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UN Military Demands and Non-Offensive Defence
Collective Security, Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Support Operations

Bjørn Møller **

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
8-12th July 1996


  1. The Dilemma
  2. What Is NOD?
  3. UN Military Norms and NOD
  4. Collective Security
  5. Post-Gulf War Collective Security
  6. NOD and Collective Security
  7. Humanitarian Intervention
  8. UN Operations Other Than War
  9. NOD and Peace Support Operations
  10. Conclusion
  11. Notes

1.  The Dilemma

Wonderful though it would be, in the real world it is not always possible to combine whatever is desirable and valuable. The present author holds (at least) two things to possess these qualities, namely a defensive restructuring of the armed forces and an expanded role for the United Nations. The purpose of the present paper is to analyze whether these two desiderata are possible to combine, or whether any incorrectable incompatibilities necessitate a choice between the two. The diagram below illustrates some of the possible inherent dilemmas in the form of a hierarchy of values, with an indication of logical (dotted lines) and causal (arrows) connections.

'Peace' is generally held to be a very high-ranking value, 1 but it cannot stand alone at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. Other values of comparable standing include a meeting of other basic human needs, which may occasionally conflict with that of peace: How much deprivation should one, for instance, be obliged to suffer before a recourse to arms is allowed? Most people would concur that a breaking of the peace is sometimes warranted, if only under extreme circumstances. However, the distinction between negative and 'positive peace' (suggested by Johan Galtung 2 ) allows for a seeming reconciliation of conflicting demands, hence makes it possible to elevate peace to the rank of the  supreme value. Even though it debatable whether anything is gained in conceptual clarity by this trick, for the sake of the argument, I shall accept the distinction. Negative and positive peace, however, have quite different--perhaps even conflicting--implications:

Both the attainment of negative and positive peace call for an expanded role for the United Nations as the most appropriate (and only legitimate) framework for global governance, responsible for a reallocation of resources to development purposes, as well as for collective security and humanitarian interventions. These demands are, in fact, mentioned expressis verbis  in the UN Charter's article I:

The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security (...);
2. To develop friendly relations among nations (...);
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

The question is, however, whether these diverse goals can actually be harmonized and, in particular, whether a defensive restructuring (i.e. a switch to NOD) by some or all states is compatible with an expanded role for the UN. The following analysis of this question is divided into two parts. First, an analysis of the compatibility between UN norms about military matters and the envisaged product of defensive restructuring, namely a non-offensive defence. This being really a very simple question, only a few pages are devoted to arguing in favour of a fundamental compatibility that may, at most, require a few modifications of certain NOD models.

  Much more space is devoted to the second part of the question, namely whether a switch to NOD by a significant number of states would prevent the UN from performing its various military (and military-related) functions, or whether it might even help in this respect. The analysis looks at both such tasks as entail, by their very nature, offensive missions (collective security and humanitarian intervention) and such as usually do not. While the latter present no problems for NOD advocates, the former do imply a genuine dilemma, to which a solution is suggested, namely a far-reaching division of labour and force integration.

  Before proceeding with the analysis as such, however, an explanation of what NOD is all about seems in order. Having dealt with this theme at considerable length on numerous previous occasions, 5 I shall limit this to a very sketchy expose.

2.  What Is NOD?

NOD is best understood as the military component of a policy of common security 6 -in its turn a proposed guideline for national policy-making in an anarchic setting 7 where the security dilemma applies. 8 It allows states to enhance their security without thereby reducing the security of anybody else, not even their adversaries.

  'NOD' signifies a military posture and strategy that satisfies this requirement by possessing sufficient defensive but no significant offensive strength. It thus represents the end point of, and as such the conceptual guideline for, a process of defensive restructuring of the armed forces. The purposes of such defensive restructuring are threefold:

What matters is that states should be incapable of attack, whereas it is of secondary importance how they become so. In fact, some states are by their very nature less capable than others of attack, almost regardless of their military posture and strategy. Democratic states thus very rarely, if ever, attack other democracies, 12 and this political inhibition against war can be further strengthened by legal provisions: Some constitutions, e.g. those of Japan and Germany, erect high barriers against aggression, 13 and international law may present valuable additional obstacles. Also, firm civilian control over military matters may help a great deal in curtailing the frequent offensive proclivity of the armed forces. 14

  Powerful though such inhibitions against aggression may be, it is advisable, according to NOD advocates, to underpin them with a material (most often structural) incapability of attack--i.e. to let defensive intensions be reflected in the posture of the armed forces. It stands to reason that the intended inability to attack will be context-dependent. In Europe, and particularly in the divided Germany (where the NOD idea originated), the only attack to be taken seriously was that of an armoured invasion, in which the main forces would be tank divisions with appropriate air support. Hence the CFE negotiations' focus on tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters, i.e. precisely those weapons systems that were indispensable for 'surprise attack and large-scale offensive action', as the NOD criterion was formulated in the CFE mandate. 15 Elsewhere, however, these weapons categories may not be all that worrisome: Why should, say, Japan be particularly concerned about Chinese or North Korean armoured forces, or the latter about Japanese army strength? The military capabilities that matter here, as well as in other 'maritime theatres' are naval forces (especially such with an amphibious or land attack capability) and air and missile forces. Or why should countries featuring inaccessable jungles, high mountains or similarly tank-unfriendly terrain worry about armoured forces, where light forces and helicopters may be more suitable for attack? 16

  Such complexities have made some analysts jump to the conclusion that 'everything is in the eyes of the beholder'. However, this is a logical fallacy. 17 There is a half-way station between abstract objectivity and complete subjectivity, namely what might be called 'objective intersubjectivity'. It is less than the abstractly objective postulate that offensiveness and defensiveness are features inherent in particular weapons, regardless of the geographical and historical context. There is no such thing as a 'defensive weapon'. 18 However, it is also more than subjectivity. It is the (falsifiable, hence scientifically meaningful) statement that under specified circumstances expert opinion would agree than posture A is more suitable for aggression, i.e. large-scale border-crossing operations, than posture B, both of them specified in terms of weapons mix, deployment, logistics, personnel structure, etc.

  Defensive restructuring of the armed forces would go a long way towards meeting most countries' defence needs. Not only could their defence be strengthened (e.g. via specialization), but the threat against which they would have to face would also decline as a result of the defensive restructuring of adversaries. Nevertheless, force differentials means that some countries will remain insecure. There is, for instance, no way (neither through their own efforts not through any Russian military build-down with or without defensive restructuring) that the Baltic states could become capable of standing up to a determined Russian attack. They are simply too small, and/or Russia too large.

  Countries in such unfortunate positions therefore need some underpinning of their indigenous defence efforts. Three options are available: Either they can (like Israel 19 ) go nuclear, but the implications would be a tidal wave of nuclear proliferation, which most would regard as deplorable. 20 Or they can seek membership of an alliance, as most former Warsaw Pact member states do. The effects of such alliance expansion, however, might well be to merely replicate the original problem on a grander scale--hence NATO's reluctance to admit new members without Russian consent. 21 Or, finally, they may chose to rely on collective security guerantees, more about which in due course.

  This deliberately superficial and sketchy account of what NOD is all about will, hopefully, suffice for the purposes of an analysis of its compatibility with UN norms and requirements, to which I shall now turn.

3.  UN Military Norms and NOD

One of the UN's main functions in the international system is to develop and codify (as well as to a limited, but in the future perhaps growing extent, enforce) international norms. The norms pertaining to military matters fall into two approximate halves, corresponding to the two components of the traditional 'just war' theory: the jus ad bellum  and the jus in bello  provisions. 22 While there are several versions thereof, they all contain the principles listed in the table below. They are enshrined in a number of documents, such as the UN Charter, various Security Council resolutions and rulings by the International Court of Justice. 23

Jus ad bellum  principles Jus in bello  principles
Just authority     Just authority/responsibility
Just cause ('right a wrong')     Non-combatant immunity
Last resort Prohibited targets
Just consequences Prohibited weaponry
Proportionality Proportionality

As far a jus ad bellum  is concerned, the world has seen a gradual outlawry of war. In continuity with the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 24 the UN Charter thus proscribes wars of aggressions in the following unequivocal terms:

(2.3) All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
(2.4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Whereas aggressive war is thus prescribed, national defence remains legitimate, both for individual states and for alliances:

(51) Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The abolition, or build-down of offensive military capabilities as envisaged by NOD is obviously in conformity with these norms, since it would make states materially incapable of violating the no-aggression rule, yet leave them with undiminished defensive strength. Indeed some have argued that the very possession of armed forces with an offensive capability constitutes an implicit or latent 'threat .. of force', hence that the UN Charter actually demands NOD.

  While such an interpretation is probably not tenable, the UN has expressis verbis  recommended NOD in at least two connections: In Resolution 45/58-0 on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies,  passed by the 45th Session of the General Assembly, and in the Guidelines and Recommendations for Regional Approaches to Disarmament,  passed by by UNDC in 1993. 25 One might also infer from the resolutions pertaining to Iraq (especially what has been called 'the mother of all resolutions', SC 687), that the UN regarded Iraq's possession of offensive capabilities as an implicit threat, hence sought to limit them. 26 The same was, indeed, the case with most peace treaties signed with (or enforced upon) the defeated aggressors (and German allies) after the Second World War. 27

  Some have argued that 'anticipatory self-defence' in the form of a pre-emptive attack may qualify as legitimate defence, 28 whereas most observers subscribe to a more restrictive view, according to which a defender must grant the attacker the first shot. Even though some might argue that NOD would make a poor defence, since it would rule out such anticipation, i.e. pre-emption (materially and otherwise), there can hardly be any doubt about its lawfulness: A reactive national defence as envisioned by NOD advocates would obviously satisfy the jus ad bellum  demands for just cause and last resort.

