The Development of the Climate Regime: Positions, Evaluation and Lessons

The Development of the Climate Regime: Positions, Evaluation and Lessons

Steinar Andresen

University of Southern California, Center for International Studies

January 1998

Table of Contents

Abstract

Preface

Introduction: Scope and Purpose

The Development of Commitments, Institutions, and Approaches

The Political Process: The Development of Actor Positions

Evaluation: Different Criteria Give Difference Scores

Could More Have Been Achieved if the Negotiations Had Been Organized Differently?

Conclusion

References

Abstract

It is now a decade since the climate issue reached the international political agenda. In this exploratory Working Paper a rough overview and evaluation of the process is presented. Maybe the most important accomplishment during this decade is that an institutional basis has been created to deal with the problem for the coming decades, signalizing that the way in which energy is produced and consumed must gradually change. Initially, many actors tended to see this as just “another environmental issue” that could be dealt effectively with simply by deciding on ambitious goals. Over time perceptions have matured, and an increasing understanding has been gained as to the unprecedented complexity and difficulty of the issue. Simple copying of “lessons learned” from other international environmental problem is not the way to deal with the global warming problem. Rather, new and innovative ways of thinking is what is needed. In this perspective, the newly adopted Kyoto Protocol has some promising elements. However, as key point still need to be clarified, it is too early to know whether it will be sufficient to set the international community on the right track. Thus, although we can safely conclude that there has been a considerable growth in learning and understanding on the issue, any “real” evaluation of the process is still premature. Moreover, even if the governments come to agree on how this issue is going to be dealt with, due to the nature of the problem, it is the people of the world through their behaviour that is going to decide whether any agreement is going to be effectively implemented. Due to the long–term and uncertain impact of climate change, there is little reason to be optimistic. If costs prove to be considerable and benefits long term and uncertain, forceful action can hardly be expected, especially among developing countries with pressing short–term problems on their agendas. In discussing whether more could have been accomplished within this time span, I have argued more might have been achieved if the Annex 1 countries had decided on the nature of the “first step” everybody agreed they should take, among themselves, rather than within a global framework. This may have made a more institutionally advanced regime possible. Less emphasis on targets and timetables and more on matters related to implementation and verification could have worked in the same direction.

Preface

This report is published as a Working Paper within the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) research project on Norwegian Energy and Environmental Policy in an International Perspective (‘Norsk energi– og miljøpolitikk i et internasjonalt perspektiv’). The project is financed by the Norwegian Research Council under the programme ‘Samfunnsmessige rammebetingelser og virkemidler for norsk energi– og miljøpolitikk – SAMRAM’.

The report gives an account of the efforts of the international community to deal with the challenge of climate change from the time it reached the international political agenda a decade ago until the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. A first and very preliminary part of this report was presented at the Open Meeting of the Human Dimension of Global Environmental Change Research Community hosted by The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in June 1997. Comments and input received at that Conference led me to change the design and outline of the report considerably. In part I had to refine my measurement criteria in order to evaluate the process in a more meaningful way. In part I had to delve deeper into the process than I had originally planned. Although I rely quite heavily on secondary sources, I have also used primary sources extensively. As the Third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto approached, I decided to include this event. The important developments that took place there justify this decision, although the report has been lengthened considerably and has taken much more time to complete. The main research process was finished by January 1998. Therefore I had to rely extensively on newspapers and similar sources to cover this event. In revising the first draft, I have not included additional sources. Parts of this exploratory Working Paper will be further revised and published as one or two articles later this year.

I have benefited from conversations with the following persons on the climate change issue: Shardul Agrawala, Princeton University; Dan Bodansky, University of Washington; Georg Børsting, Norwegian Ministry of the Environment; Ruth Greenspan Bell, Resources for the Future; and P. J. Simmons, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Finally, I want to thank my colleagues Jon B. Skjærseth, Olav S. Stokke and Jørgen Wettestad at the FNI, David Victor at the Council on Foreign Relations for very helpful comments. Parts of this paper has been presented at the Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University as well as at the Center for International Studies and Environmental Studies Program at the University of Southern California (USC). I am grateful for all the useful comments and input I got on these occasions, especially from the discussant at the presentation at USC, Professor Robert Friedheim. Unfortunately time constraints have prevented me from addressing all of the comments I would have liked to.

The Center for International Studies at the USC, where I presented this paper, has recently joined a group of academic centers in contributing to Columbia University Press’ Columbia International Affairs Online program (CIAO). As the Institute wants to put online all the papers presented in this seminar series, this report will also be published by CIAO.

1. Introduction: Scope and Purpose

“Mankind’s activities have increased carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere. This increase has the potential to warm the earth’s climate by the ‘greenhouse effect’ in which CO2 absorbs infrared radiation and the re–radiates it back to the surface of the planet. Other gases also act as greenhouse gases and may warm the climate even further. Computational models that include these factors predict that the climate will warm significantly over the next century” (Mahlman, 1997, 1:1416)

This is the so–called greenhouse effect in a nutshell. The aim of this report is to take stock of the international community’s ability to deal with this problem. The first step is to establish what has come out of this process so far. Thus, the first main section of the paper presents a factual description of how the international community has dealt with the issue. When did climate change reach the international agenda, what were the initial responses to it? What are some of the main components of the Climate Convention adopted in 1992, and what has been achieved in fleshing out commitments and institutions thereafter? Following this somewhat dry, but necessary documentation, I will delve into the more colourful political interactions in an attempt to explain what has come out of the process. In broad terms the output produced by the climate negotiators can be explained by the intellectual and political “malignancy” of the issue. (Underdal, 1992) Intellectually and scientifically the issue is highly complex and politically it is most difficult to deal with, as reduction of greenhouse gas emissions will affect virtually every key sector of all societies, developed or developing. Applying a traditional realist perspective to what we know about the issue today, we should not expect much action on the issue, as benefits are long–term, diffuse and uncertain while the costs are high and concentrated. In fact, as will be seen from the initial optimistic response, this was not how the problem was perceived at first. But gradually the complexity of the issue became clear, significantly reducing initial enthusiasm. Most of my attention will be focused on the development of positions of state actors in relation to commitments, and on why some of them changed their position and role over time. ₁ Who were the “pushers” and who were the “draggers”, and how was agreement reached on crucial mile–stones?

The next step is to evaluate what has come out of the process so far? First, there is a need to be explicit about what measuring rods are being applied. This is often not the case in evaluations of the climate negotiations. In this report four criteria will be applied: learning and understanding produced by the regime; the output produced in the way of commitments and institutions; the outcome in terms of behavioural change in the target groups; and the impact of the regime on the climate system. As will be shown, by some criteria the process can surely be termed a “fiasco” while it comes closer to a “success” if alternative measures are applied. The key question is then which indicators are most reasonable to use. After an evaluation of the process, I will discuss what lessons emerge, or more specifically, whether more could have been achieved if the process had been organised differently. Based on the first parts of the report, two factors especially stand out: the scope of participation and the negotiation approach of focusing primarily on commitments regarding emission goals. On the question of participation, I address primarily the wisdom and consequences of the very inclusive approach regarding state participation that has been adopted. No one questions that climate change is a global problem, but does this require that virtually all the states of the world take part in all phases of the process? Could more have been achieved if it had been possible to choose a more exclusive or incremental approach? The question of participation will also be discussed briefly in relation to the inclusion of sub–national actors in the process as well as the organisational links to the scientific community. Finally, has the tendency to focus negotiations almost exclusively on“targets and timetables” led to a corresponding neglect of the necessary institutional basis to implement commitments agreed upon, or have the climate negotiators been able to balance the two needs?

2. The Development Of Commitments, Institutions and Approaches

Pre–1988: An Issue for the Few Competent and Interested

Although the greenhouse warming theory was put forward more than a century ago by the Swedish chemist Arrhenius, ₂ the more recent scientific history of global climate change began in 1957 in connection with the International Geophysical year. The first climate models were made in the 1960s and by mid–1970s US scientists claimed that a doubling of CO2 emissions would imply an average increase in global temperatures of 3 degrees C. The US was the dominant scientific actor in this early period. By the end of the 1970s there were also some high level political interest in the issue in Germany and the US. In 1979 the National Academy of Sciences took the initiative to assess available scientific findings, partly as a result of President Carter’s task force on the “quality of life”. (Bohlin, 1997:99) Also in 1979, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) summoned the first World Climate Conference in Geneva. Their effort to attract participation by policy makers, however, was unsuccessful. ₃ Nevertheless, this was the first time climate change was discussed at a major intergovernmental conference. The declaration from the Conference recognised a “clear possibility that ... anthropogenic increases in carbon dioxide may result in significant and possibly major long–term changes of the global–scale climate”. (Lanchbery and Victor, 1995:31) There were a number of scientific meetings in 1980–83 and other major international organisations such as the International Council of Scientific Unions (ISCU) and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) became involved. Scientists continued their work and by the mid–1980s, it was claimed that anthropogenic emissions of other gases such as methane and nitrous oxide also contributed to the greenhouse effect.

Several political actors in the US took an interest in the issue in the early 1980s. The White House got involved, as did the Department of Energy, the EPA and Congress. ₄ (Pomerance, 1988) In 1985 the first Villach Conference, co–sponsored by the WMO, UNEP and ICSU, was organised and scientists from 29 countries participated, appealing to the world to address seriously the issue of climate change. According to one observer the first Villach Conference marked a “shift of emphasis away from solely the need for more research towards including assertion of the need for political action”. (Paterson, 1992:176) In 1985 the EU (then EC) Commission also addressed the greenhouse problem in its research policy by stating that CO2 emissions were a vital environmental issue, and one year after the issue was discussed at the political level by the European Parliament. (Skjaerseth, 1994)

In 1984 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) established the World Commission on Development and Environment and global climate change was discussed in the UN following the presentation in 1987 of the Commission’s Report, Our Common Future. ₅ The Commission called for the negotiation of a climate treaty. An advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases under the joint auspices of WMO and UNEP was also established. ₆ In 1987 follow up workshops were arranged in Villach and Bellagio; the first one for scientists and the latter for policy makers. This was the first joint international gathering of scientists and policy makers, calling for an agreement on the law of the atmosphere as a global commons and the need to move towards a convention along the lines of the one developed for ozone. “At this point it was clear to most observers that the issue of climate change was in the process of being politicised”. (Borsting and Ferman, 1997:56) Nevertheless, the climate issue was still basically a question for a rather small group of “concerned citizens”, primarily scientists, but an increasing number of international organisations and policy makers. The real break–through for the climate issue on the international political agenda did not, however, take place until 1988.

Formalised Science and Ad Hoc Politics (1988–1990)

The period 1988–1990 is characterised by two parallel processes. One is the formalised scientific process organised by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established by UNEP and the WMO in 1988. The other is the political process characterised by a large number of international conferences of various kinds: ₇

The Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, June 1988. The conference issued an ambitious “call for action” to governments and industries to reduce by 20% CO2 emissions by the year 2005 (1988 baseline) and eventually by 50%.
The Hague Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change in March 1989. The Hague Declaration underlined the need for more effective decision making procedures and better enforcement mechanisms to deal with international environmental problems.
The Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change (November 1989). According to the conference statement: “In the view of many industrialised nations (such) stabilisation should be achieved as a first step at the latest by the year 2000.”
The Bergen Conference, May 1990, was one of the regional preparatory conferences for the 1992 Rio Conference. No specific targets were mentioned in the Bergen Declaration, but support for the precautionary principle (see below) as well as the need for financial transfers to developing countries were underlined.
The Second World Climate Conference in Geneva, October/November 1990. This was primarily a conference for scientists, but also included a political session. The Ministerial Declaration had no targets or timetables. ₈

The initial political process was somewhat “messy” in the sense that it did not take place within a stable organisational framework. The scientific process had a much earlier start and was therefore more formalised. In 1988 WMO and UNEP established the Intergovernmental Panel on Global Climate Change (IPCC). Since starting its work in November 1988, the IPCC has provided the main organisational basis for the scientific research on climate change. The function of the IPCC was to coordinate and initiate research on climate change in order to fulfil three tasks: 1) assess available scientific information on climate change; 2) assess environmental and socio–economic impact of climate change; and 3) formulate response strategies for the management and mitigation of climate change. A working group for each task force was set up accordingly. The IPCC continued to meet throughout 1989 and 1990 and in October 1990 the first IPCC Assessment Report was presented at the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva. The report was accepted as an adequate basis on which to start political negotiations. Of particular importance for the upcoming negotiations was the conclusion adopted by Working Group 1, in which the IPCC “calculated with confidence” that a stabilisation of CO2 emissions at today’s level would require an immediate 60% reduction in emissions. ₉ (Houghton et al. 1990) The IPCC also established a special committee to look at options for increased participation by scientists from developing countries. (Lunde, 1991)

Formalised Negotiations: The Road To Rio (1991–1992)

In 1988 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recognising that climate change was a “common concern of mankind”. In 1989 the UNGA decided to convene the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992 and “granted the issue of climate change top priority within this framework”. (Borsting and Ferman, 1997:62) An UNGA resolution in 1989 on climate change underlined the concern of developing countries in general, emphasising the vulnerability of low–lying coastal and island states. Late in 1990 the UN adopted another climate resolution, establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) as responsible for negotiating a climate convention to be signed at UNCED in 1992. Formal negotiations could start.

The first formal negotiation session within the framework of the INC took place in February 1991. Well over 100 nations and a large number of NGOs and IGOs participated in the process. ₁₀ Links were also established to the Preparatory Committee to the UNCED Conference. Negotiations were conducted on such issues as the nature of the commitments for various groups of countries, targets and timetables for the reduction of CO2 emissions, financial mechanisms, technology transfer, reporting and verification, whether commitments could be implemented jointly and the institutional set–up of the regime. A consensus approach was adopted throughout the negotiation process. After five INC sessions, agreement was reached in May 1992 on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Convention was signed by 153 nations at the UNCED meeting in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): Commitments and Institutions

The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC(Article) is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inference with the climate system. This level should be achieved within a time frame “sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”. Some of the key principles included in the Convention (Article 3) underline the need for common but differentiated obligations, that developed countries should take the lead and that “full consideration” should be given to the specific needs of developing countries. Precautionary measures should be undertaken and scientific uncertainty should not be used as a reason to postpone action.

Commitments. The general commitments are spelled out in Article 44. Countries listed in Annex 1 (OECD countries and countries whose economies are in transition) were to adopt polices and take measures that “demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer–term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognising that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification, and taking into account the differences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases.” (Art. 4.2.a) ₁₁ . Moreover, Annex 1 countries were to adopt national plans to limit emissions and enhance sinks “with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases”. (Art. 4.2.b.) The first review (of the adequacy of commitments) was to take place at the first Conference of the Parties (COP). Commitments would be implemented jointly: “These Parties (Annex 1) may implement such measures jointly with other Parties” (Art. 4.2.a). More specific criteria for joint implementation were to be decided later. The FCCC’s other main commitment was to address the need for financial and technological transfers (Art. 4.3). Annex II Parties (OECD countries only) were to “provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties.” Besides these commitments to control emissions and transfer resources, the FCCC also required “communication of information” by the Parties — i.e., submission of reports. (Art. 4, Art. 12) All parties were required to report periodically on inventories of greenhouse gas emissions. The other type of self–reported data, required especially of the developed countries, relates to detailed description of policies and measures adopted to implement emission controls. Annex II countries were also obliged to report on transfers of resources and technology. The first communication on part of Annex 1 countries was to be submitted within six months after the Convention came into force. ₁₂ As a point of departure, developing countries were to submit their communications within three years after the Convention had come into force. However, Article 4.3 modified this deadline, making it conditional on “the availability of financial resources”, and the least developed countries could provide communications at their discretion.

Institutions. The Convention establishes six institutions to implement the rules and regulations it contains. First, the Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision making body of the Convention, where all the Parties participate (Art. 7.2). The Convention permits qualified NGOs to attend the COP as observers unless one–third of the Parties present object (Art. 7.6). The primary function of the COP is to make the decisions necessary to promote the implementation of the Convention and to review its effectiveness regularly. It is also to adopt criteria for joint implementation and reporting as well as review reports from subsidiary bodies. The Convention leaves open whether the COP should make decisions by consensus or some type of majority rule. Meetings are to take place annually.

The Secretariat (Art. 8) is to arrange sessions of the COP, facilitate assistance to the Parties (particularly developing countries) in preparing, compiling and transmitting reports, and coordinate with other relevant secretariats. The decision on which institution should serve as a secretariat for the Convention was to be taken by the first COP (Art. 8.3).

The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) was created to “provide the COP with timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention” (Art. 9). It is open to all Parties and the need for interdisciplinary participation is stressed. The SBSTA shall comprise government representatives “competent in the relevant field of expertise” (Art. 9). Regular reports shall be provided to the COP. More specifically, the SBSTA shall provide assessment of relevant scientific knowledge; assessments of the effects of measures taken to implement the Convention; and information on efficient technologies (Art. 9.2a/c) The SBSTA is to draw upon information from existing competent international bodies as well, including IPCC. Finally, “the functions and terms of reference of this body shall be further elaborated by the Conference of the Parties” (Art. 9.3).

The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) was established to assist the Parties in the assessment and review of the effective implementation of the Convention (Art. 10). It is also open to all parties and is comprised of government representatives “who are experts on matters related to climate change” (Art. 10). It is to consider information communicated in accordance with Article 12 (reporting) to assess the overall effect of steps taken by the Parties. Moreover, it is to assist the COP in carrying out the reviews called for in Article 4. ₁₃

Article 11.1 of the Convention also provides for a mechanism for the provision of financial resources, including the transfer of technology. This financial mechanism is to have an “equitable and balanced representation of all parties” (Art. 11.2) and function under the guidance of and be accountable to the COP. Its operations are to be entrusted to “one or more existing international entities” (11.1). According to Article 21, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) will be the entity entrusted with the operation of this financial mechanism on an interim basis, but not before the GEF is “appropriately restructured and its membership made universal”. It was left to the COP1 to implement the broad principles laid down in the Convention, including a decision on whether the interim arrangement should be maintained. Four years later the COP is to review the financial mechanism. Transfer of resources may be done bilaterally, regionally or through other multilateral channels.

Finally, in Article 13 it is stated that the COP at its first session should consider the establishment of a multilateral consultative process, available to parties on request, for the resolution of questions related to implementation.

According to Article 7.4 the first COP should take place no later than one year after the date of entry into force of the Convention. The UNFCCC came into force on 21 March 1994, 90 days after 50 Parties had ratified it. In order not to halt the process of negotiations until after the Convention came into force, it was decided to hold them within the INC framework. The INC was tasked with developing the rules, procedures and institutions of the FCCC in time for them to be approved at the first COP. There were more INC meetings after Rio than before, and the eleventh and final INC session was convened in February 1995.

Post–Rio Developments: The Fleshing Out of Commitments

This account is brief, as there was not much action until the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) in Kyoto in December 1997. The first COP, in April 1995 in Berlin, produced a compromise called the Berlin Mandate. The COP agreed to take appropriate action for the period beyond 2000, including the strengthening of commitments of the Parties in Annex 1 to the Convention through the adoption of a Protocol or some other legal instrument. Policies and measures were to be elaborated with the aim of reaching quantified limitations and reductions within specific time frames such as 2005 and 2010 for emission of greenhouse gases. The continuing negotiation process on commitments was to take place within “an open ended ad hoc group of parties”. This Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) met twice in 1995 and twice in 1996 without making much substantial progress.

