Understanding Balkan Organized Crime: A Key to Success in Iraq?

An interview with Mark Edmond Clark
Sean Costigan, Senior Editor, CIAO

CIAO: In your estimation, what would it take to get organized crime in Southeastern Europe under control?

Mark Clark: A successful fight against organized crime typically would require the successful change of culture in the society in which it exists. Organized crime groups maintain their control by creating and maintaining an environment of fear within the societies that they operate. Practically as a prerequisite, they must possess the capacity to kill and commit other acts of extreme violence against friend and foe alike. To that extent, history would show that few in any society have had the strength to stand up against them. However, organized crime also survives often because the society in which it exists, accepts it. In the Balkans, peoples of the different ethnic groups have typically lived in rural communities, based on agrarian economies, and for the most part have been isolated and provincial, with little interest in making dramatic transformations regarding the place of organized crime. In the cosmopolitan cities and areas of almost each state, organized crime has also developed real influence. Perhaps a cause for that might be the successive migrations to the cities and towns, thereby assuring that there would always be segments of the population that accepted organized crime and would welcome the goods and services criminal groups could provide.

During the last decade, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, political leaders, even those with little intention or capability to bring their states forward to form democratic societies, retained support from the international community. Pressures from the international community to deliver results often led its representatives to support political leaders who would appear to get things done quickly, as opposed to community leaders and other local actors who may have been able to yield results with long-term advantages. In Bosnia, for example, many political leaders, at the national, municipal, and local levels, mastered the skill of saying what the international community wanted to hear without necessarily embracing the ideas of democracy. Clearly this worked against the desired goal of building a stable and civil society. For such political leaders, having Bosnia appear as a burgeoning democracy was better than actually developing an ethnically integrated state based on democratic principles and the rule of law. Perhaps it was never really viable to use the existing political structures, parties, and leaders to create change because many of the political officials did not have either the knowledge or the experience to govern in a democratic state. But there was no prior system of democratic control upon which they could base their efforts. In the end in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkans, it was the former Yugoslavia's Communist-era style approach to governance, with political patronage, corruption, control of the economy, control of the media, and secret intelligence and police organizations, that some fell back on.

CIAO: It’s often said that organized crime is deeply imbedded in the Balkans. Can you talk a little about their “role” in society?

MC: Balkan organized crime groups generally have functioned in complex networks that include: state security, intelligence, the military, political leaders, paramilitary groups, religious leaders, and business leaders in state-owned firms. They work in close cooperation to achieve mutual goals of increasing wealth and establishing greater influence in their states and sometimes other states within their region. In some cases, the networks have a global reach.

The operations of Balkans organized crime groups are nearly the same operations that one would see anywhere in the world. They provide goods and services in societies that the governments of those societies are unable to provide, may limit, or may restrict. The list of such activities might typically include: the trafficking of narcotics and sale of narcotics, the trafficking of women (prostitution), arms trafficking, people smuggling, hijacking transport, auto theft, establishing black markets (e.g., goods from clothing, liquors, cigarettes, furniture, and other products are sold to the population), smuggling of diamonds and precious metals, racketeering (i.e., protection, loan sharking, money laundering), forging government documents (i.e., passports, property titles, ethnic status), and counterfeiting. Much of the activity relies on transnational criminal activity. Further, these activities are usually conducted on an inter-communal basis. Interestingly, the first inter-communal business activity centers sponsored by the international administration and military officials in Bosnia were the Arizona and Virginia markets which in reality were controlled by organized crime groups in Croatia and Republika Srpska to cater to both Muslim and Serb shoppers.

CIAO: How have recent efforts to curb their activities affected the situation?

MC: To survive the international community’s current efforts to thwart their activities, organized crime groups have simply adjusted to the situation. Serious organized crime groups have serious thinkers in them at some level. Working within networks that include current and former state security, intelligence, and military links, organized crime groups have the ability to assess and defeat threats to their existence. Many former government operatives connected to organized crime groups were well trained to perform that function in defense of their states. If the international community announces that a particular effort will be made against an organized crime group using certain tactics, techniques and procedures, alert "operational advisers" in the targeted organized crime groups will make necessary adjustments to defeat those announced efforts.

With so many linkages to the power and machinery of the government security apparatus of their states, organized criminal groups are very sensitive to the political changes and political demands of their societies. Organized crime, for example, might not engage in high profile activities or increase the intensity of its operations in a state seeking recognition from the international community as a viable point for international investment or a province that seeks recognition as a stable entity worthy of independence and sovereignty.

