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International Position of Macedonia and Balkan Security
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
In the Second Yugoslavia there were three major interlocking conflict triangles or "powder kegs" based on major national traumas of the Albanians, Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. In the western triangle there has been conflict between Croatian (and Slovenian) separatism, on one side, and the (initial) desire of other republics to preserve Yugoslavia, at the other side. As it was stressed, it was highly inflammable because the complex and greyzoned boundary between Serbs and Croats differed widely from the Croatian border within the Second Yugoslavia. This conflict is based mostly on Serbian-Croatian traumas (originating from the Second World War, inter-World Wars and from some earlier periods 1 ).
In the central "powder keg" there has been conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Moslem and Croatian separatism, on one side, and the initial desire of the ethnic Serbs to preserve Yugoslavia or to establish own state (not accepting the Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent and unitary state - the initial goal of Croat and Moslem leaderships), at the other side. This conflict is mostly based on the mentioned Serbo-Croatian as well as on Serbo-Moslem traumas (originating approximately from the same periods as the previous traumas 2 ).
The southern "powder keg" contains the Serbo-Albanian-Macedonian complex of relations, with possible extensions to some neighbouring and other Balkan states. 3 It consists primarily of two major closely connected and interlocking segments: first, Kosovo problem, and second, western part of Macedonia problem. This article was created with intentions to present and analyze major characteristics and various aspects of the international position of a few years ago established state of Macedonia, its relations with neighbouring states and its role in rather complex Balkan security relations.
In the post-Second World War period the Albanian problems were opened by the first Albanians' public demands for an own republic in 1968. Their demonstrations were suppressed by police and army forces and demands were refused. However the rights of the "nations of Yugoslavia" 4 and "national minorities" 5 were made equal in principle by the 19th constitutional amendment of 1968. 6 Already by late 1960s and early 1970s Serbs began to show some signs of discontent with such solution, blaming it for "protectorate of provinces over the republic," and "historic injustice toward the Serbian nation." 7
However during the 1970s the Kosovo conflict was rather successfully avoided. Mentioned constitutional construction seemed to be a sort of compromise that was made as an attempt to satisfy both sides: seeking of the Albanians to get in fact own republic, on one side, and efforts of the Serbs to preserve territorial integrity of the Republic Serbia, at the other side. Later it was obviously manifested that none side was satisfied with that solution. Both sides were intending and trying to fulfill their aims completely.
Kosovo Albanians' demonstrations with the same demands were repeated in 1981, one year after death of Josip Broz Tito and were suppressed again. In that time initial (signs of) profound differences, misunderstandings and disagreements occurred between the government in Belgrade, on one side, and those in Zagreb and Ljubljana, at the other side. It seemed that the acts of oppression significantly affected (more precisely, disturbed) relations within the Yugoslav federation. However, it was concluded that political elites and bureaucracies imposed their political will, and used ethnic tensions to postpone demands for democratization. 8
In 1990 the Albanian majority/minority 9 elected an own multiparty parliament which proclaimed an independent "Republic of Kosova" (recognized by Albania only). 10 In return, the government of Serbia made attempts to establish a single power on the whole territory of the republic (by means of the state centralization, political and propaganda pressures and even the policy repression). Albanian political leaders responded by establishing parallel agencies (police, schools, health care institutions, elections, etc.).
The trauma between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo seems to be as deep as those between the Serbs and Croats or between Serbs and Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandzak. Here Serbian eyes saw (only) Turks expelling Serbs from Kosovo - their historical heartland - and implanting Moslemized Albanians there. During the Second World War, Albanian fascist forces (Balli Kombetar) collaborated with the occupiers against the Serbs, expelling many from Kosovo, etc.
Albanians' eyes saw (again only) a ruthless Serbian occupation since 1878 of increasing Albanian areas; a Serbian colonization of Kosovo and racist attempts at Serbianisation and expulsion of Albanians to Turkey; Serbian massacres of Albanians during the Second World War and later, etc. 11
It was emphasized that "most of these perceptions, originating in family traditions or political propaganda, have some historical background, sometimes much; they disagree on how many were killed, to what extent different peoples took part, and whether events were typical or exceptional." 12 In addition, for existence of such traumas it is not so important what really happened, but it is important what people "know" (believe) that happened.
Many ethnic groups in the ex-Yugoslavia found themselves as historical victims of brutal oppression, even genocide, typically claiming that their own depredations had been maximized, while those of the enemy had been minimized. All sides took the pose of victims rather than offenders, and proclaimed that the accusations against them were exaggerated and unjust; everybody was profoundly convinced that they are more sinned against than sinning... 13
Moreover, as it was stressed, secession attempts and demands for an 'ethnically pure' Kosovo, and resort to police repression instead of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, were taking place in an extremely serious economic atmosphere and in situation of mass poverty. 14
At the beginning of the 1990s the most popular question - as it was ironically written by a Yugoslav political observer - became: "Why should we be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in our state?" But that thought understates the ferocious nationalism of "ethnic cleansing", whose main message is "No minorities at all in my ethnically homogeneous state." 15
Ancient Macedonia became a major power under Philip II (359-336 BC) and his son, Alexander the Great (336-323 BC). Enlarged and consolidated by Philip II, in 338 BC, Macedonia became the dominant power during the era of the Classical Greek city-state. As his army went all the way to India, Alexander conquered a huge empire. After 167 BC, Macedonia became part of the Roman Empire; and later joined and remained part of Byzantine Empire, except during the Empire of Tsar Samuil, 969-1018 AD. The same area (as well as almost entire Balkan peninsula) was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth Century, and the status changed during the First Balkan War (1912-13, when the territories were liberated by Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Montenegrin military forces who defeated the much weakened Ottoman Empire).
In a 1913 report it was stressed that the Second Balkan War 16 was "waged not only by the armies, but by the nations themselves" and this is why these wars are so sanguinary and produce so great a loss in men, and end "in the annihilation of the population and the ruin of whole regions." Reportedly, "the object of armed conflict ... was 'the complete extermination of an alien population.' Villages were not just captured: they were in large part destroyed. The inhabitants were driven out (where they had not only already fled) and their houses burned. Woe betided the man of military age, or the woman of 'enemy' national identity, who was found alive in the conquered village. Rape was ubiquitous, sometimes murderous. Victims, now wholly dispossessed and homeless, were obliged to take to the roads or the mountain trails by the thousands, in a frantic search for places where they could at least lay their heads. Great streams of pathetically suffering refugees could be seen on many of the roads of the peninsula."
Prisoners of war were killed out right, or sometimes driven into outdoor compounds or ramshackle buildings and left there to die of hunger and exposure. "There was in general a total hard-heartedness toward the defeated, whether military or civilian." Often the rumors of the scales of the atrocities turned out to be exaggerations. But in many such instances that the residue of reality discovered to lie behind the quantitative exaggerations was "itself enough to turn the stomach of any reasonably decent person."
