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Sub-Regional Security Cooperation: The Southern African Development Community in Comparative Perspective
This paper surveys the progress made in security cooperation by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and explores a number of key challenges and issues facing SADC on the basis of comparisons with experience in regional and more particularly sub-regional security organisations in other parts of the world.
It seeks to answer a number of key questions relating to sub-regional security cooperation, both in relation to SADC and more generally. It identifies a number of problems in relation to the definition of regions and sub-regions and briefly surveys existing regional and sub-regional security arrangements.
Particular questions it addresses include:
SADC was formed in 1992 and now includes all the countries of Southern Africa - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Indian Ocean island of Mauritius was admitted to membership in 1995; twelve states in all, including some of the poorest countries in the world but also sub-Saharan Africa's richest and most powerful state.
While primarily concerned with economic integration, SADC is increasingly committed to political and security cooperation and during the course of 1996 agreed to establish an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. SADC is the newest of the seven major sub-regional organisations in Africa 1 , and although its predecessor, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was not particularly successful, SADC can build upon existing structures of regional solidarity and will be able to draw on the considerable resources of South Africa.
Historical development of SADC
The countries that now make up SADC have been linked historically in a number of ways: the political definition of 'Southern Africa' (now equated with SADC membership) thus bears a reasonably close resemblance to historical and geographical usage of the concept, although Mauritius, Tanzania and to some extent Angola are less closely associated with the core grouping. 2
Economically, the development of the region largely centred on the exploitation of the gold and diamond fields of South Africa and to a lesser extent the copper in what is now Zambia, as well as areas of agricultural development in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Labour was recruited from most of the current SADC members to serve these areas of economic concentration while trade and transport links radiated outwards. Six of the 12 SADC states are landlocked and transport routes are often shared - the ports of Beira, Maputo, Benguela, Durban and Cape Town have served the landlocked countries as well as the great industrial and mining centre of the Witwatersrand.
Politically, the SADC states have quite distinct histories and cultures, although these converged to some extent during the 1970s and 1980s through the struggle against white minority rule. With the exception of Mauritius, the states may be grouped into three broad categories:
South Africa forms the economic centre of this web of interdependence, and it has dominated the region's politics and security which have been profoundly affected by the conflicts over apartheid. 4 As the African independence movement swept through Africa and white minority rule came under increasing pressure, successive South African leaders - notably Jan Smuts, Hendrik Verwoerd and P.W. Botha - promoted the concept of regional economic and political cooperation in Southern Africa on the basis of South African leadership.
These proposals for a Southern African 'commonwealth' were linked to attempts to develop a formal South African defence alliance with the Western powers, based on the argument that white-ruled South Africa was a bulwark against communism. 5 But Africa turned its back on the apartheid regime, and South Africa was excluded from the OAU and the Commonwealth and became increasingly isolated, not only in Africa but internationally, although Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland remained closely linked to South Africa through the Southern African Customs Union (negotiated in 1910) and transport links with South Africa proved to be durable.
South Africa's last attempt to achieve regional cooperation on the basis of its hegemony was P.W. Botha's effort in 1979 to set up a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) but this was premised on the expectation that Zimbabwe would become independent under a government not unsympathetic to Pretoria. Instead, Zimbabwe became a leading force behind the establishment in 1980 of the Southern African Development Community (SADCC), formed mainly to reduce the region's economic dependence on South Africa and to coordinate investment and aid. All the countries now in SADC except South Africa and Mauritius joined SADCC (although Namibia became a member only after its independence in 1989). SADCC was deliberately termed a 'Conference' rather than an organisation and its functions were limited: a small secretariat was established in Botswana and its coordinating tasks, broken into sectors, were each allocated to member states.
SADCC did not take on any security functions, which were the responsibility of the informal Frontline States (FLS) grouping. Formed in 1970 specifically to assist the struggle for the liberation of the white-ruled countries of Southern Africa, the FLS initially consisted of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana; Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and then Namibia joined as they gained their independence. Lesotho and Swaziland stayed out on the grounds that their security would have been too compromised; Malawi had fairly close links with Pretoria and while it was prepared to join SADC would not support liberation movements. The FLS operated very informally, and largely on a heads of state level: most of the FLS leaders knew each other personally and agreements were struck with little recourse to the niceties of diplomacy or bureaucratic process. The presidents of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO of Namibia) and the African National Congress (ANC) sat in on FLS meetings.
The FLS included a military coordinating structure, now known as the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the functions of which expanded over time to include coordination of training and intelligence, but not joint control of operations.
Formation of SADC and its security organ
SADCC had not been constituted as a legal entity with articles of association: members states simply signed a Memorandum of Understanding. After the independence of Namibia, it was decided to formalise the structure and extend its mandate - this process was given even greater impetus after February 1990, when negotiations began between the ANC and the apartheid regime and it became evident that South Africa would soon be democratised. These developments came at a time of a sea-change in African politics, precipitated largely by the end of the Cold War, in which a 'second wave' of democratisation came about.
The SADC Declaration and Treaty was signed in Windhoek in 1992 by all the SADCC member states (South Africa acceded in 1994). The Treaty commits member states to a set of principles including 'sovereign equality ... solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; [and] peaceful settlement of disputes' and sets out objectives which include economic integration and the promotion of peace and security. 6 The associated Declaration further calls for the establishment of 'a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security'. 7
A subsequent agreement, the 1993 SADC Framework and Strategy for Building the Community argued for the adoption of a 'new approach to security' broadly reflecting integrated, multi-faceted approaches adopted internationally through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which in turn were reflected at the 1991 OAU meeting in Kampala which declared that 'there is a link between security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa'. 8 The SADC framework emphasised the non-military dimensions of security, linked democratisation and development to security, and called for a reduction in military expenditure and force levels and the adoption of non-offensive defence doctrines. 9
These themes prevailed at a seminar hosted by the UN in Windhoek, Namibia in February 1993 on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Southern Africa. While the seminar was characterised by disputes over whether South Africa's military capacity represented a threat to the region or not, it concluded that most of the major threats in the region were internal and had been generated by political and economic problems. It argued that 'there is ... a rich history of CSBMs in the military sphere, especially among Frontline States ... with the exception of South Africa' and that these needed to be strengthened. 10
A ministerial workshop held in Windhoek in July 1994 at which many of the SADC ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, security and policing were present took this forward by formulating proposals on a wide range of security-related issues including human rights, arms control and disarmament, civil-military relations and conflict resolution. It called for the establishment of a Human Rights commission, a Conflict Resolution Forum comprised of foreign ministers, a Security and Defence Forum involving ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence, and a SADC Sector on Defence and Security. It also provided for a Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence Pact and for the 'coordination of military and security policies and doctrines'. 11
These proposals for structures to manage a comprehensive common security regime were in retrospect premature and too ambitious. They were also regarded by many governments as too complex and bureaucratic. Some governments preferred the old FLS approach where security issues were resolved in a non-bureaucratic manner by heads of state and military liaison took place on a technical level; there was also some debate over whether political and security functions should be combined with the economic tasks of SADC. The South African government feared a proliferation of structures and argued for a flexible approach; some commentators pointed out, however, that the conditions which made the FLS effective (a common threat, mutual friendship between presidents) had disappeared and that more formal structures were needed to hold countries to account and to protect weaker states.
The desire for flexibility led to a proposal which was adopted at the SADC foreign ministers meeting in March 1995 to establish an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) which would function independently of the SADC Secretariat. It would carry out political and security functions and report directly to the SADC heads of state Summit. Separate committees on defence and security and on political matters were envisaged. However, little progress was made amidst evident disagreements, and the communique which followed the SADC Summit in August 1995 made no mention of ASAS. 12
In the meantime the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (IDSSC) had been expanded to include the remaining SADC states which were not members of the Frontline States, as well as South Africa. Through a proliferating network of committees and sub-committees it efficiently carried out an expanding array of security co-operation tasks including policing, intelligence, border security, military exchanges, training and professional liaison. 13
At the June 1996 SADC heads of state Summit endorsement was finally given for the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Security and Defence, which would incorporate the ISDSC and adopt key features (informality, direct access to heads of state) of the ill-fated ASAS. Its mandate included a long list of principles and tasks, inter alia:
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe was appointed the first chair -thereafter a 'troika' system would operate (the chair-elect, the outgoing chair and the incumbent), rotating on an annual basis. 15 It was agreed that the organ would operate on a Summit (heads of state or government) level, independent of other SADC structures, as well as at ministerial and 'technical levels' and that the ISDSC would be one of the institutions of the Organ. While the organ is thus a SADC structure, it is essentially based on the model of the FLS. A small secretariat is likely to be appointed to service the chair, but bureaucratic functions will be kept to a minimum: the aim will be to coordinate existing government structures rather than replicate them on a multilateral basis.
Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
The ISDSC is likely to become the backbone of the Organ. It is structured on three main levels, with a plethora of sub-committees and sub-sub committees which meet as required or agreed, usually in the country chairing the committee concerned. 16 It operates fairly informally, with no permanent secretariat - limited secretarial support is provided by the country chairing the ISDSC on an annual basis. In 1995-96 the ISDSC was chaired by South Africa's Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, with support provided by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) - the chair was due to pass to Malawi in October 1996 and had been previously held by Tanzania. It is as yet unclear what effect the likely integration of the ISDSC into the SADC Organ will have on these arrangements.
The ISDSC Ministerial Committee involves ministers responsible for defence, home affairs, policing and intelligence. It meets only occasionally, on a fairly formal basis - most of the work is carried out by three subcommittees: Defence, Public Security (policing) and State Security (intelligence). While the focus of the ISDSC's work appears increasingly to revolve around policing and intelligence functions, the defence committee remains the most highly evolved. It consists of three sub-sub committees, the Functional Committee (divided into the usual staff functions of operations, intelligence, personnel and logistics), the Professional Committee (responsible for cooperation between military lawyers, medics and chaplains) and the Standing Committee, consisting of the Aviation and Maritime Committees.
The Public Security Committee has a range of coordination functions, mostly related to cross-border crime and including vehicle theft, drug trafficking, smuggling of light weapons, forged travel documents, counterfeit money and illegal immigration. It is supported by a Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Organisation.
At a full meeting of the ISDSC (ie sub-committees followed by a ministerial meeting) in September 1995 in Cape Town an ambitious agenda was drawn up, much of which will overlap with the proposed functions of the SADC Organ. These tasks included:
As is the case with SADC as a whole, multilateral coordination within the ISDSC does not exclude or restrict bilateral or other multilateral defence and security cooperation.
It is clear from these developments that, with the integration of the ISDSC into the SADC Organ, SADC will become a sub-regional political and security organisation as well as an economic one. It will incorporate principles of flexibility as well as formality (in the sense of formal agreements on non-aggression and possibly conflict resolution) and build on the effective and non-confrontational defence and security cooperation established through the ISDSC.
While the Organ will thus operate in terms of principles and practices which have been developed over time, and on the basis of structures which have arisen incremental and organically, many issues remain unclear. This paper aims to explore some of these issues: in order to do this, it will examine some conceptual and comparative terrain.
Although usually referred to in Southern Africa as a regional body, within the international system SADC is better conceived of as a sub-region of the region Africa - the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) being generally recognised as a regional organisation within the meaning of the UN Charter, along with the Arab League and the Organisation of American States (OAS).
In practice distinctions between regions and sub-regions are sometimes difficult to make. 18 For the purposes of this study, SADC will be regarded as a sub-regional body, a category which includes, for example, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and other organisations in Africa such as the Arab Maghreb Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Association of East Asian States (ASEAN) can also be regarded as sub-regional as can a number of organisations in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is with such organisations in the developing world that SADC will principally be compared.
What constitutes a region or a sub-region is contested and unclear. Several criteria may be employed in drawing the boundaries of (sub-)regions 19 : geographic proximity or geographical distance from a (sub-)regional 'centre'; cultural affinity; regularity and intensity of trade and economic interaction; intensity of military or security interaction; and internal and external recognition of a group of states as a distinctive area. 20 Historical patterns of amity, competition and enmity - culturally, military and economically defined - may also be considered.
Relatively little attention has been given to regions within the dominant Anglo-American paradigms in strategic studies and international relations. However, regional integration has been a powerful force in the late twentieth century and since the end of the Cold War there has been a renaissance of regionalism around the world, although it remains to be seen how durable this feature is. Much of the new emphasis on regionalism is aimed at economic integration, following the European and now the North American leads, as countries seek security in numbers from the vagaries of the international markets and attempt to pool resources to become bigger players. The end of the Cold War has 'unfrozen' many regional security dynamics, tipping some areas into conflict (the Balkans, parts of the former Soviet Union) but also creating opportunities for stabilisation in some (sub-) regions (South East Asia, Southern Africa). 21
Academic efforts that have been made to focus on regions have attempted to fill the gap between state and system analysis: essentially most of these studies have concluded that sub-systems can be identified on the basis of geographic proximity and intensity of interaction (whether conflictual, competitive or cooperative). 22 As noted above, economic, political, social, cultural and security interactions could all be taken into account.
More recently, Ayoob, Buzan, Vayrynen and Waever amongst others have taken a narrower approach, focusing on regions in terms of security relations and dynamics. This provides a far more manageable framework. Buzan has defined these sub-systems as security complexes. Originally he viewed them as being determined by conflictual dyads (eg India-Pakistan in South Asia), but in later formulations such complexes were defined in terms of amity as well as enmity:
A security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. 23
This formulation may be criticised on a number of accounts. It applies principally on the level of state or 'national' security and it is unclear if sub-state and human security concerns could be approached in the same way. Great difficulties arise in dealing with states which might form part of more than one complex, or which are sandwiched between two complexes (Buzan refers to these as 'buffer states' although such states may serve to transmit rather absorb security interactions). While it is fairly clear in some cases what constitutes membership of a security complex, in others it is more difficult to decide. 24
Nevertheless, when analysing security interactions (if not international relations more generally) the idea of security complexes is a useful one. As Ayoob has pointed out, at least this emphasis on regional dynamics 'permits analysts to note that most security issues in Third World regions have a life of their own independent of great power relationships'. 25
Security complexes may be conceived of as lying along a continuum of insecurity-security which may evolve in one direction or the other. At one end of the continuum, where there is a high degree of conflict, rivalry and polarisation, a 'conflict formation' may be identified. When this conflict becomes mediated through 'principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in the belief that others will reciprocate', a 'security regime' in the sense used by Jervis may be identified. This may be formally constructed or emerge on the basis of tacit understandings. 26
Further evolution of the security regime might lead to a condition of regional 'common security' as popularised by the Palme Commission. In this states would adopt cooperative or collaborative approaches to security on the basis of the development of reciprocal restraint mechanisms. This could entail amongst other things the institutionalisation of a range of confidence- and security-building measures, defensive restructuring along non-offensive lines, harmonisation of some aspects of foreign policy, and moves towards economic integration. 27 Finally, when integration on political, economic and social levels predominates, a 'security community' may be identified. States retain sovereignty, but war between them is virtually unthinkable. 28 The next phase would be confederation or federation.
Southern Africa as a security complex
Buzan has defined Southern Africa as a security complex, although this excluded two countries which are now members of SADC: Tanzania and Mauritius. But is it the case that the national securities of SADC states cannot be considered separately from each other? All the SADC states except Mauritius were profoundly affected by the conflict over apartheid in South Africa. But without the South African connection, would Malawi, for example, have any security link with Namibia, or Lesotho with Angola, or even Zimbabwe with Tanzania? Essentially, it was the conflict over and with South Africa that drew all the current member states of SADC (except Mauritius) together into a security complex, as South Africa attempted to destabilise them in various ways.
South Africa's prominence in the region is so great, however, that even without a conflictual relationship the securities of all Southern African states remained linked with those of the Republic. Railways and roads remain an important security link between most of the continental SADC states, and their histories and politics are now so intertwined that SADC will probably remain a security complex in the sense defined by Buzan for some time. However, it should be noted that with the ending of apartheid and its conflictual spin-offs countries on the periphery may find that their main security concerns lie outside of SADC: Angola and Zambia with Zaire and central Africa (Rwanda and Burundi in particular), Tanzania with central and east Africa. Mauritius in any case has few security concerns in continental Africa.
While the political boundaries of SADC may not correspond exactly to those of the Southern African security complex, Southern Africa as a region is likely to be defined increasingly in terms of SADC membership as the organisation's institutions are strengthened and tariff and other barriers are negotiated away.
By taking on security and political functions, SADC has become a self-defined sub-regional multipurpose organisation, one of a small number of other such structures around the globe. It joins a club which has at best a mixed record of success. The majority of sub-regional organisations have failed to meet their claimed objectives and while some have succeeded in stabilising inter-state relations within the organisation, this has often been achieved at the expense of entrenching broader regional conflict formations.
Roles and functions of (sub-)regional organisations
The security functions of regional organisations (and by extension sub-regional organisations) are legitimised in the international system through the UN Charter. Article 51 recognises the 'inherent right of individual and collective self-defence' for states in the case of an armed attack; Article 53 provides for the UN to recommend action to prevent war by regional organisations as well as individual states; and Article 52(1) provides that regional organisations may deal 'with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action', provided that this action is consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. Article 53 states that 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council'. 29 The Security Council is also required to be kept informed of activities undertaken or contemplated by regional agencies for the maintenance of peace and security.
