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Preconditions For Nato Enlargement From A Common Security Point Of View *

Bjørn Møller **

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

Paper for the International Conference/Brainstorming Workshop
NATO-Russia Agreements:
Necessity, Feasibility, New Approaches
9-11 April 1997, Moscow


The author argues that NATO membership is worth much less than assumed by the potential new members, hence that it should also cost less than demanded by NATO. Even though an enlargement of NATO is thus not particularly desirable, it is probably going to happen rather soon. Unless accompanied by various measures to ensure Russia of NATO's peaceful intentions, however, this enlargement will be viewed as a hostile move by Moscow, especially by the 'Eurasian' groupings. Eventually, Russia may take reciprocal steps that would negate whatever immediate security gains could be achieved through NATO membership. It is thus in the best interest of both present and future members of NATO to 'sweeten the pill' by taking Russian security concerns into account. A number of suggestions are made to this effect.

1. NATO's Existential Crisis

Throughout its existence, NATO had three main rationales (aptly formulated by Secretary General Lord Ismay), which may or may not remain relevant and important in the post-Cold War era 1 :

NATO has thus lost one (probably the main) rationale, but the two others retain a certain relevance, which might be enough to warrant a maintenance of the organization. If it is retained (albeit in a somewhat tenuous position as its very raison d'être is no longer obvious) NATO faces a choice between three alternative survival strategies:

2. Architectural Choices and Their Consequences

Even though one might occasionally get this impression, NATO is not 'the only game in town'. To some extent the states in Europe face a choice between different 'security architectures', i.e. about the division of labour and responsibility between global organizations such as the UN, other (sub)regional organizations such as the EU, the WEU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe and various (even more) sub-regional collaborative schemes such as the Nordic and Baltic councils, the Visegrad Group and the Alpe-Adria group. 8

It is neither self-evident that NATO is best equipped to take charge of the security of European states, nor that it has a legitimate right to do so. The regional organization endorsed by the UN is, for instance, the OSCE, not NATO. When NATO was put in charge of military operations in the former Yugoslavia it was thus simply because it was the only organization available with the experience, command structure, etc. required for the job. Moreover, this was not because of NATO's nature, but simply because member states, as a matter of political choice, had assigned their forces to the alliance rather than to the UN or OSCE. They might have prioritized their efforts differently, thereby empowering other organizations to do what only NATO was now in a position to do.

In that case, other organizations than NATO might have been much more attractive to the former members of the Warsaw Pact. The new democracies might, for instance, have placed their faith in the OSCE, with its excellent (but badly publicized) record of mediation and conflict resolution 9 (which is tantamount to 'peace making' and 'preventive diplomacy' in the Agenda for Peace terminology 10 ). The residual need for peacekeeping forces might, in principle, have been met by forces under OSCE command, if only the member states had wanted so.

Or the European states might have provided the EU with a higher security profile, say by reinvigorating the old idea of 'security through interdependence and integration' which inspired the communities in the first place, 11 and which might be perfectly applicable to the post-Cold War situation. This might or might not have required a strengthening of the WEU, transformed directly into the military arms of the EU. The combined military strength (and nuclear arsenals) or WEU member states would surely have been quite an adequate match for the Russsian armed forces.

Be that as it may, as a result of political choices made along the way (which probably cannot be undone) the impression has spread that NATO alone is able to deliver security to countries in need of some foreign underpinning of their national defence efforts.

3. Here's a Knocking Indeed (Macbeth, II,2.3)

There has, indeed, been quite a knocking at NATO's doors since the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. However, the obvious eagerness of the former Warsaw Pact member states to join NATO 12 seems to be based on several misinderstandings: a rather fundamental and important one and a couple of minor ones of slightly lesser importance.

The fundamental misunderstanding is that NATO's security guarantees are 'rock solid' guarantees, ensuring that the rest of the Alliance will rush to the assistance of any member under attack. In actual fact, article five of the North Atlantic Treaty says no such thing. Its wording is much vaguer, leaving the choice of what action to take to national governments:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them (...) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The other members of NATO may thus certainly take military action to restore the security of a member state, provided only that such action is endorsed by the UN Security Council, which has the final say. However, they are not obliged to do so, and they might prefer not to if the stakes are too high, say if the aggressor is a nuclear power. On the other hand, they may certainly decide to take action even in the absence of a treaty commitment (once again: provided that the action is sanctioned by the UNSC). Kuwait was no member of NATO, but nevertheless received all the assistance any state could have hoped for. 13

According to a 'Realist' interpretation, what will ultimately decide the issue is an assessment of relative costs on the part of other members: What they stand to lose if country X is engulfed by country Y, compared to what they risk by taking action against the infamous country Y, if such action is tantamount to war. Even though Realists are not necessarily realistic, they may nevertheless have a point: Not that countries are always dependent on 'self-help', but that what help will be forthcoming is rather unpredictable, and certainly cannot be ascertained simply by reading treaties. In some instances, states may balance against an aggressor, hence come to the help of a victim state, while in others they may 'bandwagon' with the culprit in order to be on the winning team. In still other cases, the rest of the world may simply ignore what is happening, i.e. remain neutral, as they, for instance, did when the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, or when Iraq attacked Iran in 1980. 14

What ultimately matters for the countries in East-Central Europe is whether they matter to the rest of Europe and the United States (including NATO members), and whether any prospective aggressor is sufficiently aware of this, hence mindful that any aggression against these countries would entail costs. This message may be conveyed by admission into NATO, or by other means. Contrary to widespread beliefs, membership of NATO is thus neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondition of receiving security assistance. It may help, however.

Among the less important misunderstandings one could mention the follolwing:

Since NATO membership is thus worth much less than is commonly assumed, it should also cost less than is presently being alleged by NATO (see below).