In minds of observers arose the question of how much the ferocity of these hostilities could be properly attributed to religious fanaticism. It was clearly recognized that religion played a part at many points in the animosities that motivated the fighting, particularly in the first of the Balkan wars, when (mostly) Christians were fighting together against the Muslim Turks. Similar situations happened in the Second Balkan war as well (being Muslim elements in the Bulgarian and Macedonian populations). But it is considered that it would be to go too far to conclude that those differences were the main cause of animosity; the strongest motivating factor involved in the Balkan wars was aggressive nationalism. This nationalism drew on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past, a tendency to view the outsider, generally, with dark suspicion, and to see the political-military opponent, principally, "as a fearful and implacable enemy to be rendered harmless only by total and unpitying destruction. And so it remains today. ... In the face of extreme nationalistic self-admiration and suspicion of every neighbour, there was little room for anything resembling conciliation." 17
After the Second Balkan War, according to the Peace Contract signed in Bucharest on 10 August 1913, Macedonia was divided by the three neighbours; Greece received about 50 percent of the territory (Aegean Macedonia), Serbia (later the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Kingdom of Yugoslavia) acquired about 40 percent (Vardar Macedonia), and Bulgaria ended up with about 10 percent (Pirin Macedonia).
Initially, all the Yugoslav nations passionately attempted to unite into one state. With the end of the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles tore the South Slav lands away from the 'sick' (Ottoman) and 'dying' (Hapsburg) empires. The international community assumed that the Yugoslavs were tribes of a single people and, if united, would forge a common national existence. However, the Soviet Union apart, Yugoslavia has been the most complex European country and a problematic country from the very beginning. As Yugoslav nations had second aims, it seems that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created on the basis of a major misunderstanding: the Council of Croats and Slovenes wanted a confederal Yugoslavia (a partnership of equals), but Serbs wanted and established a unitary country (in which they can fulfill an old dream: all Serbs united in one state). 18 "The tensions between these two visions were sharpened by Serbian centralizing tendencies and Croat tactics of political obstructionism to expand their autonomy in face of what many Croatians experienced as Serbian colonization." The essence of the problem were the relations and misunderstandings between the two largest ethnic groups - Serbs and Croats. Others were too small and too weak to do anything more than shift alliances and maneuver between these main groups. 19
After the Second World War the Vardar Macedonia became one of the Yugoslav six republics (the Socialist Republic of Macedonia - SRM) and the Macedonian question has been the source of tensions in relations among Bulgaria, Greece and Second Yugoslavia. 20
In 1990, when Croatia and Slovenia set up national guards, Yugoslav Peoples' Army (YPA) secretly tried to bring weapons of the territorial defence units into central depots, but the SRM government - unlike reactions of Slovenia and Croatia - did not protest; in 1991, after the beginning of war in Croatia, Macedonia did not immediately stop sending recruits, but was waiting until the YPA withdrew from Croatia during the first half of 1992 (although Macedonia held independence referendum by September 1991). These and some other acts indicated that the SRM leadership has stepped on more cautiously in its relations with the YPA than those of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Albanians consider themselves as descendants of the ancient Illyrians, and therefore as a nation who has one of Europe's oldest traditions, and who managed to preserve much of their language and local customs through many centuries of foreign domination (starting with the rise of the Roman Empire). The largely Christian Albanian population (as well as some parts of other nations in the region) was converted by the Ottomans in order to take advantage of lower taxes levied against the Muslims in the multireligious Turkish Empire.
The rapidly growing Albanian minority in Macedonia (mostly concentrated in western parts of Macedonia, near border with Albania) has pushed for recognition as one of the two "state-building nation" and own autonomy within the territory of Macedonia. The Skopje government has steadfastedly refused to accede to this demand, and it seems that Albanians in Macedonia (as well as those in Kosovo) later demanded a full independence. The Albanian minority did not participate in the 1991 referendum in Macedonia, but on 10-11 January 1992 organized own referendum. The referendum gave 90 percent for own independence, and there have been clashes between Albanians and Macedonians.
At the beginning of Macedonian independence - when YPA withdrew in April 1992 - the Skopje government almost had no army on its own and no arms either. There were almost no means of protecting Macedonian borders, but an army was created gradually (many officers of the Macedonian army are ex-YPA officers) and the empty border posts have been filled (sometimes in cooperation with police forces). Meanwhile unknown number of Albanians from Albania - living there in misery - entered illegally into Macedonia, on a similar way as they sometimes cross to the Greece and FR Yugoslavia.
It seems that conflicting relations in Macedonia exist primarily between the Macedonians (67% of population) and the Albanians (23%); the Serb minority is rather small (around 2%). 21 At early November 1993, police arrested a group of Albanians (including a deputy minister of defence in the government of Macedonia) and accused them of attempting to establish an "autonomous province of 'Ilirida'" in the western part of the state territory. Their next steps ostensibly would have been to separate "Ilirida" by force, and then to unify it with Albania and independent Kosovo. The Albanians from Macedonia - as well as their compatriots in Kosovo - have established their own paramilitary forces (the arrested group had a list of 21,630 conscripts in a "Pan-Albanian Army" and some 300 "Kalashnikov" rifles 22 ). In 1994 Albanians also established an Albanian language university parallel to that held by Macedonian government. The recent move by the Skopje authorities to demolish the university makeshift buildings in the city of Tetovo appeared to have exacerbated the level of ethnic tensions in Macedonia.
The present coalition government in Skopje between the reform communist Social Democratic League of Macedonia (SDLM) and Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDMP) will probably keep the largest Macedonians' political VMRO-DPMNE (nationalist and irredentist) party away from the levers of power as long as this marriage will last. Hence, could be concluded that a significant internal source of potential political and even armed conflict exists between the two largest ethnic groups in Macedonia. Existing kind of social and political atmosphere is likely to generate frustrations at the both sides: on one side, reason could be a danger for integrity of the state (generated by the other side), and at the other side, reason could lie in impossibilities to join the own (neighbouring) state (generated by the opposite side).
One could mention that the Balkan (and some other) experiences indicate that armies are not likely to be excepted of mentioned kinds of frustrations. The case of civil war in the former Yugoslavia (particularly the YPA experiences from the war in Croatia in 1991) indicates that it is dubious how (part of) professional soldiers and conscripts 23 would react in case of an internal ethnic conflict. The more an army demonstrates disloyalty to the multinational character of its country, the less is the probability that soldiers will be loyal to the army.