The second session of the COP met in Geneva in July 1996. The Geneva Ministerial Declaration was the most important document produced, and it underlined that a continued rise in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere would lead to “dangerous interference with the climate system”. (FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1) The Geneva Declaration also instructed representatives “to accelerate negotiations on the text of a legally binding protocol ... for adoption at the third session of the COP”, including “quantified legally binding objectives for emissions limitations and significant overall reduction within specified time frames”. However, 16 countries reserved themselves against the majority view. Another four AGBM meetings took place after COP2, between December 1996 and October 1997, and although no agreement was reached over commitments, real negotiations had finally started. ₁₄ (Ehrman and Oberthur, 1997:192)

At the third COP, in Kyoto, the negotiators succeed in reaching agreement on a protocol and new elements were added on commitments. According to Article 3, the Annex 1 Parties were to reduce their overall greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 5.2% by the year 2008–2012 (base–line 1990). This is to be done with regard to six greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and three halo–carbons used as substitutes for ozone damaging emissions (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6). Annex B reveals a differentiation among the Annex 1 countries as to the required level of emissions. While the large majority were to reduce their emissions, some were called on to stabilise them and a few countries were allowed to increase their emissions, the range being from —8% to +10%.

Institutional and Organisational Development

While there was a virtual standstill until Kyoto on the question of commitments, a more gradual development can be noted in relation to the softer mechanisms elaborated to help implement the commitments agreed upon. The most substantial development has taken place regarding reporting and review.

Reporting and review of national commitments. The first concrete obligation for the (37) Annex 1 countries was the submission of national reports by September 1994, six months after the Convention came into force. ₁₅ Fifteen countries provided reports on time. ₁₆ In order to prepare for the first reviews of these communications, the Parties at the ninth INC adopted guidelines and procedures based on work undertaken by the OECD and the IPCC. At the next INC session the Parties adopted an in–depth review procedure to be followed by the Secretariat in an evaluation of these reports. While this was essentially a paper review, subject to the approval of the party concerned, an expert team carrying out the review was permitted to visit the country to “clarify” the information it had submitted. (Greene and Lanchbery, 1996) At the eleventh INC session it was decided that the resulting synthesis would be “non–confrontational” but could name parties “as appropriate”. (Oberthur and Ott, 1995) Agreement was also reached that the second communication from Annex 1 countries should be due 15 April 1997. At COP1 it was decided that each national communication from Annex 1 countries should be subjected to an in–depth review within one year after it had been received from the Secretariat. The expert review teams were under the authority of the SBI and SBSTA and the review team would consist of experts nominated by other parties and from international organisations. The Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies were entrusted to ensure balance in terms of expertise and region.

Thirty–one Annex 1 Parties had submitted national communications by 1 May 1996 and 21 in–depth reviews of communications had been conducted and 6 reports had been published. ₁₇ (FCCC/CP/1996/12) Eighteen Annex 1 Parties had provided inventory data for all the years subsequent to 1990 and 20 out of the 22 Annex II Parties had described measures taken to meet commitments regarding transfer and assistance to developing countries. ₁₈ The majority of Parties reported on their contribution to GEF and some parties stated explicitly that such contributions were new and additional. However, the Secretariat noted that “it was not possible to quantify aid flows”. (FCCC/CP/1996/12)

By October 1997, all Annex 1 countries but one had submitted their first national communication. Thirty–two country visits had taken place in connection with in–depth reviews of national communications and 28 reports had been issued. (FCCC/SBI/1997/INF.6) As to the second national communication from Annex 1 Parties, due 15 April six communications were delivered on time and 10 after the deadline. (FCCC/SBI/1997/INF.6) As to communications from non–Annex I Parties, which had a tentative deadline of 15 April 1997, only two were submitted to the secretariat by October 1997. However, a large number were under preparation and others had recently received approval by the GEF. (FCCC/SBI/1997/INF.3) ₁₉ Further measures to assist the developing countries were also discussed. The review of the second communication by Annex 1 countries were to be finished within a two year period after they had been received. Procedures for methodological improvements and measures to secure increasing comparability in reporting continued to be developed. The practice evolved regarding reporting and review was essentially codified in the Kyoto Protocol.

Joint implementation. While no progress was noted on this issue during the INC negotiations, a compromise was reached at COP1. The parties agreed on a pilot phase under the new heading of “activities implemented jointly”, or (AIJ). However, no credits would accrue to any party as a result of greenhouse gas emissions reduced during the pilot phase. Developing countries could participate on a voluntary basis. The COP should review progress made annually and the Subsidiary Bodies should establish a framework for reporting. However, no obligation was established for parties to report on AIJ activities, although they were encouraged to do so. (Oberthur and Ott, 1995) The pilot phase was not formally limited, but a comprehensive review was set to take place no later than 1999. The first review of information on progress made under the pilot AIJ resulted in a decision to continue the pilot phase. Reporting procedures for activities implemented (Uniform Reporting Format) was agreed upon in March 1997. Thirty activities had been reported in time for consideration by the Secretariat while another 23 had been reported later in 1997. (FCCC/SBSTA/1997/12) Eleven countries were involved in the projects. The new deadline for inclusion in the next synthesis report was set at 30 June 1998. As for joint implementation in the Kyoto Protocol, Article 6 states: “For the purpose of meeting its commitment under Article 3, any Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing ... emissions”. The Conference of the Parties was to elaborate guidelines for implementation of this article, including verification and reporting procedures.

The financial mechanism. As called for in the Convention, GEF had been restructured. It was decided that the restructured GEF should continue to be the international entity entrusted with the operation of the Convention’s financial mechanism on an interim basis. The arrangement should be reviewed after four years, when a definite decision on the role of GEF should be taken. A memorandum of understanding between the Conference of the Parties and the GEF has been adopted. An annex to the memorandum spells out in more detail the procedures for fund disbursement, subject to further deliberations within the SBI. (FCCC/CP/1996/9) By COP2, US $ 53 million in total had been provided by GEF to support 75 countries in preparing their first “national communication”. (FCCC/CP/1996/8:10). By the Kyoto meeting, the corresponding figure was US $ 63 million, and 85 climate project programs had been adopted to give support to 114 countries. (Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB), 13 December 1997)

Organisational development. The permanent Secretariat was placed in Bonn — somewhat surprisingly, as the Interim Secretariat had been in Geneva. ₂₀ The broad mandates of the SBSTA and SBI were rather quickly decided. The Subsidiary Bodies, dealing with the various institutional issues, met in conjunction with the AGBM meetings. Before the reporting and review process got under way, the SBI did not have a heavy workload, but gradually it increased. ₂₁ (Greene and Lanchbery, 1996) As for the SBSTA, one of its immediate tasks was to establish “intergovernmental technical advisory panels” (TAP) to provide it with advice on issues related to technology and methodology. However, no agreement was reached on the composition and role of the TAPs. ₂₂ Moreover, no agreement was reached on the relationship between these two bodies and the IPCC. (Greene and Lanchbery, 1996) In December 1995 the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC was released. It was the function of the SBSTA to “translate” and convey the findings of the IPCC (and other scientific bodies) to the negotiation bodies (AGBM and eventually COP), but no agreement could be reached on what conclusions should be drawn from the assessment report. (Oberthur, 1996)

In 1997 a more distinct division of labour and responsibility between SBI and SBSTA was agreed upon. The main rule was that each body will take overall responsibility in considering an issue. SBI was to have overall responsibility for national communications, transfer of technology and consultation with NGOs. SBSTA was responsible for activities implemented jointly and for research and public awareness. Provisions were also made for informal joint groups.(FCCC/SBI/1997/20) Related to the work of the Secretariat, a new trust fund was created “for the special annual contribution of DM 3.5 million from the Government of Germany to finance events in Germany”. (FCCC/SBI/1997/18) ₂₃

As for the establishment of the multilateral consultative process stipulated in the Convention’s Article 13, it was decided to establish an open ended ad hoc group of technical and legal experts to study all issues on this process. The first meeting in this Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 (AG 13) took place in October 1995. Interested parties as well as NGOs participated. It was decided to make a questionnaire on what issues to be addressed by the group. At the second meeting in July 1996, links were established between this process and the AGBM. The role of the multilateral consultative process (MCP) has later become more clarified, and is “leaned heavily in the direction of an assistance process”. (Lanchbery, 2, 1997) Thus, the MCP is advisory rather than supervisory, and its work continues after COP3.

Rules of procedure. One important issue that has not been resolved throughout this process was the rule on voting. ₂₄

New elements added by the Kyoto Protocol. Article 12 of the document defines a clean development mechanism, the purpose of which is to assist Parties not included in Annex 1 in “achieving sustainable development and contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention and to assist Parties included in Annex 1 in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation.” (Art. 12.2) The clean development mechanism is to be supervised by an executive board. Participation is voluntary, and the emission reductions are additional. The Conference of the Parties is to elaborate at its first session procedures ensuring “transparency, efficiency and accountability through independent auditing and verification”. (Art. 12.7) Both private and public entities may participate in the clean develoment mechanism.

According to Article 16, the COP is to define rules and guidelines for “verification, reporting and accountability for emission trading”. All Annex B countries (similar to the group of Annex 1 countries in the 1992 Convention) may participate in emission trading in order to reach their commitments and this trading should be supplemental to domestic measures. (Art. 6)

Measures to address non–compliance (Article 17) as well as more specific (voluntary) commitments on the part of developing countries have been left for the subsequent COP process to determine. The next COP will be in Buenos Aires in November 1998. The Convention will be open for signature from 16 March 1998 until 15 March 1999 (Art. 23). The Protocol enters into force 90 days after it has been ratified by 55 parties, “incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990.” (Art. 24)

Summary

The purpose of this exercise has been to provide a factual basis for evaluating developments over time, primarily regarding commitments and institutions. It underlies the discussion in the remaining parts of the report. In the next section, attention will be focused mainly on the question of actor positions towards commitments; subsequently, the main features of the institutional framework presented above will be evaluated.

3. The Political Process: The Development of Actor Positions

How Did the Issue Reach the International Political Agenda?

Scientists discovered the potential environmental problems associated with emissions of greenhouse gases. However, as is commonly the case, there was a considerable time lag between the scientific findings and the call for political action. ₂₅ It is a common notion that “science regularly plays an important role in agenda setting by identifying and highlighting previously unknown ... problems”. (Young, 1989) However, it is equally well documented that the agenda setting effect varies among issue areas and science alone is seldom or never sufficient to get the attention of decision makers and the public. As pointed out by Bodansky (1996:2) “Whether improved scientific knowledge would have been enough to spur political action is doubtful, particularly given the scientific uncertainties about climate change.” Not only has there been scientific uncertainty; the nature of the climate change problem is not one to elicit a rapid political response. If problems are “visible” and effects appear dramatic (the ozone hole and tanker accidents), political response is often swift. In contrast, global warming has been a long–term, “invisible” problem with diffuse impacts. Nevertheless, between 1985 and 1988 the issue reached the international political agenda. Why?

First, a small group of “environment oriented scientists”, major figures in the international science establishment with close links to WMO and UNEP acted as “knowledge brokers” and entrepreneurs to promote the climate change issue on the international agenda. (Bodansky, 1996) They were instrumental in “translating” and communicating the complex scientific models through workshops, conferences and the more popular scientific journals. Secondly, this was a period of increased concern about international environmental issues, triggered by such events as the discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole, the Chernobyl accident as well as the publication of Our Common Future (known as the Brundtland Report). Finally, although the problem of climate change is intrinsically invisible and diffuse with assumed slow and gradual warming, unusual weather–conditions will often be perceived and interpreted by the public as a result of global climate change. ₂₆ This is exactly what happened in the US during the summer of 1988. The heat wave and drought “gave an enormous popular boost to greenhouse warming proponents, particularly in the US and Canada”. (Bodansky, 1996) Testimonies by climate modelers such as James Hansen before US Congressional Committees in 1987 and 1988 reinforced the perception that a “dangerous warming” was just around the corner. The media in the US also played a very important role in getting the issue on the international agenda.

In short, the ”climate” for agenda setting was highly ”benign”. In a setting characterised by strong environmental concern and seemingly dramatic evidence of global warming, some key scientists with links to important international organisations were able to catch the attention of the public and decision makers. The process was dominated by non–governmental actors and their room for manoeuvre may have been increased by the fact that no state institutions worked actively against the politicisation of the issue. ₂₇

Environmental Enthusiasm But Increased Politicisation (1988–1990)

In retrospect, the Toronto Conference can be seen as the true start of the political history of the climate process. This was when the “targets and timetables” approach was adopted and, to judge by the “strong” statement the Conference produced, “the world” seemed ready for tough political action to deal with the problem. Toronto was not, however, a ministerial conference. The participants took part in their capacity as individuals. ₂₈ Nevertheless, because the Toronto Conference was attended by two heads of government and more than 100 government officials as well as a large number of scientists, industry representatives and environmentalists, it has rightly been called “the high water mark of policy declarations on global warming [which] had far more status and influence than other non–governmental meetings held before or since”. (Bodansky, 1993: 462)The Toronto Conference was not the only indication that the Western developed world seemed to take this problem seriously. It has already been noted that President Bush did so (see note 27). At about the same time, another actor, not previously known for deep environmental concern, the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, warned in a speech to the Royal Society that we may have “unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system of the planet itself”. (The Times [London], 28 September 1988) Although countries such as the UK and the US, initially seemed to share the general environmental enthusiasm at the time, they were never the main drivers of the process. In addition to the crucial roles played by international organisations such as the WMO and various UN agencies, it was the smaller Western countries that seemed prepared to take the lead in the process. Canada signalled a high environmental profile by calling the Toronto Conference and, together with Norway, participated at the highest political level. ₂₉ Although the Toronto Conference may have been the high point of environmental enthusiasm specifically related to climate, The Hague Ministerial Conference was the highlight in more general international environmental terms. Twenty–four countries participated, mostly represented by heads of state. Norway was a convenor together with Holland and France. The Hague Declaration was very radical in the sense that new international institutions called for involved, non–unanimous decision making, “in effect a partial renunciation of sovereignty”. (Bodansky, 1993:466) According to the Norwegian Prime Minister at the time, “the principles we have endorsed are in fact radical, but anything less would not serve”. (Ibid.) In order to be able to adopt such a radical resolution, the convenors had been careful in picking who should be allowed to take part. The US, the USSR and China were not invited because of “their unenthusiastic attitude towards climate change policy instruments.” (Borsting and Ferman, 1997:58). The UK was invited, but it declined to participate. Thus, for some of the key parties the environmental enthusiasm was rather short–lived.

In 1989 and 1990 the initial rather idyllic picture of consensus on action gradually disappeared. Most importantly, the US seemed to have transformed itself from a key co–operating party to a distinct laggard. ₃₀ The gradual polarisation of the issue became clear at the Noordwijk ministerial conference, convened by the Netherlands in November 1989 and attended by 66 nations. This time the developing countries were also well represented, making it the first high level and representative international political meeting focusing specifically on the climate issue. Both the radical call for action through new decision making procedures, voiced by the more “exclusive” Hague meeting, and the call for emission reductions by the “less responsible” Toronto meeting, had disappeared. A minority of countries, including the US, Japan and the Soviet Union were opposed to targets and timetables, while these were was favoured by a majority of countries, including the EU. Those familiar with the more recent history of global climate change might find surprising the positions taken by some delegations at the time. The delegate from Saudi Arabia characterised global warming as a “life or death issue for considerable areas of the earth”, and recognised the need to move to non–greenhouse emissions energy production and consumption systems to stabilise and reduce emissions. (Bodansky, 1993:467) Thus, although there was a more sober tone to the Noordwijk meeting than to previous ones, some of the delegates still possessed environmental enthusiasm. The North–South dimension was still essentially missing, while conflicts between developed countries, most notably the US and the EU, were building.

As regards the positions of the developed countries, the Noordwijk conference set the stage for the remainder of this period. On the one side, and seemingly quite isolated, was the US, stressing scientific uncertainties, calling for more research and advocating its no regret option. ₃₁ The US was against targets and timetables in principle, insisting they were premature, and argued instead that states should focus on developing national programs and strategies consisting of concrete policy measures as well as intensifying research. (Andresen, 1993) On the other side, the EU and most other OECD countries favoured the “targets and timetables” approach. In line with its ambition to be a “pusher” or leader on the issue, Norway in 1989 became the first country in the world to adopt an emission target, stabilisation of CO2 emissions by the year 2000. ₃₂ The EU adopted a similar target for the whole of the EU in 1990, and some countries were willing to go considerably further than stabilisation by the year 2000. (Skjaerseth, 1994, Wagner, 1997)

Norway again demonstrated its ambition to be in the forefront of international environmental issues by organising the so–called Bergen Conference. Although the “green side” was able to win support from the US regarding the significance of certain guiding principles, the conference declaration was perceived by many as empty as there were no figures in it. (Andresen and Wetttestad, 1990) This conference, as well as many of the other more or less ad hoc gatherings of the period, were colourful events with lots of media attention. The reason was not least the “clashes” between the EU and the US, where most of the media and the environmental groups had painted the EU as the “good green guy” and the US as the “bad gray guy”. It was not only the US that projected a high (negative) profile. The EU Commissioner on Environmental Affairs, Ripa de Meana, did his part to create conflict with an extremely harsh critique of the US policy and strong support for the target approach as well as the adoption of the precautionary principle. Meana’s views may have been representative of the EU Commission’s DG 11, which was the key external EU player in this period, but as we shall see later, his views were not shared by all EU countries. ₃₃ The Second World Climate Conference brings us very close to the start of the real negotiations, and 137 countries participated in it. The Declaration produced was quite vague; and the important development at this conference was not continued disagreement in the North, but the changing views among the developing countries. They made it clear that the issue of global climate change was a North–South issue as well; not only about environment, but about development. However, the South was not unified on the issue. The oil producing states no longer conceived of climate change in “life or death” terms; they realised that they could lose money through reduced export earnings from a tough climate policy. They questioned the science and argued for a “go slow” approach. (Bodansky, 1993:471) In contrast, the small island and low–lying coastal states, later to be organised under the heading of AOSIS, feared the adverse effect of a predicted sea–level rise resulting from the global warming and supported strong measures to curb emissions.

Developing and developed countries had different opinions on what would be the most appropriate framework for the upcoming negotiations. In fact, at first, the US did not want any negotiations on a climate convention, but after strong pressure it reversed its position and announced in May 1989 that it was ready to support such negotiations. (Bodansky, 1993:473) Essentially there were two alternative frameworks for negotiations; either they could be conducted under the auspices of the WMO and the UNEP, much as the IPCC had been organised, or they could be conducted under the auspices of the UN General Assembly. In general, the developing countries favoured the latter option, both because it would give them better control of the process and because of their scepticism towards the IPCC and the more ”technical” approach of the UNEP and WMO. For the same reasons, the major developed nations favoured the first option. As we know, the developing nations “won” this battle.

Explaining the Development of Actor Positions on the Era Of Environmental Enthusiasm

Initially, strong international environmental concern, the “veil of uncertainty” (Young, 1991) as to effects as well as costs, and a strong position by various non–governmental actors caused all the main players to endorse the need for swift and forceful action. This gradually changed as the ad hoc period came to a close and more formal negotiations approached. The most important change took place in the US. According to Bodansky, “the United States may have been the only Western country to view the climate change issue through a domestic policy prism from the outset”. After 1987, international environmental issues were coordinated by a working group in the White House Domestic Policy Council, “in which the Environmental Protection Agency was increasingly outmuscled by major domestic players” (Bodansky, 1993) However, it was not until John Sununu entered the White House as chief of staff during the fall of 1989 that the US started to act almost demonstratively negative. The new chief of staff was not only very sceptical about the scientific side of the issue, he was also negative about both “excessive” government control and international global cooperation. (Andresen, 1993) Most of the OECD countries, however, still seemed ready for action. One reason may be that they perceived climate change exclusively as an environmental issue and officials from the environmental sector dominated the process. In line with their general ambitions of international environmental leadership, Canada, Norway and the Netherlands, and to some extent the EU, seemed ready to take the lead on the issue. The fact that developing countries also tended to be represented by their ministry of environment may explain why they also initially seemed ready to act. (Bodansky, 1993) However, towards the end of this process, the positions of the developing countries are starting to change. The reason for this change will be elaborated further as the issue gradually matures and their positions are better clarified.