Often, reductions in organized crime activity in such states or will be proclaimed as evidence of the success of international efforts to thwart and defeat organized crime groups in the Balkans. In allowing the international community to "showcase" meager successes in states which are administered by international organizations, organized crime groups provide themselves the opportunity to acquire greater strength and security. It enables the groups to demonstrate to the local population that the international community has a poor understanding of the environment that it is working in and demonstrate that they have the ability to function with impunity against the wishes of the international community.

Many of the organized crime activities that I spoke of earlier are transnational activities and rely upon connections to organized criminal groups outside of the Balkans. One possible new link organized crime can have with the outside is with terrorists. Operations such as narcotics trafficking, arms trafficking, people smuggling, the smuggling of diamonds and precious metals, forgery, counterfeiting, and money laundering would be particularly useful to the terrorists. The skill sets that organized crime groups provide in their states and entities would allow a terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda to function effectively "underground" in the region.

CIAO: Much has been made of ties between organized criminal groups and terrorists. Can you speak to that?

MC: In March 2002, then Foreign Minister of Macedonia, Slobodan Casule made the claim that organized crime groups in the Balkans may be serving as a repository for al-Qaeda money to elude the investigative efforts of law enforcement agencies globally to uncover the reservoirs of funds and funding efforts in support of al-Qaeda. The threat that members of the organized crime group would simply abscond with the al-Qaeda funds is ostensibly obviated by the fact that organized crime respects the capabilities of the terrorist organization to retaliate. That purported respect was apparently developed during periods of contact that Balkans organized crime groups may have had with al-Qaeda operatives from 1998 to 1999 in Kosovo fighting alongside the KLA and in Northern Albania in KLA training camps. Experience was also gained in Bosnia from 1992 to 1996, where mujahedin and the "El Mujahed" Brigade of al-Qaeda fought in support of the Bosnian Muslims and created strong ties with the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). The SDA leadership, supported by the international community during the war, fell in disfavor, being seen after the war as being ultra-nationalist and linked and working in support of organized crime groups as well as Iran and terrorist organizations. Such ties to organized crime allowed for the creation of Balkan organized crime groups as a conduit for al-Qaeda money transfers and a host of other activities hostile to Western interests.

Nearly every state in which organized crime exists has a vested interest in the fight against al-Qaeda and terrorism. The presence of organized crime groups makes it more likely that terrorists can influence events against the interest of local political leaders. Law enforcement and intelligence services must control, deter, or eliminate terrorist groups in the name of their own survival. They are not just doing a favor for the US by participating in the global counter-terrorism effort. Terrorism is also a transnational problem. All governments are in this together, and the best chance for success is cooperation.

CIAO: Some analysts have spoken of a resurgence of organized crime in Iraq. Are there parallels with the situation in Balkans?

MC: Combating organized crime in Iraq will be an issue that will demand further consideration as the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts get underway. The Balkans could possibly serve as a model for understanding what is now taking place in Iraq. Certainly, social, political, and economic development cannot take place until all influences on those elements, such as organized crime, are considered and thoroughly understood. Pretending otherwise would be a mistake. It is recognized that much of the looting that took place after April 9 was part of an organized effort. Many goods, of all types, likely found their way out of Iraq and profits were made. The acquisition of new possessions through the looting also presents the lesser opportunity of selling them on the streets of Iraq. Those possessions, when exchanged for cash, could allow citizens to make wagers with organized crime controlled gambling rings that take bets on many things, sporting events, for example.

The goal of the US civil administration must be to eliminate or greatly diminish the presence and impact organized crime groups have on Iraqi society. With appropriate information, they would be able to detain and arrest suspected members of organized criminal groups or arrest individuals suspected to be linked to organized criminal groups. This work must be amplified by efforts to seek out and neutralize sources of financial support for criminal activity. Controlling the flow of money is a critical element in the fight. Assets of criminal organizations suspected or known must be frozen or confiscated depending upon the circumstances.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and agencies of the US intelligence community have established a presence in Iraq. In coping with the issues, the initial task for both will be to use all resources available to them to identify individuals possessing credible links to critical operations of organized crime groups.

In certain cases it may not be necessary to place all individuals, groups, organizations, and firms linked to the organized crime groups in custody. Rather, individuals with links to those groups, whether strong or tenuous (being outside of the organization), might prove useful as a line back into them, and serve as possible sources of valuable information. If well directed, such activities might allow for the creation of a pathway into the criminal organization's leadership cells. Recruiting individuals who are connected to the organized crime groups certainly would not be easy. Yet, it is a far less daunting task than penetrating the groups directly.