Finally, an author found out that before the disintegrations of the former Yugoslavia and the USSR had been existing some similarities in the importance and the character of the republican interdependence in these countries. The main similarity was formulated on the following way: "the lesser size of the republic the greater dependence on the interrepublican trade." The interrepublican trade exceeded the volume of foreign trade in both cases too. Considering the size of their economies in ex-Yugoslavia, the larger republics (Serbia and Croatia) were less dependent on the interrepublican trade than the smaller republics (Macedonia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and thus the disintegration to a smaller extent affected the bigger republics, and to a bigger extent the smaller republics. 24 The largest share in the interrepublican exchange was accounted for by industry (showing steady growth) and trade.
The projections made before the final disintegration of the ex-Yugoslav federation on the possible effects of the disruption of interrepublican relations showed that their complete rupture would result in high sensitivity of the republics' economies to external shocks. One of the mentioned studies also indicated that the separation of the republics into autonomous economies would increase the share of the foreign factor in Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia by three to five times. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia this would increase more than fourfold, and in the case of Montenegro even sevenfold. Complete rupture of the interrepublican trade would cause a drop in total production and employment in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia by more than 33%. 25
However, the expected negative industrial indicators (inevitable because of the disintegration of the federation and disruption or reduction of the interrepublican trade) have been additionally drastically aggravated by the catastrophic war conflicts and destruction in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, process of transformation was slowed down (and, in the case of the FR Yugoslavia, has had a retrograde tendency - slowing down or completely halting the process of privatization, marginalizing market mechanisms, and in fact, affected the whole region, 26 etc.).
Despite certain differences among the factors related to the USSR and ex-Yugoslavia, in both cases the economic indicators made possible certain conclusions. 27 Considering comprehensiveness and complexity of the changes that were to be carried out, and in view of the micro-economic stabilization programs and measures, the process in the first phase entails more expenses than profits. The disintegration, as a part of these processes, adds to the expenses of the first phase. However, the disastrous consequences of the war conflicts between and inside some republics of the former federations jeopardize the emerging processes of economic and political transformation and push the affected areas many steps backwards. In such conditions, the renewal and reconstruction of material and human resources are considered as indispensable. 28
Before the time of SRM's separation from Yugoslavia a confusion about distinct Macedonian (and not only Macedonian) identity has generated a number of serious political and security problems and explicit or implicit misunderstandings and territorial and other disputes within this Balkan region. 29
In spite of the Badinter Arbitration Commission opinion that only Slovenia and Macedonia met the necessary criteria for recognition (of all Yugoslav republics that applied for it), until the end of July 1992 neither the European Community nor other subjects have decided to recognize Macedonia. The main reason was the resistance of Greece, which put certain conditions (including the change of the name of this republic), fearing from possible territorial aspirations of this former Yugoslav republic toward some parts of northern Greece territory. Greece denies that there is a distinct and separate non-Greek Macedonian identity and sees any effort to link the name "Macedonia" as an attempt to deprive Greece of its heritage, with possible threats to the country's territorial integrity. The Greek government has made it clear that it was willing to accept an independent state in the place of the Former Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Macedonia, 30 but under a name other than Macedonia.
At the other side, Macedonia heraldically incorporated the star of Alexander the Great from the Greek territory. The deputy speaker of the Parliament in Skopje asserted that the Greece "has no legitimate right over Aegean Macedonia." 31 Furthermore the VMRO was showing maps where 38 percent of the "Greater Macedonia" is in present state of Macedonia, 51 percent in northern Greece and 11 percent in western Bulgaria. 32 However it appeared that Athens and Skopje were slowly inching towards a compromise on the issue of the name Macedonia in hyphenated fashion, but domestic imperatives still forced both sides to hang tough and to be unwilling to move the concessions necessary to work out their differences. 33 The first step was recognition of the Macedonia given by the agreement with Greece on October 6, 1995. In accordance with the same agreement, Macedonia removed the disputable symbol from its flag.
In both World Wars Bulgarian soldiers occupied Macedonia (and some parts of Serbia), trying to apply the concept of the "Greater Bulgaria." After the Second World War Bulgaria recognized the existence of Macedonian minority, 34 but subsequently denied it as well as (later) the existence of Turks in Bulgaria. 35 Bulgarian government has held the view that the Macedonian language has been a Bulgarian dialect (having no special status in Bulgaria itself), and, consequently, Macedonians have been "Bulgarians by language". Thus Bulgaria has recognized the state of Macedonia but refused to recognize the existence of a distinct Macedonian nationality. For Bulgaria, Macedonia is simply another Bulgarians' state.
The assassination against the President of Republic Kiro Gligorov was attempted in Skopje on October 3, 1995 (one day after he returned from Belgrade talks with President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic). On October 26, 1995, Macedonian police announced that the attempt was committed by a powerful financial and economic multinational organization having the head-office in a neighbouring state. 36
Since YPA was withdrawn from Macedonia, FR Yugoslavia has recognized Macedonian nation, but not the state of Macedonia, and some authors have held the view that Macedonia was nothing more than southern province of Serbia (contemporary Macedonian town Prilep used to be the capital of the medieval Tsar Dusan's "Greater Serbia") until Tito advanced and supported the notion of a distinct Macedonian nationality 37 and helped separation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (which has never been accepted by the Serbian Orthodox Church). It was noted that the Macedonian church got a separate identity a generation ago, but it was still under the Serb patriarchy in Nis. The Serb, Bulgarian and Greek churches informed the Russian church that they would not attend its millennium in 1987 if the Macedonian church was invited on a par with them. 38
Although Macedonia and Yugoslavia have no bigger mutual territorial claims, some minor border incidents used to happen from time to time. The Serbian minority in Macedonia is concentrated mostly along northern border, and Yugoslav government demanded an equal treatment for the Serbs and other minorities in the Macedonian constitution and in the Macedonian authorities' practice. However it was stressed that this demand was not a precondition for the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Skopje. The precondition for the normalization used to be reaching a solution for the dispute between Skopje and Athens governments. 39
As the Skopje authorities believed that the Serbia has never given up on its intention to control the Macedonia, they perceived the main threats to be coming from Yugoslavia. The government in Skopje feared that when the Belgrade government is no longer preoccupied with conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it will turn its guns against Macedonia, but the fears seem to be decreased since Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia mutually recognized each other in April 1996. However, on the Balkans there are also intensive fears that possible ethnic violence (or even civil war) in Kosovo could relatively easily spill-over to Macedonia (or vice versa). Thus the Macedonia's most unpredictable national security danger may be linked with neighbouring Kosovo in Serbia.
