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The Security Policy of Lithuania and the 'Integration Dilemma'

Grazina Miniotaite

May 2000

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute


Table of Contents



Foreign and security policy (FSP) of Lithuania, like that of other Baltic states, is closely related to the development of her political identity. The main objectives of Lithuania's FSP, those of strengthening state sovereignty and joining the European process of integration, are subject to the tensions as far as the 'integration dilemma' in Lithuania's political discourse. This dilemma pits state sovereignty against the processes of integration, for the preservation of sovereignty by way of an integration with international institutions requires the abandonment of certain aspects of sovereignty.

The problems involved in the integration dilemma have a number of different aspects and can be approached from a variety of theoretical positions. Traditionally, the 'integration dilemma' has been tackled by utilizing integration and adaptation theories. After a brief survey of these theories the present study proceeds with the analysis of the development of Lithuania's FSP from the perspective of social constructivism.

The analysis is based on the hypothesis that Lithuania's political reality may be conceptualized as an interplay at least of two competitive discourses: the discourse on sovereignty and the integration discourse, with each of these reflecting different discursive practices. Considered from the perspective of constructivism, the integration dilemma acquires a very different content. Discussions about the relative power of loyalty to Europe versus that to nation/state loses its point, as Europe and state/nation are mutually constitutive.

On the basis of the hypothesis, the present study attempts to catch the link between security conceptualizations and Lithuania's FS policies since the declaration of independence in 1990. In particular, the prospects of Baltic states' co-operation, Lithuanian - Polish relations and the process of integration with the West are considered, with an emphasis on the problems of NATO enlargement and European integration.

The analysis concludes that Lithuania's FSP is dominated by the precepts of the sovereignty discourse. In justifying the integration process the meanings which have been shaped in the sovereignty discourse are then transferred to the emerging integration discourse. However, the conflict-based model of the relations between 'inside' and 'outside', when applied to the integration process, can easily lead to misunderstandings and inadequate assessment of the situation in practical politics.



The post- Cold War European development has been characterized by two seemingly opposing tendencies, namely, that of fragmentation which is related to the emergence of new states and that of integration related to these states' desire of joining the international community. 1 The relation between these two tendencies is often characterized as 'the integration dilemma', i.e. "the dilemma between being "entrapped" by the integration process or "abandoned" through possible exclusion." (Kelstrup, 1998:38). The dilemma sets state sovereignty against the processes of integration by stressing that the preservation of sovereignty by way of an integration with international institutions requires the abandonment of certain aspects of sovereignty (Kelstrup, 1993; Petersen, 1996). As Stanley Hoffman notes, "What threatens us is, rather, an imbalance between the supreme legitimate authority that still resides in the sovereign state, and the incipient but fragmentary and feeble authority of collective institutions dealing with problems that transcend the states, or exceed their capacities, or require the reduction of their authority" (Hoffman, 1997: ix).

The integration dilemma has influenced the political climate in many of the newly emerged states by creating tensions between domestic and foreign policies. The problems involved in the integration dilemma have many different aspects and can be approached from a variety of theoretical positions. Traditionally, these issues have been tackled by integration theories. However, in this study I shall examine the development of Lithuania's FS policy from the perspective of social constructivism. 2

My analysis is based on the hypothesis that Lithuania's political reality has been conceptualized in terms of at least two competitive discourses: a discourse on sovereignty and another one on integration, each ot these implemented in different discursive practices. It is claimed that Lithuania's FSP is based on the interplay of these two discourses. First, (in part I) I analyze the 'integration dilemma', as it is interpreted in integration theories and in constructivism, supplementing it with an outline based on a constructivist interpretation of security. Then (in part II) an attempt is made, within the framework of such hypothesis, to capture the link between security conceptualizations and Lithuania's FSP since the declaration of independence in 1990.


Part I: The 'Integration Dilemma' and Conceptualizations of Security

1. Integration Theories and the 'Integration Dilemma'

Contemporary integration theories are concerned with the nation state transformation in the context f European integration. Basically, the unfolding of integration theories is a reflection of developments in the process of European integration. The theoretical stagnation of the 1970s was followed by revitalization and, later on, by novel theoretical developments. Among the earliest developments, a most fruitful one turned out to be Karl Deutsch's transactionalism, with its stress on the importance of common values and issues of identity for the development of a "security community". 3 Initially there were conspicuous differences in the treatment of the integration process between the functionalist and the normative view. The functionalist view stressed the importance of the increase of institutional capacity of the newly developing political system (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970), while the normative view was mostly about community building: "Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new political centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones" (Haas, 1961:196).

A new impulse for the development of integration theories was created after the European Single Act and the Maastricht Treaty. Their contents were unquestionably influenced by the inter-paradigm debate between neorealism, a state-centric position, and liberalism, characterized by its pluralist non-state-centric position. Among most influential theoretical perspectives on the study of the contemporary integration process are the liberal inter-govementalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1997, 1998), which is usually associated with the neorealist paradigm, and the multi-level governance approach (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996), related to the liberal paradigm. 4 Both acknowledge the heterogeneity of integration by stressing the importance of both state and non-state actors although liberal inter-govementalism is more sensitive to the individual state position in the process of integration. Integration is treated as an interstate bargaining through a series of intergovemental "bargains", aiming at the strengthening of control over domestic affairs and primary importance according to the problems of state survival. (Kelstrup, 1998: 37). Limitation of sovereignty in exchange for the benefits of integration can only be accepted if joining supranational institutions is in the interest of the state, that is, if it contributes to national security and national economic and social development.

This is the view of the integration process that creates the 'integration dilemma'. The basic motive for integration — the preservation and the strengthening of state sovereignty — is characterized by the contradiction between the goal (state sovereignty) and the means (joining a broader political community). Thus liberal inter-governmentalism — as an aspect of the state-centred view on the integration process — is closely tied to the discourse on sovereignty.

There has, more recently, been a growing interest in the 'multi-level governance' approach which considers the 'governance' of European integration as a very complicated decision system with many different kinds of actors, the state being just one among them. The multi-level governance theories are geared towards the tendencies of state transformation (weakening of the state) which are explained by globalization and European integration. The state is then defined as a set of rules or a set of formal institutions, rather than in terms of a sovereign actor ( Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). The difference between domestic and international politics is seen as being gradually eroded. Politics come to be regulated by common rules rather than by the nation state political elite. It might appear that according to the multi-level governance approach there is no real integration dilemma, for in the decision-making process there is no antagonism between a nation state and the integration process. However, in this case one is confronted with a decision-making legitimacy problem, this being a problem that can only be solved by a new normative theory of European integration (Kelstrup, 1998: 40).

2. Constructivism and European Integration

All the above integration theories focus on the integration process within a fixed setting. However, integration in terms of transformation of European states — one that comprises the change both of identities and values — remains at the periphery of these theories' concern. This might be due to the fact that the tools of analysis employed are not adequate for the purpose of revealing "the impact of 'intersubjectivity' and 'social context' on the continuing process of European integration" (Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, 1999:2). It was the search for more adequate tools of analysis that led in 1990s to the so-called constructivist turn in the theory of international relations. Despite the rapidly growing number of publications associating themselves with constructivism its basic message is still far from clear. 5 According to John Gerard Ruggie constructivism seeks, first of all "to problematize the identities and interests of states, to show that and how they are socially constructed" (Ruggie, 1998:33).

