Social Sciences
Vol. 30, No. 4/December 1999

Modern Problems of Fighting Crime in Russia
By Alexander Akhiezer

In Soviet times the mythology of violence played a rather unusual role in society and in people's consciousness. Two main forms of violence could be identified. First, imprisonment of large numbers of people and, in most cases, their subsequent liquidation, that is, genocide. Second, the confiscation of property of all types from the majority of citizens.

The scope, frequency and duration of such practices testified to the special atmosphere in society that made them possible and that provided a certain moral legalization, inducing the whole society to take part in them. For example, there is evidence of the cases when some peasants, who had just suffered from food-requisitioning, joined these campaigns to requisition food in a neighboring village. This atmosphere was maintained due to the following characteristics:

1. The Soviet mass terror was not directed at any specific (political, ethnic, etc.) group of people. Potentially, anyone could become its victim. For the state machine the victim's political or any other affiliation was of secondary importance. The aim of the state terror was not associated with any community or organization (such as real opposition) but was directed against the whole society in order to create a special atmosphere in it and institute an ideal order with a view to minimizing any disorganization (the latter was understood as a deviation from the ideal order in each individual cell of the society) and imposing order onto all the ties among all the citizens and even onto their very thinking.

2. The most extraordinary aspect of the Soviet state terror was the contradiction between the absence of any real guilt or even any misdemeanor on the part of the victim (from the point of view of common sense, to say nothing of the law and human rights) and the absence of any interest on the part of the corresponding authorities in finding the truth. (This is, incidentally, what makes Soviet organs of state security different from Gestapo, which recognized the possibility of repeal in the case of the absence of corpus delicti.) Noteworthy in this respect are the attempts of the authorities to cook up the victim's guilt according to an archaic-mythological scenario, thus establishing the basis for mutual understanding with the archaic part of society. This integration on the basis of mass mythology was realized in the official ideology.

3. Widespread popular mythology had a powerful influence on society and created favorable atmosphere for mythological constructions devised by the authorities. For instance, dissemination of the belief that violence is an effective means of solving all the economic and political problems of the day.

4. On this basis mass support of the very possibility of terror and of the need for real and potential victims was created among the majority of the population (suffice it to recall the evidence provided by Alexander Solzhenitsin about such sentiments among prisoners).

The specific Soviet terror could not have been the result of faith, or the fantasies of a handful of ideologists, doctrinaires, or bureaucrats, it could only have been the result of notions shared by wide masses of people, of the specific popular culture, its dynamics, the specific reactions to crisis situations manifested by society on the basis of this popular culture.

 

Manichean Mythology

Among the characteristic features of Russian cultural and intellectual life Manicheanism takes a prominent place, carrying, by its very nature, the idea of the inevitability of conflicts and violence as an immanent condition for the existence of society itself. "Russia represents a Manichean type of imperial-like civilization." ₁ The Russian type of terror, particularly of that scope, could hardly have happened in another society, where the majority adhered to the Christian Commandments of forgiveness towards enemies, love of one's neighbor, liberal notions about personal guilt which has to be proved in court according to the law.

Popular Russian mass culture experienced a strong influence of Manicheanism which had a stronger effect on humankind than any other religion. However, Manicheanism is something more than religion. In the broader sense, it is a logical-historical step in one's intellectual development, which is characterized by a confrontation of different poles in a dual opposition. An attempt at a theoretical generalization of this point of view leads us to regard reality as an absolute opposition of two substances-subjects, as an absolute relentless struggle between them without compromise. Throughout its existence this archaic system invariably finds concrete forms of its manifestation in various cultural and ideological phenomena. But it can exist also as a hidden subsoil underlying phenomena of a different nature, such as monotheistic religions. In any case, the influence of this phenomenon in Russian popular culture is enormous, penetrating even elitist spheres where simultaneously with its influence critical attitudes towards Manicheanism are formed.

It is particularly important to note that Manicheanism also nourishes revolutionary doctrines and the world outlook of those who strive "to stir up the masses for a liberation struggle." The masses really did try to liberate themselves from the state and culture, appearing on the post-Manichean foundation (including Christianity with its monotheism). All the revolutionary mythology in Russia developed as an attempt to assimilate Manichean ideas whereby the people as the carrier of absolute good lives in absolute antagonism with evil, embodied by wicked authorities.