These provisions would appear to limit the roles of (sub-)regional organisations. In practice, however, since the 'authorization' of US enforcement actions by the OAS during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and further efforts by the US to use the OAS and not the UN to settle conflicts in the Western Hemisphere, the authority of the UN Security Council over regional organisations has been eroded. 30
There is no necessary contradiction between regional and universal or global organisation, although there has been considerable debate between those who see regionalism as the best building blocks of universal organisation, and those who believe that they can impede universalism. It can perhaps be argued that military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact which have divided the world into hostile blocs have tended to impede universalism, while regional organisations seeking economic and political cooperation have generally (although certainly not always) advanced it.
In the second half of the twentieth century regional and sub-regional cooperation has been attempted on the basis of culture, economics, security and politics. In practice, of course, such distinctions are difficult to draw and most sub-global organisations combine these functions to different degrees. Regional and sub-regional organisations may be defined in various ways. Bennet makes a useful distinction between multipurpose organisations, which deal with a variety of issues (economic, military, social and so on); alliance systems such as NATO which are concerned entirely (or almost so) with security against external actors and are largely a product of the Cold War; and functional organisations which 'promote economic, social, or political collaboration, with little or no regard to security factors'. 31
This paper concerns itself with multi-purpose organisations - although in some cases functional organisations have become multi-purpose when they have expanded from economic cooperation to political and security cooperation. It mostly deals with such (sub-)regional organisations in the Third World; although it also considers some cases where developing countries are members of interregional organisations (such as the Organisation of American States). It excludes trans-regional organisations such as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.
The nature and extent of security functions taken on by multi-purpose organisations various considerably. Farer has identified six categories into which the wide variety of security functions of sub-global organisations may be organised:
Africa has seen many attempts at sub-regional economic integration, while pan-Africanism has played an important role in the evolution of the continent's political identity. Virtually all integration efforts have failed, for reasons which include: premature politicisation (the 'grand gesture' which does not build incrementally on shared objectives); the inability to bargain with reciprocal benefits due to the similarities of the economies (dependent on commodity exports to the developed world) and limited resources; the relative absence of pluralistic democracy, leading to erratic leadership; the short-term acquisitiveness and insecurities of national elites; the effects of Cold War great-power interventions; the policy-making weakness of states and the poor integration of economies (countries which are poorly integrated internally are unlikely to be able to contribute meaningfully to regional integration). 33
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, listed defence and security cooperation in Article 2 of its charter. Provision was made for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) (Article 19) and for a Specialised Commission for Defence (Article 20). However, the OAU's ability and willingness to interfere in conflict and to build security cooperation has been severely constrained by a number of factors, most of which relate the weakness of member states in terms of regime legitimacy and military and economic strength. Coupled with the fact that many states were the artificial creations of colonialism and that sovereignty had only recently been attained from external powers, this led to the entrenchment of the principles of sovereign equality of members and non-interference in internal affairs. 34
These principles, combined with political divisions, prevented the effective exercise of security authority by the OAU or the development of stronger organisation (eg the proposal for an 'African Security Council'). While the concept of a joint African defence force was approved - if only to assist in the struggle against white minority rule - it came to naught and a half-hearted attempt at peacekeeping in Chad in 1981 was abandoned due to lack of resources and political bickering. Nor did the OAU succeed in responding to natural disasters or in upholding human rights.
The 1990s have brought new attitudes, however. The manifest failure of the state system in Africa, combined with the global changes accompanying the end of the Cold War, the end of apartheid and donor pressures on indebted states have brought a new wave of democratisation. With it has come a less state-centric and more holistic approach to security: the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states has been challenged on the basis that in upholding state security the OAU neglected human security. 35 These same pressures led to a renewed interest in intra-African peacekeeping and conflict resolution, resulting in the establishment in 1993 of the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, followed by a commitment in 1995 to set up an Early Warning Mechanism.
The OAU's successes are difficult to judge: it has probably assisted, in part though its insistence (until the 1990s) on the inviolability of colonial borders, in preventing inter-state wars and in stabilising the system of states in Africa. But the price for this has been to turn its back on the sub-state conflicts and massive violations of human rights (including genocide) which have racked post-colonial Africa, and it has made little progress with regional integration. For the OAU, national security has been equated with regime security.
The new OAU structures, and the new political commitment to take a stand against human rights violations and to tackle sub-state conflicts may lead to a renaissance of African security cooperation. So far, the record has not been impressive, except in the field of election monitoring - the OAU's spectacular failure in Rwanda is a case in point. The huge inter-African regional cultural/political differences, the lack of resources and the continuing weaknesses of member states will probably require that the OAU relies for security cooperation either on sub-regional organisations or on the capacities of a handful of the more powerful states. (But key states which could play a leading role in developing sub-regional organisations in Africa are racked by internal conflicts - Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, or otherwise engaged - Egypt.)
Of the sub-regional organisations in Africa, the only one apart from SADC to take on security issues in a concerted way has been the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Established in 1975, it was initially concerned with economic cooperation, although in 1978 a non-aggression treaty was signed by the member states (currently 16) 36 and in 1981 a defence protocol was signed. This established a council of heads of state and a commission of defence ministers and chiefs of staff. From the outset, ECOWAS was dominated by Nigeria.
In 1990 ECOWAS took the decision - without explicit UN Security Council authorization - to send multilateral armed forces into Liberia in an attempt to secure a ceasefire in the civil war there. Troops drawn from several member states were organised into ECOMOG which landed in Monrovia on 24 August 1990. However, ceasefires proved hard to negotiate and even harder to enforce and ECOMOG was rapidly drawn into conflict with the Liberian factions. After successive ceasefire failures, ECOMOG came close to being abandoned during 1995, and although some progress was made later in the year peace once again proved elusive. 37
ECOMOG encapsulates the dangers as well as the benefits of 'in area' sub-regional peacekeeping: ECOWAS was able to deploy a large force and pay for it largely because of Nigerian commitment; but this in turn undercut the legitimacy and impartiality of the peacekeeping force as it was increasingly seen as an instrument for furthering Nigerian interests. Efforts to get around this problem through an 'Expanded ECOMOG' involving other African countries only partly alleviated the problem. ECOMOG presents a clear example of the difficulties associated with a security organisation built around a regional hegemon. It also highlights the dangers associated with open-ended commitments to intervention in collapsing states; as the first example of peacekeeping carried out by a (sub-)regional organisation, it does not set a healthy precedent.
The vast area of the Middle East (which is usually taken to include parts of North Africa as well as the Horn) includes two formations, one sub-regional, and the other regional (or even supra-regional) which have explicitly taken on security functions. This area is defined more in 'civilisational' terms than in geographic ones: essentially it the area of Arab civilisation.
The League of Arab States (Arab League), founded in 1945, includes Middle Eastern Arab states as well as the Maghreb states, Egypt, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan and was from the outset driven by pan-Arabism (many of the countries were also involved in the OAU's pan-Africanist project). Although a collective security pact was signed by several members in 1950, the Arab League has been beset by major political (and religious) divisions which have prevented any effective security activity: the area remains highly militarised and interstate relations are characterised by distrust, shifting alliances and hostility. 38
The failures of the League - made most obvious when Iraq invaded a fellow member, Kuwait - can be attributed largely to the fact that it attempted to coordinate far too many heterogenous states, many of which have little in common other than their 'Arabism' and which are internally fissured. As Farer has put it, 'important differences among Arab League states ... are replicated within states, thus inviting mutual intervention and promoting mutual distrust'. 39
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in contrast, provides a relatively successful example of sub-global organisation by states which share similar characteristics and comparable security environments. Driven by external and internal threats, the Arab monarchies of the Gulf have sought to shore up their regimes through a security alliance.
The GCC states, in which Saudi Arabia plays a hegemonic role, have sought both to enhance their joint defence capabilities and to seek external backing, mostly from the USA. A Military Committee has been established, joint military exercises carried out, a small joint rapid deployment force set up and a common air defence network is being developed. 40 Nevertheless, the GCC proved largely powerless when Iraq invaded Kuwait and it was obliged to rely upon great-power intervention to restore the status quo.
The GCC has equated national security with the security of autocratic (and in the long run probably unstable) regimes. While it has contributed to the survival and stability of the Gulf monarchies, it can be argued that this has been achieved at the expense of wider stability in the Middle East complex: by in effect bloc-building with the support of an external great power, it has institutionalised divisions.
Like the Middle East, South Asia is a potentially unstable part of the globe constituting a 'civilisational area', characterised by conflict and competition between regional powers and historically subjected to great-power intervention. Several factors have contributed to insecurity in the region: the dyadic conflict between India and Pakistan, India's presumption of sub-regional hegemony, chronic border and territorial disputes and ethnic conflict, strategic asymmetry (China-India-Pakistan) and weak regimes which facing internal challenges.
