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**TAMING THE REVISIONIST STATE:
THE EFFECTS OF MILITARY DEFEATS ON THE WAR-PRONENESS
OF GERMANY vs. IRAQ**

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**Taming the Revisionist State: The Effects of Military Defeats on the War-Proneness of
Germany vs. Iraq**

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Introduction

Following the post-2003 US intervention in Iraq, and with a potential US use of force against Iran, one key analytical question stands out, which has major policy implications: Does military defeat by the great powers have stabilizing or de-stabilizing effects on the aggressive behavior of revisionist states? Somewhat similarly to the pre-2003 Iraq invasion debate, the great powers have a number of options for dealing with the potential Iranian nuclear threat: diplomatic engagement, deterrence, or resort to military power-- either to bring about a regime change, or to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities. Taking into account the possibility of resorting to force against Iran, an intriguing question emerges: what does IR theory lead us to expect-- and what does the historical record show -- with regard to the effects of military defeats on the war-proneness of revisionist states? In other words, why do some militarily defeated states become war-like, while others peaceful?¹

A revisionist state is often defined as a state which is dissatisfied with the current international order and is willing to incur high costs by using force to change the territorial status-quo or change the regime of other states.² Thus, the state's risk-taking propensity is high – it is risking great losses for the sake of great gains, which may include territorial, ideological (regime change) or enhancing its prestige and get a “place at the table”³. Specifically, a revisionist state is defined as a state that wishes and/or acts upon its desires to alter the existing territorial distribution and/or change another state's policy and/or regime.⁴ Nonetheless, we focus here on major regional revisionist states that are a crucial component in their regional security complex, and thus are key contributors to the (in)-security of their respective security structure.⁵

We offer here a gradual and integrated explanation accounting for the variation in the effects of military defeats on revisionists' war-proneness, while also explaining the transition from revisionism to status-quo. To do that we introduce four types of states according to their war-proneness (i.e. the dependent variable): *revisionist*, *incoherent*, *frontier* and *status-quo states*. These are the major post-defeat options available for a defeated revisionist state (including to continue to be a revisionist). The underlying factor (i.e. the independent variables) is what we define as the *state-to-nation balance* (hereafter the s/n balance), which incorporates both the extent of state strength and the degree of congruence between the division of the region into territorial states and the national aspirations and political identifications of the region's

¹ This puzzle also refers to ongoing debates as to the usefulness of various methods to tame, coerce or even defeat an aggressor, see George and Simons (1994); Schelling (1966); Freedman (1998); Haass (1994), and de-Wijk (2005); whether unconditional surrender is necessary, see Aron (1967, ch.vi); Fuller (1961, 293); and whether military occupation is a prerequisite or perhaps air campaigns are productive as well, see Pape (1996).

² In a recent work, Davidson (2002, 125-26) defines revisionism as a preference for changing the international “distribution of goods”—including, but not limited to, territory, and a willingness to incur costs in pursuing that preference. See also Legro (2005, 10). While it is true that post-9/11 US can also be seen as a revisionist state, our focus here is on the effects of military defeats on revisionist Iraq (although, as we will discuss below, it was successfully contained in the post-1991 period).

³ Schweller (1998, 21).

⁴ This partly follows the MID codebook's definition of revisionist states (i.e. RevState). Accessed October 2, 2010, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID_v3.0.codebook.pdf.

⁵ On security complexes see Buzan and Waever (2003).

peoples.⁶ Hence, military defeats, which strengthen the balance – by bringing about both strong and nationally congruent states – will have stabilizing effects. Conversely, military defeats that exacerbate or even create an imbalance will have destabilizing consequences. The proposed explanation incorporates also some insights from all three major approaches in IR theory – realism, liberalism and constructivism – as important intervening variables which affect the translation of the various combinations of the s/n balance into the specific four post-defeat outcomes (i.e. the dependent variables).

In order to examine the theoretical argument we compare Germany with Iraq, while focusing on post-World War I and post-World War II Germany, together with post-1991 and post-2003 Iraq. This comparison makes sense due to several reasons. First, before the 2003 invasion of Iraq many in the US administration drew an analogy between the post-1945 US occupation of Germany and the consequently imposed democratization there, and what they hoped would take place in a post-invasion democratizing Iraq.⁷ Thus, these cases are both intrinsic to understanding the effect of defeats as they are relevant to contemporary policy making. Second and most important, Germany and Iraq – both revisionist powers, which suffered military defeats – were chosen according to variation in the values on the independent variables⁸, that is, the s/n conditions at war's end, specifically the level of state strength and national congruence. Since these cases are different with respect, for instance, to their socio-cultural histories or the level of violence they initiated (world wars vs. regional conflicts) we compare not only between Germany and Iraq, but also within them (i.e. within case variance), and hence are able to partly control for socio-cultural factors. To conclude, these cases are not test cases, nor are we offering a deterministic generalized assertion here, though both Iraq and Germany serve to highlight the gradual effect of defeats, the underlying power of s/n issues as well as the intervening effect of realist, liberal and constructivist factors. This assessment might also provide us with policy implications for relevant issues.

We use here the “structured, focused comparison” methodology as we combine a comparative examination and within-case analysis, hence accounting for both variations between the cases and change over time within each case.⁹ This study does that through the following four steps: The first part overviews some of the key existing theoretical explanations. The second part is this paper’s theoretical core. We introduce the dependent variable as an innovative classification of post-defeat states’ war-propensity. We then define the underlying explanation, that is, the state-to-nation balance. Finally, we lay-down our key argument, while also presenting four propositions relating to the causal linkages between the various post-defeat s/n conditions and states’ war-propensity. This part also addresses the utility of causal factors from the three major IR paradigms as intervening variables. The third and fourth parts conduct the empirical analysis, starting with the more successful cases of pacifying revisionists, then moving to the failures in taming them: specifically, the third part presents the successful case of post-1945 Germany, which shows the utility of military defeat when it strengthens the s/n balance, while post-1991 Iraq provides a semi-successful case where the US contained Saddam Hussein’s regime. In the fourth part, we discuss the unsuccessful cases of both post-WWI Germany and

⁶ This argument draws on Miller (2007), but here we further develop it and extend it to a new puzzle and a different set of cases and empirical data. The earlier work of Miller is reflected here only in part I of the paper. All the other parts go much beyond the previous work.

⁷ See, for instance, Newsweek 18 October 2004, also available at <http://www.newsweek.com/id/55274>

⁸ See King *et al.* (1993, 140-141).

⁹ See George and Bennett (2005, 233-262 and 181-204), and King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 137).

post-2003 Iraq, which show that military defeat that exacerbates the s/n imbalance brings about de-stabilizing effects (even though the Iraqi case is still evolving, over seven years of bloodshed are quite suggestive). We finally present the conclusions and some implications.

I. The State of the Literature: War Termination, Nation Building and Regional Explanations of War and Peace

The literature on War Termination and Nation Building addresses the effect of military defeats and the conditions under which resuming to violence is possible. Some argue that a decisive military defeat is a necessary condition (though not a sufficient one) because otherwise "...the belligerents worry that the other side will not live up to the agreement".¹⁰ According to Fortna, the historical record since WWII shows that military defeats have indeed reduced the odds for resorting to arms in post-conflict situations, though a strong agreement is needed as well.¹¹ According to Werner and Yuen peace agreements in the post-war settlement would last only if its terms reflect the opponents' military expectations.¹² Their focus is on the information environment, that is, whether or not the information arising from the battle field is consistent and, thus, inconsistency in battle results or a third party intervention might create a disagreement regarding the balance of power and impede the peace agreements. Lo et al. maintained that what is key in determining the success and longevity of peace settlements is foreign-imposed regime change, especially if it is followed by democratization. Their argument is based on two mechanisms.¹³ One is that regime change simply alters the target state's policy by removing revisionist elements from power and state's institutions. The second mechanism is deeper and refers to the transformation of the target's political institutions such as its constitution.¹⁴

The RAND project on nation building suggests that although a decisive military defeat is necessary, the crucial element explaining the successful cases of post-WWII Germany and Japan is the commitment of the intervener and its willingness to fully invest in the reconstruction of the post-defeat society.¹⁵ Edelstein stresses three key features of successful occupation, namely that the occupied society has to be destroyed by war and thus welcome the intervener; both the occupied and the occupier ought to face a common foe, and finally the occupier must not have the intention to stay indefinitely.¹⁶ Finally, Ikenberry asserts that after major wars the winning party is able to establish new world orders that are also perceived by the defeated as preferable. These orders then are institutionalized and form an after victory order and hence account for a change in foreign policy.¹⁷

We would argue that these accounts omit several theoretical issues. First, the war termination literature is mostly realist and draw heavily on the security dilemma mechanism and the balance of power among the belligerents at war's end. Even Fortna's argument, which refers to the efficiency of peace agreements, stems from a (defensive) realist bias since she argues that states will resort to arms mostly out of fear and mistrust.¹⁸ Secondly, our model does not strive

¹⁰ See Werner and Yuen (2005), who cite Fearon (1998) and Walter (1997).

¹¹ Fortna (2004, 85-90, 77-78)

¹² Werner and Yuen (2005).

¹³ Lo et al., (2008, 717-736)

¹⁴ Ibid. (2008, 719-720).

¹⁵ Dobbins et al. (2003).

¹⁶ Edelstein (2004, 49-91)

¹⁷ Ikenberry (2000).

¹⁸ Fortna (2004, 10-12).

merely to explain failure of peace agreements and peacemaking and for that matter also interstate war dynamics, that is, explaining how and why some dyads lock themselves in ongoing cycles of rivalry.¹⁹ Instead, we focus on types of states and their general inclination towards war and peace. Thus, third, we also include the possibility of domestic conflict as well as states which engage in external war, but as a process of boundary making. Fourth, we pay attention to the underlying conditions that caused violence in the first place and hence seek to find out whether these conditions were removed in the post-war setting. Put differently, while most of the mentioned literature addresses the mechanisms for the implementation of peace agreements at war's end, we offer a theory that focuses on the structural and underlying conditions of war and peace.

Consequently, our argument might be located within the literature on regional war and peace which calls for an integration of several paradigms and approaches so as to explain the regional transition from hot conflict to pacific relations. Largely, these studies stemmed from a new focus on regionalism emerging in the post-Cold War era, while maintaining that the characteristics of a region are shaped not by great powers interaction, but rather through regional dynamics and a region's innate properties.²⁰ Focusing on the regional level of analysis opened the door for a variety of explanations including realist, constructivist and cultural accounts.²¹ Ripsman, for instance, presented a two-tier model of regional peacemaking.²² By analysing post-WWII Germany and Europe he asserted that realist factors were key in providing stability and security, whereas liberal factors account for the longevity and depth of European peace. Rynhold, however, maintained that although Ripsman's thesis is valuable the cultural or constructivist dimension is missing.²³ Specifically, Rynhold advocated for an integrated explanation in which the resolution of the "German question" in Central and Eastern Europe coupled with Cold-War constraints and domestic cultural shift in Germany would account better for European peace since 1945. Our contribution lies in a more gradual and comprehensive account of regional shifts between revisionism and status-quo as well as the role of military defeats. Specifically and unlike Ripsman and Rynhold, we argue that all three theoretical approaches are important, that is, realism, liberalism and constructivism, albeit they all depend on the underlying s/n balance in a given region. Hence, we sequence the effects of realist, liberal and constructivist factors in three different phases, as opposed to the two offered by Ripsman and Rynhold, while asserting that they affect a state's war and peace propensity according to the s/n conditions (see below).

II. The Theoretical Explanation

The Dependent Variable: Classification of the Post-Defeat War-Propensity of Revisionist States

The conflict literature usually advances some dichotomous distinctions regarding the key types of states' war-propensity, especially between revisionist and status-quo states.²⁴ While

¹⁹ See, for instance, Diehl & Goertz (2000); Maoz and Mor (2002).

²⁰ See Lake and Morgan (1997), and Katzenstein (2005).

²¹ See Buzan and Waever (2003), who combine a neorealist and a social constructivist approach so as to explain regional security structures.

²² Ripsman (2005, 669-694).

