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CIAO DATE: 11/00
Danish Integration Policies: Dilemmas and Options
Morten Kelstrup
June 2000
Abstract
This paper a discussion of the problems of integration policies with special regard to Denmark's dilemmas and options in her relations to the European Union at the turn of the century. The paper characterises Denmark as a semi-integrated actor in the European Union, characterises Denmark's historical integration policy and identifies major dilemmas and options, also strategic options, for Denmark in regard to the present and future European integration.
This working paper is a preliminary to a chapter in the forthcoming book "Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945" by Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.). It builds upon another working paper, Morten Kelstrup: "Integration Policy: Between Foreign Policy and Diffusion" (COPRI 18/2000) which is a preliminary for another chapter to the book mentioned. It is the hope that this version will diffuse even wider and contribute to the debate on how scholars and students approach integration studies in general and the study of integration policies of individual states towards the EU in particular.
1. Introduction
It is amazing to see how the project of European integration which started few years after the Second World War, has developed into the present European Union. During the last 50 years the project has - with "ups and downs" - changed the economic and political organisation of Europe. Today, around the turn of the century, the European Union is a major part of the political structure of Europe and a major actor in the international political system. All states in Europe are in the present phase of European history challenged by the changes in Europe's political organisation made by the project of European integration. They are not only challenged to formulate their policies towards - or within - the European Union. They are also challenged in their domestic structures by the political system of the European Union.
The changes of the EC/EU have taken place continuously, yet the changes have been greater in some phases than others. The European Community had a stagnating phase in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. But an important change was initiated in the EC in the middle of the 1980s resulting in a new dynamism which led to the Single European Act. Another important change occurred - as a continuation and further acceleration of the integration processes from the 1980s - after the end of the Cold War with the reforms in Maastricht in 1991, which led to the formation of the European Union in 1993. Maybe "Maastricht and its aftermath" should be seen as the most important "constitutional moment in the history of the European Union". 1
Yet, since the agreement in Maastricht on the Treaty on the European Union we have seen further steps in the European integration: the initiation of the process of further enlargement of the EU, the Schengen Agreement on free movements within the EU, the Amsterdam Treaty, Agenda 2000, further steps towards the creation of an "area of freedom, security and justice", the realisation of the Economic and Monetary Union (the EMU) and the initiation of its third phase in the beginning of 1999. In addition, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990's, which culminated with NATO's intervention in Kosova, have given new impetus to changes in the European security structure, strengthening of the common foreign and security policy, and to a further involvement of the EU in European security. Also other initiatives could be mentioned, as for instance the work on a charter on fundamental rights for the people living in the union and other topics included on the agenda of the intergovernmental conference of the year 2000.
It is difficult on the basis of all these changes and initiatives to describe the situation of the EU at the turn of the century. The number of issues and perspectives is great, and it is not easy to paint the main picture of the present and future EU. Much point to a situation in which the EU is in a new and very decisive phase, at the edge of taking further steps towards more intense economic and political integration. Yet, as so often, the situation is also filled with challenges and uncertainties. The EU is, partly as a result of its earlier actions and partly because of new developments, confronted with new problems, not least the problems of combining its coming enlargement with up to 12 or 15 states with reforms of EU's institutional structure. With the very comprehensive - and some will say overloaded - agenda, some foresee a coming crisis for the EU. Others foresee that the EU, once more challenged with crises, will react to these by taking new important steps towards further integration.
Challenged with this development, it becomes a major task for the European states to find the strategies and policies they want to pursue in regard to the future process of European integration. As will be discussed extensively in the forthcoming book by Branner and Kelstrup 2 , the character of a state's foreign policy and integration policy depends on its internal and external environment. The policies depend on history and traditions, and on domestic institutions and actors. The policies also depend on the international setting and the character of the integration system. As discussed, in particular in my previous working paper 3 , integration policies in regard to a supranational and transnational system are different from policies towards an intergovernmental integration system. Thus, the growing integration in the EU is once more a challenge to states to define their integration policies. It is also a challenge to the ways in which the integration policies are defined. Partly, the complexity of the EU and the many kinds of involvement which a member state has in the EU, makes it difficult for the states to act as unitary actors. This problem - and the danger of diffusion of the integration policy - in some ways sharpens the needs for having explicit policies.
The purpose of this working paper is to discuss the problems of integration policies with special regard to Denmark's dilemmas and options in her relation to the European Union at the turn of the century. A major purpose is to attempt to identify what we might call "strategic options" for Denmark in regard to the present and future European integration. By options we mean courses of action available for a given actor at a certain time. Options, for instance for a government in its foreign policy or integration policy, are primarily defined from the outside - as courses of action available in the international system - but also from the inside, depending on internal acceptability. 4 By strategic options we mean more general policy alternatives which an actor has in regard to its position within and attitude towards a specific political system. In this connection we talk of strategic options in regard to European integration, i.e. the general policy choices in regard to the state's position within and attitude towards EU's present and future political system.
It is for many reasons difficult to identify the strategic or long term options for Denmark in relation to the EU. One reason is that strategic analysis is a difficult kind of analysis. Being directed towards the future, it has to deal with uncertain perspectives. Another reason is that since the Danish policy towards the EC/EU has been rather non-committed, fragmented and pragmatic, we do not in Denmark have a tradition of specifying what Denmark's goals and options are in relation to the EU, rather a tradition for not doing so. 5 As a consequence, we have very little to build upon in making this kind of analysis.
The aim of the working paper is not to reach any specific, normative view on one recommendable strategy for Denmark, nor - directly - to take part in the political debate in Denmark on her policy towards European integration. But, since the aim is to contribute to the identification of major policy choices, the analysis does - unavoidably - have a certain involvement in the political debate on this issue. In particular, the paper indirectly takes the stand that it is important with political analyses that are able to identify relevant dilemmas and to differentiate between different political options. Yet, the emphasis is on major perspectives and better conceptualisation, not on specific recommendations.
2. On the Analysis of Denmark's Integration Policies
2.1 On Denmark as a Semi-Integrated Actor
The following discussion is based on two premises: Firstly, that the EU has developed beyond being an intergovernmental system and has become a relatively integrated political system comprising different modes of decision making, including supranational decision-making. And, secondly, that Denmark can be seen as a semi-integrated actor within the EU. By a semi-integrated actor we understand an actor which is part of a greater social or political system. It is an actor which has some independence, but which also depends on the greater and more encompassing system and has a specific position and, possibly, specific roles in relation to the greater system. The more encompassing system has a certain structure within which the semi-integrated actor is positioned, and the greater system might itself be an actor. Thus, semi-integrated actors might also be understood as actors within actors.