Until the Republic of Macedonia was not recognized by Yugoslavia, according to the Macedonian government perceptions, the second most dangerous neighbour is the modern Albania, who recognizes a Macedonian state only if it is not exclusively that of the Macedonian people (which Albania recognizes). An analyst emphasizes that Macedonia is in a great danger, but not of Serbia. The biggest problem of Macedonia is the Albanian minority, and in case of conflict with the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, Serbs would in fact become Macedonia's allies, not a threat. It was concluded that "an authentic problem are Macedonian relationships with Albania and Bulgaria." 40 One could also assume that domestic political considerations in Skopje have influenced President Kiro Gligorov and his government to downplay the threat from Albania (particularly given that the ethnic Albanian PDMP is a member in the governing coalition) and to have a false sense of security created by the presence of relatively small number of soldiers in UN forces (observers) in Macedonia. 41
The Tirana government believes that the Macedonian census statistics downplay the size of the Albanian ethnic element in Macedonia, and stated that the Albanians make up almost 40 percent of the population. Though Albanian President Sali Berisha advocated a diplomatic solution to the issue, he has made it known that if war breaks out in Macedonia, Tirana would not remain idle but rather would come to the rescue of its brethren. At the other side, reportedly, the Berisha government is terrified at the possibility that Albania might have to care for thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees who would likely cross the border in case of war in Macedonia.
In comparison with the neighbouring states - Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia - population and territory of Macedonia are the smallest; Macedonian GNP is the second smallest (smaller is Albanian GNP only). Macedonia has the lowest total number of active and reserve soldiers, the number of the active soldiers per 1,000 population in the Macedonian army is among lowest (it is smaller in Bulgaria only) and the number of reserve soldiers per 1,000 population (excluding Albanian paramilitary units) is lowest again; Macedonia has the smallest number of military planes, and - as landlocked state - does not have a naval force. 42 Reportedly, Macedonian army still lacks heavy armament (tanks and field artillery), and it is unlikely that the government would use its (rather poor) hard currency reserves or other resources to buy the armament. 43 Although its army seems to be the weakest in the area, Macedonia devotes a tiniest share of GNP for defence and its defence budget is the smallest. In addition, it is known that Macedonia has an underdeveloped economy. 44
It seemed that the leadership of Macedonia (as well as leaderships of several other Balkan countries) was possibly faced with two opposite patterns of its future defence behavior. One is an assumed orientation toward demilitarization and neutralization, and the other - militarization and alignment. Mentioned careful steps taken during the last years and months of the Second Yugoslavia and some others indicated that the leadership of the Macedonia could have applied a similar strategy in future; however some others later steps seemed to be (to some extent) divergent. 45
It could have been expected that a strategy of demilitarization (and neutralization) in military circles would have been considered as ultimately self-destructive for the state of Macedonia. 46 It seems important to stress that in this case demilitarization does not mean getting rid or complete eliminating of the army; it means only creation of an army which could not act within the field of security, and particularly defence, in a manner which is in accordance with the Balkan "rules of the game". In addition, such a "soft" demilitarization would probably make international guaranties for eventual Macedonian neutrality more likely to be provided (there are rather low possibilities to provide such guarantees for a state with a "robust" army which itself could easily make international and/or internal crisis and problems).
The Serbs had been keeping the status quo in the first and the second mentioned "powder keg" as long as it had been possible (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina separated). In the third "powder keg" (triangle) the status quo has been kept as long and as much as it has been possible (Macedonia separated, and Kosovo remained within Serbia and FR Yugoslavia, but - at least a part of - Albanians in Kosovo still keep on performing a secessionist kind of activities).
The Macedonians - as the last secessionist republic from the Second Yugoslavia - were criticizing the status quo and challenging the legitimacy of the Second Yugoslavia as long as Macedonia became an independent state. Since that time, Macedonians started to keep the status quo in Macedonia but - at least a part of - Albanians from Macedonia started to challenge it (as well as those who challenged the status quo in FR Yugoslavia), attempting to establish a new status quo - probably united with other Albanians in a "Greater Albania" similar to that from the Second World War.
As national identities are already rediscovered in the region, politicians ("by definition") can hardly resist to posture as "fathers" of their nations, but they in the search of security must (try to) avoid "ethnic mine-fields" and territorial irredentas that define country-specific and regional security problems and perspectives alike. 47 An armed struggle in the southern "keg" would probably repeat the model of shifting coalitions from the northern and central "kegs" and it carries a greater risk of (further) internationalization. Macedonia - located in the centre of the Balkan geopolitical axes and without seriously devoted political allies among its neighbours - can hardly expect to profit much from its independence. Macedonian economy, army and other state potentials seem to be simply too small and weak to succeed in a struggle with the internal and external paramilitary forces, and possibly few armies of the neighbouring states at the same time. This means that Macedonia is risking much in case of armed conflict and that its perspectives within a war scenario are not optimistic at all. 48
Macedonia, Albania, Greece and Bulgaria, third Yugoslavia and Turkey cover almost the entire Balkan peninsula what means that another Balkan war could be (much) worse than previous two (and civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Ex-Yugoslav experiences show that once when the shooting started, control over the political spectrum on all sides left the hands of relatively rational policymakers and went to the hands of those who could be marked as radical. Simply, war operations, war logic (or way of thinking and perceiving), war chaos, tragedies, atrocities, bloodshed, destruction and other related phenomena and circumstances usually give chances to (para)military leaders and radical politicians to act (much) more autonomously than they could do in peace time. Finally, and the most important, problems in ethnic relations usually cannot be solved by use of armed forces. On the contrary: as it was mentioned, armed force and violence in general usually become a (major) part of the problem, not the solution. 49
Mentioned Macedonia's powerless could also be considered within a wider East European viewpoint. An author tried to give an answer to question is the ethnic complexity of entire East Europe really that different from West Europe? He noted that if one goes back far enough in West Europe, can be found all kinds of ethnic groups. "The difference is that most West European monarchies had the political, military, economic, and cultural power to turn divergent ethnic groups into subordinate parts of their kingdoms, in time assimilating them and erasing their languages and cultures. France is the model for this kind of modernizing and centralizing monarchy. Neighbouring Spain, unable to turn its Basques and Catalans into Spaniards, exhibits some of the problems of East Europe, especially of Yugoslavia. The point is that almost every country starts with or acquires ethnic groups. The stronger nation-states are able to control, dominate, and sometimes assimilate minority groups. The key is political power, and in this the East European states have been much weaker than their European counterparts." 50
However it seems that the end of 20th century is not an appropriate time for national subordination, assimilation and for erasing languages and cultures of minorities. Particularly on the Balkans, it could be an even counterproductive kind of attempt and pattern of behaving. The modern world knows for two basic types of security: one primarily linked for militarily (relatively) strong countries, and another - to militarily (relatively) weak countries. The first is based on a narrow interpretation of the old Roman principle si vis pacem, para bellum or qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum (he who desires peace, let him prepare for war). Although the principle does not say how he who desires peace should prepare himself for war, militarists all over the world usually use this principle to justify accumulation of arms and soldiers only and as much as it is possible. YPA had been equipped for decades to protect the state of foreign enemies, but after the death of its first supreme commander Josip Broz Tito in several of the ex-Yugoslav federal units it became visible how could happen that those who try to ensure peace by preparing for war may not get what they wanted, but that what they prepared for. So it seems that the principle would need - at least partly - a modern (re)interpretation that would cover not only military war preparations, but some other human activities too: authentic peace oriented politics, diplomacy, communication, economy, culture, education...