²³ Rynhold (forthcoming-2010).

²⁴ On revisionist vs. status quo states, see Wolfers (1962, 18-19, 96-97, 125-26), Schweller (1994 and Spring 1996 which includes citations to other works who make similar distinctions in n. 31, 98-99, and 1998, 22-24, 84-89). See

revisionism and status-quo present opposite foreign policy orientations, especially regarding war-initiation, they are not exhaustive of the types of states prone to be engaged in regional wars. There are other important classes of states which produce war-proneness even if they do not make a deliberate choice to engage or not to engage in revisionism and related warfare. One such type of states provides an arena for civil wars, which frequently also trigger neighbours' intervention. The second such type is engaged in boundary/territorial warfare in neighbourhoods, where boundaries are not marked clearly and are not agreed upon by the parties.

Thus, we get a four-fold classification of states' war-proneness:

1. **The revisionist state:** a state which is dissatisfied with the current international order and is willing to incur high costs by using force to change the territorial status-quo or change the regime of other states.²⁵ Thus, the state's risk-taking propensity is high – it is risking great losses for the sake of great gains, which may include territorial, ideological (regime change) or enhancing its prestige and get a “place at the table”²⁶
2. **The status-quo state:** a state which is satisfied from the current order and is willing to use force only to defend it and not to change the current distribution of rewards in the system.
3. **The incoherent or “failed” state:** a state which is prone to civil/ethnic wars and also to foreign intervention in these wars.²⁷
4. **The “frontier” state:** a state, which is located in a neighbourhood where boundaries are unclear or are disputed, and thus is prone to boundary and territorial wars.

The Independent Variable: The State-to-Nation Balance

The post-defeat outcome depends foremost on the s/n balance in the aftermath of the defeat, that is, on state strength and on national congruence. Different post-defeat outcomes of these two factors produce different types of states with regard to their war-propensity as specified below.

Why are these two factors the most influential? This paper deals with cases in the modern era where states and nations are key actors in the area of conflict and violence because of the centrality of the state as the key actor in the international system, and of nations as the key political locus of identification at least since the late 18th century.²⁸ Moreover, national self-determination is a major norm legitimizing sovereignty in the international system, and a powerful motivation for people to fight for their independence. The s/n balance has two

also Kupchan (1998) and Buzan (1991, ch. 8). On aspiring revisionist regional powers in the post-Cold War era, see Job (1997, 187). On other classifications of states' war propensity see Maoz (2004).

²⁵ In a recent work, Davidson (2002, 125-26) defines revisionism as a preference for changing the international “distribution of goods”—including, but not limited to territory, and a willingness to incur costs in pursuing that preference. See also Legro (2005, 10).

²⁶ Schweller (1998, 21).

²⁷ To underline the need for these additional categories, I would point out that states which I would place in this category, at least in certain periods, include some of those which Maoz (2004, 118) places in the “pacifist” category: Haiti, Dom. Repub., Liberia, Afghanistan, Nepal, Panama, Burma, and Sri Lanka.

²⁸ This part of the paper draws on Miller (2007, 56-59). Although there are several debates regarding the origins of nations and nationalism, the paper relies especially on the “ethno-symbolic” synthesis, see Smith (1986, 1991). For a good review of past and contemporary debates on nationalism, see Smith (2000).

distinctive dimensions. While in practice there might be some interrelationships between the two dimensions, for analytical purposes it is useful to make a distinction between them. The first dimension refers to state strength. This is the “hard” element of state-building. The second refers to the extent of congruence or compatibility between political boundaries and national identifications in a certain state. This is the “soft” component of nation-building.²⁹

i. The extent of state strength (or the success of state-building)³⁰

This variable refers to the institutions and resources available to states for governing the polity. Weak states lack effective institutions and resources to implement their policies and to fulfill key functions. Most notably, they lack an effective control over the means of violence in their sovereign territory and an effective law-enforcement system is absent. Thus, they face great difficulties in maintaining law and order and providing security in their territory. This, in turn, severely handicaps the economic activity in the state. Strong states, therefore, entail the functioning of basic institutions and services such as mail, water supply and electricity. We measure this variable while relying on Tilly's focus on the ability of the state to coerce and/or extract resources. Indeed, to qualify as a strong state, the state must at the minimum be able to control its sovereign territory and maintain law and order there, including by means of coercion. Thus, a necessary prerequisite for state strength is the state's control over the security apparatuses and its ability to rule effectively and achieve compliance even by suppressing opposition and rebellion by coercive means.

Hence, state strength or capacity can be measured by the ability of the state to mobilize manpower for military service and also to extract financial resources from their societies to fund the security forces as well as other state services. Equally important is a state's communication and transportation apparatuses, or what Mann refers to as "infrastructural power". More specific indicators include: (1) Tax ratio, that is, a state's tax revenue as a percentage of its GDP indicates state control since "Taxes are exact indicators of governmental presence".³¹ Where indicators of revenues are absent we shall measure tax ratio indirectly by measuring the GDP per capita, GDP growth and trade indicators since states with higher economic development enjoy larger pools of resources to extract taxes from and indeed in economically developed states taxes constitute a major portion of the annual income.³² (2) Expenditure ratio, that is, the ratio of military expenditure to GDP is also a good indicator since it indicates whether a given state is capable to mobilize manpower for military service. (3) Where available the percentage of paved roads will be used. This is a good indicator of strength and infrastructural power since it enables a state's apparatuses to penetrate its territory and society.

ii. The degree of congruence (or the extent of successful nation-building)

The extent of congruence between the territorial states and the national aspirations and identities of the people in these states, namely the extent to which the current political boundaries in a certain state reflect the national affiliations of the main groups in that state and

²⁹ For elaboration, see Miller (2007, 53-56).

³⁰ This definition of 'state-strength' relies on Huntington (1968); Mann (1993) and Tilly (1975). For other approaches to state-building see Migdal (1988); Ayoob (1995), and Paris (2004).

³¹ Organski and Kugler (1980, 74) cited in Thies (2004, 62).

³² Thies (2004, 64-65).

their aspirations to establish states and/or to revise existing boundaries. High congruence means that there is a compatibility between the state (as an entity administering certain territory) and the national sentiments of its citizens (that is, their aspiration to live as a national community in their own state). In other words, there is a strong acceptance and identification of the people in the state with the existing state and its territorial boundaries.

A major previous attempt at measuring congruence includes Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore,³³ although this paper addresses congruence issues as a regional and spatial factor (which among others addresses majority-minority relations and various manifestations of incongruence such as settlers and pan-national movements).³⁴ We rely here instead, therefore, on demographic measures, and accept that the threshold of 5-7 percent of ethno-national minorities would constitute a nationally incongruent state.³⁵

Congruent states are either ethnically homogenous or have strong civic nationalism³⁶-- mostly West European states or the immigrant societies in the New World. If the dominant national identity in the state is ethnically-based, there are two primary senses in which a state's geopolitical and national boundaries may be *incongruent* in relation to the ethno-national criterion of one state per one nation:³⁷

1. Single geopolitical entity may contain numerous ethno-national groups. This is the *internal dimension of incongruence*, which affects the possibilities for civil wars, especially in weak states.
2. A single ethno-national group may reside in more than one geopolitical entity. This is the *external dimension of incongruence*, which has major implications for revisionist policies, especially if the *majority* ethnic group in the state lives in substantial numbers also in neighboring and other regional states, either as a majority or a minority. External incongruence may also have a historical dimension, namely, if an ethno-national group lost the control it once had over certain territories, it may believe that they "should" again belong to it based on the nation's historical attachment to these territories.

Measuring types of incongruence refers to two factors. The first factor is demography or, more precisely, the geographical spread of the national groups in the region. The second factor is the history of the state and the nation in the region: which preceded which, and especially if some ethnonational groups lost the dominance they once had over the territories they have settled or in adjacent areas.

Demography: The settlement patterns of ethnic groups in the region are key to measure incongruence and its proneness to violence. When a single ethnic nation resides in a number of states – the incongruence is magnified in proportion to the extent of the transborder spread of the national groups in the region: the greater the spread, the greater the imbalance. That is, the spread of a single ethnic nation into five neighboring states creates a greater imbalance in the whole region than the spread into two states which might create conflict only between these two states. In internally incongruent states patterns of settlement also affect the likelihood of

³³ See Alesina and Spolaore (2003), and Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2006, 8-13 also available at <http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/Easterly/File/artificialstatesNBER.pdf>.)

³⁴ See Miller (2007 88-96).

³⁵ See Welsh (1993, 45).

³⁶ On this distinction see Brubaker (1996).

³⁷ See Gellner (1983).

violence. If a given ethno-national group resides as a concrete majority in a specific region it is likely to lead to secessionism. Of course, multi-national states fear this would set a precedent and thus often violently oppose such separatist ventures.³⁸

History, or more specifically, the history of state formation and of national independence: If the state preceded the nation, it is more likely that there will be a state-to-nation congruence, and vice versa; if ethnic nationalism preceded the state, incongruence is more likely. More specifically, nationalist challenges are more likely to be mounted by national groups that have lost control they once held of territories in the region, especially if these territories are identified with a past “Golden Age” of national glory. These territories become major expressions of the nation’s identity.

The s/n imbalance affects both the motivation for resort to violence and the opportunity to do so. National incongruence affects the level of motivation by incorporating substantive issues of war such as territory, boundaries, state creation and state making. External incongruence, in particular, affects motivations for inter-state war related to nationalist revisionist ideologies such as wars of national unification and irredentism. Thus, the s/n imbalance provides an explanation for many of the territorial conflicts among states.³⁹ The extent of domestic incongruence affects the motivation for civil wars and for wars of secession. The degree of state strength, for its part, exercises major effects both on the capacity of states to wage international wars as well as on the opportunities to initiate civil wars and for external intervention in the territory of the state.

The Argument – The post-Defeat S/N Conditions and the Gradual Effect of Realist, Liberal and Constructivist Factors on States' War-Proneness

We argue that military defeats exercise major effects on revisionist states, but they are indeterminate and the effects depend first of all on the s/n balance at war’s end, and secondly on the secondary effects of the intervening variables. First, we maintain that a dichotomous categorization of states' war-propensity overlooks other intrinsic war and peace inclinations including the failed states as well as the frontier one. Thus, we present here four types of states' war-proneness. Second, we argue that what best explains states' war and peace propensity relies on the s/n conditions at war's end. Hence, defeats per se which do not address the underlying s/n challenges, or even exacerbate them, would lead to a revival of revisionism and resort to force. Alternatively, defeats which are followed by a reduction of s/n impediments are likely to bring about peaceful relations. Third, we maintain that to fully understand the effects of defeats and the transition between revisionism and status-quo, a gradual and multi-paradigmatic approach is needed. Hence, we offer a gradual integrated model in which realist, liberal and constructivist factors play an important role. We sequence them in three different phases and argue that they may pacify a state/region only if they reduce s/n problems and reinforce the s/n balance (see below).

³⁸ On the effects of settlement patterns on the inclination, legitimacy and capacity of ethnic groups to secede, see Toft (2002-3, 95-6). See also Gurr (2000, 75-6).

³⁹ See the data-file in Miller (2007, 425-447), which shows the effect of the s/n balance on states' and regions' war-proneness (i.e. all major armed conflicts since 1945).