An analysis of Denmark as a semi-integrated actor within the EU implies on the one hand that we analyse the character of the EU and also, since strategies and policies will be future directed, that we develop an understanding of the future prospects of the EU. On the other hand an analysis of Denmark's position as a semi-integrated actor should also include analysis of the internal basis for Danish decision-making as it can be seen in the present phase of history, also the internal constraints on Danish decision-makers. Before commenting on this, I will, though, recapitulate some of the major perspectives for this kind of analysis.
As discussed in Branner and Kelstrup as well as in my previous working paper, integration policy is, as foreign policy, formed on the basis of history and tradition. Policy formulations are always embedded within established discourses and institutions. Thus, the policy formulations of a state is also bound by traditions, former policies, earlier formulations and - more or less - established discourses. At the same time, external conditions are important. When external conditions are changing fast, there will most likely be a tension between the challenges from the changed international environment and the hitherto formulated and somewhat institutionalised discourses and policies. In addition, the formulation of new policies have to take account of the necessity of public support, and the generation of public support for new policies will normally require some continuity from earlier policies and discourses. Thus, sometimes it is likely to be very difficult for collective actors to break away from traditions or just away from views which in some other way have been institutionalised. 6
2.2 On the Relationship Between State Sovereignty and the Status of Semi-Integrated Actors
Some might ask the questions: Can states also be sovereign when they are semi-integrated actors? What is the relationship between sovereignty and the status as semi-integrated actors? Obviously, these are questions which could lead to an extensive discussion of the concept of sovereignty and its status in regard to the present changes in Europe. It will be too much to go into this discussion here. My general view is that it is possible to keep the formal understanding of states as sovereign and at the same time talk of states as semi-integrated actors.
Clearly, the understanding of Denmark as a sovereign state is an institutionalised understanding deeply embedded in the Danish tradition which cannot easily be changed. When processes of change appear and practices develop which somehow are at odds with the formal view, a discrepancy might appear, a tension between the formal view on sovereignty and the practices accepted. In my view, this is what is happening - and it is implied in the understanding of Denmark as a semi-integrated actor. On the one hand we can accept the traditional point of view of international law, that Denmark is fundamentally a sovereign state. 7 Denmark has - on the basis of its constitution - entered the European Communities (and European Union), and the Danish authorities have, in accordance with the Danish constitution, i.e. section 20 of the constitution, delegated some of their authority to the bodies of the European Union. 8 Thus, although it has chosen to delegate authority to the EU, Denmark is still a sovereign state. And Denmark is - as other states - in a constitutional position to withdraw this delegation, not without responsibility in accordance with international law, but without any fundamental constitutional disruption. On the other hand there is, through the participation in the EU, established new and special kinds of dependency. Denmark as a state takes part in the EU's decision-making system, and Danish citizens and other legal subjects are bound by decisions taken by the Community. Further, Denmark is influenced by the effects of the decisions taken in Bruxelles. And since the EU has developed into a political system which comprises about all political sectors, Denmark must be considered as being deeply integrated in the EU. Said differently, Denmark is at one and the same time a formally sovereign state and a semi-integrated actor in the EU.
2.3. Different Kinds of Integration Policies for Denmark in Relation to the EU
When a state gets more involved in a process of integration, its policy of integration becomes more differentiated. We might, as explained more in detail in the previous working paper, in the very early phase of integration see integration policy as part of the state's foreign policy, but from a certain level of integration the policy towards the integration system becomes more differentiated. If we use the theory of adaptation, we might distinguish between the following five different types of integration strategies or policies: 9 1) "relative isolation", 2) "reluctant political integration", 3) "balancing and optimizing integration", 4) "dominant political integration" and 5) "alternative political integration". Within this categorisation, we will expect Denmark to follow a "balancing" strategy. This view might be used as base for further elaboration of more specific strategies, partly strategies relating to the integration system and partly strategies relating to the domestic scene. 10
Yet, when the integration has developed so far that the actor in question is a semi-integrated actor within the new political system, the policy of the actor "proliferates" into different aspects or dimensions of integration policies. As described in the previous working paper, these aspects, which can be seen as a further differentiation of the categories above, can be described as: 1) policy towards participating or not, 2) policies in regard to position within the integration system, 3) policies in regard to institutional changes in the integration system, 4) policies in regard to the internal output or policy of the integration system, and 5) policies in regard to the external output or policy of the integration system. Within each of these dimensions we can make further distinctions. For instance, in relation to a state's "position" within the integration system, we might distinguish between participation without reservations and with reservations, and we might distinguish further between different kinds of "conditionality" of participation. In regard to institutional change, we might differentiate between policies that support further supranationality and policies that do not. Yet, a further specification could relate to the already established institutions within EU's political system, for instance policies that support further power to the European Council vs. policies that support the European Parliament or the European Commission. In relation to the policies towards internal and external output, we might distinguish between policy in different fields or sectors. For instance the policy within the security field might be distinguished from other, possible more "pragmatic" or "economic fields". 11 In the following discussion I shall briefly attempt to use these categories in a discussion of Denmark's present and future integration policy. Yet, first, I shall comment on a few historical perspectives.
3. Denmark's Policies Towards European Integration
3.1. Historical Reflections on Denmark's Integration Policy
Which integration strategies have Denmark followed through the course of history? Branner and Kelstrup 12 go into depth with several aspects of the Danish policies. I shall not attempt to summarise the analyses in this working paper. The findings show, that it is not easy to characterise the Danish policies. I shall, though, point to some important aspects which shall form a basis for the following discussion of Denmark's dilemmas and options in the present situation in the beginning of the year 2000.
It has been shown that Denmark has very deep traditions, and that the Danish foreign policy traditions are rooted in fundamental traits based in the history of the Danish people and the Danish state. An important interpretation is that although Denmark has a small state tradition, this is not Denmark's only tradition. Rather, we have a duality consisting of the small state tradition and a tradition which build upon the earlier and stronger, multicultural Danish state (see Uffe Østergaard in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b)). Somewhat in parallel to this analysis, it has been argued that Denmark does not only have a "deterministic" small state foreign policy tradition supplemented by a compensatory "internationalism", but has a more independent internationalistic and activistic tradition (see Branner's chapter 6 in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b)). Some of the traits from these two traditions can be found in present days politics. Said differently, parts of the present Danish politics can be interpreted as a revival of parts of the Danish tradition, and for instance the Danish "active internationalism" from 1990 can be seen as a reactivation of deep historical roots.
In Branner and Kelstrup it has been shown that Denmark has given relatively low priority to its European policy in the first decades after 1945. Denmark gave a high priority to the 'great' European option, which had a solid base in both economic as well as general foreign policy considerations. As Hans Branner writes (in chapter 11 in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b)), reminiscences of this can be found in later Danish policies "including the rapid decisions to join Britain in applying for EEC membership in 1961 and 1967; the NORDEK experiment at the end of the 1960s as a stepping stone towards subsequent entry into the EC; the emphasis by the decision-making elite on economic advantages and concrete results when arguing for Danish EC membership and supporting EC integration steps; the hesitant and half-hearted approach to union plans resulting in reservations to treaty obligations; and, finally, the enthusiastic endorsement of EU enlargement plans in the 1990s. All elements may be traced back to the pattern identified as characteristic of Danish policy in the 1950s."
