CIAO DATE: 08/01

A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Regional Cooperation: The United States and the Northern European Initiative

Christopher S. Browning

April 2001

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

 

 

Introduction

In September 1997 at a meeting of the Nordic and Baltic Foreign Ministers in Bergen, Norway, Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman introduced the new US regional policy, the Northern European Initiative (NEI), to the international audience. Since then the NEI has received some rave reviews. Scholar Edward Rhodes, for example, sees the NEI as intellectually stimulating and as representing "one of the most extraordinary and most exciting departures in US international security policy undertaken during the Clinton years. The NEI", he continues, "must be viewed not simply as a creative, pragmatic package of policies aimed at encouraging continued and expanded stability in the Baltic basin but as a remarkable, though largely overlooked, revolution in American thinking". ₁ Another scholar, Peter van Ham, concurs. According to van Ham, the NEI represents the US government's willingness "to experiment with new ideas and foreign policy approaches". ₂ In an extensive report on the NEI a task force of the US Council on Foreign Relations contended the NEI and northeastern Europe to be one of the 'focal points' of US foreign policy of the Clinton administration, ₃ whilst Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Frank Loy, added official endorsement to such a view in a statement to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) in March 2000, in which he claimed the NEI as "one of President Clinton's highest priorities in Europe". ₄

If at this point you are wondering quite what the NEI is and how it has managed to pass you by unnoticed over the past three or four years, then you are not alone. If the NEI really was one of the major legacies of the Clinton administration it was certainly only notable by its absence in all the postscripts and reflections that accompanied the end of the Clinton presidency. However, whilst the NEI has certainly not achieved the amount of column inches that more well known Clinton foreign policy initiatives have (e.g., the peace processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle-East), the lack of trumpet-blowing does not mean the NEI is not important. Indeed, the lack of publicity may well be one of the NEI's major assets in that as a result the initiative remains rather unpoliticised. At the same time this lack leaves us with many questions. Not least, what exactly is the NEI? What are US goals in northern Europe? What is the relation between the NEI and the EU's Northern Dimension Initiative? And by no means least, why has the US thought it necessary to put forward an initiative for northern Europe in the first place?

To such questions this paper does not claim to provide any definitive answers, but rather attempts to construct a tentative framework which it is hoped may add some clarity to understanding US ambitions in northern Europe through the NEI, and which will hopefully open the way to further investigations in the future. ₅ The paper begins with a brief outline of the NEI policy as presented by the US government. Through an analysis of the speeches of US officials regarding the NEI the paper then argues that three different, and in part contradictory, theoretical approaches can be seen to inform US aims, discourses and practices in the NEI. In this respect it is argued the NEI contains elements of traditional geopolitical thinking, liberal internationalism and lastly, and more covertly, elements of postmodern deterritoriality/regionality. Despite apparent contradictions it will be argued such different approaches appear to sit relatively easily alongside each other in the NEI, the emphasis attributed to each being rather context and issue specific. At the same time though, it is the presence of the postmodern discourse which can be seen to underlie the positive attitudes to the NEI expressed above. Thirdly, the paper elaborates on the relationship between US policy toward NATO and NATO's position in the NEI. This is a rather complicated relationship, however, it is also a relationship the development of which is likely to have significant consequences for which discourse (geopolitics, liberal internationalism, postmodernism) is likely to become predominant over the coming years. The paper then turns to analyse the relationship between the NEI and the EU's Northern Dimension Initiative, which was also launched in 1997. Whilst it is tempting to frame this relationship in terms of the question of whether these are competing or complementary proposals, such a dichotomy probably misses some of the finer points of the relationship. Indeed, it makes sense to see them as both competing and complementary. Finally, whilst the NEI was an initiative of the Democrat Clinton administration the paper ends by considering what the arrival of Republican George Bush jnr. in the White House may entail for the future of the NEI. In the first instance, will it have a future? Secondly, assuming it does, what future will that be?

 

The Northern European Initiative - Towards a Europe Whole and Free

The origins of the NEI appear to lie in a period of questioning following the end of the Cold War concerning the future role of the US in Europe now that the enemy had disappeared. As Ronald Asmus has put it in explaining US policy in northern Europe, the question soon arose, "Should the Americans claim victory and go home or should they stay? And if they were going to stay, why?" ₆ In explaining their resolution to stay American officials connected to the NEI typically draw on three justifications. Firstly, they argue that history has taught us that the US and Europe do best when they stand together. Secondly, they argue that although the US may be the sole remaining superpower they do not want to be isolated, but would rather have Europe as a partner than as a competitor. Thirdly, and most importantly from the perspective of understanding the NEI, however, is the argument that whilst the US may have succeeded in helping to 'fix' Western Europe, the end of the Cold War only served to illustrate for them how broken much of the rest of the continent remained. To quote Asmus again:

we have concluded that the job is not yet done. Our mission in coming to Europe was not just to 'fix' western Europe but to 'fix' Europe as a whole. We wanted to be a part of and contribute to Europe's effort to redefine itself and to extend integration from Western to Eastern Europe. We wanted to help Europeans build a vision of Europe whole and free as well as help to ensure continued democracy, prosperity, and security. ₇

This notion of building a Europe 'whole and free' is at the heart of the NEI. ₈ As will become clear, however, the US goal of creating a Europe 'whole and free' has been explicitly linked to questions of the re-envisaging of NATO's role after the end of the Cold War in civilisational terms, and the consequent decision to open NATO to future enlargement, a policy which is of course highly anathema to Moscow. It was this initial strategy of creating a Europe 'whole and free' through NATO enlargement that provided the initial impetus behind the development of the NEI. With Russian sensitivities to enlargement being seen to preclude the membership of the Baltic states in NATO, at least in the first round, an alternative strategy to strengthen the independence of these countries was needed. One result of this was a 1996 article by the RAND scholars, Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick on the question of NATO enlargement and the Baltic states, ₉ and it is the ideas of Asmus and Nurick that have provided the foundation stones for both the US-Baltic Charter of Partnership, which was eventually concluded in 1998, and for the more all-encompassing NEI.

In short, the emergent strategy has built on a notion of 'cooperative security' that encourages integration and cross-border interaction across the region in order to foster a sense of common destiny. As Gfoeller puts it, the idea is to encourage the states of the region "to think beyond their own borders and enable them to contribute to multilateral organizations". ₁₀ To encourage such a multilateral approach the NEI does not anticipate creating its own organisational structure but rather promotes regional integration through the existing institutional structures of the region (the CBSS, BEAR, Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council and so forth), whilst at the same time strengthening "the region's ties with the EU, with nearby countries such as Germany and Poland, and with North America as well". ₁₁ In this process the US sees itself as able to bring a certain amount of 'added value' in order to stimulate developments. Such added value appears to be conceived of in terms of small-scale financial assistance, diplomacy, and also in terms of more general encouragement. Of particular note, however, is that the NEI puts security on a different footing to the way it was understood during the Cold War. No longer is security understood as a zero-sum game in which if the security of one actor increases that of another must necessarily suffer. Rather security is understood as a win-win situation in which, if we play our cards right, all can benefit. This has meant that the concept of security has been broadened in the NEI. Security is no longer simply seen as protection from external threats but also focuses on societal issues of human welfare. ₁₂ Consequently the following six priority areas have been identified for action and assistance: business promotion, law enforcement, the construction of civil society, energy, the environment, and public health. ₁₃

