|
|
|
|
CIAO DATE: 8/01
A Better Way to Build a Missile Defense
On The Issues
August 2000
The antiballistic missile system tested last month is not worth building. An effective missile defense will need to intercept missiles during their launch phase.
Far from lamenting July's highly publicized test failure, advocates of a defense against ballistic missiles should rejoice. The move to deploy an ill-conceived system supported by the Clinton administration has been stymied, and the prospect of a far more effective defense is greatly increased.
The system that failed in the July 8 test conformed to the main provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty between the United States and the late Soviet Union. That treaty, which became defunct when the Soviet Union collapsed, expressly prohibits the deployment of national missile defenses and allows only a tiny, highly localized defense based on old, ground-based technology. So it is hardly surprising that a system designed to fit within it, like the one the administration is recommending, would turn out to be inadequate.
The system's inadequacy is inherent in its technology and architecture. It relies on a small number of ground-launched interceptors, based on U.S. territory, that must be maneuvered with astounding precision to collide with incoming warheads at closing speeds of fifteen thousand miles per hour.
Since each enemy missile may carry several nuclear warheads, along with a large number of decoys, the one hundred interceptors could be overwhelmed. And the interceptors will have only one shot: there is no chance to fire a second time if an interceptor misses.
To make matters worse, the entire system depends on a small number of ground-based radars, including one located on Shemya Island in Alaska. If that single radar were destroyed, the entire system would be disabled. Surely nations capable of building long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads could damage or destroy a large, immobile radar on that frozen, barren island.
A More Sophisticated System
If this technology is so fragile, why build it when the potential exists for a far more effective missile defense system? Unfortunately, the Clinton administration's primary concern seems to be the defense of the ABM treaty. Administration officials are prepared to subordinate military effectiveness to a thirty-year-old treaty that they persist in calling a "cornerstone" of stability.
A more effective system, although inconsistent with the treaty, would intercept hostile missiles (or missiles launched accidentally) early in their flight, just after liftoff, during what is known as the "boost phase." Television viewers familiar with shuttle launches have seen the booster rockets lift the shuttle, plumes of flame burning brightly as it rises gracefully into space. Similar rockets can, and do, deliver nuclear warheads.
During the boost phase, missiles move relatively slowly. They are easy to pinpoint: the intense heat from their rocket motors is readily detected by sensors based on satellites. If hostile rockets are intercepted in the beginning, during the boost phase, as opposed to the "terminal" phase, as targeted by the administration's system, there are neither decoys nor multiple warheads to contend with. A successful intercept destroys all the warheads and all the decoys before they can be separated from the rocket that carries them into space.
Moreover, a properly configured missile defense system protects widely. A missile destroyed in the boost phase will never reach its intended target—whether it is Washington or Paris or American forces abroad.
One approach to a national missile defense would be to deploy interceptors on naval ships, possibly on Aegis cruisers, which could then be positioned as necessary. Such a sea-based system might work together with lasers and other devices in space to provide a limited but technologically sophisticated system with global reach and effectiveness.
Encouraging Stability
Opponents of a robust missile defense argue that it would encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons and lead to instability. The opposite is far more likely. Imagine a sharp rise in tension between India and Pakistan. Both countries have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Suppose the United States could dispatch an Aegis cruiser to the region with instructions to intercept any ballistic missile fired by either side. Such a capability in American hands would be highly stabilizing, reducing the likelihood of conflict, discouraging the use of offensive missiles, reassuring both sides.
Other nations, like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, are actively trying to acquire missiles capable of attacking the United States. They believe that acquiring even a single missile will catapult them into a select class of states capable of inflicting massive damage on the United States. Given time and money, a single missile, or even several, is not beyond their reach.
But suppose that we were to construct a defense that could intercept all the warheads and decoys carried by one hundred or two hundred enemy missiles. A Saddam Hussein or a Kim Jung Il would need more than that number to be confident he could land a missile on New York or Chicago or an allied capital. In that case, even a determined adversary might well throw up his hands and conclude that such a missile force is beyond his reach.
The best way to protect against a missile attack is to discourage our adversaries from investing in the missiles in the first place. There can be no more powerful disincentive than to have a shield that guarantees their hugely expensive programs will fail. It is that shield, based on our most advanced technology—not an outdated treaty—that will protect us best.
Richard N. Perle is a resident fellow at AEI and an adviser to Governor George W. Bush. A previous version of this article appeared in the New York Times on July 13, 2000.
Email this citation