Strategic Analysis

Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

April 2000 (Vol. XXIV No. 1)

 

Ballistic Missile Defences: The Debate in the United States
By Tara Kartha *

 

Today there are few issues that are so contentious as that of ballistic missile defence (BMD). After years of living under the threat of that almost invincible weapon—the nuclear armed missile— BMD appears to be set to turn the technological cycle in favour of defence, with the potential therefore of turning the deterrence doctrine on its head and forcing countries to completely re-evaluate their options. The concept itself is far from new, and spans more than fifty years of research with frequent gaps and hiccups in between. But a series of factors—political, technological, and strategic—seem to point to the fact that missile defence proponents are finding themselves "third time lucky". After the volte face of the 1960s, and the promise of Reagan years, the Clinton presidency has seen the virtual and quiet acceptance of one facet of missile defence—theatre missile defence—and the energetic espousal of national missile defence, an activity barred by treaty. Today, even its most strident opponents accept that some sort of defence effort would continue for the foreseeable future regardless of which administration comes in next. Thus it appears that the BMD debate has reached a stage of maturity, with all sides hardening and clarifying their stances, and poised for the next round of "when" rather than the "why" of defences.

This debate has been an acerbic one, at times becoming particularly virulent with neither side willing to hear the viewpoint of the other. The fact that Democrats and Republicans are poised at either end of the defence debate is well known. But there are clearly other actors — the Pentagon, the analysts, the scientists and other's whose inputs have been significant. In the final analysis, what interests us here is the effect this has on capabilities, (and deterrence postures thereof) not only in the United States, but also in China, and Russia. Clearly the BMD debate impacts far beyond the United States, and must force at some point a re-evaluation of what constitutes a minimum deterrence in the face of a possible horizontal proliferation of missiles#151;both offensive and defensive#151;in our neighbourhood. Thus the debate has to be followed and taken note of when evaluating our own security environment. This paper begins with a background of past BMD programmes, as a backdrop to understanding the present debate. With this backdrop, the various strands of the debate-and there are many-are grouped around certain common positions to achieve better understanding and for research brevity. The technical aspects are only covered in brief, (see Appx-1) and conclude with a review of the nature of the debate, and the possible consequences of US action in terms of the ABM Treaty. This would lead directly into the second phase of this project#151;which is the possible actions of the major international actors, and the effects of BMD on non-proliferation in general and deterrence doctrines in particular.

 

The Search for a Defence

The problem of defence in any given situation has always been a problematic one. Considerable energy has been devoted towards finding the perfect defense, either through technology or good planning. In past years, city states constructed thick walls and fortresses and considered themselves reasonably safe till better materials provided longer range arrows and battering rams to make the defenders task a difficult one. The cycle of offense and defense went on, with the advantage sometimes weighing against the former or bolstering the latter. Often, covert or innovative strategies found a solution where technology could not, and thus it was not always the side with the better resources which won, but the one that used what it had intelligently. Thus, Marshal Fouchet was forever accused of having lulled the French army into somnolence by constructing what was then seen as an impregnable defense. In the event, a brilliant German offensive simply passed around it in a devastating pincer action.

The advent of air power set new parameters for the defence, and the fear generated by air attacks even during the First World War sent the scales tipping to the offence. History shows that even the threat of a possible air attack was an important factor in persuading the British to sign the now infamous Munich Agreement (1938), a fear perhaps compounded by analysts who predicted "half a million casualties in three weeks" 1 in a German air blitz.

The desperate search for a defence led to some brilliant inventions in the realm of defence like radio beacons and radar, but much of this was overturned as the first missiles hit, and Britains air defence had to be put on "scramble" once again. The use of the V-1 and V-2 in terror attacks against the civilian population threatened the now gathering might of the Allied forces, and major policy makers were one in noting that had the attacks been launched earlier, the whole operation may well have been affected. However, though the attacks came too late, the missiles did cause a considerable diversion of resources in trying to nullify the missiles and their sites. Overall the assessment made after the war, was that the campaign had cost the Allies to incur an expenditure of 47,635,000 pounds while the cost to the Germans was estimated at 12,600,000 pounds #151;which indicates at least a ratio of 4:1 in favour of the attack. 2

The realisation that the missiles were well nigh impossible to stop, and that their launchers difficult to target immediately underscored the significance of the new weapon. It was not long before the triumphant powers went about replicating these missiles in their own countries,#151;even as they ensured that the precious technology did not seep into other countries, not even that of their allies. The catch-phrase that "the missile will always get through" became the centre-piece of doctrine thereafter. But this did not mean that the prospect of a defence was rejected outright. Both the Soviets and the US had initiated programmes to develop and deploy an ABM in the late 1950s.