The analysis of identity-formation is mainly focused on the impact of rules and norms, on the role of language and of political discourse in (re)constructing national identities under the influence of the integration process. The dynamics of European integration is considered "as intersubjective understandings or discourses of actors at many levels, possibly overlapping" (Larsen, 1998: 245). Such authors as Ruggie, Wæver consider European integration in terms of neo-mediavalism, i.e. — the emergence of overlapping patterns of political authority and territoriality (Ruggie, 1998).

Considered from the perspective of constructivism the integration dilemma acquires a very different content. The discussion about the relative power of loyalty to Europe versus that to nation/state declines in significance (Wæver, 1998: 105). Europe and state/nation are mutually constitutive. The analysis is now focused on "the interaction between the national and the European level and the meanings and identities which shape, or are shaped by, the process. (Larsen, 1998:244). The emerging tension between the state level and the European level is analyzed as a result of a conflict between two different discourses. Accordingly, any analysis of the FS policy demands an analysis of intersubjective meaning of such concepts as state, nation, Europe and security.

3. Constructivism and Security

Security can be analyzed as an objective condition (as in the case with a realist or a conventional understanding of security) or as an intersubjective phenomenon (as conceived by constructivism). The objectivist approach to security became predominant after the Second World War, as the influence of Keynesian economics expanded considerably the functions of the state. Advancement towards the welfare state, with the government taking over the responsibility for the well-being of its citizens, naturally led to the expansion of the powers of the state. The preservation of national security, conceived as an objective identification and neutralization of threats to the state, became a central priority of the government. It is within the framework of such an objectivist conception of security that a major role was accorded to the institution of experts (Dalby, 1990: 4-16).

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union that was never anticipated in the scenarios of the experts, the end of the Cold War, the prolonged crisis in Yugoslavia and the increasing influence of the ideas of liberalism posed a challenge to the conventional understanding of security. There has been in security studies a noticeable shift towards the conception of security as an intersubjective phenomenon, as a social construct, "a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to stress on culture, civilization and identity; the role of ideas, norms and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which the process takes place" (Krause, Williams, 1997:49).

In contrast to realism's quest to legitimize and naturalize status quo constructivism focuses on the sources of change. It is particularly promising as a tool for an analysis of security and foreign policies of the newly emerged states. As to the constructivist view, the central issue in post-Cold War international studies consists of collective identity formation which is to be analyzed by focusing on how different groups constitute one another's identities and how social boundaries between human collectives are maintained. A constructivist analysis articulates, in other words, how contemporary insecurities are being created and intensified by the settled oppositions of inside/outside, self/other, particularity/universality, identity/difference (Walker, 1993). Security is thus defined, at least in some respects, as a matter of intersubjectivity, as a social construct. "It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them" (Lipshutz, 1995). Discourse is to be understood as "a relational totality which constitutes and organizes social relations around a particular structure of meanings" (Doty, 1996: 239). A constructivist approach has introduced some important changes in the goals an analysis of security should pursue. The chief problem becomes mainly that of finding an answer to the question — "How do ideas about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse and, eventually, become institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles and practices" (Lipschutz, 1995 ). In other words, how and why is there an intersubjective actualization and de-actualization of environmental, economical, societal issues as threats (or securitization and de-securitization)? In applying the constructivist in the analysis of politics, the focus is mostly on particular conceptualizations of security/insecurity (from which follow policy and practice). "There are not only struggle over security among nations, but also struggle over security among notions. Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discourses of security, as well" (Lipshutz, 1995).

4. Security Conceptualizations: Between Discourses on Sovereignty and Integration

Lithuania's political life presents ample material for analysis of conceptualizations of security. Since 1990 the problems of national security have been regarded to be of major importance. A first document 'An Outline of the Concept of National Security' was issued in October 30, 1990. This took place only half a year after the declaration of Lithuania's independence and almost a year before the international recognition of Lithuania (Lithuania joined the UN on September 17, 1991). It was drafted by the chief officers of the Department of National Defence. In 1992 a group of scholars, commissioned by the Department of National Defence, prepared the first draft of the national conception of security to be submitted for the adoption by Seimas, Lithuania's parliament. Later on, at least three more drafts, prepared by different political groupings, were made public. In December 1996 Seimas finally adopted a document titled "the Basics of National Security of Lithuania." The texts of these documents provide rich material for the analysis as to the conceptualizations of security and to the related dynamics of security policy. As already noted, they are part of Lithuania's political discourse, one constituted by two overlapping discourses. Accordingly, the contents of the security conception as presented there will be here articulated by the contrast and the interplay of the sovereignty and the integration discourse.

The sovereignty discourse is related to the logical, the ontological and the ethical characteristics of the modern state. As Jens Bartelson has emphasized, a modern state is being realized through a dialectic of conflict that establishes an inside out of the outside, an identity out of a difference, "it treats identity and difference as qualities that implicate each other logically as well as temporally" (Bartelson, 1995: 211). At the core of sovereignty discourse lie the concepts of security, state and nation. Discursive practices construe meanings which entrench the differentiation between the inside (self) and outside (threatening Other). Security is identified with the security of the inside (the nation state). "In seeking to authorize itself the state must confront an other" (Burton & Carlen, 1979: 48). The principal distinction drawn between the secure inside and the threatening outside is the precondition for the securitization of the outside and the inside (in so far as its integrity is threatened), i.e. "the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1997: 23-24).

The discourse on integration has not been as thoroughly analyzed in constructivist security studies as the one on sovereignty, though in recent years the flow of literature based on the assumptions of reflectivism has grown considerably ( Jorgensen, 1997; Weaver, 1998;Diez, 1999, 1999a ). These publications deal with such issues as how Europe becomes part of national identity, relating them to the problems of European governance and legitimization of new European order. They show that depending on the interpretation of the European integration (e.g. as federal state, economic community or as network of supranational, national and subnational institutions) the foreign policy of particular counties (mostly EU member states) are being shaped. They also show that 'Europe' "can be incorporated in given nation state identities" only if its meaning resonates with core elements of older visions of the political order (Marcussen, 1999: 614). These studies are mostly concerned with the analysis of European political integration as conceived from the point of view of EU member states. The present article is an attempt to explicate how the constitution of Lithuanian political and security identity is related to her foreign and security policies.

In the paper I consider the integration discourse as comprising those discursive practices and meanings that are related to a partial abandonment of sovereignty conceived as "the supreme legitimate authority within a given territory" (Hashmi, 1997: 5).

The texts in focus of analysis belong mainly to what may be termed as the official discourse. The analysis has first of all to identify the author, the reader, the object and the Other: The purpose of official discourse is "to allay, suspend and close off popular doubt through an ideal and discursive appropriation of material problem" (Burton & Carlen, 1979:13). "Either the text can effect closure of a problem via a meconnaissance which denies the Other, or it can give new meaning to a problem via recognition of a problematic which denies not the Other but the Other's already known conditions of existence" (Burton & Carlen, 1979: 33). In official discourse a situation or a problem is "closed" by the displacement of one paradigm by another. There is thus a constant process of constitution of social reality. It is no accident that discourse analysis has been characterized as deconstruction in order to point out that the goal of analysis is disclosing something that was consciously or unconsciously "closed".

