CIAO DATE: 04/2009
December 2008
The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies
This paper uses the case of Russia in the 1990s to demonstrate the utility of approaching transitional regimes not just as emerging democracies but as failed or unconsolidated authoritarian regimes. Even for many competitive or democratic regimes, it is essential to focus not just on the development of constitutions, civil society, or party systems, but on the success or failure of efforts to build institutions to eliminate opposition and maintain political control. I examine the evolution of state and party organizational strategies by Yeltsin and then Putin to consolidate power and the impact of these strategies on regime competitiveness. First, I demonstrate how state and party weakness under Yeltsin in the early 1990s promoted political contestation in important ways. In turn, stronger state and party organization under Putin undermined political competition. Next, I show how organizational strategies taken reflected a logic of learning by trial and error. The failure of initial organizational forms to reduce contestation led to adoption of new approaches, culminating in Putin’s decision to create a highly centralized state structure and single ruling party.
Resource link: The Evolution of Authoritarian Organization in Russia under Yeltsin and Putin [PDF] - 463K