 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989) pp. 128-179. See also Biddle, Stephen D.: 'The European Conventional Balance: A Reinterpretation of the Debate', Survival, vol. 30, no. 2 (1988), pp. 99-121. Back.

Note 45: Simpkin, Richard E.: Race to the Swift. Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare (London: Brassey's, 1986), pp. 84-85. Back.

Note 46: Walt, Stephen M.: The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 27-33; idem: 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power", International Security, vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43; Labs, Eric J.: 'Do Weak States Bandwagon?', Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 283-416. Back.

Note 47: Thomson, James A. & Nanette C. Ganz: 'Conventional Arms Control Revisited: Objectives in the New Phase', in Uwe Nehrlich & James A. Thomson (eds.): Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 108-120. Back.

Note 48: Müller, Albrecht A.C. von: 'Die Schaffung konventioneller Stabilität. Ein modifiziertes Rahmenkonzept für die Rüstungskontrollpolitik und die Streikräfte-Modernisieriung der NATO', in Bahr & Lutz (eds.): op. cit. 1987 (note 10), pp. 81-92. Back.

Note 49: Epstein: op. cit. 1990 (note 38). Back.

Note 50: This is one of the point made by Gupta, Raj: Defense Positioning and Geometry. Rules for a World with Low Force Levels (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). Back.

Note 51: Mearsheimer: loc. cit. 1982 (note 44). For a comparable analysis of the problems facing a stipulated North Korean attack on the South see Masaki, Stuart K.: 'The Korean Question: Assessing the Military Balance', Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 365-425. See also Kang, David C.: 'Preventive War and North Korea', ibid., pp. 330-364. Back.

Note 52: On FOFA, see e.g. Rogers, Bernard: 'Sword and Shield: ACE Attack of Warsaw Pact Follow-On Forces', NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol. 28, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 16-26; Farndale, Martin: 'Follow on Forces Attack', ibid., vol. 33, no. 2 (April/May 1988), pp 42-50; Office of Technology Assessment: New Technology for NATO. Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack, (Washington D.C.: Congress of the United States, 1988); Sutton, Boyd D., John R. Landry, Malcolm B. Armstrong, Howell M. Esles III & Wesley K. Clark: 'Deep Attack Concepts and the Defence of Central Europe', Survival, vol. 26, no. 2 (1984), pp. 50-78; Burgess, John A.: 'Emerging Technologies and the Security of Western Europe', in Stephen J. Flanagan & Fen Osler Hampson (eds.): Securing Europe's Future. A Research Volume from the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 64-84; Flanagan, Stephen J.: 'NATO's Conventional Defense Choices in the 1980s', ibid., pp. 85-112. On NATO's continued adherence to FoFA after the end of the Cold War, see Dugan, Michael J.: 'The Future of FOFA. An Operational Perspective', NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol. 35, no. 9 (September 1990), pp. 41-48; Sharfman, Peter 1991: 'The Future of FOFA', in Reid & Dewar (eds.): op. cit. (note 23), pp. 95-110; Skingsley, Anthony: 'Interdiction and Follow-on Forces Attack', ibid., pp. 207-218. Back.

Note 53: Hofmann, Hans W., Reiner K. Huber & Karl Steiger: 'On Reactive Defense Options. A Comparative Systems Analysis of Alternatives for the Initial Defense against the First Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe', in Reiner K. Huber (ed.): Modelling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe. Assessment of Improvement Options (New York: Plenum, 1986), pp. 97-140; Huber, Reiner K. & Hans Hofmann: 'The Defence Efficiency Hypothesis and Conventional Stability in Europe: Implications for Arms Control', in Boserup & Neild (eds.): op. cit. (note 30), pp. 109-132. Back.

Note 54: Snyder, Glenn: Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961). Back.

Note 55: Huntington, Samuel P.: 'Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe' (1983), in Steven E. Miller (ed.): Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy. An International Security Reader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 251-275. For a critique, see Dunn, Keith A. & William O. Staudenmaier: 'The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO', Survival, vol. 27, no. 3 (May-June 1985), pp. 108-118; Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Manoeuvre, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front', International Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 104-122. Back.