The importance of Manicheanism for Russian society consists in that this trend bears a relatively simple explanation of social phenomena and its program of mass actions motivated by a passionate desire to exterminate the world evil. The emotional simplicity of such a model stimulates a temptation in society to think and act according to a simplified model, reducing everything to an absolute conflict of two morally opposing forces.

Manichean over-simplification always needs to be rendered more concrete, its proponents are forever confronted with the task of translating their abstract ideas into concrete notions, such as who precisely (what people or social group or individuals, etc.) is the living embodiment of evil. Manicheanism always requires a concrete answer to the famous question asked by the Russian intelligentsia: "Who is to blame?" for all the misfortunes and injustice. They, too, expect a concrete answer to the question: who precisely is the embodiment of good and the carrier of the truth, who will show a way of doing away with evil.

Manicheanism in its various forms is at the basis of ideological myth-making in Russia. Its influence and enormous potential for creating ideological constructions enable the demagogues and pogrom-mongers, as well as the romantic-minded fools and political adventurers, to justify the mass rejection of the culture and morality that have developed historically. Manichean methodology allows one to present this or that social group as an embodiment of absolute evil. This is a means of turning violence into the core of human relationships, of using superficial pretexts to raise people for mass violence, of justifying unheard-of forms of terror, the destruction of the state and the genocide.

It is Manicheanism (rather than the complex, inaccessible ideas of Marx's Capital, known from fragmentary, indirect sources even to professional revolutionaries) that became the real basis for the mythology created by Russian intelligentsia. Manicheanism required interpretation at every step in Russian history for otherwise it would remain a pure theory unable to offer any program of mass action.

 

Sociocultural Reasons for Encouraging Manichean Mythology

The development of mythology based on Manicheanism becomes possible in the presence of a sufficiently strong stimulating factor in society, involving socially-influential and relatively active groups of people. This factor could be a high degree of discord in society, which naturally brings in Manicheanism as it provides an explanation of the inevitable hostility among people. Manicheanism is, in essence, an absolutization of conflict, of discord among different social groups, one of which can be viewed as an embodiment of evil. Conflicts are periodically fanned up among them. Manicheanism is fraught with conflict and, conversely, primitive systematic conflicts tend to embrace Manicheanism which takes a different, distinctive socio-cultural form in each concrete case.

Russian society is characterized by a high degree of disorganization, ₂ taking the form of social discord in access of a certain level of tension. Below we point out several aspects of discord as an everyday phenomenon.

First, noteworthy is the obvious fact that after the liberation from the power of the Tartar Golden Horde Russia failed to stay on the route of developing a dialogic mechanism of interaction between the various levels of power, and also between the various levels of state authorities and the population clustered in local worlds and communities. A striving to establish such a dialogue can be clearly traced during the rule of Ivan III, reaching its height in the 1550s when under Ivan the Terrible the "Elected Rada" followed the policy reforms encouraging local self-rule through elections. However, the society responded with oprichnina terror to these attempts at reforms. Oprichnina was a new instrument of terror, serving to solve conflicts in favor of the "first person". Mass murders were used to prevent the very possibility of a conflict. At that turning point in Russian history the state appropriated the right to interfere in the everyday life of every community and every individual. It was possible because "the mass consciousness RECOGNIZED the right of the authorities to poke their noses (to put it bluntly) into all the details of private life. Not only one's own home was not one's fortress in Russia but even a man's beard was not really his property. The reason for that was not a lack of dignity but the Russian cultural tradition in which the level of sensibility was noticeably shifted towards the greater rights, compared to other states, of the state over the individual." ₃ This totalitarian tradition turned out to be stronger than the tradition leading to the division of powers and to dialogue.