The thrust for missile defense in the US provides an insight into the various interests involved in a multimillion dollar programme, and the wide gap between the actual and projected threat. In the US, work on the Nike-Zeus and the Nike-Ajax systems was collared by the Army pleading that it had a stake in the continental defence of the United States. The Air Force weighed in with the same plea, but discontinued some programmes (Project Thumper) due to inadequate technologies for radar , data processing and rocket guidance. 3 By 1956 however the Army-which had been suffering from low budget allocations due to the expanding budget for strategic nuclear missiles-convinced Secretary of Defence McElroy that it would run the ABM programme. This programme was given a new urgency after the Soviets launched the Sputnik-1, and in reaction the Advanced Research Projects agency (ARPA) was created with responsibility for "Project Defender" a long term research programme for ABM. Meanwhile the army and defence contractors were going all out for funding of the Nike Zeus system (basically a terminal/late mid course defence system which however had a speed of about one fourth of that of an ICBM warhead) which received additional budgeting for research, in spite of the reservation of President Eisenhower. Through a process of creeping incrementalism the Nike programme was to grow until in 1964 it was known as the Nike-X, with improved data processing and phased array radar, and faster interceptors.

However before these improvements were made, the demand for a "Thin" ABM had already been raised by the Republicans as an election issue. With the perceived missile gap, and the Chinese nuclear test, the demand was also backed by the Army-as well as the other forces who hoped to win a sea based and air based role of ABM as well. Headlines of one trade magazine "Thin Nike-Fat orders" underlined the other interest groups involved. For instance Western Electric company, as prime contractors had won over $1.5 billion for ABM between 1963 and 1967, and could expect more. Another business magazine noted that over 15,000 companies including 12,000 small businesses, were expected to profit from deployment. Raytheon, Martin and McDonnell Douglas could each expect some $600 million. AT&T took over the programme for defensive guided missiles in a contract worth $2.25 billion for the Nike-Ajax alone.

The first (projected) threat perception for a thin ABM system was unquestionably the Chinese rather than the Soviets. Many reasons underlay this rather astonishing assessment at a time when the Chinese had no clear missile capability to speak of. In part the Chinese threat was identified in keeping with Secretary McNamara's opposition to an ABM against the Soviets#151;since as he pointed out, a limited ABM against such a large capability would be no shield at all. This was also the time when the violence of the "Cultural Revolution" had disrupted most long term intelligence estimates. China's missile chief was under repeated Red Guard poster and pamphlet attacks. Turmoil had broken out among two scientific factions, both responsible for the nuclear weapons programme, and reports told of the ransacking of the offices of one of the factions by Red Guards. The internal instability in China was therefore also an additional factor.

Another factor that impinged on the debate was considerable writing on the fighting of limited war. Preparations for a variety of options of conflict short of full-scale war had been under consideration in the Defense Department for some time. But the possibility that these options may have to be exercised against a possible nuclear backdrop was clearly something that needed more thinking over,-especially in a climate where the enemy was not the Soviets (with whom a certain amount of deterrence arising out of assured destruction was understood to be operating). Implicit in this argument-put forward cogently by Bernard Brodie for one 4 #151;was that another power may not be easily deterred (especially if its very integrity was threatened) which might push it into launching even a few nuclear weapons in desperation.

The most compelling and "realpolitik" rationale naturally came from the scientists. Herman Kahn 5 argued that not only would a thin ABM constrain an arms race, but would prevent "other countries" from projecting themselves as invulnerable superpowers by fielding a few hidden missiles. This was the argument of the "nth nuclear power" (the Europeans) who constituted a still unknown entity in the delicate business of deterrence. The argument was that missile defence being so prohibitively expensive, only the superpowers could possibly afford it. Thus the assumption was that-given the energetic Soviet interest in BMD,#151;this should remain a big power preserve, which would permanently render all others capabilities more or less questionable. It must be noted that this marked the heydays of non-proliferation when the Nassau agreement with the British was being renegotiated, and when the Americans were frowning on Gaullist temerity in pursuing a nuclear programme.

Other arguments are also interesting in the light of the ongoing arguments today for a thin NMD. Kahn argues that given that there was no certainty of a complete defence, the balance of terror would continue, though at lower levels, and in the same breath noted that even a thin system would reduce the lead time necessary to quickly go in for crash deployment of a nation wide system (in three to four years at that period). Yet another analyst argued that a thin ABM would ensure stability (read intervention) in Asia, since China would not be able to ensure a credible second strike, even after a US first strike at her known forces. Thus the US would have a certain "blackmail power" against China. 6