Geographically the NEI is subdivided into three points of emphasis. First is a focus on the Baltic states with the aim to secure the independence and liberal democratic development of these states. Second is an emphasis on strengthening relations with the Nordic states. In this respect the Nordic states are understood as essential partners in assisting the US in 'fixing' the problems of the Baltic states and their relations with Russia. Emphasis on this US-Nordic link is often extended to include Germany, the UK, Poland, France and the EU. ₁₄ Third is a focus on Russia with the aim being to reach out to Russia and get Russia involved in regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. As such, and to quote the task force report of the Council on Foreign Relations, "This effort has been designed to integrate Russia gradually into a broader European framework as well as to defuse Russian concerns about the integration of the Baltic states into Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially NATO". ₁₅ Or as Asmus has put it, the aim "is to include Russia, not isolate it". ₁₆ As the initial motivating factor it is not surprising that the Baltic dimension is the most developed and structured of the three, and is enshrined in the US-Baltic Charter of Partnership. The result of this Charter has been the initiation of a series of diverse projects which emphasise the breaking down of borders between the Baltic states. Amongst other things the US has sponsored regional business forums and military defence cooperation in this regard. However, the Russian dimension appears to be gaining increased emphasis. At least at a conceptual level it is notable that US officials have begun to refer to the Northern European Initiative as the Northeastern European Initiative. ₁₇ Such a change in emphasis appears to shift geographical focus to the problems associated with developing and integrating Russia's northern regions into European structures. Of course, all three dimensions are clearly interrelated and are increasingly seen as being mutually reinforcing, however, it will also be argued below that this shift towards an emphasis on the Russian dimension has been linked to an increasing longer-term vision for the NEI in which northern Europe is seen as a testing ground for developing a new type of politics in which traditional political divisions are transcended. In this regard the idea of northern Europe as a testing ground is explicitly stated and contrasted with the fractious politics of the Balkans. To quote Asmus, "The sense is that if we could figure out a way to translate your experience and plant similar seeds in southeastern Europe today, we would be very, very well advised". ₁₈

 

Mapping the Discursive Framework of the NEI

To summarise, therefore, the NEI is a strategy to promote regional integration in the Baltic Sea Region and to promote the development of a Europe whole and free. However, such rhetoric is clearly very vague and quite what US motivations behind the NEI are, and quite what this end goal of a Europe whole and free is in substance, frequently remain unstated in the speeches on the NEI by US officials. Partly, this is probably because the US administration itself is uncertain as to where the NEI is headed. However, such uncertainty reflects the fact that the NEI is flexible and dynamic and consequently open to various logics of explanation. Indeed, the point which I would like to elaborate in this section is that at least three distinct theoretical ways of thinking can be discerned in US rhetoric on the NEI, each of which imbue the initiative with slightly different motivations, goals and potentialities. Broadly speaking these approaches can be labelled those of traditional geopolitics, liberal internationalism, and postmodernism. Before discussing these in detail it is important that these should not be seen teleologically, with one way of thinking giving way to another through time, rather all three discourses can be identified as existing together, and frequently all within the same texts.

The Endurance of Geopolitics

That the NEI should be ingrained with some elements of traditional geopolitical thinking is perhaps not surprising. After all, during the Cold War northern Europe was predominantly understood in geopolitical terms as a question over which side, NATO or the Soviet Union, had the right to define, organise and control political space. ₁₉ In NATO the north was understood as the northern flank, on the other side of which lay a significant selection of the Soviet army and naval war machine, and not a few nuclear missiles. Whilst the US was able to draw Norway and Denmark into NATO the Soviet Union claimed the Baltic republics, Poland and East Germany. The blurring of lines was only apparent in the case of the neutrals Finland and Sweden, however, and particularly in the case of Finland, these were frequently understood as blank spaces over which control by one side or the other was yet to be established.

Geopolitical considerations were written into the NEI at the very beginning in the influential article of Asmus and Nurick, subsequent to which Asmus was co-opted by the US State Department to be one of the leading figures of US policy in northern Europe. For Asmus and Nurick the fact that the Baltic states were unlikely to be included in the first round of NATO enlargement raised significant questions about the future security of these states. Using traditional geopolitical language Asmus and Nurick warned of the danger that unless a separate strategy was adopted for the Baltic states, with NATO enlargement to East-Central Europe the Balts would find themselves left in a 'grey zone' characterised by uncertainty. ₂₀ As they put it, "If NATO enlargement stabilises East-Central Europe but destabilises the Baltic region, it will hardly be deemed a success". ₂₁ If enlargement was mishandled, they argued, if a strategy was not also developed for the Baltic states, the consequence would be a detrimental redrawing of the security map in northeastern Europe. ₂₂ Talk of grey zones and redrawing security maps clearly has a very traditional power politics ring to it. Invoking the 'Korean syndrome' the two RAND scholars warned that the West had to find a way to convince Moscow that the exclusion of the Baltic states from NATO membership was not an invitation for Russia to take coercive action against them. ₂₃ The continuing designation of Russia as a potential enemy to the West is clearly apparent in such rhetoric. Moreover, the article was replete with references and insinuations towards nationalist and revanchist forces in Russia intent on re-establishing their influence in the Baltic republics. ₂₄ Such characterisations were further supported by the insistence that a Baltic policy was also essential to preserve the security gains Finland and Sweden had attained with Baltic independence. Such gains were understood in terms of military strategic depth, or what might otherwise be termed a buffer zone. ₂₅ In short, Asmus and Nurick cautioned that NATO enlargement must not be allowed to undermine the gains of the end of the Cold War. The expansionist ambitions of revanchist nationalist forces in Russia had to be contained by demonstrating clearly that although the Baltic states were not presently in line for NATO membership NATO indisputably saw them as a part of its sphere of influence.

Such geopolitical arguments were clearly a major motivation behind the emergence of the NEI, and in particular the 1998 US-Baltic Charter of Partnership. Notably, the Charter devotes considerable attention to affirming the desire of the Baltic states to become members of NATO. Moreover, the Charter notes that the US welcomes such aspirations and that it sees NATO enlargement as an on-going process over which no non-NATO country (i.e., Russia) has a veto. ₂₆ Although far from being a full-fledged security guarantee the Charter was clearly designed to send a message to Moscow to keep its hands off. ₂₇ Furthermore, although NATO membership may have been off the agenda the US has persistently encouraged the EU to include at least one of the Baltic states in the next round of EU enlargement for precisely the same considerations of not leaving the Balts isolated in the grey zone. ₂₈ Importantly, the NEI and the US-Baltic Charter also paved the way for developing extensive levels of cooperation between the Baltic states, and also called for proposals to develop the structures of liberal democracy in Russia through promoting multilateral cooperation. Again, this largely reflects the strategy laid out by Asmus and Nurick in 1996. However, from the geopolitical perspective the important point to note is that such fostering of interdependence has been seen as a means of promoting military security rather than being considered an end in itself. In the case of Russia the aim in this respect is clearly to prevent the feared revanchist forces from attaining power. As US Ambassador to Finland, Derek Shearer, put it in 1997:

It is important to stay engaged. If we turn our backs on Russia, saying, "I'll get involved when Russian attitudes change and conditions improve", we may have a long wait. Worse, our passivity may allow other, less progressive forces to gain the upper hand. ₂₉

To quote Asmus and Nurick, "The goal should be to cast a cloak of cooperation around the Baltic states to provide an additional element of deterrence". ₃₀ Again, the rhetoric of the NEI as a cloak of cooperation to promote deterrence once more illustrates the extent to which, at least at the beginning and especially when the NEI is focused on the Baltic states, traditional geopolitical considerations remain salient.