Second, the attempt to realize the above-mentioned variant of coping with the disorganization was possible not because it was effective but because it corresponded to the mass consciousness of the archaic peasantry, constituting, until quite recently, the majority of Russia's population. Such actions on the part of the authorities could not possibly do away either with conflicts or with the conditions creating conflicts. On the contrary, they encouraged the development of conflicts on the micro-levels. The study of a local peasant community in the Tambov Region before the abolition of serfdom in 1861 suggested the conclusion that "the atmosphere there was characterized by a lack of cooperation, all-round violence, and indifference." ₄ "Their life abounded in conflicts, violence, revenge, envy, fear, and swearing. Patriarchal landowners held the community together by means of punishments in order to force the serfs to obey." ₅ "Mistrust, suspicion, and social conflict were the main features of the serfs' life, and the main destructive elements, while violence was the everyday means of letting off steam." ₆ The research reveals "widespread cases of disobedience to the authorities, sloppy work, resistance, laziness and hooliganism." ₇ An important conclusion was made that "maintaining law and order contradicted with the necessity of carrying out production assignments correctly." ₈ Local communities were torn apart by serious inner conflicts, exploitation, violence, etc. Conflicts dominated the relationships between communities: "Patriarchal system did not require any serious cooperation between heads of clans. Each elder pursued his own interests, resorting to theft, slander and fights if it were necessary or possible. This explains hostility between clans." ₉

It is not so much the conflicts themselves that are important in this respect but their influence on Russian society. In the 19th century violence was an acceptable form of solving conflicts in France, Germany, England. Authorities in these countries put up with this which meant that they did not see violence to be of any threat to themselves, for the statehood and for the existing law and order, regarding violence as part of that order. Russia's situation was different: here the authorities "could not put up with violence because it disrupted the functioning of the economic system and also carried the germ of serious social unrest." This means that the community under consideration "was not a self-regulated system and that violence was controlled by violence." ₁₀ In other words, Russian authorities were aware of the danger of mass violence and of the natural disparity between the kind of violence typical of peasant behavior and their own functions of power, that is, in the final analysis, the statehood itself.

Third, the hidden tendency towards conflict created conditions in Russian society for responding to crises by periodic mass attempts to liquidate the ruling and educated sections of the state. The state reacted to these attempts with mass violence towards the people, with large-scale terror and constant interference in people's everyday life. These actions can be seen as precautionary measures to prevent disorganization from developing into an economic catastrophe. The mechanism of this process is very simple. The weakening of state power led to the condition when local conflicts, not restrained by external barriers, spread beyond their limits and threatened to overturn the state and society. True, this process did not always assume extreme forms, but it inculcated permanent hatred or indifference towards power as something hostile, alien, something that should not be supported and reproduced. That was often enough for a disastrous downfall of the state. Mass bloodshed could emerge later as a result of conflicting attempts to form a new statehood.

Fourth, high predisposition to conflict on the micro-level is not just part of the past, it exists in Russia to this day. Suffice it to recall the great number of cases of manslaughter today and the dependence of their rise on the length of time spent at home (that is, the number of murders is correlated to the duration of personal contact). For example, the number of such murders grows in Moscow during severe frosts when people have to spend more time at home together.

Today certain symptoms indicate that these conflicts outflow the boundaries of private life. Some people, who had suffered losses in the current economic crisis, particularly those whose wages have been delayed, and who tend to assemble in large groups, disorganize the functioning of the society and the state (for example, by blocking the railroads) thus aggravating disorganization to the point of economic catastrophe. Today we observe the formerly suppressed social groups trying to defend their interests, refusing to support the state even minimally and thus destroying it at every step. Such destructive periods have regularly happened to Russia in the past, beginning with the opposition between the people (certain social groups) and the state and gradually growing into an all-embracing hostility which threatened to the state with downfall. The record of such developments in Russian history shows that on all the social levels people adhering to such policies reveal much less interest in finding an effective positive solution to problems. Their actions are not compensated by civic responsibility and concern for the effective functioning of the whole, they are not aware of their responsibility for everything that is happening in the country. This attitude is rooted in the archaic beliefs, tending towards Manicheanism, that the destruction of evil is identical to bringing the restoration of good.

 

Manichean Myths of Popular and State Origin

The sharp opposition between the anti-state values shared by the lower social strata and the values shared by the state authorities with their own subculture are expressed in the two traditional Manichean interpretations which have always been either conflicting with each other or merged into an indivisible whole. The Manicheanism of the masses takes the form of identifying any power and any bureaucracy, including the top one, with "werewolves of evil" and "the devil's forces". They may believe that the tsar is "not natural, not a real heir", that he's been "replaced", that he is an anti-Christ. Peter the Great was believed to have been born out of wedlock by a Jewish woman "from the tribe of Dan." Contemporary notions of power are associated with corruption and believed to be dominated by world Sionism, imperialism, foreign financial organizations, etc. Establishing a socio-cultural place for each of these versions and their role in the formation of people's programs of action are of great importance for the understanding of the current situation in Russia and people's mass actions.