Table 1:

The Causal Linkages between the Post-Defeat S/N Balance and Types of States

| | Congruence | Incongruence |
|----------------------|--|--|
| Strong states | <p><u>4</u> <u>Status-quo States</u></p> <p>Peaceful Conflict Resolution Civic-Identity</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The post-defeat conditions of Western Europe after WWII</p> | <p><u>1</u> <u>Revisionist States</u> and nationalist unification; (Pan-national movements)</p> <p>Wars of aggression and diversionary wars</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Serbian Revisionism vis-à-vis Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s; Post-1948 and post- 1967 Arab revisionism vis-à- vis Israel.</p> |
| Weak states | <p><u>3</u> <u>“The Frontier State”</u></p> <p>Boundary/territorial wars</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The various post-defeat outcomes S. American states in the 19th- century</p> | <p><u>2</u> Civil War & Intervention in <u>Incoherent/”Failed” States</u> separatism; security dilemma</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Post-2001 Afghanistan; Post- Intifada Palestinian Authority</p> |

The following propositions present causal linkages between the various combinations of the s/n balance and the types of states. There are four post-defeat options regarding stateness and national congruence which affect the likelihood of the emergence of the four types of states’ war-proneness:

The combination of the continuity of state strength and of high external incongruence produces a continuation of a revisionist state:

If at war’s end the s/n conditions in a given state include external incongruence, while the state is relatively strong then it is likely that the state will embark on revisionist ventures. The logic is as follows: The external incongruence in the post-defeat situation creates strong nationalist sentiments which, even if also manipulated by leaders for their own political agenda, motivate the society to embark on military adventures for the purpose of territorial annexations. Since external incongruence disconnects peoples from their kin brethren and from territories they regard as a legitimate part of their nation-state, there is likely to be a widespread national belief that the nation is artificially and arbitrarily divided into a number of states. In this nationalist view, the nation should unify into a single state, which would reflect the national

aspirations and sentiments of the single unified nation. The level of stateness in this equation accounts for the capabilities, necessary for implementing this “noble” purpose of national unification.

Manifestations of this post-defeat outcome of high incongruence and stateness include the “Greater State” aspirations, or irredentism, claiming territories beyond its boundaries based on national identity of the people or historical rights. A second manifestation includes the scapegoat dynamics, as a result of both internal and external incongruence coupled with stateness. In this case leaders of such states are likely to believe that wars with external enemies will strengthen their state and lead to national unity and solidarity, thus reducing challenges to their leadership, and strengthen their hold over power.

An example of post-defeat revisionism is the post-defeat outcome of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, which saw a relatively strong but nationally incongruent Serbian state. This in turn resulted in the continuation of Serbian revisionism, which was evident in Milosevic's campaign in Kosovo. Another example is the post-defeat outcome of the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars when there was a continuation of revisionist policies by the relatively strong and incongruent Arab states -- Egypt, Syria and Iraq, sharing a Pan-Arab orientation -- vis-à-vis Israel.

The combined effect of post-defeat declining stateness and continuous incongruence (internal and external) is likely to produce a failed state:

When the post-defeat s/n conditions form weak states that are nationally incongruent, especially internally, the state in question is likely to become *incoherent* or a “failed state”, subject to various violent outcomes, such as ethnic conflicts, secessionism and outside intervention by both state and non-state actors. The logic here is that there is a low level of identification of the citizens with the state and with its territorial identity, as reflecting their national identity and aspirations, while the state is too weak to either suppress these aspirations or bribe the insurgents.⁴⁰ Thus, a major characteristic of failed states is the internal security dilemma between the contending ethno-national groups. The security challenge is greater in cases where the incongruence is also external, that is, when the trans-border ties of a specific ethnic group with the members of the same ethnic group residing in neighboring states are stronger than its affiliation with the citizens of their own state, who belong to a different ethnic group. The trans-border ties of Kurds or Shiites in the Middle East are good examples of this type of incongruence.

Incoherent states may also bring about challenges to the regional order even though they are militarily and domestically weak (vis-à-vis their own societies). In this case, one should expect the eruption of civil/ethnic wars within these states, which also create temptations for their neighbors to intervene in these conflicts because of either security fears or a quest for profit. A current illustration of these patterns includes Afghanistan since the 1979 Soviet invasion.

The combined effect of declining stateness and growing congruence is likely to produce the frontier state:

This post-defeat outcome creates states that are nationally congruent, though fairly weak and, therefore, do not fully control their territory while boundaries are still disputed. In such a

⁴⁰ Byman and Van Evera (1998, 37-9).

case violence between these states is likely, mainly vis-à-vis the disputed borders, though the potential for stability and even status-quo relations is higher than the former two post-defeat cases following the rising strength of these states. The various post-defeat outcomes of 19th century South America until the relative strengthening of the regional states starting in the 1880s, is a good example of this type of states.

The combined effect of rising stateness and growing congruence is likely to produce a status-quo state:

This post-defeat outcome is the most desirable—for the purpose of peace and stability—where states are strong and nationally congruent. These conditions of the s/n balance precipitate peaceful relations among states and provide lower incentives for violence. The nation is essentially satisfied from the current boundaries of its state. Since the people identify themselves with their state, its institutions and territorial identity, there are no territorial ambitions vis-à-vis its neighbors. This type of state not only reduces the motivations for war but it also provides the necessary capabilities for maintaining the credibility of their commitments-- being able to deliver on their peace promises, thus guaranteeing stable peace. The post-defeat outcomes of post-WWII Western Europe is a good example of these patterns.

*The Intervening Effects of Realist, Liberal and Constructivist Factors: Deducing Expectations from Alternative IR Theories*⁴¹

We can derive three types of theoretical expectations with respect to the effects military defeats have on revisionist states. Overall, realists expect that revisionist states would become less belligerent if they lack the needed capabilities for aggression.⁴² Thus, inflicting a great blow on the revisionist state has stabilizing effects. Liberals, conversely, assume that in order to have stabilizing effects military coercion must be followed by democratization, free trade and effective international/regional institutions.⁴³ Constructivists pay great attention to culture, norms and identities. Hence, military defeats on its own might cause humiliation and thus make these states revengeful and as a result more revisionist.⁴⁴ A transformation of states' identity and/or the culture of the regional or international system might have, however, stabilizing effects on the ex-revisionist state and even pacify it.⁴⁵

⁴¹ We focus here on key expectations derived from the three schools of thought, rather than more policy-oriented writings, because we want to make two points: First, these are not necessarily contending approaches and they actually all contribute to the question at hand. Second, their effect is gradual and depends on the s/n balance (see below).

⁴² On the balance-of-power and balance-of-threats theses see, respectively, Waltz (1979, Ch. 6) and Walt (1987).

⁴³ On the democratic peace theory see Russett (1993) and Maoz and Russett (1992). On Commercial liberalism see Keohane and Nye (1977) and Doyle (1997). On neo-liberal institutionalism see Keohane (1984, esp. Ch.2).

⁴⁴ On revenge in IR, see Löwenheim and Heimann (2008). For more on the inter-linkages between shame, humiliation and revenge leading to revisionism and irredentism see Harkavy (2000, esp. 346, 350-35). Other works mainly address the role of humiliation with respect to nationalism and ethnic conflicts, see, for instance, Kaufman (2001). Historical works also, though often implicitly, connect the concepts of military humiliations and irredentism, see the case of Alsace-Lorraine between 1870/1 and 1945 as analyzed in Gutmann in Chazan (1991, 37-50); or the Arab humiliation following the 1967 war, which has arguably led to the 1973 war, see Harkavy (2000, 248).

⁴⁵ On domestic factors accounting for cultural transformations see Berger in Katzenstein (1996); Berger in Brady *et al.* (1999); Herman in Katzenstein (1996), and Barnett (1999). On systemic effects on state's identity and culture see Wendt (1999, esp. Ch. 6-7).

Table 2:

Military Defeat and Revisionism – IR Theories and their Expectations

| Expectations Theories | Is Military Defeat a Necessary Condition? | Is Military Defeat a Sufficient Condition? | What Else is Necessary to Tame the Revisionists? |
|--------------------------|---|---|--|
| Realism | Yes, the more decisive the military defeat, the greater its stabilizing effects | Yes, military blow makes revisionism a smaller threat (esp. if structural constraints persist after the defeat) | If total defeat is not achieved, containment is the next-best strategy |
| Liberalism | Yes, but only if it is fully-fledged revisionism | No, military defeat per se is hazardous | It must be accompanied by democratization, free trade and regional institutions |
| Constructivism | Not necessarily – it depends on the roots of revisionism | No, military defeat per se is counterproductive in the long run | It must be followed by a cultural and identity transformation in both the domestic and regional realms |

While realism, liberalism and constructivism present varying causal factors based on each theory’s logic, our argument is that the pacifying effects of these factors depend on their relations with the state-to-nation balance following the military defeat. In other words, the s/n balance conditions the effects of the various factors highlighted by these theories. Thus, these factors have pacifying effects in the following gradual order: 1) if they, in the first stage, make it impossible to revise the post-defeat s/n imbalance, that is, the realist factors which affect the opportunity to return to revisionism; 2) if in the second stage they take place under a greater s/n balance in the post-defeat settlements, that is, the liberal factors which can exercise moderating effects only when there is at least some s/n balance in place; and 3) if in the third stage they reinforce the post-defeat s/n balance, that is, the constructivist factors which can further undermine revisionist sentiments if the conducive realist and liberal factors are in place.

Transition among the four types of states’ war and peace inclinations is not static as the following empirical cases demonstrate. A complete transition from revisionism to status-quo orientation, as the post-WWII case displays, exhibits the dynamic characteristic of the proposed argument. Thus, a military defeat that is followed by a reduction of national incongruence decreases the rationale of irredentist and offensive foreign policy since demographically the nation-state’s people are within the existing state’s legitimate borders. This is not sufficient, however, since losing territories and the mere process of deportations might foster so as to create dissatisfaction with the status-quo and a continuous desire to re-occupy the lost territories. In this phase realist and later liberal factors are highly productive. In accordance with realist logic, the more decisive the military defeat, the greater the stabilizing effects of the defeat. In addition, realist factors both at the international and regional levels are constructive if they politically and

militarily curtail revisionist endeavors. This is achieved in various ways such as the stabilizing effects of a bi-polar system like the Cold War, the pacifying effects of great-power military presence on the ground as well as containment policies. To not only affect the capabilities dimension and indeed alter society's preferences, liberal factors are crucial since they provide the state with the abilities to alleviate harsh economic conditions. Investing in the economic welfare of people changes their prioritization and also makes a military adventure seem undesirable and counterproductive. At this stage a high level of congruency coupled with a strong and economically flourishing state highly reduces the likelihood to resort to arms and yet it does not transform society's deep cultural inclinations, beliefs and attitudes. The final stage, therefore, relates to the effects of social construction factors. Processes of socialization which incorporate a moderate approach to foreign policy will finally not only make an aggressive behavior undesirable, but simply unthinkable. This is of course the longest and deepest phase of all three as it consists of, for instance, processes of reconciliations, coming-to-terms with the past as well as changing the texts books at schools and universities.

III. Taming the Revisionist State: Successful Cases When Defeat leads to growing Stateness and More Congruence

This empirical part focuses on examining proposition 4, though it deals also more briefly with proposition 3, while showing that the post-defeat outcome of national congruence and stateness following the military defeat has stabilizing effects on revisionist states. The first section (III. A.) deals with post-WWII Germany until the end of the Cold War. This case is addressed in relative length because the transformation from revisionism (cell no.1) to status-quo (cell no. 4) went through three distinctive phases: (1) Germany's transition from an aggressor to a frontier state (cell no.3), as a result of its full-blown defeat, the mass expulsion from Eastern Europe and the structural effects of the Cold War. This phase is best explained by realist factors under a greater s/n balance. (2) Germany's transition from a frontier state to a status-quo state due to the rising stateness of Germany (mainly thanks to the American security umbrella), coupled with democratization, regional institutionalization and economic prosperity. Hence, this phase is better explained by liberal factors under an even greater s/n balance. (3) The consolidation of Germany's status-quo orientation. This phase is better explained by constructivist factors (identity transformation and cultural shift) under a fully-fledged s/n balance. This gradual and integrated account also explains why post-WWII Germany, that was divided between east and west, did not embark on a revisionist venture, but endorsed instead a status-quo approach, which was even strengthened after the German unification in 1989.

The second section (III. B.) deals with post-1991 Iraq, while showing that partial military defeat followed by containment has some stabilizing effects, though not as successful as in the German case. Addressing post-1991 Iraq here side-by-side to post-WWII Germany is useful for it validates our argument that s/n issues are indeed the root cause of violence and revisionism. This is because post-1991 Iraq remained highly incongruent, though strong and hence continued to be a revisionist state. However, the Iraqi case study also exhibits the utility of realist factors, even when s/n issues are unresolved, where revisionism is not transformed, but rather checked by the great powers of the day.