Liberal Internationalism

However, it would be wrong to see the NEI solely in terms of geopolitical considerations of securing the independence of the Baltic states, and to see the US encouragement of regional integration through promoting interdependence between the states in the region in purely strategic terms. Indeed, rather than simply just being a means for geopolitical ends the promotion of liberal democratic interdependence is also frequently presented as an end in itself in the NEI. Indeed, much of the rhetoric utilised in presentations of the NEI reflects the tradition of Wilsonian idealism and liberal internationalism in US foreign policy dating back to the 1920s. ₃₁ This is particularly evident in protestations of the US desire to create a 'Europe whole and free' which is linked up with rhetoric of a US national mission to come and 'fix' Europe, much in the same way as they did after the Second World War through the Marshall Plan. ₃₂ As Rhodes notes, such a liberal internationalist vision resonates with a particular construction of American national identity as imbued with a moral purpose. As he puts it, "at its heart, it is a crusading vision, defining American identity in terms of a commitment to a noble, transformative goal". ₃₃ The assumption of this liberal internationalist vision is that there is nothing inherently conflictual about international politics. Difference need not imply conflict and if liberal democratic institutions are created and common principles accepted then there is no reason why different cultures cannot coexist peacefully and fruitfully. At the same time, though, creating such structures where they do not yet exist entails an obligation to go out and bring the benefits of the liberal internationalist order to those regions thus far bereft of it. ₃₄ The NEI certainly contains such elements of idealism, and talk of moving beyond politics understood in traditional realist terms is widespread. For example, Robert Hunter informed a conference in 1997 that "We are trying to do nothing less than to repeal and abolish that most failed principle of international politics of the last 350 years, which is the balance of power itself". ₃₅ Likewise, Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott has talked of the need to move beyond 'now-defunct ideological divides', ₃₆ whilst Madeline Albright has expressed the hope that her extensive library full of books on the Cold War, Soviet ideology, nationalism, totalitarianism, East-West conflict, arms control and so forth, might soon be consigned to the rubbish bin as the old zero-sum politics of the Cold War is transcended in favour of a liberal democratic win-win situation. ₃₇

Given that US foreign policy during the Cold War was premised precisely on the balance of power, such liberal internationalist rhetoric is clearly a major departure. Rather than focusing on the preservation of strict borders between us and them the liberal internationalist vision encourages building cooperation across borders through inter-regional and sub-regional networks that promote the development of a commonly accepted liberal democratic regime of norms of behaviour. Such a vision, we have seen, entails a broader conception of security to embrace societal concerns. In this respect existential military security is to be achieved through tackling other problems in partnership and cooperation, thereby creating trust between former enemies that in turn removes traditional military security from the agenda. Such a view entails seeing sovereign states as only one set of actors amongst others, even if states remain of foremost importance. Also relevant in building a new security architecture, however, are non-governmental organisations, business and the private sector. ₃₈ In the liberal internationalist vision economic development is clearly regarded as of paramount importance. The extension of trade networks and cross-border business partnerships, it is believed, will draw together a complex web of cooperative security which it will be in nobody's interest to break. In the opinion of Strobe Talbott, economic development "crosses geopolitical boundaries, bridges political divides and heals historic wounds". ₃₉ Or to quote Ambassador Derek Shearer, "if we get the economic structures right, then the political structures will be easier to build". ₄₀ In such a strategy, opening the region up for private investment becomes of central concern and this is certainly at the forefront of the NEI. For example, a private sector programme has been initiated that supports American companies interested in doing business in the Baltic and Nordic states and northwest Russia. Similarly, the private sector programme of the US-Baltic Charter enables the business community to bring their concerns directly to the authorities. Such developments are interesting for the reason that such forums offer the chance for non-state actors to set the agenda, to designate what and where problems lie in the region, and to point to solutions. In this context the states become facilitators of societal concerns, a move which breaks down traditional notions of the split between foreign and domestic politics. ₄₁ Other than economic programs the NEI also promotes initiatives in areas of law enforcement, the construction of civil society, energy, the environment, and issues of public health, each of which is also seen as essential in creating politically stable and economically prosperous democratic regimes.

Whilst geopolitical thinking appears to have been focused on the security dilemma of the Baltic states, arguably it has been such Wilsonian liberal internationalist thinking outlined above, which draws on notions of American national identity as imbued in fulfilling a missionary and moral destiny to spread the good life elsewhere, that has provided the motivation to extend a more particular focus of the NEI on relations with Russia. In this respect the NEI is presented as a testing ground and laboratory for the liberal internationalist vision in global politics. With such a missionary and visionary element it has been logical that the US should also try to integrate Russia into the new vision and to overcome Cold War divisions once and for all. ₄₂ The clear idea is that if Russia can be successfully integrated into regional cooperation in northern Europe the NEI will provide a model to be transposed elsewhere in order to extend the democratic peace to more tumultuous regions. The point is that, in liberal internationalist terms, the US cannot remain agnostic about developments in Russia. The future development of Russia is rather a battle to be fought. To quote from a lecture Strobe Talbott delivered at Stanford University.

We are not simply neutral by-standers. Their is no doubt where our own national interest lies; quite simply, we want to see the ascendancy of Russia's reformers who look outward and forward rather than inward and backward for the signposts of revival. A Russia that reflects their aspirations is more likely to be part of the solution to the world's many problems. Conversely, a Russia that erects barriers against what it sees as a hostile world and that believes the best defense is a good offense - such a Russia could be, in the 21^st century just as it was in much of the 20^th century, one of the biggest problems we will face. ₄₃

As he then went on, the outcome of the battle between Westernisers and Slavophiles in Russia is still uncertain and is still being fought. The insinuation was that the US too had to be involved in this clash, not just for the benefit of Russia, but in the cause of securing the post-Cold War peace more generally. At the same time the methods of influence to be utilised are to be rather low-key, the hope being that through fostering economic and social interdependence the Russians will be given an incentive to cooperate and in consequence come to see the Baltic states, the region, and NATO, not as a threat but rather as an opportunity. ₄₄ Russia's future cannot be forced onto it, the Russians themselves have to make this choice, but through programmes under the NEI what the US can do is open certain pathways, to foster a new type of politics in the Baltic Sea Region, that the Russians find suitably attractive that they desire to be included.

Of course, the missionary liberal internationalist element to the NEI does not always sit well with Russian understandings of the US. Fears of US neo-imperialism are widely apparent in Russia. For example, in a recent article the Russian scholar A. Bogaturov almost lamented the passing of the Reagan era in which spheres of influence were strictly defined. Alarmed, he argued that with the end of the Cold War "the Americans became deeply convinced that their development pattern was absolutely the best. This produced an emotional messianic urge to spread 'American democracy and the market economy' well beyond the traditional limits within which the US foreign policy has been acting for several centuries". ₄₅ Bogaturov's fear is that Russia is set to be 'smothered by US embraces' ₄₆ and although he does not mention it one might assume he would see the NEI as one such fearful embrace. As will be noted later the US is aware of such fears. Consequently the NEI is often presented as a way to emphasise the role of the United States' partners in dealing with Russia and thereby subsequently depoliticising various approaches. This is certainly an innovative strategy. For present it is enough to note that Bogaturov's fears illustrate the continuing prevalence of geopolitical thinking in Russia and the continuing designation of the US as the other to be excluded.