4. Tomorrow, and Tomorrow, and Tomorrow ... (Macbeth, V.5)

Even though the present author is somewhat puzzled by the eagerness of the Central European countries to join NATO, and even do so at unjustifiable costs, it is an obvious fact that these countries are so inclined, hence a reality in its own right, to which NATO has to respond. 15

To its credit, NATO was rather fast to acknowledge that the East-West conflict had ended. With its London Declaration of 5-6 July 1990, the NATO Summit did, on the one hand, 'extend its hand in friendship' to its former adversaries and declared its intention to 'build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe'. 16 On the other hand, it soon became clear that such 'partnerships' were not tantamount to alliance bonds.

In a certain sense, of course, NATO was almost instantaneously enlarged through the absorption of the GDR by the FRG, but the number of member states has not (yet) been expanded, even though most of the former Warsaw Pact member states have applied for admission. Whether or not to let them in, and if so who and when, remains controversial, inter alia because of a divergence of interests between the central states, reflecting their concern about the Russian response (see below). 17 As a rather inadequate substitute for an enlargement, a new affiliate organization was been created which includes the former Warsaw Pact members: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC. This was, however, a very far cry from any ironclad security guarantees such as desired by the applicants. 18

The next 'waiting room' (now almost officially designated as such) was the Partnership for Peace, PfP. Under its auspices, a plethora of (mostly bilateral) partnership agreements have been signed, creating rather curious bedfellows, such as military collaboration agreements between Norway and Albania (sic). 19 Recommendable or even useful though this may certainly be, it is still a far cry from (what the applicants erroneously believe to be the benefits of) actual NATO membership.

In 1995, NATO prepared a lengthy study on the modalities of enlargement, in which is was stated that:

When NATO invites other European countries to become Allies ...
... new members will enjoy all the rights and assume all obligations of membership under the Washington Treaty; and accept and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time that new members join;
- Strengthen the Alliance's effectiveness and cohesion; and preserve the Alliance's political and military capability to perform its core functions of common defence as well as to undertake peacekeeping and other new missions;
- Be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe. It would threaten no-one; and enhance stability and security for all of Europe; (...)
- Complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracies in the East.

In the same study, NATO insisted that 'there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance', but that 'enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis'. Nevertheless, the Alliance seems to have been promulgating a fundamental misunderstanding about the terms of membership: that membership rights are logically accompanied by duties, e.g. in terms of standardization and interoperability of equipment, or of a willingness to allow foreign deployments on national territory. Not so, however:

Even at times when the alliance was very important, i.e. when the risk of war loomed large, terms of membership varied widely. If anything, the margin for diverging from the rule should be wider now when the risk of war has abated considerably and the alliance is thus much less likely to be put to a test on the battlefield. During the Cold War, NATO was able to accomodate, among others, anomalies in the following fields:

In view of the above, ii is something of an enigma how the new membership applicants have gotten the impression that membership logically presupposes conformity with certain standards. For this, NATO is undoubtedly to blame. Even though the Alliance is, of course, entitled to erect high barriers to admission and formulate very rigid criteria for membership, it is surely both morally and factually wrong to claim that these are logical, rather than arbitrary, requirements.

Because of concerns about possible Russian reactions, NATO is facing a difficult dilemma, as it cannot possibly slam the door in the face of applicants with as impeccable credentials as Poland or the Czech Republic. Hence the curious spectacle of a NATO discourse that is becoming increasingly vague: From 'perhaps, but probably not' through 'probably, but not quite yet' to 'surely, in the fullness of time, at the appropriate juncture....'. In fact, NATO's vacillations might best be analyzed by means of the methodology of 'discourse analysis', 26 but I shall not venture this on the present occasion. The dialogue between NATO and the applicants from the former Warsaw Pact has, however, been reminiscent of that between Alice and the Queen in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass:

'The rule is, jam to-morrow and jam yesterday-but never jam to-day.' 'It must come sometimes to ''jam to-day,'' Alice objected.' 'No, it can't,' said the Queen. 'It's jam every other day: today isn't any other day, you know.' 'I don't understand you,' said Alice. 'It's dreadfully confusing!' 27

NATO's political case is just as weak as that of the Queen, and it is quite understandable if the applicants find it 'dreadfully confusing'. The democratic credentials of the new states are certainly far better than those of certain early members (Portugal under Salazar, for instance); most of them enjoy a fair degree of political stability (certainly better than that of Turkey, perhaps even Italy). Above all, however, the applicant are so eager to please that they even try to accomodate NATO's concerns before these are raised officially: what has aptly been called 'anticipatory adaptation'. 28 They thereby place NATO in the embarrasing position of not daring to 'take yes for an answer'.

Hence, NATO probably cannot keep postponing the decision, but would be well advised to take Macbeth's approach: 'If it were done when 'tis done, then t'were well it were done quickly' (Macbeth, I.7). This would imply letting the first batch of new members (Poland, the Check Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) in immediately without further ado. What NATO seems about to do is to take a formal decision at its impending summit in July 1997 to admit new members by 1999. 29

5. Niet! Once Again

What lies behind the somewhat undignified spectacle of NATO's vacillations is, of course, uncertainty as to how enlargement will affect NATO-Russian relations.

In the aforementioned enlargement study, NATO underlined that 'No country outside the Alliance should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and decisions', but this was, of course, exactly what Russia had been given, albeit only informally. Nobody wanted to seriously alienate the giant in the East, even though this was not so much concrete fears of possible military counter-moves. In fact, Russia's only residue of former military strength, namely the nuclear weapons, are only a risk as 'loose nukes'. 30 It is neither conceivable (even to die-hard worst-case analysts) that Russia would use these nukes, nor that it would bring its conventional forces to bear against NATO. NATO's fear is rather a diffuse anxiety that things may 'spin out of control' in Russia, in which case anything could happen. Hence the desire to somehow gain Russian acceptance for an enlargement of NATO, which is tantamount (even though the Alliance could ever admit so) to having given Russia a droit de regard in NATO.