III.a. From the Revisionist to the Status-Quo State--Stabilizing Effects if more Congruent and Rising Stateness – Post-WWII Germany

i. From Revisionism to the Frontier State: The Rising Degree of Congruence due to the Total Defeat of Germany in WWII and the Consequent Expulsion of Ethnic Germans from the East, 1944-1948

Table 3: Germany’s Timeline – From Revisionism to Status-Quo

| Years | The Independent Variables / The Post-Defeat State-to-Nation Balance | The Intervening Variables/ The Effect of Causal Factors from different IR Theories | The Dependent Variables / Types of States | Characterization of the Phenomenon |
|------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| 1944-1948 | Total defeat, rise of the Cold War and mass expulsion | Realist factors and greater s/n balance | From the revisionist to the frontier state | Discredit of revisionism, impossibility of return to revisionism, and reduced incongruence |
| 1949-late 1950s | Rising Stateness – sovereignty, functioning bureaucracy, and economic boom | Liberal factors under an even greater s/n balance | From the frontier to the status-quo state | Democratization, successfully tackling domestic issues and border disputes |
| 1957-1989 | Full-fledged s/n balance | Constructivist factors which reinforce the s/n balance | Consolidation of the status-quo state | Changing identity, reconciliations, entrance into the European Community and pacifism |

The sharp decline of revisionist ethnic nationalism in postwar Germany and the inclination toward regional integration were derived, first of all, from the outcome of WWII:

“The dream of a German nation state during the nineteenth century had seemingly held out great promise for the future of the German people, but the reality had been overshadowed by defeat, collapse and criminality.”⁴⁶

The unconditional defeat of Germany was a crucial element in creating eventually the conditions for the stable peace in post-1945 Europe. Such a decisive blow was necessary to discredit revisionist ethnic nationalism in Germany and in Europe as a whole.⁴⁷ That is because a decisive military intervention gives the intervener the opportunity to impose the necessary

⁴⁶ Schulze (1996, 315-6).

⁴⁷ The seeds of German antimilitarism were sown in Germany’s catastrophic defeat in 1945, see Berger (1999, 475).

conditions on the ground conducive to peace (mainly security and reassurances), and it conveys a powerful message to aggressors that revisionist campaigns are counterproductive. Hence, realist factors and especially those promoted by offensive realists have the best effect in such cases, since powerful revisionist states can only be brought down by an all-out military defeat and by so doing discrediting their costly policy altogether.

It also made possible the removal of millions of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe in the aftermath of WWII, which contributed to a greater s/n balance on the continent, and esp. in a region, that was a source of instability and wars before WWII. As Wolff puts it, deportations might have stabilizing effects in two main forms: "to avoid internal ethnic strife and to prevent external minorities from being used as instruments of irredentist foreign policies."⁴⁸ Moreover, the deportation of the Germans was part of the more general un-mixing of nations in Central and Eastern Europe in the 20th century as a result of WWI and WWII, and thus the emergence of ethnically more homogenous states,⁴⁹ which has contributed to European peace in the second half of the 20th century.⁵⁰

The expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern territories started already in 1944 under the frenzy of war (approximately between 700,000 and 800,000 from the Sudetenland and 4.3 million from Poland), although the mass deportation took place during 1945-1948 (in which another 8 million Germans were deported). It was, nonetheless, the total defeat of Germany in the war, which gave the Allies the power to initiate such an act, which was endorsed by the great powers at the Potsdam Agreement on 2 August 1945. The process of deporting such vast number of people was far from benevolent, but it physically corrected the s/n imbalance by redrawing states and nations.⁵¹ Consider, for example, the nationalist tensions of inter-war Poland with its ethno-national minorities in comparison to the homogenous post-WWII Poland which, after its liberation from Soviet control, could liberalize peacefully and join European institutions.⁵²

Nonetheless, simply transferring people might have de-stabilizing effects if the expulsion issue is used for revisionist-nationalist reasons like the case of the Palestinian refugees in 1947/8.⁵³ Here one could note the advantage of a full-blown military defeat, which brings people to reject revanchist aspirations, while nourishing instead moderate tendencies. Thus, the full-fledged defeat of Germany alongside the beginning of the Cold War had major stabilizing effects. Revisionist nationalism by resort to military force lost its appeal following the outcome of WWII. This was reinforced by the rise of the Iron Curtain which curtailed revisionist ideas about the re-unification of Germany by the use of force due to the deterrent capacity of the Soviets. The dream of German unification and irredentist claims were completely impractical in the context of the division of Europe by the superpowers. The total defeat had also brought Austrian society after the war to consider themselves not as 'Germans', but rather as Austrians,

⁴⁸ Wolff (2003, 476).

⁴⁹ See Brubaker (1996, Ch. 6).

⁵⁰ Muller (2008, 18-35). See also Ferguson (2006).

⁵¹ For good historical reviews see Hubatsch (1967, 312-317); Jankowiak in Ther and Siljak (2001, 87-106); Schechtman (1962, part II and III). Several scholars, though, criticized the expulsion either claiming that it was an inhuman and immoral act, or that it was not the cause for the peaceful state of Europe after the war, see Naimark (2001); Kramer in Ther and Siljak (2001, 1-42, esp. 9); Ther in Ther and Siljak (2001, 43-74).

⁵² Becoming more homogenous in this case, however, came at a terrible price, notably to the Jews; thus, it is definitely not a recommended policy prescription by any means. On the growing homogeneity in Central/Eastern Europe, see Brubaker (1996) and Muller (2008). On Poland's domestic and foreign affairs between the wars, see Stachura (1998).

⁵³ Another important difference is the type of incongruence, whether it is internally or externally. The case of post-Saddam Iraq will emphasize this.

thus distancing themselves from the pan-Germanist ideology. They have portrayed themselves, moreover, not as Nazi Germany's ally, but rather as their victim.⁵⁴

Thus, the realist features of the emerging bipolar system are especially relevant here, since the structural constraints have both pushed the US to become highly invested in Germany and Western Europe, and completely discredited the idea of renewed German revisionism.⁵⁵ Germany, consequently, realized that the Eastern territories would never be German again, Austria is not part of a great German nation, and in the successive decades decided instead to invest in modernization and economic prosperity.

ii. From the Frontier to the Status-quo State: Rising Stateness of the more Congruent State – Western Germany in the Beginning of the Cold War, 1949-late 1950s

Rising stateness of an already more nationally congruent state has stabilizing effects on its war-proneness. Thus, liberal factors –democratic institutions, free trade and prosperous economy, coupled with regional forums – have a key role here in making the revisionist state more peace-prone and moderate. Under a greater s/n balance liberal factors create incentives, which bring even the revisionist elements of society to divert their political resources and societal power toward pragmatic solutions. In Germany during the 1950s the material benefits of a welfare state, housing projects, employment, functioning bureaucracy and the economic boom, brought the German society to acknowledge the merits of moderation and status-quo. Indeed, in that period Germany regained its sovereignty, revived its bureaucratic tradition of stateness, fully integrated the eastern refugees,⁵⁶ and experienced an economic boom.⁵⁷ Overall and mainly due to the realist factors of bipolarity and the Cold War that emerged in the late 1940s, during the 1950s the US fully invested in West Germany, mostly via the Marshall Plan, which later on made it a strong and functioning state.⁵⁸ Even though foreign troops remained on its soil for an extended period, they provided a security umbrella against the common Soviet threat under which German citizens could develop their state and devote their resources to a socio-economic reconstruction. Hence, the post-defeat outcome of a more congruent and strengthening Germany was key to its transformation from a revisionist to a frontier and later a status-quo state. We shall focus on the following landmarks in Germany's history during the 1950s: – a. The Full Integration of the Refugees. b. The Western Border Dispute and French-German Relations. c. Germany's rising Stateness and the Economic Miracle. – These developments accord well with our argument and continue to display the utility of key realist, liberal and constructivist factors as intervening variables.

a. The Full Integration of the Refugees

The case of the German refugees from the East became a success story, which helped to both sustain the German national congruence and strengthen Germany's institutional capacity. Nonetheless, during the 1950s (and to a lesser extent the 1960s) the German government and

⁵⁴ See Wodak et al. (1999, 149-173).

⁵⁵ Frevort (2005, 103-108) points to the fact that Germany was divided between the Eastern bloc and the West, forcing Germany to abandon its revisionist aspirations toward the lost *Heimat*. See also Calleo (2001, 27).

⁵⁶ Schulze (1997, 53-72) sees the new German identity as the main cause for the integration of German refugees in the 1950s.

⁵⁷ See Schildt and Sywottek (1997); Lindlar and Holtfrerich in Brady *et al.* (1999)

⁵⁸ On the Marshall plan, see Hogan (1996, 203-240).

society faced a serious problem regarding the refugees' yearnings to return to their homes and previous lives. Such a revisionist and bitter element within every society is a recipe for either internal turbulence, or external aggression. Therefore, Bonn strived to fully integrate the ethnic German refugees into the native society. The key purpose was to suppress the refugees' irredentist inclinations by investing in their welfare on the one hand, and weakening their political revisionist aspirations on the other. Germany achieved these goals due to the unprecedented US investment in Germany and Western Europe.

The expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to Germany proper was a difficult process. In order to reconcile the expellees, the German government introduced both material and cultural gestures such as housing projects for the millions of refugees, a special festive day named 'Homeland Day', as well as museums and special archives.⁵⁹

Furthermore, in the domestic political sphere extreme parties were weakened and integrated into Adenauer's coalition. The Adenauer administration introduced tax relief programs (*Lastenausgleich*), housing projects and other material aid. In 1957, the few remaining political leaders from the BHE (i.e. the expellee party or Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten) were integrated into Adenauer's party (i.e. the Christian Democrats).⁶⁰ Even the German organization for expellees in Western Germany (BdV) acknowledged, in 1958, the need to focus their efforts on integrating the refugees rather than cultivating homesick feelings (e.g. The Right of the Nation – *Recht auf die Heimat*).⁶¹

b. The Western Border Dispute and French-German Relations

In the early 1950s Franco-German relations were still under the shadow of the security dilemma.⁶² These archenemies did not trust one another and regarded their mutual intentions as malign. Despite significant progress in Franco-German relation (e.g. the European Coal and Steel Community), there was an unresolved border dispute halting the relations from further advancing.⁶³ This is a characteristic of the *frontier state*, that is, a relatively congruent state, but not quite strong yet, facing border issues with its neighbors.⁶⁴

On its western frontier Germany had 5.9 million ethnic-Germans, on what was known as the Saarland region.⁶⁵ This coal-rich region (with the exception of 16 years after WWI) was traditionally part of Germany with an overall majority of ethnic Germans. The Saarland question, however, was not resolved primarily due to the fear and mistrust France held toward Germany. France occupied the Saarland not as a mere attempt of gaining compensations from the German offensive, but because that region was the area in which the raw materials for war-fighting (coal and steel) were produced. Thus, France believed that the best way to prevent Germany from becoming aggressive again was to check its strengthening efforts.⁶⁶

The issue of the Saarland was a major obstacle to Franco-German reconciliation and integration. Indeed, even Germany's moderate Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, vigorously rejected the French control over the Saar. He declared that if France would not show more

⁵⁹ Levy (2002, 23); Schulze (2002, 49-50).

⁶⁰ For a full review of the German approach to extremist parties see Merkl (1999, 35-62).

⁶¹ Wolff (2002, 109-110).

⁶² On the security dilemma, see Jervis (1978).

⁶³ On the French-German relations see Creswell and Trachtenberg (2003).

⁶⁴ See Miller (2007, 59, 105 and 317-336).