Let us then proceed to an analysis of the texts. The concept of security will be explicated by addressing the following questions: Who or what performs the speaking (author)? What are the referent objects for security (object)? Who is an addressee (reader)? And how are identified the main dangers and threats for security (Other)?

4.1 The Draft An Outline of the Concept of National Security, 1990

In March 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic issued the Declaration of Lithuania's Independence, a unilateral and defying act of separation from the Soviet Union. Even though neither the Soviet Union, nor any other state was ready to recognize Lithuania's sovereignty, the process of institutionalizing the independence began at once. A Department of National Defence was created in April. This was a period of dual government, as the governmental structures of independent Lithuania were created while the Soviet authorities were still in place. The population was overwhelmingly in support of independence and accepted the legitimacy of new state institutions, despite the fact that Soviet Union declared them illegal and attempted to prevent their functioning both by decrees and by the explicit use of force.

The Outline of the Concept of National Security was born under these circumstances (October, 1990) A draft of the document, four pages long, was prepared by the leadership of the Defence department. It was not open for public discussion and was targeted primarily for the narrow circle of the political elite of Lithuania. As to the Defence department itself, functioning in a state that did not have legal existence by international standards, the document was in essence a symbolic expression of the quest for independence. Nevertheless, some of the principles stated in the document became the building blocks of Lithuania's foreign and security policy till the withdrawal of Russia's troops from Lithuania (August 31, 1993).

The very first sentence of the Outline, namely: "National security is the necessary condition for the preservation, development and continuity of the nation" makes it clear that the guiding idea is that of the nation state. However, in defining the referent object of security the nation is no longer mentioned. Moreover, security is confined to the state and the citizens; i.e. conceived in extremely broad terms comprising the "spiritual, ecological, economic, civil and military" dimensions. The ambiguity of the text reflects the ambiguity of the situation at the period, one characterized by the necessity of winning popular support (including that of non-Lithuanians) for independence needed to obtain the state's international recognition. The aim was to achieve this without abandoning the nationalist aspirations. The text contains no explicit reference to particular threats or enemies, though obviously the Soviet Union, still in existence at that time (with its troops still on Lithuania's territory and having a common border with Lithuania), was the intended target. Baltic and the Scandinavian states are explicitly referred to as friendly states.

The document reads: "In exploiting Lithuania's geographical and political position, the economic situation and the historically evolved international ties, the policy should aim at creating in the Baltic states a zone of increased confidence between the East and the West" (p. 1). In the zone "the countries' neutrality and immunity" should be recognized. 6

One can thus conclude that the first document devoted to the articulation of Lithuania's security was as ambivalent as the future of a country not yet internationally recognized. It was dominated by the meanings of sovereignty discourse with its attempts to define the 'inside' and the 'outside' and to identify the Other. The document was still compatible with a number of different possible developments of Lithuania's political identity, even though an orientation to the West was already quite prominent.

4.2 The Draft Conception of National Security of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992

The dual rule that ensued after the declaration of independence could not last long. In January 1991 Moscow made an attempt at forcing Lithuania into submission. The attempt failed primarily due to an international opinion being favourable towards Lithuania, to the collapse of the authority of government in the Soviet Union and to the massive support of Lithuania's population for the cause of independence, manifested in forms such as civil disobedience and mass action. This explains why Lithuania's government was very favourably disposed towards civilian based defence and made, even before the January events, some efforts at implementing it in practice (Miniotaite, 1996). In September 1991, after joining the UN, Lithuania became an independent subject of international relations. The problem of national security rose to a new level. In 1992 a draft of the conception of national security was prepared by a group of scholars from the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law, commissioned by the Defence Ministry. 7

In preparing such a draft the problems of national security were extensively discussed in the seminars of the Institute. Moreover, a conference was organized and the draft of the conception published in a book entitled Lithuania's National Security: Theory and the Realities (Bagdonavicius, 1994). The problems of security were on the agenda in many different circles of society. The draft prepared by the scholars did not, however, satisfy the aspirations of Lithuania's political elite and was silently rejected. It did not correspond to the views of the political elite, but rather that of intellectuals striving to regain the support of the state they nearly lost. Later, the main political parties presented their own visions of national security in which one can easily discern a number of points originating from the scholars' draft.

Despite a rejection, the text, 20 pages long, constituted an important stage in the process of conceptualizing and developing Lithuania's political identity. National security was defined there as: "the maintenance of conditions favorable for the pursuit of the interests of the citizen, the nation and the state, to be achieved by minimizing the destabilization created by threats and dangers' (Bagdonavicius, 1994:128). Thus the referent objects for security are the citizen (whose "liberties and rights are to be protected"), the nation ("the preservation of the identity of the Lithuanian people") and the state ("the maintenance and strengthening of independence"). Lithuania's political identity was defined by drawing an explicit distinction between external and internal threats.

The following items were considered there to be the external threats to Lithuania's security: "tensions between Lithuania and Russia's Federation (in particular, because of the presence of Russian troops in Lithuania); emerging tensions between Lithuania and the CIS due to the attempts of the latter preserving the common military-strategic space; instability of the East European region due to economic, social and ethnic problems; the possibility of the country's economic and financial subjection to other states and multinational corporations; the possibility of the decline of the scientific and cultural potential because of external influences; ecological, social pathological and other threats from abroad." (Bagdonavieius, 1994: 132). There were also other threats identified as internal covering, in fact, all the domains of social life from politics to culture (including, e.g. negative demographic trends and insufficient support for the development of spiritual and moral culture (Bagdonavicius, 1994: 135)). Thus the concept of threat — as defined in the document — allowed for the politicization and securitization of the whole social life, societal and cultural life in particular.

The draft was based on the idea of national identity as fixed and unchanging, and thus particular emphasis was laid on its preservation and purification. The goal of the security policy stood out as that of "achieving maximal independence both from the East and from the West" (Bagdonavicius, 1994:133). The threat of "Westernization" was seen as leading to an erosion of national identity, culture and values. Relations with the Baltic and the Scandinavian states were seen as particulary important for the preservation of national security. 8 The common security interests of these states were depicted as having "led to the revival of the idea of a collective security system for Baltoscandia and to its practical implementation" (133). Similarly, the idea of a common security region for all the Baltic Sea states was seen as promising and desirable.

It should be noted that great importance was accorded to a civilian based defence ("people power") as a major vehicle for upholding national security. "Non-violent resistance is not only a means for defending independent statehood, but is also conducive to the survival of the nation" (127). With even modest military capacity, non-violent defence is said to "help preserve the nation's self-confidence and faith in the power of the state" (134).

It is rather obvious that the conception of national security as developed in the draft prepared by scholars was imbued by the meanings pertaining to a sovereignty discourse. The clear-cut division of the inside/outside, a rigid identification of permanent threats, state-centrism, a belief that "politics is science inscribed in law" (Burton & Carlen, 1979: 38), all of this shows the conception's links with the ontological and the epistemological premises of a modern state and with the paradigm of realism. The project's stress on cultural and political isolationism was quite alien to the post- Cold War atmosphere of openness. Hence it is no wonder that the draft did not translate into an official document.