As Nikolaj Petersen points out in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b), Denmark joined the European Community in 1973 on a highly selective identification with EC goals. The primary motivation was economic, and politicians advocating membership focused almost entirely on the economic benefits of joining in the referendum campaign prior to membership. Denmark's identification with EC/EU's goals has in general been low in the areas of foreign and security policy and especially in constitutional-institutional policy. Thus, Denmark's priority has been that security and defence should be dealt with within NATO. And in relation to EC/EU's institutional aspect, the Danish policy has in general been reserved towards supranational and federalist elements, having preference for an intergovernmental structure.
In general, Denmark's policy towards the EC/EU has been described as characterised by "limited engagement", "fragmentation" and "pragmatism" (Branner, chapter 11 in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b)). One might argue that there was a change towards greater commitment to the European project in the late 1980s, after the referendum in 1986, in particular caused by the change of attitude within the Social Democratic Party (SDP). As Jens Henrik Haahr argues (in Branner and Kelstrup forthcoming 2000b), the single market plans in the 1980s constituted in the view of the SDP (and also of the Social Liberal Party and parts of the Socialist Peoples Party (SPP)) an important societal change which gave new international conditions. It led the SDP, the SPP and the Social Liberal Party to support the introduction of majority voting in the EC in new areas. And from 1988 to 1991 there was a high level of agreement in Danish policy towards the EC, i.a. an agreement which formed an important part of the background for the acceptance by the majority of the political parties of the Maastricht Treaty. Yet, one might also argue that the "No" at the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 changed this more active EC/EU policy. Instead, the predominant Danish policy became the one codified in the so-called "national compromise". The compromise included an "active part" which stipulated a basis for an active Danish integration policy based on high priority to i.a. democracy, openness, subsidiarity ("nærhed"), environmental concerns and employment. And it included the four "reservations" mentioned in the introduction, that Denmark should avoid far reaching Danish participation in four areas of EU policy: the single currency, defence cooperation, the common citizenship, and supranational cooperation in justice and home affairs. One might say that the "national compromise" and its confirmation in the Edinburgh Agreement and in the subsequent referendum on "Maastricht and Edinburgh" in 1993 changed Denmark from being a reserved or reluctant member of the EU to a "member with reservations". 13
It is no exaggeration that since 1993 the four Danish reservations have played an important and maybe even dominating role in the debate on Danish policies towards the EU. Yet, seen in hindsight it is clear that there has been - and still is - very different interpretations of the Danish reservations. 14 One might talk of two rather different strategies in regard to the way in which the reservations should be interpreted. One interpretation is that the reservations give Denmark a "time out" which can give the Danes the possibility of seeing how the development will be within the different problem areas and thus give them possibilities of cancelling the reservations later, possibly one by one, depending on the circumstances. This interpretation has clearly been supported by the liberals and the conservatives, and at least partly also by the social democratic and social liberal government. The other interpretation, supported by the Socialist Peoples Party and the "no-movements", sees the reservations as permanent conditions for Denmark's participation in the EU, not as something temporary which should easily be changed, rather as a basis for Denmark's more general policy within the EU.
It can be discussed how Denmark's integration policy since 1993 as "a member with reservations" shall be characterised. One interpretation is that Denmark after 1993 returned to the policy of limited engagement, fragmentation and pragmatism. Major elements of this seems to hold. Thus, the reservations can be seen as a sign per se of limited engagement. Denmark's reservation in regard to defence can be seen as a policy line of fragmentation (wanting defence issues treated in NATO). The construction of the "compromise" can in itself be seen as a very pragmatic approach. One might argue, though, that there also have been new and more active elements in the Danish EU policy after 1993. The policy of the Danish government can be seen as a policy which at the one hand accepted the four reservations, but on the other hand went nearly as far as it could in an active participation within the communities. The active Danish policy in the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty is an indication of this. Also Denmark's acceptance of the Schengen Agreement is such a sign. In the debate about the Amsterdam Treaty it was recognised by the government as by the political parties that the Danish EU policy is, primarily, political and not only a question of Danish economic interests. Thus, in this respect part of the Danish "fragmentation" has been abandoned.
One might also argue that in the interpretation of the Danish reservations, the government has shown a considerable "pragmatism". This pragmatism has in some ways run somewhat contrary to the policy line of limited engagement. Although there has been some uncertainty as to which of the two "reservation-strategies" the government has followed, most interpreters will probably claim that the government has chosen - at least in its external policy - to regard the reservations as only temporary. Internally, the government has in general adhered to a consensus-oriented policy line (compare also Hedetoft's chapter in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b)). It has been giving many guarantees that the Danish reservations will be respected and only changed after a referendum, but it has also attempted to get as much room for active engagement in the EU as possible. Lately, i.e. in the spring 2000, there has been a certain move which challenges the consensus-oriented policy. The government decided to hold a referendum in regard to the reservation on Danish participation in the Euro-cooperation in September 2000 with the clear indication that the government want Denmark to participate fully in the third phase. One might see this as a clear indication that the government follows the policy of regarding the reservations as temporal, and maybe the decision on the new referendum can also be seen as an indication that government now attempts to follow a more active and integrationist policy and try to get public support for this.
3.2 Some General Features of the Danish Integration Policy
Let us on the basis of the reflections above try to summarise the Danish integration policy, using the dimensions presented above. One picture is the following:
1) One aspect of Denmark's integration policy towards the EC/EU relates to Denmark participating or not in the EU. One might say that this question became a major issue in the 1960s, articulated around the question whether Denmark should apply for membership, as Denmark did in 1961, 1967 and again in 1972, or not. The question of membership was the major issue in the Danish referendum in 1972, and the result of the referendum decided formally this question. The solution was found, once and for all, some might say. Others might say that the question was not decided in any definitive way by this first referendum. The rather strong "People's Movement against the EC" kept the issue alive. The debate on the referendum in 1986 was in many ways also about Denmark's general position as a member or a non-member of the EU. In the later referenda, the membership issue has not been as dominant, and most interpreters will say that from the late 1980s there is a rather general acceptance that the membership issue has been decided. Yet, the issue isn't quite dead. The People's Movement against the EC still exist, and it is still represented in the European Parliament. The membership issue is still articulated in the referenda, and it is heard as a complaint from some that the referenda in Denmark on EU issues tend to politicise the membership issue. This said, the Danish policy seems to be relatively consolidated on a membership course.
2) Another aspect of Denmark's integration policy relates to Denmark's position in the integration system, here the EU. We are dealing with a question which arises for Denmark as a member of the EU as it does for other members. The state in question might attempt to be in the centre of the integration process, but it might also place itself with some reservations, keeping outside part of the common policies. Obviously, if the integration system develops with differentiated speed, possibly within a framework of flexibility, the question of a state's position in the system become crucial. Thus, the prediction is that this dimension is a very important aspect of the integration policies of all semi-integrated actors in the EU.