At the same time authorities had various interpretations of anti-state activities at different stages in history, seeing dissidents now as betrayers of Orthodox Christianity, now as followers of the Pope or Luther, now as the carriers of other heresies. Sometimes they were viewed as agents of certain ethnic groups (Jews, Poles, Germans, "people from the Caucasus"), agents of imperialism, saboteurs, etc. The Soviet and pre-Soviet ideologists of state power differed from one another only by their different modes of interpretation, based on the Manichean conviction in the endless hatred of the other side. Manichean mythology develops as a result of the attempts at consolidating certain social forces, primarily as a result of the authorities' attempts to substantiate their program of securing unity between society and themselves as their symbol and organizational guarantor. The analysis of this aspect requires a study of specific functions performed by authorities in a split society.

The analysis of the conflict situation in Russia reveals not only the scope of this phenomenon. Destructive civil wars, and mutual exterminations happened in other societies as well. The qualitative difference of the Russian conflict situations consisted in the fact that the authorities tried to suppress conflicts not only when the angry mobs presented an immediate threat but also when conflicts stayed within the limits of the family, small communities, local disputes. In the Middle Ages, small-scale conflicts were happening all over Europe among peasants, that is, the majority of the then population, but the authorities did not see them as any particular danger to their existence. In Russia the authorities interfered with such micro-conflicts, becoming their constant participant and thus deepening the split in society. Peasants were subjected to corporal punishment even in the beginning of the 20th century (for example, if a father complained that his son did not obey him). Each of such conflicts presented no public danger, but the interference of the state created enormous threat to society. The reason for this interference was contained in social immaturity, in the forced transition, historically justified, from local communities to a large community, in the inadequate mechanisms of linking the local communities with the state superstructure.

This heightened interest of the authorities towards micro-conflicts among peasants testified to the former's conviction that peasants presented danger to the existing law and order, to the state as such. Such micro-conflicts could always outgrow their bounds and enter into a conflict with the state. The emerging statehood destroyed the tribal life, disrupted unions among tribes and saw their main task in collecting tributes from them. As a result of this the state was finally formed, but it was different from Western-type states which organically developed from local communities. Throughout Russian history people were avoiding the state power as much as possible. The state reaction to this took the form of rigid structures aiming to tie people to their functions and impose on them the modes of life associated with serfdom. On this archaic basis the state built up industry, developed urbanization, and even tried to create a post-industrial society.

The state attempts to interfere in the conflicts at all levels, including the lowest one, stimulated the constant reproduction of pre-state values on a mass scale. In situations of crisis it could have destructive consequences for a large society and the state. This threat turned the state into a consumer and interpreter of myths, because with the help of myths the universal world evil, existing in various forms, could be justified. Conversely, the state could play the role of a sacral center of good, saving society from mortal danger, providing effective solutions to its problems, and securing its smooth organization. Such attempts were undertaken by all the previously existing governments in Russia but the Soviet government took them to extremes.

 

Special Features of Soviet Mythology

Despotic governments appearing in Russia at various times, beginning with Ivan the Terrible and ending with Stalinism, inevitably fell apart. The main reason for their downfall (such as the Times of Troubles in the 16th century or the downfall of the USSR) was a periodic inability of the state to interfere in all the micro-conflicts (mainly because of the diminished support for such an interference in all the sections of society, which caused these conflicts to break out of their local bounds and reach state proportions). A conflict situation turned into mass disobedience, into rejection of the existing state system, becoming at times strong enough to cause the downfall of the state. Russia's catastrophes can be interpreted as a result of the dominance of a Manichean world view whereby authorities and the larger part of society regarded each other as an embodiment of absolute evil.

The Soviet state developed in a peculiar way: never before Russian society developed such a complex and varied composition, never before a conflict between archaic, pre-state mass culture and developed utilitarianism (pragmatism) reached such a high tension. Soviet statehood emerged as a result of an explosion of powerful archaic mass violence against the larger society and statehood as such rather than any of its forms. Nevertheless this archaic explosion gave rise to a new state which soon turned into a source of state terror. The "insane traditionalism", which had retreated to the pre-Orthodox level, was characterized by "the idea of violent-magic outcome from a puzzling chaos." ₁₁ The Soviet state emerged on the new wave of archaism and tried to monopolize mass violence, finally employing it against archaism as well in order to drive it back to the micro-level and thus suppress it completely.

