Columbia International Affairs Online: Working Papers

CIAO DATE: 06/2011

Taming the Revisionist State: The Effects of Military Defeats on the War-Proneness of Germany vs. Iraq

Benjamin Miller, Moran Mandalbaum

September 2010

Centre for International Peace and Security Studies

Abstract

Following the post-2003 US intervention in Iraq, and with a potential US use of force against Iran, one key analytical question stands out, which has major policy implications: Does military defeat by the great powers have stabilizing or de-stabilizing effects on the aggressive behavior of revisionist states? Somewhat similarly to the pre-2003 Iraq invasion debate, the great powers have a number of options for dealing with the potential Iranian nuclear threat: diplomatic engagement, deterrence, or resort to military power-- either to bring about a regime change, or to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities. Taking into account the possibility of resorting to force against Iran, an intriguing question emerges: what does IR theory lead us to expect-- and what does the historical record show -- with regard to the effects of military defeats on the war-propensity of revisionist states? In other words, why do some militarily defeated states become war-like, while others peaceful? A revisionist state is often defined as a state which is dissatisfied with the current international order and is willing to incur high costs by using force to change the territorial status-quo or change the regime of other states. Thus, the state‘s risk-taking propensity is high – it is risking great losses for the sake of great gains, which may include territorial, ideological (regime change) or enhancing its prestige and get a place at the table. Specifically, a revisionist state is defined as a state that wishes and/or acts upon its desires to alter the existing territorial distribution and/or change another state‘s policy and/or regime. Nonetheless, we focus here on major regional revisionist states that are a crucial component in their regional security complex, and thus are key contributors to the (in)-security of their respective security structure.