Denmark's policy has as described been that of a "reserved member" which was transformed into the position as "a member with reservations". Yet, it should be noted that within this position there are a lot of sub-positions, and that Denmark in the period 1988-91 and again in the 1990s has followed a more active and influence-oriented policy.
3) Integration policies might also be characterised in regard to the existing institutional system and the changes which the state might want in this institutional system. As the institutional system of the EU has evolved, it becomes important not only to have a policy in regard to the general character of the system as such (for instance in regard to the question whether - and to which degree - the system should be supranational). It also becomes important to have policies in regard to other issues, for instance to the character of constitutionality in the EU or to the allocation of competences between the community institutions and the member states. In addition, it is relevant with policies towards different aspects of the institutional system. For instance, with the importance of the European Court of Justice which has evolved as an important, integrationist actor, it is also required to have a policy towards the position and practices of the Court. 15 In parallel, it is important to have policies in regard to the powers of the European Parliament and with respect to the rules of decision making, for instance the rules for Qualified Majority Voting in the Council, the (lack of!) rules for the system of Commitology etc. Since institutional questions will be extremely important in the future EU, not least in combination with enlargement, this dimension of a state's integration policy seems to be of growing importance.
Denmark's policy in institutional matters has, as described above and in Branner and Kelstrup, been very intergovernmentalist and institutionally conservative. One might add that Denmark's policy has been pragmatic in the sense that Denmark has accepted to adapt to the gradual changes in the institutional system. Some of the Danish reservations can be seen as an attempt to formulate barriers to this adaptation - or at least to institutionalise a certain inertia in the adaptation process. Maybe, in some ways Denmark has in this followed its own tradition as a small state, accepting - although it hasn't been very articulated - that Denmark in institutional matters act within a power structure in which Denmark only has limited influence. Interestingly enough, Denmark accepted a more active, institutional policy with the national compromise (working for more democracy, more openness, and subsidiarity). As an institutional policy this has been very selective and not followed by much success. One might - by analysing Denmark's position in regard to the different intergovernmental conferences - find more specific indications of Denmark's integration policy in regard to the institutional dimension, but it is remarkable that in the public debate in Denmark concrete dimensions of this aspect hardly play any role at all. The domestic discourse seems to be so dominated by the question whether "we get more or less union", that it makes articulation of more differentiated institutional policies impossible.
4) We might also characterise integration policies in regard to the internal policy output which the state in question wants of the integration system, i.e. its policies in relation to the participating societies. Within this we might distinguish in many ways between different kinds of policies. We might for instance differentiate between economic, ecological, socio-cultural, legal, political, military and possibly other aspects of integration policies. We might also distinguish between market orientated, regulative and distributive policies. In general, with the growing importance of EU-legislation (comprising 60-80 % of the total legislation of the member states, depending on the way of calculating this), obviously the interest in the kind of internal policy output is growing. As some has remarked, we do not only in relation to the EU have the difficult problem of understanding the "nature of the beast", we also have the problem of understanding the "colour of the beast". The EU is - by becoming a politically important system - also becoming a more important arena for fights between political orientations and different political and/or social and economic interests. For instance, one of the effects is that the interest in "lobbying" the EU-system has increased. Paradoxically, it might be appropriate also for governmental bodies to act as lobbyists in Bruxelles (as this, for instance, is done by local governments, see Kurt Klaudi Klausen's contribution to Branner and Kelstrup forthcoming 2000b).
Denmark's integration policy has gradually acquired an important dimension related to the policy output of the EU system. Although being a reluctant EU-member, Denmark rather soon engaged in the formulation of an active EU policy in the ecological field. Part of the "national compromise" in 1992 pointed, as mentioned, to an active engagement in this area and in relation to employment. And the, partially, "renewed activism" in relation to EU in the 1990s has been related to Danish engagement in selected policy fields. In general, though, the thinking in Denmark in relation to policy formulation through the EU seems underdeveloped and mainly restricted to insights found in the Danish central administration and in parts of the lobbying system.
5) Finally, integration policies can be characterized in regard to the external policy of the new integration system, here the EU. As the EU becomes stronger as an international actor, not only in the economic, but also in the security field, the importance of having a policy towards EU's many different roles and possibilities is growing. Thus, we see an increased importance also of this dimension of the states' integration policies, and also a need for differentiating policies within this policy field.
Denmark's integration policy in regard to EU as an international actor has been marked by a certain ambivalence. Economically, it has been accepted that the EC/EU acquired the competences in trade policy. In regard to foreign policy, Denmark has been supportive of the EPC-cooperation which lead to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Danmark has been rather active within this. Yet, Denmark has placed one of its important reservations in regard to future defence cooperation within the EU. One of the effects is that Denmark must stay outside EU's engagement in peace keeping. Some will regard this as an "unintended consequence" since the major aim of the reservation was to avoid the emergence of a proper EU defence capacity.
The general picture of the different dimensions of Denmark's integration policy is that in many dimensions there is a need of a much more articulated and differentiated policy. If and when Denmark's policy is characterised by "limited engagement", "fragmentation" and "pragmatism", this stands somehow in contrast to the need for formulation of basic policy goals and for differentiated policy formulations. A main argument in the following part of this article will be that Denmark's rather general integration policy is being challenged even more by the present and coming development of the EU.
4. On EU's Development in the Late 1990's and in the Beginning of the 20th Century
4.1 On the EU and Globalisation
In the following I shall very briefly discuss some of the major aspects of EU's development in order to identify perspectives for future integration policies of states in regard to the EU. It is important that a discussion of the relations between states and the EU is not discussed in isolation as a zero-sum game, but also include other aspects of the international development which challenge the nation states. Formulated in very general terms, the nation states are today involved in an increasing globalisation. By globalisation we understand the formation of social systems across state boundaries. In particular, we are experiencing a growing economic globalisation, the internationalization of the economy or the further development of global capitalism, as we might call it. This globalisation isn't new, it has been going on for at least two centuries. But it has acquired new dimensions, not least related to the internationalisation of capital markets.
It is important that there are two very different perspectives on the EU and globalisation. In one perspective the EU furthers globalisation. The establishment of the "four freedoms" furthers the free movement and competitiveness on the markets. The common European currency, the Euro, is also furthering this. - On the other hand the EU has a function in regard to regulation of globalisation. By insisting on concerns with social aspects of labour, environment protection, health, employment, regional development etc. the EU is able to regulate aspects which could otherwise be neglected. I shall return to this aspect of the EU later.