⁶⁵ For more on the Saar in Potsdam Germany, see Klessmann (1998, 48-49)

⁶⁶ Ripsman (2002, 8-9).

flexibility regarding the Saar, Germany would strongly protest the unilateral fixing by the Soviet Union of Germany's Eastern frontier. The French became concerned about reawakening German nationalism; the Germans referred to the hypocritical French, willing to accept the Germans into the Council of Europe, but still intent on controlling the Saar.⁶⁷ However, in the context of the emerging East-West divide, US pressure combined with security guarantees led France to start negotiations with Germany over the Saarland.⁶⁸ By June 1956 a deal was struck and in 1957 the Saar was handed back to Germany.

c. Germany's rising Stateness and the Economic Miracle

The 1950s introduced a period of enormous changes in Germany, in almost all aspects of life, and esp. in the economy and society. Already during that decade the transformation of Germany can be seen both internally and externally. As Schildt and Sywottek claim, the 1950s were of two phases; 1950-1955 as the years of reconstruction ("Rekonstruktion"), while the years of 1955-1960 were of expansion ("Ausbau") – often referred to as the beginning of modernization.⁶⁹ The end of the 1950s onwards introduced a growing economy, a stable government, infrastructure building, and the revival of bureaucratic offices. Most of all, the Federal Republic of Germany became a sovereign state with an army (though relatively small and for defensive purposes) and a membership in NATO.⁷⁰

The economic boom was so impressive that from the end of 1949 until 1989 Germany's economic export boom was hardly interrupted. French-German trade relations, for example, quadrupled between 1955 and 1965,⁷¹ and Germany's world market share increased as well, from 2 percent to above 10 percent between the late 1940s to the early 1970s.⁷² Exports grew by 9.5% per year and the GDP by 4.2%, while only in 1951 and 1980 the balance of payment was negative.⁷³ In 1955, for instance, GDP per capita levels were 6.829 while rising to 8.463 in 1960 and to 10.299 in 1966. Tax ratio rose accordingly from 30.803% in 1955 to 31.310% in 1960.⁷⁴

Liberal factors, which included Germany's prosperous economy, building democratic institutions and its gradual cooperation in regional institutions, had pacifying effects on its foreign policy. They have provided incentives for status-quo behavior and deepened both Germany's domestic pacific inclinations and its peaceful relations with its neighbors. Nonetheless, these liberal mechanisms could have only worked under a greater s/n balance—the high internal national congruence, the disappearance of the external incongruence in Eastern Europe, the successful integration of the refugees from the East and the well-functioning of state institutions. Another pre-requisite was that the realist factors made it impossible to resort back to revisionism, while pushing the US to fully invest in the European project.

⁶⁷ Friend (1991, 16).

⁶⁸ France tried to incorporate the Saarland, though after Germany's continual demands and US pressure, as well as a public opinion poll favoring annexation with Germany (1955), France became more willing to discuss the matter with Germany. For more see Gerbet (1996, 66-71); Freymond (1960); Wiskemann (1956).

⁶⁹ Schildt and Sywottek (1997, 416-417).

⁷⁰ Although Schildt and Sywottek address some of the social and economic difficulties of those years, they clearly provide evidence showing the quick modernization of the German state and society. See especially 419-422.

⁷¹ See Ripsman (2005, 679 esp. footnote no.16).

⁷² See Lindlar and Holtfrerich in Brady *et al.* (1999, 163), for detailed figures and tables see 164-167, 169-170.

⁷³ Ibid (164).

⁷⁴ On GDP levels and tax revenue see <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CSP2009> (20/04/10) and Maddison (1995, 181).

III.B. The Consolidation of the Status-quo State: The Changing National Identity and its Implications for Germany's Foreign Policy – Germany between 1957 and 1989

From the late 1950s onward the German nation undertook a process of reeducation, holding themselves responsible for WWII outcomes and atrocities.⁷⁵ The German education process was by far moderate and peaceful in the sense they used the massive deportations to construct a renewed peaceful national identity.⁷⁶ By that time, Germans saw themselves as a new-nation (*Neue Heimat*),⁷⁷ a cultural shift which had consequently affected Germany's foreign policy.

Germany reconciled with its Eastern neighbors in the 1960s and 1970s; it led, jointly with France, the deepening of European integration since the late 1950s; and its nationalist pride and militancy were impressively low, an indication of a cultural shift and a moderate foreign approach. The most important shift in the political culture and consequently in the foreign policy of West Germany came under Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. At the late 1960s and early 1970s Germany fully acknowledged its Eastern borders (the Oder-Neisse line) and accepted its prime responsibility in WWII, especially regarding the suffering of Poles and other East European peoples. Brandt, on his famous visit to Warsaw in December 1970, knelt at the monument to victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (*Warschauer Kniefall*). West Germany also signed several treaties with both Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1970 and 1973, respectively. In 1975, Germany signed the treaty of Helsinki, thus helping to generate the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).⁷⁸

Another aspect of German moderate foreign policy is seen through their enthusiastic integration to the European Union. Germany constantly aspired to enter the European integration project both politically and economically. Moreover, the German identity in societal and political terms utterly changed, and though German citizenship laws remained rather ethnically based, their sense of community and belonging became pluralist and liberal. The German collective memory was not about forgetting or suppressing the wrong-doings of the past, but rather about confronting them and highlighting the importance of individuality at the expense of nationalistic sentiments.⁷⁹ According to Berger, Germany's pacifism is embedded in its history and the process of education, which had a great effect on both the elite and the public.⁸⁰

With regard to the European integration and decline of national sentiments, one can view the German case as a success story.⁸¹ As Dogan shows, the revisionist sentiment all across

⁷⁵ On the perceptions of Germans during the 1950s onward, regarding their collective identity and Germany's future, see Parkes (1997, 170-174).

⁷⁶ See Levy (2002, esp. 27-29) who provide an in-depth analysis of the integration process and the emerging collective identity. For more on the way Germans dealt with their past and also internal debates regarding the German collective memory see Moeller (2001). It is important to note, however, that the ideational and cultural shift in the German people and consequently German politics did not occur in a single decade, but was rather a continuous process, see Conradt (1980, 227-228).

⁷⁷ See Schildt and Sywottek (1997, 422-425).

⁷⁸ On the domestic resistance to Brandt's policy, however, see Dornberg (1995). The German-Czech relations at that time were still highly problematic and fully resolved only during the 1990s.

⁷⁹ Feldman (1999, 334-335).

⁸⁰ Berger (1999, 473-499)

⁸¹ For more on the benign foreign policy of post-1945 Germany, see, for instance, Banchoff (1999); Feldman (1999).

Europe declined, while Germany was a 'clinical case'.⁸² In Dogan's study, Germany was ranked as one of the lowest in the list in terms of national pride and confidence in the army. This decline is also found in the process of education and the socialization of the youth, and indeed a comparative study of 1930 and 1990 textbooks used in Germany showed a low nationalist message in the latter.⁸³ Moreover, Germany was found to be a big advocate of European integration and Europeanism as a whole.

Overall, Germany's past failures and the atrocities conducted under Hitler's regime taught the Germans to trust each other and their neighbors. Due to historical lessons and American influence, Germany adopted an identity of liberal nationalism at the expense of their previous narrow and exclusive nationalistic identity.⁸⁴ Thus, under the post-defeat outcome of a fully discredited revisionism, and due to the systemic effects of bipolarity and the moderating effects of liberal factors, constructivism could better account for the deep transformation of Germany's identity. However, it should be emphasized that this constructivist shift in Germany's identity was made possible under the benign underlying s/n balance and would have confronted much greater hurdles if such a balance had not been in place in the post-WWII era.

III.C. Containment of the Revisionist (and Strong) State by the Great Powers – Post-1991 Iraq

i. Iraq's State-to-Nation Balance until the First Gulf War

Iraq had been a rather strong state under Saddam's reign with a strong control over the population. It was, however, nationally incongruent, fragmented along three key ethno-religious-national groups – Kurds (18-20%), Sunnis (20%) and Shiites (55%). This incongruence was both internal and external due to trans-border ethno-national ties between each sect and its cohort beyond the border: Kurds in Turkey; Shiites in Iran, and the Sunnis in most of the Arab world.⁸⁵

Iraq's s/n impediments, though, go back to its establishment by the British Empire after WWI. Iraq, due to its severe imbalance, was a "Frankenstein's monster of a country"⁸⁶ exhibiting the failed attempt of nation-building from the start: "For their own imperial and strategic reasons, the British marked out the boundaries of a collectivity which had never existed before and which lacked the minimal sense of social cohesion thought to be a necessary attribute of statehood".⁸⁷

*ii. The First Gulf War and the "War of Sanctions"*⁸⁸

Saddam's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 posed a threat to the West's oil interests in the Gulf region, and was considered by US-led coalition as a serious violation of international law. The war against Iraq, therefore, was handled in earnest by the Coalition forces expelling Saddam's army away from Kuwaiti soil and back to Iraq proper. The Iraqi army, though

⁸² See Dogan (1994, 285-287, esp. 287) and the surveys he relies on such as the *Eurobarometer* and the *European Values Survey*.

⁸³ Ibid (1998). See also Ibid (1993). On textbooks used in German schools see Kolinsky (1992, esp. 288-289).

⁸⁴ Haas (1999, 334-335). On Germany at the end of the Cold War see Maull (1990/1).

⁸⁵ On the Sunnis and the other groups in Iraq, see Bengio in Bengio and Ben-Dor (1999, 149-169); see also Ibrahim (1995, 57); Ayoob and the references he cites (1995, 41, fn. 54); Hudson (1977); Ben-Dor (1983, 164-173).

⁸⁶ Kaplan (1998, 8).

⁸⁷ Chubin and Tripp (1988, 14-15). See also Dawisha (2002, 119).

⁸⁸ This is Cordesman's (1999) Phrase.

experiencing severe blows, was not completely defeated, while Saddam remained in power and even managed to reassert power over rebellious Shiite territories. Unlike post-1945 Germany, revisionist forces within Saddam's Iraq (i.e. the Baath party led by Saddam Hussein) were not removed from power. Hence, Saddam's Baathism and revisionist inclinations were not discredited by the regime's base of support, mainly the Sunnis. Others, either dissident from the army or rival ethno-national groups, were crushed by Baghdad's security services and the Republican Army, thus intimidating any prospective dissidence.

As the war ended, US and UK leaders believed that Saddam's reign would not last.⁸⁹ The sanctions imposed on Iraq under UN resolutions number 687 and 715 made clear the US-led coalition's objective that the Iraqi army and military capabilities must remain weakened and crippled. These UN resolutions made further restrictions on Saddam's Iraq. First, resolution number 687 stated that Iraq must not possess WMD and long-range missiles. Equally important, it gave UN inspectors (i.e. UNSCOM and IAEA) the mandate to supervise the dismantling of these weapons and explore any suspicious location in Iraq. To achieve obedience, Iraqi oil exports depended on full compliance by Saddam. Moreover, resolution 687 continued the ban on any Iraqi export of conventional military equipment as passed by resolution 661 shortly after the invasion of Kuwait. Second, other restrictions created the "no-fly zone", that is, banning Iraq from using its air fleet in both northern and southern Iraq.⁹⁰ These provisions and restrictions made it impossible for Saddam to embark again on hegemonic or revisionist ventures.⁹¹

These circumstances, however, did have an effect on Iraq's s/n imbalance. Thus, in the following we display these effects and maintain that, although weakened, Iraq remained a strong state, while being contained by the US and the UK.

iii. Post-Gulf War Iraq's Strength

After the invasion of Kuwait, per capita income dropped from approx. \$ 1,500 to \$ 750, and remained between \$ 500 and \$ 900 during the 1990s, while life expectancy rates drooped as well from 65 in 1985-1990 to 59.5 in the early 1990s. As a result of war's end the size of the Iraqi army dropped from around 1,200,000 to approx. 500,000 -600,000 soldiers.⁹² Moreover, according to the State Failure Task Force Post-Gulf War Iraq was weakened, mainly due the Kurdish revolts and their ability to create a de facto Kurdish State.⁹³ Still, there is one criterion that indicates that Iraq during the 1990s can still be considered a strong state, which is its ability to penetrate into society and achieve obedience from most of its population, even by means of terror and cruelty. As Dobbins et al. put it "Iraq benefits from having a strong state capable of imposing order on Society".⁹⁴ Indeed, Iraq under the Baath regime and especially under Saddam's reign suppressed Shi'ite and Kurdish-led uprisings and even launched brutal campaigns against minority and rebellious groups such as the Al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds in Iraq

⁸⁹ See Graham-Brown (1999, 20).

⁹⁰ On UN resolutions see Cordesman (1999, 2-4).