The military must also continue its efforts to keep "ears to the ground" through the use of its Civil Affairs units and other mechanisms of outreach to the local population. Although this work has been historically risky and is perhaps even somewhat riskier in Iraq, it allows the military personnel, and officials of other US government agencies who often accompany their units, to establish low-level contacts and develop informants. Such coordinated inter-agency efforts will prove to be invaluable part of the military's force protection effort.

CIAO: What’s the state of organized crime in Iraq?

MC: Iraqi organized crime is likely in a transition period. In the past, it undoubtedly worked alongside state security, intelligence, the military and the Baath Party to bring goods and services to the country as well as maintain the state's linkages to the outside world. Leading figures in Saddam's regime likely received a considerable cut from the proceeds of that activity. With the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein out of power, organized crime will not shrink, but will rather seek new ways of operating. The possibility exists that new relationships among crime groups will be created and a new pecking order of power will be developed. Leadership changes can take place, new territories of influence can be established, and new sources of income can be developed. With the dismantling of state security, intelligence and military structures, individuals with leadership and management experience who are of work form a pool of new recruit for organized crime groups. Many of these individuals also possess special skill sets that would support criminal operations. Further, although some of the individuals from the state security, intelligence and military structures may join existing criminal groups, others may choose to form their own organized crime groups and compete for power. In any event, the key factor for the success of organized crime in Iraq will be its ability to engage with profitable transnational criminal activities. Any new groups formed from veterans would also likely have a strong interest in political activity and lend their support to conservative, anti-Western political organizations that might develop.

The separation of members of the Iraqi state security, intelligence and military structures from service also presents opportunities for penetration and destruction of many organized crime groups. Some of the military officers could possibly be recruited to join an organized crime group, presenting their special skill set, and serve the US by openly collecting information based on the requirements of law enforcement and the intelligence. Once recruitment is complete and there is a relatively high degree of assurance that the individual is credible when he states that he is willing to serve as an agent for the United States, he must be handled by the intelligence service or law enforcement in a way which will allow for the best penetration of the targeted organized crime group. The individual could be instructed in techniques by his intelligence service or law enforcement handlers for the clandestine collection of information from his counterparts or superiors.

Those individuals might engage in the eavesdropping on conversations and meetings, the examination of sensitive records relevant to the organized crime group, the planting of listening devices or cameras provided by his intelligence service or law enforcement handlers, and providing entry for handlers to areas of restricted access in offices of his group or organization. A safer technique, but the one least likely to yield immediate results, would be to have the individual gather information through passive collection. By listening closely for off-hand remarks from colleagues and superiors about the activities of a group, valuable intelligence may be developed. This technique might typically be used in conjunction with other technical efforts to gather information.

The ideal result would be to have the individual work his way through into the heart of the organized crime group's on-going operations, to know what their aims and plans are, to know who is directing activities and who will carry them out, and what has been planned. Through diligence and patience, the individual could achieve a position of influence enabling him to actively participate in the groups operations. There would always be the possibility that double agents might be recruited in error. However, techniques such as “inspiring” these individuals, by providing them with misleading information to pass along to their superiors, could be used. In perhaps rare, but extremely fortunate circumstances, there will be occasions when individuals in such groups or organizations may literally walk into the offices of intelligence services or law enforcement agencies. They may provide warnings of attacks or offer themselves as agents for some form of compensation.

As a result of an effort to penetrate Iraqi organized crime groups, two types of intelligence might be acquired. For the purposes of prevention, tactical intelligence (working level information about the day to day activities of the organized crime groups) would be acquired. This will allow us to prepare for, deter, defeat, and eventually predict their activities. For the purpose of developing military operations to counter the organized crime groups, the information will be developed into combat intelligence (information for immediate battlefield use). This would help US and coalition military forces hit the organized crime groups and destroy their bases of support.

CIAO: What if such efforts to cope Iraqi organized crime groups prove to be ineffective?

MC: If organized crime groups in Iraq manage to establish new links and firm links to the outside, the results would be devastating. Of course there would be problems typically associated with transnational crime. However, it could also potentially mean linkages to known organized crime groups in Balkan states, Russia, other former Soviet states, and other groups in Asia, Africa, and of course, the rest of the Middle East, including Israel. If Iraqi organized crime groups have access to products of Saddam Hussein's WMD program, those elements could be moved anywhere in the world through the transnational criminal underground. The threat of having Iraqi organized crime groups linking with al-Qaeda also exists. Given the large presence of US troops and other personnel in Iraq, it could be problematic in terms of force protection and overall security. The problem increases threat levels on the ground with the possibility that al-Qaeda might seek to purchase products of the former regime's WMD development programs. Lastly, Iraqi organized crime groups could link up with intelligence services of other states interested in purchasing WMD from Iraq.