Formal Negotiations Start: The Us Perceived as Chief Laggard On Commitments

In the eyes of the media and most environmental groups, it was simple and essentially uncontested who was the “laggard” and who were the ”pushers”. During the whole negotiating process up to Rio, the US was judged as the chief laggard. A few selected quotes illustrate this. One summary of the first INC session in the US early in 1991 was: “US says no, most of the rest of the world says yes”. (International Environmental Reporter, 13 February 1991). Another typical headline during the INC negotiations was: “America creates cold climate for climate talks”. (New Scientist, 16 February 1991). During the fall of 1991, Mr. Brinkhorst, the leader of the EC (EU) delegation said: “the US is becoming increasingly isolated in the Western World”. (International Environmental Reporter, October 9, 1991) This picture was reinforced when the delegates arrived in Rio, where media attention was intense and environmentalists played a key role in setting the stage. “Bush courts disaster in Rio .... He could be the embarking on his biggest public relations disaster”. The US position was that “finding a single strict approach binding all countries would be unrealistic”. ₃₄ Japan was among the few OECD countries also arguing against uniform emission standards during the INC negotiations.

Conceiving of the countries that had adopted or suggested the most far–reaching emission reductions as pushers, there is some continuity from the previous phase, but some new actors entered the scene at Rio, while others disappeared. Germany, which had been rather vocal in the pre–negotiation phase but had taken no major initiatives to address the issue, now seemed ready to follow up in practice and set a target to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 25% or more by 2005 from 1987 levels. Denmark and Australia were relative newcomers on the “activist scene”, calling for 25% and 20% respectively by the year 2000. AOSIS also called for drastic measures at the first INC session. As late as the December 1991 session of the INC, the draft negotiation text included alternative proposals for the developed countries to reduce emissions by 25%, as a first step, by 2010. (Bodansky, 1993:513) By the end of the INC process, almost all OECD countries had joined the so–called “carbon club”, countries that had adopted national carbon emission targets. ₃₅

The negotiations on commitments took place mainly among the OECD countries. ₃₆ When it became clear that the developing countries would be exempted from concrete commitments, generally they became pushers in the sense that they advocated strong commitments for the developed nations. OPEC, under the “leadership” of Saudi Arabia, was probably the most reluctant party regarding commitments, taking the opposite position of AOSIS. This variance among the developing nations was greater than among the developed nations. ₃₇ Apart from the question of commitments, the question of transfer of resources to developing countries was the second most important item on the INC agenda. As long as the negotiations were put in these terms, their subject was a “classical” North–South issue, with ensuing strong polarisation. The developing countries wanted additional resources and a new international mechanism to deal with climate change. The developed countries, in turn, were reluctant to commit new resources of any significance and they wanted the GEF to deal with the issue.

Developing Countries as Institutional Laggards

Compared to the heated debate over commitments, there was less emphasis both outside and inside the halls of negotiations on the procedural or institutional set–up of the regime. To some extent this question also turned into a North–South conflict, where most developing countries wanted a weak institutional regime and most OECD countries wanted a strong regime. While the oil–exporting countries and the US were often lumped together as laggards in the sense that they were against the targets and timetable approach, they were at opposite extremes when it came to the institutional arrangement of the regime. Not only did OPEC countries resist to specific commitments, they ”favored at most a barebones convention that set general principles ... and that did not establish subsidiary bodies to the COP.” ₃₈ Among the OECD countries, the US was the “pusher” for a strong regime in this sense. The US supported what it characterised as a “process–oriented convention” with flexible non–compliance procedures and quite ambitious implementation mechanisms, including advisory committees on science and implementation and detailed provisions on scientific research and information exchange.

Instead of focusing most attention on commitments, Japan, like the US, was more preoccupied with the institutional strength of the regime. It stressed the need to establish procedures and institutions to give the regime adequate capacity to implement the rules and regulations adopted. At the 2^nd INC meeting Japan introduced the concept of “pledge and review” as an attempt to compromise on the timetables and targets issue. Under the Japanese proposal, states would be required to make unilateral pledges consisting of a national strategy and response measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions. “An international team of experts would periodically review and evaluate the pledges and make recommendations”. (Bodansky, 1993:486) The main function of such an approach, according to its proponents, would be to promote transparency and accountability, but they argued that it would also contribute towards gradually stricter commitments. Environmental NGOs sharply criticised this approach, dubbing it “hedge and retreat”. At subsequent sessions those in favour of the traditional approach said ”pledge and review” could only be a supplement. The EU was particularly critical, characterising it as “the twin ghost [that] has been haunting this session”. (Ibid. p.487) The EU, generally joined by the so–called CANZ group (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) stressed the need for both strong institutions and target and timetables, but put most emphasis on the latter.

Who Got What in the Climate Convention?

Given these disparate views and position; how was agreement finally reached? First it can be noted that only limited progress was made on most major issues up until the last INC session. Both main contesting parties, the EU and the US, upheld their principal positions throughout this phase, though there may have been some de facto softening on each side. As regards the EU member states, it was a major embarrassment that they were not able to agree on a common tax on CO2 emissions. It served to weaken their credibility and lent some support to the US argument that the EU position was not backed by practical means to implement their targets. As for the US, the fact that Mr. Sununu left the White House during the fall of 1991 may have paved the way for a somewhat less dogmatic position. Be that as it may, it is a fact that bilateral negotiations between the US and the UK were instrumental in bringing about the final compromise. ₃₉ Towards the end of the negotiations, other exclusive negotiation groups also played a key role. ₄₀ Originally, the UK/US compromise text was heavily criticised, not least by key developing countries, but in the final end this proposal was only marginally changed. The link to the Rio process and the fact that time was running out were probably important in this context. Although many delegations were not entirely happy with the outcome, they simply could not take the blame for opening up a delicately balanced package. The negotiators were “doomed to success” ₄₁ . (Bodansky, 1993)

How does the Convention reflect the negotiation process among the various national positions? Maybe the most obvious “winner” in terms of substance, if not in terms of public relations, was the US, as the Convention does not contain targets and timetables even though an overwhelming majority of countries wanted this included. This reminds us that international treaties are not worth much if the most significant contributor to the problem does not participate — although the outcome is often a “weaker” agreement. ₄₂ Another “winner” was the developing countries as they were exempted from anything that resembled real commitments. On both these accounts it seemed that the law of the “least enthusiastic party” had prevailed — at the expense of the environment. (Underdal, 1980)

On other important points, however, the convention was a genuine compromise among different interests and positions, such as the decision to reorganise and use GEF on a interim basis, the differentiated system for reporting requirements and the vague and general option of joint implementation. The fact that the Convention was opened up for differentiated commitments is a concession to the countries arguing for “special circumstances”. ₄₃ As to the strength of the regime, again there was a compromise between the North and the South, but the outline of the regime seems closer to the “maximalist” OECD model than the “minimalist” developing countries model. However, on this point, as on many others, much was left to be decided by future negotiations. This brief overview indicates that the “losers” in the design of the convention were the EU and the “rest OECD group”. For the EU the link between concrete commitments and fairly strong institutions was the key to an effective regime, and this was not achieved. However, quite a few countries in this category, while regretting the weak commitments in public, privately said they were quite happy with a Convention without targets and timetables, as they had become increasingly aware of the costs involved. (Bodansky, 1993, Andresen, 1993) Subsequent developments may prove they were fortunate to have lost the battle over commitments in this round.

Development of Pre–Rio Positions: Clarification of National Interests

In the early 1990s, economists got increasingly involved in the climate change issue. Calculations showed that there might be weaknesses and problems associated with the seemingly straightforward and fair approach of equal emissions reductions, as it was very far from an optimal cost–effective approach. (Nordhaus, 1991) The argument was that, since this was a global problem, emission reductions should be conducted where they would be least costly. This ran counter to the “equal emissions reductions” approach which implied uniformity irrespective of costs. As some countries had a very efficient energy production system, further reductions of CO2 emissions would be both more costly and have less environmental effect than when introduced in countries with low energy efficiency. In short, the same measures would neither have the same costs, nor the same effect across countries. In pointing out the comparative advantages of emission–trading, taxation of emissions and joint implementation, economists favoured the use of the market as a regulator over the more traditional command and control mechanisms. This discussion not only affected preferences on which approach to choose, it also increased the awareness of the costs involved. This is amply illustrated by the gradual change in the position of one of the previous ”pushers”, Norway.

As pointed out, Norway was in the very forefront during the pre–negotiation phase, in terms of both agenda setting initiatives and policy declarations. However, Norway is conspicuously absent from the group calling for reductions in CO2 emissions during the INC negotiations. Why? Until the early 1990s, the climate issue had been essentially under the domain of the Ministry of Environment. Then a broad planning process started, involving a large number of government agencies as well as research institutions. As a result the Ministry of Finance appeared as a key actor, and the climate issue was no longer conceived of in purely environmental terms, but also in economic terms. (Sydnes, 1996) Calculations showed that strict emission standards, and not the least an equal caps on emissions, would be very costly to Norway. ₄₄ Initially Norway was not ready to leave the commitment adopted in 1989 to stabilise CO2 emissions, but started to advocate flexible approaches, including the need for joint implementation and a “clearing house” mechanism. In fact it was Norway that introduced some of these concepts, which later came to be included in the Convention. ₄₅ (Mintzer, 1994) Thus, Saudi Arabia discovered around 1990 that it might be very costly to embrace a strict climate policy. It took a year or so more for Norway to realise that a pure environmental approach towards the climate issue might not be in the “best national interest”.

As noted, Japan did not endorse the majority approach either. It scored very high on energy efficiency due to measures introduced in the wake of the “oil–crisis” in the early 1970s, and additional measures to curb emissions would be more costly to Japan than to most OECD countries. At the first INC session, in February 1991, the Japanese Head of Delegation argued that the aim should be “an appropriate framework that will encompass all countries by taking into account their individual situation instead of a mechanical and uniform target.” [emphasis added] (Bodansky, 1993:514) Thus, the US was no longer the only actor that was concerned about the economic dimension of the issue; traditional economic cost–benefit analyses showed that decisive action might be costly for some, while the benefits were rather long–term and diffuse. Also, from a traditional national interest point of view, it is not surprising that OPEC would fear decreased use of fossil fuels — although understandably, at the negotiations they were met with less sympathy than AOSIS members, facing potent loss of their lands if predictions come true. Thus, a process that can be characterised as creating understanding for “special circumstances” had started, and it would soon gain increased momentum. However, different regulatory philosophies, not necessarily derived from economic interests, also made a difference.

Post Rio Positions: Stability and Change

Stability more than change characterise the positions of most actors during the post–Rio negotiation process. This was particularly pronounced for the developing countries. AOSIS continued to be the most credible pusher for strong commitments, while OPEC continued to be the most consequent “draggers” by delaying or weakening commitments. (Lanchbery, 1996:7) Based on the compromise finally reached in Kyoto, however, it seems their influence was gradually diminishing over time. As to the G–77/China group, it “used every opportunity to distance itself from any attempt to draw developing countries into anything that can be interpreted as new commitments”. (ENB, 13 December 1997) Most developing countries were also against joint implementation and saw this essentially as a way for the rich countries to buy themselves out of the problem. Generally they were also against using market mechanisms and economic incentives to deal with the climate problem. Overall, there does not seem to be many examples of developing countries moving beyond stating their preferences during the negotiations. An exception was during the Berlin Conference where the G/77, with India playing a key role, was instrumental in creating the compromise on joint implementation by submitting a “green paper” and was also active in efforts to work out the Berlin Mandate. (Greene and Lanchbery, 1996)

There was more change among the developed nations. However, for those hoping for quick agreement on forceful measures, the development seemed to go in the “wrong direction”. This is illustrated by the development of the previous CANZ group (Canada, New Zealand and Australia). Initially this group was rather “progressive”, with members that had been pushers in the initial phase. The addition of “JUS” (JUSCANZ) illustrates that Japan and the US have joined the group; indicating that it was no longer very “progressive” — judged by traditional standards. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland also joined the JUSCANZ group. ₄₆ While most of the other negotiation groups were either based on a traditional set of commonly perceived interests (as were OPEC or OASIS) or a common broad ideology, as within G–77/ China, the JUSCANZ have been characterized more as a “discussion club”. ₄₇ As the EU operated as a rather closed group, having enough difficulties reaching an internal agreement, the remaining OECD countries also needed their own “residual” forum. ₄₈ In broad terms, the JUSCANZ group represented two types of interests. On the one hand were the “energy–efficiency” countries such as Japan, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. As additional measures would be very costly, these countries argued for differentiated emission goals as well as flexibility in terms of how to reach the commitments. ₄₉ On the other hand were the geographically large countries such as the US, Canada and Australia; large consumers and producers of fossil fuels, not the least in terms of coal. There were predictions for steady increases, and they argued that strong measures to curb emissions would be damaging to their economy. In this sense, the JUSCANZ was the prime example of the argument introduced earlier on the increasing plea for “special circumstances”. They demanded flexibility and differentiation. However understandable and legitimate, this made already difficult negotiations even more complex.

Those who had expected that a change in the US administration would lead to a radically new environmental policy were also disappointed. True, the US became more of a “normal” player, and less demonstratively “negative” on key issues, but it did not change position much on commitments. ₅₀ Those waiting for a strong leadership role by the EU were also disappointed, as no progress was made on a common carbon tax. ₅₁ A few EU countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, however, continued to call for reductions of CO2 emissions among developed countries.

This configuration of interests and positions in broad terms explains why there was no development towards a compromise during the renewed INC negotiations. For this reason expectations were low when the COP1 met. Against that backdrop, the Berlin Conference has been deemed a “success”. (Greene and Lanchbery, 1996) Although the Berlin Mandate may be interpreted as a small step towards more concrete commitments, it is probably more of a symbolic step, sending a signal that the process is moving in the “right” direction. It may well be the lack of specificity that allowed OPEC to refrain from opposing it. The Berlin Mandate was also worded in a way that made it acceptable to the US. Although it states explicitly that the current emissions levels are not adequate to reach its objective, “the mandate does not determine unequivocally that the future negotiations will be on reductions of greenhouse gas emissions to be reached by certain dates (“targets and timetables”) as called for by many states and NGOs”. (Obertur and Ott, 1995:4) The Berlin Mandate may have been more than most observers expected, but it does not reflect any basic change of positions of any major actors towards taking on more commitments.

The first four AGBM meetings in 1995 and 1996 seemed to send the negotiators back to the “shadow–land”, ₅₂ confirming that the Berlin Mandate did not represent any break through towards new commitments. JUSCANZ countries demanded “endless discussions over policies and measures (and) OPEC resumed their previous activities at preventing, delaying or weakening commitments”. (Greene and Lanchbery, 1996, p.7) ₅₃ On the positive side, at the two latest AGBM meetings several countries put forward concrete proposals. For example, Germany called for a reduction of CO2 emissions by 10% by 2005 and by 15–20% by 2010. The US also showed signs of movement, “partly in response to the new scientific findings”. (Oberthur, 1996:196) This change became more apparent at the COP2 in Geneva. The US was now ready to accept legally binding targets and, to the surprise of many, the US supported the new and more conclusive IPCC report. The US was careful to get political and media attention regarding its shift of policy: “Perfectly staged, the US statement was the most tensely expected one — and it seemed to fulfil the expectations”. (Oberthur, 1996:197) As to the Geneva Declaration, the US “whole–heartedly endorsed this excellent declaration .... we must move forward on the basis of the new and compelling scientific advice [and] next steps should focus on legally binding targets”. (FCCC.CP/1996/15:47) The reasons for this evidently dramatic shift in policy, according to Oberthur (1996), were an improved economy, the upcoming presidential election and changing personnel in the administration. US officials also claimed that the message of the IPCC had had an important impact on the new US position. ₅₄ However, this shift may not have been quite as dramatic as it first appeared, for the US said nothing about concrete targets or base years, “leaving much room for manoeuvre”. (Oberthur, 1996:197) Still, the US now found the time ripe to adopt a principle it had rejected as premature ever since the process started. This had the effect of injecting much needed new political energy into the process and gave the negotiations new momentum. Not only the US changed its position; the UK, not previously very visible on the scene, became a “born–again” activist, criticising some of the reluctant parties in the JUSCANZ. This change in the UK position was probably a result mainly of domestic economic policies, unmotivated by the climate issue. ₅₅ In any case, the forces that wanted to specify the Berlin mandate further were suddenly quite strong.

Not everybody was convinced that the Geneva Declaration was an “excellent document”; the OPEC countries, Russia, Australia and New Zealand all ended up saying that they could not support it. In the words of Australia: “We have difficulty, however, with the aspect of the text which commits the Parties to include in the final instrument legally binding targets without the nature and context of those commitments being clear”. (FCCC/CP/1996/15) ₅₆ However, the large majority of the states did not want to let this rather small minority of 16 counties to prevent them from adopting the Declaration. Thus, after some five–and–a–half years of formal negotiations (since INC 1 in February 1991) targets and timetables were finally included in a high level negotiated document. Although no consensus was achieved, all key parties strongly supported the Declaration.

The final stage of the AGBM process is characterised by a hammering out of more precise negotiation positions. The EU was the first major OECD actor to present its concrete position. After several years of hard internal bargaining, agreement was finally reached at the EU Council Meeting just prior to the sixth AGMB, in March 1997. The EU suggested an emission reduction of 15% by 2010 of three greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N20) with 1990 as the base year. This was a change compared to the previous EU position that had included CO2 only. Interestingly, the EU proposal opened up — in the longer term — new ways by which to distribute emission reductions. ₅₇ Most JUSCANZ countries argued that the ambitious EU proposal was only possible thanks to an internal differentiation of targets within the EU — precisely the type of differentiation they had argued for among Annex 1 countries. ₅₈ The EU claimed that, in contrast to the Annex 1 group, as a single political and legal unit it could adopt this “bubble–approach”, or internal burden–sharing mechanism. ₅₉ The US also criticised the EU “bubble” approach, both on political and legal grounds. A certain envy could be detected in this, as the EU appeared ready to take on the leadership role it had struggled for so long. ₆₀ Although the US was not yet ready to present its concrete negotiation position, it made clear that it would not embrace the EU proposal, which it saw as unrealistic and too ambitious. However both the US and the EU wanted equal emissions reductions for all Annex 1 countries. This was considered the only “realistic” approach, given the time constraints. As to the means by which to achieve those goals, the US argued for maximum flexibility, e.g. extensive use of joint implementation and market based forces like emission trading. It also introduced the concepts of emission budgets, implying some flexibility as to when reductions could be achieved, as well as borrowing from future emissions. The EU still argued for the adoption of more standardised policies and measures while most JUSCANZ countries still argued for differentiated targets among Annex 1 countries.