As it was mentioned, the Balkan pattern or typical model of security is still mostly based on the mentioned narrow interpretation of the old Roman principle, but Macedonia seems to be too weak to use it on a way similar to those practiced by most of its neighbours and some other states in the region. At the other side, optimistic perspectives for Macedonia within a peace scenario could include a pattern or type of security reasonably similar to that mostly practiced by relatively small European states. This type of security is often characterized by the strict neutral foreign politics (at least regarding to the neighbours), relatively weak armed forces (in comparison with such forces in the neighbouring countries), 51 and stabilized (even "stilled") interethnic relations within the multiethnic structure of the country. On this way, neither Macedonia nor the neighbouring countries and nations could control the whole geographic territory of Macedonia (Vardar, Pirin and Aegean Macedonia) for a longer-lasting period. Nobody won, nobody lost, and the new multiethnic country was born.
Eventually established "greater" states in the region (Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Greece, Macedonia, etc.) simply would not provide more power for their governments and more security for their populations (regardless to their ethnic origins or nations they belong to). On the contrary, it would be a beginning of new (circle of) wars in the region (already seen at the beginning of 20th century) that in present conditions would make the Balkan states more powerless, and populations to suffer even (much) more than those in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As professor Robin Alison Remington once has stressed, a wider Balkan war will endanger the transition to democracy throughout post-communist East Central Europe, engulf the former Western Europe with refugees endangering the projected integration under the Maastricht Treaty, increase neo-nazi fanatics in the newly united Germany and strengthen Zhirinovsky in Russia, and rewrite the imperatives of national security in Washington, Moscow and Brussels.
Could be concluded that it seems that Macedonia - as well as the other states in the region - could have a longer-lasting security protecting itself by its (relative) military weakness, neutrality, and rather precisely regulated and relatively stable relations within its multiethnic structure. The purpose of Macedonian independence (as well as other countries' independence in the region) could be to link - not to divide - its neighbours and on this way to make them mutually closer and more peace devoted. This is the way on which Macedonian weakness could become strength, softness - hardness, etc., and for Macedonia to become one of relatively prosperous and a peaceful country in the region. In addition, this way of weak (military) defence would be cheaper and thus could stimulate development of its economy (that provides a source for defence as well as for other state expenses) and decreases political risks, strengthening some sort of "safety belt" for brave politicians (who are willing to tell it as it is and to survive politically afterwards) as well as for peace in the Balkans and Europe. 52
The economic and other potentials in observed region seem to be an adequate basis for relatively small armies (and, usually, the smaller armies are, the more will be viable an efficient civilian control over them). In that case there would be little political and economical space for military self-promotion and autonomy. Security must be maintained not only by armaments and soldiers, but by diplomacy and the procedures associated with conflict resolution. Otherwise, societies as well as armies in the region could begin to follow the way and the unfortunate destiny of the Second Yugoslavia and its YPA (but in most cases having (much) poorer resources than the YPA used to have).
Majority nations in all of mentioned Balkan countries are not going to be secure unless the human and civil rights of the minorities are protected (as much as it is necessary and conceivably in the same time). In these conditions minorities should be deprived only of the right to self-determination or, more precisely, "right" to secession (as that right is commonly interpreted on the Balkans 53 ), and majorities should be deprived only of the "right" to jeopardize and violate human rights of minorities (rights that represent some sort of safeguards of minorities' distinct identity and dignity). 54 On this way the states in the Balkan region could find a way to keep (protect) their territorial integrity, on one side, and in the same time the individual and collective rights of minorities could be protected on a sufficient (and efficient) way, at the other side; 55 and the Balkans will gradually drop its reputation of the European "powder keg". For this reason these countries basically need developed economies and stable systems of human rights protected by law as well as by habits and tradition. The same nations have lived in this area for centuries, waging wars but also being good neighbours, even close relatives, and making mixed marriages too. 56
Majority nations in this area in one or few decades could become minorities. 57 Thus could happen that Macedonians and some other peoples on the Balkans - constructing the minority human rights "building" - are making their own future "home"; securing minorities today, each of that majority nations obtains its own future security and vice versa. 58
Minority populations will not be secure unless they develop workable political and economic relationships with majority populations. As a loyal minority could expect a present-time majority to be a loyal minority in the future, minorities must come to see the majority position as own future position. This means that security is mutual, nowadays and in future (and the roles could be exchanged). Could be concluded that - as within presented circumstances security exists for all or for nobody - both sides must come to see their security as a function of other's side security.
Mentioned major problems within the area could be considered not only as dealing to the constitution or human rights and democracy, but as a fight between the ethnic groups, or (rather) their political elites who wish to take control over the same territory and resources. This hypothesis stresses a need for the conclusion that future of the weak post-communist democracies in the region is based on democratic principles in the civilian sector (including procedures for their fulfillment), and sufficient control of that sector over the military sector. Particularly within the environment where soldiers prove their patriotism by their national roots, military leaders should urge upon professionalism. 59
The actual state of affairs taken into account, and according to the predominant current pattern of behaving, there is no a genuine solution for western, Aegean, Vardar and Pirin Macedonia, Epirus or Cameria, Kosovo and Sandzak, etc. that could satisfy all involved sides. It seems that governments as well as minorities in the region are faced and taking part in the same time with a sort of circulus vitiosus: looking from one side, the more a minority is far from being loyal to state in which it has been living, presumably the more is used repression by the same state; but looking from the other side, the more the repression is used the less the same minority is likely to be(come) loyal, and to perceive the legal power (authority) as legitimate, but perceives it as "plain domination". 60 There is the known old question: who is going to break the circle?