  Neither would there seem to be any problem with the other requirements in this category of the laws of war: To merely envision the repulsion of an aggressor, i.e. a restoration of the status quo ante bellum  (rather than undertaking any large-scale counter-attack 29 ) ensures 'just consequences'; and for a state to thus defend its own national territory satisfies the demand for just authority (provided the UN Security Council is duly notified 30 ). Finally, the strictly conventional nature of a NOD defence, as well as the deliberate abstention from retaliatory strikes, would also ensure compatibility with the proportionality criterion.

  Even though NOD cannot thus be used for aggression in violation of the jus ad bellum  provisions, it might violate other just war criteria and/or UN norms. This would, for instance, be the case if it were envisioned to wage a defensive war in a proscribed manner. The jus in bello  provisions pertain equally to the aggressor and the defender, no matter how just the cause of the latter is.

  The call for just authority, i.e. clear chains of command and an unambiguous distribution of responsibility, might indeed be violated if NOD were to involve actual guerilla warfare, waged by paramilitary forces operating on their own (as seemingly suggested by Johan Galtung 31 ). However, neither the employment of guerilla tactics by regular armed forces, nor a far-reaching decentralization (as envisaged by some NOD proponents 32 ) would by incompatible with the 'just authority' requirement. Subdelegation is not tantamount to a relinquishment of responsibility. The essentially reactive nature of NOD is, furthermore, a hedge against escalation (both horizontal and vertical), which makes it easier to abide by the rule of proportionality. The aforementioned abstention from retaliatory attacks also facilitates discrimination, thereby ensuring non-combatant immunity.

  There may, however, be a problem with some of the weapons bellum  (rather than undertaking commonly suggested for an NOD-type defence: Mines have generally been regarded as, by their very nature, defensive. While this is not automatically the case, since they may be used by attackers as well, there is some truth to it: Mines do fit in nicely with a stationary defence, be it forward or area-covering. Besides this appealing feature, however, mines have some very appalling ones: Unless minefields are carefully mapped and cleared after the end of hostilities (or the mines have built-in self-destruct mechanisms) they will be lying around after the guns of war have fallen silent, as 'hidden killers', almost always in a random pattern and well-concealed--otherwise they would be too easy for an aggressor to clear, hence useless. According to the UN Secretary General, as many as 110 million anti-personnel landmines thus lie scattered around in a handful or so of countries (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, and others), 33 inevitably exacting a heavy toll of civilian casualties (around 25,000 a year), demonstrating their inherently indiscriminatory nature. 34 Moreover, efforts are currently underway--spearheaded by the ICRC and various NGOs--for a ban on antipersonnel landmines, in casu via a special protocol appended to the 1981 Inhumane Weapons Concention. 35 Negotiations are underway at the time of this writing, 36 accompanied by several unilateral initiatives---such as the 16 May White House announcement the US immediate cancellation of the use of non-self destruct mines and destruction of 'dumb' mines. 37

  It has been, correctly, pointed out by NOD advocates that NOD schemes do not so much envisage the use of anti-personnel as that of anti-tank and sea mines, which are usually reasonably discriminatory (even though some might be set off by civilian vehicles or fishing boat); further that self-destruct devices can be easily and cheaply attached to all sorts of mines; and that the minefields of NOD-type defences will be meticulously mapped. Desirable though a very specific prohibition of non-detectable (i.e. entirely plastic), non-mapped, non-selfdestruct anti-personnel landmines might be, we might end up with a blanket prohibition of anti-personnel landmines--which would surely be an improvement over the present situation. Should such a prohibition enter into force, there can be no disputing the need for 'NOD designers' to amend their schemes with a view to finding substitutes for landmines. It is this author's opinion that such substitutes can be found. If they are more expensive than mines, then so be it. Humanity does not have to be 'free of charge'.

  With this qualification, there seems to be nothing in the concept of NOD that goes against the UN norms of war. Indeed some NOD advocates have acknowledged the just war conformity as one of their main motivations. 38

4.  Collective Security

There may, however, be one significant qualification of the above assessment, namely that NOD might be too 'passive' to meet the requirements of collective security, to which I shall now turn.

  The idea of collective security is of very ancient origin. 39 The 18th Century 'Concert of Europe' was a partial approximation to the ideal, 40 but the first serious attempt at implementation was with the establishment of the League of Nations after World War I. Unfortunately, however, the League failed completely in containing the fascist and communist expansionism in the 1930s. The reason was probably not so much (as often alleged) that the system as such was unworkable, as a lack of political will on the part of the major powers. 41 Be that as it may, as a result of the League's failure states reverted to the self-help practices of the past, accompanied and legitimized by an International Relations theory (Realism) that elevated such behaviour to the norm. 42 However, some support for collective security remained--both on the fringes of the academic community, in the peace movements, and among states, even though one might suspect the latter to be paying little more than lip service to the idea.

  The idea was resurrected with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. In the UN Charter, it was, for instance, envisaged that the Security Council should respond to any breach of peace by whatever this might require, albeit in conformity with the just war requirement of 'last resort'. In article 41 were listed a number of 'first resort' options, such as 'complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations'. Should none of these measures prove sufficient, 43 however, the SC might exercize its 'last resort' option:

(42) Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

From the very beginning, however, the UN's organizational structure included significant departures from the ideal of collective security, such as the granting of veto powers to the great powers of the day. During the Cold War, this accommodation of 'Realism' proved almost tantamount to a complete emasculation, since the great powers (above all the two superpowers) were able to take refuge behind the veto that made them immune to sanctions. The same was almost the case for their allies and friends, i.e. in the final analysis most of the world's states--since the bipolar 'pull' on the neutrals and non-aligned was very strong. Furthermore, the mechanisms originally envisioned for the collective security system were either never established or never used: the on-call forces mentioned in articles 43 and 45 were never established, and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) was never allowed to assume the duties envisaged in articles 46-47. 44

  The only instance where the system worked remotely like it was supposed to was thus the Korean War (1950-53), and even here the actual military operations were not performed by the UN as such, but by a US-led coalition, albeit operating under the UN flag. 45 The UN coalition thus exercized the fall-back option envisioned in article 48 of the charter: that 'the action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security' might not be performed by the UN as such but by 'some of [the members], as the Security Council may determine'.

5.  Post-Gulf War Collective Security

The end of the Cold War, however, removed the main obstacle to a workable collective security system, namely the international system's bipolar nature. The Gulf Crisis became the first test case. Because the system was not in place at the outbreak of the crisis (the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) some improvisation was inevitable. 46 By and large, however, the system worked, for the first time ever.

  In the aftermath of the Gulf War, interest in collective security surged, both politically and in the academic community. 47 It became intertwined with notions such as cooperative security, and innumerable proposals were put forward to improve the system: for a reform of the UN Security Council and a reordering of relations between the various UN organs, 48 for the establishment of on-call forces, for reenvigorating the MSC, etc. 49 Regionally as well, there has been a growing interest in collective security arrangements. 50 The stage may thus be set for realizing collective security, which would have several advantages:

  First of all, it would provide a powerful deterrent against aggression, since any prospective aggressor would have to reckon with the prospects of ending up at war with all the rest. If it is true that the end of bipolarity (and its siamese twin: the MAD sitiation of nuclear deterrence) will bring the 'long peace' to an end, 51 then collective security may be more important than ever as a hedge against war. Not least, collective security would provide the aforementioned requisite underpinning of the indigenous defence efforts of small states with strong neighbours.

  Secondly, it would modify a powerful element in the armament dynamics, i.e. the aforementioned action-reaction phenomenon. Provided that military imbalances between states are not very substantial, they will not matter at all. Hence they would provide no justification for an arms build-up that might, in its turn, legitimate a reciprocal build-up by the respective other side, etc. What would matter would be the inferiority of any aggressor to the combined strength of all the other members.

  For all the benefits it would imply, collective security would, of course, be no panacea for all sorts of security problems. For instance (just as NOD), it would only apply to inter-state conflicts and have little or no application to intra-state disputes. The typical 'Third World security predicament', however, is that of internal armed conflicts, reflecting weak state structures. 52 The 1995 SIPRI Yearbook  thus lists 31 armed conflicts in 29 locations in 1994, none of which were 'classical' conflicts between states--even though some were transformed into inter-state wars by the international recognition of the statehood of the warring parties, and others were partly internationalized through the interference by other states. 53

  Major war may thus be approaching obsolescence, 54 in which case both collective security and NOD would become solutions without problems. However, we are not quite there yet, and international war seems to be a genuine risk in certain parts of the globe such as East and South Asia, the Middle East and perhaps parts of eastern Europe and Africa. Here both NOD and collective security could have a directly positive effect, whereas elsewhere they might simply be less expensive insurances against very remote contingencies than their alternatives.

  Its presumed advantages notwithstanding, collective security may involve some inherent problems, and numerous concrete obstables stand in the way of its implementation. On the other hand, the arguments of the critics do not seem entirely convincing: Either they are logically flawed, or they are unsupported by fact, or the problems they highlight might be rather easily corrected. I shall limit myself to a brief and inconclusive discussion of three problems: free-riding, force imbalances and nuclear weapons.