4.2 EU's Latest Developments and Prospects for Further Change in the EU
It has already been indicated that the European Union seems to be in a new, very decisive phase, at the edge of taking further steps towards more intense economic and political integration. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the EU has undergone important changes in several important areas in the latest years, and the EU is in a process of transformation, challenged with a very heavy agenda. In the following I shall briefly point to some of the possible and/or likely developments of the EU.
The EMU
A very important step in the European integration was the agreement in the Maastricht treaty on the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union. Subsequently, the realisation in the beginning of 1999 of the third phase of the EMU, the so-called "Euro-cooperation" with the establishment of a common currency and a common set of institutions, represents an important step towards closer integration in Europe. It was in many ways a surprise that 11 of the EU-countries managed to start the Euro-cooperation. It was not least due to the political choice for European integration made by the German chancellor Helmut Kohl, and to the French-German cooperation around the process of German unification. There is no room here for discussions of the perspectives of the Euro-cooperation, but probably it can easily be accepted that the most likely development is that the Euro will lead to a much closer economic cooperation between the "Euroland" members. Analyses might differ concerning the prospects for the Euro-cooperation. Some see the most likely perspective as a relatively harmonious cooperation between the participating states, a cooperation which will lead to further cooperation and harmonisation. Others focus more on the many possible problems within the EMU, not least problems caused by unequal economic development within the EU or "asymmetrical shocks". The perspective could easily be that these problems will lead to a further politicisation within the EU and - on that basis - even further pressure for increased political cooperation (see also Kelstrup, 2000a). Without going into details of the debate on these perspectives here, it shall only be concluded that the prospect is that the Euro-cooperation will lead to further, important steps in the European integration.
The security development of the EU
The crisis in the former Yugoslavia and NATO's intervention in Kosova in 1999 did in many ways challenge EU's role in relation to European security. The crisis in Kosova exposed the European dependence of the US, and a reaction to the intervention has i.a. been for the Europeans to engage in further action within the security sphere. There has already been appointed a spokesman for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and it was in December 1999 at the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki agreed that the EU should in 2003 have a military force of 50-60.000 soldiers which can be used in crisis management. Without going into details on these plans and the organisational structure of the decision, the general conclusion must be that the EU is taking important steps in regard to this dimension. The most likely development is that this aspect of the EU will be strengthened even further.
Cooperation in legal and home affairs: The creation of an "area of freedom, security and justice"
Since the Maastricht Treaty there has been intensified cooperation in legal and home affairs. In 1998 it was in the Amsterdam treaty specified as a goal to create an "area of freedom, security and justice", and the Schengen Agreement was included in the Amsterdam Treaty. The initiatives have been followed with a plan of action and several declarations from the European Council. The policy field has developed into one of the most important for EU's future cooperation. 16
The enlargement of the EU
As it is well known, the EU is preparing for its next enlargement. At present 13 states, mainly from Central- and Eastern Europe, have applied for membership, and it is likely that even more states will line up in the queue of applicants. Negotiations are going on at present with the applicant countries. Without going into any evaluation of the difficulties and prospects, enlargement can be understood as a very important perspective for the EU's future. The perspectives linked to enlargement are extremely important, for Europe as such, and for the EU. The positive perspective for Europe is that it is made possible, through the EU, to stabilise a peaceful, prosperous and united Europe. There are many possible negative visions, for instance that the enlargement process will be postponed, frustrating the applicant countries which will turn their attention away from the EU. Or that the enlargement will create internal problems in the EU, making internal cooperation in the EU much more difficult. Without going into these perspectives, enlargement can be taken as a very important perspective for the EU.
Institutional change of the EU
Already now the EU is going to undertake institutional change at the intergovernmental conference of the year 2000. Partly, this is due to unsolved institutional problems from the Amsterdam negotiations. The major perspective was that the EU should undertake institutional changes in order to be prepared for the admittance of new members, yet the negotiations on these changes were unsuccessful.
Yet, probably there are much more fundamental institutional changes on EU's future agenda. In a somewhat crude interpretation one might claim that there is a dilemma for the EU in regard to a future enlargement. At the one hand the EU seems so committed to enlargement that it seems necessary to take these steps. At the other hand some of the leading participating members see a danger in having an EU with about 25 members, a situation which could easily lead to a loosening, not only of the decision-making procedures in the EU, but also of the integration itself. This problem seems to lie behind the articulation of several leading politicians in the EU of thoughts about a "small federation" within the EU, most recently articulated by the German foreign minister, Joscha Fischer, in his capacity as leader of the Green Party. One of the central differences between the recent suggestions for such a "small federation within the union" is whether it is "the original six", the "Euro-11" or some other special collection of "core-states" that should take part in the small federation.
Obviously, some of the most radical suggestions for institutional change shall be interpreted as "balloons" testing new ideas. But the radical thoughts on EU's future institutional structure should be a clear indication that the question will be on EU's future agenda, and that it is necessary to have an integration policy which also take this into account. The most likely development seems, in all case, to be that the process of institutional reform will continue at new intergovernmental conferences beyond the present one.
General reflections
Other areas for major changes could be mentioned, for instance the steps taken towards a Charter of Fundamental Rights. Yet, the purpose of this brief enumeration has been to point out that the EU does have a heavy agenda. The most likely development seems to be that rather great changes are to take place, and that there will be a pressure for more integration. This - obviously - presents a challenge to all the European states for formulation of their policies towards the future European integration. We should add that it is not only states that have the problem of finding strategies in relation to the process of European integration, it is a task also for parliaments, parties, interest groups, media and individual citizens - and maybe also, for instance, courts and individual governmental agencies.
In order to attempt to foresee coming developments of the EU it might be useful to speculate in negative scenarios. This should be done, not in order to be negative or produce alarming results, but in order to predict the kind of problems that might arise. For instance, one might argue that it is likely that the development in regard to the EMU or in regard to the enlargement will create severe problems either for individual states or maybe for certain regions. If such problems arise, the first reaction will probably be to articulate the problems in the domestic system and in the political system of the EU. In the first round, this will lead to a politicisation within the EU. This, in itself, will imply that the demands for problem management through the EU-system will increase, a process which might lead to further integration. If, on the other hand, the EU shows itself to be inefficient to solve the problems, a very likely development will be that local politicians will blame the EU. This process might initiate a "negative spiral" of delegitimation, which will make it harder for the EU to gain sufficient legitimacy. Such actions could provoke "rupture" with the EU.
Negative scenarios might be developed even further, including also the thoughts which we in relation to processes of globalisation know about different forms of reaction. Too fast changes which create too severe problems for certain groups or regions might provoke different forms of "reaction". In the extreme, we could get "the 1000 Haider's Europe". Such a development will be very severe and imply the danger of severe problems in Europe's political structure.
The expectation will be, though, that the EU will react to such tendencies. These reaction will, one should expect, also lead to further political integration.