4.3 The Basics of National Security of Lithuania, 1996

The Basics of National Security of Lithuania (BNSL, adopted by Seimas in December 1996, was prepared by a task group created at the end of 1994. The group consisted of representatives from all the parties represented in Seimas, so that one can say the final document expressed the common attitude of Lithuania's political elite towards the issue of national security. During the five years between the first draft of the conception and the document adopted by Seimas, Lithuania's foreign and security policy acquired a distinctly pro-Western orientation. Membership in NATO and the EU became the chief goals of Lithuania's foreign and security policy. And what an extent and in what form did the new political realities find their expression in the BNSL? The document defines the following as the chief goals of the national security policy: "to develop and strengthen democracy, ensure a safe existence of the Nation and the State, deter any potential aggressor and defend the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the constitutional order of the state" (Basics, 1996:1). The referent objects for national security are "human and citizen's rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; the cherished values of the nation, its rights and conditions for a free development; state independence; constitutional order; the integrity of the state's territory; environmental and cultural heritage"(Basics, 1996: 2).

The definition of the "risks and threats" for national security is based on a clear-cut dissection of political reality into the inside and the outside and the risks and threats are, accordingly, defined as internal and external. Without listing all the threats envisaged, let us single out the major types and examples of these. External threats are classified into political ("political pressure and dictate, attempts to establish zones of special interest and ensure special rights, preventing Lithuania from obtaining international security; threats by foreign states to use force under the pretext of defending their interests; attempts to impose upon Lithuania dangerous and discriminatory international agreements"); military ("military capability in close proximity to Lithuanian borders; military transit through Lithuania"); specific ("illegal immigration and transit migration, influx of refugees; attempts by other states to impose on Lithuania the principles of dual citizenship"); economic ("economic pressure, blockade or other hostile economic actions; investment of capital with political goals") ( Basics, 1996:10-11). Though the document makes no reference to particular countries as posing a threat for Lithuania's security, anyone familiar with the realities of the region would easily discern that the threats classified as political, military and, partly, economic are conceived as originating from Russia.

Similarly, the definition of "Potential Internal Risks and Domestic Crises" includes the political ("political instability or crisis of State power posing threat to the constitutional democratic order"); economic ("rise in unemployment, decline in production volume and decrease of gross national product beyond a critical level"); social ("excessive differentiation in wealth approaching a critical level and threatening to provoke a social conflict"); national ("factors weakening the Nation's immunity and sense of identity; negligence toward national values, spread of antihumanistic, pro-violence pseudo culture"), criminal ("high crime rate, corruption") and some other risks for Lithuania's security ("environmental pollution, especially with carcinogens and mutagens").

Such a detailed listing of threats illuminates a tendency towards the politicization of all spheres of life and lays the ground for broad securitization. This is confirmed in the third part of the document entitled "The means of ensuring national security". It begins with the statement that "national security shall be ensured by the state, by the citizens". Then follows a detailed list of the domains of social life, from economics to culture, which are considered liable to insecurity and thus subject to political control. Among the means for ensuring national security is "unconditional defence and total civil resistance in the event of aggression" (Basics, 1996:2) as well as integration with the EU, the WEU and joining of NATO. The latter presumably means that the main motive for the integration with the West is the protection of Lithuania's sovereignty. A most prominent feature of the document is the partition of the security space into those of peace and those of potential conflict zones. One can thus conclude that the concept of security employed remains within the field of meanings of the sovereignty discourse with its characteristic "dialectic of conflict".

The texts reviewed belong to different stages in the build-up of the Lithuanian State. This finds reflection in their contents. The first project of the conception of national security (1990) envisioned the policy of neutrality and layed hopes at exploiting Lithuania's geopolitical situation as the bridge between the East and the West as a means for ensuring national security. The second project of the conception (1992), with Lithuania already formally recognized as an independent state, was mostly concerned with identifying the threats — both external and internal — to the Lithuanian state, the nation and the citizens. It explicitly refers to Russia as Lithuania's threatening Other, while a western orientation found its expression in stressing the importance of close relations with the Scandinavian countries. A policy of neutrality was seen as promising, and great importance was accorded to a civilian-based defence. The third document, The Basics of National Security of Lithuania, adopted by Seimas in 1996, also focuses on the identification of threats. Though not referred to by name, Russia remains the chief threat to Lithuania's security. The document is explicit and unambiguous about Lithuania's integration with western structures (EU, NATO, WEU) as the means for ensuring Lithuania's security. Civilian based defence is accorded an important role, alongside with the military one.

It is to be noted that almost in all drafts of security conceptions, including the document adopted by Seimas, a significant role is accorded to a civilian-based defence. Why? The liberation movements in the Baltic countries made history as 'singing revolutions', a term nicely expressing their nonviolent character. In all the three countries a wide variety of forms of nonviolent civilian resistance was used. However, only in Lithuania civilian defence was supported from the start by the government. Neither in Latvia, nor in Estonia did the idea acquire such prominence, it remained at the level of National Fronts. One of the reasons for this is the different ethnic composition of the three countries. Starting as movements in support of the perestroika they soon acquired the character of national liberation movements. Lithuania differed from the other Baltic countries by the relative ethnic homogeneity of the population. In 1989 Lithuanians made up for 79,6% of her population, while Latvians in Latvia made up 52%, Estonians in Estonia, 61,5% (Zaagman, 1999: vi). In Latvia and Estonia the liberation movements were confronted by two powerful forces, the People's Front and the Interfront. No wonder that the idea of civilian defence, implying as it does social solidarity, found little support there.

In the development of Lithuania's security conceptions this idea has played a prominent role. In the draft proposed by the scholars, in particular, it harmonized with the whole project's vision of the world, as one composed of national states each relying exclusively on self-help. The belief was that Lithuania, a small and weak state, could always resist the aggressor with 'people's power'. In later drafts, too, the security conception, though more pragmatically oriented, left room for civilian defence, even if not conceived, as formerly, in purely moral terms. In The Basics of National Security civilian-based defence is considered a part of total defence, to be applied together with such forms of violent defence as, e.g. guerrilla warfare. In my view, the idea of total defence belongs to the realist paradigm. It is clearly premised on centrality of a state as subject of security, on identification of the security of population with that of the state, and on the simplistic idea of the enemy. The inclusion of the idea of civilian defence in that of total defence in security conceptions is an indirect sign of their origins in the sovereignty discourse.

The conceptualizations of security at the analyzed documents, though differing in contents and in some of their presuppositions, are mainly based on the paradigm of realism. Security is conceived as the preservation of a fixed and unchanging entity (the nation, the state), as the identification of the threats it faces and as their neutralization by political and military means. These ideas are squarely within a sovereignty-based discourse. This is only natural, since the goal of the documents is the justification of the nation state security and of the nation state foreign policy. The goal of integration with the West, as formulated in the third document, is still based on the meanings of sovereignty discourse. In justifying the integration process the meanings, which have been shaped in the sovereignty discourse are being transferred to the emerging integration discourse. However, the conflict-based model of the relations between `inside' and `outside', when applied to the integration process, can easily lead to misunderstanding and inadequate assessment of the situation in practical politics. I will try to substantiate the claim by reviewing the development of Lithuania's foreign and security policies since the declaration of independence, concentrating mostly on the issues of Baltic states' co-operation, relations between Lithuania and Poland, pro-Western orientations, and the relations with Russia.