Soviet statehood turned out to be an unprecedented hybrid. On the one hand, it was based on mass archaic form of local government, that is, popular assembly named Soviet power, a mechanism functioning on a purely emotional basis and uniting groups of people who are familiar to one another and belong to the same local world (clan, village, community, etc.), constantly reproducing authoritarianism which in extreme situations could take extreme forms up to totalitarianism. On the other hand, it contained elements of liberalism reduced to technological means and distorted science.

Soviet statehood emerged as a result of the so-called "explosion of people's creative energy" which Russian intelligentsia had been dreaming about. However, contrary to their romantic expectations this explosion led not to a new post-capitalist socio-economic formation (as Russian Marxists believed it would) but to an activation of archaic (pre-feudal) values leading to disorganization of every cell in the already too complex society. In these conditions the state could emerge only having suppressed this ocean of everyday disorganization and turning it into an ocean of terror. There appeared a society where terror was an everyday occurrence, where the difference between labor camps and free life were obliterated. Such a state needed to legalize violence as supreme law. The basis of such approach could be found in mass Manicheanism. Lenin also found it in "theory", having distorted classical Marxism and ascribing to it the idea of the leading role of violence in history. This idea enabled him to justify the possibility of social revolution in "the capitalistically underdeveloped and economically backward country." ₁₂

The state employed the Manichean idea of unity of the whole people against external and internal enemies, reserving for itself the freedom of the archaic high priest (that is, one who has the right to decide who represents evil and who represents good). They also had the freedom to change their decisions at any time, depending on how they had to oppose a new wave of disorganization at that particular time. Gradually people learnt to respond to the state's violence with their own interpretation of Manicheanism, deciding for themselves who was the bearer of evil. If the majority of the people and the authorities see eye to eye on this matter then the state enjoys a powerful socio-cultural foundation, but if they diverge drastically there is a serious danger of the state's downfall.

Soviet authorities fought with the danger of such a divergence not only by means of terror but also by constantly and actively shaping up ideological constructions designed to hold together the ever disintegrating society. The official ideology emerging as a result of it can be viewed as pseudo-syncretism, that is, an attempt to form an ideological hybrid by identifying the people's archaic mass notions (popular truth) with reduced liberalism and thus, under the guise of scientific ideology, combine archaic culture with the theories of radically-minded modernizers. ₁₃

The resultant society came to be viewed as almost ideal, where no inner conflicts were possible in principle, and above all the conflicts between the utopian striving to achieve abundance, on the one hand, and the archaic means, way of life and culture on the other. Society was believed to be an ideal community, a patriarchal family headed by a father. (In this way the very possibility of a conflict not controlled by authorities was deprived of any moral sanction. Suffice it to recall the Soviet beliefs about the absence of contradictions under socialism, when the only possible conflict can occur "between the good and the excellent".) Society was explained in Manichean terms as the embodiment of Truth and Light. But as any source of Truth the country was supposedly surrounded by a sea of evil, forever penetrating this source in preparation for another battle of cosmic proportions. (This idea freed the authorities from any moral responsibility for the cruel means, causing numerous victims, employed to fight the world evil.) This model of the world was deeply rooted in the popular mythology although some of its elements were new.

The mass influence of Manicheanism was not kept unchanged: it underwent corrosion due to utilitarianism which prevailed in society, pushing to the background the abstract notions of good and evil and viewing the world as a more complex structure. Utilitarianism preached the notions of usefulness and profit, and based itself on people's striving to turn the surrounding world into a potentially inexhaustible set of means. Manicheanism was also undermined by the development of liberalism with its aiming at dialogue, pluralism and consensus, with its critical attitude towards any a priori mythological constructions. However, the influence of liberalism in today's Russian society and the support of it among the population are not yet sufficient. As a result liberalism is subjected to mythological influences and thus liberal mythology is created, carrying a possibility of anti-state Manicheanism, a blind faith in market economy as the supreme Truth. For all its dangers the growth of utilitarian influence undermines the foundations of Manicheanism, creating possibilities, together with liberalism, of a rational approach to society.