Everything would, needless to say, have been much less complicated if the former Soviet Union, now Russian Federation, had just read the writing on the wall and folded gracefully. This raises the question, What does Russia have against NATO? An answer to this question would give a clue to what NATO might do to sweeten the pill and make Russia accept an enlargement of the Alliance.

It should come as no surprise that Russia sees NATO as, at least potentially, hostile. After all, the western alliance was all along directed against the perceived 'Soviet threat', the reality of which the USSR (needless to say) could not accept. Hence, if the Soviet threat was a mere figment of the imagination (or even a clever ploy contrived to deceive the Western public) then the alleged counter-threat was no such thing, but a threat pure and simple. 31 What is intended as a defensive measure often gets misinterpreted by the respective other side as an offensive move. 32 And NATO's nuclear weapons and conventional forces were surely targeted against the Soviet Union (and vice versa, to be sure).

It is, of course, undeniable that NATO has changed since 1989, and especially after 1991, both as far as its rhetoric has been concerned ('hand in friendship', etc.) and, to some extent, with regard to its practice (see below). On the other hand, first the GDR and then the rest of the Soviet alliance system switched sides, thereby affecting a very swift and dramatic change in the balance-of-power between East and West. Even at this moment of unprecedented weakness, NATO remained in place and even insisted on an implementation of the 1990 CFE Treaty, calling for a very schewed build-down of conventional armed forces. 33 Fair and equitable though the treaty may have been as long as the USSR and WTO were intact, after their dissolution it must have appeared as profoundly unfair.

For a country with a long-standing 'encirclement syndrome' and proclivity for paranoia, what has been happening around the edges of the former Soviet empire could surely be seen as less than confidence-inspiring. NATO military strategy has been amended (vide infra), to be sure, but not radically; and many nuclear weapons have been withdrawn, but quite a few remain, undoubtedly with Russia as their most likely target. If a NATO alliance that is still seen in an adversarial light moves its frontiers closer to the heart of 'Mother Russia' this may surely be a cause of concern for some in Russia-especially for those who refuse to see Russia as genuinely 'European', but regard it as a Eurasian power sui generis. 34

Not only may (some in) Russia think along these lines, (others in) Russia may also reckon with NATO's being aware thereof and somewhat concerned about the prospects of helping members of the so-called 'Red-Brown coalition' of ex-Communists and ultranationalists to power in Moscow. If they, realistically, regard NATO enlargement as inevitable in the long run, they will want something in return and try to play their hand as best they can in order to get the most. This is not particularly cynical, given Russia's present predicament, and it is probably in the best interest of both the present and the future members of NATO to play along, i.e. to give Russia some concessions as a quid pro quo for enlargement of the Alliance.

6. Common Security as Damage Limitation

If NATO does expand, without expanding so much as to encompass Russia, something must be done to limit the damage thereof. This something might include the following:

The purpose of the latter type of measures should be to ensure Russia that NATO enlargement constitiutes no threat to its security, i.e. that neither the old nor the new members of NATO seek security at the expense of Russia. An appropriate guideline therefore might be the 'old' notion of 'Common security' that was promulgated by the Palme Commission in 1982, endorsed by the West European social democratic parties and subsequently (under Gorbachev) by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. 35 Several recent NATO communiques seem to intimate that NATO has also taken the notion at heart, albeit in the slightly modified version and with the new label 'Cooperative security'. 36 I shall, however, prefer the old label of common security.

According to Common Security theory (as well as old-fashioned Realism), states tend to see each other as adversaries, hence are predisposed to view their opponent's actions as (potentially) hostile. The interaction between states (or alliances, or both) takes the form of an stimulus-response or action-reaction pattern, as illustrated below, where no distinction is made between action and reaction, which is always a 'chicken and egg problem'. As defensive reactions tend to be interpreted as offensive proactive moves, this can easily develop into a spiral of malign interaction. 37

States thus find themselves trapped in a 'security dilemma', the two 'horns' of which are not to respond (thereby risking vulnerability to whatever the other side might do), or to respond with (re)actions that the other side may find threatening, thereby perhaps provoking the other side to do precisely what the defensive response was intended to avert-or something even worse.

Common Security may best be understood as an simple admonition to take such behavioural patterns into account, i.e. to always consider how the respective other side may view the actions one is contemplating and to acknowledge that neither side can achieve lasting security at the respective other's expense, but a precondition for the security of either side is that the respective other also feels secure.

It is thus in NATO's best interest, as well as that of the new members, to make the Russian Federation feel as secure as possible about NATO enlargement. This presupposes that an enlargement cannot be construed as a threatening move, not even by the most 'Eurasian' (i.e. 'Red-Brown') groups within the political spectrum in Moscow. This depends, among other things, on NATO military dispositions that should be confidence-inspiring and non-provocative, not only in the eyes of NATO itself (that undoubtedly has defensive intensions) but also in the eyes of Russia, which cannot be quite as sure about the innocent intentions, but has to look for tangible evidence. It may thus not be quite enough for NATO to declare that it would never attack Russia (after all, even Hitler made such promises), but a dismantling of the ability to do so may be called for.