Under such conditions, the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 41 may be regarded as a minor achievement, although the organisation's tasks are phrased in limited terms of economic, technical and cultural cooperation. 'Bilateral and contentious' issues are explicitly excluded in its charter and decisions have to be reached by consensus. Nevertheless, SAARC has provided one of the few forums in South Asia for the mediation of conflict (even if this has been a 'hidden agenda'), and since 1990 some multilateral security issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking have been formally considered. From the point of view of the smaller states of South Asia, SAARC is a way of reining in India (and to some extent Pakistan); neither Pakistan and India can afford to turn their backs on it lest it be used by their rival. 42 However, it is unlikely to evolve much further without the underlying conflicts being resolved.
Asia-Pacific covers a vast area which can be usefully divided into North-East Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific (including Australasia). While North-East Asia is relatively highly militarised and dominated by the Korean and Chinese conflicts as well as great power jockeying (China, Japan, Russia, USA), in South-East Asia the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 43 formed in 1967, is often held up as a successful example of regional cooperation. While its main focus is on economic cooperation, it has increasingly taken on security functions, and has played an important role in smoothing tensions between the main regional players, and in containing and then (in 1995) incorporating Vietnam.
ASEAN has not aimed at developing a collective defence capability; military cooperation is extensive and based in part on a 'spiderweb' of bilateral and trilateral agreements. ASEAN has firmly established itself through an incremental and diplomatic approach and has sought to develop a common approach to both external and internal security issues. 44 In essence, it has sought to improve inter-state relations through (often informal) political dialogue and by incremental cooperation in the political and economic fields. 45
ASEAN has served both to protect member states from a shared threat (communism and China) and to strengthen fragile regimes by preventing them from exploiting internal tensions in other member states. 46 ASEAN's main concern has been with internal security, especially communist insurgency; it has seen political stability as a basis for rapid economic growth as the solution. Leifer has described this as 'collective internal security' which has implications for external posture. The aim is to prevent
the contagion of internal political disorder ... from spreading from an infected state to contaminate the body politic of regional partners, and from providing a point of entry to South-East Asia for competing external partners. 47
With the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has had new opportunities to reposition itself. In 1994 it launched the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which included its 'dialogue partners' (Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and USA) as well as Russia and China; the first steps towards extending ASEAN's confidence-building processes more widely into the Asia-Pacific region. The benefits of this include keeping the US engaged (and on a multilateral basis), restraining China and Japan and providing some reassurance for smaller ASEAN states. ASEAN also played an important role in the launch of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which aims to set up a free trade area by the year 2020 in a zone which accounts for half the world's GDP and 40 per cent of its trade. 48
In the Pacific, the South Pacific Forum (SPF), consisting of Australia, New Zealand and a number of island micro-states draws together states which face relatively few threats to their security from external actors, especially as the vast distances of the Pacific effectively protect the micro-states. 49 Nevertheless, some of the states have been threatened by internal secessions or ethnic strife (Fiji in particular) and there have been tensions with France over nuclear testing and its continued colonial presence. The SPF has had considerable difficulty in developing an associative diplomacy to counter external intervention due to inter-state political differences, in particular divisions between member states supporting non-alignment and those aligning themselves with the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treat (ANZUS). 50
Latin America and the Caribbean
Regional and sub-regional economic groupings and organisations have proliferated in Latin America and the Caribbean and through the Inter-American system. Many of these initiatives have been dominated or overshadowed by the USA, and many have resulted in multi-purpose organisations. 51 Considerable realignment has taken place since the end of the Cold War as nations jockey for position in relation to the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). 52
The Andean Group or Andean Common Market is primarily concerned with economic integration, although since 1979 with the creation of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, the Andean Parliament and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the group became overtly involved in political affairs. However, progress with integration has been uneven due to political differences.
Security coordination is an important function of the Permanent Mechanism of Consultation and Political Coordination (the Rio Group), established in 1986, which arose out of the Contradora Group's initiatives to establish peace in Central America. The Rio agreement, essentially providing for a system of meetings between ministers and presidents, and procedures for conflict resolution, commits member states to democratisation, financial reforms, negotiated approaches to conflict resolution and cooperation for disarmament and technical, cultural, scientific and educational interchange. 53 The Group has adopted an extremely broad political agenda, which has somewhat undermined its effectiveness.
The Mercado Comum del Sur (MERCOSUR), created in 1991, is mainly concerned with economic integration and building a common market in the Southern Cone to rival NAFTA, although as it has emerged from the Brazil-Argentina agreement of 1986 which provided for economic, diplomatic and nuclear cooperation and the consolidation of democracy, it may, like many economic-integration initiatives, increasingly take on political and security functions.
Founded in 1981, the Organisation of East Caribbean States (OECS), is a multipurpose organisation with a strong security focus. Like the GCC, it is composed of states which share common domestic and regional security concerns and a similar political and cultural history (all are Western-aligned microstates that were former colonies, all are susceptible to internal instability and opposed to Cuban influence). 54
Despite the existence of a Defense and Security Committee, when it came to dealing with the crisis in Grenada the other OECS states were obliged to call on outside states - Jamaica, Barbados and the US - to intervene. Efforts were made to develop a broader Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) after 1982, involving Barbados. The OECS has also taken substantial steps towards economic integration.
Essentially, like the GCC, the achievements of the OECS draw on the similarity of the states (or regimes) involved and shared strategic threat assessments in which internal and external security concerns are seen as being intimately linked, leading to a common approach to external security intervention.
The Inter-American System, which is dominated by the Organisation of American States (OAS), has served as a hemispheric defence system under US dominance, constituting an alliance as well as a multipurpose cooperative organisation. The 1947 'Rio Pact', the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, declares that 'an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the states'. In practice, with the exception of the Cuban missile crisis, the OAS has been concerned with settling disputes and conflicts between or within member states rather than carrying out collective defence functions against external aggression.
The OAS has been used - many would say abused - by the USA carry out its hemispheric objectives free from control by the UN and 'to provide a multilateral legitimacy for essentially unilateral US action'. 55 However, during the 1980s the USA often chose to ignore the OAS, utilising more pliant instruments (such as the OECS) to justify its hemispheric interventions.
Since the end of the Cold War the OAS has adopted a less regime-oriented approach to security, emphasising the importance of democratisation. The 1991 Declaration of Santiago provides for measures to be taken in the case of 'the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process' in member states; this was reinforced by the establishment in 1993 of a so-called 'defence of democracy' mechanism. The OAS has also taken an interest in peacekeeping, cooperating with the USA over Haiti. 56
Regional and sub-regional cooperation on security issues seems to be most effective when regimes share similar threat perceptions (both internal and external) and seek a similar approach to external powers as a result. In the developing world, internal threats appear to be more important than external ones. Although regime security and stability can be enhanced through security cooperation this does not necessarily entail the enhancement of human security or the consolidation of democracy. Indeed (sub-)regional security arrangements may help to keep undemocratic regimes in power and to protect weak regimes that might otherwise have collapsed. More recently, however, there has been a tendency for (sub-)regional organisations to entrench human security and democratic processes - this necessarily entails a revision of principles of non-interference in internal affairs of member states.
(Sub-)regional security cooperation is less likely to succeed when conflict is endemic within the region and regional hegemony is contested (South Asia, North-East Asia, the Middle East) or when member states are too heterogeneous (Arab League) 57 or too weak (sub-Saharan Africa). It is also unlikely to succeed when ancient conflicts which have been 'overlaid' by the Cold War have re-emerged, as in the Caucasus and the Balkans: here conflict formations are likely to remain for some time until ethnic balances of power can be settled.
Many factors determine why and how countries are willing to enter into regional cooperation agreements. Most regional organisations appear to evolve within security complexes and by increments: they wax or wane according to political and economic circumstances and the level of commitment by individual countries is driven by perceptions of national self-interest. There appear to be few 'models': some are formally constituted, some less so; some begin as economic integration organisations and take on security issues later, while some are multi-purpose from the outset; some are composed of states of relatively similar sizes and levels of developments, others are more heterogenous, and so on.
This diversity provides a basis of the contextualisation of the issues facing SADC as it seeks to institutionalise political and security cooperation.
A distinction can be made between a common security regime (essentially, where member states seek to prevent conflict between each other though CSBMs) and a collective defence organisation (where states ally with each other and put in place arrangements for joint defence against external threat). Most sub-global multi-purpose organisations deal with security issues within a framework of common security (although often a minimal programme); some also adopt collective defence. Alliances such as NATO or the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) are usually concerned mostly with collective defence.