Postmodernism

Thirdly, the NEI also contains elements that extend beyond liberal internationalism and rather emphasise a more radical vision of de-bordered postmodern politics for the region. This is particularly evident in rhetoric designating the European north as a 'laboratory' and testing ground for the development of a new pattern of regional cooperation. Such rhetoric, we will see, embraces a new spatial politics for the region and breaks down previous geopolitical and state territorial divides. Whilst during the Cold War the boundaries on the maps of the European north were seen as immutably fixed and as exclusionary, the NEI promotes a process of erasing those borders. The fact that the NEI embraces and gives voice to multiple actors above, beyond and within the state undermines traditional notions of state territorial sovereignty. In consequence the NEI promotes the blurring of borders and the emergence of a new regionality, with regionality referring to the growth and development of regional networks outside the framework of traditional state-to-state relations. To a large degree such a postmodern discourse is perhaps unwitting rather than planned, and clearly sits as an extension of the liberal internationalist vision. At the same time, though, its implicit attack on the sovereignty of the modern state is what gives this discourse a postmodern tinge.

Such notions are particularly evident in the fact that in promoting the NEI the US has picked up on the discourse of region-builders within the Baltic Sea area of the potential future development of the region into an updated version of the Hanseatic League of the 13^th and 16^th centuries. ₄₇ In this respect, the construction of a neo-Hanseatic League of the pre-modern state era is presented as representing a return to normality following the artificial division of the region during the Cold War. As Anthony Wayne has put it:

With the disappearance of the artificial divisions of the Cold War, the Baltic sea is resuming its role as a regional unifier rather than a divider. The old Hanseatic ideal of an open trading area can once again become the model for how the region can grow politically and economically. ₄₈

In this respect the CBSS, with its focus on bringing about the cultural, commercial, economic and environmental unity of the region, has been evoked as a direct spiritual descendent of the Hanseatic League. Moreover, the Americans have also been keen to affirm that Russian cities like Novgorod were also participants in the Hanseatic League. As such the Americans are encouraging actors to think regionally and to transcend traditional notions of an East-West division. ₄₉ The implication is that without taking Russia into account not much can be profitably accomplished in terms of moving towards a new security agenda. ₅₀

Moreover, the desire to move beyond traditional East-West divisions of Europe is also clearly apparent in that, designated as the Northern European Initiative, the US has stepped outside the constraining conceptual boundaries of East and West. As Peter van Ham notes, as such "Since 'Europe' is no longer defined on the basis of 'westernness' but also on a more diffuse notion of 'northernness', Russia is offered a new focal point, a new route for cooperation which may make it feel at home". ₅₁ This is to say, by opening up the notion of northernness the NEI appears to depoliticise the significance of East-West categorisations of Europe. Such rhetoric transcends Huntingtonian notions of civilisational divides, in favour of a more variegated European geography which offers Russia the opportunity to be included. To quote van Ham again.

Europe's New North obliterates the bipolar divide between 'East' and 'West'; it goes beyond modern thinking in exclusionary categories of either/or, of inside/outside, of being a member of NATO or not, of being a part of the western security community or not. ₅₂

In this respect, framed in postmodernist terms the NEI undermines the exclusivity attached to national identities and rather encourages a more multiperspectival and regional approach. When postmodern thinking is at the fore, "It is not that nations, states, and sovereignty will wither or disappear in the American vision; it is that they will cease to be of central importance". ₅₃ Rather, states will become merely one part of a much broader network of organisations and institutions designed to meet specific needs and problems and lacking any distinct hierarchy between them. In such a vision key watchwords are flexibility, inclusiveness and community. Moreover, in this regard the fact that the NEI remains rather vague is not really something to be too concerned about. Such vagueness implies flexibility to cope with matters as they arise and points to the fact that the NEI and the new northernness it promotes can offer something for everybody.

Understood in such postmodern terms the NEI is illustrative of the ability of the US to engage in innovative and entrepreneurial thinking, renouncing traditional power politics for an understanding of the power of the production of ideas and agenda setting. Such a view reflects the argument of Pertti Joenniemi that in the post-Cold War period the central issue pertaining to the ability of a state to influence international politics is not whether it is big or small, but rather whether if it is smart or dumb. In this respect it does appear the US has been rather swift in realising the potential in the European north for the development of a new type of international politics that might ultimately provide an enlightened model for global politics more generally. ₅₄ On the other hand, bearing in mind the geopolitical thinking that underlies the initial strategy of the NEI towards the Baltic states it might rather be the fact that such a realisation of the postmodern potential of the NEI has evolved through its implementation rather than being inscribed at its inception. Indeed, how comfortable the US would feel if such a postmodern vision of fluid borders and decentralised political space were to be the end result of the NEI process is, as van Ham notes, debatable. ₅₅ And as pointed out above, there is also something of an unintentional element underlying this postmodern discourse within the NEI.

Finally, it is also worth noting that the central obstacle to the emergence of both the postmodern and the liberal internationalist visions for the region, the Russian mindset that emphasises traditional realpolitik views of security, remains intact. ₅₆ The NEI vision, whether that be the postmodern, the liberal internationalist, or even the geopolitical version assumes a certain devolution of power from Moscow to the regions of northwest Russia and Kaliningrad, which is a prospect that touches a raw nerve amongst those in Moscow who continue to see world politics through the lenses of concepts such as the balance of power and spheres of interest. As we will now see, such fears tend to be reaffirmed by the close link the US draws between the NEI and NATO enlargement, and which at first glance appears to betray any benevolent intentions expressed in liberal internationalist and postmodern discourses on the NEI.

 

NATO, the NEI and the Definition of Europe

That the NEI is explicitly tied in US thinking to questions of NATO enlargement is undeniable. This is no more evident than in the fact that a link with NATO is always drawn in speeches on the NEI by US officials. Moreover, we have also seen that the question of the effect of NATO enlargement to East Central Europe on the security position of the Baltic states was the point of departure for the article of Asmus and Nurick which later came to provide the foundation for the NEI. However, given the stated goals of US policy through the NEI as being to overcome Cold War geopolitical divides and to promote a new politics through fostering cooperation, interdependence and networking, the persistent linkage to NATO may seem surprising and only likely to result in failure in the face of endemic Russian suspicions of the Alliance. This leaves us with two questions. On the one hand, why is it that the US is so persistent in maintaining a linkage that is only likely to reinscribe East-West divisions rather than overcome them? On the other, is the NEI actually preparing the way for the Baltic states' membership of NATO or is it rather designed to postpone, or even prevent, it? The two questions are closely linked and the second will be tackled first.