This is a matter of military doctrines and strategies (i.e. of what NATO plans to do) as well as of what the alliance actually does, i.e. of activities such as exercizes. But it is also a matter of what NATO has, i.e. of military holdings and deployments. The best guideline for confidence-building vis-à-vis Russia may be that of defensive restructuring and non-offensive defence. 38

7. NATO Strategy and Deployment

The 1990s have, to be sure, seen significant changes in NATOs military doctrines and strategies (inter alia with the 1991 New Strategic Concept 39 ) as well as in their material manifestation: holdings and deployments. On the whole, these changes are to the better:

On the other hand, the fact that these conventionalized, reduced, cadred and multinationalized armed forces are being given a enhanced mobility, both tactically, operationally and even strategically, could be seen as a step in the 'wrong' direction. This may especially be the case if Russian military planners believe (as they seem to do 42 ) in what the present author regards as the myth of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), also labelled the Military-Technological Revolution (MTR)-a myth that has been promulgated by the United States in the wake of Operation Desert Storm. 43 The myth is based on the following assumptions, all of which are questionable:

Russian observers may thus believe that NATO is even stronger, and the Russian armed forces even weaker, than they are in reality, hence feel even more exposed.

8. Recommendations

There may thus be a need for additional confidence-building measures to make NATO enlargement more acceptable to Russia. I shall conflude this presentation with a few suggestions to this effect:

Finally and perhaps most importantly, the national defence planning of the new members should emphasize the defence of national territories and be strictly defensive. This might, e.g., imply their assuming what has aptly been called a 'spider-and-web' posture: The main component of the defence should be a stationary web on which the mobile elements should be made dependent so as to make them as agile and mobile within the web, but as immobilized as possible beyond it. 46

Even though one might certainly hope for a Russian reciprocation of some of these measures, they should be made unilaterally and unconditionally, i.e. as NATO concessions to Russia as a quid pro quo for NATO enlargement.

However, even the most comprehensive and radical military measures are merely short-term palliatives. They should be combined with a determined quest for transforming NATO from an adversarial alliance against Russia into a collective security system encompassing Russia. A promise to follow this path might, for instance, be included in the 'charter' (or other type of solemn declaration) that is expected to accompany the impending decision to admit new members. Before something like this has been achieved, there should be no further expansion of NATO membership to include what used to be (rightly or wrongly) parts of the USSR, such as the Baltic states. 47


*: Preliminary version as of 8 March 1997. Not for quotation. Comments welcome. Back.

**: The author is Ph.D. & MA, senior research fellow, project director and board member at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research); associate professor of International Relations, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen; project director of the Global Non-Offensive Defence Network (funded by the Ford Foundation); editor of NOD and Conversion; and secretary general (elect) of the International Peace Research Association. He is the author of the following books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense (1995). Back.

Note 1: Mandelbaum, Michael: The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), p. 12. The literature on NATO's future is enormous. Among recent works, one could mention the following books: Carpenter, Ted Galen (ed.): The Future of NATO (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Goldstein, Walter (ed.): Security in Europe. The Role of NATO after the Cold War (London: Brassey's, 1994); Papacosma, S. Victor & Mary Ann Heiss (eds.): NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does It Have a Future? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Dean, Jonathan: Ending Europe's Wars. The Continuing Search for Peace and Security (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Books, 1994), pp. 241-287; Kelleher, Catherine McArdle: The Future of European Security. An Interim Assessment (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Bertram, Christoph: Europe in the Balance. Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment/Brookings Institution, 1995). The following articles also deserve mentioning: idem: 'NATO on Track for the 21st Century?', Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 1 (March 1995), pp. 65-71; Beiles, Alyson J.K.: 'European Defence and Security. The role of NATO, WEU and EU', Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 55-64; Betts, Richard K.: 'NATO's Mid-Life Crisis', Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 37-52; Cambone, Stephen A. (ed.): NATO's Role in European Stability (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Brussels: NATO, Office of Information and Press, 1995); Carpenter, Ted Galen: 'Conflicting Agendas and the Furure of NATO', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 143-164; idem: 'Introduction: The Post-Cold War NATO Debate', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 1-6; Clarke, Jonathan: 'Replacing NATO', Foreign Policy, no. 93 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 22-40; Constantinou, Costas M.: 'NATO's Caps: European Security and the Future of the North Atlantic Alliance', Alternatives, vol. 20, no. 2 (April-June 1995), pp. 147-164; Cornish, Paul: 'European Security: the End of Architecture and the New NATO', International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4 (October 1996), pp. 751-769; Glaser, Charles L.: 'Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe', International Security, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50; Hellmann, Gunther & Reinhard Wolf: 'Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO', Security Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-43; McCalla, Robert B.: 'NATO's Persistence after the Cold War', International Organization, vol. 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445-475; Sloan, Stanley R.: 'US Perspectives on NATO's Future', International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (April 1995), pp. 217-232; Woyke, Wichard: 'NATO Faces New Challenges', Aussenpolitik. English Edition, vol. 44, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1993), pp. 120-126. Back.

Note 2: Bluth, Christoph: The Collapse of Soviet Military Power (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995); Baev, Pavel K.: The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles (London: Sage, 1996); Woff, Richard: The Armed Forces of the Former Soviet Union. Evolution, Structure and Personalities (Portsmuth, Hampshire: Carmichael and Sweet, 1995); Wilson, Andrew: 'Russian Military Haunted by Past Glories. Battle to Improve Slumping Morale and Poor Performance', Jane's IDR. International Defense Review, vol. 29, no. 5 (May 1996), pp. 25-21. Back.

Note 3: See, for instance, Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-52. Back.

Note 4: Winrow, Gareth: 'NATO and Out-of-Area: A Post-Cold War Challenge', European Security, vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 617-638; Gompert, David & Richard Kugler: 'Free-Rider Redux. NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1 (January-February 1995), pp. 7-12. On the background see Bentinck, Marc: 'NATO's Out-of-Area Problem', Adelphi Papers, no. 211 (London: IISS, 1986). Back.