Much of this was resisted by the Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, and his opposition was shared by the Office of International Security#151;which had no links with contractors, and Secretary Dean Rusk of the State Department. Also at his side were a bipartisan group from Congress who put out a landmark paper on the disaster that would result world wide in deploying an ABM. But this spirited attack against the programme failed and the decision on the Grand Forks site was passed by a 51-50 vote (with the Vice President providing the tie breaking vote). 7 However later the Chinese threat was downgraded, and Secretary McNamara noted that the Chinese threat in itself would not dictate the deployment of ABM defences. His own fear that Sentinel might generate a certain "mad momentum" 8 was soon proved right Preoccupied by Vietnam, he had little time to supervise the implementation of the ABM announcement, which gave the Services the leeway to deploy the system the way they wanted. But those who assumed that the people who were to be defended would welcome this gladly were proved wrong after huge protests in the cities involved (including the Church, liberal and anti-war groups) forced the Pentagon to rethink its policy (which included a massive campaign to gain congressional support, and influence newspaper editors and reporters). However the two sides were evenly matched, and then came Safeguard.

In 1968, the Nixon Administration reviewed the system and recommended a modification of the "Sentinel". This was renamed "Safeguard" with the changed objective of a "limited defence" of Minuteman silos, bomber bases, and command and control centres. The contractors remained largely the same, with some like General Electric continuing research to become major contractors for SDI in the 1980s. Federal laboratories (Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore) and four leading contractors (Lockheed, Boeing, TRW, and Rockwell) emerged in the forefront.

However the political rationale for BMD was eroding. Elected on a campaign pledge of negotiation rather than confrontation, Nixon declared his intention to negotiate on both offensive and defensive systems. Supporters of ABM noted that such a defence would give more credibility to the extended guarantee that lay at the heart of NATO strategy (since the US would remain relatively safe). Policy makers like Brezinski argued that the "Ambiguous Strategic equivalence demanded an ABM, "since the USSR had "outstripped the United States in the momentum of arms build up and had made giant strides in accuracy". Thus neither side had a high degree of confidence regarding the outcome of a nuclear attack. 9 But post-Vietnam America was going through an agonised debate and self-doubt, and the motives of the military were considered suspect, with the whole deployment decision relying on intelligence estimates which hinged on the assessment that Soviet missiles would continue to grow at an assumed rate and that all of them would be MIRV'ed, the whole resulting in a "first strike" capability that would presumably be able to take on the vastly more numerous US and NATO mobile and concealed threat . Scientists like Richard Garwin also pointed out the technological unfeasibility of such a defence, which in the end was a telling enough argument to finally suspend the programme in favour of a limiting Treaty. Four days after the US Senate voted for construction funds for Sentinel in June 1968 the Russians officially agreed to strategic arms talks. Meanwhile the Nixon administration had initiated diplomatic talks with China marking a historic shift in US-China relations. Simultaneously all official talk of China vanished, though it was understood that the country remained under the targeting sights of US nuclear weapons.

It is significant to note here that there were several end effects of this major meta controversy that surrounded the ABM Treaty and that involved such figures as Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter on the one hand, as well as members of the natural scientists on the other. This end effect was important for future policy and may be briefly examined here.

The shock waves unleashed by the war in Vietnam led to a breakdown of the scientific-technological consensus that has remained virtually unchallenged since its initial declaration in Vannevar Bush 1945 Manifesto "Science the Endless Frontier". 10 This faith in technological fixes eroded in the face of its inability to protect American boys in "Nam," and also its failure to secure objectives militarily. The scientific establishment came under attack, and in March 1969 a storm erupted in over 30 American universities with the entire scientist community placed in the dock. Two important developments arose out of this. The scholarly community became politicised, and it gradually acquired the confidence to challenge the scientists on questions of arms control policy. Many of these like George Rathjens, Panofsky and others continued to be part of the debate in later years. For the first time also, Congress entered the fray, inviting for the first time, the critics and supporters of the deployment to testify. The legislature discovered itself as an instrument of control, which needed to acquire and institutionalise knowledge and information gathering to reinforce this control. All of these changes in terms of growth of institutions and new interest groups were to make a tremendous impact as the quest for a national missile defence again resurfaced. Meanwhile the meta controversy subsided as the ABM Treaty was signed.

 

The ABM Treaty

In the event the ABM Treaty came into existence in 1972, it is not necessary to reproduce the treaty here chapter and verse. But the essence of the treaty was the following:-

In effect, the Patriot (then the SAM-D) was left alone, as was the SAM-5 in the USSR. Something that was swept under the carpet was the deployed Nike Hercules which had been designated an ATBM long before the negotiation of the ABM Treaty. Unsurprisingly also, the aftermath of "arms control"-including after SALT I was that both sides increased their missile holding rather than the reverse.