⁹¹ On US containment of Iraq during the 1990s, see Byman and Waxman (2000).

⁹² For numbers and estimations on Iraqi military personal, expenditure, GNP and exports see Cordesman (1999, 32-66) and the tables he presents.

⁹³ See The State Failure Task Force at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf>, page 137 (Accessed June 25, 2009).

⁹⁴ Dobbins et al. (2003, 172)

between 1988 and 1991, and the one against the southern marshes in 1992.⁹⁵ The categorization of Iraq as a patrimonial regime offers a good understanding of the causes of Saddam's ability to remain in power while facing social unrest and uprising. Brownlee, for instance, shows that the Baath network consisted of Saddam's loyalists from his own family and clan, the Tikritis, as his sons, Udai and Ousai, were in charge of the security agencies, and Saddam's Republican Guard comprised of his fellow Tikritis.⁹⁶ Saddam was also able to penetrate into society and deter enemies by using the parliament, 5 different security agencies and a "vast network of informers".⁹⁷ Also indicating Iraq's relative strength is the percentage of paved roads which despite Iraq's exacerbated conditions rose from 77.9% in 1990 to 86% in 1996 and decreasing in 1998 to 84.3%.⁹⁸

The military blow to Saddam's army did encourage dissidence from within, especially in northern and southern Iraq. Nevertheless, Saddam tackled these mutinies rather quickly and with great effectiveness. The uprisings took place mainly in the south because people there were already prone to revolt. Accordingly, the partial collapse of the Iraqi state during the war was a catalyst for the mounting rebellions.⁹⁹ The uprisings began already on the last day of February 1991 in the cities of Abu'l-Khasib and Zubair, spreading later to Basra. By 7 March, the Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala were too in revolt. The dissident groups included not only Shiites but also army officers and soldiers along with rebellious groups from Iran (i.e. SCIRI, al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya and Badr Brigades). Still, Saddam Hussein quickly made security reforms and achieved full control over the southern parts. This was partly because large units of the Republican Guard and elite units retreated from Kuwait fully equipped, and also due to the notorious Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin, who was appointed to be the new interior minister.¹⁰⁰ Another fact helping Saddam was that restrictions on using air force were not imposed yet, hence cities like Karbala and Najaf were heavily bombed from the air. Then, after crushing resistance in the south, the Republican Guard headed north defeating the rebellious KF (i.e. Kurdish Front). By the beginning of April, both the north and south were under Iraqi control.

Furthermore, Saddam had reshuffled the cabinet as he appointed loyal cronies; consequently tightening his grip over the political *apparatus* as well.¹⁰¹ Overall, Saddam's Baath regime reasserted full control over Iraq's territory and people, and even though the Kurdish part regained some degree of independence later on, the ability to pass regulations, implement them, extract taxes and mobilize armed forces remained under Baghdad's control.

Largely, Iraq was not a modern state in Western terms, neither before nor after the war and yet managed to sustain a functioning state. The 1990/1 war and the "war of sanctions" did exacerbate Iraq's general situation, though they have kept Saddam 'in a box', forcing him to address domestic issues and the survival of his regime, and thus although weakened, Iraq was

⁹⁵ See Graham-Brown (1999, 202-205).

⁹⁶ See Brownlee (2002, 43-45).

⁹⁷ Al-Khafaji (1992, 16) cited in Brownlee (2002, 44).

⁹⁸ World Bank. "World Databank". Accessed April 20, 2010.
<http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2>

⁹⁹ See Baram (1994, 553), mainly regarding food shortages that were caused by the ground offensive and in turn pushed many to rebellion.

¹⁰⁰ See Graham-Brown (1999, 155 and footnote no. 15).

¹⁰¹ For more on the uprisings and the way Saddam dealt with them, see Graham-Brown (1999, 153-157) and the footnotes she provides.

not a failed state nor did it collapse, and was able to maintain law and order even if by means of terror and brutality.¹⁰²

iv. Post-Gulf War Iraq's National Congruence

Post-1991 Iraq still remained an incongruent state, where the Sunni minority continued to rule Iraq under the Baath banner. Nonetheless, already as a result of the Iraq-Iran war and especially after the 1990/1 war, Saddam's reassertion of power came in a high price for the 'wrong' ethnic and tribal groups. Chiefly among the victims was the Shiite population, who were underprivileged and persecuted.¹⁰³

Saddam's reassertion of power was obvious in the southern marshes not far from the Iranian border. These marsh villages were a safe haven for dissidents, provocateurs from Iran and many refugees fleeing after taking part in the rebellions. Hence, Saddam first cruelly crushed the uprisings, thereafter launching a mass deportation campaign (during April 1992), moving most of the marsh inhabitants to the fringes of the area. This act literally destroyed their livelihoods and pushed many to migrate to nearby Iran.¹⁰⁴

As to the north of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan became a partial autonomous authority, though it has only hardened the identity divide and its regional ties. After the Republican Army withdrawal, of approx. 4 million Iraqi Kurds, between 3 and 3.5 million fell under the new northern provincial government (i.e. the Iraqi Kurdish enclave), which incorporated Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaymaniya.¹⁰⁵ Although the no-fly zone and UN humanitarian assistance provided some security and assistance, Iraqi Kurdistan did not gain full independence and suffered severely from this in-between situation.¹⁰⁶ Here, realist factors had the highest effect on Iraq's war-proneness. Since defeat was partial and was not followed by a resolution of the s/n imbalance, Iraq's revisionist inclinations were not totally brought down, though contained and stopped by the great powers. Due to the reassertion of power by Saddam in post-1991 Iraq, liberal factors had no pacifying role, if any. Since Iraq did experience a military blow, nonetheless, its pan-Arabic ideology was seriously weakened, though no liberal, moderate and status-quo ideas came to replace the revisionist agenda. Put differently and although the power of Arab unification under Iraq's leadership was not as appealing as it used to be, no free marketplace of ideas was in place and thus no ideational alternatives could mount an effective challenge to revisionist nationalism in post-1991 Iraq.

IV. Taming the Revisionist State: Failures When Defeat Leads to more Incongruence and/or less Stateness

This part shows that military defeat *per se*, one which does not strengthen the s/n balance, has de-stabilizing effects. The first section (IV. A.) examines proposition 1, dealing

¹⁰² See Rotberg (2003, 5-9) who, despite measuring the state strength variable differently, urges us to distinguish between weak and collapsed states.

¹⁰³ The Shiite community in Iraq is composed mainly of Bedouin tribes, who endorsed Shia Islam and settled in the southern and western parts of Iraq. On the history of Shiites in Iraq and their political role, see Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett (1983) especially regarding the Shiites' rural and social structure between 1870-1958 ; Nakash (1994), and Stapleton (1993, 18-24), mainly regarding their oppression by the Baath regime after the Iranian revolution.

¹⁰⁴ See Graham-Brown (1999, 202-205) and the references she cites.

¹⁰⁵ See Ibid (219-221); Hoff *et al.* (1992).

¹⁰⁶ On the severe humanitarian conditions in Iraqi Kurdistan see, for instance, the Human Rights Watch (1995).

with post-WWI Germany where military defeat was not decisive, and even increased the imbalance. In this section we do not intend to explain the roots of the extreme Nazi ideology, nor dismiss the role of the great depression or Germany's political structure, but rather maintain that the s/n imbalance was the underlying cause of Germany's revisionist propensity.¹⁰⁷ The second section (IV. B.) examines proposition 2, addressing post-2003 Iraq, where the military defeat was total, but it also exacerbated the s/n imbalance.

IV.A. A Strong State becomes more Incongruent, Especially Externally – post-WWI Germany and Nationalist Revisionism

A revisionist state facing only partial defeat is most likely to aspire for a revival of power and influence in world politics. Most important, if the result of war creates or exacerbates the s/n imbalance, the tendencies of the revisionist state toward violence would increase.

WWI ended in the surrender of Germany in November 1918, while most Germans were taken by a surprise, believing that German victory was assured. Moreover, the Versailles treaty further humiliated Germany, as it was separated by the "Polish-corridor" from Eastern-Prussia and dispossessed of territories in the east and west (i.e. Alsace-Lorraine on the western border and Upper Silesia and the Sudetenland on Germany's Eastern border).¹⁰⁸ In this light, the German people not only suffered from a defeat in war, a shattered economy and a high burden of reparation (mostly to France), but a loss of connection with their "kin brothers". Equally important, the refusal of the Allies to allow Germany to unify with Austria was condemned by all parties, since after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire there was no nationalist justification for an independent German speaking country apart from Germany.¹⁰⁹ This was a serious blow to German nationalism that was based on ethnicity and a pan-nationalist agenda, which is a major source of s/n imbalance.¹¹⁰ Indeed, scholarly studies have already pointed to the formation of the German nation during the 19th century, while focusing on Germany's ethnic and exclusionary character.¹¹¹ As a result, the s/n imbalance in Europe at large and in Germany in particular was exacerbated.¹¹²

Germany's level of stateness during the 1920s was reduced as a result of WWI and the Versailles Treaty which held Germany responsible and burdened it with reparations, as well as military and economic tight control until the early 1930s. Germany's military expenditure ratio

¹⁰⁷ This is the difference between underlying and proximate causes of war, see Vasquez (1993, 293–297).

¹⁰⁸ The Sudeten Germans were part of The Habsburg Empire, though viewed as Germans. Thus, annexing that region to Czechoslovakia was perceived by both Germans and Sudeten Germans as an unjust change.

¹⁰⁹ MacMillan (2002, 194). This demand was also regarded as Germany's right to self-determination since Austria was considered a crucial part of the German nation, see Coolidge (1925, 44). The NSDAP used these aspirations and preached for a racist agenda. For more on the establishment and activity of the National Socialist Party and Weimar politics see Hiden (1974, 42-49); Hughes (1988, 189-205). An important ultra-nationalist event in this context was the putsch attempt on 8 November 1923.

¹¹⁰ See Miller (2007, 88-89).

¹¹¹ See Kohn (1944); Brubaker (1992); Mosse (1978).

¹¹² For a good understanding of the history of ethnic-Germans dispersal see Alter (2000, 24, 65, 98). On territorial changes after WWI, see Thomson (1962, 626-627); Fulbrook (1992, 30-31); Taylor (1961, ch. three). The Saar, for that matter, was placed under international control for 15 years, de-facto separating this area from Germany as well. For a recent book which enormously overstates the injustice done to Germany in the first half of the 20th century, see Buchanan (2008), though he is relatively more to the point with regard to the effects of the Versailles Treaty: "By forcing German democrats to sign the Treaty of Versailles, which disarmed, divided, and disassembled the nation Bismarck had built, the Allies discredited German democracy at its birth" (2008, 83).

dropped from 3.28 in 1914 to 0.93 in 1928, while France's expenditure ratio, for instance, was 2.56 in 1928.¹¹³ During the 1920s Germany suffered from economic instability, inflation and massive unemployment rates which, of course, became a critical issue as a result of the 1929 depression. On the other hand and despite the economic and societal instability of the 1920s, Germany was a developed and highly industrialized country with functioning and effective state institutions and strong bureaucracy. During the 1920s and despite the economic troubles, GDP levels rose gradually until the great depression of 1929 and in several instances nearly paralleled France's GDP levels. In 1928, for instance, GDP levels in Germany were 4,308 in comparison to 4,390 in neighboring France.¹¹⁴ Until 1933, Germany, therefore, nurtured revanchist aspirations, but due to restriction on its economy and military it could not strengthen so as to fully endorse a revisionist policy like it did under Hitler. Indeed, since the rise of Hitler to power in 1933 Germany's GDP levels per capita increased dramatically to around 6,000 during WWII (until 1944) as Nazi Germany fully invested in its Army and Economy.¹¹⁵

As a result of Germany's acute incongruence and relative strength during the 1920s, one could notice the rising nationalist sentiments already at the end of WWI and, of course, throughout the 1920s. The capitulation of Germany in November 1918 (and later the establishment of the Weimar Republic) was regarded by most Germans as a shameful act. This was because the German society believed that their triumph over the Allies was guaranteed, especially after the Brest-Litovsk agreement in the spring of 1918. Hence, the armistice of November 1918 alongside German capitulation was a surprise and seen as a betrayal by the German people. At that time, the capitulation was conceived as 'the stab in the back', the *Dolchstoßlegende*, as conveyed in the accusation testimony of the famous General Field Marshall, von Hindenburg: "I wanted forceful and cheerful cooperation [from the German government] and instead encountered failure and weakness."¹¹⁶

The partial defeat was characterized as a capitulation of German politicians without the cooperation of the army and without any territorial conquest. This made the already ethno-nationalist German society more conducive to develop irredentist inclinations.¹¹⁷ It is especially so when one considers the large differences between Germany's empire before 1914 and post-Versailles defeated Germany, dispossessed from large territories and its German-speaking brethren, more precisely, one-eighth of her territory and one-tenth of her people.¹¹⁸ German intellectuals at the time were among the most vigorous nationalists, advocating a return to the Bismarckian way of Blood and Iron, while rejecting any moderate approach both internally and externally.¹¹⁹ As a whole, the Weimar Republic was seen as an un-German system, created and influenced by foreigners and inside traitors.¹²⁰ In addition, the occupation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr area, the imposed reparations and the restrictions on the German army, further humiliated the Germans and were seen as hypocrisy.¹²¹

¹¹³ Hantke and Spoerer (2010, 10).