Note 5: On UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force), see Steinberg, James B.: 'International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.): Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 27-76; Freedman, Lawrence: 'Bosnia: Does Peace Support Make Any Sense?', NATO Review, vol. 43, no. 6 (November 1995), pp. 19-23; Gow, James: 'Nervous Bunnies: The International Community and the Yugoslav War of Dissolution, the Politics of Military Intervention in a Time of Change', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.): Military Intervention in European Conflicts (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 14-33; Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Appeasement, Intervention and the Future of Europe', ibid., pp. 34-55; Ghebaldi, Victor-Yves: 'UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia: The Misuse of Peacekeeping and Associated Conflict Management Techniques', in Daniel Warner (ed.): New Dimensions of Peacekeeping (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 13-40; Marcuse, Elie: 'The Former Yugoslavia: NATO's Role', ibid., pp. 173-179; Eknes, Åke: 'The United Nations' Predicament in the Former Yugoslavia', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.): The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 109-126. On IFOR (Implementation Force), see Solana, Javier: 'NATO's Role in Bosnia: Charting a New Course for the Alliance', NATO Review, vol. 44, no. 2 (March 1996), pp. 3-6; Julwan, George A.: 'SHAPE and IFOR: Adapting to the Needs of Tomorrow', ibid., pp. 6-9; Lightburn, David: 'NATO and the Challenge of Multifunctional Peacekeeping', ibid., pp. 10-14; Eide, Espen Barth & Per Erik Solli: 'From Blue to Green. The Transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Working Papers, no. 539 (Oslo: NUPI, 1995); Nicholls, D.V.: 'Bosnia: UN and NATO', RUSI Journal, vol. 141, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 31-36; Portillo, Michael: 'Bosnia-Implementing the Peace Agreement', ibid., pp. 27-30. Back.

Note 6: Krause, Joachim: 'Proliferation Risks and their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO', Survival, vol. 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 135-148; Joseph, Robert: 'Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and NATO', ibid.. vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 111-130; Spector, Leonard S.: 'Neo-Nonproliferation', ibid., vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85; Roberts, Brad: 'From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation', International Security, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173. Back.

Note 7: See for instance Kupchan, Charles A. & Clifford A. Kupchan: 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; idem & idem: 'The Promise of Collective Security', ibid., vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.): Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Butfoy, Andrew: 'Themes Within the Collective Security Idea', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 490-510; Cusack, Thomas R. & Richard J. Stoll: 'Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 33-59; Downs, George W. (ed.): Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Gullikstad, Espen: 'Collective Security in Post-Cold War Europe', NUPI Report, no. 176 (Oslo: NUPI, 1994). For a more sceptical view, see Betts, Richard K.: 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', International Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Clark, Mark T.: 'The Trouble with Collective Security', Orbis, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 237-258. Back.

Note 8: One of the first analyses thereof was Buzan, Barry, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer & Ole Wæver: The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990). See also Clarke, Douglas: 'A Guide to Europe's New Security Architecture', European Security, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 126-132; Rotfeld, Adam Daniel: 'Europe: Towards New Security Arrangements' (with appendices), SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 279-324. On Vigrad cooperation see also Michta, Andrew A.: East-Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992); Spero, Joshua: 'The Budapest-Prague-Warsaw Triangle: Central European Security after the Visegrad Summit', European Security, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 58-83; Zielonka, Jan: 'Security in Central Europe', Adelphi Papers, no. 273 (London: IISS, 1992); Schumaker, David: 'The Origins and Development of Central European Cooperation: 1989-1992', East European Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 1993), pp. 351-373. Back.

Note 9: Michael R. Lucas & Oliver Mietzsch: 'Peaceful Dispute Settlement and the CSCE', in Michael Lucas (ed.): The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 83-108. Back.

Note 10: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'An Agenda for Peace', in SIPRI Yearbook 1993, pp. 66-80. Hill, Roger: 'Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping', ibid., pp. 45-65. Back.

Note 11: See, for instance, Mitrany, David: 'A Working Peace System', in Brent F. Nelsen & Alexander C.G. Stubb (eds.): The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 77-97. Mayne, Richard: The Recovery of Europe. From Devastation to Unity (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970); Burgess, Michael: Federalism was Buzan, Barry, Morten Kelstrup, Piand European Union. Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987 (London: Routledge, 1989). Back.

Note 12: See, for instance, Dunay, Pál: 'NATO and the East. A Sea of Mysteries', World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 123-127; Gabany, Anneli Ute: 'Rumäniens Sicherheit und die NATO', Südosteuropa, vol. 43, no. 1-2 (1994), pp. 1-17; Piatkowski, Krystian: 'Outline and Timetable for the Integration of Poland into NATO (January 1994)', European Security, vol. 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 501-528. Back.

Note 13: Hume, Cameron R.: The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq. How Peacemaking Changed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 14: Labs, Eric J.: 'Do Weak States Bandwagon?', Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 283-416; Walt, Stephen M.: 'Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs', ibid., pp. 448-482. Back.