Meanwhile the question of intermediate forces in Europe-another highly politicised debate that had little relation to the threat-was raising questions on the credibility of the US guarantee. The stationing of US Pershing and Ground launched cruise missiles, and the enunciation of Presidential Directive -59 which enunciated a countervailing strategy, led to much unease on both sides of the Atlantic . While on the one hand, the US (and also the USSR) began to seriously consider the adoption of conventional war-fighting doctrines, worried Europeans revived the concept of missile defences (under the more acceptable cover of Extended Air Defence), against the threat of conventionally armed missiles in the Soviet armoury. The cycle had once again begun to turn to defence.

 

The triumph of the "Defence": SDI

Several different strands combined together to push America into the next phase of defence-the now famous "Star Wars" or the Strategic Defence Initiative. The subject has been extensively covered in the literature of the times, and it is not proposed to replicate it here. However it is relevant to note the main inputs that led to serious thought on the programme. Firstly, as American competitiveness decreased vis a vis Europe and Japanese goods, a growing consensus emerged for a "reindustrialisation" which would concentrate public R&D efforts precisely on those areas which would give America an edge, and facilitate economic growth. Second, analysts were uneasy about the highly destructive force of Soviet SS-18s and SS-19s that was thought to have the capability to take out US land nuclear forces. The Scowcroft Commission noted that "more than half the Soviet ICBM's...have been deployed since the last U.S ICBM was deployed..." This was thought to raise serious questions on the credibility of deterrence. Third, this was the high noon of "linkage politics" in arms control. US foreign policy during this time was linked in turn to the START and INF negotiations. The emergence of the SDI had not a little to do with this search for a new chip. Fourth, by the time of the 1982 elections the previously dormant question of deterrence became a major election issue, and the administration lost 26 seats in Congress and consequently its working majority in the House of Representatives . Fifth, Congress then rejected the dense pack basing mode of the new MX ICBM, and it began to be feared that modernisation of the arsenal would be rejected as well. By this time also the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission 11 had been accepted and the US was in a strong position to make its next move. On March 23, 1983, President Reagan outlined his vision of SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) which promised to make nuclear weapons obsolete. The centre-piece of the strategic concept was strategic defense: that is "to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies." This on the one hand reassured the Europeans that they would not be left out of this "grand strategy" while on the domestic front the President succeeded in eroding both the platform of the right (which maintained that American technology in space would free the world from fear) and the Democratic left (which maintained that the Soviets were no longer a threat to freedom.) In the next elections (1984) Reagan was re-elected in a landslide victory, and Gorbachev emerged as the leader of the Soviet Union.

The SDI was clearly not just about protecting the American homeland, but also about such diverse issues like Alliance politics and maintaining America's position as number one in the technological sphere. The involvement of West European and Japanese researchers in SDI translated into a boost for the development of the American economy. 12 The SDI was seen as the "third wave" (after the Manhattan Project and the Apollo programme) that would pump in substantial amounts of money into industrial R&D programmes under government determined national security guidelines.

Significant in the debate was also the reassertion of power by the Senate. The Reagan administration had threatened to unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty by executive fiat, a move that was opposed by the Senate energetically. Subsequently the Sam Nunn (D-GA) review was an important milestone in legislative procedures, since the Senate's victory with the Biden resolution made clear that any changes in any arms control treaty would have to be considered by the Senate. This was to limit the efforts of later administrations to do the reverse-that is to centralise the ABM Treaty rather than sideline it.

 

The "Adjustment" of the threat

Within a few short years into the Reagan administration, it was apparent that the Soviet threat was diminishing and disarmament rather than armament was the order of the day. The INF Treaty, the reduction of force levels by the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) brought in genuine disarmament rather than arms control. By the end of the 1980's, calls for a peace dividend and greater attention to America's "revitalization" was apparent among Congressmen and scholars alike. 13 Leading figures like Robert S. McNamara and Lawrence K. Korb Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration began to call for a significant decrease in military spending ( to less than half). 14 Among the programmes on a possible cancellation list was the mobile M-X missiles, the B-2 Stealth bomber, and the centrepiece of the Reagan administration, the Strategic Defence Initiative. Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee and an acknowledged ally of the military establishment charged" "The basic assessment of the overall threat to our national security on which the budget is based is rooted in the past", he told fellow senators. If the DOD hopes to obtain Senate approval of its proposed budget (of March 1990) he warned, it would have to fill in the "threat blank " with a more plausible assessment of future security risks." 15

Faced by such developments, Pentagon planners moved in diverse ways. Some like Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney continued to identify the Soviet Union as the principal threat, but General Colin Powell, the newly appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by tasking General Butler and his associates in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to devise a new posture that would focus on threats other than that posed by the former Soviet bloc.