US rhetorical commitment to the Baltic states' future membership of NATO is unquestionable and is enshrined in the US-Baltic Charter of Partnership. However, there are significant reasons for arguing that, despite the rhetoric, the NEI is designed with precisely the opposite goal in mind, to defer any decision on NATO membership altogether. Not least, it is notable that despite the rhetorical commitment no timetable has been officially aired for the membership of the Baltic states. Furthermore, the Charter also states that aspirant countries will only be admitted when they can prove themselves "able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance" (emphasis added). ₅₇ Such open-ended provisions clearly open the possibility for delaying the membership of the Baltic states and also appear to give the lie to the claim of the very next paragraph in the Charter that no non-NATO country will have a veto over the membership decisions of the Alliance. Clearly, if enlargement to the Balts is going to be staunchly opposed by Russia then enlargement is unlikely to contribute to European stability or the strategic interests of NATO. Such thinking has led to scepticism within the Baltic states that the NEI, and the Charter more particularly, are merely rhetorical flourishes designed to delay the difficult question of enlargement to the Balts. ₅₈ Furthermore, even if the US government is serious about enlargement there still remains the fact that large numbers of the US Congress, not to mention the United States' NATO partners, remain less than enthusiastic about extending Article 5 commitments to the Baltic states. ₅₉ Bearing such considerations in mind there is considerable reason to conclude that the NEI and the US-Baltic Charter are merely intended as the next best option to NATO membership and as a way to signal to the Balts that they have not been forgotten.

On the other hand, there are at least three reasons to presume the US commitment to the Baltic states' membership of NATO is genuine. In the first instance the missionary rhetoric of the liberal internationalist discourses, that construct American identity in terms of a crusading role that it is America's destiny to play in Europe, is important. In this vision all the previous Eastern bloc states have the right to belong to Europe. However, such notions mask a very particular understanding of what 'Europe' and 'belonging to Europe' means in US thinking. In short, the US maintains a highly institutionalised view of the definition of Europe that equates belonging with membership in Western organisations, in particular NATO and the EU. This is prevalent in rhetoric that the Baltic states have a 'right' to 'join Europe', membership of which was denied to them as a result of the Cold War. As van Ham puts it, "The aspiration of becoming a full member of NATO and the EU (and to a lesser extent the WEU), is considered a necessary and natural element of being a European country, of not just being an integral part of geographical Europe, but also of a political Europe". ₆₀ Likewise, Strobe Talbott has picked up on rhetoric of the Baltic states as 'coming home to the West', that is 'coming home to Europe', ₆₁ the implication being that it is NATO and the EU that represent the essence of the 'real' Europe. Consequently, the US desire to create a Europe whole and free is seen to require expanding the institutional framework of Europe as embodied in NATO and the EU. As Madeline Albright contended in April 1997, a central reason for enlarging NATO "is to right the wrongs of the past. If we don't enlarge NATO, we will be validating the dividing line Stalin imposed in 1945 and that two generations of Americans and Europeans fought to overcome". ₆₂ Thus, the desire to erase all border lines in Europe has in fact become synonymous with the need for NATO expansion.

Secondly, and closely linked, is the fact that since the end of the Cold War NATO's role and raison d'être has been broadly re-imagined. Rather than simply being a military alliance NATO has been reconceptualised in civilisational and cultural terms as a security community centred around the shared democratic foundations of its members. ₆₃ Consequently, understood as a civilisational project, membership of NATO is potentially open to all so long as applicants successfully comply with the values of the security community. To quote Madeline Albright again, "We have said all along that NATO is open to all democratic market systems in Europe". ₆₄ Similarly, the US-Baltic Charter affirms that the Baltic states "will not be left out or discriminated against due to factors of history or geography". ₆₅ Arguably, having proclaimed such policies there is a certain obligation to live up to the promises. Moreover, the fact that in liberal internationalist discourse American identity is largely constructed in terms of this mission of 'fixing' Europe and eroding dividing lines through NATO enlargement also provides a very real motivation to put this policy into practice.

Thirdly, and very briefly, the US emphasis on NATO enlargement in the NEI can also be explained by the fact that ultimately NATO is the main instrument of representation of the US in Europe. Not being a member of the EU, NATO offers the most obvious opportunity for the US to retain a voice in European affairs.

Bearing these three reasons in mind it is arguable that US rhetoric on expanding NATO to the Baltic states is genuine. That the Baltic states see progress on this issue as being inordinately slow is clearly a reflection of US prudence and their other commitments expressed in the NEI. The US desire to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in the NEI needs to be taken seriously. Speeches on the NEI are full of comment on the need to calm Russian anxieties regarding the motivations for NATO expansion and the desire that Russia will soon begin to look at the Baltic states as a gateway for cooperation rather than as a bridge-head for an invading NATO force, and the NEI is explicitly designed to help the Russians make this psychological transition. As such, through the NEI the US is attempting to depoliticise the issue of NATO enlargement. As Madeline Albright has put it, what the US really wants is for Russia to get bored with NATO and NATO enlargement and rather to focus on more productive avenues for cooperation. ₆₆ However, waiting for Russia to get bored with NATO may take some time and whether the NEI will succeed in creating such a psychological transition remains to be seen. Until such time as Russia does get bored NATO enlargement is only likely to reassert previous divides rather than overcome them. Consequently, until such time enlargement is probably off the agenda, at least for so long as the US continues to hold to liberal internationalist and postmodern visions of the NEI.

However, there are a couple of more explicit problems with linking the expressed NEI goal of transcending borders in the European north with NATO enlargement to the Baltic states. Firstly, despite the re-envisaging of NATO as a civilisational and cultural security community there can be little doubt, and there certainly is not in Russia, that first and foremost NATO remains a military alliance designed to protect its members against those very traditional security threats the NEI is intended to overcome. Consequently, the fact that NATO is a military alliance makes it likely that geopolitical thinking is always going to play a role in the NEI (and is also likely to reaffirm an emphasis on geopolitics in Russia) irrespective of liberal internationalist and postmodern discourses which are also embedded in the initiative.

Secondly, even the civilisational re-envisaging of NATO after the end of the Cold War is problematic. In this respect there is a danger that the Europe envisaged by the US as embodied in the institutions of NATO and the EU becomes presented as a civilisational empire gradually extending its borders through enlargement. Placing so much emphasis on NATO and EU enlargement arguably has the potential to undermine the more multiperspectival view entailed in postmodern discourses on the NEI which emphasise the role of multiple overlapping organisations and institutions without a particular hierarchy amongst them. By focusing so much on NATO there is a tendency to reinscribe a hierarchy in which NATO is seen as the primary actor. Furthermore, given the history of the organisation, linking the NEI so closely to NATO is also only likely to undermine attempts to get beyond traditional East-West divisions in order to promote less politicised notions of Europe as being open to a new plurality of which northernness would be one part. Evidence that many in Russia see NATO as a threatening expansionist empire is not hard to find and frequently results in oppositional constructions of Russian identity that see it as Russia's destiny to oppose the imperialistic tendencies of Western culture as epitomised by the US. The parallel between such rhetoric and that of liberal internationalist discourse is striking. Arguably, therefore, whilst it is understandable that the NEI has been attached so closely to NATO and NATO enlargement, it would appear that if the NEI is going to be successful then this linkage should rather be played down.