Initially, most discussion within SADC took place around common security principles, based on CSBMs such as those developed in the CSCE/OSCE process in Europe; these formed the basis of proposals adopted at the 1994 Windhoek workshop. Common security is usually understood to entail an holistic approach to security in which social, economic and cultural agreements are linked with (or in negotiations, possibly traded against) defence arrangements. Common security is essentially collaboration for something, rather than against something and with its emphasis on human security it usually envisages disarmament.
While collective defence is not necessarily incompatible with disarmament, in Southern Africa capacity for collective defence is lacking and any such programme would therefore have to entail considerable modernisation and reorganisation, probably involving a rearmament process.
Most of the provisions of the communique of 28 June 1996 which set up the SADC Organ are essentially those of common security, but it also lists its objectives as being to 'develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats'. 58 This would imply an organisation - to use a European analogy again - more along the lines of NATO than the OSCE.
Within an alliance, common security provisions can - and often are - combined with commitments to collective defence. However, the implications of collective defence (if SADC's commitment to 'collective security' plus a defence pact against external threats can be taken to mean that) are enormous. To be effective, this would require common military doctrine, joint training, some harmonisation of equipment and some formula for sharing command and control (or handing it over to one country). It would also require considerable harmonisation of foreign policy, at least as regards potential external threats (whatever those might be). Furthermore, without careful safeguards, and probably even with them, such moves are likely to be regarded as bloc-building, particularly in Africa, and could lead to reciprocal actions by West, Central, East or North African countries and to the militarisation of the continent.
Furthermore, it would be impossible to build up any credible force without consideration of contingencies and likely threats - and at present it is difficult to see what these might be. What is the alliance to prepare itself against? Are the threats from within Africa or from without? If the latter, then this would imply a degree of military preparedness and coordination that could lead to arms-racing in the Indian or Atlantic Ocean areas. If the former, then South Africa's overwhelming superiority comes into play: essentially, it would be incumbent on South Africa to 'defend' all the countries of the region. In order so to do it would need to build up a force-projection capacity that would almost certainly be viewed with alarm by other African states not in SADC.
There is little evidence that South Africa is prepared to build capacity for collective defence. Despite agreeing to the SADC commitment, South African policy documents make no mention of collective defence and during the 1996 Defence Review process which laid the basis for future force design the issue was not even discussed. In discussions with senior South African officials, the standard response to questioning around the implications of the Communique is to the effect that it provides a broad mandate which ought not to be interpreted too literally: it is merely a framework, an agenda. This may be the case. Such ambiguity, while it might be useful of the short term, could have very negative effects over the longer term, especially if smaller or weaker states are reading the text differently and seeing in it guarantees. Furthermore, if it is a framework, there is a lack of clarity. SADC will have to set itself on quite different courses for common security and collective defence, and different processes of integration will need to be embarked upon. Clarification will no doubt ensue with the expected development of a non-aggression pact - which is something quite different to a mutual defence pact.
It is not unprecedented for (sub-)regional organisations to adopt both common security and collective defence commitments - even if the latter be unrealistic and structures not developed to operationalise capacity for it. The OAS has long contained a provision that 'an armed attack by any State against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American States'. In practice, however, this was an extension of US hemispheric hegemony built on the back of the Monroe doctrine and made possible by US power. It was not put into action during the Anglo-Argentine war. 59
In the East Caribbean, Article 8 of the OECS Treaty authorises member states to act in concert against external aggression 'operating with or without the support of internal or national elements', but during the 1993 Grenada crisis the OECS felt obliged to call upon external intervention on the grounds that the other OECS states were too weak to deal with Grenada. (It should be noted that the UN General Assembly censured the US for this action, rejecting the OECS's claim that it was entitled to call upon external intervention.) A 1982 Memorandum of Understanding established a Caribbean Regional Security System involving all member states of the OECS except Grenada and including Barbados. It was meant to authorise joint OECS/Barbadian response to external threat but was never used. Subsequent efforts to set up a Regional Security Service (RSS) also foundered as member states lost interest in collective defence and the idea of a collective defence capacity came to be seen to contain more dangers than benefits. 60
In the Middle East, the Arab League's Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation which obligates each member to assist any other member which is attacked has been ignored. In the Gulf, efforts at collective defence have been made along the lines of traditional balance-of-power alliances and have been overshadowed by great-power (mainly US) intervention. The GCC adopted the principle of mutual and collective defence and set up a small standing force under GCC authority in Saudi Arabia in 1985. However, it had difficulty developing a command structure and many of the regimes showed nervousness over control of their domestic military establishments, often composed mostly of non-nationals. In the final analysis, the GCC has been obliged to rely upon, and integrate itself into, US strategic interests in the region, although it has tried (largely unsuccessfully) to keep some distance between it and the US. While it could be argued that Kuwaiti sovereignty was saved in part by the collective defence arrangements it had entered into, the continued arms build-up in the region and the constant threat of war point to the failure of collective defence to stabilise the region over the long term.
Collective defence raises many difficulties and sits uneasily alongside common security: in essence collective defence constitutes a balance-of-power and bloc-building approach to international security which was a characteristic of the Cold War era. One alliance and one bloc will almost inevitably lead to another, thus potentially creating a new 'security dilemma' on an inter-regional or inter-sub-regional basis. Common security represents a more holistic approach, and provides opportunities for (sub-)regional security organisations to contribute to the universalisation of security. South African defence policy, and that of an increasing number of SADC states acknowledges that non-military and sub-state threats to security are paramount: these can best be addressed by common security rather than collective defence.
The advantages of collective defence in the Southern African context appear to be few and the dangers and difficulties great. There is not the capacity for it, nor is there is any apparent need, and the consequences will almost certainly be negative beyond the sub-region and probably inside it as well.
Much has been written on peacekeeping and wider operations and activities in support of UN peace initiatives; 62 this section will point out some of the issues arising in relation to sub-regional security organisations.
As UN peacekeeping operations have expanded exponentially during the 1990s and have increasingly come to involve complex multi-task operations in the context of intra-state conflicts, the previous principle of deploying national contingents in areas where their country had no real strategic interest has come under pressure. Indeed, there is a growing conception that peacekeeping operations can best - or most easily and cheaply - be devolved to contingents drawn from states within the region concerned. There is also growing pressure from the Western powers for Third World countries, particularly in Africa, to undertake their 'own' peacekeeping, particularly where quick solutions are unlikely. The logical conclusion of this is to utilise regional and sub-regional security organisations.
The ECOMOG experience (see above) points to one of the most obvious inherent dangers in this: that regional powers will seek to use peacekeeping operations to advance their own strategic interests. Essentially this could undermine one of the basic principles of UN peacekeeping: impartiality. Another potential problem is that this could lead to a 'second tier' of peacekeeping whereby the developed world would carry out expensive, well-equipped operations in areas of strategic concern but leave (sub-)regional security organisations to take care of most Third World conflicts as best they can.
Despite these drawbacks, the principle of 'in-area' peacekeeping by (sub-)regional organisations is becoming rapidly established. 63 The deployment of NATO in the IFOR operation in former Yugoslavia marks a quantitative departure, but the 1990s have also witnessed ECOMOG, the involvement of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in UN sanctioned and monitored operations in Georgia, and the OAS-UN operation in Haiti. 64 The CSCE-supervised elections in Bosnia in September 1996 marked a further development of this trend.
In Africa, the international community has increasingly expected the OAU to take the lead since the Somalia debacle. African countries have been earmarked for possible operations in Burundi, while in Southern Africa Zimbabwean and Zambian troops are deployed with UNAVEM III in Angola. While not a UN operation, nor strictly speaking a peacekeeping one, Zimbabwean troops were deployed to good effect in Mozambique before the end of the civil war there to protect the Beira corridor. There is thus already some experience within SADC states of in-area peacekeeping.
SADC's role in peacekeeping
South Africa, which is under pressure to take a lead on peacekeeping within SADC, has adopted a cautious policy. There is a tacit or explicit acceptance within South Africa and most SADC states that national defence forces are likely to be involved in peacekeeping within or on the periphery of the SADC region. There is, however, no commitment within the region to developing a standing peacekeeping force, although logistical and operational support centres are likely to emerge, probably under SADC/ISDSC auspices. 65
In his 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali identified five ways in which (sub-)regional organisations could assist the UN in peace support activities:
SADC would find it relatively easy to participate in negotiations and possibly to carry out limited operational support. However large-scale deployment of forces will be very difficult without a far greater degree of standardisation of doctrine and equipment and the development of joint command and control systems. Capacity within the region is limited as a result of defence cutbacks and the fairly recent integration of defence forces in some of the militarily more powerful states (South Africa, Angola). Moreover, South Africa (and as far as can be ascertained, the other states of the region as well) will not design forces specifically for peacekeeping and while some countries have acquitted themselves well in UN operations (Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Namibia, Botswana) the difficulty of maintaining impartiality in complex situations with relatively poorly-trained and equipped military forces which may have ethnic, cultural or other links in the target country should not be underestimated. 67
Given the weakness of OAU structures as well as the poor integration of SADC structures at present, any effective peacekeeping in Southern Africa on a significant scale would probably need to rely on UN-coordinated multilateral support from outside the region.