During the fall of 1997 the last main actors, the US and Japan, were finally ready to present their positions. Japan was the first of the two and proposed a 5% cut in emissions between 2008 and 2012 for Annex 1 countries. ₆₁ The US did not speak out until October 1997. ₆₂ The US proposal calls for reductions of emissions for Annex 1 countries to 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012 and unspecified reductions below 1990 levels after that. In contrast to Japan and the EU, the US wanted to include six greenhouse gases. ₆₃ The US repeated its call for meaningful developing country participation, again provoking G–77/China. ₆₄ On their hand, they did not give up the initial target of reduction to 1990 levels by the year 2000. ₆₅ Thereafter they call for a 7.5% reduction by the year 2005 (as did the EU in its final proposal), 15% by 2010 and 35% by 2020. They rejected both specific and legally binding targets as well as a global trading system that includes developing countries. They also call for a fund to compensate poorer countries either harmed by climate change or for suffering economic losses due to emissions cuts in richer countries, for example oil–exporting countries. Thus, five and a half years after Rio, finally all parties had elaborated a national position on how to deal with the climate issue. As there continued to be little progress during the AGBM negotiations, optimism was not pronounced on the possibility of reaching a compromise in Kyoto. (New York Times, 1 November 1997)

The Kyoto Protocol: A Genuine Compromise?

Let us start out by taking a look at the Annex I countries and see “who got what” through the Kyoto Protocol. If we compare the result with the positions, the text of the Protocol on commitments is very similar to the Japanese position, calling for (on average) 5% emission reduction of three gases by 2008–2012. It seems that Japan presented its proposal as a possible compromise between the EU and the US positions. ₆₆ In any case, the final protocol on this point proved that Japan had been able to strike a middle ground with its proposal. Considering the high costs of further measures in Japan, it may well be that reducing emissions by 5% will be more painful for Japan than for most Annex 1 countries. “Japanese business expressed concern that the emission target Japan had accepted would prove hard to meet and might harm national competitiveness”. (Climate News, 16 December 1997) Thus, Japan may have sacrificed some “narrow” national interests in order to get agreement. For the EU the Protocol was a victory in the sense that the two other major actors, Japan and the USA, finally agreed to reduce their emissions, although by much less than the 15% suggested by the EU. According to the EU Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregard, “We would have liked the parties to be more ambitious”. ₆₇ (Climate News, 16 December 1997)

On the other hand, both the EU and Japan had to give in to the US proposal, supported by some of the JUSCANZ countries, to consider six gases for reductions. For a long time during the negotiations it seemed that these would apply to three gases only, and the other three would be included further down the road. (Financial Times, 4 December 1997) It may have been that the US linked acceptance of emission reductions to an inclusion of all six gases. With this expansion of the number of gases, the overall level of ambition between what was adopted and the original EU position was also reduced. However, there are differences among the parties in their ability to achieve this; especially Japan is said to “have much more difficulties cutting emissions” of these gases. (Financial Times, 4 December 1997) While the US was the winner in getting its more comprehensive approach adopted, there can be no doubt that within the Annex 1 group, it was the US that gave the most on commitments, compared to its original position. Judging by the general reaction of industry in the US, most notably the fossil fuel industry, even the original US position was seen as drastic, with severe economic consequences. “This will be a tremendous cut ... [and] a very aggressive target”, noted the President of the Global Climate Coalition. (New York Times, October 27, 1997) ₆₈ Not surprisingly, after the adoption of the Protocol, criticism has been even stronger, both from a number of Congressmen as well as from industry and business. “It is a terrible deal and the President should not sign it .... Business, labor and agriculture will defeat the treaty”, according to the Chairman of the Global Climate Coalition. (New York Times, 11 December 1997) ₆₉ Opposition is usually more vocal in the US than in other countries, so such statements cannot necessarily be taken as an indication that the US gave more than others. Still, on this point, interpreted in narrow bargaining terms, it may be that the US was the “loser” compared to Japan and the EU. Although the equation is complicated by the inclusion of the six gases, termed an important victory by the White House, (Climate News, 16 December 1997), it may be that the US negotiators, like Japan, sacrificed some traditional national interests to reach an agreement.

However, the biggest winners among the Annex 1 countries regarding commitments, again in narrow bargaining terms, were not one of the “big three”, but JUSCANZ countries that have pushed for differentiation among Annex 1 countries. Among the winners with a right to increase emissions are Iceland (plus 10%), Australia (plus 8%) and Norway (plus 1%), while New Zealand and some of the economies in transition (Russia and Ukraine) are called to stabilise emissions at the 1990 level. Canada is to reduce emissions by 6%. There is also some moderate differentiation between other transition countries (see Annex B). The reactions among these countries after Kyoto indicate that some see themselves as true “winners” while others do not. ₇₀ The reason why these countries were allowed to increase or stabilise their emissions was that the major industrial blocks were willing to cut their emissions more than was expected. The US and the EU had also been opposed to differentiation as a matter of principle. While the EU upheld its opposition, the US moved to signal more flexibility, probably as an effort to reach a package agreement and to get countries such as Australia and New Zealand to accept the treaty.

“While the EU provided the ambition that drove the numerical targets of the suggested protocol, the US played an influential role in shaping the institutional approach to implementation, notably with emission trading.” (ENB, 13 December 1997:39) The US has also portrayed this as a great victory: “The agreement reflects an historic emphasis on market based mechanisms to address an environmental problem.” ₇₁ The significance of the Clean Development Mechanism is also underlined by the US in this context. ₇₂ However, the US was unsuccessful in getting “meaningful participation” by the developing countries and even the article on voluntary commitments was dropped. China and India were the key players on this point. In short, the Kyoto Protocol seems to have been a genuine compromise in the sense that no parties got all that they wanted, but all of them got something. The EU got their numbers, the US got their institutions, Japan gained some prestige and the developing countries avoided reduction commitments. There were even some prospects of progress on the North–South dimension, through the Clean Development Mechanism. ₇₃

Summing Up: Pushers, Draggers and Leaders: How Was the Process Moved Forward?

Among the developing countries there has been a remarkable stability in negotiating position over time, whether in the G–77/China, OPEC or AOSIS group. Overall the developing countries underline their right to development and industrialisation under the same conditions as other countries had. This is a problem created by the developed countries, which have to show concrete action before developing countries will do something. Although perfectly understandable and legitimate as an argument, the paradox of this stance is that developing countries will doubtless be much harder hit by the climate effect than developed countries. The long–term and uncertain nature of the effects of climate change is why developing countries view a number of other issues, economic as well as environmental, as more pressing. This has also made the developing countries “pushers” for strict commitments for the developed countries, but their credibility is somewhat undermined by the fact that they seek to avoid all kind of commitments for themselves. Generally the developing countries have been draggers in relation to institutional development, seemingly preferring a weak regime. Recently, an interesting split has begun to develop between China and India on the one hand and major Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico on the other hand on questions like joint implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism. The latter seem to think that there might be something to gain for them by these approaches and institutions. Apart from the somewhat shifting position of Russia, the countries with economies in transition essentially have played the role of bystanders.

The process have been driven mainly by the OECD countries, and here there have been some dramatic shifts as some of the state actors have virtually exchanged positions with regard to strong commitments. Countries such as Australia, Canada and Norway started out as “pushers” in the process; taking initiatives and calling for forceful measures in the era of environmental enthusiasm. These positions seemed more a reflection of their traditional “green roles” with little attention to underlying material costs. When the costs of action were integrated into their positions, in the eyes of many, they switched from pushers to laggards over a fairly short time. The opposite development has taken place regarding the US negotiating position: after being the most demonstrative dragger, the US administration is now ready to take on more commitments than most countries. ₇₄ Considering the massive US consumption of fossil fuel, this switch hardly qualifies it to play the role of leader on the issue. The US still has a long way to go before it gets down to the per capita emission levels of many western European countries. Whichever label we use, however, the role of the US has been crucial throughout the process. Smaller countries have not been able to affect the process in a similar way. The EU, with its remarkably stable position over time, may have had the potential, but it spent too much time on internal deliberations. However, the EU did play an important role throughout in reaching compromises and moving the process slowly forward. Germany and the Netherlands have been among the more consistent pushers, although it is debatable whether Germany can be labelled a leader, as “fortunate circumstances” (German reunification) more than forceful climate change measures has made the German position possible. Nevertheless, Germany does seem to take the issue seriously and its host function for the Secretariat may also have a more long–term effect on the German position, making it want to stand out as a major player on the issue. The host function may also have caused Japan to stretch further than it would otherwise have done in Kyoto.

Although state leaders have not been prominent during the process, certain individuals have been crucial. While John Sununu was the architect of the initial US position, it is equally clear that Albert Gore is the architect of the new position. When asked about climate change, President Clinton has said: “I didn’t know much about it, but Al Gore did”. (Washington Post, October 21, 1997) ₇₅ There is hardly any doubt that the more flexible negotiating position, announced by the US President during his short visit to Kyoto, was instrumental in breaking the deadlock. (Financial Times, 9 December 1997) ₇₆

The crucial role played by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole (COW), Raoul Estrada–Ouyela, has also been pointed out by many observers. ”This man has been brilliant. He has been able to create something out of nothing, said John Prescott, the UK Deputy Prime Minister. (Financial Times, 11 December 1997). He conducted the negotiations between Annex 1 Parties on the differentiation of targets, and played a key role in making the Parties finally come to an agreement. (ENB, 13 December 1997, New York Times, 10 December 1997) He also played an important role in moving the process slowly forward earlier in the process, as chairman of the INC as well as of the AGBM. Other individuals, as well as green NGOs are also said to have played constructive roles at critical times during the two first COP meetings. (Oberthur and Ott, 1995, Greene and Lanchbery, 1996) Greenpeace seems to have played an important role as mediator between G–77/China and the developed countries in Kyoto. (Financial Times, 11 December 1997)

Overall it appears that the progress that has been made on commitments was achieved during the Conferences of the Parties, and especially during the high–level ministerial conferences towards the end of the session. This may indicate that high level political energy was instrumental in breaking the deadlock. ₇₇ In a somewhat cynical interpretation, it may be that no real effort to move the process at all was made during the intermediate (AGBM and INC) negotiations. This would reduce expectations to a minimum and thus whatever small steps achieved “when the ministers arrived”, would be judged a “success”. An alternative explanation would be that these intermediate sessions were not really considered negotiation fora, but mere preparations, sounding boards for new ideas and mutual learning. In this perspective, there has been a functional differentiation between the two fora.

In line with traditional realist thinking, the major changes in the process appear to be the result of policy shift by the most powerful player, the US. The US did not want any targets, so no targets were adopted. Similarly, when the US was ready for targets, they were included in the agreement, and when the US was ready for numbers, agreement was also reached here. ₇₈ The roles played by Japan and the EU in the final stages of the negotiations were also instrumental in reaching agreement. The record also shows, however, that the small but necessary steps in order to move the process forward, were at least partly the result of clever individual leadership — which is more in line with the institutionalists’ way of thinking. It is the interaction between the process of domestic change and incremental developments in the international arena that has driven the process forward.

4. Evaluation: Different Criteria Give Different Scores

An Unprecedented Effort by the International Community?

How do we evaluate what has come out of the process so far? Has the world community moved significantly ahead in dealing with this problem or has it mainly wasted political energy and burned thousands and thousands of tons of fossil fuel as the professional diplomats and green and gray NGOs have travelled to protracted meetings over a number of years?

Let us start with the expenditure of political energy, crudely measured as the frequency and intensity of multilateral negotiations dealing with the climate change issue. A tentative adding up through December 1997 gives a rather impressive record. During the pre–negotiation phase there were some 8–10 large international conferences and meetings. While the meetings in the initial phase were mostly attended by “activist” governments and various non–governmental actors, it did not take long before most of the world’s nations participated. After formal negotiations started in early 1991, there have been 11 INC meetings, eight AGBM meetings, three COP meetings and a global summit, where climate change played a key role. ₇₉ Add also that after COP1 in Berlin in 1995, there have been seven meetings of the two main subsidiary bodies. ₈₀ Moreover, climate change has been an important issue at many G–7 meetings, it has been hotly debated in the EU and it played a prominent part at the UN “Rio plus 5” meeting in summer 1997.

The Rio summit was the largest high–level event, including most of the world’s leaders as well as an unprecedented number of non–governmental organisations. The three COP meetings were attended by some 150 nations, and there has been a high–level ministerial section at the end of each meeting. ₈₁ Close to 2000 participants attended COP2 in Geneva, while the number climbed to 10 000 at COP3 in Kyoto. Participation has tended to be somewhat lower at the INC meetings and the subsequent AGBM meetings. Nevertheless, usually well over 100 nations have taken part and the total “turn–out” for AGBM and the other subsidiary bodies has been approximately 1000 participants. (FCCC/SBI/1997/18). Generally, participation by all types of actors has increased over time. Meetings in all these fora have usually lasted 1–2 weeks. If we add this up very roughly, over the last seven years, thousands of climate negotiators and lobbyists have spent well over half a year together discussing these issues. Thus, we can truly say that there is “a large and growing community with a stake in participation in the issue quite apart from the possible stake in the outcome. On balance, that community favours control and limitation of greenhouse gases.” (Skolnikoff, 1997:17) This may certainly be needed to bring the process further after Kyoto.

To my knowledge, this is the most intense global diplomatic effort that has taken place over such a short period in a single issue–area. Moreover, the negotiations are bound to continue into the foreseeable future. ₈₂ This leaves little doubt that the nations of the world have perceived this as a serious problem and have tried to deal with it in a serious manner. How do we evaluate the upshot of this process? First some general remarks on how to measure or evaluate the performance of international environmental regimes.

How to Evaluate the “Effectiveness” of International Regimes

With reference to the process leading up to the 1992 Rio Summit, a representative of Greenpeace concluded : “It seems most important to underscore the vast scope of opportunities lost in the 18 months of negotiating the Convention”. (Leggett and Hohnen, 1992:76) An alternative view of the process leading up to Rio was that: “much of the frustration expressed in the public debate about what has been accomplished through UNCED build on a misconception of the political process ... the UNCED process can be seen more as an exercise in research and learning than as an effort to negotiate the regime”. (Underdal, 1992,1:2) Much of the same disparity can be seen in perceptions of the five–year process after Rio. Some tend to underline the vast complexity of the issue area, the fact that the process has just started and that it will last well into the next century and beyond. The COP3 in Kyoto is seen as a first “baby–step” in coping with the climate problem. ₈₃ Many environmentalists are more impatient, and judged the process mainly as a failure. “Greenpeace has labeled the result of the Kyoto climate summit a tragedy and a farce because it is totally inadequate to slow the environmental impacts of climate change.” (Climate News, 16 December 1997) In short, evaluation of “performance” or “effectiveness” of a regime depends entirely upon the measuring rod you use, or the expectations you have (e.g., whether the bottle is seen as half full or half empty).

Thus, it is important to be explicit on what type of measurement or criteria for evaluation are being used. ₈₄ If an agreement is being reached, negotiations can be deemed a success simply because a piece of paper is produced saying that the parties agree to some collective effort to deal with the problem. Alternatively, even when significant progress has been made on a knotty issue, if negotiations do not produce a treaty, they are often flatly labelled a fiasco. This reflects a tendency to focus on the immediate and the visible, and to forget that any agreement is seldom more than a starting point. It is the process after the flashbulbs have gone off that is usually the most important in deciding whether the regime will be effective or not. This is determined by the willingness and ability of domestic actors to actually implement decisions taken at the international level. (Victor et al. 1998, Skjareseth, 1998)

With that caveat, what indicators could be used to measure effectiveness or the performance of international environmental regimes? Over the last few years a considerable body of literature on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes has emerged. ₈₅ Space does not permit me to go into detail on the complexities of this issue here. However, I will give a brief and simplified version of how degrees of effectiveness can be measured along four different dimensions — impact, outcome, output and learning. ₈₆

Impact: Regime effects on nature. There is basically consensus on an effective regime being one that has been able to “solve” the problem that caused its establishment. That is, if the goal of a given regime was to eliminate hunger and we could demonstrate that hunger was eliminated due to that regime, it would be judged truly effective. Unfortunately we do not find many examples of such highly effective regimes in the real world. ₈₇ Moreover, when we deal with environmental regimes and institutions, this approach is exceedingly difficult to apply, as it presupposes that we can establish a causal link between the consequences flowing from the regime and the state of the environment. ₈₈ Thus, although this measuring rod may be the best if we want to know how “really” effective a regime is (that is, it scores high on validity), unfortunately it scores low on reliability. We may want to speculate broadly on the link between the regime and the state of environment, but the answer we come up with is usually tentative, uncertain and has a lot of qualifications attached.

Outcome: Regime effects on behaviour. A less ambitious, but still methodologically difficult approach, is to try to find out whether the regime in question makes its members (states as well as sub–national actors) change their behaviour as a result of the regime and in the direction prescribed by the regime. In order for a regime to be effective in accordance with this measuring rod, it is thus not sufficient that behaviour is changed. ₈₉ Changes have to be traced back to the regime. We can observe that the rate of CO2 emission in the economies in transition in the 1990s have dropped significantly. We know, however, that this is not a result of strong environmental enthusiasm spurred by the climate regime, but rather the result of economic recession and transition. This illustrates the need to establish causal linkages for the “outcomes”measuring rod as well. ₉₀ However, in most cases it is not so simple to trace links from the regime, and other factors, to changed behaviour. In order to win green points, either domestically or internationally, an actor may be tempted to link new and lower emission standards to an international regime, but these measures may well have been taken in any case (for other reasons). Nevertheless, with sufficient (economic) resources and intellectual capacity, it is possible, through careful process tracing, to pursue this avenue of measuring effectiveness. ₉₁

Output produced by the regime. This is the rules, regulations and decisions produced by the regime, and the “strength” of the regime, as judged by its score on such indicators as dispute–making procedures, procedures for reporting and verification, decision making procedures etc. The more elaborate and strict these various mechanisms are, the more effective the regime, according to this line of reasoning. International lawyers often tend to concentrate on such aspects when evaluating international regimes and organisations. A high score on these dimensions are most often pre–conditions for subsequent effectiveness in terms of i.e. behavioural change, but not necessarily. ₉₂ However, normally we would expect that a regime with good reporting requirements, a review system and maybe even some sort of non–compliance mechanism would be more effective in securing compliance and changing behaviour than a regime without such procedures. (Sand, 1991) However, the effect of a strict regime in this sense might be that key parties choose not to join the regime, reducing its effectiveness from a problem solving perspective. ₉₃

Learning. In line with the evaluation of the UNCED process presented previously, a fourth, and even “softer” criterion for evaluation might be added. The effectiveness of a regime (or process) might be conceived of in terms of the extent to which it fosters learning and understanding among the actors on how to deal most effectively with an issue. Knowledge through scientific contributions would be an important component of learning, but understanding about the effect of various institutional approaches to the problem at hand may be equally important.

Which of these measuring rods is most suitable to use, depends on two factors: the nature of the problem, that is how difficult or malign it is, and the time dimension. ₉₄ I shall not go into the discussion on the exact meaning — or the possible limitation — of controlling for the nature of the problem when judging the accomplishments of a regime as a success or a failure. Suffice it to say that most observers would agree it is more of an accomplishment to lift a weight of 200 kg one meter up in the air than it is to lift a weight of 20 kg 2 meters. In a similar vein, it has been said that solving the problems associated with the reduction of the ozone layer “is a piece of cake” compared to the problem of global climate change, (Mahlman, 2, 1997) the main reason of course is that the production and consumption of CHCs is highly concentrated and alternatives to these substances are readily available (Skjaerseth, 1992). On the other hand, and put in simple terms, it takes concerted action by virtually all of humankind to deal effectively with global climate change. ₉₅ The time dimension is equally important. It clearly makes a huge difference whether a problem reached the international agenda only a few years ago, or has been addressed by a regime for decades within a well established institutional framework. Overall, there are clear indications that regime effectiveness tends to increase over time, and also that it take less time for more recent regimes to become more effective, as learning takes place. (Andresen and Wettestad, 1995) Clearly, we would expect an easy problem that has been dealt with in an established institutional framework to have a fairly high score even on a rather demanding effectiveness scale. In contrast, a very difficult problem that has only quite recently reached the international agenda and is being dealt with in a “soft” and immature institutional framework can be expected to score correspondingly low on most indicators of effectiveness. In fact, according to this line of reasoning, the two extremes (easy problem in a long time frame vs. difficult problem in a short time frame) should not be measured using the same indicators of effectiveness. Instead, one could envisage a step–wise procedure, applying the softer “knowledge and learning” criteria in the initial stages, and then gradually applying harder indicators as the regime matures. In addition, we need to control for the “malignancy” of the issue; “easier” problems’ could be expected to achieve a higher score at an earlier time.