 

The NEI and the Northern Dimension

Whilst the NEI shares a close relationship with NATO it is also important to try and understand the NEI's relationship with the EU's policy framework in the European north, the Northern Dimension. The similarities between the NEI and the Northern Dimension are clearly striking. Both originated in 1997, both profess the aim to create stability in northern Europe, both envisage achieving this through promoting interdependence, both prioritise a new security agenda focusing on issues of the environment, business, civil society, law enforcement, energy, and public health, and not least, both also tell stories of the Hanseatic League as a motivating vision for the future. Such parallels are intriguing and pose the question of 'why the need for two initiatives?' That observers are confused regarding the relationship between the NEI and the Northern Dimension is clear and such confusion has tended to result in the understanding that the initiatives are competing rather than complementary. ₆₇ However, whilst there is certainly some truth in such a view there are also elements of complementarity which makes the relationship between the two initiatives rather complicated.

Negative views of the relationship between the NEI and the Northern Dimension, or at least a total lack of interest in the NEI, are apparent on the part of the EU. For example, typing in the words 'Northern European Initiative' on the search engine of the europa website of the EU produces the stunning result of just one match out of a possible 1,045,396 documents. This document is a joint statement following the EU-US summit of December 1999 that mentions the NEI once and merely states an intention to cooperate on matters in northern Europe, but remains silent on actual projects in the offing. ₆₈ More importantly, the Action Plan on the Northern Dimension presented to the European Council at Feira, Portugal, in June 2000 makes no reference to the NEI whatsoever. Whilst the US is mentioned three times, at its most generous the Action Plan states that there may be some favourable synergy gains from cooperating with the US and Canada in areas such as energy, environmental cooperation, nuclear safety, legal reform, health, and matters of sustainable development in the circumpolar and adjacent northern regions. However, quite what this would entail in practice remains unspecified. ₆₉ Moreover, the exclusion of the US from the Northern Dimension is made apparent in the opening paragraph of the Action Plan which sets out the geographical scope of the Northern Dimension as extending from Iceland in the west to northwest Russia in the east, and from the Barents and Kara Seas in the north to the southern coast of the Baltic Sea in the south. ₇₀ Such an exclusion of the US is interesting, particularly in light of the fact that when Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, first introduced the concept of the Northern Dimension to the international audience in September 1997, he made it explicit that geographically the United States and Canada were also included in the concept. ₇₁ However, as Arter notes, some EU countries, particularly France, were initially suspicious of the Northern Dimension believing it to be US inspired, and therefore undesirable. ₇₂ Such an attitude is of course reflective of French opinions regarding US foreign policy more generally and may explain the subsequent erasure of reference to the US in EU documents on the Northern Dimension ever since. On the other hand, the Finnish government continues to emphasise the role of the US in northern Europe and explicitly draws positive links between the Northern Dimension and the NEI. ₇₃ In the Finnish case the reasons for continuing to emphasise the US link may well be a result of security considerations. Whilst the Finns are generally reticent to see NATO enlarged to the Baltic states they are keen that the US remains interested in the European north in order to prevent the peripheralisation of north European security concerns. To this extent, therefore, it is clear that the EU states themselves are divided on quite how to think about the NEI.

For their part the Americans appear much more positive regarding the relationship between the NEI and the Northern Dimension. Indeed, there is barely a speech by a US official on the NEI that fails to draw a link to the Northern Dimension and to stress that it is in northern Europe that a new post-Cold War US-EU partnership can be forged. ₇₄ In this respect the NEI is presented merely as a 'supplement' to the efforts of the EU in northern Europe. ₇₅ There are at least three reasons which can explain the more pro-active attitude of the US in comparison to the EU in this respect. In the first instance, the NEI, and the persistent emphasis on developing a relationship of partnership with the EU, appears to betray a certain fear that as the EU develops into an ever more coherent actor with its own foreign policy, and perhaps even its own defence force, the US is in danger of being isolated from Europe. To this extent the NEI is a vehicle which offers the chance for the US to remain engaged in Europe, which is to say, through the NEI the US finds space and a forum within which it can retain a constitutive voice in European affairs, and more particularly in the developing relationship between the EU and Russia. Moreover, it is also probably this reason that, to a large degree, explains the one major difference between the NEI and the Northern Dimension, which is the NEI's focus on NATO and NATO enlargement. By contrast the Northern Dimension eschews any linkage with NATO whatsoever and rather appears in the business of putting NATO out of a job. As noted earlier, one reason for the US focus on NATO is the fact that it preserves a voice for the US in European affairs.

Secondly, the positive attitude of the US to linking the NEI with the Northern Dimension can also be explained in respect of internal debates on the future role of the US in world politics, and more particularly on the controversy regarding burden-sharing with its European allies.  By linking the NEI to the efforts of the EU the US is thus able to keep down its financial commitments. To quote the official fact sheet on the NEI:

It is also an effective way to use increasingly scarce US resources efficiently. Through NEI, US contributions of financial support, expertise, and diplomatic clout are multiplied by cooperating with the Nordic partners and with regional organizations and programs. ₇₆

As Rhodes implies, despite the fact that many of the visionary post-national, postmodern elements of the NEI are unsettling for some US policy-makers it is the fact that the initiative is financially very modest and engages in burden-sharing that makes it largely uncontroversial. ₇₇

Thirdly, and to reiterate a point made earlier, the US also takes a positive view of cooperation between the NEI and the EU's Northern Dimension for the reason that through partnership, through down-playing the US role, the NEI is also able to further its agenda by playing to Russian sensitivities and avoiding the impression of the US as a hegemon throwing its weight around in northern Europe. ₇₈ Reflecting such concerns Ronald Asmus has argued that, "We know that the US won't be the major player in these areas, but we think we can play a modest and, in some niche areas, a really crucial role. We are prepared to be a junior partner or a bigger partner depending on the issue and depending upon what we can bring to the table" ₇₉

 

In Lieu of Conclusion: The NEI and George Bush Jnr

Given that the NEI was very much a product of the Clinton administration, in conclusion it is worthwhile reflecting a little on what the victory of Republican George Bush jnr in the recent presidential elections may entail for the NEI. Bearing in mind that Bush appears to have taken it upon himself to repeal many of the resolutions of the latter days of the Clinton era the initial question that springs to mind is whether the NEI has any future at all? Prophesising is always difficult, however, two points may bode well for the NEI. As Rhodes notes, in the first instance the NEI is likely to be preserved simply as a result of bureaucratic inertia. ₈₀ Secondly, the fact that the NEI is cheap and uncontroversial is also important. In this respect, the fact that the NEI never made it to the eulogies of the Clinton years could well be its saving grace.

Assuming, therefore, that at least in the short term the NEI is safe, the second question that arises is what future that will be? What spin is the NEI likely to get? Geopolitical? Liberal internationalist? Postmodern? From the perspective of liberal internationalist and postmodern discourses that see the NEI as creating a Europe whole and free and moving towards a post-sovereign, post-national politics of networks and cooperation, the future is perhaps not rosy. Unlike the liberal internationalism of Clinton the Bush administration rather appears to endorse a traditional realist world view of international politics that emphasises national self-interest above what they would see as any utopian ideals of an illusory international community. ₈₁ The implication of such a view is that conflict in international politics is inevitable. Such a position is clearly apparent in the assertion of the need for the US to move ahead with its planned missile defence shield irrespective of the diplomatic damage that may do to relations with Russia as well as with the United States' European allies. To this extent the Bush administration would seem to represent a return to zero-sum thinking, as opposed to the win-win games espoused by Madeline Albright. Consequently, if such views do take hold it will be the geopolitical discourse of the NEI which will likely become paramount, resulting in a refocusing of the NEI on traditional military strategic considerations. However, whilst the Bush administration may result in an emphasis on geopolitical concerns this is perhaps unlikely to be total. The point this paper has rather tried to emphasise is that the NEI is interesting for the very fact that in the NEI the US appears able to talk in a number of different theoretical languages at the same time, without necessarily posing them in dichotomy to each other. Consequently, whilst geopolitical concerns may attain greater priority, liberal internationalist and postmodern discourses will probably also retain an important, if reduced, constitutive voice in US policy in the Baltic Sea Region.