  First of all, critics rightly argue that credibility is of the essence. Unless mutual assistance commitments are regarded as credible by a prospective aggressor, they will not deter. If aggressor state leaders are familiar with (and convinced by) the writings of 'Realists' they might, e.g., believe that 'free rider incentives' would prevent a strong response: Everybody would expect and prefer everybody else to 'do the job', with the result that it would actually be done by nobody. Persuasive though this argument may seem at first glance, it either over- or undershoots the mark. On the one hand, whereas it is certainly true that some states sometimes under-perform with regard to their collective duties, it is surely not empirically true that no states ever do anything to meet them. On the other hand, if all states always did succumb to free-rider temptations, neither collective security arrangements nor alliances would ever be of any value whatsoever, since precisely the same incentive structures operate in both. 55 The critics of collective security, however, tend to believe that at least NATO's security guarantees are credible. In fact their argument is often 'let's not give up NATO for the chimera of collective security'. 56

  Secondly, critics are right to point out that very substantial imbalances would be a problem. If a state were to possess more than half the military strength of the entire system (or believe that it did) then it might not be deterred by the prospects of all the others teaming up against it. With less than 100 percent credibility of commitments, even smaller imbalances might be a problem. However, in the real world the only state that might be thus immune by virtue of its strength happens to be the USA, where most of the critics reside. By implication, if only the United States could be persuaded to support collective security, nobody else would surely be immune and the problem thus solved. Alternatively, problems such as these might be solved (or mitigated) by means of 'sufficiency rules' such as that applied to the CFE--according to which no state was allowed to possess more than one third of all weapons in each category. 57 However, such rules might be difficult to apply in other regions where the asymmetries are even more glaring than in pre-CFE Europe. Should India, for instance, be denied the right to more than one third of the combined armed forces in South Asia, even though it is, on all other accounts, much larger than all the rest combined? In such instances, however, external 'balancers' might help correct whatever regional deficits there might be. This might, in fact, be a powerful argument for combining regional with global collective security.

  Thirdly, nuclear weapons greatly complicate the matter, since they might provide effective immunity to an aggressor. It might not even be any help if other states, or the system as a whole, also possessed nuclear weapons. The following might thus be a realistic scenario: A conquers B and warns C,D ... N that it would retaliate with nuclear weapons against any attempt at evicting it (say, through a new 'Desert Storm'). This would be a fairly credible deterrent threat, especially if the result of not retaliating might be to suffer the present fate of Iraq. A potential threat by the other states (or the system) to counter-retaliate would be much less credible. 58 However, let us not forget that nuclear deterrence 'theory' is a nebulous realm of speculation, regardless of whether it concerns states, alliances or a collective security systems. 59 One might thus counter the above problem with a reductio ad absurdum:  If nuclear status equals immunity to reprisals, all states would seek such status--while neither bilateral defence treaties (even in the form of 'nuclear umbrellas'), nor alliances or collective security arrangements would be adequate counters. In the real world, however, most states have chosen to remain non-nuclear 60 (and some have even relinquished their former nuclear status 61 ). Indeed, with their signature to the indefinite extension of the NPT Treaty in 1995, the overwhelming majority of the world's states have willingly renounced their right to ever acquire nuclear weapons--while only three states have 'crossed the line', according to most analyses: Israel, India and Pakistan. 62

  The actual behaviour of the world's states thus does not seem to confirm the arguments of the critics of collective security. Whatever weaknesses the concept may contain might apparently be corrected by various means. That is not to say that this will ever happen, however. It is all a question of political will, especially as far as the major powers are concerned.

6.  NOD and Collective Security

On the assumption that the political will exists to go ahead, collective security would imply certain requirements for the military wherewithal, which may or may not conflict with other requirements or desiderata, including that of defensive restructuring:

The latter presents a genuine dilemma for NOD advocates, who argue in favour of a universal defensive restruturing of the armed forces, but who also have to advocate the maintenance of residual offensive capabilities strong enough to forcefully evict a major power. Fortunately, there is a solution to this dilemma.

  Since offensive strength is the product of many factors, it is possible to only let it come into being upon the joining together of the diverse components. Some states might e.g. provide the transport capacity for air and sealift of an offensive task force without themselves possessing land forces with significant offensive capabilities. Other states might have, say, the armoured elements thereof (tanks and other armoured vehicles, etc.), but no air force to speak of--implying that they are unable to launch an invasion. Still other states might have such air power, but lack the ground forces, etc. They might thus all contribute to the requisite offensive capability without any of them having a fully-fledged offensive posture, as illustrated in the chart below.

  It is always easier to devise a scheme in abstracto  than to realize it in practice, if only because 'the devil is in the details'. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to go into the actual details. Suffice it therefore to recall that multinational operations and task forces are nothing new: In fact, the medieval crusades were multinational, 66 and many of the great battles of the world wars were fought be multinational forces.

  Moreover, multinationality seems to be 'the order of the day', in view of, e.g. NATO's new strategic concept and the actual establishment of the ARRC (ACE Rapid Reaction Corps) and the Eurocorps. 67 Even though the USA has generally been reluctant to participate in such forces (unless a US officer happened to be the supreme commander), the US military are now acknowledging the occasional need for multinationality, and exploring the doctrinal and practical implications thereof. This has particularly been the case in what the US Army labels OOTW ('Operations Other Than War'), which include so-called peace (or peace support) operations. 68 The latter panoply of military task, to which I shall return shortly, might thus be viewed as a training ground for a multinationalism that might also be used for war.

  Furthermore, much of the aforementined training afforded by NATO to the new PfP partner states concerns peace support operations and involve multinational operations. Finally, some of the smaller states have already launched, or are in the process of establishing, joint (i.e. multinational) rapid deployment forces for peace-keeping purposes. 69 There may be an added benefit to such collaborative endeavours, namely that it involves close professional military-to-military contacts that may serve as a confidence-building measures in its own right.

What may further pave the way for multinationality is the phenomenen of 'unilateral structural disarmament': Rising unit of state-of-the-art major weapons system, combined with falling defence budgets (almost) worldwide, necessitate hard choices: 70 Either states end up with ridiculously small miniature versions of great power arsenals, or they specialize. In the latter case, it makes perfect sense to embed specialization in a division of labour with friends and allies.

7.  Humanitarian Intervention

The use of military force to right other wrongs than that of inter-state aggression (in particular gross human rights violations) has been called 'humanitarian intervention' by some analysts, 71 even though others use the term in a narrower sense, i.e. as referring to military aid for humanitarian assistance.

  The pros and cons of humanitarian intervention in the wide sense are a matter of dispute, but few would deny that it might be warranted under certain, extreme circumstances: For instance, what if Nazi Germany had never attacked Poland, but 'only' killed off all its jews, gypsies, mentally retarded persons, etc.? Should the international community have stood idly by in respect for the sovereignty of Germany and the accompanying norm of non-interference? Or should other states have intervened, if need be by force, to stop the genocidal atrocities? Most would agree that they should have, implying that the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of states-strong though it may be--does not automatically overrule all other considerations. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's formulation in An Agenda for Peace  (art. 17) may thus be as precise as is possible at the present stage, its apparent blurredness notwithstanding:

Respect for [the State's] fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.

There are many signs that the saliency of human rights considerations is on the rise globally, inter alia because of the emerging consensus on the fundamental principles 72 and the growing exposure of gross violations to international public opinion via the media. Leaving aside (however important it may be) the debate on sovereignty versus some sort of global governance, 73 let us take a brief look at the military requirements of humanitarian interventions.

  Let us be frank: A humanitarian intervention is an attack, pure and simple, albeit one that may (in the present author's opinion) be entirely justified. To launch such an intervention is thus tantamount to starting an inter-state war for the sake of human values. This could probably be done in perfect conformity (mutatis mutandis) with the just war criteria: just cause, to right a wrong, last resort, proper authority, proportionality, etc. Still, it would be a war, and one that would have to be waged offensively. The few instances of humanitarian interventions that the world has seen so far seem to indicate that they may be, but need not be, related to international conflict. Operation Provide Comfort was in some continuity with Desert Storm--in its turn the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait--and the Security Council in Resolution 688 (5 April 1991) made sure to place the plight of the Kurds in this context, as well as to reaffirm 'the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq'. Nevertheless, the resolution was obviously motivated by humanitarian concerns, and its implications were clearly to violate exactly those principles it pledged to observe: by creating 'safe havens' that were within Iraqi territory, yet withdrawn from Iraqi sovereignty. 74 The subsequent interventions in Somalia and Haiti were spurred entirely by internal considerations, 75 whereas the creation of protected zones in former Yugoslavia followed from the peace-keeping missions there.

  Especially if unrelated to inter-state wars, humanitarian interventions may thus be even more demanding than collective security operations, since they will most often imply attacking the home country of thes human rights violator. This may well be defended by powerful (and perhaps strictly defensive) means, since there is no strong correlation (in any) between military offensiveness and human rights violations.

  There seems to be nothing fundamentally new about this. The need for offensive strength merely amplifies the 'capabilities dilemma' outlined above, springing from the need to combine defensive restructuring for national defence purposes with the maintenance of significant (yet reduced) offensive capabilities for collective security purposes. Hence, multinationality would seem to provide the solution, once again, especially since the only legitimate authority that might embark on humanitarian interventions would be the UN.

8.  UN Operations Other Than War

Recent years have seen not only a quantitative expansion of the UN's military tasks but also a qualitative one: operations have become both more numerous, diverse than was previously the case, as well as generally more demanding. UNTAC, 76 UNPROFOR 77 and IFOR (implemented by NATO 78 ) are thus unprecedented in the history of peace-keeping. 79 The new form of operations are now usually lumped together under the heading of 'peace (support) operations' 80 --not all of which are new, to be sure. They have also become known at 'Operations Other Than War', OOTW. 81

  UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali outlined various OOTW in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, where he listed three sets of tasks:

The Agenda for Peace  also mentioned 'post-conflict peace-building', described as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'. In a longer-term perspective, the objective would be to forge cooperative relations, but in the short term it might involve such activities as

...disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

To this list, the Secretary General added de-mining: a field that has since then assumed a growing saliency (vide supra ).

  In his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,  Boutros-Ghali highlighted the shift of emphasis in 'peace support operations' that had occurred since 1988: Whereas at that time, only one out of five peace-keeping operations had related to an intra-state conflict, thirteen of the 21 operations established since then had concerned such conflicts--albeit, in the case of ex-Yugoslavia, with some international ramifications. 82 While there is no disputing the characterization of some of the on-going armed conflicts in terms such as those above, there is a debate in academic circles about the future. Some have alleged that the whole world is approaching 'the coming anarchy'. 83 One should, however, be cautious with such generalizing extrapolations: Africa and ex-Yugoslavia may be special.