Note 56: Müller, Albrecht A.C. von: 'Structural Stability at the Central Front', in Anders Boserup, Ludvig Christensen & Ove Nathan (eds.): The Challenge of Nuclear Armaments, Essays Dedicated to Niels Bohr and His Appeal for an Open World (Copenhagen: Rhodos International Publishers, 1986), pp. 239-256, especially pp. 253-254. Back.

Note 57: The German NOD debate is described at length in Møller: op. cit. 1991 (note 4); idem: 'Germany and NOD', in idem & Wiberg (eds.): op. cit. (note 30), pp. 153-165.. Back.

Note 58: See above, note 28. Back.

Note 59: This is, e.g. the wiew of Gates, David: Non-Offensive Defence. An Alternative Strategy for NATO? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 186. Back.

Note 60: For an elaboration see Møller, Bjørn: 'Preconditions for NATO Enlargement from a Common Security Point of View', paper presented to the International Conference/Brainstorming Workshop NATO-Russia Agreements: Necessity, Feasibility, New Approaches (9-11 April 1997, Moscow), to appear as a Working Paper (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI, 1997). See also Huber, Reiner K.: 'NATO Enlargement and CFE Ceilings: A Preliminary Analysis in Anticipation of a Russian Proposal', European Security, vol. 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 396-403; idem & Gernot Friedrich: 'Der KSE-Vertrag und die Øffnung der NATO nach Osten', Europäische Sicherheit, vol. 45, no. 8 (August 1996), pp. 33-35; Schmidt, Hans-Joachim: 'NATO and Arms Control: Alliance Enlargement and the CFE Treaty', PRIF Reports, no. 42 (Frankfurt a.M.: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 1996); idem: 'NATO-Erweiterung und KSE-Vertrag', S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 14, no. 3 (1996), pp. 166-175; Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Let's Make a Deal: NATO and CFE', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 51, no. 2 (March-April 1995), pp. 19-21. Back.

Note 61: See, e.g. Ivlev, Leonid: 'NOD in the USSR and Its Successors', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): op. cit. (note 30), pp. 138-142; Trenin, Dmitri: 'NOD in the USSR and Successor States', ibid., pp. 127-137; Arbatov, Alexei: 'Russian National Interests', in Robert D. Blackwill & Sergei Karaganov (eds.): Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 55-76. Back.

Note 62: Prystrom, Janusz: 'Eastern Europe and NOD', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): op. cit. (note 30), pp. 143-152; Huber, Reiner K. & Otto Schindler: 'Military Stability and Multipolar Power Systems: An Analytical Concept for Its Assessment, Exemplified for the Case of Poland, Byalarus, the Ukraine and Russia', in Huber & Avenhaus (eds.): op. cit. (note 40), pp. 155-180; Kelley, Charles T. Jr., Daniel B. Fox & Barry A. Wilson: 'A First Look at Defence Options for Poland', in Paul K. Davis (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), pp. 451-477. Back.

Note 63: For the view that the Yugoslav experience discredited NOD see Buzan, Barry: 'Does NOD Have a Future in the Post-Cold War World?', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): op. cit. (note 30), pp. 11-24. For a description of the defence policy of Yugoslavia as an example of defensive territorial defence see Roberts, Adam: Nations in Arms. The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 124-217. On the Slovenian (NOD-like) fight for independence see Bebler, Anton A.: 'Der Krieg in Jugoslawien 1991-1992', Østerreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 30, no. 5 (September-October 1992), pp. 397-411; idem: 'Slovenia's Territorial Defense', International Defense Review, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 65-67. Back.

Note 64: Conetta, Carl, Charles Knight & Lutz Unterseher: 'Defensive Restructuring in the Successor States of the former-Yugoslavia', reprinted in extenso in NOD & Conversion, no. 39 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institiute, 1996), pp. 25-31. Back.

Note 65: See Møller, Bjørn: 'Non-Offensive Defence and the Arab-Israeli Conflict', Working Papers, no. 7 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994). It was prepared for the inaugural meeting of the UNIDIR project on 'Confidence-Building in the Middle East' in which the author has been involved as member of its 'expert group'. A revised version of the paper is to be published by UNIDIR in 1997. An Israeli example of NOD-inspired thinking is Levite, Ariel: Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post/Boulder: Westview, 1990). Back.

Note 66: This is elaborated upon in Møller, Bjørn: 'Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Persian Gulf. Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Defensive Restructuring', paper presented to the 1st ISODARCO Seminar on the Middle East, 12-15 April 1997 in Amman; and possibly forthcoming as an Occasional Paper (Abu Dabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies, 1997). Back.