The Ability of the International Community to Deal With the Climate Change Issue

With the four criteria in mind and the need to control for the nature of the problem and the time elapsed, how do we evaluate the emerging climate regime? Not much will be said about the first two criteria (impact and outcome). Greater attention will be paid to the elusive but more relevant (in this setting) concept of learning. And the most attention will be paid to the output dimension. This will be discussed in relation to the Climate Convention, the reporting procedures and finally the Kyoto Protocol.

Impact. It has been maintained that it is premature to evaluate any international environmental agreement before it has existed at least a decade, due to the time it takes to establish effective international institutions and for domestic actors to respond to them. (Andresen et al. 1995) If we stick to this piece of advice it does not make sense to evaluate the climate regime’s impact until the beginning of the next century, at the earliest. Given that the regime was born in Rio through the Climate Convention of 1992, the six years since then is too short a time for a meaningful evaluation. This point certainly has some merit, as long as the more demanding measurement criteria linked to outcome or impact are meant. In fact, the latter indicator would not make much sense to use until many decades from now. ₉₆ In the first assessment report of the IPCC, it was stated that a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions was necessary in order to stabilise the global climate. This is often seen as if the scientists said that there should be a 60% reduction. Clearly, against such a standard, the climate regime is doomed to failure in the foreseeable future because atmospheric concentrations will continue to rise even if “participating countries could obey its emission limits to the letter”. (New York Times, 12 December 1997) Seen in this perspective, certainly the whole process, including the Kyoto Protocol is a failure; but it simply does not make sense to use this measuring rod.

Outcome. We should not expect much success if we measure performance in terms of behavioural change within the target groups either, considering the short time that has elapsed. ₉₇ Overall emissions of CO2, the greenhouse gas by far the best monitored, is increasing sharply worldwide. ₉₈ For the large majority of Annex 1 countries, greenhouse gas emissions are increasing considerably. Only EIS countries and a small handful of Annex 2 countries will be able to meet the original target of stabilisation of CO2 emissions by the year 2000, mainly as a result of developments unrelated to the climate regime. ₉₉ The Netherlands seems to be one of the relatively few countries that have responded rather strongly to the threats of climate change. ₁₀₀ (Skolnikoff, 1997).

Thus, as expected, the overall picture related to the outcome criteria is one of a low effectiveness climate regime. The regime does require that Annex 1 countries report on emissions as well as policies and measures adopted to deal with the climate issue, ₁₀₁ and the reports clearly show that most of these countries are in fact taking measures of various kinds to reduce their emissions.(FCCC/SBI/1997/19) Many of the measures are of a long–term nature, and their effects remain to be seen. Moreover, they may not be very forceful and usually they are not sufficient to reach the ambitious national targets set in the era of “environmental enthusiasm”. ₁₀₂ It should be noted, however, that many of the national targets were conditional, meaning that they would not apply unless other actors introduced similar goals. (Holtsmark and Hovi, 1997)

Nevertheless, based on reports on measures taken among Annex 1 Parties, emissions would probably have been slightly higher if the issue had never surfaced. It has also been maintained that developing countries have “done a great deal in recent years to reduce subsidies, to adopt market policies and to reduce the rate of increase in emissions”. (UNFCCC/AGBM/1997/8:3) ₁₀₃ The main point, however, is that it is simply premature to apply the “outcomes” measuring rod as well. Thus, at this stage it hardly makes sense to evaluate the climate regime in other terms than those of learning and output. It may even be that instead of discussing regime “effectiveness” it would be more appropriate to view the process being measured as one of regime formation. ₁₀₄

Learning. By this criterion the climate negotiations have been rather successful, but important challenges are still ahead. Recall that a decade ago only a tiny group of experts, and even fewer (Western) policy makers, knew about this problem. Today, the problem is well known to policy makers all over the world. The process has also stimulated new and rather creative ways of thinking about how to deal effectively with global environmental problems of this type and magnitude; most prominently various market based mechanisms as well as the recently introduced concept of a clean development mechanism. ₁₀₅ Not all of these concepts are new. Economists have been discussing cost effective ways to protect the environment for a long time. (Mitnick, 1980) There are also examples of both taxing and trading at the domestic level in some countries, but these approaches have never been applied at the global level. ₁₀₆ The underlying philosophy is that economic incentives have to be created for key actors, not the least for business corporations, to change behaviour in the direction of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Put simply, if long–term and stable changes are to happen, actors have to see it in their self–interest to change behaviour. From an intellectual and rational point of view, this way of thinking seems logical, as behavioural change has to be strong and stable. Also, the economic stakes are high and the climate change regime is not only an environmental regime but also a trade regime. ₁₀₇ However, as already noted, there is no consensus on the need for a new approach. ₁₀₈ Rational economic arguments about cost effective ways of dealing with the problem are met with ideological or fairness arguments from developing countries.

If they are to be applied, economic incentives must be shown to work in practice. Major developing countries also have to see that it is in their interest to realise these ideas. Prior to the start of the pilot phase for joint implementation, the situation was described as “a tough Catch 22. JI must prove itself to build trust in the concept, but building trust requires “free markets” that let the JI phase run its course, and free markets require trust in the JI concept.” (Victor and Salt, 1994:26–27.) This is still a valid observation, and it is highly relevant for the trading regime as well as the Clean Development Fund. ₁₀₉ Thus, although there has been a steep learning curve among policy makers of the world, from virtually zero knowledge a decade ago to the intellectually rather imaginative Kyoto Protocol, there is still a long way to go to reach common perceptions on how to deal effectively with the issue.

It is important that policy makers learn and understand, but it is also imperative that the public is ready to pay the rather significant costs that will be incurred. In general, the interest for environmental issues has been declining in the Western world since Rio (Victor and MacDonald, 1997) and understanding of the issue among the population at large is probably moderate. Opinion polls from the US are ambiguous as to how far people are willing to change behaviour to curb emissions. ₁₁₀ In trying to “sell” the climate policy of the US administration, the US President has used dramatic illustrations of what may happen to low–lying parts of the US territory if global warming is allowed to continue. However, as the impacts of global climate change will not be felt significantly until at least 50 years or so from now, many people are probably more concerned with potential negative impacts of abatement measures on their own life situation than with distant threats.(Mahlman, 2, 1997) ₁₁₁ Thus, rather than being pressed by the public to act on the issue, the US Administration has been obliged to begin “an ‘educational’ campaign with public sessions to be held around the country” (Skolnikoff, 1997:9). While attention was moderate initially, as Kyoto approached it increased considerably. ₁₁₂ The picture in Europe seems somewhat different. In general, “environmental enthusiasm” as described earlier has dropped significantly since it reached its peak in Rio some five years ago, although there are significant differences between European countries. (Dahl, 1998, Skolnikoff, 1997, Skjareseth, 1998) Still, “political forces in most European countries ... are in the direction of pushing governments to a strong stance in the negotiations.” (Skolnikoff, 1997:8) Whether this pressure will continue, remains to be seen and will probably be a function both of economic developments as well as the prominence of the climate issue on the international political agenda — in competition with other environmental as well as non–environmental issues. In any case, the challenge to inter–generational solidarity, not an outstanding feature of most of today’s societies, will be an unprecedented one. ₁₁₃

Thus, there are important differences in political cultures and traditions among OECD countries. ₁₁₄ Still, it seems that most OECD countries now endorse a combination of targets and timetables and a flexible approach to reach the goals. This is essential as a first step, but the real challenge, from the learning perspective, has yet to be met. That is, getting the countries and peoples with economies in transition, and not the least the developing countries, to take an interest in the issue. While “enough” learning has taken place in the Western world to trigger action, the challenge ahead on this dimension is to increase learning in other parts of the world.

Up until the Climate Convention was adopted in Rio, it did not make much sense to evaluate this process using other measuring rods other than learning and understanding. However, since the UNFCCC has been adopted, and has been specified through subsequent negotiations, it also makes sense to evaluate the process in terms of the output produced. Let us start by a brief evaluation of the Climate Convention.

Output: The Climate Convention: Empty Shell or a Good Start?

Are the representatives from Greenpeace, cited earlier, right that “opportunities lost” is the most apt characterisation of the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Convention, or did the climate negotiators produce something worthwhile as a result of “frequent flying” to the various INC sessions? Common sense suggests the Convention is weak because it is a framework convention without binding commitments. However, few if any international environmental accords started out as more than a rather loose framework. Both regional and global agreements that have come to stand out as quite successful — e.g., on North Sea environmental cooperation, acid rain cooperation and ozone cooperation — all started out as loose framework conventions. (Victor et al. 1998) Initially they were typical examples of what may be labelled first–generation international agreements; the parties essentially acknowledge the existence of a problem and state their good intentions to deal with it, without making concrete commitments. Later on a number of them have turned into typical second–generation agreements. ₁₁₅ That is, institutions have become more specified and, not the least, commitments have been made more concrete and specific in the form of targets and timetables adopted. ₁₁₆ Typically, the targets and timetables have been equal for all parties involved. More recently, however, we can see the features of third–generation agreements, reflecting differentiation between parties according to various criteria. ₁₁₇

It seems that essentially some of the environmental enthusiasts, states and non–state actors, were trying to skip phase 1 (the declaration stage) and move directly to phase 2 (specific commitments). It may be argued that more recent environmental agreements, like the climate agreement, should have a comparative advantage over the early environmental agreements, as they can base their approach upon “lessons learned” and insight achieved over the last two decades. (Andresen and Wettestad, 1995) From this perspective, maybe it should have been possible to move directly to the commitment type of agreement. This may have been the case for a number of other environmental agreements, but I would argue, not for the climate issue, considering its unprecedented difficulty and complexity. ₁₁₈ The development after 1992 also indicates that targets and time–tables were premature in 1992. Some might argue that if these had been adopted, most or all OECD countries would have been able to stabilise their emissions because overall, countries tend to comply with agreements. (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). ₁₁₉ This would be a valid statement provided the parties conducted a thorough calculation of their ability to comply before they entered the treaty. Since few Annex 1 Parties appear to have conducted such an exercise, a more likely prediction would be that the credibility both of the agreement as well as of most parties would be undermined through significant instances of noncompliance.

As to the more specific institutions and procedures, suffice it to say that — based on lessons learned from other international environmental agreements — most “standard requirements” have been included. A Secretariat and subsidiary bodies were established to secure links to the scientific community as well as to oversee and assist with implementation and reporting. The establishment of the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 was clearly inspired by experience with the non–compliance procedures of the Montreal Protocol. A mechanism was also established to work on the question of financial assistance. One common observation is that a number of points are ambiguous and some of the most important issues were left to be decided by the continued negotiation process. This can be interpreted as a weakness. An alternative and, I think more reasonable, interpretation is that this was the price that had to be paid if agreement was to be reached — considering the global and inclusive approach that had been chosen. If the developing countries were to stay on board, the regime could not be too strong on institutional framework, and if the US were to stay on board it was not possible to have targets and timetables included. Moreover, as many analysts have pointed out, the UNFCCC was not the end of a process, but rather a starting point. In fact, if we accept the notion that the COP3 in Kyoto was the first baby–step of the international community in dealing with this issue, then the Convention should be seen as the first attempt of the international community to move forward on hands and knees, as a baby crawls. In this perspective, the Climate Convention represented a decent start.

Output: Reporting and Review

As accounted for in the first main part of this report, the most concrete output that has so far resulted from the climate negotiations is the elaboration of the system for reporting and review. As procedures have now been in place for some years, it makes sense to comment briefly on how they are working. National reporting is the main mechanism used in international agreements to gather information to assess compliance. (Ausbel and Victor, 1992, Young 1992) Experience from other international agreements also tells us that reporting is necessary as a tool for long–term information gathering and learning. The precedents, however, are not encouraging. ₁₂₀ Overall, procedures developed have been more advanced within arms control and trade agreements, but performance is improving for international environmental agreements as well. (Victor et al., eds. 1998) Reporting as such is now a fairly standard part of all international environmental agreements. However, the more independent element provided by the in–depth reviews as well as by the country visits within the climate regime is, to my knowledge, still fairly rare. ₁₂₁ Nonetheless, the procedures were put in place rather quickly, in comparative terms, and they have steadily been improved. ₁₂₂

As to the independence of the review system, this can be debated. Initially there were those who called for “NGOs as being independent judges of these plans”. (Victor and Salt, 1994:13) The majority of states were not ready for such a concept. It can be expected that evaluations by green NGOs would have been more critical than those by the present teams, where a balanced composition has been attributed much importance. ₁₂₃ This relates to the question of what is the most effective approach to induce behavioural change of the Parties, a softer and non–confrontational approach or a harder and more confrontational approach. ₁₂₄ Looking at the mandate and composition of the reporting and review system, there is no doubt that the soft approach has been adopted by the climate negotiators. ₁₂₅ In the initial stages this makes sense, in order to gain experience with the concept and secure legitimacy and mutual trust among the parties. Further down the road, as commitments are being better specified, harder approaches may be needed.

What are the more specific experiences gained from the reporting and review system? One procedural, but nevertheless important point relates to the timeliness of the submission of national communications. To some extent this has been a problem throughout the process. This has reduced the value of the Synthesis Reports on National Communications made by the Secretariat, as they have been based on incomplete data. It has also continued to slow down the review process. (FCCC/CP/1996/13:12–13) A major player like the EU, with leadership ambitions, have not scored high on this minimum requirement. ₁₂₆ One might expect that it would take some time to establish the necessary routines and procedures for reporting, thus explaining late delivery of the first report by some Parties. However, only 6 countries met the 15 April deadline for the second submission.(FCCC/SBI/1997/INF.6:2) ₁₂₇ (Countries in note) This is not impressive, given the fairly moderate costs of compliance with this provision. The Secretariat and the COP have pointed to the problems this has caused, but in line with traditional diplomatic conduct, have avoided singling out the relevant Parties. ₁₂₈ One source has claimed that, compared to the acid rain regime (LRTAP) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the rate of reporting within the climate regime is “remarkably high”. (Corfee Morlot, 1997) Within the London Dumping Convention, the average reporting rate is approximately 50% (1976–94), and has not been increasing significantly. (Stokke, 1998) The developing countries have a rather poor record within this regime, and their performance is of source not included in the above figures from the climate regime. Based on somewhat slim data across a few conventions, the reporting frequency of the Annex 1 countries seems to be fairly good, considering the climate regime’s age.

Whatever score we assign to the timeliness of the Annex 1 countries’ submissions, it is bound to be lower for the non–Annex 1 countries, as only two developing countries complied by the deadline for the first communication (15 April 1997), Argentina and Jordan. ₁₂₉ The poor performance may be linked to unclear treaty language that makes reporting conditional on “the availability of financial resources”; to the discretionary element introduced in relation to the least developed countries; or to the unclear meaning of the term “additional incremental costs” in relation to reporting. It also seems that the dividing line of responsibility between GEF and the developing countries has been unclear. “While efforts are being undertaken by the various actors involved — non Annex 1 countries ... and GEF — overall progress towards the completion and submission of national communications needs to be further accelerated and supported”. (FCCC/SBI/1997/INF3:6) While many developing countries criticise the GEF for not providing adequate assistance, the GEF claims that many developing countries have not been inclined to accept the help offered. As noted, this process has now speeded up considerably and the lines of responsibility seem clearer. Nevertheless, the unimpressive results achieved so far suggest the question of non–Annex 1 reporting should have been given higher priority.

According to an evaluation by the Secretariat, the process of in–depth review and the teams of experts has generally been good. “Without exception, host Parties during the in–depth reviews were very open and transparent, willing to present the maximum information requested by the review teams.” (FCCC/CP/1996/13:5) Although the reviews are not supposed to criticise, make comparisons or suggest policy recommendations, they seem sufficiently direct and open to make the country in question understand what the main messages are. ₁₃₀ In discussing measures to improve the review system, most weight has been given to procedural matters such as how to increase the participation by non–Annex 1 countries on the review teams Thus, so far the question is framed mostly in technical terms. The political assessment of performance and status of compliance has not yet been discussed and neither has the question of a more independent verification of the information provided. (Corfee Morlot, 1997) If implemented, these procedures will make the system lean more towards the “hard” approach. However, experience so far with the Article 13 process and with the treatment of these issues in Kyoto, shows no sign of such an approach.

Finally, problems with comparability and lacking data on important points have also been noted. ₁₃₁ However, it is said that the quality of data has been generally better in the second submission than in the first. (Ibid.) As this statement is based on data from the “most enthusiastic reporters”, we do not know whether it will apply when all nations have submitted their second communications. Overall, the system for reporting and review has had a decent, although somewhat mixed, start. However, as with most aspects of the climate regime, the most difficult parts remain to be dealt with: reporting from developing countries and whether there is a need for “harder” approaches further down the road.

Output: The Kyoto Protocol: Promising Signs, But Major Uncertainties

Based on what happened in Kyoto, it seems the “baby” has been able to take its first shaky step. However it is far too early to say whether it will ever be able to walk properly. The important achievement in Kyoto is that it establishes at least the foundation of an institutional framework and accompanying mechanisms for dealing with the problem for the coming decades, for the industrialised countries. It gives a signal to business and industry that the issue is here to stay: the way in which energy is produced and used must gradually change, and the climate issue be taken into consideration in planning and investment for the long term. The specific reduction percentages are probably less important and evaluations of them vary according to interests and positions. Thus, it is impossible, and maybe not very meaningful to determine whether 5.2% is "good" “bad” or “average”. Similarly, “The structure of the global warming treaty was always more important than the numbers” (Financial Times, 12 December 1997) Unless some unexpected technological and/or economic development takes place within the next decade, my guess is that the goal is rather optimistic. A reduction of emissions by some 30–35% compared to a business–as–usual scenario is going to be a tall order for many actors. Thus, it may well be that the momentum in Kyoto made many actors stretch longer than various domestic players and constituencies are ready to. However, in order to implement the Kyoto Protocol, it is crucial to start a process to get the developing countries more firmly on board. ₁₃₂ Not only is it uncertain if and when key developing countries will take on commitments, the practical significance of most new key elements — the Clean Air Mechanism, the trading system and the enforcement mechanism — is uncertain. (ENB, 13 December 1997, New York Times, 12 December 1997) Even if the Parties agreed on the principle of trading, it is a huge challenge to set up an effective system that prevents cheating. (Hagem and Holtsmark, 1997, Financial Times, 10 December 1997) The Clean Development Fund has been described as a “hybrid institution which brings together credited joint implementation and emission trading, all with ‘certified’ voluntary developing countries participation”. (ENB, 13 December, 1997:39) It may have a potential for bridging the North–South gap, but it will be the challenge at COP4 and beyond to clarify its practical significance. As these provisions are still vague, they cannot be properly evaluated here as to their precise implications. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol does provide an elaboration of the institutional framework, but essential pieces are still uncertain.