Part II: Lithuania's Foreign Security Policy: Main Features

5. Lithuania and other Baltic States: Allied or Separate?

Let us consider, in the context of the sovereignty and the integration discourses, the development of Lithuania's relations with the other Baltic States since the restoration of their independence. Despite a number of historical and cultural differences between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, at the level of international relations they are usually not differentiated and are treated as a whole, the Baltic States. As we saw, at least the history of the 20th century provides some reasons for this treatment. The common experience of the Soviet occupation and the joint efforts during the liberation movement have laid the foundations for the Baltic states' co-operation after they regained their independence. Seen from the outside, their contemporary FSP seem to be essentially similar: they share the same pro-Western orientation, they seek membership in NATO for the hard security it would guarantee, they are actively involved in attempts of joining the EU for soft security and, finally, they are cautious and distrustful in their relations with Russia.

However, in implementing their basically similar foreign policies the Baltic States have at the same time regressed on the issue of their own mutual integration. This is somewhat paradoxical, for formally there are numerous institutions for their co-operation, including the Baltic Assembly, the Baltic Council of Ministers, the Free Trade Agreement, as well as some common initiatives in matters of defence. Yet , the dominant public opinion in Lithuania is that the relations among the Baltic States are unsatisfactory. Retrospectively, one can say that before the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Baltic States in 1994 the Baltic states acted as a geopolitical unit in respect of their foreign and security policies. Since that time, however, despite common initiatives, a mutual competition has evolved. It plays out in the pursuits of integration with the West and in strengthening of respective state's sovereignty.

This is clearly demonstrated by the peculiarities of Lithuanian - Latvian relations. In particular, problems have arisen in the delimitation of sea border. Negotiations on the issue have been carried out for five years and it was only in May 1999 that an agreement on the sea border delimitation was reached. The heart of the matter is that in the disputed area of the Baltic Sea shelf there is a promising oil deposit claimed by both Latvia and Lithuania. Latvia has started negotiations with foreign companies on the exploration and possible exploitation of the deposit. In Lithuania this was conceived as doing injury to her economic and political interests. Within the conceptual framework of sovereignty discourse, the chances of reaching a mutually advantageous agreement are meager. The positive turn in the negotiations was reached once a separation of the legal and the economic aspects of the issue took place. This, in turn, was influenced by the EU demand making membership in EU conditional on the signing of a treaty on the border delimitation.

The other problem is the construction of the Butinge oil terminal near Klaipeda. The terminal could lessen Lithuania's dependence on Russia's energy supplies and strengthen Lithuania's role as a seafaring nation. Experts see the project economically worthwhile. However, the building of the terminal was turned down by Latvian politicians. They claimed, supported by the greens, that the project was ecologically dangerous and economically useless. On the other hand, Lithuanian politicians interpret the ecological arguments a mere disguise for Latvia's economic interest in keeping the Ventspils terminal (the biggest terminal in Baltic states, with the capacity of 32 million tons) free from the new competitor (the planned capacity of the Butinge terminal is 12 mil. tons). According to some experts the two countries could achieve a mutual economic gain. However, in this case, too, the political approach overshadows the economic one. Among other examples of policies, associated with the sovereignty discourse and causing tensions between the Baltic States, one can mention the so-called "pork wars". The most recent case was that of tariffs on pork imports imposed in May 1999 by the Latvian Parliament, to protect the interests of the country's domestic producers.

By far the largest progress in the development of trilateral relations of the Baltic States has been achieved in the sphere of military co-operation. The observers of the developments in the Baltic states are certainly familiar with the four major co-operative projects of the Baltic states — Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and Baltic Defence College (BDC). However, even in this field there are some threats to co-operation. The projects, even if supported by Western participants, put strong pressure on national defence budgets. On the whole, the trilateral co-operation for 1998 included about 40 items of co-operation. The Baltic States may face serious difficulties in financing the projects. This is particularly true of Latvia, for Latvia's defence spending in 1998 amounted to 0,6% of the GDP, while in Estonia this figure reached 1,2%, and in Lithuania 1,5% of the GDP. In absolute terms these figures constitute 39.3, 58.7 and 119.75 million USD respectively. In 1999 Latvia increased the defence budget to 0,93%, while Lithuania will spend 1,51%. Lithuania's defence budget will reach 2% of GDP in 2001, according to a law adopted by the Seimas. These differences might soon become an obstacle for the implementation of the common projects and lead to some misunderstandings among the Baltic States. This might also bring back the idea, put forward by Lithuania in 1996, of joining NATO separately.

In all the Baltic States, the central motivation of the political elites for closer integration with the West remains within the sovereignty discourse, with its characteristically clear-cut division between foreign and domestic policy and the prioritization of 'national interests'. The whole idea of Baltic unity and integration is hardly compatible with their inclination of building a nation-state. No wonder, that first Estonia and then Latvia turned towards the North, while Lithuania, since 1995, was turning to the South, that is in the direction of Poland and Central Europe. Such a re-orientation was succinctly put by Lithuania's Foreign Affairs Minister Saudargas in 1996, namely, that the unity of the Baltic states is a myth that only exists in the heads of Western politicians (Atgimimas, 1996). Doubts concerning Baltic unity have been repeatedly voiced by Estonia's President Lennart Meri and Latvia's Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs. At the Baltic Assembly in May 1999 Birkavs told that the illusions of Baltic unity are indeed disappearing (Baltic Times, 1999).

6. Lithuania and Poland: Between the Past and the Future

The development of Lithuanian-Polish relations since 1990 is a good illustration of the mixture between the sovereignty and the integration discourses in Lithuania's political and public life. The two countries have old historical links. One can speak of their common history starting with the Lublin Union (1569) which brought the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into existence. The common history includes both joint uprisings against the Russian Empire in the 19th century and also the Polish occupation of Vilnius in 1920. The territorial conflict between Lithuania and Poland constituted the leitmotif of the foreign and security policy of inter-war Lithuania. The conflict isolated Lithuania's from the other Baltic States and led to a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Indirectly, it encouraged the Polonization of the Vilnius region occupied by Poland. It is hardly surprising that in the dynamics of Polish-Lithuanian relations in the 90-ties, historical arguments played a prominent role. One can distinguish three stages in the dynamics of this short period.

The first stage was the period from the declaration of Lithuania's independence on March 11, 1990 till the August putsch (1991) in Moscow. It was characterized by Poland's unqualified support for the Lithuanian case (with the exception of official recognition). At the time, though critical of the way minorities were treated in Lithuania, Poland did not support the autonomy demands of the Polish ethnic minority (Burant, 1993: 399-401; Miniotaite, 1993: 216-218).

After the August putsch, when Lithuania achieved international recognition, the relations between the two countries deteriorated. At the end of 1991 Lithuania's Defence minister Audrius Butkevicius pronounced Poland the greatest threat, while Poland's president Lech Walesa in his letter to Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Council, described the two countries' relations in terms of a "near-crisis" (Lopata, Zalys, 1995:19-20). The events could only turn this way because of Lithuania's becoming an independent agent of international relations faced with the challenge of its political identity. By taking inter-war Lithuania as the model, the image of Poland as Lithuania's malicious enemy was naturally embraced. The image was also influential in shaping early Lithuanian policies in the 1990s towards the Polish ethnic minority.