Several alternatives lay before the planners. The LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) threat that threatened access to "vital economic and military resources" was one, but it was unlikely that the high end technology weapons that were favoured by Pentagon planners would be passed by Congress for this mission alone. The possibility of a threat emanating from the second world-the possible nuclearisation of Germany and Japan-was considered, but obviously could not form the basis of public policy. 16 A third possibility was to characterise the "unknown" and inchoate threats from various quarters-in other words the full spectrum of forces to deal with everything from nuclear war to drug trafficking. 17 (This perception is readily apparent in the language of drafters of the NATO Strategic Concept of 1991, intelligence assessments, and major documents emanating from the OSD 18 even today). Given the lack of threat in the First World, and the politically incorrect statement of threat from the Second, it was logical that the focus of these "unknown" threats would inevitably be from the Third. The trend towards designating some of these as "terrorist states" had already begun in the Reagan years, and with the communist threat sidelined, the argument about the "inherent instability" of these states, their irrationality, and in essence all the attributes once attendant to terrorist states were appended to missile powers-the "Rogue states" with considerable ease. Much of this was pushed by the acquisition by these powers of not only considerable military strength but mostly by their acquisition or search for missiles and/or a nuclear capability.

The Third World threat had already been noted by the late 1980's by a landmark report Discriminate Deterrence in a January 1988 report by the US Commission on Long Term Integrated Strategy which apart from the potential of conventional deterrence also noted " The (expanding) arsenals of lesser powers will make it riskier and more difficult for the superpowers to intervene in regional wars. The US ability to support its allies around the world will increasingly be called into question. Where American intervention seems necessary, it will (be necessary to) use our most sophisticated weaponry , even though this could compromise its effectiveness in a US Soviet war." 19

At the same time, the US intelligence community was picking up on the new threat. The 1989 report by then CIA chief William Webster, stated this perception clearly. Firstly, Third World countries were increasingly cooperating among themselves for missile technology, thus diluting the purposes of the MTCR. Secondly, this could lead to many becoming major exporters of missiles in their own right. Thirdly, short and intermediate range missiles had a potential for creating instability since in most of the countries in the Middle East, these had essentially 'strategic' capabilities. He noted " It is ironic that at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate a whole class of weapons, Third World nations are building up their own arsenals. 20 According to his assessment there were likely to be at least 15-20 Third World countries building their own ballistic missiles in a little more than a decade. The end effect on US policy would be that of hesitation in the face of lack of public support. Thus Kahn and Brodie' theories of how even a few nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction could deter a much larger power was again part of official threat perception.

That this threat was taken very seriously indeed was apparent in the fact that a change of nuclear targeting to include the new threats appears to have begun with the fall of the Berlin Wall itself. According to then Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, " as early as October 1989, we abandoned global war with the Soviet Union as the principle planning and programming for the US armed forces." Nuclear war planners now saw that " A new series of threats had begun to emerge on the horizon" and began to shift their attention to potential targets outside Russia and China. The post Cold War target base would consist of "fewer but more widespread targets." 21

The spectre of one regional bully taking on the massive US forces however still was not one that could be "sold" easily to congress. A core shift took place in US planning with the shift from containment to power projection outlined in the new "Regional Defense Strategy" which envisaged the US fighting against not one, but two "paired" enemies simultaneously. With all these moves, the "threat blank" identified by Senator Sam Nunn had been filled-for the moment. Missile proliferation was now appended to the "new threat". By 1991, the issue of missile defences to counter Third World missiles had come to the centrefold.

 

Missile Defence to the fore

The US Department of Defense (DoD) had already reactivated the moribund Proliferation Counter measures Working Groups which began a study of the threat posed by Third World Scud upgrades and Scud export by the USSR. 22 The result of these exertions led President Bush to announce in his State of the Union address (Jan 29, 1991)-in concurrence with a DOD proposal-that the mission of the SDI would be changed to reflect the new threats in a multipolar world, that might include regional bullies armed with missiles of the Scud variety, and possibly with chemical, biological or nuclear warheads. The case of "irrational" responses was laid out with the argument that in the case of aggression against a US ally, the US would be hamstrung on how to wield deterrence against an enemy who had no clear defence policy or was used to the rigid rules of deterrence. Moreover, a dictator would be less likely to be deterred by the possible sacrifice of a section of his population (especially if a religious spin was given to the conflict) and thus his `cost benefit' calculus would be impossible to predict.

The mission was thus changed from defence against large scale Soviet attack to "providing defence against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source". 23 The new scaled back concept was the "GPALS" (Global Protection against Limited Strikes) a variation of a December 1989 proposal put forward by Senator Sam Nunn called the Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS)-which as the name suggests-had only envisioned a threat from poor command and control over Soviet missiles. This premised a strong co-operation with the Soviets, a co-operation which however remained on paper only as the Soviet Union itself collapsed, to be replaced by four nuclear powers instead of one. The need to return all missiles to Russia, and the push towards START led to a focus on disarmament, and less emphasis on protection against Russian missiles. This was also the time when Russia was proving most co-operative ( under the influence of the European lobby) and the perception of threat from Russia was difficult to sell.