¹¹⁴ Maddison (1995, 194-195).

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Cited in Kaes, Jay and Dimendberg eds. (1994, 15), brackets added by authors.

¹¹⁷ On the phenomenon of irredentism and its manifestation in Germany, see Chazan ed. (1991, 1-8) and Horowitz (1992).

¹¹⁸ Buchanan (2008, 74)

¹¹⁹ For more on Germany's hyper-nationalist sentiments within the liberal and intellectual elite after WWI see, for example, Kohn (1962, 306-311).

¹²⁰ Hughes (1988, 189).

¹²¹ On the German issue in the Treaty of Versailles, see Macmillan (2002, Part Four).

Regarding Germany's foreign policy, it is clear that Germany constantly strived to break free from the Versailles treaty, rehabilitate its economy and regain a dominant position in world politics. Already at the Spa meetings in July 1920, the German delegation vigorously tried to alter the Versailles restrictions on the German army.¹²² During the disarmament conferences of the late 1920s and the early 1930s under the auspice of the League of Nations, Germany consistently argued for an 'equality of rights'. This demand was at the basic German aspiration to become, once more, powerful in economic, political and military terms.¹²³

As to Germany's approach to its neighbors, one could see the difference between the German attitude toward East European and West European states. The then Germany's foreign minister (later to be chancellor for a short period), Stresemann Gustav, held revanchist aspirations as to the lost Eastern territories (Eastern Prussia, Upper Silesia and the Sudetenland). Stresemann, however, was a pragmatist, knowing that in order to regain those lost territories Germany must first strengthen itself and be liberated from the compulsory Versailles treaty. Hence, he advanced his revisionist objectives slowly but gradually, and yet never giving up the pan-German irredentist aspirations of greater Germany. As Knight-Patterson put it

"First get German soil free from occupation – the stranglehold off our necks – and then the fight for political freedom must follow freedom in external relations. First get rid of the last foreign soldier, abolish the Commission in the Reichsbank, the Reichsbank and all the rest of them, then carry on the fight for the national aims in foreign politics, which were clearly kept in view"¹²⁴

Steiner shows the cautious approach of the Germans vis-à-vis the minorities issue in Poland and Czechoslovakia, while cultivating good relations with Britain and France.¹²⁵ Stresemann strived to decrease East European influence (mainly Polish) since he never accepted the Eastern status-quo. He even succeeded in burying the Polish suggestion of a non-aggression pact, which resembled a possible Eastern-Locarno. In terms of culture and ideology during the 1920s and 1930s, Germany saw itself culturally superior to its neighbors, possessing a special political way – *sonderweg* – while considering itself as Europe's defender - *Festung Europa* – from either Russian or American Menace.¹²⁶ The economic depression in 1929 and especially the removal of external constraints over Germany in the early 1930s – the cancellation of Germany's war debt and the Allies' disengagement from the Rhineland – increased Hitler's popularity and eventually compelled Germany's president, Von-Hindenburg, to turn to Hitler.¹²⁷

Indeed, during the early 1930s elections the National Socialist Party (i.e. NSDAP) received strong popular support. In the two elections that preceded the 1933 January election, 38% and 33% voted for the NSDAP, while in the March election in 1933 Hitler received 44% of the votes, which then enabled him to pass the Enabling Act and end the Weimar Republic.

¹²² Eyck (1962, 164-166). One has to consider also the treaty of Rapallo in the early 1920s between Berlin and Moscow.

¹²³ See Steiner (1993, 66).

¹²⁴ Knight-Patterson (1945, 438) Cited in Myhill (forthcoming). See also Röhl (1970, 112).

¹²⁵ Steiner (1993, 50-51).

¹²⁶ See Frevert (2005, 95, 100). On political and economic changes in Germany as well as its foreign policy (the Locarno and Rapallo treaties, disarmament conferences and more), see Ross (1983, 54-70); Thomson (1962, 655-679); Taylor (1961, Ch. iii).

¹²⁷ See James (1989, 134-135, 140).

This situation – gaining strength while still nationally incongruent – made Germany conducive to revisionism, a potential that could be translated into aggression when it became stronger under the Nazis. Indeed, Nazi Germany engaged in a clear-cut revisionist policy. First, Hitler declared that all Germans must be united under one Reich.¹²⁸ This notion of revisionist nationalism was a response to the German capitulation in WWI and the denial of its Eastern territories. There were, of course, domestic factors accounting for the rising of the NSDAP to power, such as the economic crisis of 1929, unemployment and political instability. Nonetheless, it was the underlying factor of the incongruence between the German state and its dispersed people, which helped to create those revisionist tendencies in the first place. Thus, revisionist sentiments of Greater Germany had already been popular and common among most Germans from the early 1920s. Nazi Germany, therefore, approached that situation in an aggressive way while strengthening the state in all relevant aspects, mainly economically and militarily.

Unlike the more passive revisionism of Stresemann vis-à-vis the German minorities in the east, Nazi Germany actively addressed the Sudeten issue. The ethnic German in the Sudetenland supported the idea of annexation with Hitler's Germany, while constantly defying Prague's orders. From January 1933 Germany began inflaming the ethnic Germans residents of Poland and Czechoslovakia, while in the latter a Nazi party of Sudeten Germans was established provoking the Prague government.¹²⁹ The ethnic-Germans in Eastern Europe (i.e. *Volksdeutsche*), especially in the Sudetenland, helped Berlin by espionage and sabotage, and by taking part in the Nazi war machine during WWII.¹³⁰

By the end of the 1930s, Germany took over the Rhineland (1936), rebuilt its army and air force in particular (1935 onward), and entered treaties with Italy and Japan (1936). The annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland and later Czechoslovakia were soon to take place.¹³¹

In post-WWI Germany, the working of realist, liberal and constructivist factors affected Germany's war-propensity. Yet, the specific manifestations of these factors under an exacerbated s/n imbalance helped to bring about a revival of revisionism, which proved to be the most aggressive and brutal in the history of modern Europe. The underlying cause is that the s/n imbalance was exacerbated, a post-defeat outcome which made Germany conducive to territorial revisionism. Realist factors were only partly implemented due to the fact that Germany was not occupied by the Entente Cordial. Moreover, due to the disengagement of the two most powerful great powers (the US and the Soviet Union) in a multipolar system -- an international system which made such a disengagement possible¹³² -- the status-quo powers did not have enough power to enforce the post-WWI settlement once Germany became stronger under the Nazis. Most important, the post-WWI peace settlements only worsened the s/n imbalance especially with respect to Germany and its kin brethren over the border. As a result, democratization made Germany conducive to become even more nationalist and revisionist because of the ability of revisionist politicians to manipulate the nationalist card due to its mass appeal under the post-

¹²⁸ This is explicit in Hitler's 'Mein Kampf', see Talmon (1980, 525-527) and Kershaw (1998, 445-494).

¹²⁹ See Smelser (1975, ch.VII).

¹³⁰ In the Sudetenland the German party headed by Henlein was fully supported and backed by the Nazis, undermining the legitimacy of Masaryk's and Benes' consociational democracy, see Broklov (1998, 187-204). A known notorious group of ethnic-Germans during the war was the *Selbstschutz*. They took part in the *Einsatzgruppen*, the mobile killing squads of the SS, and helped to operate several concentration camps -- see Piotrowski (1998, 23, 170, 222, 301).

¹³¹ See Paxton (1975, 413-439).

¹³² Posen (1984).

WWI s/n imbalance.¹³³ Finally and although constructivist variables were present, nationalist ideas eventually triumphed due to the s/n imbalance created after WWI and its effects on the popular appeal of nationalist ideas and the desire for revenge.

IV.B. The Failed State: The Collapse of an Incongruent State – post-2003 Iraq

Post-Saddam Iraq became a failed state, maintained together by foreign forces, as it continues to be highly incongruent. Thus, being transformed from a revisionist-aggressive state to one that is prone to civil wars and foreign interventions by the US and its allies, its neighbors and Jihadists from all over the Islamic world (as Afghanistan was under and following the Soviet occupation in the 1980s). In order to see the effect the s/n balance has with regard to the success or failure of military defeats, one should account for the changes the US occupation has had on both the Iraqi domestic structure and the regional political and strategic interplay.

First, the military defeat in March 2003 was total as US-led forces marched on Baghdad and completely toppled Saddam's regime. The state's structure including its bureaucracies, institutions (including the ruling Ba'ath party) and public services were altogether demolished as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Most important, the Iraqi army was dissolved, hence no central control existed to maintain law and order.¹³⁴ Although the US-led "coalition of the willing" achieved a complete victory and occupied the whole country, it was quite different from the occupation of Germany in 1945. In the latter, revisionist forces (i.e. the Nazi regime backed by the majority of the German society) were totally discredited, thus affecting the perception of the entire population. Since Germany was an externally incongruent state, a blow to the state's army and institutions made the society less bellicose and more conducive to moderate approaches. Post-Saddam Iraq, however, is both internally and externally incongruent. While the US victory eliminated the violent manifestations of the external incongruence (namely, Iraqi revisionism), it made possible numerous violent manifestations of the internal incongruence in a failed state. Thus, pacifying Iraq has become a harder objective.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 completely buried the pan-Arabic (and "Greater Iraq") agenda, already severely weakened after the First Gulf War.¹³⁵ However, it was mainly the Sunnis who were brought down, thus opening the political door for the rise of the Shiite majority and the partly secessionist Kurds in the north. Consequently, "Greater Iraq" revisionism on the Sunni part and their pan-Arab aspirations were checked, whereas internal insecurity and violence rose dramatically.

The post-defeat outcome in Iraq consisted of a severe s/n imbalance, composed of state weakness – due to the war outcome, the occupation and the destruction of state institutions – while still highly incongruent. Thus, a complete defeat of an internally incongruent state can be de-stabilizing and must include additional strategies in order to reduce the s/n imbalance. The defeat is, therefore, merely a first and necessary condition though not a sufficient one.

The Shiite majority saw the democratization process as an opportunity to seize power from the heretofore dominant Sunni minority, especially through ethnically-based voting in the general elections. The Sunnis, for their part, were not only afraid to lose their dominance but

¹³³ See Snyder (2000).

¹³⁴ Stansfield (2007, 167-8).

¹³⁵ It is important to note, though, that pan-Arabism led mostly by Egyptian ruler, Nasser, was already weakened following the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel and during the 1970s especially in the wake of the rise of radical Islam as manifested in the Iranian revolution. For this point, see Ajami (1978-1979).

also that the Shiites would abuse their newly acquired power, thus leading to a strong sense of Sunni insecurity, resulting in a violent insurgency, aggravated by the influx of Jihadists from all over the Arab world. The Kurds saw the weakening of the Iraqi state as a great opportunity to advance their own secessionist, or at least autonomous, aspirations.

