CIAO DATE: 3/00

Does Syria Want Peace?

David Wurmser

On The Issues

February 2000

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

For several years, the Syrian government has flouted U.S. attempts at diplomacy. That behavior is no accident; it is an integral element of Syria’s strategy to maintain its dominance over Lebanon and preserve its own domestic stability.

The round of Syrian–Israeli peace talks that took place last month in West Virginia was attended by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Syria, meanwhile, sent only its foreign minister, Farouk al–Shara. The Clinton administration would like observers to believe that there is no significance in this. But symbolism does not go unnoticed in the Arab world, with its precise protocol and constant emphasis on who is paying homage to whom. Public events express the relations of power among leaders and nations–an ancient legacy inherited from Byzantine times, when high politics were decided by seating arrangements at banquets.

True, it must be acknowledged that Syrian President Hafez Assad’s health remains questionable and may make it difficult for him to travel. (He managed to make it to Moscow last year.) Assad would also, if the activist lawyers who nabbed Augusto Pinochet were consistent, risk arrest for crimes against humanity. But Assad could at least have sent his designated successor–his son Bashar–as he normally does for important events he does not himself attend. That he did not is consistent with Syria’s behavior so far and suggests Assad may have more interest in a peace process than in peace itself.

During the December round of talks in Washington, Mr. Shara shocked everyone by launching a tirade against Israel and the United States. He dwelled on the long conspiracy to oppress and victimize Syria. And as if that were not enough, the last hours of the summit were spent unsuccessfully trying to convince Mr. Shara to publicly shake Mr. Barak’s hand. The White House dismissed these humiliations as negligible glitches in an otherwise momentous, historic chain of happy events. But Syria intended the very structure of the negotiation to portray Israel and the United States as subjugated.

 

A Pattern of Disdain

Syria’s behavior is part of a pattern. Indeed, for most of the last decade the Syrian government seems to have made sport of humiliating the United States. Here a few highlights:

• In late 1994, President Clinton traveled to the Middle East. While visiting Syria right after a bomb, likely planted by a Syria–based group, ripped through an Israeli bus, Mr. Clinton gingerly called on Syria to crack down on terror groups. Assad contradicted the president at a news conference and defied him to produce any evidence that Syria had ever supported terror, in essence calling him a liar to his face–an absurd charge given the volumes of generally dispersed and confirmed information on Syrian terror. Much of that information emerged from highly publicized cases in European courts that tied Syrian intelligence to major terrorist attacks and attempted attacks. One such case, the Hindawi trial, led Great Britain to sever relations with Syria. Clinton’s silence in the face of this challenge was especially disconcerting because Syrian support for terror had long been a key item on our agenda in all bilateral discussions. His silence almost suggested acquiescence.

• In fall 1995, Mr. Clinton again traveled to the Middle East to witness the Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty. Syria marked the moment by letting its minions unleash a volley of rockets on northern Israel to protest, while Assad flew to Cairo to coordinate with Egypt how to derail the treaty. Mr. Clinton, trying to avoid offending Syria, went on to Damascus right after that to pay a courtesy call.

• In early 1996, after the last time Israel offered Syria the entire Golan Heights for peace, Syrian–backed factions in Lebanon unleashed a volley of Katyushas on Israel, which led Israel to launch a mini–war. Seeing his carefully nurtured negotiations melt into the hell of rocket and artillery barrages, then–U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher flew to Damascus to mediate a ceasefire. He sat for hours on the tarmac waiting to meet any Syrian official. None came. Mr. Christopher returned to the United States.

• In late 1998, America launched a short air war on Iraq. In Damascus, where nothing happens without the blessing of the government, crowds of students–regime loyalists–stormed and ransacked the U.S. embassy and hoisted Syria’s flag atop the consular office. The crowd then sacked a British installation and wound up at the U.S. ambassador’s house, which they also ransacked while his wife hid in the cellar. Syrian police looked on but never interceded. Syria never apologized, but the speaker of its parliament appeared on television to say that the U.S. deserved the attacks. About the same time, the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon ran into a band of Hezbollah fighters while visiting Syrian–controlled areas. In sight of Syrian soldiers, according to the Israeli press, he was surrounded and forced at gunpoint to trample on an Israeli flag. Syrian troops never intervened, nor did Syria apologize.

 

A Difficult Dance

Why does Syria do this? After coming to power 30 years ago, Assad’s regime quickly degenerated into a totalitarian ally of the Soviet Union. It has failed in every aspect of governance. Its economy is a mess. Ethnic and sectarian divisions tear as hard as ever at its seams. Like North Korea, Syria became a poor country with a large army into which it still pours ever more precious resources. The Syrian regime cannot base its legitimacy on internal accomplishments, since it has none.

Syria has failed externally, too. Its patron, the Soviet Union, turned out to be a lame horse. Turkey to its north has a larger army than Syria’s and shows no hesitation to use it. War with Israel has only brought Syria defeat. Syria successfully digested Lebanon, but only because of Iranian support, American acquiescence, and Israeli passivity.

Instead, Assad’s path to legitimacy lies in humiliating the United States and Israel. Assad has long sought to demonstrate to his people that his Arab neighbors, Israel, and even the United States acknowledge his power and superiority. By humiliating America and getting away with it, he, like Saddam, taps its power to vindicate his own.

It is, however, a difficult dance. Assad must humiliate without engendering a resistance to his regime or its hold on Lebanon. Enter the peace process. Real peace would loosen his grip on Lebanon and shake Syria’s internal stability. A regime like Assad’s needs external conflict to survive. Without it, he cannot explain to his people why massive internal repression and a state of emergency are still necessary. A peace process, on the other hand, is useful. Through offers of progress, he lures Israel and the United States close enough to give him a steady stream of opportunities to demonstrate his importance.

And why does the United States dance with Syria? Perhaps it is because the Clinton administration has no concept of honor. Lacking that, this administration cannot understand the damage caused to its credibility by allowing a flailing Stalinist regime in Syria to humiliate it freely and repeatedly. Nor, it seems, does the Clinton administration understand that tolerating Syria’s behavior makes real peace less, not more, likely.

 

David Wurmser is director of Middle East studies at AEI. An earlier version of this article appeared in the Wall Street Journal Europe on January 4, 2000.