The shift to Theatre Missiles

Moreover, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the requirement of a defence for US troops deployed abroad and US allies in unstable areas was felt to justify immediate attention. Critics both within Congress, and outside began to mount a strong move that shifted the focus away from national defence to theatre defence. 24 The SDIO which had been accustomed to a $50 billion budget 25 was to receive another body blow, which fuelled criticism of its programmes. The Pentagon 'watch dog' body under David Chu, the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Program Analyses and Evaluation testified that in order to quicken deployment, the SDIO had planned to skip early tests and deploy prototype hardware, rather than final operational versions. 26 Further shocks were in store for what was already a controversial programme. The Washington Post of September 15, 1992, quoting a GAO report, said that the SDI had overstated the success of four tests. In a March 17, 1991 test of Brilliant Eyes, the original test goals had been reduced, allowing a 90 per cent successful claim. Other tests like the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle interceptors had also not demonstrated the ability to discriminate real warheads from decoys, though the organisation claimed it could. By November, the SDIO was being pilloried as a "Strategic Deception Initiative" 27 as more information about early testing irregularities and outright deception began to filter into the press.

By mid 1992, allocations for SDI had been scaled down, the theatre programme delinked from SDIO, and Congress underlined the centrality of the ABM Treaty, thus relegating the National Missile Defence to the background. Funding tilted heavily to TMD, and as the Director of SDIO bitterly remarked , "we would be embarked upon a serious acquisition programme to provide defence for our allies, but not to defend America" 28 This shift was buttressed by intelligence estimates with the Report by CIA Chief Robert Gates on January 15, (1992) noting that the United States faced no immediate threat for a period of at least 10 years. 29 The report raised a howl of protest from the SDIO lobby which pointed to the fact that the intelligence community had failed to adequately assess Iraq's ability to covertly produce nuclear weapons. 30 But given the soaring deficit, expensive programmes were unpopular especially when a new President campaigning on a ticket that promised a turn round of the economy, came to the White House.

The new Administration

The new administration immediately underlined the importance of the ABM Treaty, but also moved swiftly to multilateralise it, a move that was fiercely opposed by the DoD. 31 The new Defence Secretary Les Aspin, was clearly in favour of TMD, even as he downplayed the long range threat. In the "Report to the President and the Congress" Les Aspin clearly identified WMD, and their delivery systems in the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups as the new danger to the US and its allies 32 which had the usual "warning" of "more than 25 countries, who possess or may be developing NBC weapons" and more than 15 countries (unnamed) with ballistic missiles. The case for a TMD was built up as before with the additional clause that the ability to extend protection of allies and friends in a region can have a significant effect toward mitigating their desire to produce their own offensive WMD system and can encourage their willingness to act conventionally with the US in any conflict." 33 Thus the focus of the administrations thrust tended to be towards emphasising non-proliferation with a new strategy that was called "Counter proliferation" which sought to synergise such efforts across the entire activities of the DoD and other organisations.

The rogue state was the also immediate focus of the "Bottom-Up Review" (BUR)-the landmark report that was to form the basis for the restructuring of US forces for the post cold war, as well as follow on documents like the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Nuclear Policy Review. All these emphasised new capabilities and technologies for power projection, and a policy of "lead but hedge" against the threat of a proliferation of WMD, which required a strong and steady US nuclear arsenal. 34

The threats identified included one or more "wild cards"-for instance one which involved a war in 2015 with China and North Korea - and other conflict scenarios which analysts call the "Othello effect" 35 -(a trail of plausible but false suppositions). The same theme was followed by the NPR with the key clause of nuclear weapons use in response to non nuclear attacks remaining even as the definition of what constituted WMD was expanded to include chemical and biological weapons. 36 Funding for TMD was prioritised, though the Administration immediately came up against the ABM Treaty which manifestly prohibited any testing of technology which might have "ABM capabilities". 37

The negotiations with Russia (conducted by the so called Ross- Mamedov group) was a tortuous one, and caused Congress to stake out the claim that US security was being held hostage by Russian intransigence. 38 Expectations of Russian 'concessions' reflected a dangerous readiness to subject national security interests to a Russian veto. 39