A gradual improvement in Lithuanian-Polish relations began in 1992. The Declaration of Friendship and Good-Neighbourly Co-operation was signed in 1992. The signing of the main document, Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, was delayed till 1994. Such a delay was mostly due to the opposition's demand in Lithuania of including a clause condemning the occupation of Vilnius in 1920; this, however, was not acceptable to Poland. The year 1994 was the turning point in Polish-Lithuanian relations. The change was related to the rise of the movement in Central European states towards closer association with NATO. Poland was turned into 'a bridge linking Lithuania with the EU and NATO'. During the visit to Lithuania in 1996 by Poland's president Kwasniewski, it was agreed to prioritize military co-operation. The two countries endorsed common projects on airspace control, joint military exercises and peace-keeping (the establishment of a joint Lithuanian-Polish peace-keeping unit, LITPOLBAT). The right-wing coalition that came to power in Lithuania in autumn 1996 has the intent on a simultaneous progress of Lithuania and Poland towards an association with NATO and the EU. It even seems that an attempt is made on the part of some politicians at changing Lithuania's identity from that of a Baltic state to that of a Central European state. The eight years' dynamics of Lithuanian- Polish relations clearly show that the nationalist security policy is being supplanted by a more pragmatic one. Now it is possible to talk about close Lithuanian-Polish co-operation both at the parliamentary and the executive levels.

However, in examining some particular Lithuanian-Polish relations in Lithuania or in Poland we can find some causes for misunderstandings and tensions. The latest example is an episode related to the law on the official language dating from 1995. The law states that languages other than Lithuanian can only be used at non-state institutions. In January 1998 the Vilnius district municipality proclaimed Polish the second official language of the region (with the exclusion of Vilnius City, 63 percent of the Vilnius district population is Polish). The decision was annulled by the governor of the district. In a conciliatory gesture, Lithuania's Seimas adopted an amendment tothe law allowing for dominant regional minority members to make appeals and to communicate in their own language. Still, the only official language remains Lithuanian. Despite some mutual concessions, the problems of the Polish minority in Lithuania and of the Lithuanian minority in Poland are still live issues. In order to tackle them a bilateral commission was created in May 1999.

As this brief survey shows contemporary Lithuanian-Polish relations are characterized by two tendencies: 1) friendly bilateral relations in matters related to the countries' integration with the West (the integration discourse) and 2) the ever-present misunderstandings related to the problems of national minorities (the sovereignty discourse). Both the Poles in Lithuania and the Lithuanians in Poland the counties' policy towards national minorities consider as assimilatory, as posing a threat to their identity. A solution is possible by a gradual substitution of the normative asumptions of the sovereignty discourse by those of the integration discourse.

7. Lithuania: From the 'anti-East' to the 'pro-West' Identity?

The end of the Cold War seemed to promise that Lithuania's geopolitical position in the confrontation between the East and the West would no longer be relevanct. However, subsequent developments have shown that the optimism was somewhat premature. Lithuania is part of the emerging European security complex and its security inevitably rests on the specific interdependencies within that system. With the European security system losing its bipolarity, the cultural and political watershed between the East and the West has nevertheless remained and still has the potential of turning into a political and even military confrontation. As a small nation Lithuania does not exert any significant influence on the security dynamics in the region; yet because of her geopolitical situation she has the possibility of choosing either an Eastern or a Western alignment. It should be noticed that the concepts of the East and the West are highly value-loaded with the West being associated with prosperity, security and democracy whereas, the East is loaded with poverty, unpredictability, totalitarianism, insecurity. From the point of view of Lithuania's national security, West is not associated with any particular country. It is rather linked with their different alliances, and in particular, with the EU and the NATO as the most important ones. After regaining its independence Lithuania was unwavering in its choice of integration with the West. The choice was even sanctioned by a constitutional act "On the Non-Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania with Post-Soviet Eastern Alliances (1992).

After the withdrawal of Russia's troop from Lithuania in 1993, the pro-Western orientation has been expressed by such radical political decisions as the application for membership in NATO (1994) 9 and the signing of the European Agreement (1995). Lithuania's prospective membership in the EU was treated favourably both in the West and in the East. The situation was quite different if compared with the intention of joining NATO. It became increasingly obvious that Lithuania's political elite had underestimated the role of East - West (Russia's and NATO's) relations for Lithuania's chances of success in choosing and implementing her political goals. The active and unswerving Baltic quest for membership in NATO was perceived in Russia as a challenge to her national interests. It was countered by Russia's Federal Council's statement denouncing the expansion of NATO (March, 1996), by a vote in the Duma in favour of restoring the Soviet Union (March, 1996) and by increased attempts at strengthening the ties between CIS member states. All these measures have caused tensions in the region and made the problem of the Baltic countries more acute. This, in turn, created a 'Baltic dilemma' for the West, namely, 'how to reconcile legitimate security interests of Russia and the CEE states and a unique opportunity to influence internal processes in those states by promoting stability in the transitional period' (Rotfeld, 1996: 26). The way the dilemma is going to be solved is bound to have an impact on the whole European security climate, with consequences directly relevant for the Nordic countries, continental Europe, the EU and Russia. The 'Baltic dilemma' remained an unresolved issue even after the Madrid Meeting (1997) and the signing of the USA - Baltic Charter (1998).

From Lithuania's point of view, the way the dilemma has been dealt with till now has been one of giving preference to Russia's interests ('Russia first') and postponing indefinitely Baltic States' entrance into NATO. The approach was met both in the Baltic States and sometimes in the West with allusions to the realities of the Second World War. The "Munich complex", "New Yalta", "Danzig corridor" (relating to Lithuania's geopolitical situation after Poland's joining NATO), have been the epithets often employed (Landsbergis, 1996). The assumption underlying these allusions is that just like on the eve of the Second World War the Baltic States have again become an object of a deal between the big powers. 10

This dynamics of the reaction suggests that the orientation of political identity that underlies Lithuania's FSP is 'anti-East' rather than 'pro-West'. While Western decision-makers "foresee NATO become more of a co-operative security organisation in its relations with Russia", Lithuania's politicians used to treat it as a "collective defence organisation against Russia" (Archer and J¦ger, 1998: 459). In supporting the democratisation processes in Russia, West has aimed at creating a common security space encompassing both Russia and the Baltic states. As for the majority of Russia's political elite, they hold that "the Baltic states are part of Russian sphere of influence in a sense that bilateral problems should be predominantly resolved without direct or indirect interference of the third powers" (Moshes and Vushkarnik, 1997: 81). This Russian position became even more pronounced at the end of 1997 (Moshes, 1998). After the Madrid meeting and before the signing of the USA-Baltic Charter Russia offered security guarantees for the Baltic States. These guarantees laid particular emphasis on the Baltics' non-alliance with military blocs and the importance of their policy of neutrality. It was suggested that the guarantees might be legally enacted as a bilateral agreement between the Baltic States and Russia. The Baltics unanimously rejected these offerings. In part, this might be explained by the memories of Russia's guarantees given in 1939.