As noted earlier in this paper, the sanctity of state sovereignty in the international system is giving way to a focus on human rights and human security. The SADC Communique establishing the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security includes clauses which commits it to assist in promoting 'the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states and to encourage the observance of universal human rights'. It is not clear how it will do this - no institutional mechanisms have been set up, although earlier proposals (the 1994 Windhoek Workshop) provided for this. The Communique was criticised by a number of South African NGOs on the grounds that it gave insufficient weight to human rights issues and did not provide any resources for human rights work.
With the notable exceptions of the EU and the OSCE, where elaborate mechanisms have been put in place, (sub-)regional organisations have not been effective in securing human rights.
ASEAN, for example, has largely ignored human rights abuses and has resisted US pressure to include democratisation amongst its objectives (although it has put some pressure on Burma/Myanmar to democratise as the price for future membership). Led by Malaysia and Indonesia, ASEAN has insisted on an 'Asian way' in which liberal democratic values are balanced against the need for political stability (often achieved through semi-authoritarian corporatism) as a precondition for rapid economic growth. Indonesia has used membership of ASEAN to put pressure on other countries to clamp down on human rights activists campaigning against Indonesian government actions in Timor: for example Indonesia boycotted a meeting of the East ASEAN Growth Zone and cancelled joint ventures when Manila allowed an NGO conference on East Timor in June 1995. 68 The ASEAN and GCC experiences demonstrate that regional security cooperation is not necessarily linked to democratisation, whatever might be said in official statements. At the SADC Summit in June 1996 where the Organ was set up, human rights and internal political and security issues in Swaziland, Lesotho, Zambia, South Africa and Tanzania were discussed, and these deliberations were reflected for the first time in the public communique issued after the Summit. The recommendations are bland - 'noting with appreciation' and 'expressing satisfaction with' the actions of governments, 69 but an important principle of multilateral discussion of internal affairs was established (and the Communique might not reflect the intensity of discussion).
Internal military deployment
A particularly acute problem for SADC would be the possible deployment of national military forces in the suppression of human rights or democratic freedoms. This would be a challenge for collective security particularly if forces strengthened through collective defence or peacekeeping tasks were utilised for internal security tasks. Member states might also request assistance from other SADC states to combat internal dissent. Such situations are seldom simple in imperfect democracies and SADC may have to make hard political decisions - a scenario could be imagined, for example, where a state with a weak government, democratically elected but representative only of one ethnic group, was faced with well-supported mass protests by another ethnic group which degenerated into violence. Where would SADC stand? The OAU has neatly avoided such issues through the principle of 'non-interference' but this expedient stance is no longer possible in the post-Cold War environment. At the very least, SADC will have to develop a set of principles and probably mechanisms for monitoring of such issues, which have implications for sovereignty.
The OSCE has adopted a clause in its Code of Conduct on Politic-Military Aspects of Security which states:
Each participating State will ensure that any decision to assign its armed forces to internal security missions is arrived at in conformity with constitutional procedures. Such decisions will prescribe the armed forces's missions, ensuring that they will be performed under the effective control of constitutionally established authorities and subject to the rule of law. If recourse to force cannot be avoided in performing internal security missions, each participating State will ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. The armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property. 70
The difficulty is enforcement - while the OSCE can exert moral and political pressures, it has been unable, for example, to prevent Russian military abuses in Chechnya. Nevertheless, given the history of military deployment in internal security tasks in Africa, SADC would be well to consider attempting to entrench such principles to cover this eventuality.
Throughout Africa (although less so than in most other regions of the continent), defence forces have proven a threat to democracy. The danger of institution building in the defence sector without concomitant strengthening of democratic institutions, and in particular consolidating democratic control over defence, is that militaries will utilise their institutional strength and their ability to wield force to take over government at times of crisis.
SADC has already had experience in managing such a threat, in Lesotho in August 1994, when the military (instigated by the monarchy) intervened to overthrow a recently-elected civilian government. The crisis was handled by the presidents of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe, meeting under the auspices of the Frontline States. It was easy to bring pressure to bear on Lesotho, entirely surrounded as it is by South Africa and vulnerable to border closure, and democratic rule was rapidly restored (a 'coincidental' South African military manoeuvre near the border may have helped concentrate minds in Maseru). 71 Coups in any other Southern African country will be far more difficult to deal with, but the credibility of the SADC Organ will be severely undermined if it fails to deal effectively with such eventualities (and will it expel from SADC any state which falls to military rule?).
Coups can be inhibited by the entrenchment of democratic controls through building healthy civil-military relations and a democratic ethos within the defence forces. The OSCE has clear guidelines in this regard: member states are committed to establishing 'democratic political control of military, para-military and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services', ensuring that 'its armed forces as such are politically neutral', providing for 'transparency and public access to information related to the armed forces' and so on. 72 (Sub-)regional organisations can also put into place mechanisms to take previously agreed multinational steps automatically in cases where coups are threatened or take place - these could include sanctions, border closures, diplomatic isolation and so on and could be a powerful disincentive for coup plotters. The OAS's commitments to the maintenance of democracy, contained in the 1991 Declaration of Santiago and subsequent agreements are relevant in this regard.
Perhaps one of the most basic questions to be asked of any multi-purpose sub-global organisation with both a security mandate and a mandate for economic integration and development is how the two issues relate.
Should economic cooperation or integration precede security coordination, or vice versa? In some instances, groups of countries have come together to seek collective security (the GCC, OAS), in others - and this is probably the predominant tendency - economic cooperation has preceded security cooperation. Usually, there is an overlap both chronologically and functionally. Writing in the 1970s, Haas concluded that the most effective (sub-)regional integration efforts were those based on the evolution of economic cooperation revolving around mutually reinforcing economic relations:
... the commitment to create a common market is the most conducive to rapid regional integration ... Military alliances, even if equipped with far-ranging competences and standing organs, have triggered very little permanent integrative consequences. 73
In Southern Africa, security and development institutions were kept functionally separate for political reasons during the 1980s, but it has now become possible to integrate them. The difficulty of maintaining entirely separate processes is that they are both united by politics - both economic and security cooperation require multilateral political decision-making. Given the weak resource base within national governments, a proliferation of institutions is probably unwise and unnecessary.
A further difficulty in this regard is that most members of SADC 74 are also members of PTA/COMESA, an overlapping and broader economic organisation (abeit a very weak one) aimed at establishing a free trade area. In principle this should not be a problem: there are many examples around the world where some, most or all member states of multi-purpose organisations are also members of broader economic functional groupings - OECS and CARICOM, ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, for example. In Asia-Pacific the situation is even more complex, as there is a considerable overlap between APEC membership and that of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), while other free trade groupings also exist within the APEC region: NAFTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and Australia and New Zealand's Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement. On top of this there are proposals for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). 75
The economic and security architecture of Europe is even more complex: the West European Union (WEU), the EU with its plethora of structures, the Council of Europe, NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the OSCE. In addition there are a number of sub-regional structures such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Central European Initiative. 76 Such a proliferation of organisations has obvious disadvantages - bureaucratic burdens, competition between organisations, policy confusion. It also has advantages in the flexibility it offers and the ability to tailor organisations to suit specific purposes and local conditions and to call upon a 'menu' of organisations to deal with any particular problem: under the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, NATO, the UN, the EU and the OSCE are all allocated specific roles. Many of these initiatives arise from complex political processes and it will clearly take some time before regional architectures are simplified.
Defence and development
SADC is committed to disarmament, and simultaneously to improving capacity for peacekeeping and collective defence. Some of the political issues involved in this are examined elsewhere in the paper, but the question must be asked whether it is possible to combine economic growth with defence modernisation.
Economists now tend to agree that, on balance, high or increasing levels of military spending usually detract from economic growth in developing countries, especially over the long term. There may, however, be particular circumstances where increased investment in the military and defence industries helps to kick-start an industrialisation process: the pattern is uneven and complex and the interpretation of the data is contested.
In a survey of 50 developing countries in 1983 Deger and Sen found that although military expenditure could have 'a small positive effect on growth through modernisation effects', the net effect was negative. 77 In an in-depth survey of existing studies, Ball concluded that the available evidence suggested that 'expenditure in the security sector is more likely to hinder than to promote economic growth and development in the Third World'. 78 In short, she argued that there was a trade off - government could buy 'guns' or it could buy 'butter' to use a metaphor common in the earlier part of this century.