Summing up: Not much has been achieved in relation to our first two measuring rods, outcome and impact, but that could simply not be expected. Considerable progress has been made on the learning dimension, but now the OECD countries are at the point where they have learned enough, and action is more important. The main challenge here is to increase understanding about the issue in developing countries. As to the output produced by the climate negotiators, the Climate Convention represents a decent start. The reporting and review system is also well under way, the main challenge here being better quality reports and bringing the developing countries aboard. The Kyoto Protocol has some promising elements, but it cannot be properly evaluated until some of these are clarified. How does this relate to our initial question? Has the world community moved significantly ahead in dealing with the problem, or has political energy and tons of fossil fuel been wasted on the myriad of meetings that have taken place? That is, what have the transaction costs been and could more have been achieved if the process had been organised differently? This is the main question to be addressed in the last part of the report.

5. Could More Have Been Achieved if the Negotiations Had Been Organised Differently?

The Scope of Participation: Sub–National Actors and States

Three questions will be addressed here. First the consequences of the fact that the environmental segment dominated the initial political process. Secondly; the role of knowledge and science within the process and finally the effects of the very inclusive negotiation approach chosen. I will address each in turn.

It has been noted that the negotiations were initially a game for three types of actors: “activist” scientists, non–governmental actors (mostly green), and environmental officials. It may be argued that, because they dominated the game too long, the unrealistic expectations about what could be done were allowed to flourish. It has long been recognised that “environmental issues” are important not only for ministers of environment. Ministers of transport, finance and energy are often more important in practice, not the least for the implementation of environmental policies. Also, they are often politically more important actors than environmental ministries. The lesson implied is that these actors should have been on the delegations of most countries at an earlier time. This may have hampered “enthusiasm” but increased realism and made the players able to start the serious discussion process on how to deal with the issue at an earlier stage. ₁₃₃ On the other hand it may be argued that, had the sobering economic dimension been present from the beginning, the whole process might never have started. Key actors might have concluded that the economic costs were so high and the benefits so uncertain that the issue should be buried. In this perspective, it may have been instrumental to have some environmental enthusiasm to get the ball rolling.

As to the scientists, they have continued to play a key role throughout the process, although they may have lost some importance over time. (Lanchbery and Victor, 1995) This is essentially in line with what could be expected; when the political stakes increase and real bargaining starts, there is less room for science. But the impact of the second assessment report of IPCC illustrates the key role that science may still play under certain conditions. It seems that the way “hard–core” scientific work has been organised within the IPCC, both with regard to producing consensual knowledge as well as to communicating knowledge and advice, has been quite effective. (Skodvin, 1998, Aggrawala, 1997) However, there are some interesting variations in the response to the scientific message among the US and other key Western actors. For some European players “the scientific conclusion of the detection of a human signal in the climate is now a settled matter.” (Skolnikoff, 1997:4) ₁₃₄ In the US, however, “there are some sceptics who vocally and vehemently deny the validity of the IPCC analysis altogether” (Ibid.), even if this is only a tiny segment of the scientific community. More (essentially US) scientists are concerned with what they see as a “disconnect between the body of evidence presented in the full IPCC report, with all its qualifications, and the Policymakers’ Summary that leaves out the qualifications and presents the bald statement as an agreed conclusion”. (Ibid.) ₁₃₅ Considering the fact that literally thousands of scientists have been involved in the issue, its scientific complexity and its close link to important policy issues, one could hardly expect more of a consensus. Non–OECD countries have also become much more integrated in the scientific analysis over time. ₁₃₆ It may be, however, that the scientific controversy will be reopened, at least in the US, in connection with the ratification process. The increasing focus on regional impacts may also increase politicisation as scientists may be forced to point out “winners” and “losers”.

In contrast to the basic science, the scientific process regarding social impacts has not been as well developed or accorded similar authority. (Skolnikoff, 1997:4) ₁₃₇ Nor is the work done by IPCC’s Working Group III on Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change endorsed by all analysts. (Schmalensee, 1996) It may be that research (and advice) relating to economic and social aspects is so closely related to policy that it is impossible to report in “neutral” terms in the same manner as basic science does. There also tends to be a controversy between economic modelers and technologists: “With few exceptions, macro–level energy modelers typically forecast that controlling emissions will be expensive because they disturb the natural path of the economy. But technologists have identified myriad ‘no regret’ ways to limit emissions and save money”. (Victor and Salt, 1994:8) Thus, the attempt to put a neutral scientific stamp on these types of research under the umbrella of IPCC has not been very successful.

The organisation of the scientific process has also caused some problems along the North–South dimension. Early scientific assessments were viewed with suspicion by developing countries, because they had not participated in the process. In contrast to the initial scientific process, the IPCC was a governmental initiative and a means for governments to reassert their control over the scientific process. Even though the IPCC was established in part to satisfy demands from the developing countries, initially it was more successful in scientific terms than as a means to include the developing countries in the process. (Agrewala, 1997) In fact, Brazil almost prevented the adoption of the First Assessment Report, and it insisted on a qualification: “the Report reflects the technical assessment of experts, rather than governmental positions, particularly those governments that could not participate in all Working Groups of the IPCC”. (IPCC, 1990)

While the North–South conflict in the IPCC has been significantly reduced, to some extent it has been transferred to the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA). The idea of establishing the SBSTA as a transmitter of information between the IPCC (and other scientific organisations) and the Conference of the Parties was no immediate success. Due to scepticism and opposition on the part of some developing countries, not the least the OPEC countries, towards the work of the IPCC, politicisation has sometimes been more prominent than straight advice. It has also proved very difficult to come to an agreement on the relation between the SBSTA and IPCC. As the SBSTA has been much more of a “political animal” than the IPCC, it could be that some of the countries that have been outvoted “scientifically” within IPCC have reopened the battle within SBSTA. As the IPCC has been reasonably successful both as a producer and transmitter of basic science, not much value has been added by SBSTA on this point so far. However, it appears that the work within SBSTA is beginning to run more smoothly. ₁₃₈ Some of the more basic problems confronting SBSTA are the differing opinions between most developed countries and key developing countries on the role of science and “expertise”. To simplify, developed countries tend to prefer more ”neutral” technical expertise, while developing countries are often more concerned with political control and a “just” geographical distribution. This conflict has been most clearly reflected in the discussion of the role and composition of the Technical Advisory Panels (TAP) within SBSTA. (FCCC/SBSTA/1996/MISC.3) The basis for this conflict is partly culture and political tradition. Many developing countries have less of a tradition of valuing the “independence” of science. Equally important, because there more technical expertise concentrated in the OECD region, criteria of competence tend to create bodies dominated by representatives from developed countries.

In sum, the experience with the organisation and participation of the scientific community is somewhat mixed. However, it is doubtful whether it had would have been possible to organise this much differently due to the comprehensive global approach chosen. Political conflicts over the role of science are not simply removed by clever institutional design. (Underdal et al., 1998)

The problem of global warming is a truly global issue. Assuming that there should be a rough match between those affected by the problem and those who should participate in devising an solution, it seems reasonable to choose a global forum with participation roughly along the lines that we have witnessed. ₁₃₉ However, seeking a global solution does not necessarily mean than virtually all actors have to participate in all phases of the process. In sorting out the equally global problem of ozone depletion within the Vienna Convention/Montreal Protocol process, there has been a sequential or gradual inclusion of parties. ₁₄₀ Initially only key developed countries participated and some of the most difficult problems between the EU and the US were sorted out before negotiators embarked on the next step; the North–South issue. (Andresen and Wettesttad, 1992) As already noted, the ozone–issue is much easier to deal with than the climate issue. Thus, we should not be led to expect that a similar step–wise process within the climate negotiations will necessarily have much of an effect on the outcome produced. On the other hand, looking at the experiences from the climate process, the approach taken in the ozone negotiations may not be entirely without merit.

Let us for the moment leave aside the question whether it would have been feasible to exclude the developing countries and discuss briefly possible consequences of a more exclusive, or step–wise approach. At the current stage of the negotiations, when the Annex 1 countries seem ready to take on concrete commitments, there is no doubt that the developing countries need to be included in the negotiations, at least the major ones. Not only is the day approaching when most emissions will come from developing countries; it is equally important to avoid “emissions leakage”: “CO2 emissions control will raise the costs of producing energy–intensive goods in Annex 1 countries, tending to encourage the development of energy–intensive in non–Annex 1 countries. (Jacoby et al. 1997:7) Once this has happened, developing countries will be more reluctant to take actions to curb emissions as it has become an important source of wealth. ₁₄₁ Looking back, however, it is not equally obvious that including them in all stages of the process was necessary.

In the era of “environmental enthusiasm” a high–ranking official in the Norwegian Ministry of Environment said that a Protocol for reducing CO2 emissions could be settled within a few months among the major European countries. ₁₄₂ As it was clear that the US would not have joined, this approach never materialised. Moreover, the main conflict in the period leading up to Rio was not between developed and developing countries, but essentially between the EU and the US. Thus, in terms of commitments there would not seem to have been much to gain from an alternative approach in this period. However, the Rio Convention could have been strengthened institutionally if it had not been necessary to accommodate the “laggard” position of key developing countries. After Rio, the developing countries have been much more actively involved in the process, but the Kyoto compromise on commitments was also negotiated exclusively among the developed countries. Thus, while nothing has been gained in terms of commitments by the inclusive approach chosen, the institutional features of the regime have been weakened. Also, the negotiation process may have been prolonged by “endless” repetitions of well–known positions; here OPEC played a key part. ₁₄₃

Since virtually all nations agreed, not least the developing countries, that the developed world should take the first steps to deal with the problem, there was no obvious reason for the “all–inclusive” approach chosen. Obviously, the developing countries had to be included somehow in the process to secure its legitimacy, their right to participation as well as diffusion of learning and understanding. A global UN forum could have been created for such a purpose, without being the main negotiation forum. In the initial phase, the Annex 1 countries could have constituted this forum. When they had formed a basis for common action, time would have been ripe to include all, or the most important developing countries. In the present process, it has been noted that “real” negotiations did not start until just prior to Rio and just prior to Kyoto. One reason may be that the inclusive approach created a setting where “real” negotiations were very difficult to conduct. ₁₄₄

There is no reason to believe that an alternative approach would have guaranteed quick and forceful action on part of the Annex 1 Parties. However, if an Annex 1 forum had constituted the main negotiation forum, this might have weakened the forces most vocally demanding “real” developing country participation. The main message of the large domestic US coalitions against a Kyoto Protocol during the fall of 1997 was “it’s not global, and it won’t work” (see note 68). Also, as noted, Congress demands real developing country participation to ratify a Protocol. As long as the developing countries have been there all the time without “giving” anything, this is not a surprising standpoint. If the climate problem from the start had been cast as one that should be dealt with first by those who had created it, such an objection might have been less likely, although it would of course have surfaced later. The polarisation of the issue, with ideological discussions on a number of issues that deal more with principles than practicalities, might also have been avoided. Negotiations within a more limited group could have been expected to be more pragmatic and oriented towards practical results. It may even be that the parties would have found time to try out the concept of joint implementation (between East and West) in a more systematic manner to see if it worked. In short, if the world community had agreed that this issue should be addressed first by the developed countries and had involved the developing countries further down the road, some of the problems were been encountered during the process might not have appeared.

However, the developing countries wanted to take part, the UN was given a prominent position and mechanisms have been created to secure that also the least developed countries are allowed to take part in the process. ₁₄₅ At the COP3 in Kyoto, it also appears that some important developing countries see that they might benefit from more active participation, indication that maybe the world community in the long run can benefit from the time–consuming inclusive approach chosen. It should also be noted that many of the potential problems of “over–crowding” have been solved rather pragmatically through the establishment of small informal groups at crucial points.

Targets and Timetables: The Only Way?

Since the Toronto Conference almost a decade ago, the target and timetables approach have been seen as the best was to deal with the global climate change issue by most countries as well as by most green groups. For most actors it was also essential that targets were legally binding. The basis for this approach was clearly the “lessons learned” from other environmental agreements. ₁₄₆ The climate issue surfaced at the time when the second generation environmental agreements were about to be elaborated. The most prominent model for the climate negotiators was the Montreal Protocol, widely praised for the way it dealt with emission cuts of CFCs. However, this approach has not been universally endorsed as the best way to deal with the climate issue. It has been argued that although targets may be important, what counts in the end is how they are implemented domestically. “The current commitments are not being fully implemented; a new debate on commitments will distract from the more important task, now still in infancy, of building an effective system of national reports and review”. ₁₄₇ (Victor and Salt, 1995 2:1) In this line of argument, less emphasis should have been attributed to the targets and timetables and more on means for securing implementation. More recently it has been argued that, although most focus now is on a binding protocol, the year 1997 was more important for the regime because the first reports from developing countries and the second round of reports from developing countries were due that year.(Victor, 1997) It has also been pointed out that “only a small fraction of FCCC resources are targeted to reviewing the imminent flood of national reports”. (Ibid.) ₁₄₈

Others have also been critical of the strong focus on legally binding targets and timetables: “Negotiations have become focused on a single question: how much will each of the developed nations promise to cut CO2 emissions by 2010 .... Today’s focus on near–term emission reductions will be counter–productive if it delays development of the institutions and policy architecture ... necessary to ... sustain such an effort over much of the next century”. (Jacoby et al., 1997:1) These analysts, many of them economists, tend to underline the long–term nature of the issue, the high uncertainties involved, the high initial costs and the insight that may be gained from experiences with non–environmental regimes, such as the GATT/WTO. Using experiences gained from the Marshall Plan has also been discussed. ₁₄₉ The usefulness of a target, in absence of specified means on how to reach that target, has also been questioned. Schelling (1992:13) has argued: “In any international public forum, governments could be held somewhat accountable for the policies that had or had not been put into effect, but probably not for the emission levels achieved”.

My review and evaluation of the efforts of the international community to deal with this issue over the last ten years, confirm some of the criticism voiced as to how the negotiations have been conducted, but show other parts of it to be somewhat exaggerated. Unrealistic expectations were created due to a “green beauty contest” over numbers and years among many OECD countries. The media and large parts of the green community reinforced this rather fruitless competition. It is a sound point of departure to look for “lessons” from other issue–areas, in this case targets and time tables, but first a diagnosis has to be made where the comparability between the issues is considered. This would show that some lessons were “transferable” and others were not. The climate issue has such an unprecedented political difficulty, such technical and scientific complexity and the time perspectives are so long, so even a “perfect” institutional approach, based on the best of insights made from other agreements, would only take us a tiny step towards “solving” the issue. Thus, it terms of the climate issue, it is more a question of thinking in new and innovative ways, rather than “copying” lessons from other regimes.

I think a careful analysis of the climate issue would have shown that although a target and timetable approach may have proven useful in some contexts, it has never been a panacea as such to deal effectively with international environmental problems. The context and setting within which they are adopted is crucial for the effect, if any, of such an approach. ₁₅₀ Thus, the criticism that too much weight has been attributed to this approach and too little to the development of key institutional features seems warranted. Somewhat paradoxically, however, during the process much more progress was made regarding institutional development than regarding commitments. This being said, I will not argue against the use of this approach within the context of the climate negotiations. Rather, experience has shown that it was called for too early and attributed too much weight. A more balanced dose of the political energy used for discussion of goals and institutional mechanisms would have been more appropriate; it should have been possible to produce more than two developing country reports five years after the Climate Convention was adopted. However, it may be that the inclusive approach chosen has made such a balance more difficult to attain. Another reason for the seemingly low priority of institutional features may be that the latter are seen as rather “dull stuff” (Victor and Salt, 1994:13) that does not catch the imagination of either the media nor most green NGOs. ₁₅₁ You would rarely expect a lead story on “Norway demands better reporting procedures during the UNFCCC process”, while “Norway is against the EU proposal for deep emission cuts” would probably have made the front page! In a similar vein, commentators and analysts have tended to describe and analyse the process much in terms of states being “leaders” and “laggards” in relation to their positions on targets and timetables. Similar credit has not been given to innovative suggestions. As most delegates are sensitive to how they are labelled, irrespective of what they say, this may have strengthened the tendency to somewhat one–sided negotiations.

6. Conclusion

It was mainly a small number of key scientists, with links to important international organisations that were able to get the issue of global warming on the international political agenda, in a period of strong environmental concern. This triggered the most far–reaching effort of the international community ever to deal with a global environmental problem. Although the scientists, organised within the IPCC, have continued to play a key role, it did not take long before the governments took control of the process. Due to the strong position of scientists, green groups and activist countries in the initial phase, however, an impression was created that the world was ready to act quickly and forcefully on the issue. This proved not to be the case, when the complexity of the issue as well as the high costs involved became better understood; the “veil of uncertainty lifted and positions hardened.” ₁₅₂ The majority of actors favoured the “targets and timetables” approach, based on experience from other rather successful international environmental agreements. As the economic dimension of the issue came more to the forefront, a number of countries started to argue for differentiated targets due to their “special circumstances”. Some of these countries had started out as pushers in the process, but a more careful analysis of “national interests” made them into laggards — in the eyes of many green groups. However, some of these countries, most notably the US, were pushers for creating an institutionally strong regime through elaborating new means to deal with this global environmental problem. However, the EU and many European countries seemed to be willing to go further to curb emissions than the US, not the least due to a stronger public pressure. But the role of the EU during the negotiations was hampered by strong internal conflicts. Thus, true leadership by states was most mostly absent in the process, but individuals in various capacities played a key role in moving the process slowly forward.

In Kyoto, agreement was finally reached on binding emission reductions for developed countries, but developing countries were not ready to take on any commitments. The main reason it was possible to reach an agreement in Kyoto was probably the changed position of the USA. However the roles played by the EU, Japan and not the least the chairman of the negotiations was also critical for reaching agreement. Thus, while it seemed that the developed countries were finally able to sort out their differences, there are major uncertainties ahead on the North–South dimension. The developing countries, together with the economies in transition, started out as bystanders to the process. Quite soon, however, the developing countries became pushers for strong commitments — for developed countries, while rejecting to take on commitments themselves. This has been the position of most developing countries throughout the process. Thus, the main climate battleground is moving from within the developed countries to a North–South conflict — which will not make it any easier.

In an evaluation of this process, I have concluded that the climate negotiators have been quite successful when the process is coined in terms of learning and understanding of the issue, but we still do not know whether the public is willing to pay when the bill is presented. The main challenge along this dimension is diffusion of learning particularly in developing countries. The picture is more uncertain when it comes to the output produced by the regime, because so many elements are yet uncertain. The Climate Convention was about as good as could be expected, considering the inclusive negotiation approach chosen. Reporting and review procedures seem to be functioning reasonably well in a comparative perspective, but there have been problems with lack of timeliness, slow development regarding reporting from non–annex 1 countries and the quality of data. Moreover, the most difficult challenges are still ahead. Some of the elements of the Kyoto Protocol are quite promising, but it will take time, probably many years, before we know its practical significance. Effectiveness is low if contrasted with the more demanding indicators of behavioural change caused by the regime and even more so regarding impact of the regime on the global climate. However, the use of these measuring rods is premature.