The anti-East rather than pro-West orientation of most Lithuanian politicians, as well as the tendency towards securitization have been clearly illustrated by the story of the privatisation of "Mazeikiu nafta" (MN), the biggest oil refinery in the Baltic states. The story, still far from being transparent, led to the government's resignation, to sharp divisions in the society, loss of popular trust in Seimas, Government and President, it caused political realignments and party splits, and has also ushered in anti-American and anti-Western emotions.

The contract between the Lithuanian government and the US based "Williams International Company"(WIC), on terms presumably very unfavourable to Lithuania, was signed in November 1999. The privatisation was carried out without open competition, behind closed door; some Lithuania's laws have been changed to suit the demands of WIC, and the government has pledged to credit WIC to the amount of over 300 million USD. The Financial Times wrote that Lithuania's would do best in the situation by refusing to sign the contract with the WIC and announce an international competition for the privatisation of MN. Adelbert Knobl, representative of the IMF for Lithuania, declared that Lithuania's financial obligations, as defined in the contract with WIC, were disastrous for the country (Grineviciute, 1999: 27). Yet in spite of all the criticism the contract, initiated by the ruling coalition of conservatives (led by Vytautas Lansbergis) and Christian democrats, was ultimately signed. As the debates in Seimas and in the government show, the signing of the contract was motivated mainly by two political reasons.

After the signing of the contract oil supplies from Russia were sharply curtailed, and then negotiations between WIC and 'Lukoil' began. The main figure behind the deal with the WIC Vytautas Landsbergis, told at a press conference, early January 2000, that if 'the cat and mouse' negotiations between 'Lukoil' and 'Williams International' would protract too long, Lithuania should approach Nordic states oil companies (Lietuvos rytas, 2000a). Representatives of the WIC were wary of Vytautas Landsbergis' anti-Russian declarations, considering it as a hindrance in the negotiations (Lietuvos rytas, 2000a). 11

The story of WIC coming to Lithuania does illustrate the claim: the politicalization and securitization of privatisation (the issue was on the agenda of Lithuania's Security Council) show that most politicians in Lithuania conceive security in terms of the sovereignty discourse.

This can only be confirmed by the political scandal in May 1999 caused by the intention of the national power supply company 'Lietuvos energija' to sign a joint agreement with Russia, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia on integrating power supply. This agreement, signed by all, but Lithuania, dealt with ways of better managing the inherited unitary power supply system. Lithuanian politicians condemned the intention of signing the agreement as implicating Lithuania in the eastern zone and as blocking the road westwards. An essentially technical agreement was provided with a political interpretation: the case was even considered at an urgent session of Lithuanian Defence Council.

These examples suggest that the incentives for seeking membership in NATO are still those part of a framework pertaining to a sovereignty discourse. However, the new NATO doctrine that puts democracy above state sovereignty is being shaped within the framework of integration discourse, with its characteristic emphasis on the priority of human rights. It is probably because of a mismatch between NATO's self-identification (integration-based discourse) and its identification in Lithuania (sovereignty-based discourse) that the number of those supporting Lithuania's membership in NATO has been on the decrease in April-May 1999 (in connection with the events in Kosovo). According to public opinion survey centre 'Vilmorus', in May 1999, for the first time, those who were 'against NATO' outnumbered those who were 'for NATO' (32% and 31%, accordingly). The dynamics of popular attitudes towards NATO became more favourable after the issue was closed. According to data supplied by Vilmorus in September 1999, those who favour joining NATO constitute 36,2%, those against, 30,0%, with non-voting 12,2% and undecided 21,6% (the results of the survey have not yet been published). To compare, early in 1997 those 'for NATO' comprised 48%, while those 'against NATO' were 14% of the respondents. By contrast, the attitude of the political elite towards membership in NATO has not changed, but remained invariably positive.

Public opinion surveys have also shown a decrease in the support for Lithuania's membership in EU. Early in 1997 membership in the Union was supported by 49% of the respondents, 11% were against; in April 1999 the numbers were, accordingly, 39% and 28%. This falling tendency has first surfaced at the end of 1998 (Integracijos zinios, 1999:12). 12

The decrease of support for Lithuania's membership in EU derives from the perceived discrepancy of the consequences of integration for economic and social structure, from the growing influence of Euroskeptics on public opinion, and from the growing politicization of the process. This can be illustrated by the debates on the rationale for the closure of the Ignalina atomic power plant and by the conflicting views on the process of privatization.

According to the demands of the European Commission, one of the conditions for Lithuania's membership in the EU is the closure of the Ignalina atomic power plant. This is the biggest Chernobyl-type atomic power plant in Europe potentially threatening the whole Baltic Sea region. The plant is major source of cheap electric power in Lithuania that is also exported to Russia and Belarus. It produces 80% of the country's electric power. There are also realistic projects for the export of electricity via Poland to Western Europe. In order to raise the safety level of the plant, some 220 million USD have been invested since 1991 from both national and international sources of funding. Nevertheless, the European Commission insists that because of the reactor type the safety level of the plant's long-term exploitation cannot attain to Western standards of safety. To complicate things further, according to an international expert study (Barselina study, 1992 - 1996), with safety upgrade already done, the risks of an accident in the Ignalina plant are more or less comparable with those of Western plants. Lithuania's politicians, objecting to the demand for the precipitant closure of the plant point out the huge direct and indirect costs this would involve. These are estimated to be about 2,3 and 3,5 mlrd USD, accordingly (Integracijos zinios, 1999: 4). They also stress the importance of the plant for Lithuania's economy. Lithuania's President, formerly himself a prominent ecologist in the United States, considers the development of nuclear energy a most promising priority for Lithuania. Some Lithuanian politicians even consider the demands of the European Commission for the closure of the plant as a covert attempt at ousting the potential competitor from the electricity market of the unified Europe. All these claims and counterclaims suggest that the basically technical issue of the plant's safety has been politicized on both sides. 13

The other example is related to the demand of the European Commission to speed up the privatization of such large companies as the 'Telekomas" (privatized in 1998), the oil refinery "Mazeikiu nafta" (privatized in November 1999), the Klaipeda Sea port and "Lietuvos energija". The decision was challenged by the opposition, mostly social democrats and the democratic labour party. Even a referendum was suggested in 1998 on the issue of the privatization of the so-called strategic objects. The proposal failed to gain sufficient popular support. Together with the trade unions the opposition organized protest marches and meetings. In 1999 protest actions have been directed mainly against the privatization of the MN and the Klaipeda Sea port. Even though the actions are joined only by a small fraction of the population, the events have shown that without due consideration of local circumstances privatization can spur social tension and political instability. Thus in 1998 the opposition to privatization led to structural changes in the government and had influenced the decision to abolish the Ministry of European Affairs. In 1999 the privatization of "Mazeikiu nafta" led to a political instability.