In February 1995, Senator Thurmond introduced the "Ballistic Missile Revitalization Act", which accused the Administration of bargaining away not only strategic systems but also the ability of the United States to defend her troops. 40 This was followed by the presentation on April 6, 1995, of the `Theatre Missile Act of 1995, 41 which prohibited funding for any programme that would apply the ABM Treaty or any limitation or obligation under the Treaty, to R&D, to TMD upgrades, or components. 42 Meanwhile the BMDO was funded at roughly $3bn , $600mn more than requested by the Administration, and the NMD received $745.6 (requested amount $370.6mn) 43 Under pressure, the Administration began to negotiate for an interpretation of the ABM that was even broader than that demanded by Reagan. Apart from other criteria, it sought unlimited development and deployment of any systems as long as it was not "tested" against RV's. This would have immediately opened the whole SDI Pandora's box again. In fact, most of the so called "new" programmes were in fact carry over's from the SDI era, labouring under new names and roles. 44 Thus while President Clinton was warning of appending new threat to a programme the powerful MIC lobby with support from groups within Congress was pressing for what was in effect the old SDI under a new name. This was severely resisted by the arms control lobby, which noted that:

It was not until 1995 that an understanding was reached with Russia on the contentious "double restrictions" ( interceptor and missile speeds) 46 where the US agreed to a `demonstrated' interceptor velocity of 3km/sec (the actual SCC document and the parameters agreed upon remains classified) against missiles with a velocity higher than 3km/sec. This however made the Navy's programme non ABM compliant, a result that immediately led to NMD proponents like the Heritage Foundation making a "finding" that the Navy system was in fact the cheapest. 47

 

National Missile Defence-back to the fore

With the emergence of a Republican dominated Congress in December 1996, National Missile Defence was back to the forefront of debate. But this was far from easy, given that intelligence agencies were still predicting a low threat perception ( in particular that North Korean ICBM was considered 10 years down the line), the technology was still considered ineffective, and arising from this that the military was opposed to it. In fact the Joint Chiefs of Staff was quoted as saying that funding should remain at $500 million a year for NMD and no more than $2.3billion for TMD. Finally, defeating the figures projected by the Thad Cochran (R-Miss) and the pro-NMD group, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the programme would cost roughly $ 116 billion (over 20 years) . This led to an outcry even among Republican supporters who had been led to believe that the programme would be virtually cost free. 48 A final and important input was the close working of non governmental groups who worked closely with the Democrats to not only produce their own agenda, but also to spread the message. So effective was this that even leading papers from Republican home ground turned against them. In the final analysis the lack of a credible threat left leading editorials wondering why billions needed to be diverted to a "gold plated rat hole" .Thus when the "Defend America Act" was introduced, by Senate majority leader ( March 21, 1996) the move ricocheted badly.

Throughout the year however Congress hit back by holding the CWC hostage, 49 the deployment to Bosnia, and the DoD authorisation bill. 50 Others were demanding that the President,-who they noted had made the point on 145 occasions that there were no Russian missiles pointed at the US-give Congress a guarantee that this was indeed so. 51 A follow on interview with General Sergev on CBS news, which confirmed that re-targeting would take only a matter of minutes, was held up to show that the threat still existed no matter what the President said.

The battle was again joined when the annual National Intelligence Estimates" 52 Emerging Missile Threats to North America in the next 15 years (November 1995) again upheld the low probability of threat, 53 an observation that immediately drew ire. In the House, a separate evaluation by the Committee on National Security found such estimates of 100 per cent certainty was overstated, and moreover it did not quantify the certainty level of nearly all of it's key judgements 54 (in other words, it used unquantified words or phrases like "unlikely", "probably "etc) The storm of disagreement, with noted NMD supporters alleging that the report had been "politicised" led to the setting up of a Commission under the chairmanship of former Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. 55 The set up of the Commission was significant in that it included a former chief of the CIA (James Woolsey who had first brought up the threat of Third World missiles), a co-founder of the rightist Stimson centre (Barry Blechman) a former commander of the Strategic Air Command (Gen. Lee Butler) . Six were Republican appointees, and three Democrats. The brief of the Commission was limited , in that it was not asked to comment on BMD or threats to US forces abroad or to allies, 56 but was limited to assessing the threat to continental US. The main findings of the Commission focussed on the fact that the "threat" was broader and more mature than anticipated, and that the intelligence community's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates was eroding due to reasons both within and beyond the intelligence process itself. The warning times that the US could expect of new ballistic missile deployments was reduced. Most significantly in noting the greater degree of interaction between North Korea, Iran and Pakistan in the development of ballistic missiles, it noted that foreign assistance was not a "wild card"-as stated by the NIE-but a given one which had unpredictable consequences. Clearly these countries did not need to reinvent the wheel (as in early US and Soviet programmes) nor did they apparently need extensive testing to produce crude ballistic missiles..

