Columbia International Affairs Online: Working Papers

CIAO DATE: 07/2013

What's Behind Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Anxiety?

Frederic Wehrey

December 2012

Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales

Abstract

Will Saudi Arabia get the bomb ? Overwhelmingly, common wisdom suggests that acquiring a countervailing deterrent will be the Kingdom’s surest response if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold. Proponents of this argument marshal an array of evidence: the repeated statements of Saudi officials, the robust Pakistani - Saudi strategic relationship, Saudi Arabia’s ceaseless quest for regional prestige, and the apparent uncertainty of U.S. security guarantees. Added to this , they point to a number of highly suspicious technical indicators such as Riyadh’s purchase in the mid - 1980s of CSS - 2 missiles from China and its refusal to allow IAEA inspectors on to its soil. While these are no doubt compelling points, they disregard the broader question of the Saudi calculus on a nuclear Iran. Specifically, many arguments tend to treat Saudi acquisition as a foregone conclusion, without considering the many disincentives against getting a weapon. Chief among these is the enormous normative and legal damage Saudi Arabia would incur if it were to break its commitments under the Non - Proliferation Treaty (NPT) , with related backlash from the United States, among others . Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s most likely supplier, Pakistan, may be loath to transfer nuclear weapon s technology for fear of antagonizing the U.S. or embroiling itself in an Arab - Iranian cold war at a time when its attention remains squarely focused on the threat from India. 1 In many ways the perception that Saudi Arabia might seek nuclear weapons serves the Kingdom’s interests, with less risk, than would the rea lity of actually acquiring nuclear weapons.