Copenhagen, March 1997
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985
John F. Burns, "Winds of Yugoslavia's Ethnic War Threaten to Engulf Ethnic Enclave in Serbia," The New York Times, May 26, 1992
Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy, no. 91, Summer 93
Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972
Dzonatan Ejal, "Britanska igra macke i misa" (British Cat and Mouse Game), Interview for the AIM, Vreme (Belgrade), 1 August 1994
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "Ethnicity and Nationalism: Definitions and Critical Reflections", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 23, no. 2
Nathan Glazer, "Individual Rights against Group Rights", in: Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995
Misha Glenny, "The Yugoslav Nightmare", The New York Review of Books, vol. XLII, no. 5
Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination - The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990
Eric Herring, "International Security and Democratization in Eastern Europe," in: Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Stanford (eds.), Building Democracy? The International Dimensions of Democratization in Eastern Europe, London: Leiccester University Press, 1994
Branko Hinic, An Analysis of Interrepublican Trade, Belgrade: Institute of Economic Sciences, 1992
Zlatko Isakovic, "Macedonia, Its Neighbours and Balkan Security," Analysis of Current Events, Association for the Study of Nationalities (Eastern Europe and ex-USSR), Year 6, no. 10, History Department, City College of New York, 2 May, 1995
__________ "Polozaj Makedonije u balkanskom okruzenju" (Macedonia on the Balkans), Medjunarodna politika (Review of International Affairs), (Belgrade), no. 1024, 1994
__________ and Constantine P. Danopoulos, "In Search of Identity: Civil-Military Relations and the Nationhood in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)," in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, Civil-Military Relations in Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995
Dusan Janjic, "National Identities, Movements and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians," Balkan Forum, Vol. 3, no. 1, March 1995
Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," Foreign Policy, no. 92, Fall 1993
George F. Kennan, "The Balkan Crisis 1913 & 1993," The New York Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 13, July 15, 1993
Paul Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers - Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Fontana Press, London, 1989
Ruth Leger Sivard & al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1993, Washington D.S.: World Priorities, 1993
Zoran Lutovac, "Ethnic Relations in Kosovo and Metohija," Medjunarodni problemi (International Problems), (Belgrade), no. 1, 1994
Olga Murdzeva-Skarik i Svetomir Skarik, "Peace and UNPREDEP in Macedonia", Paper presented at the XVI IPRA General Conference Creating Nonviolent Futures, Brisbane, Australia, 8-12 July 1996
Jan Øberg, "Conflict-Mitigation in Former Yugoslavia - It Could Still Be Possible," in: Radmila Nakarada (ed.), Europe and Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Belgrade: Institute for European Studies, 1994
Michalis Papaconstantinou, "The Balkans," Balkan Forum, no. 1, vol. 3, March 1995
Gordana Pesakovic, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and of the USSR: Economic Consequences and Perspectives," in Radmila Nakarada (ed.), Europe and Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Belgrade: Institute for European Studies, 1994
Robin Alison Remington, "Partije, armije i bezbednost u istocnoevropskim balkanskim drzavama" (Parties, Armies and Security in the East European Balkans), in Zlatko Isakovic (ed.), Vojske i promene u evropskim socijalistickim zemljama (Militaries and Transformation in European Ex-Socialist Countries), Beograd: Institut za evropske studije - YUPeace Centar za istrazivanje mira i konflikata (Institute for European Studies - YUPeace Centre for Peace and Conflict Research), 1994
__________ "Security Dilemmas in the Post-Communist Balkans - Party-Army Dynamics," Eurobalkans, Winter 94/95, no. 17, 1994
Michael G. Roskin, The Rebirth of East Europe, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1991
Iso Rusi, "A Young Government Treads Carefully," Balkan WarReport, no. 17, January 1993
Laslo Sekelj, Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993
Predrag Simic, "Civil War in Yugoslavia: From Local Conflict to European Crisis," in Armad Clesse and Andrei Kortunov (eds.), The Political and Strategic Implication of the State Crises in Central and Eastern Europe, Luxembourg: Institute for European and International Studies, 1993
Vojislav Stanovcic, "History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts," in: Dennison Rusinow (ed.), Yugoslavia - A Fractured Federalism, Washington DS: The Wilson Center Press, 1988
__________ "How political and Constitutional Institutions Deal with a People of Ethnic Diversity: The Yugoslav Experience," in: Robert A. Goldwin, Art Kaufman and William A. Schamibra, Forging Unity Out of Diversity - The Approaches of Eight Nations, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989
__________ and Robin Remington, "Bureaucracy and Socialism: The Experience of Yugoslavia," in: Jaroslav Piekalkiewic and Christopher Hamilton (eds.), Public Bureaucracy Between Reform and Resistance, New York, Oxford: Berg Publishers and San Martins Press, 1991
Transition of Yugoslav Economy, Belgrade: Institute of Economics, 1992
Stefan Troebst, "Macedonia: Power Keg Defused," RFE/RL Research Report, no. 47, January 28, 1994
Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, "The Trial of Democracy in 'Macedonia': The Ethnic Problems and the Military", paper presented on the International Conference of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Research Committee "Armed Forces and Society," National Security and Globalization, Seoul, Korea, 23-26 July 1996
Håkan Wiberg, "Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia," in Ole Wæver, Bary Buzan, Morten Kelstrup & Pierre Lemaitre, (eds.), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1993
Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Security Threat to Greece?," Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 1994
__________ "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Contemporary Macedonian Issue," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. no. 3, 1994
Note 1: Some authors rather use term "misunderstanding" or some other words with more or less similar meanings (see for example: Robin Alison Remington, "Partije, armije i bezbednost u istocnoevropskim balkanskim drzavama" (Parties, Armies and Security in the East European Balkans), in Zlatko Isakovic (ed.), Vojske i promene u evropskim socijalistickim zemljama (Militaries and Transformation in European Ex-Socialist Countries), Beograd: Institut za evropske studije - YUPeace Centar za istrazivanje mira i konflikata (Institute for European Studies - YUPeace Centre for Peace and Conflict Research), 1994, p. 73), but it seems that they all have intentions to assign disappointments or frustrations of ethnic groups originating from disputes in present and/or past mutual relations. For a more detailed analysis of Croatian, Magyar, Serbian and other nationalisms in 19th century within the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires see John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985, pp. 92-99, 105-107. Back.
Note 2: See more detailed Håkan Wiberg, "Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia," in Ole Wæver, Bary Buzan, Morten Kelstrup & Pierre Lemaitre, (eds.), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1993, pp. 97-98. Back.
Note 4: The term "nation" in Yugoslavia was not used with the same meaning as in Western countries (to denote the whole population of a country or state). It was used instead to denote each of six ethnic groups organized in constituent republics and distinguished from "nationalities". Back.
Note 5: The differences between the terms "nations of Yugoslavia", which numbered five (and later six) nations of Slavic descent (Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbians, Slovenians, and later Muslims), and "nationalities" (Albanians, Hungarians and another fifteen national minorities, although this term was not used) have existed since the 1943. The differences between the rights of these groups have never been related to members' individual rights, but rather to the character and scope of their collective rights to organize into distinct political communities. Back.
Note 6: See more detailed: Vojislav Stanovcic, "How political and Constitutional Institutions Deal with a People of Ethnic Diversity: The Yugoslav Experience," in: Robert A. Goldwin, Art Kaufman and William A. Schamibra, Forging Unity Out of Diversity - The Approaches of Eight Nations, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989, pp. 390-391 and 408. Back.