Note 67: For an elaboration see Møller, Bjørn: 'A Common Security and NOD Regime for South Asia?', Working Papers, no. 4/96 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Centre, 1996). Indian works on NOD include Singh, Jasjit: 'Defence Strategies', in UNIDIR (ed.): Nonoffensive Defense. A Global Perspective (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990), pp. 23-39; idem: 'Defensive Security: The Conceptual Challenges', Disarmament, vol. 15, no. 4 (1992), pp. 112-125; idem: 'NOD and Southern Asia', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): op. cit. (note 30), pp. 195-207. Back.

Note 68: For an elaboration see Møller, Bjørn: 'Non-Offensive Defence and the Korean Peninsula', Working Papers, no. 4/1995 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1995); and idem: 'Common Security and Non-Offensive Defence: Are They Relevant for the Korean Peninsula?', in Hwang, Bypong-Moo & Yong-Sup Han (eds.): Korean Security Policies Toward Peace and Unification, KAIS International Conference Series, no. 4 (Seoul: Korean Association of International Studies, 1996), pp. 241-291. The most prominent advocate of NOD in the ROK is Han, Yong-Sup: Designing and Evaluating Conventional Arms Control Measures: The Case of the Korean Peninsula (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Graduate Institute, 1993). See also Ok, Tae Wan & Gerrit W. Gong (eds.) Change and Challenge on the Korean Peninsula: Past, Present and Future (Seoul: RINU, 1996); Pollack, Jonathan & Young Koo Cha: A New Alliance for the Next Century. The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995). Back.

Note 69: Møller, Bjørn; 'A Common Security and Non-Offensive Defence Regime for the Asia-Pacific?', Working Papers, no. 8/1995 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, abridged version forthcoming in Pacifica Review, 1997). On the relevance of NOD for the China-Taiwan conflict see idem: 'The Unification of Divided States and Defence Restructuring. China-Taiwan in a Comparative Perspective', ibid., no. 9/96. Furthermore, based on a conference organized by the Global NOD Network in Beijing 13-15 December, 1996, an anthology on NOD and related matters is forthcoming: idem (ed.): Security, Arms Control and Defence Restructuring in East Asia (Aldershot: Dartmouth, forthcoming 1997 or 1998). A further conference on 'Defence Doctrines and Strategies in Asia' is scheduled to be held in Simla, India, 5-8 July 1997, which will produce an anthology with the same title, edited by Bjørn Møller and Jasjit Singh. Back.

Note 70: Møller, Bjørn: 'The Concept of Non-Offensive Defence: Implications for Developing Countries with Specific Reference to Southern Africa', in M. Hough & A. du Plessis (eds.): 'Conference Papers: The Future Application of Air Power with Specific Reference to Southern Africa', Ad hoc Publication, no. 32 (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 1995), pp. 48-128; and various contributions to Cawthra, Gavin L. & idem (eds.): Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa (Aldershot: Dartmouth, forthcoming 1997). It is based on a conference on NOD held in Johannesburg in March 1996, organized by the aforementioned Global NOD Network and the Wits University in Johannesburg. Back.

Note 71: Møller, Bjørn: 'The Decalogue of Mon-Offensive Defence Revisited. Five Years Later and in a Different Part of the World', Working Papers, no. 16 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994). The most comprehensive work is Cáceres, Gustavo & Thomas Scheetz (eds.): Defensa No Provocativa: Una Propuesta de Reforma Militar para la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editoria Buenos Aires, 1995). See also Proença Júnior, Domicio: 'Prioridades para as Forças Armadas. Uma Visao do ''dever-ser'' acadêmico', in idem (ed.): Indústria bélica brasilieira. Ensaios (Rio de Janeiro: Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos, 1994), pp. 25-72; idem: 'Força Minima. Notas para uma defesa minima suficiente do Brasil (um ensaio)', ibid. pp. 115-167; idem: 'Segurança e Defesa do Brasil: a Visao das Forças Armadas em 1989', in idem (ed.): Uma avaliaçao da indústria bélica brasilieira. Defesa, Indústria e Technologia (Rio de Janeiro: Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos, 1993), pp. 139-172. Back.