5. The Internal Dependencies of the Danish Government in Relation to the EU-Policy
The approach applied here takes for granted that a state's integration policy is very dependent on domestic factors, including history, traditions, domestic institutions and actors. I shall not attempt to analyse these domestic factors anew. In general, the internal setting for the Danish government has not been changed in any dramatic way in the latest years. The polls still indicate that the Danes are very divided in their attitude towards the EU and that rather many, maybe a majority, are sceptical towards giving away authority or sovereignty to the EU. As analysed by Hedetoft and Haahr in Branner and Kelstrup, there are important dilemmas in regard to the domestic basis for the governments integration policy. The vote in 1998 in favour of the Amsterdam Treaty showed with 55.1% in favour a rather positive attitude to the governments policy. Yet, the polls in regard to the referendum on the Euro-cooperation show that attitudes are divided and still so uncertain that an outcome in either direction seems possible.
6. On Dilemmas and Options in the Danish Integration Policy
Now, how can we on the basis of the analysis above identify dilemmas and options in the Danish integration policy. The major interpretation in the following section is that there are several rather severe dilemmas in regard to Denmark's integration policy. These dilemmas are, it is argued, becoming even greater in the present phase of EU's development because of the likelihood that EU's integration is increased. If the picture presented above of EU's present situation is true, we can expect that the EU with its heavy agenda is taking important steps towards further integration. The political and economic integration is already so developed that Denmark is to be considered as a semi-integrated actor. And the realisation of the Euro-cooperation and the likelihood of enlargement and further institutional reform will create even further pressure for clearer integration policies. This is also true if the EU, as it is expected in this analysis, will become more politicised.
6.1 Dilemmas
When there is a high tension between two courses of action, between two policies, there might be a "dilemma". A dilemma is a situation in which there are two courses of action, and each of these include severe costs in terms of giving up on the other policy. Dilemmas might for instance arise in a situation in which a semi-integrated is confronted with a new, important step in the integration process. The actor might either have to accept this new step - with the costs this might imply - or reject this step, with the cost this might imply. Another dilemma could arise in a situation in which a government is bound at the same time by the domestic and the external scene. The situation might be that by following the demands from the external scene the government will have severe disadvantages on the domestic scene, or vice versa. I shall briefly describe four different dilemmas which exist in relation to a semi-integrated actor's integration policy.
It should be added though, that it is a special question whether there are ways out of dilemmas. Often the strategy in relation to a dilemma is not to choose the one or the other alternative, but to "reinterpret" the situation and thus to add to the possible courses of action. Thus, dilemmas might not only be more or less severe, but also more or less fixed. In addition, we might distinguish between "real dilemmas" and perceived dilemmas. Some real dilemmas are not perceived, and vice versa. 17
The integration dilemma
The integration dilemma is the dilemma which an actor, possibly a state, experience when it is confronted with a new important step towards further integration. The situation might be that it has to chose between either at the one hand participating in the more intensified integration (with the possible risk of being "entrapped", being forced to accept decisions which it would otherwise reject) or at the other hand rejecting the new integration step (with the risk of being "abandoned", left outside the integration process or losing influence within this). The integration dilemma has been discussed elsewhere, in particular in Nikolaj Petersen's contribution to Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b), and shall not be elaborated here. 18
A major contention in regard to the integration dilemma is that it might increase as the degree of integration increases. The cost of breaking loose might become greater, while the possibility for others to force the integration process further, might also become greater. This implies that the intensified integration of the EU might intensify the integration dilemma for the states that do not find that it is in their interest to go "all the way" in the integration process. On the other hand, if it is accepted within the integration system, that there should be a certain "flexibility" in regard to each state's participation, this might loosen the integration dilemma.
The democracy dilemma
The democracy dilemma is that if one link the understanding of democracy to the concept of the state in the way that one can only imagine democracy in states, there are only two democratic strategies for European integration. Either democracy is to be kept or developed in the present nation states. The negative consequence is that important decisions at the European level are left as not controlled by democratic political structures. Or democracy is to be formed at the European level as "the nation state writ large" for instance with the formal establishment of state-like democratic institutions at the European level with the negative consequence that it tends to undermine democracy in the existing states. The democracy dilemma cannot be elaborated in this context. 19 But it is important to recognise the dilemma and to avoid the close link between statehood and democracy. Thus, it is relevant for thinking about the policies of democratising the EU to find strategies which can contribute to this goal without linking thoughts on democratic legitimacy to statehood.
The inside/outside-dilemma
The dilemma is that a governments might have to chose either to act dominated by concern in regard to its external environment, with the possible cost of not being sufficiently attentive to domestic concerns, or to act dominated by internal concerns, with the possible cost of not being sufficiently attentive to external concerns. The tension between a politicised external scene and an equally politicised domestic scene will create demands on the government from both directions, and a government might well find that it has no "room of action" (or maybe even that it has a "negative room of action": that it is impossible to find solutions without severe cost. There are different strategies in such a situation. One strategy is a) to give priority to the internal scene and, for instance, to find the best domestic agreement (for instance a "national compromise") and then take the risk of presenting this externally with the severe risk that this might cause severe problems. Another strategy is b) to choose a policy in accordance with the analysis of the external situation and to do so with less regard to the internal conflicts which this might cause (for instance with the acceptance of a "divided nation" as a consequence). A third strategy could be c) to attempt to play the optimal roles internally and externally at the same time with possible inconsistencies, and to try to avoid that it become clear for either part that such inconsistencies exist.
The old/new discourse dilemma
The dilemma is that an actor, typically a government, might have to choose between either a new discourse which might be necessary in order to formulate policies and strategies that are relevant in regard to new, complex external constellations (with the possible cost that this new discourse isn't understood sufficiently and therefor not generating support), or the formulation of policies in old and established discourses which can mobilise traditional support (but might have the cost that the policies that gain support are inadequate in regard to the actual problems). This dilemma seems relevant in many established institutional settings, certainly not only in politics. But it is also relevant in regard to integration policy, in particular in periods in which new kinds of political organisations emerge and in periods of swift change. The dilemma is mentioned here, because a major problem in relation to international integration seems to be that such phenomena are poorly understood.
The strategies related to this dilemma have a certain parallel to the strategies in the inside/outside dilemma. Typically in this dilemma, the actor will choose discourses which is well known to the domestic public and is known as effective in generating internal support. This might sometimes give at "room of manoeuvre" in areas which are excluded from the chosen discourse. For instance, such a mechanism might explain why major actors choose to articulate an economic discourse - for instance in the Danish referenda - even when it is obvious for all well informed persons that major problems are political. Obviously, education and general insight in new conditions give a possibility of getting out of the dilemma mentioned here. Yet, one might in periods with many changes fear that policies have to be formulated within old discourses in spite of their inadequacy.