Note 7: More detailed: Predrag Simic, "Civil War in Yugoslavia: From Local Conflict to European Crisis," in Armad Clesse and Andrei Kortunov (eds.), The Political and Strategic Implication of the State Crises in Central and Eastern Europe, Luxembourg: Institute for European and International Studies, 1993, p. 228. Back.
Note 8: "Overall tensions and conflicts between ethnic groups in Yugoslavia certainly strengthen the positions of republic and provincial leaders who have pretended to be representatives of their respective ethnic groups." See more detailed: Vojislav Stanovcic and Robin Remington, "Bureaucracy and Socialism: The Experience of Yugoslavia," in: Jaroslav Piekalkiewic and Christopher Hamilton (eds.), Public Bureaucracy Between Reform and Resistance, New York, Oxford: Berg Publishers and San Martins Press, 1991, p. 204. Back.
Note 9: Albanians are majority in the Province Kosovo, and minority in the population of the Republic Serbia (whose part is Kosovo). "The population of Kosovo was doubled in the period 1948 - 1981: from 1961 to 1981 the Albanian population increased by 90% and their share in total population of Kosovo rose from 67.2% to 77.4%; the Serbian and Montenegrin populations diminished by 7.3% and 28.1% respectively, while their share in the total population of Kosovo dropped from 23.6% and 3.9% to 13.2% and 1.7% respectively." On this base it was concluded that "a definite ethnic homogeneity of the population was achieved." It is estimated that over the coming twenty years Albanian population will double again, since the half of the entire population in under 20 years of age and it is expected to marry and have children. It was concluded that "the Albanian population in Kosovo has more demographic similarities with the population of the neighbouring Albania than with other parts of Serbia and Yugoslavia. However, there are differences even in comparison with Albania. Thus, during the 1980s the women in Kosovo, on the average, had one child more than the women in Albania, despite the fact that the economic and cultural development was at a higher level and more accelerated in Kosovo than in Albania." (See more detailed: Dusan Janjic, "National Identities, Movements and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians," Balkan Forum, Vol. 3, no. 1, March 1995, pp. 21 and 64). Back.
Note 10: See John F. Burns, "Winds of Yugoslavia's Ethnic War Threaten to Engulf Ethnic Enclave in Serbia," The New York Times, May 26, 1992; Laslo Sekelj, Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 205. Back.
Note 11: It was concluded that entire period of Serbian-Albanian relations before the First Balkan War manifested oscillations of alliances, cooperation and more frequent conflicts that primarily had to do with their association against or in the interest of a third party. (See more detailed: Dusan Janjic, op. cit. p. 21; Zoran Lutovac, "Ethnic Relations in Kosovo and Metohija," Medjunarodni problemi (International Problems), no. 1, 1994, pp. 143-145. Back.
Note 15: See Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," Foreign Policy, no. 92, Fall 1993, pp. 52-53. It was stressed that the Yugoslav example seems to be an appropriate evidence that "from the internal perspective, nationalist passions, economic hardships, and weak political parties are a potentially deadly combination." (Robin Alison Remington, "Partije, armije i bezbednost u istocnoevropskim balkanskim drzavama," p. 72). In addition "minorities in the Balkans - that is the existence of many nationalities in the same state region - are a reality which is either forgotten or ignored, although it is the Achilles' heel of stability and peace on this peninsula. It has never been possible to draw state borders on the basis of homogeneous regions." (Michalis Papaconstantinou, "The Balkans," Balkan Forum, no. 1, vol. 3, March 1995, p. 11). Back.
Note 17: See more detailed: George F. Kennan, "The Balkan Crisis 1913 & 1993," The New York Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 13, July 15, 1993, pp. 5-7 (this essay is an introduction to the 1993 edition of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars Report, the first time issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1914. The 1993 title is The Other Balkan War: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect, with a new Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan). Back.
Note 18: See more detailed: Vojislav Stanovcic, "History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts," in: Dennison Rusinow (ed.), Yugoslavia - A Fractured Federalism, Washington DS: The Wilson Center Press, 1988, p. 25. Back.
Note 21: Population of Macedonia consists also of Turks (4%), Gypsies (2%) and some other ethnic groups (2%). Source: "Vise od dva miliona stanovnika u Makedoniji," (More than 2,000,000 Inhabitants in Macedonia) Politika (Beograd), 14 September 1994; see also Zlatko Isakovic and Constantine P. Danopoulos, "In Search of Identity: Civil-Military Relations and the Nationhood in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)," in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, Civil-Military Relations in Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 191; Olga Murdzeva-Skarik i Svetomir Skarik, "Peace and UNPREDEP in Macedonia", Paper presented at the XVI IPRA General Conference Creating Nonviolent Futures, Brisbane, Australia, 8-12 July 1996. Back.
Note 23: The majority of the conscripts in the Macedonian army are Macedonians, and the percentage of Albanian conscripts has increased from 7.5 percent in 1992 to 26.5 percent by the end of 1993. This increase indicates that the Albanians have either decided to accept Macedonia's statehood or they seek to infiltrate the army. (See Stefan Troebst, "Macedonia: Power Keg Defused," RFE/RL Research Report, no. 47, January 28, 1994, p. 20). More detailed on significance of ethnicity in and for the Macedonian army see: Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, "The Trial of Democracy in 'Macedonia': The Ethnic Problems and the Military", paper presented on the International Conference of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Research Committee "Armed Forces and Society," National Security and Globalization, Seoul, Korea, 23-26 July 1996, pp. 10-15. Back.
Note 24: The analysis used the data on the interrepublican dependence from the studies of the Institute of Economics, Belgrade: Transition of Yugoslav Economy, 1992, and from Branko Hinic, An Analysis of Interrepublican Trade, Belgrade: Institute of Economic Sciences, 1992. Back.
Note 26: According to the estimates of the Vienna Institute for East and South-East Europe, the sanctions against Yugoslavia, in one year, resulted in a loss of the Balkan and East European countries of about 35 billion dollars. The estimated damages to Yugoslavia's economy, for the first year, are between 20 and 25 billion dollars. (Politika (Belgrade), 26 August 1993). Back.
Note 27: The process of disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia differs also in quite obvious forms: the attempt to preserve the federation in Yugoslavia and the creation of the community of independent states, in the case of the USSR; international (non)recognition of the newly formed states; the processes of reintegration among the former Soviet republics, which in the case of Yugoslavia - having in mind the civil war - at present is not possible to achieve. Back.
Note 28: See more detailed Gordana Pesakovic, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and of the USSR: Economic Consequences and Perspectives," in Radmila Nakarada (ed.), Europe and Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Belgrade: Institute for European Studies, 1994, pp. 219-224. Back.