  Be that as it may, such conflicts pose new challenges to the peace-keepers: the combatants are not so much regular soldiers as 'militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of command' (in fact an astounding number of combatants are children! 84 ); the battlefield is often vast (comprising large parts of the country in question) and without any clear fronlines; moreover, it is often filled with refugees and/or internally displaced persons; 85 and state institutions have frequently broken down completely, exacerbating already severe humanitarian emergencies. Finally, 'peace-keeping' is often a misnomer, since there is no genuine peace to keep, but only a temporary (and sometimes only partial) truce. Peacekeepers are thus at constant risk.

  The humanitarian emergencies also imply a need for protection to be afforded to humanitarian relief operations. While this problem is universally acknowledged, however, there is serious disagreement about the solution, e.g. about the advisability of 'humanitarian interventions' in the narrow sense mentioned above. Some hold that the very involvement of military forces hampers the provision of humanitarian aid, 86 whereas others see no alternative to military protection of supply lines. The latter may even advocate the establishment ot protected zones, i.e. 'safe havens', as happened (without much success, to be sure) in the former Yugoslavia.

  While the above categorization refers to the political effects of the peace opertion, one might also distinguish between the military missions. The most common dichotomy is here between 'peace-keeping' and 'peace enforcement'. According to the US Army's Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations  the principled distinction is threefold: consent, force, and impartiality. While peace-keeping presupposes consent, enforcement does not; hence the need for using force beyond mere self-defence in the latter, which is superfluous (as well as harmful) in the former. The very use of force damages impartiality in peace enforcement, whereas peace-keeping can and should remain impartial.

  The table below enumerates the various (military) forms of peace support operations. The order does not reflect prioritization. I have omitted such missions as are, by their very nature, civilian, even thougn they may on occasion be performed by armed forces: election monitoring, etc. Whereas some of these functions are 'traditional' in the sense of conforming to the peace-keeping criteria (consent, impartiality, no use of force except in self-defence), others are new in the sense of being non-consensual, of involving a taking of sides and actual combat.

  Most observers agree that 'mission creep' is dangerous, say when traditional peacekeeping forces are assigned to enforcement tasks. It tends to destroy their image of impartiality, thus preventing them from performing their original tasks. On the other hand, situations on the ground do develop, often beyond what could reasonably have been foreseen and planned in advance. In such circumstances, the only alternative to mission creep might be to withdraw the forces and dispatch new ones, with a different mandate and tailored for that mandate--something that is very time-consuming and may even exact a toll of lives, if UN forces have to be evacuated under hostile fire.

Category Mission NOD
1. Supervision     a. Monitoring compliance with arms control agreements E
    b. Observer missions for confidence-building E
    c. Observer missions for early warning E
    d. Exchange of POWs and the like.
2. Disengagement     a. Forcible separation of belligerents B
    b. Enforcement of exclusion zones (e.g. no fly-zones) B
    c. Patrolling ceasefire lines or demilitarized zones E
    d. Interpositioning of forces between belligerents--whether they are states or sub-state forces, i.e. regardless of whether it occurs after an international or a civil war B
    e. Preventive deployment, with the consent of all or one side to the conflict
3. Disarmament     a. Disarming warring factions 87 E
    b. Custody of weapons E
    c. De-mining
4. Protection     a. Protection of humanitarian assistance E
    b. Establishment and defence of protected zones ('safe havens'), which may entail some of the disengagement measures mentioned above
5. Sanctions     a. Interdiction of supplies by air, sea or land
6. Deterrence     a. 'Show of force to dissuade a potential aggressor' (as it is euphemistically termed by the US Army 88 )
Legend: B: NOD is better than traditional forces;
E: NOD is equally good; W: NOD is worse

9.  NOD and Peace Support Operations

There being no reason to expect the need for peace support OOTW to decline in the immediate future, it will be a matter of some importance whether NOD-type forces would be adequate for the task. Fortunately they seem to be, in fact their particular features seem eminently suitable for peace support operations: The force elements that NOD deliberately omits (nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, fighter-bombers and the like) are anyhow unsuitable for peace support operations, while the remaining (and perhaps expanded) elements would prove useful. The table above provides a rough indication of whether NOD-type forces would be better, equally good or worse at performing the various missions than traditional forces.

  As far as traditional peace-keeping is concerned, NOD-type forces would seem quite adequate, if only because the task resemble those of a strictly defensive national defence. The interpositioning of peace-keeping forces between two warring states along a line of demarcation defined by a ceasefire agreement is thus tantamount to a form of forward defence, only less demanding because it usually happens with the consent of both sides.

  Under the heading of 'preventive diplomacy', the Agenda for Peace  also mentioned the following tasks, that are very 'NOD-like':

... measures to create confidence [..] early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding, [..] preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones

What was new about this was, above all, the notion of preventive deployment with the consent of only one side. It was closely interlinked with that of demilitarized zones, since the Secretary General envisaged these as being patrolled by UN forces 'for the purpose of removing any pretext for attack'. Not only is the mission very NOD-like, the official rationale was also very close to the thinking of NOD advocates.

  As far as the expanded menu of peace support operations is concerned, only few present problems. Most of the missions listed above thus require no heavy forces embodying offensive capabilities, but are to be performed mostly by infantry units assisted by engineers and scouting teams. Furthermore, even the US Army (which is not known as particularly 'soft') acknowledges that restraint is of the essence, both with regard to weapons, tactics and levels of violence: 'the use of force should be a last resort'. 89 Even though missions 2a-b and 4b above, call for something more than self-defence, this 'more' is not something fundamentally different from what is required for the national defence on one's own territory, for which NOD is conceived.

  The only exception would seem to be mission 6 (deterrence), which NOD-type forces would be incapable of performing (on more than a tactical scale). They would be incapable of punitive attacks against the homeland of a transgressor's presumed allies. However, the entire case for punitive deterrence (for whatever purpose) seems very weak, indeed.

10.  Conclusion

While the case for collective security and humanitarian intervention remain controversial, that for peace support operations is not, and there is little doubt that it will continue to demand the attention of armed forces around the world. In view of the declining (in most places) need for national defence, it will almost inevitably become one of the main tasks. 90

  A caveat may be in order at this stage: Armed forces (as all other organizations) are predisposed to fight for their survival and for maximizing their share of societal resources. If their claim to defend the nation is no longer tenable, they thus have an interest in finding a new raison d'être,  which peace support operations may provide, as may various, by their very nature, civilian tasks (emergency relief, etc.).

  Be that as it may, there is no disputing the need for peace support operations and much evidence pointing in the direction of a growing number and scale in the coming years. Regardless of how relevant a defensive restructuring of the armed forces worldwide (as envisioned by NOD theory), the resultant forces should remain capable of performing peace support operations. As the analysis above has, hopefully, shown, this will not constitute much of a problem. On the contrary, NOD-type armed forces tend to be eminently suitable for such operations that do not call for offensive capabilities, but for tactical agility. The only problem is 'getting there and away', which is generally easier, the lighter the forces are.

  Article 42-type collective security operations, as well as actual humanitarian interventions, however, are more of a problem. They do require offensive capabilities, hence are not immediately compatible with a switch to NOD. While the author has argued that multinationalization of the armed forces, in the shape of joint task forces, offers a resolution of the dilemma, numerous practical problems remain, for practitioners as well as for arm chair strategists and tacticians.

11.  Notes

*: Paper for the Commission on Security and Disarmament
Sixteenth General Conference
of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA)
Creating Nonviolent Futures

**: Bjørn Møller
Senior Research Fellow, Ph.D. & MA
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI
(formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research)
Project Director, Global Non-Offensive Defence Network
Editor, NOD & Conversion
Ass. Professor, University of Copenhagen. Back.

Note 1: For an elaborate analysis of the concept see Rapoport, Anatol: Peace. An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992). Back.

Note 2: Galtung, Johan: 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', in idem: Peace: Research, Education, Action. Essays in Peace Research. Volume 1 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1975), pp. 109-134; idem: 'Peace Research', ibid., pp. 150-166; Wiberg, Håkan: Konfliktteori och fredsforskning (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1976), pp. 4-8. Back.

Note 3: On the negative relationship between military spending and development see Ball, Nichole: Security and Economy in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Väyrynen, Raimo: Military Industrialization and Economic Development. Theory and Historical Case Studies (Aldershot: Dartmouth and UNIDIR, 1992); Norman A. Graham (ed.): Seeking Security and Development. The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Bütner, Veronika & Joachim Krause (eds.): Rüstung statt Entwicklung? Sicher-heitspolitik, Militärausgaben und Rüstungskontrolle in der Dritten Welt (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995). Back.

Note 4: See, for instance, Commission on Global Governance: Our Global Neighbourhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Camilleri, J.A. & Jim Falk: The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (London: Edward Elgar, 1992); Archibugi, Daniele & David Held (eds.): Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Lyons, Gene M. & Michael Mastanduno (eds.): Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); Falk, Richard: On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics (University Park: Penn State Press, 1995); Simai, Mihaly: The Future of Global Governance (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); Glossop, Ronald J.: World Federation? A Critical Analysis of Federal World Government (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993). On the ethical foundations for global governance, see the excellent treatment of cosmopolanism (as opposed to communitarianism) in Brown, Chris: International Relations Theory. New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). Back.

Note 5: Møller, Bjørn: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1991); idem; Common Security and Non-offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner & London: UCL Press, 1992); idem: Dictionary of Alternative Defense (Boulder: Lynne Rienner & London: Adamantine Press, 1995). Back.

Note 6: On common security see the Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). The preferred post-Cold War term for 'common security' is 'cooperative security', which seems to be synonymous, albeit perhaps with a slightly increased emphasis on institutions. See, for instance, Nolan, Janne E. et al.: 'The Concept of Cooperative Security', in idem (ed.): Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 3-18. Back.