Finally, I have discussed whether more could have been achieved if the process had been organised differently. Focus is on the scope of participation and the rather one–sided focus on targets and timetables. On participation, initially it was a general weakness that the environmental segment of most countries dominated the scene too long; hampering the process of more realistic negotiations. On the other hand, had it not been for the initial environmental enthusiasm, it may be that the process had never gotten under way. Although there may be certain weaknesses as to the organisation of the science/policy interface, overall the picture is positive and it is doubtful whether much more could have been achieved if the process had been organised differently. As to the participation of states, however, if a more exclusive approach had been chosen as the main negotiation forum initially, it might have been possible to establish an institutionally stronger regime. An initial exclusive approach would not have been any panacea to “quick success”, but since all agreed that the developed countries should take the first step, it may have been easier to decide upon the nature of that step within their own group first, before including all the players. If, however, some of the key elements of the Kyoto Protocol relating to the North–South dimension are successfully implemented, the broad and time–consuming approach may prove to have been worthwhile. Experience from the climate negotiations show that too much attention was paid initially to the targets and timetables approach. The subsequent development has showed that a “hard” target in 1992, that most OECD countries and the green movement wanted, was premature. If adopted, significant non–compliance would probably have occurred, undermining the value of this approach. Targets and timetables may be one important element, but this needs to be balanced with elaborate plans on how to implement policies in order to reach declared goals. The Kyoto Protocol points towards such an accommodation, but so far only the commitments are in place. Unless the institutional mechanisms suggested to implement them are elaborated, the value of these commitments are in jeopardy.

List of acronyms

AIJ Activities Implemented Jointly

AGBM Ad Hoc Group of the Berlin Mandate

AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States

CANZ/JUSCANZ Negotiation Group with increasing membership

COP Conference of the Parties

EIT Economies in Transition

ENB, Environmental Negotiation Bulletin

GEF Global Environmental Facility

ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions

IIASA International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis

INC International Negotiating Committee

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation

SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

TAP (Intergovernmental) Technical Advisory Panels

UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNEP United Nations Environmental Program

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Committee on Climate Change

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

WMO World Meteorological Organization

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Notes

Note 1: It may be argued that such a state centric view is not appropriate regarding this issue, and I agree. More than in any other issue, active participation as well as decisions have to be taken by all individual of the world. In contrast to arms control agreements, governments have only limited control over this issue. Nevertheless, so far governments have been the key actors, although industry, business and environmental groups have been very active. At this stage, however, I have chosen to concentrate mainly, although not exclusively, on states. Back.

Note 2: Arrhenius is usually the one given credit for putting the theory forward. However, already in 1861, Tyndall (UK) reported that water vapour and CO2 were important for absorbing radiation and hence controlling the climate. Although Arrhenius noted that the burning of coal would warm the earth, he also argued that CO2 will be absorbed by the oceans. (Agrawala,1997) Back.

Note 3: According to the chairman of the conference, however, it served to "trigger off the wave of climate change research that has marked the past two decades". (White, 1990) Back.

Note 4: Hearings on the greenhouse issue were conducted in Congress both in 1982 and 1984. The initiative was taken by Albert Gore, then (D–TN) as a member of the US House of Representatives. Back.

Note 5: There had been close contact between the Commission and the scientific work being conducted under the auspices of WMO, UNEP and ICSU. (Bohlin, 1997:100) Back.

Note 6: This organisation never acquired any great significance and it ceased to meet after 1990. (Agrawala, 1997) Back.

Note 7: The information about these conferences is based mainly on Borsting and Ferman 1997 and Bodansky 1993. Back.

Note 8: There were also a number of other international conferences on the issue in this period, some of them focusing on the role of developing countries, like the Tata International Conference, New Dehli, 1988 and the Cairo Conference, 1989. Borsting and Ferman, 1997, Paterson, 1992. Back.

Note 9: WG II pointed to the possibility that climate change could have a destabilising effect on human society and WG III proposed measures for limiting and adapting to global warming. Back.

Note 10: For details on the negotiation process, see Bodansky, 1993. Back.

Note 11: This covers the essence of the Annex 1 commitments in the language of the Convention, but this is only a part of an extremely long sentence. Back.

Note 12: However, according to Article 4.6, the countries with economies in transition (EIT countries) were allowed "a certain degree of flexibility". Back.

Note 13: Thus, it is clear from the Convention that reviews of progress based on information communicated from the Parties is called for. However, there are no details on reviews of detailed country performance. Back.

Note 14: According to Article 17.2 the text of a proposed protocol had to be communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat at least six months before COP3. Back.

Note 15: Recall that the EIT countries had some flexibility on this point. Back.

Note 16: By February 1995, 24 reports had been provided. Back.

Note 17: The in–depth review process should have been completed prior to COP2. This was not possible due to the rescheduling of COP2, late communications, the moving of the Secretariat, etc. (FCCC/CP/1996/13) Back.

Note 18: Fourteen Annex II countries had provided such information in their initial reports in 1994. Mitchell, 1996. Back.

Note 19: For a status report on preparation of national communication from non–annex 1 countries, see FCCC/CP/1997/INF.3. Back.

Note 20: For a discussion of the role of the Secretariat, see Wettestad, 1998 (1). Back.

Note 21: The in–depth review process was initiated in March 1995. Back.

Note 22: To my knowledge this issue has still not been resolved. Back.

Note 23: There are three (other) UNFCCC trust funds; the Trust Fund for the Core Budget, the trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC process and the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities. The Core Budget Trust Fund is slightly over US $ 10 million. For details on contributions, and lacking contributions, see FCCC/SBI/1997/18. Back.

Note 24: For a discussion of the significance of voting rules, in general as well as regarding the climate issue, see Wettestad 1998 (1). Back.

Note 25: For a discussion of the role of science within various international environmental and resource regimes, see Andresen and Ostreng (eds. 1989). For a more general discussion, see particularly Underdal (1989). For more recent publications focusing especially on the significance of institutional design in the science–policy interface, see Underdal et al. (forthcoming ). Back.

Note 26: In fact, because predictions (still) are so uncertain as to what will be the actual impact of climate change, almost any kind of "unusual" weather, be it drought or heavy precipitation, will often be linked to climate change. A case in point is the unusually heavy snowfall in the northern part of Norway the spring of 1997, which the media linked to climate change. Thus, this very uncertainty on impacts may be instrumental in keeping it on the political agenda. Back.

Note 27: The US was soon to be perceived as the main `laggard' on this issue. However, at this early stages there were few indications that the US would adopt such a role. In an election speech in August 1988, President Bush stated: "Those who think we are powerless to do something about the greenhouse effect, are forgetting about the White House effect. As President, I intend to do something about that." (Andresen, 1993) Back.

Note 28: Senator Timothy Wirth was one of the participants. He was later to become leader of the US delegation to the climate negotiations, but he did not represent the US at this occasion. Back.

Note 29: The high international environmental profile of Norway was no doubt linked to the fact that the Norwegian Prime Minister at the time had been the leader of the UN Commission producing the Report on Our Common Future. Although this office was held in a personal capacity, Norway would not have looked good if it were not in the forefront internationally. In 1988 the government declared in a White Paper that it was Norway's official policy to be a "pusher" on the international environmental scene. Back.

Note 30: It may be argued that the US had clear leadership potential, as the leading scientific nation and the place political and public attention had been most pronounced. Back.

Note 31: The essence of this policy was that only measures that would be economically wise to introduce, irrespective of a potential warming threat, would be pursued. Back.

Note 32: At this time, we shall refrain from speculating further about the rationale behind the Norwegian stabilisation goal. To illustrate the extent of the "green" sentiment at the time, the Government was harshly criticised for being far too cautious. Some opposition parties demanded 50% CO2 emission cuts by the year 2000. Back.

Note 33: When it later became clear that the EU countries were not able to agree on a common tax on CO2 emissions, de Meana refused to go to the Summit in Rio, and he resigned as a Commissioner. Back.

Note 34: Financial Times, 11 June 1992. The US position on the climate issue was not the only reason for the international outcry. The US was also the only country that had refused to sign the Convention on Bio–diversity. Originally President Bush did not plan to participate in the Rio Conference; that he chose to go after all is due not least to the "successful" conclusion of the climate negotiations. (Andersen, 1993) Back.

Note 35: At this stage, other greenhouse gases were (usually) not considered in such plans, partly because CO2 was by far the most important greenhouse gas and partly because knowledge was much more limited on other greenhouse gases. Back.

Note 36: In fact, I have not dealt with economies in transition countries either. Based on the sources I have used, they seem to have been rather passive during this phase of the negotiations. Back.

Note 37: This was the main reason that the G–77 was not able to keep their act together throughout this phase of the negotiations. At the fourth INC session the G–77 announced that it would no longer meet as a group. However, later on the G–77 did manage to regroup. Back.

Note 38: Bodansky, 1993:495. China was no driving force for a strong Convention either; "Initially China objected to including the heading "commitments" in the outline of the Convention, so adamant was it that the Convention should be framework only". (Ibid. pp. 495/96) Back.

Note 39: It was probably easier for the US to conduct negotiations with the UK than with most other EU countries. In many ways, the UK was somewhere "between' the two blocks, strongly against CO2 taxation at the EU level and less keen on "top down" policies Germany and the rest of Europe. (Bodansky 1993, Andresen, 1993) Back.

Note 40: For an overview of this process, see Bodansky, 1993:490–92. Back.

Note 41: Clearly, this is "success" in the narrow sense that agreement was reached. I will have more to say about how to use such labels later on. Back.

Note 42: US satisfaction with the treaty was demonstrated by the fact that the US was the very first country to ratify the Climate Convention, and the US is not known to have a speedy process of ratification if tangible interests are affected. Back.

Note 43: The Convention also underlined the vulnerability of certain groups of developing countries, both the special circumstances of the AOSIS countries as well as those of the oil–exporting countries. (Art. 4.8, 4.10) Back.

Note 44: This was due to a combination of a rather "clean" energy structure with a large component of hydro–electric power and a considerable export of petroleum products. Bergesen et al., 1995. Back.

Note 45: The differing roles played by Norway in these two phases, raises the question of what it takes to qualify as a "leader" or as a "pusher". Who defines it and by what standards? I will have more to say about this later. Back.

Note 46: Later on it has also been joined by South Korea The reason it's name has not continued to change as new members are joining seems rather obvious as an acronym "JUSCANZ" may be "bad" enough as it is. For an entertaining account of climate negotiations acronyms, see Washington Post, 5 December 1997. Back.

Note 47: Interview with G Borsting on the Norwegian delegation. Back.

Note 48: With the enlargement of the EU 1 January 1995, when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU, the EU had 15 members, or almost 2/3 of the whole OECD group. Back.

Note 49: The argument behind the latter position was that it was not "fair" that they should have the same target as other countries. They had — in contrast to others – done a lot to reduce CO2 emissions, while others had done little and could achieve a lot by a relative small costs by i.e. switching from coal to natural gas. Back.

Note 50: While the US remained targetless under President Bush, in 1993 the Clinton administration pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, "but whether that is also a commitment to stabilisation is ambiguous". (Victor and Salt, 1994:8) Back.

Note 51: On the question of common EU taxation, it seemed that the UK was creating the most difficulties, arguing on principle that this was not a matter for the EU to deal with. The principal nature of the argument is confirmed by the fact the UK adopted the same tax at the national level. (Skjaerseth, 1994) Back.

Note 52: The US had not wanted a specific negotiation group to deal with commitments. It had wanted to give this task to the Subsidiary Body of Implementation. According to one observer, "establishing a special ad hoc group should thus improve the prospects for quick progress ... to meet the deadline of 1997"." (Oberthur and Ott, 1995:5) Back.

Note 53: As the JUSCANZ group had met in the US prior to the AGBM process to prepare and discuss positions, it may indicate that this has been more that a discussion club during the negotiations. Back.

Note 54: It may be tempting to use science, as a convenient, "rational" reason to change politics. Although it was probably not the most important reason in this case, it appears to have had some effect (personal communication). Back.

Note 55: Reduced emissions of CO2 in the UK were mainly a result of a switch from coal to gas and reduction of subsidies to the coal industry. Back.

Note 56: The position of Russia may seem a bit peculiar. As an EIT country with significant reductions of CO2 emissions, Russia could be expected to exploit this fact in an effort to improve its green image. On the contrary, however, Russia sided strongly with OPEC during COP1, opposing any further commitments. At COP2, Russia is said to have "joined forces more openly and more forcefully with OPEC than before" (Oberthur, 1996:197), but that was believed to be a passing phenomenon linked to a new head of delegation that had not represented Russia since the early 1990s. (Ibid.) From his earlier performance, he was known to believe that global warming would have positive effects for Russia. (Lanchbury, 1996) This may also reflect the fact that climate policy was not high priority on the crowded Russian political agenda, giving considerable leeway to individuals. In any case, Russia seems to have played a much more constructive role in Kyoto. Back.

Note 57: This provision was probably included due to pressure from France, not always comfortable within the EU negotiation umbrella and sometimes operating outside it. Due to its heavy reliance on nuclear power, France favoured the use of per capita emissions targets. (Alfsen, 1997) Back.

Note 58: Of the 15 EU countries, eight countries were aiming for emission reductions, two for stabilisation and five countries were "allowed" to increase their emissions. The scope is as wide as 70% , as Luxembourg aims at reducing emissions by 30% while Portugal can increase emissions by 40%. The EU had calculated that a 10% reduction could be achieved by implementing presently adopted policies, and that they would need to introduce additional measures to reach the 15% goal. (Alfsen, 1997) Back.

Note 59: Although the argument by the JUSCANZ countries was understandable, apart from the legal problems, it seemed difficult to apply in practice as they all — in contrast to the EU — expected to increase emissions in this period. Back.

Note 60: The spokespersons for the EU were obviously proud of their newly won agreement. The US was equally annoyed, and demanded that individual goals for all EU countries should be included in the text, as this would show that some of them expected sharp emission increases. (Personal observation at the sixth AGBM) Back.

Note 61: The proposal allows for some countries to adopt lower targets, depending upon economic and social factors such as high energy efficiency (which would apply to Japan) or population growth (which could apply to the US). Back.

Note 62: The reason for the late US proposal can be interpreted in at least two ways. It can be seen as a deliberate strategy where the most powerful player does not reveal his cards until the last minute to gain bargaining strength. Alternatively it can be interpreted simply as a sign that the US was not able to agree on a position until the very last minute. Some observers hold the latter interpretation to be the most likely. (Personal communication) Back.

Note 63: The US proposal includes a system of tradable permits between companies at the domestic level. A package of US $ 6 billion will be proposed to stimulate developments towards reduced greenhouse gas emissions. The US also proposed a worldwide trading –system. Back.

Note 64: The hands of the US negotiators were tied on the issue of developing countries participation, as Congress had passed a resolution 95–0 demanding meaningful developing country participation before it would ratify a new Protocol. Back.

Note 65: One motive may have been to demonstrate that only a small handful of Annex 2 countries would be able to comply with the target almost all of them agreed to in Rio. Back.

Note 66: "Some observers thought the Japanese proposal would likely provide the outline of an eventual compromise". (ENB, 13 December:3) The fact that Japan announced its position before the US weakens this argument. However, there were probably consultations between the US and Japan; it seems to be more than a coincidence that both actors chose the years 2008–2012. Japan may not have known all the details of the US position when presenting its own position (the US may not have known it at the time either!), but few observers believed that the US would go further than a stabilisation of emissions. Back.

Note 67: It is more uncertain whether companies and businesses in the EU support this statement. Varying perceptions are conveyed on their willingness and ability to comply with steep emissions–reductions. (The New York Times, 12/4/97) Back.

Note 68: Most industry and business spokesmen were against the climate policies adopted by President Clinton, but there was also some business support. Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1997. Back.

Note 69: Lobbying was intense, especially from the so–called Climate–Facts organisation, with a $ 13.5 million budget to lobby against the climate treaty in major news media. The main message was: "It's not global and it won't work". This alluded to the fact that developing countries were exempt from commitments. A coalition of a wide variety of organisations backed this initiative. For details, see its advertisement in The New York Times, 20 November 1997, B–7. The Mobile oil company also ran a large campaign against strong measures to control climate change. The Natural Resources Defence Council was among the few actors on the supporting side that used this form of lobbying. (New York Times, 10/29/97) Back.

Note 70: The Prime Minister of Australia said: "The outcome of the climate change conference in Kyoto represents a splendid result". Australia would be an "enthusiastic party" to the agreement – very different tones compared to Australia's rejection of the Geneva Declaration. Environmentalists have been very critical of this outcome for Australia: "Basically the Australians have hoodwinked [the international community] and when they find out that in fact Australia won't have to do anything they will be pretty upset". On the other end of the spectrum, Iceland has declared that that compliance with the 10% emission increase standard will be impossible. In Norway, the Prime Minister has declared that the treaty could derail Norway's plans to build gas–fired power plans. As the new Norwegian government has been sceptical about the planned gas power stations from the start, some might argue that this link is being used as an excuse not to go along with the plan. In Canada reactions have been negative across the board: "Canada's agreement to cut emissions by 6 % (the negotiation position was 3%) was attacked by business officials and environmentalists, and threatened to deepen Canada's regional divisions." (Climate News, 16 December 1997) In contrast, a requirement for mere stabilisation of emissions in a country like Russia, with current emissions down 30% compared to 1990, seems quite "generous". (Climate News, 16 December 1997) Back.

Note 71: US White House Press Release, 11 December, in Climate News, 16 December 1997. Back.

Note 72: Brazil was playing the brokering role in getting this accepted, with US "sponsorship". Back.

Note 73: At this stage of my work I have not yet undertaken any systematic discussion of the different types of leaders or of the relation between leaders and pushers in this setting. On the concepts of leadership, see Underdal, 1991, Young 1991, Malnes 1995 and Ferman 1997. On the latter point I have taken the position that it is more demanding to be a leader than a pusher. A leader has to work actively towards compromise, often transcending narrow national interests. The pusher role will often be a mere reflex of underlying national interests, but not always. In the latter case, the distinction between the two concepts diminishes. Back.

Note 74: As has been recounted, it is more uncertain whether Congress and the US people are ready for this. Back.

Note 75: The same article gives an interesting account of the role played by Gore on environmental issues. See also Skolnikoff, 1997. Back.

Note 76: According to an EU spokesman, "Mr. Gore has given us a window of opportunity, and we don't get many of those." (Washington Post, 9 December 1997) Back.

Note 77: Although this holds to some extent seems for all the three COPs, one should be cautious about drawing the conclusion that their mere presence creates progress. In Geneva, the US shift of position as well as the new scientific findings were crucial for the Geneva Declaration. Back.

Note 78: It may be that the US was not really prepared for the adoption of emission cuts in Kyoto. According to one observer of the process, the US went to Kyoto seeking no outcome more ambitious than reaching agreement. The EU knew that and pushed hard, and the US agreed to more than is possible to ratify. This is also due to the fact that Al Gore wanted the US to be a leader on the issue, and "desperately wanted to avoid to be seen as a spoiler". (Personal communication) Back.

Note 79: There were also a number of meetings of the Preparatory Commission to the Rio Summit, where climate was a one of the "hottest" issues. Back.

Note 80: In addition there have been meetings, although less frequent, of the so–called Ad Hoc Group on Article 13. Back.

Note 81: As the number of ratifications has increased, to 169 by the end of 1997, the number of participating states has also tended to increase. At the COP 3 in Kyoto more than 160 nations participated. Back.

Note 82: Prior to the climate negotiations, the most intense global negotiations were probably those over a Law of the Sea Convention. This process was large in scope and high in intensity over the period 1973–1982, but there were "only" 11 negotiation sessions. Although negotiations continued thereafter in order to flesh out the details of the deep seabed regime, they can hardly be described as intense or high–level. (Friedheim, 1993) Back.

Note 83: This phrase was used by J. D. Mahlman in a lecture at Princeton University, "Global Warming in the Public Eye", 3 December 1997. Back.