Note 29: It was noted that "a year before the Second Balkan War's impact's on plans for Greater Bulgaria, the First Balkan War affected pretensions to Greater Albania. European Powers at the same time prevented Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece from realizing their own plans to divide Albania." Albanian historians and archeologists took a questionable and disputed position related to the origin of the Albanians as the autochtonous inhabitants of a part of the Balkans. Although it is not certain whether Albanians are of Illyrian or Thracian-Dacian origin, Albanian historians state that they are of Illyrian origin. On this hypothesis are based Albanian historical claims including part of Macedonia and almost the whole of Montenegro and the Dalmatian coast, and the idea of Greater Albania was temporarily realized under Italian and German protection during the Second World War. (See more detailed Vojislav Stanovcic, "History and Status of Ethnic Conflict," pp. 24 and 39). Back.
Note 31: Quoted in Eric Herring, "International Security and Democratization in Eastern Europe," in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Stanford (eds.), Building Democracy? The International Dimensions of Democratization in Eastern Europe, London: Leiccester University Press, 1994, p. 99. Back.
Note 33: See more detailed Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Security Threat to Greece?," Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 100-101; "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Contemporary Macedonian Issue," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. no. 3, 1994. Back.
Note 35: In 1985 Stanko Todorov, a member of Bulgarian communist party Politburo, declared Bulgaria as a single-nation country. (See Vojislav Stanovcic, "History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts," p. 24). Back.
Note 37: It was stressed that "creating new political nations was often accompanied by frenetic work to develop a cultural infrastructure. In the case of the Macedonians, for example, a well-known Harvard Slavicist, Horace Landt, was brought in to create a grammar for the Macedonian language." (Dusko Doder, op. cit., p. 11; compare Olga Murdzeva-Skarik i Svetomir Skarik, op. cit., p. 4). Back.
Note 39: See an interview given by Vladislav Jovanovic, Foreign Affairs Minister in the Yugoslav government, to weekly paper Zbor from Skopje (News Bulletin, 21 April 1995, Embassy of FR Yugoslavia, Ottawa, Canada). Back.
Note 41: See more detailed Zlatko Isakovic, "Macedonia, Its Neighbours and Balkan Security," Analysis of Current Events, Association for the Study of Nationalities (Eastern Europe and ex-USSR), Year 6, no. 10, History Department, City College of New York, 2 May, 1995, pp. 8-9. Back.
Note 44: Macedonia's only comparative economic advantages could be seen in agricultural and mineral resources; in the fact that it was spared of war devastation; in the interest of FR Yugoslavia for communications with Greece and vice versa; and in the support of a large number of economic emigrants in the United States, Canada and Australia (whose economic strengths and readiness to help, however, are not as great as those from Croatia). As over 70 percent of the Macedonian trade used to be with Belgrade, it seems that the UN sanctions against FR Yugoslavia were also sharply damaging for the Macedonian economy. Back.
Note 45: It seemed that this second kind of orientation was particularly related to eventual membership in military or similar alliances (for example, in NATO, although it seems that the NATO under certain circumstances could play a stabilizing role there, similar to that in Turkish-Greek conflict but much more complex). On 15 November 1995 Macedonia became 27th member of the NATO's Program "Partnership for Peace," as the first ex-Yugoslav republic after Slovenia. Back.
Note 46: The Minister of Defence put it that today no state can reasonably deprive itself of the ability to defend its territory and sovereignty, and probably no army in the world would be delighted with such an idea. Back.
Note 48: It was stressed that in case of an armed conflict, Macedonia would be possibly faced with a choice "between pox and cholera": joining Albanians and Bulgarians, who, if would be victorious, might divide Macedonia between them (along the 1941 common border line); or joining Greeks and Serbs, who, if would be victorious, might want no independent state between them. (Håkan Wiberg, op. cit., p. 107; see also George F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 7). Back.
Note 49: Compare: Jan Øberg, "Conflict-Mitigation in Former Yugoslavia - It Could Still Be Possible," in Radmila Nakarada (ed.), Europe and Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Belgrade: Institute for European Studies, 1994, p. 140. Back.
Note 51: In this regard, one could mention the case of Iceland. In 1990 this relatively small island country had population of 255,000 inhabitants and territory of 102,845 sq. km. Although the Iceland is a NATO member, it had none or negligible number of soldiers as well as military public expenditures. (See Ruth Leger Sivard & al., World Military and Social Expenditures 1993, Washington D.S.: World Priorities, 1993, p. 43). Back.
Note 53: An author concluded that "so-called ethnic principle of self-determination has never been seriously considered by the international community to be the sole, or even primary, factor in assessing claims to statehood. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of 'one people, one state' echoes in the speeches of every dissatisfied minority". (Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination - The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, p 7). Back.
Note 54: As the Balkan region has a long and extensive tradition of minority problems, an author stressed the question how can political parties, attempting to bridge ethnic cleavages, find a common denominator of national security that will satisfy the Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority in Bulgaria; Romanians and the Hungarians minority in Transylvania; Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Albanians in the former Yugoslavia?" (Robin Alison Remington, "Security Dilemmas in the Post-Communist Balkans...," p. 71.). An author suggested that maybe a solution could be found within the scope of the principle "all rights to minorities, excluding the right to secession." (See Misha Glenny, "The Yugoslav Nightmare", The New York Review of Books, vol. XLII, no. 5, p. 57). Back.
Note 55: For a discussion on relations between individual and minority rights (mostly in US) see: Nathan Glazer, "Individual Rights against Group Rights", in: Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 123-138. Back.
Note 56: See more detailed: Zlatko Isakovic, "Polozaj Makedonije u balkanskom okruzenju" (Macedonia on the Balkans), Medjunarodna politika (Review of International Affairs), no. 1024 (1994), p. 35. Back.
Note 57: An analogous event was predicted in the Soviet Union when Central Asian republics' birth rates became some three times higher than those in regions populated mostly by Slavs and Baltic peoples. Thus Moscow planners were be able to predict decreasing of the Russian population share in the total Soviet population (from 52% in 1980 to 48% in 1990). That meant that Russians, for the first time in history, were not going to be an absolute majority of the Soviet population. More detailed: Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers - Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Fontana Press, London, 1989, 641-643. Back.
Note 58: See more detailed Zlatko Isakovic, op. cit., pp. 35-36. One author has concluded that "as soon as minorities become majorities, new minorities appear. If the present number of nation-states is doubled, the number of minority problems may also be (roughly) doubled." (Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "Ethnicity and Nationalism: Definitions and Critical Reflections", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 23, no. 2, p. 221). Back.
Note 60: "Power ... is always regarded as something 'legitimate,' to a greater or lesser degree, meaning that we find it more or less natural to obey it. On the contrary, plain domination appears only to be the result of our inability to resist its pressure; we obey because we cannot physically do otherwise. But power is obeyed because we think that we ought to do so, because we believe that it is legitimate to obey." (Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972, p. 18). Back.