The conflict/diffusion dilemma
The dilemma is that an actor either might formulate a specific policy as a unitary actor with the advantage of having specific goals and objectives and having the ability to pursue this in practice, but with the disadvantage that the goals might provoke disagreement, political conflict and possible lead to lack of support. Or the actor might avoid such policy formulation, leave policy questions in diffusion and lack of clarity with the "advantage" that opposition to the "hidden" policies might be very difficult, but with the cost that the actual policy might loose direction and that support might be lost also by the diffuse strategy.
This problem is highly relevant in regard to integration policy. As described in my previous working paper (2000c), there are tendencies of diffusion in later stages of the integration processes. In many ways the Danish decision-making process in regard to the Danish EU-policy is organised with the aim of making Denmark a unitary actor in regard to the EU. 20 Yet, there are tendencies which undermine this ambition. 21 In some ways it is exactly the tendencies towards diffusion, which makes it extra relevant to work for explicit policy formulation.
All these dilemmas seem relevant in relation to a semi-integrated actor's formulation of its integration policy and also for the formulation of Denmark's integration policy. Yet, as mentioned, some of the problems might be circumvented.
6.2. Options
What are then the Danish options in relation the EU in the present phase of European integration? In attempting to answer this question we might first use the differentiation between different dimensions of integration policies mentioned above in order to identify relevant options and then discuss which of these options we should regard as major choices and thus as strategic options. Clearly, this is very difficult since the spectre of possible options is immensely great. The following discussion, therefore, is very tentative.
1) Should Denmark participate in the future EU or not? Obviously this is a major strategic choice. The basic understanding for most of the Danish population seems to be that this choice has been taken. 22
2) Which position should Denmark have or attempt to get in the future European political structure? Obviously, this cannot be answered in any exact way with all the uncertainties about Europe's future. The major options can in a rather inexact way be regarded as to attempt to place Denmark either in the "core" of EU's present and future political system, in its periphery or maybe in between the two possibilities. The terminology is somewhat vague and inexact, since it is rather unclear what we mean by "core". If we imagine that the ideas about "a federation within the union" are materialised, obviously being in the "core" will be to become part of this "narrow" federation, a rather demanding solution that would imply that Denmark in time perhaps gave up its statehood. At the other hand there might in another construction of the EU be the possibilities of participation as a "full member" without reservations. But there might also be the possibility of a position with reservations, i.e. with participation in major part of the community but with important exemptions, possibly the same as now, possibly with other exemptions.
3) What should the policies be in regard to future institutional changes in the EU? Relevant questions in this regard are related to the Danish attitude towards further supranationality in the EU, attitude towards an expanded scope of the EU, attitude towards further "democratic elements" in the EU, etc.
4) What should the policies be in regard to EU's internal output, EU's substantial policies? Relevant questions in this regard has to do with policy formulation at the EU level. Does Denmark, for instance, work for the establishment of elements of a welfare state at the EU level? If we take for granted that the nation states are confronted with globalisation, is it then the most viable policy to attempt to secure social and environmental concerns through action at the EU-level, or is it better to choose a national strategy? What kind of policies do we want at the EU-level in the intersection between market and competition concerns and ecological concerns? How are we positioned in relation to the priority between monetary policies vs. employment policies etc. The scope for policy definition is rather great. It is more difficult to identify which of these choices we should regard as strategic.
5) What should be the policies in regard to EU's external output, EU's function as an external actor in the trade field, in the security field and possibly in regard to other areas in which the EU can influence the building of international regimes? A major question is related to the priorities in EU's influence on international regimes, for instance whether social and ecological concerns are given priority to economic concerns. Another major question is related to EU's military dimension, and - maybe treated as a separate question - EU's possible function within peace keeping.
6.3. Strategic Options in Regard to the EU
A major strategic option in regard to the EU has probably to do with the degree of engagement in the integration process and the willingness to go far into the integration processes. Denmark might choose to become what we can call an A-member of the EU, being full participant in all relevant fora. This would clearly be a change away from the present position as "a member with reservations" and to the policy of "limited engagement". The alternative to becoming an A-member would be a continuation of some kind of reservation and limited engagement, what we might describe as the strategy of becoming a B-member.
A problem with the strategy of becoming an A-member might be that the EU may develop a political structure which allow some states to form a "federation within the union", i.e. to let some states become what we might call A+-members: Members which might want to go so far in the integration process that they give up their statehood. Confronted with this, an A-member might also have to mobilise reservations. Another problem with a strategy of becoming an A-member is related to the domestic scene. Is it possible to get support for such a policy? Maybe a cost related to this strategy could be a "divided nation" and maybe also, for some of the parties, divided parties?
A problem with the strategy of becoming a B-member might be that such a status diminishes the possibilities of influence. It is somewhat uncertain whether this is true or not. In particular, it is very relevant whether the future EU is created in a way which allow for states to have specific reservations and thus B-member status, or whether this is regarded as an anormality. An additional problem is related to the specification of the reservations of a B-member status. One could argue that there is a danger in "fixing" reservations as it has - at least partially - been the case for the four reservations taken in 1992. One could imagine other kinds of B-status, and maybe one could also define positions as having B+ or B- status, whatever that would mean in more concrete terms.
Another strategic option seems to be the choice of strategy in a situation in which the nation states - and the welfare states - are challenged by globalisation. It might be formulated as a major choice whether a strategy for securing social and environmental concerns is followed primarily as a national strategy or as an EU-strategy. Since the discussion of the pro's and con's of these two strategies is too demanding in this context, I shall limit myself to the indication of the possible strategic choice.
It is also possible to place the focus of the strategic choice at the domestic level. Thus, it can be seen as a major choice whether a policy of maximising national consensus is chosen as compared to a policy of domestic politicisation and acceptance of majority dominance. The negative effect of optimising national consensus might be that this might be done in categories that are inadequate or in a long term perspective problematic in relation to the EU (compare the old/new discourse-dilemma). The drawbacks of the acceptance of a majority dominance are rather obvious, i.e. the emergence of domestic cleavages and conflicts. A further danger is, evidently, that in the extreme case the majority might change, giving a severe disruption in the integration policy.
Obviously, there might be some link between the different strategic options. For instance, it is rather certain that a policy of becoming an A+ member of the EU will cause severe internal cleavages in the Danish electorate, and this might also be a consequence of an A-member strategy. At the other hand it might be expected that a B or B+ strategy could be defined in a way which gave a rather high, if not necessarily the an optimal national consensus.
These indications of strategic options for Denmark in relation to the EU are rather vague and in many ways highly inadequate. They are presented, though, as an attempt to structure a policy field which normally is left unstructured. In many ways the dilemmas mentioned above have such a strong influence on the formulation of integration policies that they tend to inhibit the analysis of policy formulations.
7. Conclusions
The purpose of this article has been to discuss Denmark's integration policy towards the EU and the dilemmas and options which Denmark has in the present phase of history. The main view has been that Denmark has already become a semi-integrated actor in relation to the European Union, that the EU is undergoing a new transformation, and that this will challenge Denmark even further.