These examples can lead one to some paradoxical conclusions. On the one hand, all major political parties in Lithuania support the country's joining the EU. 14 The arguments are that this would open more opportunities for economic growth and provide security. However, the very process of getting closer to the West is a potential source of internal tensions. This seemingly paradoxical conclusion is explained by the hypothesis that the conceptualization of Lithuania's political life is still firmly within the 'integration dilemma', with priority accorded to the sovereignty discourse. This, in turn, is related to the fact that Lithuania's security policy has been closely tied to the processes of state-building and the search for political identity. The pre-eminent goal of Lithuania's security policy and her politics in general has been the build-up of the nation state, the preservation of territorial integrity and gaining a fixed identity. Integration with the West has been mostly of instrumental nature, a mode of survival in an unpredictable environment. The proclaimed 'pro-Western' orientation of foreign and security policy finds its expression mostly in 'anti-Eastern' political decisions and in the politicization of economic and social life.


Concluding Remarks

Lithuania's FSP, like that of the other Baltic States, is closely related to the peculiarities of the development of her political identity. The main objectives of her FSP, those of strengthening state sovereignty and joining the European integration process, have been conceived along the lines of the 'integration dilemma', which is based on the realist assumptions concerning international relations. The 'integration dilemma', as it is interpreted in contemporary integration theories, is characterized by the conflict between the processes of nation-state building and the integration process, leading to tensions between domestic and foreign policy.

However, when considered from the perspective of constructivism, the integration dilemma acquires a very different content. Discussions about the relative power of loyalty to Europe versus that to nation/state lose its point. Europe and state/nation are mutually constitutive. In contrast to the realist analysis of FSP, with its stress on the preservation and strengthening of a fixed political identity, constructivism is concerned with an analysis of political identity development, with the process of constructing the meanings of such concepts as state, nation, Europe and security.

The present analysis of the dynamics of construction of these meanings within Lithuania's political discourse (based on the examination of documents and debates on national security conceptions) allows to conclude that concepts such as those of state, nation, security and Europe Europe (the West) are still firmly embedded within the framework of the sovereignty discourse.

This is confirmed by the analysis of Lithuania's FSP. A survey of the development of the relations between the Baltic states, of those between Lithuania and Poland as well as of the problems related to the integration with the West (Europe) shows that Lithuania's FSP is dominated by the precepts of the sovereignty discourse. In justifying the integration process the meanings, which have been shaped in the sovereignty, have been transferred to the emerging integration discourse. However, the conflict-based model of the relations between the 'inside' and the 'outside', when applied to the integration process, can easily lead to misunderstandings and inadequate assessment of the situation in practical politics.



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Note 1: Fragmentation and integration are the tendencies that can only be defined relatively. In every sovereign state with some ethnic or cultural diversity there is the possibility of fragmentation, if there exists a minority willing to become an independent political unit. Traditionally, a sovereign state seeks social integration in its internal policies and the preservation of sovereignty in its foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War the growing influence in politics and economics of international institutions has led to a progressive obliteration of the difference between domestic and foreign policy. This has essentially changed the meaning of sovereignty as the organizing principle of international society.  Back.

Note 2: In contrast to the more traditional approaches of realism and liberalism, constructivism is a relatively new approach in international relations and thus still very much in the process of becoming. An acknowledged representative of constructivism, Alexander Wendt, has coined the idea that identities and interests of states are constructed by social interaction (1992). One can find many elements of constructivism in recent studies stressing the role of culture and ideas in the development of international relations (Katzenstein, 1996; Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996; Krause & Williams, 1997; Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1997, Ruggie, 1998).  Back.

Note 3: The classical theories of integration propounded in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly concerned with the description and the analysis of processes concerning the unification of different states. These gave birth to five different schools: federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, transactionalism and inter-govermentalism.  Back.

Note 4: However, one should agree with Marlene Wind that with the development of so-called reflectivist studies (which include, for most authors, constructivism) it "becomes increasingly unfruitful to distinguish neorealist and neoliberalist approaches to European integration rather than to work with them as one single rational-institutionalist position.(Wind, 1997: 24). The same goes for the liberal inter-govementalism and the multi-level governance approaches.  Back.

Note 5: Contemporary constructivist research focuses on security communities (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Adler, 1998) and on political identity (Neumann 1996, 1999; Weldes 1996, Wendt 1994).  Back.

Note 6: Similar ideas were voiced in Russia's 'Baltic Concept' published in 1997 (Moshes, 1998).  Back.

Note 7: Those who are fond of juxtaposing modernity and post-modernity might easily discern in the predilection of Lithuania's political elite for 'national programs' a typical feature of modernity, i.e. the belief in the power of instrumental reason and conclusive solutions. A former Danish defence attaché to the Baltic states is reported to have said about Lithuania's military leadership that they "are convinced that there is a scientifically correct solution to every military problem" (Clemmesen, 1998: 240).  Back.

Note 8: The attitude was, undoubtedly, the result both of the experience of non-violent liberation and of the meetings with the scholars from the Albert Einstein Institution; Gene Sharp's book "Civilian Based Defence" was translated into Lithuanian and published in early 1992.  Back.

Note 9: Contacts of Lithuania's Defense ministry with NATO began as early as 1991, with the first NATO seminar held in Vilnius in December 1991.  Back.

Note 10: The former skepticism of most Lithuanian politicians as to Western support for Lithuania's membership in NATO was recently superseded by a more optimistic mood, boosted, in particular, by the fact that the communiqué of NATO Summit in Washington, April 1999, referred to Lithuania as one of nine countries seeking membership in NATO. (The Madrid Summit referred merely to 'states in the Baltic region seeking membership in NATO'). Lithuania's President V. Adamkus described the results of the Summit as "very positive and strong forward moves" (Alksninis, 1999).  Back.

Note 11: In opposition to Landsbergis, Kazimiera Prunskiene, member of Seimas, proposed taking a more moderate position. At a press conference she said: 'Treating or even naming Russia as a potential aggressor against Baltic states is utterly unproductive. This is a kind of provocation. If we really want to have Russia as a peace-loving neighbour, ready, among other things, for economic co-operation, we should actively continue the dialogue in diplomatic tone and diplomatic formulas, avoiding such provocations' (Lietuvos rytas, 2000).  Back.

Note 12: According to data made public in June 1999 by a working group of the Secretariat of the European Parliament, in April 1999 only 27% of the surveyed Lithuanian population were in support of joining EU (Respublika, 1999). In a survey carried out in November 1999 by a public opinion research centre 'Vilmorus' the standard question 'If there were a referendum tomorrow on Lithuania's joining the European Union, would you vote 'yes' or 'no''? those who voted 'yes' made 30%, those voting 'no', 17,1% of the respondents. With the question reformulated as 'When, in your opinion, it would be most advantageous for Lithuania to join the European Union?' the percentage of those whose response was positive increased to 56,8%; however, a part of them wanted Lithuania to join the EU not earlier than 2010 (Integracijos zinios, 1999a: 12).  Back.

Note 13: In September,1999 Lithuania's government agreed to close down the first reactor of the Ignalina atomic power plant by the year 2005. It is assumed that this will partly depend on a long-term financial support by the EU and other international institutions. The move has probably influenced the EU decision in Helsinki in December 1999 to invite Lithuania for official negotiations on membership in the EU.  Back.

Note 14: Euroskeptics are now represented by the National Democratic Party, established in January 1999, which opposes membership in EU and advocates moderate nationalist ideology. The party is an outgrowth of the national democratic grouping 'For Independent Lithuania', active since 1997.  Back.