Note 15: The Western literature on NATO's eastward expansion is immense. One could mention the following books: Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane & Joel S. Sokolsky (eds.): NATO's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Haglund, David G. (ed.): Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996); and the following articles: Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler & F. Stephen Larrabee: 'Building a New NATO', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4 (September-October 1993), pp. 28-40; idem, idem & idem: 'NATO Expansion: The Next Steps', Survival, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 7-33; idem, idem & idem: 'What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?', Survival, vol. 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 5-26; Asmus, Ronald D. & F. Stephen Larrabee: 'NATO and the Have-Nots. Reassurance After Enlargement', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 6 (Nov-Dec. 1996), pp. 13-20; Baldwin Jr., Rosser: 'Addressing the Security Concerns of Central Europe through NATO', European Security, vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter 1993), pp. 545-566; Brown, Michael E.: 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 34-52; Clarke, Jonathan G.: 'Beckoning Quagmires: NATO in Eastern Europe', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 42-60; Dean, Jonathan: 'No NATO Expansion Now', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 3 (May-June 1996), pp. 18-19; Fuchs, Katrin: 'Soll sich die NATO nach Osten ausdehnen?', S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 14, no. 3 (1996), pp. 151-158; Gießmann, Hans-Joachim: 'Die Osterweiterung der NATO: Königs- oder Irrweg europäischer Sicherheitspolitik', S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 14, no. 3 (1996), pp. 162-166; Haglund, David G.: 'Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths and Policy Dilemmas', Centre for International Relations Occasional Paper, no. 51 (Kingston Ontario: Queen's University, 1995); Hækkerup, Hans: 'An Open NATO', NATO Review, vol. 44, no. 6 (Nov. 1996) pp. 13-17; Kamp, Karl-Heinz: 'The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion', Foreign Policy, vol. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 116-129; Krohn, Axel: 'European Security in Transition: ''NATO Going East'' and the ''German Factor'', and Security in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea Region', European Security, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 584-302; Mandelbaum, Michael: 'Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 9-13; Rose, Jürgen: 'NATO-Osterweiterung - außenpolitischer Imperativ ohne Alternative?', S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 14, no. 3 (1996), pp. 175-182; Rose, Jürgen: 'Vom Kalten Krieg zum Kalten Frieden? Die NATO-Osterweiterung und die Zukunft der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Russischen Föderation', Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 33, no. 3 (March-April 1995), pp. 243-250; Rosner, Jeremy D.: 'NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle. The Perils of Misjudging Our Political Will', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 9-16; Roychowdury, Rajyashi: 'NATO's Eastward Expansion: An Institutional Challenge', Strategic Analysis, vol. 18, no. 1 (April 1995), pp. 73-90; Rudolf, Peter: 'The USA and NATO Enlargement', Aussenpolitik. English Edition, vol. 47, no. 4 (4th Quarter 1996), pp. 339-347; Ruehl, Lothar: 'European Security and NATO's Eastward Expansion', Aussenpolitik. German Foreign Affairs Review. English Edition, vol. 45, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1994), pp. 115-122; idem: 'Deutschlands Interesse an der NATO-Osterweiterung', Internationale Politik, vol. 51, no.11 (November 1996), pp. 49-54; Schütze, Walter: 'Sackgasse oder Königsweg? Die Osterweiterung der NATO', Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 40, no. 8 (August 1995), pp. 924-935; Simon, Jeffrey: 'Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?', Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs, vol. 37, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 21-35; Talbott, Strobe: 'Why NATO Should Grow', New York Review of Books, vol. 52, no. 13 (10 August 1995), pp. 27-30. Back.

Note 16: Quoted from NATO Review, vol. 38, no. 4 (August 1990), pp. 32-33. See also the article by NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Henning Wegener: 'The Transformed Alliance', ibid., pp. 1-9. Back.

Note 17: At the meeting in Travemünde on 20-21 October 1993, a decision about admitting new members was deferred until the January 1994 Summit (Atlantic News/Nouvelles Atlantiques, no. 2564, 22 October 1993, p. 1) after a letter from Boris Yeltsin to several Western governments in which he warned against an enlargement (ibid. no. 2559, 6 October 1993, pp. 3-4). See also Bok, Georges Tan Eng & Beatrice Heuser: 'NATO am Scheideweg', Europa-Archiv, vol. 46, no. 24 (25.12.1991), pp. 719-728; Glaser, Charles L.: 'Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe', International Security, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50; Greenwood, Ted: 'NATO's Future', European Security, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-14; Pick, Otto: 'Reassuring Eastern Europe', NATO Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 27-31; Simon, Jeffrey: 'Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?', Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs, vol. 37, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 21-35; Stepashin, Sergey: 'Russia and NATO: A Vital Partnership for European Security', The The RUSI Journal, vol. 138, no. 4 (August 1993), pp. 11-17. Back.

Note 18: Gerosa, Guido: 'The North Atlantic Cooperation Council', European Security, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 273-294; Ondarza, Henning von: 'Pillar of the New European Security Architecture-The North Atlantic Cooperation Council', NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol. 38, no. 5/6 (1993), pp. 41-43. The background for the NACC was, inter alia, the North Atlantic Council's statement on 'Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', issued by the 6-7 June 1991 meeting in Copenhagen, see NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 3 (June 1991), pp. 28-29; and the subsequent 'Rome declaration', adopted by a NATO Summit on 7-8 November 1991, ibid., vol. 39, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. 19-22. See also the evaluation of the latter by Secretary General Manfred Wörner: 'NATO Transformed: the Significance of the Rome Summit', ibid., pp. 3-8. The inaugural meeting of NACC took place on 20 December 1991, and in Brussels, 10 March 1992, a 'Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation' was adopted, reprinted ibid., vol. 40, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 34-35. Back.

Note 19: Borawski, John: 'Partnership for Peace and Beyond', International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (April 1995), pp. 233-246; Williams, Nick: 'Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?', Survival, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 98-110; Santis, Hugh De: 'Romancing NATO: Partnership for Peace and East European Stability', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 61-81; Sanz, Timothy: 'NATO's Partnership for Peace Program: Published Literature', European Security, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 676-696; Scofield, P.J.F.: 'Partnership for Peace: The NATO Initiative of January 1994. A View from the Partnership Coordination Cell', RUSI Journal, vol. 141, no. 2 (April 1996), pp. 8-15. Back.

Note 20: Adler, David Jens: Det europæiske teater. Bogen om raketterne og den nye Atomvåbenpolitik (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1984); Holbraad, Carsten: 'Denmark: Half-Hearted Partner', in Niels Ørvik (ed.): Semialignment and Western Security (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 15-60. Back.