Note 7: Both Common Security and NOD are devised for a setting dominated by state actors and without any strong supranational authorities, such as a world government. 'Anarchy' is not, however, tantamount to complete disorder, but may be more or less mature, as Barry Buzan formulates it in People, States and Fear. An Agenda for In-ternational Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 146-185. For a modern classic with pretty much the same message see Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977); or Watson, Adam: The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992). On cooperation under anarchy see Milner, Helen: 'Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', World Politics, vol. 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496; Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Stein, Arthur A.: Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); idem & Robert A. Keohane: 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', in David A. Baldwin (ed.): Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 85-115. Back.

Note 8: On the security dilemma see Herz, John M.: Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), passim; idem: 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 3, no. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180; Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-93; idem: 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Collins, Alan: 'The Security Dilemma', in Jane M. Davis (ed.): Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 181-195. Back.

Note 9: A classical formulation of the thesis of the Action-Reaction Phenomenon is Rathjens, George: 'The Dynamics of the Arms Race', in Herbert York (ed.): Arms Control. Readings from the Scientific American (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973), pp. 177-187. For a theoretical and historical analysis of the phenomenon, see Hammond, Grant T.: Plowshares into Swords. Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). For a comparison of different explanations of the armament dynamics, see Gleditsch, Nils Petter & Olav Njølstad (eds.): Arms Races. Technological and Political Dynamics (London: Sage, 1990). Back.

Note 10: Schelling, Thomas: The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 207-229; idem: Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 221-259; Vasquez, John A.: The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 11: Hence, some NOD advocates prefer the term 'confidence-building defence'. See, e.g. SAS (Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik): Vertrauensbildende Vertei-di-gung. Reform deutscher Sicherheits-politik (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1989); idem & PDA (Project on Defense Alternatives): Confidence-building Defense. A Comprehensive Approach to Security and Stability in the New Era. Application to the Newly Sovereign States of Europe (Cambridge, MA: PDA, Commonwealth Institute, 1994). See further Møller, Bjørn & Håkan Wiberg: 'Nicht-offensive Verteidigung als Vertrau-ens-bil-dende Maßnahme? Probleme und Konzepte', in Schweizerische Friedensstiftung (eds.): Blocküberwindende Vertrauensbildung nach dem europäischen Herbst '89 (Bern: Verlag Schweizerische Friedensstiftung, 1990), pp. 39-79. Back.

Note 12: Gleditsch, Nils Petter: 'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1992), pp. 369-376; Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a more pessimistic assessment see Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder: 'Democratization and the Danger of War', International Security, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; Wolf, Reinhard, Erich Weede, Andrew J. Enterline, Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder: 'Correspondence: Democra-tization and the Danger of War', ibid., no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 176-207. Back.

Note 13: Watanabe, Wakio: 'Japan's Postwar Constitution and Its Implications for Defense Policy: A Fresh Interpretation', in Ron Matthews & Keisuke Matsuyama (eds.): Japan's Military Renaissance? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 35-49; Lutz, Dieter S.: 'Zu den verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit nach dem Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-land', in Egon Bahr & idem (eds.): Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Dis-ziplinen. Bd. 2: Zu rechtlichen, ökonomischen, psychologischen und militärischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), pp. 85-104. Back.

Note 14: See, for instance, Weltman, John J.: World Politics and the Evolution of War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 83-100. Back.

Note 15: Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Conventional Arms Control in Europe', in SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 407-474 (with appendices, including the treaty itself); Koulik, Sergey & Richard Kokoski: Conventional Arms Control. Perspectives on Verification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Hartmann, Rüdiger, Wolfgang Heydrich & Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut: Der Vertrag über konventionelle Streit-kräfte in Europa. Vertragswerk, Verhandlungsgeschichte, Kommentar, Dokumentation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994); Zellner, Wolfgang: Die Verhandlungen über Konventionelle Streit-kräfte in Europa. Konventionelle Rüstungs-kontrolle, die neue politische Lage in Europa und die Rolle der Bundes-republik Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags-gesell-schaft, 1994); Croft, Stuart (ed.): The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. The Cold War Endgame (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994). Back.

Note 16: Under the auspices of the Global Non-Offensive Defence Network, the present author has written about the application of NOD principles to a wide range of settings. See Møller, Bjørn: 'Non-Offensive Defence and the Arab-Israeli Conflict', Working Papers, no. 7/1994 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994); idem: 'A Common Security and NOD Regime for South Asia?', ibid., no. 4/1996; idem: 'Common Security and Non-Offensive Defence: Its Relevance to the Korean Peninsula', ibid., no. 7/1995; idem: 'Non-Offensive Defence and the Korean Peninsula', ibid,, no. 4/1995; idem; 'A Common Security and Non-Offensive Defence Regime for the Asia-Pacific?', ibid., no. 8/1995; idem: 'The Concept of Non-Offensive Defence: Implications for Developing Countries with Specific Reference to Southern Africa', in M. Hough & A. du Plessis (eds.): 'Conference Papers: The Future Application of Air Power with Specific Reference to Southern Africa', Ad hoc Publication, no. 32 (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 48-128; idem: 'The Decalogue of Mon-Offensive Defence Revisited. Five Years Later and in a Different Part of the World', Working Papers, no. 16/1994; idem: 'Defensa no-ofensiva y fomento de confianza en Sudamerica', Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad, vol. 10, no. 3 (July-September 1995), pp. 12-19. See also idem & Håkan Wiberg (eds): Non-Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). Back.

Note 17: See, e.g., Lynn-Jones, Sean M.: 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691. Back.

Note 18: However, a few NOD proponents have, unfortunately, argued that there are. See, for instance, Galtung, Johan: There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), pp. 172-176. Back.

Note 19: See, e.g. Evron, Yair: Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (London: Routledge, 1994); Aronson, Shlomo & Oded Brosh: The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991. An Israeli Perspective (Albany: State University of New York, 1992). Back.

Note 20: On the pros and cons of proliferation, see Sagan, Scott D. & Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). Back.

Note 21: A good overview of the pros and cons of NATO enlargement is Carpenter, Ted Galen (ed.): The Future of NATO (London: Frank Cass, 1995). See also Goldstein, Walter (ed.): Security in Europe. The Role of NATO after the Cold War (London: Brassey's, 1994); Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane & Joel S. Sokolsky (eds.): NATO's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler & F. Stephen Larrabee: 'NATO Expansion: The Next Steps', Survival, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 7-33; Brown, Michael E.: 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', ibid., pp. 34-52; Baldwin Jr., Rosser: 'Addressing the Security Concerns of Central Europe through NATO', European Security, vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter 1993), pp. 545-566; Bell, Coral: 'Why an Expanded NATO Must Include Russia', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 27-41; Clarke, Jonathan G.: 'Beckoning Quagmires: NATO in Eastern Europe', ibid., pp. 42-60; Kamp, Karl-Heinz: 'The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion', Foreign Policy, vol. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 116-129; Mandelbaum, Michael: 'Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 9-13; Roychowdury, Rajyashi: 'NATO's Eastward Expansion: An Institutional Challenge', Strategic Analysis, vol. 18, no. 1 (April 1995), pp. 73-90; Ruehl, Lothar: 'European Security and NATO's Eastward Expansion', Aussenpolitik. German Foreign Affairs Review. English Edition, vol. 45, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1994), pp. 115-122; Simon, Jeffrey: 'Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?', Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs, vol. 37, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 21-35. Back.

Note 22: On the ethical foundations of just war theory see, e.g., Walzer, Michael: Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977); Johnson, James Turner: Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. A Moral and Political Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); idem: The Quest for Peace. Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).Elshtain, Jean Bethke (ed.): Just War Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Nardin, Terry (ed.): The Ethics of War and Peace. Religious and Secular Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); idem & David R. Mapel (eds.): Traditions in International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Smock, David R. (ed.): Religious Perspectives on War. Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force After the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992). Back.

Note 23: Best, Geoffrey: Humanity in Warfare. The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts (London: Methuen, 1980); De Lupis, Ingrid Detter: The Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Green, L.C.: The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopolous & Mark R. Schulman (eds.): The Laws of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); McCoubrey, H. & N.D. White: International Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992); Dinstein, Yoram: War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Second Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1994); Murphy, John F.: 'Force and Arms', in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United Nations Legal Order, Vols. 1-2 (American Society for International Law and Cambridge: Grotius Publications/Cambridge University Press, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 247-318; Shaw, Malcolm N.: International Law. Third Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications/Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 681-740. Back.

Note 24: Baratta, Joseph Preston: 'The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War', in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, vols. I-III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), vol. II, pp. 695-705. Back.

Note 25: Mason, Peggy: 'The United Nations Guidelines for Regional Approaches to Disarmament', Disarmament, vol. 18, no. 2 (1995), pp. 49-71. Back.

Note 26: Molander, Johan: 'The United Nations and the Elimination of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Implementation of a Cease-Fire Condition', in Fred Tanner (ed.): From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States (New York: United Nations/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1992), pp. 137-158; Sur, Serge: 'Security Council Resolution 687 og 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair: Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace', Research Papers, no. 12 (New York: UNIDIR); idem (ed.): Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations. Problems of Compliance and Enforcement (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 63-80; Weller, M. (ed.): Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath. Cambridge International Documents, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1993), pp. 8-12, 494-536. Back.

Note 27: On the Versailles Treaty (1919) and the post-WW2 treaties with Germany, Italy, Finland, Japan, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, see Tanner (ed.): op. cit. (note 26), passim. Back.

Note 28: Arguing in favour of the legitimacy of anticipation is Dinstein: op. cit. (note 23), pp. 182-191. However, even he acknowledges that the burden of proof falls on the party firing the first shot.. Back.

Note 29: Kokoshin, Andrei A. & Valentin Larionov: 'Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic Inter-relations', in Marlies ter Borg & Wim Smit (eds.): Non-provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989), pp. 35-44. See also Reid, Brian Holden: 'The Counter-Offensive: a Theoretical and Historical Perspective', in idem & Michael Dewar (eds.): Military Strategy in a Changing Europe (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 143-160; Mackenzie, J.J.G.: 'The Counter-Offensive', ibid., pp. 161-180. Back.