Note 84: An illustration of the different conclusions that can be drawn about regime "success" or "failure" depending upon criteria used, is provided by two studies of the regime established to deal with marine pollution in the Mediterranean . Haas (1990), focusing mainly on institution building , epistemic communities and other softer indicators, concludes that it has been a rather successful regime. Skjaerseth, (1997) focusing on "harder" indicators related to behavioural change and the state of the environment, stresses both the uncertainty and the overall low effectiveness of the regime. Back.

Note 85: For more general discussions on the concept of effectiveness and how to measure this, see Underdal, 1992, 2, Young, 1994, Levy et al, 1994, Bernauer, 1995, Wettestad, 1995 and 98, 2. (forthcoming.) Several large–scale international research project, analysing a number of regimes from an "effectiveness and implementation" perspective have also been conducted; i.e. Stokke and Vidas, 1996, Victor et al. (eds), 1998 (forthcoming) and Hanf and Underdal (eds., 1998, forthcoming), Miles et al. (forthcoming 1998). For a review of some of the earlier of these contributions, see Zürn, (forthcoming 1998). Back.

Note 86: The three first indicators are discussed in Andresen et al., 1995, and elaborated much further by Skjaerseth, 1998 (forthcoming). Back.

Note 87: A regime that by most standards should be labelled a "high–effectiveness" regime is the Oslo Commission. Its aim was to stop dumping of hazardous material in the North Sea. Such dumping has now virtually been stopped, not least due to the actions taken by the Oslo Commission. However, many scientists argue that land deposition, now preferred to sea dumping, is less satisfactory from an ecological point of view. Thus, the Oslo Commission may have helped "solve" one problem, but has created another one that may be more significant. Andresen, 1, 1996. Back.

Note 88: One example illustrates the difficulty of applying this measuring rod: Let us assume we can observe that the quality of the marine environment in a given ocean area has improved, which in practice is very difficult in itself. In order to give "credit" to the regime for this development, we have to isolate the effects of the regime from those of natural variations, i.e. changes in ocean temperature, or other factors that effect environmental quality. Back.

Note 89: Norway reduced significantly its emissions of SO2 during the 1980s. In her study of the Norwegian acid rain policy, Laugen (1995) demonstrated that this was not for the most part a result of the acid rain regime, but due to a change of energy policy, domestically driven. Back.

Note 90: In trying to establish such causal linkages, one strategy is the systematic use of counterfactuals; what would the actors have done in the absence of the regime? However attractive in principle, it is difficult to use in practice, and the analyst's subjective opinions often influence scoring on effectiveness. Andresen and Wettestad, 1995 and Zuern, 1998. Back.

Note 91: A detailed study of the acid rain regime, and its effect on policies in some 10 member countries, applies this perspective in a systematic manner. (Hanf and Underdal, 1998, forthcoming) Similarly, Skjaerseth, 1998 (forthcoming) applies a similar approach in a detailed study of the implementation in three countries of commitments within the North Sea environmental regime. Back.

Note 92: In a comparison of two regional ocean pollution regimes, in the Baltic and the North Sea, the Baltic regime was the more advanced in terms of its more comprehensive approach and the number of decisions produced, but in behavioural terms the North Sea regime stood out as more effective. (Andresen, 1996, 2) Back.

Note 93: Consider for example a "strict" climate regime in relation to non–compliance procedures. This might render it high effectiveness, but it might be that countries like China and India chose not to participate because they did not approve of this approach. Thus, a more relaxed regime might be more effective from a problem solving perspective — if it was able to get these two key actors on board. Back.

Note 94: For a through discussion on what is meant by "malign" and "benign" problems, and what consequences this may have for the ability of the international community to deal effectively with them, see Underdal, 1992. This approach is most recently being applied in Miles et al., (1998) in analysing 15 international regimes. See also Andresen and Wettestad, 1995. Back.

Note 95: A number of analysts have stressed the unprecedented difficulty of dealing effectively with the climate issue. Ses Grubb 1989; Sebenius, 1990; Andresen and Wettestad, 1992; and Bodansky, 1993. Back.

Note 96: This seems to be the indicator implied by Greenpeace in its evaluation of the situation after Kyoto, presented earlier. The same goes for the evaluation made by the Friends of the Earth, which called the Kyoto Protocol "totally immoral". (Washington Post, 12 December 1997) Back.

Note 97: Behavioural change is used here in a rather narrow sense, as it is linked to the target groups. Under a broader definition, i.e.,. including scientists and government officials, performance would be judged differently, probably resulting in a higher score along this dimension. For discussion and application of a broader definition of behavioural change, see Stokke and Vidas, 1996. Back.

Note 98: The only notable exception for a larger group of countries is the economies in transition. As already noted, however, this has nothing to do with the climate regime. Back.

Note 99: It has been noted that the seemingly more forceful UK climate policy has its roots in developments unrelated to the climate issue. However, it appears that the new UK government is more inclined to deal with the climate issue than its predecessor, being active within the EU and unilaterally increasing its goal to 20% by 2010. (Financial Times, 12 December 1997) As to Germany, as noted reunification is the main reason for its activist role. "Between 1990–1995 carbon dioxide output in eastern Germany plunged by nearly half." (New York Times, 4 December 1997) Back.

Note 100: This may be seen in part as a result of the overall green policy of the Netherlands, but it could also be linked to the fact that much of the Netherlands is below sea level. The dikes have been strengthened to withstand a sea level rise of 20 cm. (Skolnikoff, 1997:5) Dutch CO2 emissions grew slightly last year because of increased economic growth. (New York Times, 4 December 1997). Back.

Note 101: I will have more to say about the experience with reporting procedures later on. Back.

Note 102: The case of Norway may be rather typical for the development the climate policy of many Annex II countries. In 1996 it was publicly declared by the Minister of Environment that the stabilisation goal would not be reached and had thus been abandoned, much to the dismay of the Norwegian environmental movement. Norwegian CO2 emissions are expected to grow some 15% by the year 2000 (1990 base line). Nevertheless, Norway is among the countries that has adopted a tax on CO2 emissions. Due to considerable exemptions, the tax is not as effective as it could have been, but it is reported to have had some positive effect. Some would argue, not without merit, that this measure is seen as "just another tax" levied to increase public income. However, it does not seem very likely that it had been levied had the climate change issue not surfaced which shows that the climate regime has some effect also on the behavioural indicator. Back.

Note 103: It can be questioned, however, whether this is done primarily to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases or whether the main reason is other economic policy goals. .Studies carried out by the World Resources Institute confirm that many developing countries have done quite a bit to reduce the increase in emissions. (New York Times, 30 November 1997) Back.

Note 104: This begs the question of when regime formation is finished and we face a "full–blooded" regime. It may be argued that, in formal legal terms, we had a regime when the Convention was adopted in 1992. On the other hand, it may be argued that we still do not have a regime today, as there are so many uncertainties related to,e.g. the role of the developing countries, verification and trading. Ted Parson pointed this out in a comment to very preliminary version of this paper presented at the Open Meeting of the Human Dimension of Global Environmental Change Research Community hosted by IIASA in Laxenburg, Austria, 12–14 June, 1997. Back.

Note 105: I owe this point to Dan Bodansky (interview given 6 November 1997). Back.

Note 106: It remains to be seen if and when such approaches will be implemented within the climate regime. It is bound to be a "long and winding road", but gradually movement seems to be in this direction, confirmed not the least by the Protocol drafted in Kyoto. Back.

Note 107: I owe this point to G. Borsting, member of the Norwegian delegation to the climate negotiations. Back.

Note 108: The EU accepts the need for joint implementation, but is more sceptical towards the trading system, not the least due to the many potential loop–holes. (Financial Times, 12 December 1997) Others have also argued that trading might have negative environmental consequences. (Hagem and Holtsmark, 1997) Back.

Note 109: There has been an increase in activities implemented jointly. Twelve Parties submitted reports on such activities in 1997, twice as many as in 1996. However, only 11 countries are involved. Only three developing countries have AIJ "of which nine activities are in Latin America and the Caribbean and one activity in Africa". (FCCC/SBSTA/1997/12) Back.

Note 110: Under the heading "Facts about the threat of climatic change may be in short supply but opinions are not", see a poll by the New York Times and CBS News. While "most people see a human hand in global warming (40% believe global warming is a result of greenhouse gases), 2/3 also believe that "something funny is going on with the weather". However there are widely different opinions as to what causes these changes. While 17% answered El Nino, 13% named ozone and global warming, 8% Godand 31% didn't know. New York Times, 30 November 1997. Hempton, 1997, gives an interesting account on how the public (in the US) views climate change, underlining the widespread misconceptions on the issue. Due to lack of understanding, consistency is not always very high: "While 83% of US voters support higher fuel efficiency standards, only 23% support a tax on energy. In other words, the policy that could have the largest effect enjoys the least public support". However, he argues that those who are trying to raise public concern about global climate change need not worry that lay people will find the idea of human influence implausible — although the factors they point to often build on misconceptions. Back.

Note 111: According to Mahlman (2) we may come to live with this problem for centuries ahead. The shear magnitude of the problem and the long time frames may easily create a feeling of apathy. Back.

Note 112: John Cushman Jr. "Clinton Hones Sales Pitch On Global Warming Pact". New York Times, 4 October 1997, p. A10. Back.

Note 113: The differences in public opinion on the climate issue between the US and other major Western countries seem to be confirmed by an opinion poll. While 69% in Japan and 71% in Germany are in favour of early action on this issue, the corresponding figure in the US is 45%. (Financial Times, 12 December 1997) However, another poll indicates that 65% in the US support action while only 16% are opposed. (New York Times, 11 December 1997) Back.

Note 114: A meeting between German and US officials on their respective climate policies, however, showed that both parties had serious problems in understanding the other's position — due to the vast differences between the two in the policy–making processes. (Personal communication.) Back.

Note 115: For an overview of the development of key international environmental agreements, see Green Globe Yearbook (1993–1997). From 1998, Yearbook of International Co–operation on Environment and Development. Back.

Note 116: The exact percentages reached for emission reductions often seem rather random, and political bargaining over "salient" figures, rather than exact scientific advice seem to be decisive. A typical case in point is the decision to reduce emissions in the North Sea countries by 50%, reached in 1987. According to one of the key players, two countries played the main role in determining this number. The main argument was that 20% seemed too little and 80% too ambitious, so 50% seemed just right. Andresen, 1996 Back.

Note 117: The latest sulphur protocol within the acid rain cooperation has differentiated emission targets based on differences in ecological vulnerability between the parties. (Wettestad, 1998 (2), forthcoming) This has been made possible by more exact and advanced scientific information. Within the ozone cooperation, as well as other agreements, there is differentiation with regard to timetables based on the countries' assumed ability to deal with the issue. So far, however, the element of cost–effectiveness, which would play a key part in a more comprehensive third generation agreement, is not much reflected. Back.

Note 118: Another extremely difficult issue that has surfaced over the last years is the international effort to stop the loss of bio–diversity. The Convention on Bio–diversity that was adopted in Rio in 1992 is an even vaguer framework convention than that on climate. (Rosendal, 1995). Back.

Note 119: I do not interpret Chayes and Chayes (1993) to mean that, had a stabilisation target been adopted, it would automatically have been followed. Their point is that because rules and regulations are hammered out over time, generally they are made acceptable to most parties, explaining subsequent compliance. This is also why I claim that targets were premature in 1992. Back.

Note 120: US General Accounting Office, "International Environment: International Agreements are not well monitored", 1992. In a comparative study it has been concluded that: "It is the states themselves that produce the data forming the basis for whether an agreement is complied with or not. `Independent' data produced by the secretariats etc. are the exception rather than the rule". (Andresen, 1992:114) Back.

Note 121: For various reasons some developing countries were sceptical about on–site inspections but tolerated the concept, maybe because initial reviews applied to Annex I countries only. (Victor and Salt, 1994:13) Back.

Note 122: According to Levy (1993) it took well over a decade to develop systematic reporting and review systems within the acid rain regime (LRTAP). However, more recent agreements like the Montreal Protocol, have evolved more rapidly. Back.

Note 123: It might also have been possible to leave the evaluation to more "neutral" expertise such as the OECD or the IPCC. Again the climate negotiators tried to balance different needs and perceptions as expert organisations have been heavily consulted and are often on the review teams. On the other hand, efforts are made to increase developing countries participation on the teams. (FCCC/SBI/1997/20) Back.

Note 124: It is hardly possible to derive any empirically based "lessons" as to what is most effective, hard or soft approaches. Analysts also tend to disagree on the issue.See Chayes and Chayes, 1993 and Young 1992, basically on the "soft" side. Ausbel and Victor (1992) and Victor et al. (1998) argue that a harder approach is necessary under certain conditions. For a discussion of environmental performance reviews, see Stokke, 1992. Back.

Note 125: As may be recalled, the same soft approach has so far been adopted in connection with the so–called Art. 13 process. China and the EU are said to have played important roles in this process. (Lanchbery, 1997, 2) Back.

Note 126: The reporting problems for the EU is said to be due to lacking internal procedures and specific problems in the very decentralised Belgium. For further details, see (Corfee Morlot, 1997). Back.

Note 127: However, 10 more countries, including the US, but not the EU, delivered not long after the deadline. Back.

Note 128: The deadline for the Parties with economies in transition was 15 April 1998. However, the Czech Republic and Slovakia submitted reports long before this deadline, while major Annex II nations (apart from the EU) like Australia, Denmark, Japan and Italy have not submitted reports by October 1997.(FCCC/SBI/1997/Add.1) Back.

Note 129: Without knowing why these two countries were first, I would guess that the very active role played by the Argentinean Chairman of the climate negotiation may have mattered in the case of Argentina. This assumption is also supported by the fact that climate change was high on the agenda at President Clinton's recent visit to Argentina. If this assumption is correct, it provides an interesting example of how to involve countries that would probably otherwise have been rather distant from the process. Back.

Note 130: This observation is based on looking over some of the review reports, and I was surprised by the fairly open and direct tone. Back.

Note 131: For a thorough evaluation of the reporting system, see Corfee Merlot, 1997. He has kindly let me quote from his 2nd draft report and provided me with another version that is not used here. Back.

Note 132: Countries like South Korea, Argentina, Chile, Mexico and South Africa are mentioned. It is clear that few demand that these countries should take on the same commitments as the developed countries, but they have to signal some kind of commitments. If not the US Congress will surely not ratify the Protocol. In fact, the US administration will not even present it to Congress before some development is noted. Back.

Note 133: However, key domestic actors are not always keen participants at the international level. As new commitments have been developed within regional ocean pollution regimes, new target groups are affected, but they are often reluctant to take part, i.e. the agricultural sector in many North Sea countries. (Skjaerseth, 1998) Back.

Note 134: For nuances between these European countries as well as an interesting discussion on possible reasons for the difference in perceptions between these actors and the US, see Skolnikoff, 1997. Back.

Note 135: For a discussion of this issue, see Bohlin, 1997, Jacoby et al. 1997 and Skodvin, 1998. Back.

Note 136: While there were 14 non–OECD countries participating in the IPCC Plenary Sessions in 1988, there were 98 (of 117) in 1995. (Agrawala, 1997:18) Back.

Note 137: IPCC was restructured in 1992 and the previous WG II and WG III were merged, and the new Working Group: "is now responsible for assessing information on impacts of climate change and policy options". (Skodvin, 1998:12) The reason for reorganisation was to reduce politicisation of science, but it appears this has not had a significant effect. Back.

Note 138: At least this is the impression conveyed by looking at the documents produced by SBSTA over time. Initially requests to the IPCC were few and advice to the COP even fewer, but overall SBSTA now seems to be much more active on both dimensions. Change of key persons is also said to have a positive impact. (Personal communication) Back.

Note 139: For a discussion of the significance of different patterns of participation within the climate negotiations as well as in other regimes, see Andresen and Wettestad, 1992. This has been further elaborated in Wettestad 1995 and 1998. The significance of various modes of participation in relation to effectiveness and implementation is also discussed in Victor et al. (eds.), 1998. Back.

Note 140: In one sense, the climate negotiations have also gradually been broadened, with increasing participation in all major negotiating bodies. Compared to the ozone process, however, the climate process was rather "overcrowded" even before formal negotiations started. Back.

Note 141: For an interesting discussion of this question in relation to a tendency towards a rather narrow domestic focus on the issue in Norway, see Lunde and Roland, 1997. Back.

Note 142: Personal communication. Back.

Note 143: OPEC may have been "worst", but they were certainly not alone in dragging their feet. Back.

Note 144: This is obviously only one factor. As the climate issue to an increasing extent was conceived of as a domestic issue, complex and difficult internal negotiations had to be conducted in order to reach a position. As noted, the key parties were not able to come up with a position until just before Kyoto. It is not obvious that this process would have been speeded up as a result of a more exclusive negotiation forum, but it is possible. Back.

Note 145: A separate Trust Fund has been set up for participation in the FCCC process for developing countries. The current eligibility criterion for receiving support is that a Party's per capita gross domestic product was $ 5500 or less in 1994. As an illustration of what this means in practice: at the COP2 in Geneva, funding was offered to 116 Parties and 147 delegates were financed. For further details, see FCCC/SBI/1997/18. Back.

Note 146: While some argue that the lessons were correct (Hare et al., 1995), others maintain they were wrong (Victor and Salt, 1995). Back.

Note 147: The authors had published an article in Nature suggesting this alternative approach. This triggered a fierce response from other observers and green groups; Hare et al., 1995. A key point in the discussion was what lessons could be drawn from other agreements in relation to targets and timetables as well as "hard" and "soft" approaches. Although Victor has essentially upheld his criticism to the way the climate negotiations have been conducted (Victor, 1997 and Victor and MacDonald, 1997), more recently he has argued for a combination of "soft" and "hard" approaches. Back.

Note 148: The imminent "flood" probably referred to the fact that non Annex 1 reports were duie in 1997. As mentioned in my evaluation of the regime, the number of reports (from developing countries) actually amounted to more of a tiny stream than a "flood". However, this tends to confirm the point made that this aspect has not been given adequate priority by the Parties to the Convention. Back.

Note 149: For some typical examples, see Jacoby et al., 1997, Schmalensee, 1996, Schelling, 1992 and to some extent also Skolnikoff, 1990, 1997. Back.

Note 150: The strong attention on legally binding commitments is also somewhat difficult to understand, unless they are combined with effective enforcement procedures. Now, the targets are said to be legally binding, but there are no effective enforcement system on the horizon. It may well be that an editorial in Financial Times (12 December) is correct in stating that: "Although the treaty is said to be legally binding, it is in reality no more than a set of club rules". (emphasis added) Within the present structure of the international society, it is hard to see how key actors can be forced to meet them. Sanctions or similar provisions may work if the parties not in compliance are few and weak, but not if they are many and strong. Moreover, it seems problematic to hold the decision–makers of 2010 responsible for what was agreed by other in 1997, especially as most emission fluctuations will be unrelated to specific climate policy measures. Back.

Note 151: As the reader will have noticed, I have not had much to say about the role of green NGOs in this report. I have made very broad and general statements about them. It is quite clear, however, that they can not be lumped into one category. Many have had the traditional pressure strategy that I have referred to. Others, like the Environmental Defense Fund, have been preoccupied with "boring" institutional design questions, and have played a crucial role here. (Petsonk, 1997, ENB, 13 December 1997) If my understanding of the process is correct; most of them started out as more traditional pressure groups, but have become more preoccupied with suggesting creative solutions as the process has matured and become more sophisticated. It has also been argued that NGOs have specialised as the market of NGOs has saturated, in line with what could be expected in a competitive market. (Comments from D. Victor) Back.

Note 152: Quote from D. Victor in a comment to a previous version of this paper. Back.