Note 21: On NATO's continuous burden-sharing dispute see Kaldor, Mary: The Disintegrating West (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978), pp. 122-149 & passim; Krauss, Melvyn: How NATO Weakens the West (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Kelleher, Catherine McArdle: 'America Looks at Europe', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.): The Troubled Alliance. Atlantic Relations in the 1980s (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 44-66; Calleo, David P.: Beyond American Hegemony. The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 109-126 & passim; Holst, Johan Jørgen: 'Lilliputs and Gullilver: Small States in a Great-Power Alliance', in Gregory Flynn (ed.): NATO's Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway (London: Rowman & Allanhead, 1985), pp. 258-286; Trevorton, Gregory: Making the Alliance Work. The United States and Western Europe (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 10-21, 123-155; Sloan, Stanley: NATO's Future. Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain (Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 113-120. Back.

Note 22: Villaume, Paul: Allieret med forebehold. Danmark, NATO of den kolde krig. Et studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949-1961 (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995); Holst, Johan Jørgen: 'Norwegian Security Policy', in idem, Kenneth Hunt & Anders C. Sjaastad (eds.): Deterrence and Defense in the North (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985), pp. 93-123; Brundtland, Arne O.: 'Norwegian Security Policy: Defence and Nonprovocation in a Changing Context', in Gregory Flynn (ed.): NATO's Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway (London: Rowman & Allanhead, 1985), pp. 171-223; Ørvik, Niels: 'Norway: Deterrence Versus Nonprovocation', in idem (ed.): op. cit. (note 20), pp. 186-247. Back.

Note 23: Heurlin, Bertel: 'Dansk Kernevåbenpolitik', in idem (ed.): Kernevåbenpolitik i Norden, (Copenhagen: SNU, 1983), pp. 91-113; Sæter, Martin: 'Norsk Atomvåpenpolitikk', ibid., pp. 114-139. On Greenland see DUPI: Grønland under den kolde krig. Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945-68 (Copenhagen; Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1997). Back.

Note 24: Carlton, James R.: 'NATO Standardization: An Organizational Analysis', in Lawrence S. Kaplan & Robert W. Clawson, eds.: NATO After Thirty Years (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), pp. 199-213; Taylor, Trevor: 'The Development of European Defence Cooperation', in Michael Clarke & Rod Hague (eds.): European Defence Co-Operation. America, Britain and NATO (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 45-54. Back.

Note 25: On strategic dissonance in general see Garrett, James M.: The Tenuous Balance. Conventional Forces in Central Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 35-58. On Flexible Response see Stromseth, Jane E.: The Origins of Flexible Response. NATO's Debate Over Strategy in the 1960's (New York 1988: St. Martin's Press); Daalder, Ivo H.: The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Freedman, Lawrence: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, second edition (Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 285-302. The ALB doctrine is found in Headquarters, Department of the Army: Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982). On belated NATO assimilation see Bellamy, Chris: The Future of Land Warfare (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 124-129. Back.

Note 26: See, for instance, Hansen, Lene: 'Post-Sovereignty, Post-Security, Post-NATO. NATO's Redefinition of European Security after the Cold War', Research Paper, no. 16 (Athens: Research Institute for European Studies, 1995). See also George, Jim: Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994). Back.

Note 27: Quoted from Carroll, Lewis: Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), pp. 252-253. Back.

Note 28: Haggard, Stephan, Marc A. Levy, Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaïdis: 'Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining, and Institutions', in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye & Stanley Hoffman (eds.): After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 173-195. Back.

Note 29: See Albright, Madeleine: 'Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger Is Better', The Economist, 15 February 1997, pp. 19-21. Back.

Note 30: Allison, Graham T., Owen R. Coté, Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath & Steven E. Miller: Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy. Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). Back.

Note 31: Frei, Daniel: Perceived Images. U.S. and Soviet Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanhead, 1986); MccGwire, Michael: The Genesis of Soviet Threat Perceptions, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989); Wohlforth, William Curti: The Elusive Balance. Power and Perception During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Wettig, Gerhard: 'Moscow's Perception of NATO's Role', Aussenpolitik. German Foreign Affairs Review. English Edition, vol. 45, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1994), pp. 123-133; Cimbala, Stephen J.: 'Military Strategy. Soviet Threat Perceptions and Escalation Control', The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, vol. 3, no. 4 (December 1990), pp. 545-585. Back.

Note 32: Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-93. Back.

Note 33: Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Conventional Arms Control in Europe', in SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 407-474 (with appendices, including the treaty itself); Kelleher, Catherine McArdle, Jane M.O. Sharp and Lawrence Freedman (eds.): The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Koulik, Sergey & Richard Kokoski: Conventional Arms Control. Perspectives on Verification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Hartmann, Rüdiger, Wolfgang Heydrich & Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut: Der Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Vertragswerk, Verhandlungsgeschichte, Kommentar, Dokumentation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994); Zellner, Wolfgang: Die Verhandlungen über Konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle, die neue politische Lage in Europa und die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994); Croft, Stuart (ed.): The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. The Cold War Endgame (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994); Akçapar, Burak: The International Law of Conventional Arms Control in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Falkenrath, Richard A.: Shaping Europe's Military Order. The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994). Back.