Finally, it is also important to note that, whilst an emphasis on geopolitical military strategic considerations is only likely to increase Russian fears of NATO expansion, in turn such a development may actually provide an added spur for Russia to partake more actively in the regional initiatives in the European north, if not in the NEI, then at least in the EU's Northern Dimension. This would be for the reason that such participation, fostering a positive relationship between Russia and the EU, in the first place might go some way to pre-empting NATO expansion to the Baltic states, and in the second, might also undermine the close link between NATO and Europe in favour of a new multipolarity, thereby reducing US influence in the continent. ₈₂

 

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Endnotes

Note 1: Edward Rhodes (unpublished manuscript) 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture: Understanding the Northern European Initiative', p.1  Back.

Note 2: 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North: American Perspectives and Policies', in Dmitri Trenin and Peter van Ham, Russia and the United States in Northern European Security (Kauhava: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut für Europäische Politik) p.62 Back.

Note 3: U.S. Policy Towards Northeastern Europe, a report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the US Council on Foreign Relations under the chairmanship of Zbigniew Brzezinski (New York: Council on Foreign Relations; 1999) p.2 Back.

Note 4: Frank E. Loy, Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Statement at the Barents Euro-Arctic Council Ministerial, Oulu, Finland, March 15, 2000. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000315_loy_barents.html; downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 5: The fact that so little attention has been directed at the NEI does pose problems for any analysis of it, if simply in terms of being able to locate oneself inside a wider literature. At the same time this also entails a certain liberation from the structuring potential of prior discourses. Aside from the analyses of Rhodes, van Ham and the Council on Foreign Relations, academic reflections on the NEI are lacking. Indeed, I have been unable to find any other independent accounts directly discussing the NEI. Those other accounts that do exist can be attributed to representatives of the US government and are therefore rather explanatory of US foreign policy, rather than analytical of it. Saying this I have only discovered three such articles. Tatiana C. Gfoeller (2000) 'Diplomatic Initiatives: An Overview of the Northern European Initiative', European Security (Vol.9, No.1); Conrad Tribble (2000) 'The NEI and the Northern Dimension', in The Northern Dimension: An Assessment and Future Development (Riga: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Latvian Institute of International Affairs); Lyndon L. Olson (1999) 'The U.S. Stake in Northern Europe', in Lassi Heininen and Gunnar Lassinantti (eds) Security in the European North - from 'Hard' to 'Soft' (Rovaniemi: Arctic Centre, University of Lapland). For the most part, therefore, this article has relied on an analysis of the elaboration of the NEI on the Department of State website as well as on speeches by US officials presenting the NEI to a wider audience. Back.

Note 6: Ronald Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 'Northern Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship', Address at the Fourth Annual Conference on Baltic Sea Regional Security and Cooperation, Stockholm, Sweden, November 4, 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991104_asmus_nei.html; Downloaded 15/01/01  Back.

Note 7: Ronald Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 'Northern Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship', Address at the Fourth Annual Conference on Baltic Sea Regional Security and Cooperation, Stockholm, Sweden, November 4, 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991104_asmus_nei.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 8: 'What is NEI?', United States Department of State Bureau of European Affairs, http://www.state.gov/www/region/eur/nei/nei_intro.html; Downloaded 15/01/01  Back.

Note 9: Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick (1996) 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States', Survival (Vol.38, No.2) Back.

Note 10: Tatiana Gfoeller, 'Diplomatic Initiatives', p.102 Back.

Note 11: Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary, 'Opening Doors and Building Bridges in the New Europe', Address to the Paasikivi Society, Helsinki, Finland, 21 January 1998 http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980121_talbott_eursecurity.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 12: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', p.1 Back.

Note 13: Overview of the Northern European Initiative. Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of European Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC, May 1 2000. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei/fs_000501_nei.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 < 

Note 14: cf. Ronald D. Asmus, 'American Views on Security and Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region', speech delivered at the Second Annual Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation, Stockholm, Sweden, November 1997. http://www.usis.usemb.se/bsconf/asmus.html; Downloaded 31/01/01 Back.

Note 15: U.S. Policy Towards Northeastern Europe, a report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the US Council on Foreign Relations under the chairmanship of Zbigniew Brzezinski (New York: Council on Foreign Relations; 1999) p.3 Back.

Note 16: Ronald D. Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, speech at a conference on the New Hanseatic League, Helsinki, Finland, October 8 1997. http://www.usemb.se/BalticSec/asmus.htm; Downloaded 27/11/00 Back.

Note 17: Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary, 'Opening Doors and Building Bridges in the New Europe', Address to the Paasikivi Society, Helsinki, Finland, 21 January 1998 http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980121_talbott_eursecurity.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 18: Ronald D. Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 'Northern Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship', Address to the Fourth Annual Conference on Baltic Sea Regional Security and Cooperation, Stockholm, Sweden, November 4 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991104_asmus_nei.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 19: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', pp.60-61 Back.

Note 20: Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States', p.121  Back.

Note 21: Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States',  p.126 Back.

Note 22: Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States',  p.121 Back.

Note 23: Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States',  p.126 Back.

Note 24: cf Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States',  p.126 Back.

Note 25: Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States',  p.126 Back.

Note 26: A Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania, January 16 1998. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ch_9801_baltic_charter.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 27: David Arter (2000) 'Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case of Finland's 'Northern Dimension Initiative'', Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol.38, No.5) p.690 Back.

Note 28: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.65 Back.

Note 29: Derek Shearer, US Ambassador to Finland, Remarks at The New Hanseatic League Conference, Helsinki, Finland, 8 October 1997. http://www.usemb.se/BalticSec/shearer.htm; Downloaded 27/11/00 Back.

Note 30: Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, 'NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States', p.135 Back.

Note 31: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', pp.18-19; Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.58 Back.

Note 32: Ronald D. Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 'Northern Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship', Address at the Fourth Annual Conference on Baltic Sea Regional Security and Cooperation, Stockholm, Sweden, November 4 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991104_asmus_nei.html; Downloaded 15/01/01  Back.

Note 33: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', p.18 Back.

Note 34: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', p.19 Back.

Note 35: Robert E. Hunter, Address to the Second Annual Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Baltic, Stockholm, Sweden, December 1997. http://www.usis.usemb.se/bsconf/hunter.html; Downloaded 07/02/01  Back.

Note 36: Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary, 'An American Perspective on Regional Integration', Address to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Bodo, Norway, March 5 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990305_talbott_barents.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 37: Albright cited in Ronald D. Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, speech at a conference on The New Hanseatic League, Helsinki, Finland, October 8 1997. http://www.usemb.se/BalticSec/asmus.htm; Downloaded 27/11/00 Back.

Note 38: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', p.3 Back.

