Columbia International Affairs Online: Working Papers

CIAO DATE: 07/2010

From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists

Thomas M. Sanderson, Daniel Kimmage, David A. Gordon

March 2010

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Abstract

■■ A group of Central Asian jihadists survived ejection from their native countries and the collapse of the Taliban regime to remain active today. Some of these fighters have adopted al Qaeda’s global focus, while others prioritize a reestablished presence in Central Asia. ■■ Central Asian militant networks have depended on external sanctuaries since the 1990s. The safe havens currently used by these groups are concentrated in Pakistan’s tribal belt. Today, these refuges face inc reasing pressure from a combination of ethnic violence, CIA drone strikes, and Pakistan Army operations. ■■ Rising pressure on safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal belt and expanding coalition effort in Afghanistan could push more locally focused Central Asian jihadists homeward. ■■ The return of these fighters does not pose an existential threat to Central Asian stability—they lack popular support. But a militant influx could set off a destabilizing cycle of terrorist action and government overreaction amid deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. ■■ In response to this threat, the United States should avoid any grand schemes designed to undermine the appeal of radicalism in the region. Instead, it should support Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as they deal with a small but growing militant threat primed by the dynamic conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ■■ To help these states combat the threat of militancy on the tactical level, the United States should consider: • Dedicating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and direct action assets to interdict militants before they reach Central Asia; • Boosting intelligence sharing with European partners and regional governments; • Enhancing U.S. intelligence capacity on Central Asian target sets; • Launching a border interdiction initiative; • Focusing more attention on travel documents; • Engaging the counterdrug community in militant interdiction efforts; • Encouraging enhanced Central Asian counterterrorism cooperation; • Engaging Russia and China in Central Asian counterterrorism efforts; • Helping Central Asian authorities reform their prison systems; • Pushing to bring the counterterrorism legislation of Central Asian countries in line with EU directives and human rights laws; and vi | from the ferghana valley to south waziristan • Convening a “best practices” conference on successful counter-radicalization and extremist demobilization programs. Though there are significant differences among them, the Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek governments abet radicalization with shortsighted policies, making them imperfect partners. This will remain the case as long as authoritarianism, kleptocracy, and the selective suppression of religious practice continue to characterize these regimes.