But Ball's conclusions have been challenged. A 1995 study of military expenditures in the Middle East and South Asia, for example, concluded that defence expenditures impacted in different ways on different countries. Some with high defence burdens experienced rapid growth while in other cases negative effects were noted. 79
GDP growth is not of course necessarily synonymous with development. Uneven growth which marginalises certain groups, growth which focuses on wealth-creation rather than the provision of social services, health and education is not development. A far more useful indicator would be to compare improvement in the Human Development Index (HDI) 80 with military expenditures. While little or no research appears to have been done on this, it is a common-sensical conclusion that countries which spend a lot on armaments will have less to spend on health, education and other social services.
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) has argued strongly that Third World countries need to move away from spending on defence for the state (more often the regime in power rather than the people) towards spending for human security. Poor countries spend US$130 billion a year on armaments alone - while this is a fraction of what the developed countries allocate, channelling it towards human security would make a huge difference. 81 In part, this is happening. Third World security spending peaked at the end of the 1980s and has been declining since then. This, however, is not necessarily a result of political elites coming to their senses: the causes include chronic debt (preventing the import of arms), donor pressures, the end of military clientship arrangements with the superpowers and the implosion of states.
Many developing countries spend more of their GDP on defence than developed countries, although the pattern is uneven between and within sub-regional security organisations: while Latin American and SADC countries have radically reduced expenditure, ASEAN and GCC countries have continued to be high or growing spenders. South Africa, hitherto a relatively high spender (3.3 per cent of GDP in 1994) breached the 2 per cent of GDP target set by the World Bank in 1996. 82
The reasons for continuing high expenditure in South-East Asia and the Middle East, despite the evolution of common security regimes, are many. They include the fact that ascendant, sometimes expansionist middle powers lie outside of the regimes; patronage, elite formation, ideology, policy incapacities, are some of the domestic factors driving militarisation.
The dilemma is that for development to occur there needs to be at least a degree of stability and law-and-order and the state needs to be able to carry out at least some functions. But if this is achieved though militarism or authoritarianism the long term consequences are unpredictable and instability may result. While some semi-authoritarian or authoritarian Asian nations have turned out excellent rates of growth, over the longer term this may lead to instability and retarded growth - the long and often disappointing history of independent states in Latin America has indicated this. Successful sub-regional development will probably depend on the evolution of strong civil societies and a democratic system in which human security is achieved. This could entail programmes to strengthen parliamentary democracies (SADC has already established a parliamentary forum), the development of NGO networks and a focus on primary health care, education and job-creation programmes.
Potential South African hegemony within SADC is undisputed, even if the post-apartheid South African government is reluctant to assert it. South Africa spends more on defence and its GDP is greater than the rest of SADC combined. Its military and economic superiority is undisputed and it alone has the capacity to underpin joint peacekeeping operations or collective defence.
Post-apartheid South Africa has been reluctant to take too strong a leadership role in the region, given its recent history of aggression, and has been careful not to dominate the process leading to the emergence of the SADC Organ. Nevertheless (albeit after some debate) the new South Africa is committed to development on a regional, not just a national, basis, in the recognition that uneven development in the region will foment insecurity.
In the context of a policy orientation of pursuing peaceful relations with other Southern African states and seeking 'a high level of political, economic and military cooperation' South Africa has also made firm commitments to common security and multilateralism. 83 In this respect, South Africa is following a policy similar to that of Indonesia when it backed ASEAN in the late 1960s - seeking to develop regional stability by locking itself into multilateral partnerships of restraint which would be seen as a rejection of hegemonic ambitions. 84 There is little reason why any of the weaker SADC states should resist this - they have far more to gain than to lose. While SADC will provide South Africa with opportunities to consolidate its regional influence, just as ASEAN has done for Indonesia, this will be achieved in climate of restraint in which smaller nations have implicit or explicit security guarantees and stand to benefit in cooperative arrangements.
At the same time South Africa has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with its neighbours, particularly in relation to border security. The SADC Treaty does not prevent such arrangements, which have been accommodated in other (sub-)regional security organisations, notably within ASEAN.
Both bilateral and multilateral arrangements can have the effect of 'reining in' hegemonic states, just as powerful states may employ both to secure their preeminence. In the Western Hemisphere the US has long relied on multilateral agreements through the OAS to secure its hegemony. Russia, too, has utilised both bilateral and multilateral (CIS) strategies to maintain its hegemony in its 'near abroad'. In East Asia the US has traditionally relied on bilateral defence agreements to maintain its presence, on the so-called 'hub and spokes' model. However, during the 1990s it has been obliged to move towards multilateral strategies, engaging inter alia with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
South Africa's potential hegemony within SADC will have important impacts as the organisation evolves: domestic events in South Africa have a ripple effect (and sometimes a much larger effect) right across the region and many countries will seek to emulate South African policies and positions. At the same time, however, SADC is not faced with an external hegemon, as Latin America is with the US, or ASEAN with China and Japan.
SADC will have to develop strategies to deal with peripheral states, and decide whether it can be expanded or not. With the exception of Madagascar and other Indian Ocean islands, SADC would appear to have reached, if not gone beyond, the boundaries of 'Southern Africa'. That, of course, would not prevent its expansion further into Africa or the incorporation of some more Indian Ocean island states. Zaire has requested membership of SADC, which has been refused, and criteria for membership have now been drawn up which would effectively allow SADC to exclude any African state it wanted to.
An alternative to piecemeal incorporation of peripheral states could be a cooperation agreement or even a merger with, say, the remaining PTA/COMESA states or perhaps with one of the other sub-regional organisations in Africa (see Appendix) at some later date. This would effectively create an East, Central and Southern African organisation. Such developments, however, are a long way off, although it is worth noting that it has long been a pan-African ambition to establish a coherent system of sub-regional organisations within the framework of the OAU. Indeed, the OAU's 1991 commitment to the creation of an African Economic Community by the year 2025 rests on a first stage of consolidating sub-regional bodies. 85 The prospects for success in this endeavour are not good, however, given the history of failures in African integration efforts and the internal weaknesses of the large countries which could drive sub-regional consolidation (Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya and Egypt). 86 In sub-Saharan Africa, only SADC appears to offer much chance of success.
While SADC has no plans for expansion, should it prove successful it may in the long term wish to extend its methods and approaches more widely into Africa if other sub-regional structures and the OAU fail to deliver. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) offers a useful although limited model in this regard, in the sense that it seeks to extend a proven confidence-building process more widely. 87 ASEAN has also incorporated Vietnam; Laos, Burma/Myanmar and Cambodia are being positioned to join the organisation although capacities will have to be developed and institutional reforms carried out before the countries will be able to join. Such expansion becomes much more difficult in cases where collective defence is involved, however. NATO has adopted a gradualist, confidence-building approach to expansion into Eastern Europe, setting up the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to provide a link with former Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) members, and the Partnership for Peace (PFP), a structure for bilateral cooperation between NATO and other European states. However, this has not obviated the fears of Russia and the possibility of the repolarisation of Europe cannot be discounted.
Even in the context of common security and/or collective defence, enhancement of military capacity by one state can be threatening. In ASEAN for example, military modernisation and increases in defence expenditure continue unabated, driven by fear of Chinese expansionism, rapid GDP growth and the domestic power and influence of defence establishments. On the one hand governments publicly view this with approval as a contribution to the evolution of a defence community; on the other hand bilateral suspicions are commonly voiced at increases in neighbours' capabilities. 88
One way around this 'security dilemma' would be to restructure armed forces in a non-offensive way. Here the onus must be on South Africa, with its massive superiority and its historic orientation towards an offensive posture and 'forward defence' which led to the destabilisation of neighbouring countries. Perceiving this stance to be inherently destabilising, the ANC made an early call for the South African defence force to be restructured along non-offensive lines, a position which gave rise to government policy commitments in this regard.
As a result the 1996 White Paper on Defence (and the Interim Constitution, although not the final version due to be adopted in 1996) provides that the SANDF should be 'primarily defensive'. During the 1996 Defence Review process which followed the adoption by parliament of the White Paper, consideration was given to what this might mean in practice. This entailed an examination of the concept of non-offensive defence, defined by the UN as 'a military posture which emphasises defensive capabilities and eschews offensive or provocative capabilities' 89 . Also referred to as non-provocative defence, defensive defence and structural inability to attack, it revolves around configuring armed forces in such a way that they are unambiguously orientated towards defense. 90
The Defence Review Working Group which met during 1996 considered various options, noting that a defensive posture was 'a reality at the political and national strategic level' but arguing that this did not preclude 'an operationally offensive orientation and/or the absence of offensive capabilities at the operational or tactical levels'. It called for the elimination of strategic offensive capability, the scrapping of 'manifestly offensive weapon systems', a reduction in force levels and pre-emptive strike capability, limitations on the reach of military forces and the strengthening of defensive capabilities.