Note 30: According to Article 51 of the UN Charter: 'Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.' Back.

Note 31: Galtung, Johan: op. cit. 1984 (note 18), pp. 180-184. On the similarities between guerilla warfare and NOD, see Møller, Bjørn: 'Guerilla Strategies and Non-Offensive Defence', Working Papers, no. 4 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1991). Back.

Note 32: Freundl, Siegfried: 'Überlegungen zu einem Informations- und Führungsnetz für eine rein defensive Verteidigung', in Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (ed.): Die Praxis der defensiven Verteidigung (Hameln: Sponholz Verlag, 1984), pp. 167-178; Grin, John: Military-Technological Choices and Political Implications. Command and Control in Established NATO Posture and a Non-Provocative Defence (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990). On the background in Auftragstechnik see Simpkin, Richard E.: Race to the Swift. Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), pp. 227-240; Creveld, Martin Van: Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 270-272. Back.

Note 33: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'The Land Mine Crisis. A Humanitarian Disaster', Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 5 (September-October 1994), pp. 8-13. Back.

Note 34: A very comprehensive work on landmines is: The Arms Project & Physicians for Human Rights: Landmines. A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). See also Baynham, Simon: 'Eternal Sentinels-—The Legacy of Landmines in Africa', African Defence Review. A Working Paper Series, no. 18 (Halfway House, RSA: Institute for Defence Policy, 1994), pp. 25-28; Buckley, Ian: 'Landmines-—The Hidden Killers', Pacific Research, vol. 8, no. 3 (August 1995), pp. 9-11; Clements, Kevin P.: 'Limiting the Production and Spread of Landmines', Pacific Research, vol. 7, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 3-6; Cornish, Paul: Antipersonnel Mines. Controlling the Plague of 'Butterflies' (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Security Programme, 1994); Lock, Peter: 'Krieg im Wandel—Neue Anforderungen an die Politik. Überlegungen am Beispiel von Landminen und Kleinwaffen', Arbeitspapier, no. 1/1996 (Hamburg: Unit for the Study of Wars, Armaments and Development, University of Hamburg, 1996). Back.

Note 35: On the original Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, see Rölling, Bert V.A. & Olge Sukovic: The Law of War and Dubious Weapons (Stockholm: SIPRI/Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976); Lumsden, Malvern: Anti-personel Weapons (London: SIPRI/Taylor & Francis, 1978); 'The Prohibition of Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons', SIPRI Yearbook 1981, pp. 445-467. Back.

Note 36: Wurst, Jim: 'Land Mines: Inching Toward a Ban', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 2 (March-April 1996), pp. 10-11. Back.

Note 37: 'Statement by the President', 16 May 1995. Back.

Note 38: This is, for instance, the case of the British group Just Defence. See Barnaby, Frank & Stan Windass: 'What is Just Defence' (Oxford: Just Defence, 1983). Back.

Note 39: For a historical account see Claude, Inis L.: Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 4th edition (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 21-40; Bennett, A. LeRoy: International Organizations. Principles and Issues. 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp. 8-14; Downs, George W.: 'Beyond the Debate on Collective Security', in idem (ed.): Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 1-13; Lipson, Charles: 'Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?', ibid., pp. 105-131 A very early example of an actual treaty is that of King George of Bohemia (1464): 'Tractatus pacis toti christianitati fiendae', in Vaclav Vanecek (ed.): The Universal Peace Organization of King George of Bohemia. A Fifteenth Century Plan for World Peace 1462/1464 (Prague: Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1964), pp. 69-80. Back.

Note 40: Albrecht-Carrié, René: The Concert of Europe 1815-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968); Gulick, Edward Vose: Europe's Classical Balance of Power (1955, Reprint New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967), pp. 184-243 & passim; Jervis, Robert: 'From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation', World Politics, vol. 38, no. 1 (October, 1985), pp. 58-79. Back.

Note 41: For an account of the League, see Bennett: op. cit. (note 39), pp. 24-42; Claude: op. cit. (note 39), pp. 41-56. Back.

Note 42: Smith, Michael Joseph: Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge 1986: Louisiana State University Press); Carr, Edward Hallett: The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, second edition 1946 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964); Morgenthau, Hans J.: Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, Third Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960); Waltz, Kenneth N. : Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a critique of Realism's (lack of) realism see Griffiths, Martin: Realism, Idealism and International Politics. A Reinterpretation (London: Routledge, 1992). Back.

Note 43: On the effect of sanctions, see Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy, 2nd edition, vols. 1-2 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990); Cortright, David & George A. Lopez (eds.): Economic Sanctions. Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). Back.

Note 44: On the MSC see, e.g., Boulden, Jane: 'Prometheus Unborn: The History of the Military Staff Committee', Aurora Papers, no. 19 (Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993); Grove, Eric: 'UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee. A Look Back', International Security, vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 172-182. Back.

Note 45: Two recent accounts of the Korean War are Whelan, Richard: Drawing the Line. The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1990); and Stueck, William: The Korean War. An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Back.

Note 46: On the UN's role in the crisis, see Hume, Cameron R.: The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq. How Peacemaking Changed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Lauterpacht, E., C.J. Greenwood, Marc Weller & Daniel Bethelheim, eds.: The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1991: Cambridge International Documents Series, Vol. 1); Weller, M. (ed.): Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath. Cambridge International Documents, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1993). On the political improvisation see Freedman, Lawrence & Efraim Karsh: The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991. Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Gow, James (ed.): Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1993); Steinbruner, John D.: 'The Consequences of the Gulf War. Forging the New World Order Under a Forced Schedule', The Brookings Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 6-13. On the US strategy in the war, see the following semi-official narratives (each of which highlight the contribution of its respective service to the defeat of Iraq): Friedman, Norman: Desert Victory. The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Scales, Robert S. Jr.: Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1994); Keaney, Thomas A. & Eliot A. Cohen: Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995). The aggregated evaluation is represented by Aspin, Les & William Dickinson: Defense for a New Era. Lessons of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's US, 1992). More critical views include: Stein, Janice Gross: 'Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?', International Security, vol. 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 147-179; Renshon, Stanley A. (ed.): The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Record, Jeffrey: Hollow Victory. A Contrary View of the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1993); Mueller, John: 'The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War', Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 77-117; Campbell, David: Politics Without Principle. Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); Clark, Ramsey: The Fire This Time. U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992). Back.

Note 47: See for instance Kupchan, Charles A. & Clifford A. Kupchan: 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; idem & idem: 'The Promise of Collective Security', ibid., vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.): Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Butfoy, Andrew: 'Themes Within the Collective Security Idea', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 490-510; Cusack, Thomas R. & Richard J. Stoll: 'Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 33-59; Downs, George W. (ed.): Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Gullikstad, Espen: 'Collective Security in Post-Cold War Europe', NUPI Report, no. 176 (Oslo: NUPI, 1994). For a more sceptical view, see Betts, Richard K.: 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', International Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Clark, Mark T.: 'The Trouble with Collective Security', Orbis, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 237-258. Back.

Note 48: Rochester, J. Martin: Waiting for the Millennium. The United Nations and the Future of World Order (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), pp. 159-229; Barnaby, Frank (ed.): Building a More Democratic United Nations (London: Frank Cass, 1991); Saksena, K.P.: Reforming the United Nations. The Challenge of Relevance (New Delhi and London: Sage, 1993); Matanle, Emma: 'The UN Security Council, Prospects for Reform', Discussion Paper, no. 62 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995); Kennedy, Paul & Bruce Russett: 'Reforming the United Nations', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 5 (September-October 1995), pp. 56-71; Spiers, Ronald I.: 'Reforming the United Nations', in Roger Coate (ed.): United States Policy and the Future of the United Nations (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), pp. 19-40; Gordon, Wendell: The United Nations at the Crossroads of Reform (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Müller, Joachim W. (ed.): The Reform of the United Nations (A volume in the series Annual Review of United Nations Affairs), vol. 1: 'Report'; vol, 2: 'Resolutions, Decisions and Documents' (New York: Oceana Publications, 1992). For a venomous, but well-documented critique of the UN's lack of efficiency see Righter, Rosemary: Utopia Lost. The United Nations and World Order (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1994). Back.

Note 49: Urquhart, Brian: 'The UN: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?', Adelphi Papers, no. 265 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 18-29; idem: 'For a UN Volunteer Military Force', New York Review of Books, vol. 40, no. 11 (June 10, 1993), pp. 3-4; Chuter, David: 'Boutros-Ghali's Army? Proposals for a United Nations Military Force', CDS Bulletin of Arms Control, no. 15 (London: Council for Arms Control/Centre for Defence Studies, 1994), pp. 11-15; Morrison, Alex: 'A Standing United Nations Military Force', in David A. James (ed.): Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution (New Brunswick: Centre for Conflict Studies, 1994), pp. 185-204. A comparable proposal by two NOD advocates is Conetta, Carl & Charles Knight: 'Vital Force. A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion', Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph, no. 4 (Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, 1995). Back.

Note 50: Farer, Tom J.: 'The Role of Regional Collective Security Arrangements', in Weiss (ed.): op. cit. (note 47), pp. 153-186. On Europe see, e.g. Brauch, Hans Günter: 'From Collective Self-Defence to a Collec-tive Security System in Europe', Disarmament, vol. 14, no. 1, 1991, pp. 1-20; Lutz, Dieter S.: 'Europe on the Way to a Regional System of Collective Security', ibid., vol. 15, no. 4 (1992), pp. 13-26; Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, Hans-Joachim Gießmann, Dieter S. Lutz & Erwin Müller: 'Kollektive Sicherheit zwischen Realität und Modell. Beiträge zur Diskussion über eine Europäische Sicherheits-gemeinschaft (ESG)', Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicher-heits-politik, no. 82 (Hamburg: IFSH, 1994). For a critique see Joffe, Josef: 'Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends', Survival, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 36-50; Russell, Richard: 'The Chimera of Collective Security in Europa', European Security, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 241-255. Back.