The view is also that integration policies from a certain stage of integration proliferates. Thus, there are many aspects of the integration policies, and similarly there are many tasks and dimensions in the development of the integration policies. The analysis has in particular been undertaken in regard to five major questions, but even within these there are very many other sub-questions.
The working paper has drawn upon the historical analyses undertaken in Branner and Kelstrup. Historically, Denmark's policy towards Europe after 1945 was first dominated by a realist inspired small-state conception. Yet, as Branner and Østergaard have shown 23 , the Danish traditions are more comprehensive, and the view of small state "determinism" which dominated in some phases (and corresponds to a realist inspired, small-state conceptualisation) has to be supplemented with the understanding that Denmark also has a rather independent tradition of active internationalism. Denmark's policy towards Europe had in the first decades after 1945 a rather low priority. The policy towards the EU can be characterised, as Branner does it 24 , by limited engagement, a policy of fragmentation and a policy of pragmatism. This picture might be somewhat modified for the 1990s, but it still holds true in its main features also for this period.
On this background the article has presented the understanding that the European integration has taken important steps forward in the recent years, and that the EU is at the edge of taking new steps towards further integration. The understanding is that this is a challenge to Denmark, also to Denmark's traditional EU policy. A major contention of the working paper is that EU's integration confronts Denmark with several difficult dilemmas. Thus, there has been pointed to five different dilemmas: 1) The integration dilemma, 2) the democracy dilemma, 3) the inside/outside dilemma, 4) the dilemma between old and new discourses, and 5) the conflict/diffusion dilemma.
The paper concludes by considering Danish options in regard to the EU and discussing pro's and con's of a few options that might be considered as strategic options. Major options in regard to Denmark's position in EU's political system are between Denmark as a state which participates fully, without reservations, and Denmark as a state which does take reservations. If Denmark takes reservation, another debate follows on the kind of reservations Denmark might take, the assumption being that the reservations need not by necessity be the four reservations which were fixed in the "national compromise" in 1993.
The contention has been that if Denmark goes for a full participation, what one might call an A-membership of the EU, problems will arise in at least two areas. One problem is that the integration in the EU might very well continue, possibly with a concentration on some member countries which might want to go even further in their wish for political integration. Thus, "a federation within the union" is not totally excluded, maybe likely. Such a development will create a new dilemma for Denmark, a dilemma between being an A-member and what we might call an A+ member. The central question in relation to an A-member strategy is, where is the limit to integration? How is a balanced and stable structure found in which also the Danish position might be stabilised?
The other problem related to the A-member option is that it seems to be followed with the cost of internal cleavages in Denmark on the EU-issue. Already now the political cleavage on the EU-issue is one of the most severe in the Danish population. It is not difficult to predict that this situation would become increasingly severe, if an A strategy is chosen. Not to speak of the difficulties that an A+ strategy might cause. Said differently, the internal costs in the form of an undermining of the high degree of consensus in Danish politics could be very great. One might add that certain parties might be hit rather severely by such a development, not least, probably, the Social Democrats.
The contention is also, though, that the choice of a strategy of "reluctant participation" or participation with reservations, what we might call a B-strategy, might have important difficulties and costs. A major difficulty is to define the areas in which Denmark should not participate fully. A major cost could be that having reservations might diminish the Danish influence in the EU. Whether this is true or not, is, though, somewhat uncertain.
It has been suggested that other strategic options might be related to the choice of strategies towards globalisation, in particular whether one chooses a national or a European strategy for securing social and environmental concerns in the confrontation with economic globalisation.
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Endnotes
Note 1: Joseph Weiler identifies "Maastricht and its aftermath" as a the most important "constitutional moment in the history of the European Union", Weiler, 1999, 4. Back.
Note 2: Branner and Kelstrup (eds.) (forthcoming 2000c). Back.
Note 3: Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b). Back.
Note 4: See also Branner's discussion of options in chapter 11 in Branner and Kelstrup (eds.) (forthcoming 2000b). Back.
Note 5: See also Branner's analysis in chapter 11 in Branner and Kelstrup (eds.) (forthcoming 2000b). Back.
Note 6: This also implies that it is an important question how fast adaptation to new circumstances can take place. But equally it is interesting to analyse what happens when such adaptation is not taking place, or - vice versa - when it is taking place too fast. Back.
Note :7 One should be aware of the importance of formal national sovereignty as a "fall back position": If tings, in the impressive attempt to restructure European politics, goes very wrong, it is a possibility to insist on the formal sovereignty and use it for taking delegated authority back. Thus, the formal position might also have a certain "insurance-function" in relation to "worst case" developments, a function which most likely will remain latent and never be used. In addition, it gives the well known benefits of being recognized in international organizations etc. Back.
Note :8 Since the basic authority in Denmark rests in the constitutionally sovereign people, it is also - in principle - possible for the Danish institutions to withdraw formally from the integration process. Thus, there is nothing against - at a formal level - that Denmark withdraws its delegated authority. Back.
Note :9 See also Petersen's contribution to Branner and Kelstrup (eds.) (forthcoming 2000b), Kelstrup (1993), and Petersen (1995). Back.
Note :10 See Petersen's contribution to Branner and Kelstrup (eds.) (forthcoming 2000b). Back.
Note :11 Thus, the categories that Nikolaj Petersen employs in his contribution to Branner and Kelstrup (eds.) (forthcoming 2000b) can be seen as a specification within such an overall framework. Back.
Note :12 Branner and Kelstrup (eds.) (forthcoming 2000b), cf. also Kelstrup (2000c) and DUPI (2000). Back.
Note :13 See also DUPI, 2000, 225 ff. Back.
Note :14 See DUPI,2000, 261. Back.
Note :15 Interestingly enough, this policy is not only a policy of the state in question, but also relates to the practices of the individual national courts in a state and the attitude which it takes towards the EU's legal system. Back.
Note :16 See an elaborate description in DUPI, 2000, 145ff. Back.
Note :17 The problem is also that we can only identify "real dilemmas" as observers, i.e. with the uncertainties which this implies. Back.
Note :18 Kelstrup 1993, 154, and chapter 3 in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b) and my previous working paper (COPRI 2000c). Back.
Note :19 For a discussion of this and the question of democratic legitimacy, see Kelstrup, 2000a. Back.
Note :20 See also Dosenrode's analysis of the Danish EU decision-making in chapter 12 in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b). Back.
Note :21 Among these are the involvement of local government in the EU-system, see Klausen's analysis in chapter 13 in Branner and Kelstrup (forthcoming 2000b). Back.
Note :22 It might be relevant, though, to keep it as a "reserve" position that Denmark - if things in the EU goes very wrong - might have the formal option to withdraw the formal authority which has been delegated to the EU, cf. also the brief discussion above on the relationship between semi-integrated actors and sovereignty. Back.
Note :23 In Branner and Kelstrup (eds.) (forthcoming), Kelstrup 2000b. Back.
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