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Despite the fact that the age-old Manichean mythology is being eroded under the influence of both utilitarianism and liberalism it still constitutes a large layer of Russian culture. In various forms and proportions this section can be drawn into restoring the old order, based on authoritarian solutions of all the complex and serious problems. This turn of events is quite possible for various reasons. First, due to the cyclic development characteristic of the country's social-cultural dynamics, and to the mass tendency to solve complex problems proceeding from ancient cultural traditions. Second, a turn for the worse is possible due to the society's insufficient ability to formulate and realize concrete, effective and complex programs of solving vitally important problems.

In Russia, the process of modernization gave rise to a very serious problem of the lack of funding, which is vitally necessary not only for carrying out the modernization itself but also for maintaining the entire economy and state functioning, for keeping the army, supporting the cities, the society as a whole, the social security system, for regulating consumption, in short, for maintaining stability. All the countries faced similar problems at various points. But in those countries where these problems have been solved it was thanks to private economic initiative and dialogue among people not only in the political sphere but in other spheres as well. However, in Russia different type of measures predominated, here it was mostly a search within and outside the country for resources that could be expropriated and used to fill in an immediate big gap. These took the form of devastating taxes in kind (as under Peter the Great) or foreign credits (already under the tsars they were used for industrialization and then covered the expenses of the First World War). The dislocation that followed WWI prompted Russia to seek the vitally needed resources to survive. Archaic culture suggested the outcome: plundering the rich on a mass scale (including those whom the authorities chose to consider as rich), expropriation of bank deposits, plundering the churches, the peasants, and then all the rest, who have practically been turned into serfs.

All these measures were taken one by one but they failed to solve any problems. They were in accord with the archaic mass consciousness which allowed treating any group of citizens as the "enemy of the people", and even themselves in their own eyes. Consequently, there appeared a possibility to solve problems not through personal creativity (to which humanity owe everything they have got) but periodically identifying groups of people who could be plundered with sufficient moral justification of the Manichean type. The country was turned into its own colony in its most unattractive form: into a self-servicing concentration camp.

Today Russia faces the same kind of choice: whether it should take the road of accumulating resources as a sum total of individual efforts of millions of entrepreneurs, or the road of further plundering one another. There are plenty of opportunities for the latter. For example, someone thinks of a program for expropriating all the hard currency (which has become a way of saving money in Russia) by forcing the population to sell it at a very low rate. In Soviet times, for example, collective farms had to sell all their produce to the state for symbolic prices.

However, the problem is that in the modern-day world no society can exist for long on the basis of archaic culture, directing its energies towards undermining the very foundations of human existence. It's a mistake to think that this choice is in the hands of the government. This choice has to be made by each one of us. One possibility is for each one of us to join the masses and seek a Manichean way out, as the "revolutionary masses" have already done before us. As a result the country may enter into a new stage of suicidal self-plundering and thus return to a life they have lived before. But there is another possibility: a common aspiration of the people to develop their creative energies. Both options are quite possible.

Translated by Natalia Perova

 

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Endnotes

Note 1. A. Pelipenko, I. Yakovenko, Culture as a System, Moscow, 1998, p. 284 (in Russian). Back

Note 2. A. Akhiyezer, "Disorganization as a Category of Public Life", in Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost, No. 6, 1995.Back

Note 3. A. Yanov, The Shadow of the Terrible Tsar, Moscow, 1997, p. 120 (in Russian). Back

Note 4. S. Khok, Serfdom and Social Control in Russia. The Village of Perovskoye, Tambov Region, Moscow, 1993, p. 168. (in Russian). Back

Note 5. Ibid, p. 177. Back

Note 6. Ibid, p. 163. Back

Note 7. Ibid, p. 162. Back

Note 8. Ibid, p. 169. Back

Note 9. Ibid, p. 175. Back

Note 10. Ibid, p. 164. Back

Note 11. V. Buldakov, Red Dissent, Moscow, 1997, p. 263, 66, 131 (in Russian). Back

Note 12. T. Oizerman, "Leninist Interpretation of Marxism", in: Russian Civilization (Ethno-cultural and Spiritual Aspects), Moscow, 1998, p. 83, (in Russian). Back

Note 13. A. Akhiezer, "Russia as a Great Society", Voprosy filosofii, No. 1, 1993. Back