Note 34: Baranowsky, Vladimir: 'Back to Europe? The Old Continent and the New Policy in Moscow', in idem & Hans-Joachim Spanger (eds.): In from the Cold. Germany, Russia and the Future of Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 95-124; Dawisha, Karen & Bruce Parrott: Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), passim; Richter, James: 'Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity', in Celste A. Wallander (ed.): The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1996), pp. 69-93; Porter, Bruce D.: 'Russia and Europe After the Cold War: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy', ibid., pp. 121-145; Buszinski, Leszek: Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Press, 1996), pp. 49-53; Alexandrova, Olga: 'Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts', Aussenpolitik. English Edition, vol. 44, no. 4 (Fall 1993), pp. 363-372; Buszynski, Leszek: 'Russia and the West: Towards Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?', Survival, vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 104-125; Foye, Stephen: 'Civilian and Military Leaders in Russia's ''New'' Political Arena', RFE/FL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 15 (15 April 1994), pp. 1-6; Likhotal, Alexander: 'The New Russia and Eurasia', Security Dialogue, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 9-18; Kokoshin, Andrei A.: 'The New Russia: Inheritance and Perspectives', PRIF Reports, no. 43 (Frankfurt a.M.: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 1996); Petrov, Yuri: 'Russia in Geopolitical Space', Eurobalkans, no. 19 (Summer 1995), pp. 26-29; Rubinstein, Alvin Z.: 'The Geopolitical Pull on Russia', Orbis, vol. 38, no. 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 567-583; Simon, Gerhard: 'La Russia: un hégémonie eurasienne?', Politique Étrangère, vol. 59, no. 1 (1st Quarter 1994), pp. 29-48; Stenseth, Dagfinn: 'The New Russia, CIS and the Future', Security Dialogue, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 19-26; Tsipko, Alexander: 'A New Russian Identity or Old Russia's Reintegration?', Security Dialogue, vol. 25, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 443-456. Back.

Note 35: Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). On the Soviet endorsement see Shenfield, Steven: 'The Nuclear Predicament', Chatham House Papers, no. 37 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), pp. 60-69; MccGwire, Michael: Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987); idem: Perestroika and Soviet National Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991); Holden, Gerald: Soviet Military Reform. Conventional Disarmament and the Crisis of Militarized Socialism (London: Pluto, 1991); Garthoff, Raymond: Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990). Back.

Note 36: Nolan, Janne E. et al.: 'The Concept of Cooperative Security', in idem (ed.): Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 3-18. Back.

Note 37: Jervis: op. cit. 1976 (note 32). Back.

Note 38: Møller, Bjørn: Common Security and Non-offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); idem: Dictionary of Alternative Defense (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Back.

Note 39: 'The Alliance's New Strategic Concept', adopted at the Rome Summit, 7-8 November 1991, reprinted in NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. 25-32. Back.

Note 40: Miller, David: 'The Case for a New European Alliance', Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 13, no. 18 (5 May 1999), p. 865. See also idem: 'Multinationality: Implications of NATO's Evolving Strategy', International Defense Review, vol. no. 3 (March 1991), pp. 211-213; Lowe, Karl & Thomas-Durell Young: 'Multinational Corps in NATO', Survival, vol. 33, no. 1 (Jan-Feb. 1991), pp. 66-77; Barry, Charles: 'NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice', Survival, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81-97. Back.

Note 41: The wording was fairly clear, albeit without totally dismissing the option of future nuclear deployment: 'Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear posture and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and we do not foresee any future need to do so'. See 'Final Communique from the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10 December 1996'. Back.

Note 42: Petersen, Charles C.: 'Lessons of the Persian Gulf War: The View from Moscow', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 3 (June 1994), pp. 238-254; Kipp, Jacob W.: 'Russian Military Forecasting and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Case of the Oracle of Delphi or Cassandra?', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 9, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 1-45. Back.

Note 43: See, for instance, Cohen, Eliot A.: 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54; Allard, C. Kenneth: 'The Future of Command and Control: Toward a Paradigm of Information Warfare', in L. Benjamin Ederington & Michael J. Mazarr (eds.): Turning Point. The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 161-192; Cushman, John H.: 'Implications of the Gulf War for Future Military Strategy', ibid., pp. 79-101; McKitrick, Jeffrey et al.: 'The Revolution in Military Affairs', in Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.): Battlefield of the Future. 21st Century Warfare Issues. Air War College Studies in National Security, No. 3 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1995), pp. 65-97; Stein, George: 'Information War-Cyberwar- Netwar', ibid., pp. 153-179; Davis, Paul (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994). The ideas are inspired by Toffler, Alvin & Heidi Toffler: War and Antiwar: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993). On the new forms of war see also Møller, Bjørn: 'Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare. What Is the Problem? What Could Be Done?', Working Papers, no. 12 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI, 1996). Back.

Note 44: On German unification see Albrecht, Ulrich: Die Abwicklung der DDR. Die '2+4-Verhandlungen'. Ein Insider-Bericht (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992); Rotfeld, Adam Daniel & Walther Stützle (eds.): Germany and Europe in Transition (Oxford University Press, 1991); Møller, Bjørn: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 212-259. Back.

Note 45: See, for instance, Huber, Reiner K.: 'NATO Enlargement and CFE Ceilings: A Preliminary Analysis in Anticipation of a Russian Proposal', European Security, vol. 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 396-403; idem & Gernot Friedrich: 'Der KSE-Vertrag und die Öffnung der NATO nach Osten', Europäische Sicherheit, vol. 45, no. 8 (August 1996), pp. 33-35; Schmidt, Hans-Joachim: 'NATO and Arms Control: Alliance Enlargement and the CFE Treaty', PRIF Reports, no. 42 (Frankfurt a.M.: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 1996); idem: 'NATO-Erweiterung und KSE-Vertrag', S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 14, no. 3 (1996), pp. 166-175; Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Let's Make a Deal: NATO and CFE', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 51, no. 2 (March-April 1995), pp. 19-21. Back.

Note 46: For an elaboration see SAS (Study Group Alternative Security Policy) & PDA (Project on Defense Alternatives): Confidence-building Defense. A Comprehensive Approach to Security and Stability in the New Era. Application to the Newly Sovereign States of Europe (Cambridge, MA: PDA, Commonwealth Institute, 1994). Back.

Note 47: Asmus, Ronald D. & Robert C. Nurick: 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States', Survival, vol. 38. no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 121-142. For a contrary argument see Öövel, Andrus: 'Estonian Defence Policy, NATO and the European Union', Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 65-68. Back.