Note 51: Gaddis, John Lewis: 'The Long Peace. Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', (1986) in Sean Lynn-Jones (ed.): The Cold War and After. Prospects for Peace. An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 1-44; idem: 'Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future of the International System', in idem : The United States and the End of the Cold War. Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 168-192; Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War',International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-52. Back.

Note 52: Job, Brian L. (ed.): The Insecurity Dilemma. National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Ayoob, Mohammed: The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Back.

Note 53: Sollenberg, Margareta & Peter Wallensteen: 'Major Armed Conflicts', SIPRI Yearbook 1995, pp. 21-35. Back.

Note 54: Mueller, John: Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also Kaysen, Carl: 'Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay', in Lynn-Jones (ed.): op. cit. (note 51), pp. 81-103. A similar view is advanced by Creveld, Martin Van: The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991); idem: Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1993). Back.

Note 55: For a critique of the biased application of the 'logic of collective action' theory to collective security arrangements see Downs, George W. & Keisuke Iida: 'Assessing the Theoretical Case Against Collective Security', in Downs (ed.): op. cit. (note 47), pp. 17-39; cf. Olson, Mancur: The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); idem & Richard Zenkhauser: 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 48, no. 3 (1966), pp. 266-279; Sandler, Todd & Keith Hartley: The Economics of Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 19-51. See also Riker, William H.: The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Aron, Raymond: Paix et guerre entre les nations, eighth edition (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1984), p. 56; Liska, George: Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962); Morgenthau, Hans J.: 'Alliances', in idem: Politics in the Twentieth Century, Abridged Edition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971), pp. 368-389; Walt, Stephen M.: The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 17-33, 147-180. Back.

Note 56: Glaser, Charles L.: 'Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe', International Security, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50. Back.

Note 57: On the sufficiency rules in the CFE Treaty see Hartmann et al.: op. cit. (note 15), pp. 130-135; Koulik & Kokoski: op. cit. (note 15), pp. 23-27; Zellner: op. cit. (note 15), pp. 258-278. On the subsequent redistribution of the forces of the former Soviet Union (i.e. the state for which the rules were intended) see Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Developments and Prospects in 1991', SIPRI Yearbook 1992, pp. 459-479; and idem: 'Conventional Arms Control in Europe', SIPRI Yearbook 1993, pp. 591-617, 671-677, 682-683. Back.

Note 58: The logic is that the latter would be what Schelling calls 'compellant threats', intended to make somebody do something, which is inherently more demanding than deterrent threats. See Schelling: op. cit. 1960 (note 10), pp. 194-199; idem: op. cit. 1966 (note 10), pp. 35-91. Back.

Note 59: See, e.g. Buzan, Barry: An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Military Technology and International Relations (London: Macmillan/IISS, 1987), pp. 135-227; Jervis, Robert: Deterrence and Perception, in Steven E. Miller (ed.): Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence. An International Security Reader (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 57-84; idem: The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); idem: The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Kaplan, Fred: The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Denardo, James: The Amateur Strategist. Intuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Arms Race (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Feaver, Peter D.: 'Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management', Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 754-772. Back.

Note 60: Karp, Regina Cowen (ed.): Security Without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security. (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992); Reiss, Mitchell: Bridled Ambitions. Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995). Back.

Note 61: This is the case for South Africa, that had clandestinely produced six fully assembled bombs, only to dismantle them in the last years of apartheid. See Fischer, David: 'Reversing Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa', Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 3 (1993), pp. 273-286; Howlett, Darryl & John Simpson: 'Nuclearisation and Denuclearisation in South Africa', Survival, vol. 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154-173; Rabert, Bernhard: 'South Africa's Defused Nuclear Weapons-—Trend Reversal in the Third World?', Aussenpolitik. English Edition, vol. 46, no. 1 (First Quarter 1995), pp. 71-81. It was, likewise, the case for three of the four heirs to the Soviet nuclear arsenal, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. See Jalonen, Olli-Pekka: 'Captors of Denu-clearization? Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Nuclear Disarmament', Research Report, no. 54 (Tampere: TAPRI, 1994); Bukharin, Oleg: 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union', Survival, vol. 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 53-72; Batiouk, Victor: 'Ukraine's Non-Nuclear Option', Research Paper, no. 14 (New York: United Nations/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1992). Back.

Note 62: Good recent works on the NPT and non-proliteration in general include: Bailey, Kathleen C.: Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation (Boulder: Westview, 1993); Fischer, David: Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The Past of the Prospects (London: Routledge, 1992); idem, Wolfgang Köttner & Harald Müller: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1994); Reiss, Mitchell & Robert S. Litwak: Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994); Spector, Leonard S. & Mark G. McDonough, with Evan S. Medeiros: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); The United Nations and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United Nations Bluebook Series, Vol. III (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995). Back.

Note 63: See the 'Partnership for Peace Invitation', issued by the North Atlantic Council (10-11 January 1994), stating that 'At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards (...) creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed'. See also Borawski, John: 'Partnership for Peace and Beyond',International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2 (April 1995), pp. 233-246; Williams, Nick: 'Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?', Survival, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 98-110.Santis, Hugh De: 'Romancing NATO: Partnership for Peace and East European Stability', The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 61-81.Rondholz, Harald: 'Partnerschaft für den Frieden. Bilanz nach einem Jahr', Europäische Sicherheit, vol. 44, no. 3 (March 1995), pp. 44-46.Kostecki, Janusz & Katarzyna Zukrowska: 'Partnership for Peace and Poland', Peace and the Sciences, vol. 25 (December 1994), pp. 20-25. Back.

Note 64: Thompson, Julian: The Lifeblood of War. Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey's, UK, 1991); Foxton, Peter: Powering War. Modern Land Force Logistics (London: Brassey's, UK, 1993). On Desert Storm, see Scales: op. cit. (note 46). Back.

Note 65: Tamamoto, Masaru: 'Trial of an Ideal: Japan's Debate over the Gulf Crisis', World Policy Journal, vol. 8, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 89-106; Pyle, Kenneth B.: 'Japan and the Future of Collective Security', in Danny Unger & Paul Blackburn (eds.): Japan's Emerging Global Role (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 99-117; Asada, Msahiko: 'Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peace Enforcement: Conceptual and Legal Underpinnings of the U.N. Role', in Selig Harrison, & Masashi Nishihara (eds.): UN Peacekeeping. Japanese and American Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), pp. 31-70; Tanaka, Akihiko: 'The Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and U.N. Peacekeeping', ibid., pp. 89-105; Nishihara, Masashi: 'Japan-U.S. Cooperation in U.N. Peace Efforts', ibid., pp. 163-175. Back.

Note 66: Jones, Archer: The Art of War in the Western World (London: Harrap, 1988), pp. 134-141; Fuller, J.F.C.: Military History of the Western World, vol. 1: 'From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto' (1954, reprinted New York: Da Capo Press, 1987), pp. 406-436; Carlton, Eric: War and Ideology (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-109. Back.

Note 67: See 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept' (7-8 November 1991), art. 38 and 52-54; 'North Atlantic Council Declaration' (10-11 January 1994), art. 9; NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1995), pp. 75-76, 83. See also Miller, David: 'Multinationality: Implications of NATO's E-vol-ving Strategy', International Defense Review, vol. 24, no. 3 (March 1991), pp. 211-213; Schulte, Heinz: 'NATO Steps Further Down the Road to Multi-National Forces', Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 16, no. 23 (07.12.91), pp. 1096-1097; 'The JDW Interview' (with Lt Gen Sir Jeremy Mackenzie, Commander of the ARRC), ibid., vol. 18, no. 8 (22.08.1992), p. 32; Kemp, Ian: 'NATO's ARRC: Shaping Up for Service', Jane's Defence Weekly-—Yearbook, 1994, pp. 20-24; Lowe, Karl & Thomas-Durell Young: 'Multinational Corps in NATO', Survival, vol. 33, no. 1 (Jan-Feb. 1991), pp. 66-77; Mackinlay, John: 'Improving Multifunctional Forces', ibid., vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 149-173; Barry, Charles: 'NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice', ibid., vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81-97; Jordan, Robert S.: 'NATO's Structural Changes for the 1990s', in S. Victor Papacosma & Mary Ann Heiss (eds.): NATO in the Post-Cold War Wra: Does It Have a Future? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 41-69; Sloan, Stanley R.: 'NATO and the United States', ibid., pp. 153-178; Palin, Roger H.: 'Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects', Adelphi Papers, no. 294 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/IISS, 1995); Schnell, Harry H.: 'Multinationale Streitkräftestrukturen', Europäische Sicherheit, vol. 42, no. 8 (August 1993), pp. 417-420; Kelleher, Catherine McArdle: The Future of European Security. An Interim Assessment (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 67-73; Harrell, Margaret Cecchine & Robert Howe: 'Military Issues in Multinational Operations', in Paul K. Davis (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), pp. 543-561. On multinationality in the UN, see Diehl, Paul F.: 'Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options', Armed Forces and Society, vol. 19, no. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 209-230; Pugh, Michael C.: 'Multinational Maritime Force: A Breakout from Traditional Peacekeeping?', Southampton Papers in International Policy, no. 1 (Southampton: Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of Southampton, July 1992). Back.

Note 68: See, e.g. Field Manual 100-20: Operations Other Than War (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1995); and Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations (same publishers, 30 December 1994), chapter 2C-D. Back.

Note 69: This is, for instance, the case for the three Baltic states. See Beaver, Paul: 'BALTBAT Bonds the Baltics', Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 23, no. 9 (03.04.1995), pp. 19-20. Back.