At the same time, the Working Group noted that low force-to-space ratios in the region, coupled with the need for South Africa to play a role in regional defence co-operation and peace operations, as well as budgetary restraints, prevented the SANDF from adopting a fully defensive posture at an operational level. 91 These assumptions could be questioned. Strategic reach (probably needed for peace operations) is not necessarily the same as strike capability, for example. It might also be possible to configure forces in such a way that while they were capable of being deployed in multilateral actions they would lack a key component which would need to be drawn from a neighbouring country, for example airlift. The latter scenario, would, however, depend on a much greater degree of regional integration and sophistication.
The stabilising effects of a non-offensive posture would, of course, be multiplied if all countries of the region adopted this approach. In practice, most countries have been disarming and reducing force levels, with the exception of foreign-exchange rich Botswana, which has recently embarked on a defence modernisation and expansion drive during the 1990s, including the acquisition of Leopard tanks and CF-5 jet aircraft. 92 This was viewed with alarm by some neighbouring states, especially Namibia, but given the financial pressures on Southern African governments rearmament seems an unlikely scenario. In South Africa, the defence budget has been cut by just over 50 per cent since 1989, and now accounts for less than six per cent of government expenditure (down from almost a quarter at the end of the 1980s). There are also plans to cut the size of the defence from over 100 000 to around 75 000. Similar cuts are taking place in Zimbabwe (down to 40 000), Mozambique (where as a result of attrition the defence force is only 12 000 strong), Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi 93 and overall defence spending in the region has declined significantly. 94
There are relatively few successful sub-regional multipurpose organisations, but those which exist appear to be becoming durable features of the international system. In security terms, two main types of activity may be ascertained: common security, and collective defence. The latter has been singularly unsuccessful, the former can contribute to stability between and within states and help to create conditions for economic growth. At the same time, however, without commitments to processes of democratisation and human rights, any form of sub-regional security organisation can enhance regime security at the expense of human security.
Socio-economic development and security are complexly intertwined: one cannot take place without the other. SADC has adopted an integrated programme within a unified but largely informal political structure - the trick will be to simultaneously achieve the consolidation of democracy, economic growth and stability. Factors which will contribute to success will include the strengthening of civil society; the institutionalisation of democratic civil-military relations; the restraining of hegemonic ambitions by South Africa; the development of peacekeeping capacities without inducing unnecessary rearmament; the extension of confidence-building on the periphery of the region rather than bloc-building; and successful defensive restructuring and responsible disarmament.
Note: This list includes only the principal sub-regional organisations, be they multi-purpose or mainly economic in orientation.
|Name:||Union of the Arab Maghreb|
|Members:||Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia|
|Name:||Union Economique Et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA)|
|Members:||Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo|
|Name:||Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)|
|Members:||Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,Togo|
|Name:||Union Douanier Et Economique De L'afrique Centrale (UDEAC)|
|Members:||Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon|
|Name:||Communaute Economique Des Etats D'afrique Centrale (CEEAC)|
|Members:||Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Zaire|
|Name:||Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Formerly Preferential Trade Agreement for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA))|
|Members:||Angola, Burundi, Comores, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe|
|Name:||Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Formerly Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC))|
|Members:||Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe|
|Name:||Southern African Customs Union (SACU)|
|Members:||Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, Namibia|
Note 1: The others being the Union of the Arab Maghreb, the Union economique et monetaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Union douaniere et economique de l'Afrique centrale (UDEAC), the Communaute economique des etats d'Afrique centrale (CEEAC) and the Preferential Trade Area/Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA/COMESA), which includes a number of SADC member states. See appendix for a list of member states of these organisations. Back.
Note 10: United Nations, International Seminar on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa, Windhoek, Namibia 24-26 February 1993, Windhoek: United Nations, 1993, p 14; see also United Nations, 'Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa', Disarmament: Topical Papers, No 14, New York: United Nations, 1993. Back.
Note 11: Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security: Workshop Resolutions, Windhoek: 11-16 July 1994; Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security: Report of the Officials, Windhoek: 11-16 July 1994. Back.
Note 16: Information on the ISDSC is based on the author's discussions with ISDSC participants and material drawn from Cilliers, J., 'Towards Collaborative and Cooperative Security in Southern Africa: The OAU and SADC', in Cilliers, J. and Reichardt, M., About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence, Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995. Back.
Note 18: In Europe, for example, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe is usually recognised as a regional security structure. In these terms, the European Union would therefore be a sub-regional structure, and Nordic and other cooperation should take place on sub-sub-regional bases, but in practice the EU is usually referred to as a regional body. Back.
Note 20: Bjoern Moeller provided some of this categorisation, see also Thompson, W.R., 'The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory', International Studies Quarterly, vol 17, no 1, March 1973. Back.
Note 22: Cantori, L.J. and Spiegel, S.L., 'The International Relations of Regions', in Falk, R.A. and Mendlowitz, S.H. (eds), Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1973; Ayoob, M., The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p 56. Back.
Note 24: Take Turkey for example: is it a 'buffer state' (if so, between which complexes?), is it part of the European security complex, the Middle Eastern one or both? Does if form a distinctive sub-complex with Greece and Cyprus, or - in relation to the conflict in Kurdistan - with Iran and Iraq, or both? Back.
Note 33: Many of these points are made by Haas, E.B., 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorising', in Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1970, p 111. Back.
Note 34: See Goodby, J.E. and O'Connor, D.B., 'The Utility of International Organisations for Collective Action in Regional Conflicts', in Goodby, J.E. (ed), Regional Conflicts: The Challenge to US-Russian Cooperation, Oxford: Sipri/Oxford University Press, 1995, pp 207-209. Back.
Note 35: The OAU's Kampala Document puts this new perspective across with considerable force and clarity: Organisation of African Unity, Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, Kampala, 23 May 1991. Back.
Note 37: Wippman, D., 'Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War', in Damrosch, L.F., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. Back.
Note 55: Ellen Frey-Wouters, 'The Prospects for Regionalism in World Affairs', in the Falk, R.A. and Black, C.E. (eds), The Future of the International Legal Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, cited in Bennet, International Organisations, p 242. Back.
Note 61: The term is used to include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking (mediation etc), peacekeeping (military or para-military operations undertaken with the consent of the disputant authorities), peace enforcement (military force authorised by the Security Council), humanitarian and relief activities and post-conflict peace-building. This section focuses on peacekeeping and other UN-authorised operations requiring deployment of force. Back.
Note 68: Weatherbee, D.E., 'Southeast Asia at Mid-Decade: Independence through Interdependence' in Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ed), Southeast Asian Affairs 1995, Singapore: ISEAS, p 22. Back.
Note 73: Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', in Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co, 1973. Back.
Note 75: Weatherbee, D.E., 'Southeast Asia at Mid-Decade: Independence through Interdependence', in Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ed), Southeast Asian Affairs 1995, Singapore: ISEAS, 1995. Back.
Note 82: In 1994 defence expenditure in the USA accounted for 4.3 per cent of GDP, in European NATO countries it averaged 2.4 per cent; Middle Eastern countries 6.7 per cent and East Asian countries over 4.5 per cent. On other hand, the averages for Caribbean, Latin and Central America (1.7 per cent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (2.8 per cent) were fairly low (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1995-1996, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp 264-9. Back.
See Leifer, M.
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies, Report of the Secretary-General A/47/394, New York: United Nations General Assembly, 1993, Section 87. Back.
See for example United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Nonoffensive Defence: A Global Perspective, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990; Conetta, Carl, 'Defensive Defence: Principles and Prospects', Workshop on Defensive Defence, New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 24-26 June 1994; Moller, Bjorn, 'Basic Ideas of NOD', Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994. Back.
Rupia, M., 'Post-War Restructuring in Southern Africa: The Region's Defence Structures', in Cawthra, G. and Moeller, B. (eds), Defensive Restructuring in Southern Africa, Aldershot: Dartmouth (forthcoming). Back.
Note 89: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies, Report of the Secretary-General A/47/394, New York: United Nations General Assembly, 1993, Section 87. Back.
Note 90: See for example United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Nonoffensive Defence: A Global Perspective, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990; Conetta, Carl, 'Defensive Defence: Principles and Prospects', Workshop on Defensive Defence, New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 24-26 June 1994; Moller, Bjorn, 'Basic Ideas of NOD', Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994. Back.
Note 93: Rupia, M., 'Post-War Restructuring in Southern Africa: The Region's Defence Structures', in Cawthra, G. and Moeller, B. (eds), Defensive Restructuring in Southern Africa, Aldershot: Dartmouth (forthcoming). Back.