Note 39: Strobe Talbott quoted in Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North',  p.70 Back.

Note 40: Derek Shearer, US Ambassador to Finland, Remarks at The New Hanseatic League Conference, Helsinki, Finland, 8 October 1997. http://www.usemb.se/BalticSec/shearer.htm; Downloaded 27/11/00 Back.

Note 41: For example, a report on a meeting of the US-Baltic Private Sector Program in 1998 noted that the meeting opened with Latvian Foreign Minister Birkavs emphasising the role of business in identifying problems and barriers to trade and in providing recommendations so that political leaders might address those concerns. US-Baltic Private Sector Program, Conclusions reached at a meeting of the private sector program, Riga, Latvia, July 8 1998.http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei/980708_riga.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 42: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.62 Back.

Note 43: Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, 'The End of the Beginning: the Emergence of a New Russia', Stanford University, September 19 1997. http://www.usis.usemb.se/bsconf/talbott.html; Downloaded 31/01/01 Back.

Note 44: F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Russia and Baltic Cooperation: An Unofficial View from Washington', speech delivered at the Second Annual Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation, Stockholm, Sweden, November 1997. http://www.usis.usemb.se/bsconf/larrabee.html; Downloaded 31/01/01 Back.

Note 45: A. Bogaturov (2000) 'A "Quasi-Alliance" between the United States and Russia', International Affairs (Moscow) (Vol.46, No.5) p.116 Back.

Note 46: A. Bogaturov, 'A "Quasi-Alliance" between the United States and Russia', p.119 Back.

Note 47: Ambassador Derek Shearer made the Hanseatic legacy a central focus in the following; Derek Shearer, US Ambassador to Finland, Remarks at The New Hanseatic League Conference, Helsinki, Finland, 8 October 1997. http://www.usemb.se/BalticSec/shearer.htm; Downloaded 27/11/00 Back.

Note 48: Anthony Wayne, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, 'The US Stake in Northern Europe', Address to the Baltic Sea Region Conference, Stockholm, Sweden, November 19 1998. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/981119_wayne_baltics.html; Downloaded 15/01/0 Back.

Note 49: Derek Shearer, US Ambassador to Finland, Remarks at The New Hanseatic League Conference, Helsinki, Finland, 8 October 1997. http://www.usemb.se/BalticSec/shearer.htm; Downloaded 27/11/00 Back.

Note 50: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.68 Back.

Note 51: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.88. For another extensive discussion of this point see, Pertti Joenniemi (1999) 'The North Meets Europe: On the European Union's Northern Dimension', http://www.northerndimension.org/paper1.pdf; Downloaded 22/02/01 Back.

Note 52: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.84 Back.

Note 53: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', p.5 Back.

Note 54: See Pertti Joenniemi (1998) 'From Small to Smart: Reflections on the Concept of Small States', Irish Studies in International Affairs (Vol.9). I am grateful to Joenniemi for pointing out this connection regarding the NEI. Back.

Note 55: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.78 Back.

Note 56: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', pp.8-9; Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.82 Back.

Note 57: A Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania, January 16 1998. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ch_9801_baltic_charter.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 58: Peter van Ham (1998) 'U.S. Policy Toward the Baltic States: An Ambiguous Commitment', in Mathias Jopp and Sven Arnswald (eds) The European Union and the Baltic States: Visions, Interests and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region (Kauhava: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut für Europäische Politik) p.225 Back.

Note 59: U.S. Policy Towards Northeastern Europe, a report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the US Council on Foreign Relations under the chairmanship of Zbigniew Brzezinski (New York: Council on Foreign Relations; 1999) pp.5-6 Back.

Note 60: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.73 Back.

Note 61: Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary, 'A Baltic Home-Coming', The Robert C. Frasure Memorial Lecture, Tallinn, Estonia, January 24 2000. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000124_talbott_tallinn.html; Downloaded 15/01/02 Back.

Note 62: Madeline Albright quoted in Peter van Ham, 'U.S. Policy Toward the Baltic States', p.217 Back.

Note 63: Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann (2000) 'From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity', Millennium (Vol.29, No.2) p.367 Back.

Note 64: Madeline Albright quoted in Alexander A. Sergounin (1998) 'The Russia Dimension', in Hans Mouritzen (ed) Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim (Aldershot: Ashgate) p.36 Back.

Note 65: A Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania, January 16 1998. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ch_9801_baltic_charter.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 66: Madeline Albright cited in Ronald D. Asmus, 'American Views on Security and Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region', speech delivered at The Second Annual Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation', November 1997. http://www.usis.usemb.se/bsconf/asmus.html; Downloaded 31/01/01 Back.

Note 67: For example, Igor Leshukov notes that Russian foreign policy elites retain such a dichotomous view of the initiatives. Igor Leshukov (2000) 'Northern Dimension: Interests and Perceptions', in The Northern Dimension: An Assessment and Future Development (Riga: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Latvian Institute of International Affairs) p.40; Likewise, David Arter portrays the Northern Dimension as under threat of being dwarfed by the NEI. David Arter, 'Small State Influence Within the EU', p.693 Back.

Note 68: Joint Statement By the European Union and the United States On Northern Europe, Second 1999 EU-US Summit, Washington, 17 December 1999. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/summit/_wash_12_99/north_eur.htm; Downloaded 13/02/01 Back.

Note 69: 'Action Plan for the Northern Dimension with External and Cross-Border Policies of the European Union 200-2003', presented to the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal, 19-20 June 2000, p.8 Back.

Note 70: 'Action Plan for the Northern Dimension with External and Cross-Border Policies of the European Union 200-2003', presented to the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal, 19-20 June 2000, p.2 Back.

Note 71: Paavo Lipponen, 'The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern Dimension', speech delivered at The Barents Region Today conference, Rovaniemi, Finland, 15 September 1997. http://www.vn.fi/vn/english/index.htm; Downloaded 22/01/99 Back.

Note 72: David Arter, 'Small State Influence Within the EU', p.689 Back.

Note 73: cf, Paavo Lipponen, 'The European Union Policy for the Northern Dimension from an Arctic Angle', speech delivered at the Fourth Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Rovaniemi, Finland, August 28 2000. http://www.vn.fi/vn/english/speech/pm20000828e.htm; Downloaded 18/09/00 Back.

Note 74: cf, Conrad Tribble, 'NEI and the Northern Dimension', p.62 Back.

Note 75: cf, H.R. 4249: Cross-Border Cooperation and Environmental Safety in Northern Europe Act of 2000. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei/nei_bill.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 76: Overview of the Northern European Initiative, Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of European Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC, May 1 2000. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei/fs_000501_nei.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 77: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', p.7 Back.

Note 78: Peter van Ham, 'Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North', p.90 Back.

Note 79: Ronald Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 'Northern Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship', Address to the Fourth Annual Conference on Baltic Sea Regional Security and Cooperation, Stockholm, Sweden, November 4 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991104_asmus_nei.html; Downloaded 15/01/01 Back.

Note 80: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', p.21 Back.

Note 81: Edward Rhodes, 'The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture', p.15 Back.

Note 82: Dmitri Trenin (2000) 'Security Cooperation in North-Eastern Europe: A Russian Perspective', in Dmitri Trenin and Peter van Ham, Russia and the United States in Northern European Security (Kauhava: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut für Europäische Politik) p.44 Back.