CIAO DATE: 8/01

The U.S. Is Not Pulling Out of the Balkans

Richard N. Perle

On The Issues

April 2001

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

The alarm in Europe caused by rumors of a possible reduction in the level of U.S. forces in Bosnia shows just how dependent the European Union is on American military assistance—and, more broadly, on NATO.

Press reports that the United States might reduce its presence in Bosnia over the next two years have produced hand-wringing among diplomats and hysterical headlines in the most unlikely places: "Bush pulls out troops as Balkans crisis deepens" is how the British Guardian—not the first place I would expect to lament the withdrawal of the U.S. army—breathlessly informed its readers on March 16.

Perhaps the facts will reassure anxious Guardian readers: The United States and its NATO allies established force levels in Bosnia at its last semiannual review that are smaller than the deployment we have there now. The "pullout" is nothing more than the repatriation of the excess units, including some helicopters, tanks, and armored cars. When they are all safely back home, the American contingent in Bosnia will be at the level agreed last December after thorough NATO consultations. At no time, either before the December review or since, have I heard it argued that this reduction either jeopardizes the effectiveness of NATO in Bosnia or imposes an unfair burden on America's NATO allies.

There is, working its way through the policymaking process in Washington, a paper circulated by the Joint Staff (made up of officers from the uniformed military services), that contemplates gradual reductions in the American presence in Bosnia as circumstances warrant and after appropriate consultation within NATO. It was the leak of this paper that caused some observers to worry that the United States under the new administration might be withdrawing from the Balkans, abandoning its NATO commitment, and retreating into isolationism. Judging from past practice it will not be long before French diplomats are putting it about that the reduction in American forces in Bosnia validates the French argument for a Euro-army.

The paper in question is a draft reflecting the view of the staff officers who wrote it. It is not even the final considered view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, much less the view of the civilian authorities to whom they report, including the secretaries of defense and state and the president. They will eventually decide the size and nature of the American presence in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkans.

It is possible that President Bush will propose to his NATO allies that American forces in Bosnia be further reduced. Any such suggestion would reflect the fact that the armed conflict in Bosnia ended long ago. The time when NATO's air power was needed to secure the peace, and its mechanized armed presence to protect it, are past. The Apache helicopters now being withdrawn were designed to destroy enemy tanks, none of which have been seen in Bosnia for years. The American tanks coming out have not fired a shell in combat since they were introduced following the Dayton Accord years ago. It is hugely expensive to keep them where they are not needed.

The task now in Bosnia is rebuilding the country—and the urgent requirement is for civil administration and police protection, neither of which is best accomplished by men and women trained to destroy targets on the battlefield. There is, as well, a need to deter any resumption of aggression, and toward the fulfillment of this need the United States will surely contribute its fair share. Finally, should a crisis develop in Bosnia in which American forces were vital to maintaining the peace, I have no doubt the president would order them to return. After all, it was then-candidate Bush who last year prevailed on his fellow Republicans in Congress to defeat legislation that would have required a withdrawal of American forces.

The American deployment in Kosovo is another matter. There the conflict is still such as to require military forces, and the substantial withdrawal of America's NATO contingent could endanger the fragile balance that has kept incidents of violence from igniting another war. It is notable that nothing in the leaked discussion paper suggests the United States is about to leave Kosovo.

 

The Centrality of NATO

For all the talk of a new European Security and Defense Identity to be cobbled together out of the disparate outlooks and forces of the member states of the European Union, it is NATO, and not the EU, that has brought peace—and such stability as can be found there—to the Balkans. If a modest reduction in the level of American forces deployed in Bosnia sounds the alarm in Europe, what should we make of the Blair-Chirac fantasy that the EU will soon be poised to go it alone when there's trouble in Europe?

On his recent visit to Camp David, the British prime minister was at pains to dispel any notion that the misadventure at St. Malo, like the words of the Nice agreement, meant any lessening of the central role of NATO in maintaining the peace in Europe.

In his effort to gain American approbation for the EU's ambition to develop its separate defense identity, the prime minister assured the president that the mumbo jumbo written down between the opening aperitif and the closing liqueur at French coastal resorts would enhance rather than diminish the centrality of NATO. Reflecting on those assurances in an interview with Winston S. Churchill in the Daily Telegraph, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld observed that "the Devil is in the detail."

"We will be watching carefully to see how things evolve," Mr. Rumsfeld said. For like President Bush, the secretary of defense understands that what is done to effect a European Defense Initiative is far more important than what is said. It is the character of concrete arrangements rather than the characterization of them that matters.

The American administration is waiting to see whether Mr. Blair will shape French policy toward European defense—or be shaped by it. No one seriously believes that French policy, which aims to minimize American influence in Europe and the world by minimizing NATO, remotely resembles Mr. Blair's description of British policy. It is the texts elaborately negotiated at St. Malo and Nice—not some "poison" in the form of briefings from Mr. Ian Duncan-Smith—that has caused concern.

Dealing with that concern may well mean that Mr. Blair will have to disappoint Mr. Chirac as he makes good on his promises to President Bush—promises the president chose to accept by returning the ball to the prime minister's court.

It will not be easy for Mr. Blair. It is almost impossible to imagine a convincing strategy for stability in Europe that does not entail a robust NATO presence. The French concept of the EU acting alone in some theoretical situation that NATO is unwilling to confront will not stand scrutiny. If the challenge is too small to engage the whole of NATO, it cannot merit the creation of a new institution. If it is of sufficient gravity to require a serious commitment of military power, with its attendant risks and hazards, it will almost certainly need NATO's full capability.

So we'll make sure the Americans coming home from Bosnia take their return tickets with them. Just in case they're needed.

 

Richard N. Perle is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. An earlier version of this article appeared in the Daily Telegraph (London) on March 19, 2001.