Note 70: See, for instance, Kaldor, Mary: The Baroque Arsenal (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981), pp. 169-218; Deger, Saadet: 'Military Expenditure and Arms Trade: Trends and Prospects', in Lawrence R. Klein, Fu-Chen Lo & Warwick J. McKibbin (eds.): Arms Reduction. Economic Implications in the Post-Cold War Era (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1995), pp. 19-51; Pugh, Philip: 'The Procurement Nexus', Defence Economics, vol. 4, no. 2 (1993), pp. 179-194. Back.

Note 71: Rodley, Nigel (ed.): To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Muldoon, James P.: 'What Happened to Humanitarian Intervention?', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 51, no. 2 (March-April 1995), pp. 60-61; Dorman, Andrew M. & Thomas G. Otte (eds.): Military Intervention. From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention (Aldershot: Datmouth, 1995); Olmstedt, Nick: 'Humanitarian Intervention?', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May 1995), pp. 96-102; Reed, Laura W. & Carl Kaysen (eds.): Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention. A Collection of Essays from a Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Commitee on International Security Studies, AASS, 1993); Lyons & Mastonduno (eds.): op. cit. (note 4), passim; Roberts, Adam: 'Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights', International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 429-450; Weiss, Thomas G.: 'Triage. Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era', World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 59-68; Zenk, Peter-Michael: 'Auf dem Weg zur Weltinnenpolitik? Zur Problematik militärischer Intervention bei innerstaatlichen Konflikten', Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, no. 86 (Hamburg: IFSH, 1994); Morris, Justin: 'The United Nations: Collective Security and Human Rights', in J.M. Davis (ed.): op. cit. (note 8), pp. 113-135. Back.

Note 72: This is the main thesis of Fukyama, Francis: The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). On the UN's role in this process, see The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1995. The United Nations Bluebook Series, Vol. VII (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995); Farer, Tom J. & Felice Gaer: 'The UN and Human Rights', in Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury (eds.): United Nations, Divided World. The UN's Role in International Relations, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 240-296; Hannum, Hurst: 'Human Rights', in Schachter & Joyner (eds.): op. cit. (note 23), vol. 1, pp. 319-348; Bennett: op. cit. (note 39), pp. 375-404. Back.

Note 73: See note 4 above. Back.

Note 74: The resolution itself, as well as accompanying documents, can be found in Weller (ed.): op. cit. (note 46), pp. 12-13 and 714-725. See further Freedman, Lawrence & David Boren: '''Safe Havens'' for Kurds in post-War Iraq', in Rodley (ed.): op. cit. (note 71), pp. 43-92; Freedman, Lawrence & Efraim Karsh: op. cit. (note 46), pp. 421-425; Stromseth, Jane E.: 'Iraq's Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Challenges', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.): Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 77-118. Back.

Note 75: On the interventions in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) see Hirsch, John L. & Robert B. Oakley: Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995); Lyons, Terrence & Ahmed I. Samatar: Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Brookings Occasional Papers. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Sahnoun, Mohamed: Somalia. The Missed Opportunities (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); Clark, Jeffrey: 'Debacle in Somalia: Failure of Collective Response', in Damrosch (ed.): op. cit. (note 74), pp. 205-240; Sapir, Debarati G. & Hedwig Deconick: 'The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance and Military Intervention in Somalia', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.): The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 127-150; Baynham, Simon: 'Somalia-—UN at the Crossroads', in African Defence Review. A Working Paper Series, no. 15 (Halfway House, RSA: Institute for Defence Policy, 1994); Lalande, Serge: 'Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping', in Daniel Warner (ed.): New Dimensions of Peacekeeping (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 69-99. On Haiti see Fauriol, Georges A. (ed.): Haitian Frustrations. Dilemmas of U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995); Acevedo, Domingo E.: 'The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy', in Damrosch (ed.): op. cit. (note 74), pp. 119-156; Preeg, Ernest H.: The Haitian Dilemma. A Case Study in Demographics, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Significant Issues Series, Vol. 18, no. 1 (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996). Back.

Note 76: On UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), see Findlay, Trevor: Cambodia. The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC. SIPRI Research Report, no. 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Heininger, Janet E.: Peacekeeping in Transition. The United Nations in Cambodia (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994); Ratner, Steven R.: 'The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution of Internal Conflicts?', in Damrosch (ed.): op. cit. (note 74), pp. 241-273; idem: 'The United Nations in Cambodia and the New Peacekeeping', in Warner (ed.): op. cit. (note 75), pp. 41-68; Doyle, Michael & Ayaka Suzuki: 'Transitional Authority in Cambodia', in Weiss (ed.): op. cit. 1995 (note 75), pp. 127-150. Back.

Note 77: On UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force), see Steinberg, James B.: 'International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict', in Damrosch (ed.): op. cit. (note 74), pp. 27-76; Freedman, Lawrence: 'Bosnia: Does Peace Support Make Any Sense?', NATO Review, vol. 43, no. 6 (November 1995), pp. 19-23; Gow, James: 'Nervour Bunnies: The International Community and the Yugoslav War of Dissolution, the Politics of Military Intervention in a Time of Change', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.): Military Intervention in European Conflicts (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 14-33; Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Appeasement, Intervention and the Future of Europe', ibid., pp. 34-55; Ghebaldi, Victor-Yves: 'UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia: The Misuse of Peacekeeping and Associated Conflict Management Techniques', in Warner (ed.): op. cit. (note 75), pp. 13-40; Marcuse, Elie: 'The Former Yugoslavia: NATO's Role', ibid., pp. 173-179; Eknes, Åke: 'The United Nations' Predicament in the Former Yugoslavia', in Weiss (ed.): op. cit. 1995 (note 75), pp. 109-126. Back.

Note 78: On IFOR (Implementation Force), see Solana, Javier: 'NATO's Role in Bosnia: Charting a New Course for the Alliance', NATO Review, vol. 44, no. 2 (March 1996), pp. 3-6; Julwan, George A.: 'SHAPE and IFOR: Adapting to the Needs of Tomorrow', ibid., pp. 6-9; Lightburn, David: 'NATO and the Challenge of Multifunctional Peacekeeping', ibid., pp. 10-14; Eide, Espen Barth & Per Erik Solli: 'From Blue to Green. The Transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Working Papers, no. 539 (Oslo: NUPI, 1995); Nicholls, D.V.: 'Bosnia: UN and NATO', RUSI Journal, vol. 141, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 31-36; Portillo, Michael: 'Bosnia-— Implementing the Peace Agreement', ibid., pp. 27-30. For the Dayton Agreement which IFOR is supposed to help implement, see 'General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Review of International Affairs, vol. 47, no. 1041, passim. Back.

Note 79: For an elaborate comparative account of previous missions see Durch, William J. (ed.): The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Diehl, Paul F.: International Peacekeeping (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993). General analyses of 'new peace-keeping', include Roper, John, Masashi Nishihara, Olara A. Ottunu & Enid C.B. Schoettle: Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping. A Report to the Trilateral Commission (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1993); Ratner, Steven R.: The New UN Peacekeeping. Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press and Council of Foreign Relations, 1995); Warner (ed.): op. cit. (note 75), passim; Berdal, Mats R.: 'Whither UN Peacekeeping. An Analysis of the Chganging Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping With Proposals for Its Enhancement', Adelphi Papers, no. 281 (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1993); Biermann, Wolfgang: '''Old'' UN Peacekeeping Principles and ''New'' Conflicts. Some Ideas to Reduce the Troubles of the Post-Cold War Peace Missions', Working Papers, no. 18 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994); James, Alan: 'Internal Peace-Keeping. A Dead End for the UN?', Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 44 (December 1993), pp. 359-368; Kühne, Winrich: Blauhelme in einer Turbulenten Welt. Beiträge internationaler Experten zur Fortentwicklung des Völkerrechts und der Vereinten Nationen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993); Meacham, James: 'From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking. United Nations Facing a Changing Role', International Defense Review, vol. 25, no. 3 (1992), pp. 217-221. Back.

Note 80: The US Army prefers the term 'peace operations', whereas the British seem to prefer 'peace support operations'. See FM 100-23: op. cit. (note 68) for the US; and 'Wider Peacekeeping', RUSI Journal, vol. 141, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 45-50, for the Britsh terminology. Back.

Note 81: Taw, Jennifer Morrison & Bruce Hoffman: 'Operations Other Than War', in P.K. Davis (ed.): op. cit. (note 67), pp. 223-250. Back.

Note 82: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'Supplement to An Agenda For Peace. Report of the Secretary-general on the Work of the Organization', 3 January 1995, UN Documents, A/50/60-S/1995/1. Back.

Note 83: Kaplan, Robert: 'The Coming Anarchy', The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994. See also Van Creveld: op. cit. 1991 (note 54), who predicts the end of 'trinitarian war'. Back.

Note 84: See Goodwin-Hill, Guy & Ilene Cohn: Child Soldiers. The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Back.

Note 85: On good account of the 'internal refugees' problem is Deng, Francis M.: Protecting the Dispossessed. A Challenge for the International Community (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993). Back.

Note 86: Dobbie, Charles: 'Alms Under Arms: Military Support for Humanitarian Operations', Draft of an Adelphi Paper, forthcoming 1996. See also Doel, M.T.: 'Military Assistance in Humanitarian Aid Operations: Impossible Paradox or Inevitable Development?' RUSI Journal, vol. 140, no. 5 (October 1995), pp. 26-32. Back.

Note 87: This has been the focus of a large UNIDIR research project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project. Publications have included the following: 'Managing Arms in Peace Process: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe', UNIDIR/95/41; 'Managing Arms in Peace Process: Somalia', UNIDIR/95/30; and 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina', UNIDIR/96/7. Back.

Note 88: FM 100-23, op. cit. (note 68), Chapter 1B. Back.

Note 89: FM 100-23, op. cit. (note 68), Chapter 1D. Back.

Note 90: See, for instance, the notion of 'miles protector' advanced by Däniker, Gustav: 'The Guardian Soldier: On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces', Research Paper, no. 36 (New York & Geneva: UNIDIR, 1995, UNIDIR/95/28). Back.