Second, Iraq became a target for foreign intervention on various grounds. To begin with, Iraq's trans-border ethno-national ties with Iran induced the latter to meddle in Iraq's domestic affairs, as it has been striving for regional hegemony. Ever since the Iranian revolution and the weakening of pan-Arabism, Iran has advocated a pan-Islamic agenda, though in conflict with Sunni fundamentalism like al-Qaeda. Consequently, the full-blown collapse of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq opened the door for Iranian intervention, thus providing it more room to promote its hegemonic aspirations. On the other hand, partly as a reaction to Iranian intervention, Sunnis in Iraq have conducted an uprising against the Shiite-led Iraqi government. For several years, the Sunni insurgents worked closely with al-Qaeda militants, who used to infiltrate to Iraq rather easily due to the lack of state control over its borders.

Under the shadow of state weakness and national incongruence, the Iraqi people have been attached to their basic ethno-religious identities and reluctant to share power or embark upon a consociational bargain. The working of the security dilemma among the rival groups, best depicts the post-Saddam Iraq's dynamics of violence.¹³⁶ It is, nonetheless, a result of the post-defeat s/n imbalance, which created the conditions for ethnic/sectarian rivalry and insecurity in a failed Iraq.

Unlike the Sunnis and Shiites, the Kurdish elite have been the more pragmatic actor in this political stalemate, favoring an autonomous Kurdistan in a free Iraq. Although Kurds live in several other Middle-Eastern countries (i.e. mainly Turkey, Iran and Syria), they have endorsed, since the end of the First Gulf War and mainly after the fall of Hussein, a realist perspective of satisfaction with achieving a high-level autonomy in the Kurdish part of northern Iraq. They have realized that launching a more aggressive campaign for an independent Kurdistan would provoke their neighbors and risk their achievements so far.

Third and regarding the regional effects the 2003 invasion has had, one could note the fear from a spread of the Iraqi civil conflict to its regional neighbors. The Shiite majority in Iraq is the prime political actor in the domestic scene, though they have ties with the Shiite majority in Iran, which, in turn, has ties with their kin brethren in Lebanon and other Gulf states. Hence, a Shiite-dominated Iraq backed by a revisionist Iran frightens Sunni-led states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. King Abdullah of Jordan, for instance, expressed great concern of a Shiite crescent that might pose a bigger threat to the stability of the region and the ruling regimes.¹³⁷ President Mubarak of Egypt expressed his fears as well, doubting the loyalty of the Iraqi Shiites to Arab nations due to their alliance with Iran.¹³⁸ Iraq's neighbor, Saudi Arabia, is possibly at the most problematic position of all due to their Shiite minority of about 10% located in an oil-rich area and traditionally underprivileged.

Post-surge Iraq of the recent year or so shows some signs of greater stability.¹³⁹ This stability is not only because of the U.S. troop surge, but also because of a stronger Iraqi state,

¹³⁶ For the security dilemma argument and its connections to central state control, see Posen (1993), and Snyder (1993).

¹³⁷ See Rubin (2006, 57 and footnote no. 6).

¹³⁸ Interview on Al-Arabiya satellite television on 8 April 2006.

¹³⁹ On the debate regarding the success and failure of the "surge" and benchmarks strategy see, for example, the online debate named Has the Surge Put Iraq on the Path to Success? Between Steven Simon and Max Boot, available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16185/>. See also Simon (September 2007), who argued that the U.S.

helped by rising resources due to the increase in oil prices, leading to much stronger Iraqi institutions, and some limited signs of national reconciliation. Another potentially pacifying factor, somewhat similar to what happened in Europe following WWII, is the un-mixing of ethnic groups, especially in Baghdad itself in the last few years.¹⁴⁰ Nonetheless, these are very tentative and quite fragile developments and there is still an uphill battle for pacifying Iraq.

In conclusion, Realist factors in the form of a military defeat and occupation have been present in post-2003 Iraq. Yet and in contrast to post-1945 Germany, it did not bring about a greater s/n balance, but rather a failed state that faces both internal strife and constant trans-border interventions. Due to the severe s/n imbalance, democratization has de-stabilized and weakened Iraq and challenged its territorial integrity. The full-blown defeat made Iraqi revisionism impossible, though it turned Iraq into a failed state where liberal and civic identities are in a losing competition vis-à-vis both sectarian and Islamic ones. The fact that the s/n imbalance was not reduced undermined the potentially pacifying effects of both liberalism and constructivism.

Conclusions

This paper has analyzed the effects of military defeat on revisionist states. We have done it by providing an innovative account of the underlying factors of both violence and pacification. The key proposition – focusing on the effects of the s/n balance – maintains that state strength and the extent of congruence between geo-political borders and people's national identifications exercise great effects on the propensity of states and regions toward war and peace. Thus, the effect military defeat has on each situation varies according to the specific post-defeat s/n conditions.

If the state in question is strong, though nationally incongruent, thus producing a revisionist state, then a decisive military blow can be very instrumental for the purpose of discrediting future aggressive/revisionist ventures. In such a case the next phases can be helpful if they include a reduction of the national incongruence (e.g. in the case of post-WWII West Germany -- by eliminating the external incongruence in E. Europe while integrating the expellees into an internally congruent society), and investing in state-building (mainly in institutional and infrastructural components). This in turn brings about a civic national identity and can produce the conditions for the pacifying effects of democratization. Hence and as seen in the post-1945 German case, such a route toward pacific inclinations goes through the hallmarks of all three schools-of-thought: Realism contributed the total defeat of the German aggressor and the consequent occupation and thus the discrediting of revisionist nationalism,

should disengage militarily from Iraq. See the Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq report (June 2008), which states that the level of violence in Iraq is the lowest in over four years, also available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Master_16_June_08_%20FINAL_SIGNED%20.pdf. For more on the numbers of ethno-sectarian related deaths see Cordesman (9 July 2008) slide no. 14, also available at http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/080709_iraq_status_trend.pdf. For previous discussions and reports see the White House Initial Benchmark Assessment Report (July 2007), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070712.html>; and the Council on Foreign Relations (updated March 2008) http://www.cfr.org/publication/13333/what_are_iraqs_benchmarks.html; New York Times (15 September, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/15/washington/15policy.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.

¹⁴⁰ Today's Baghdad consists of more homogenous neighborhoods than it used to before 2006, mainly and unfortunately due to ethnic-cleansing. See the map in *Baghdad: Mapping the violence*, also available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/baghdad_navigator/. Accessed January 9, 2009.

whereas realism can also account for the Cold War constraints, which made the fulfillment of the national re-unification of Germany completely unrealistic and irrelevant until the end of the Cold War. Under the conditions of the post-war greater s/n balance and the conducive realist factors, liberalism was able to reinforce the transition of Western Germany into a peaceful status-quo state through the benefits of economic prosperity and especially the emergence of a stable democracy. Constructivism solidified the transformation of Germany's identity and culture, making it pacific and moderate.¹⁴¹ Indeed, post-1945 Germany represents a state transformed from a fully-fledged aggressive entity into a moderate and pacifist state. Since in this case the commitment of the US was highly credible, due to the emerging Cold War, these phases were achieved rather quickly and nearly simultaneously. Yet, it still provides important implications for today's conflicts and the relevance of both viable states and national congruence as key ingredients in the peacemaking formula.

A limited success includes a partial blow to an aggressor, while containing its aspirations for regional hegemony and conquest. Post-1991 Iraq depicts a case where the conflict was not resolved, though contained and managed by the great powers. Hence, realist factors here played a greater role, but since it was partial and was not accompanied by further steps, it did not bring about a transformation away from revisionist intentions, though US containment and deterrence made revisionism unlikely in practice.

A military defeat that exacerbates the s/n imbalance, conversely, might bring about de-stabilizing outcomes. Thus, it might create either a strong and incongruent state, which will have irredentist inclinations, or a weak and incongruent state which will suffer from internal strife and civil conflict. Post-WWI Germany illustrates the former, as external s/n imbalance after a partial defeat produced powerful revisionist ideas which could take advantage of an unstable democracy and economic difficulties to come to power with an extreme nationalist agenda. However, a total defeat might not be enough and even have destabilizing effects if the defeated state suffers from both internal and external incongruence. As state institutions collapse, democratization under these conditions of incongruence might be de-stabilizing. Post-Saddam Iraq shows clearly how a total defeat may have discredited the revisionist pan-Arab agenda and "Greater Iraq" aspirations, though unleashing ethno-religious enmity with violent consequences under a failed state.

Table 4 below presents the stabilizing or de-stabilizing effects of the causal factors associated with key theories on defeated revisionist powers in the four cases addressed in this paper. The Table shows the key role played by the s/n balance in all these cases and its conditioning effects on the various causal factors.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Berger (1996).

¹⁴² A future research endeavour might include a comprehensive list of all revisionist states that were defeated, whether they were s/n balanced and consequently whether their behaviour became war-, or peace-prone.

Table 4: The Effects of Defeats on Revisionist States: Theories and Reality

| Wars | Post-WWI Germany | Post-WWII Germany | Post-Gulf War Iraq | Post-2003 Iraq |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| Theories | | | | |
| Realist | Partial defeat & Great Power disengagement | Unconditional surrender, occupation and Cold War constraints | Partial defeat & postwar containment | Total defeat & occupation |
| Relations to s/n balance | Did not prevent the reemergence of revisionism | Made revisionism impossible | Made revisionism unlikely | Made revisionism impossible |
| Liberal | Failed attempt at democratization | Democratization, market economy and regional institutions | No effect of liberal factors | Attempts at democratization and a capitalist Iraqi market |
| Relations to s/n balance | s/n imbalance obstructed democratization | s/n balance made these liberal factors successful | No major relations | s/n imbalance destabilizes these liberal factors |
| Constructivist | Nationalist ideas competing forcefully with more liberal ideas | Discredit of ethnic nationalism, rise of liberal ideas and stronger civic identity | Weakening of pan-Arabism in the Arab world, but no free marketplace of ideas in Iraq | Sectarian, Islamic ideas and identities competing vigorously with civic/liberal ones |
| Relations to s/n balance | s/n imbalance reinforces revisionism through a desire for revenge | Reinforce the s/n balance | No major change | Failed state makes possible the dominance of sectarian identities |

Therefore and while relying on the s/n balance as a key to explain states' war-propensity, several questions remain for future agenda. These questions hold great significance with respect to post-conflict peace building in war-torn states and regions: 1) How should the root causes of the conflict be resolved? Should the disputed territory be preserved or partitioned, and are

population transfers a recommended policy? 2) What types of nation-building mechanisms are best? 3) Under what conditions does democratization have pacifying or destabilizing effects on regional conflicts? And 4) under what conditions of the s/n imbalance would different pathways to peace work best?

What, then, are the policy implications regarding Iraq and Iran? With regard to Iraq, while the sectarian cleavages should supposedly lead us to support partition to three independent states, some combination of a power-sharing arrangement in the central government and some level of regional autonomy is probably the most practical solution: first Shiites and Sunnis are still mixed, especially in Baghdad, and the Sunnis do not control the oil-rich areas in Iraq and thus will vehemently oppose any partition plan, which will leave them without income from oil. Moreover, despite the deep sectarian cleavages, which have obstructed a successful nation-building in Iraq and led to the recent large-scale violence, most of the Sunnis and the Shiites identify themselves as Arabs and Iraqis. Although the Kurdish population in Iraq is part of the power-sharing arrangement, the Kurds, who are non-Arab, should continue to enjoy their high autonomy in Northern Iraq, mainly since they already constitute an overwhelming majority there and because this form of autonomy does not threaten their neighbors with Kurdish minorities – mostly Turkey, Iran and Syria – as would have a fully-fledged Kurdish independent state.

With regard to Iran, if the attempt at dialogue regarding its nuclear program fails, then severe sanctions and even full isolation is best, since military defeat to the Iranian military and state's institutions might either cause a highly de-stabilizing failed state or lead to a revengeful revisionist state in an area already highly explosive with a lot of s/n imbalances (such as both internally fragmented societies and transborder Muslim, Shiite, Sunni and Arab communities, among others). If isolation does not achieve its goal an invasion of Iran is still not recommended and a surgical air-strike might be preferable.

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