The Commission's report, as well as the reality that North Korea had tested a staged possible ICBM (August 30/31, 1998) long before anyone had thought, had several important effects. Key Democrats like Bob Kerry (D-Nebraska) (who had earlier been responsible for breaking a START logjam by endorsing unilateral US cuts) however changed position as the 2000 elections came up, calling for NMD as a trade-off for deep cuts in nuclear forces. His explanation was also that he had suffered a change of heart following the Rumsfeld report. Other Democrats followed, and the fresh Missile Defence bill (the Cochran bill) passed a Senate vote 99-0. The President who had threatened to veto the bill, agreed to sign after an amendment (put forward by Cochran himself) allowed the Congress to annually review expenditure, thus permitting the Administration the fig leaf of affordability. On July 23, 1999, President Clinton signed the Bill on National Missile Defence into Law. The bill made it US policy to deploy a NMD system as soon as technologically possible, subject to the authorisation and appropriations process. The President however clarified that no deployment decision had been made. 57 Also he noted that by putting the Senate on record as continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear reductions, the bill reaffirms that our missile defence policy must take into account our arms control objectives. 58 Assistant Secretary of State for Strategy and Threat Reduction noted "I believe we are unlikely to turn back to the point where we will rely only on deterrence. I think over time we will rely on a combination of deterrence by threat of retaliation and this limited type of national missile defence.... 59 . "In the final analysis it appears that three factors-the threat, technological maturing, and progress in arms control-will warrant a deployment decision in June 2000. This means a congressional positive decision on the CTBT and cooperation on further START reductions.

Meanwhile the Administration stepped up efforts to get Russian compliance and NATO members agreement to NMD. The new posture was enunciated by Cohen during his visit to the continent, curiously he was not simply trying to sell ABM to the Europeans ( noting differences of opinion, since Germany is already cooperating with the US in Missile Defence) but also pronounced his displeasure on the European Security Defence Identity, which he noted should be firmly linked to NATO. In some ways it seemed a replay of the 1960s when the US was lecturing allies on their errant missile programmes.

Finally, a Bill that had been doing the rounds for over five years became law. The emphasis now appears to be on 'when' rather than 'whether'. However, two important landmark assessments have again put a spanner in the works.

The Proposed NMD systems

The Administration's present position is incredibly duplicitous. On the one hand " the centrality" of the ABM treaty continues to be underlined, however it would need to be "adjusted slightly" to allow a limited national defense, where a single site ( as permitted by the Treaty) but equipped with long range missiles travelling at high speed, and with accuracy permitting a hit to kill, with vastly improved sensors. The programme is basically in three phases, with the first stage designed to be compatible with rapid expansion if necessary, and using existing early warning radar which would be upgraded to give them greater capability.

Projected Architecture for a three stage NMD systems: C-1 C- 2 C- 3

No of interceptors deployed in Alaska 20-100 100 125

No of interceptors deployed in North Dakota 0 0 125

Upgraded EW 3 radar in US, 1 in UK, 1 in Greenland In addition also in South Korea As before

X-band radar Shemya (Aleutians Is) 1 in UK, 1 in Greenland In addition Grand

, 2 US Forks, South Korea and Hawaii

SBIRS No Yes Yes

SBIRS : Space Based Infrared System on low earth orbit.
C-1 is designed to defend against a" few, simple" missiles ( 5 or less)
C- 2 against a " few complex" missiles
C-3 against "many, complex" missiles

At present the ABM Treaty is sought to be modified to deploy the C-1 system, which clearly violates the existing treaty-since firstly the crucial x-band radar will now be deployed in other countries ( Art IX), and also will essentially give a national missile defense for the entire country. Deployment of additional phases are planned with attendant changes to the treaty as and when required.

The so called 3+3 programme (which was decided in April 1996 by Defence Secretary Perry) means that a deployment decision would be made in June 2000 ( after three years of development) leading to an operational decision by 2003. The Defence Secretary however noted that a decision would be made depending on the threat, 63 later changing this to note that under current plans, the systems of an NMD for 50 states against a few tens of warheads accompanied by "simple penetration aids", would be deployed by 2005 rather than 2003. At the time of writing, construction of the interceptor launch site in Alaska is due to begin in April 2001. The GBR would be done over the next 36 months, with Brilliant Eyes (a SBIRS) would also be included by the time the second site is built in 2010.

 

Conclusions

The broad outlines of the debate can be broadly categorised as below.

Group Threat Goals Instruments Comments

perception

Democrats Threat of Rogue Strengthen Offensive Priority on

nation acknow- deterrence deterrence+ campaign

ledged. Low Strategic defence message that

capabilities stability TMD Clinton has

Strengthen non Preserve made

proliferation ABM -co-opt Americans

Strengthen intel- Russia safer from

ligence gathering Push START nuclear threat.

Engage NMD-3+3 De-targeting

proliferators schedule, upfront Strong

Strengthen contingent on push however

defence to allow arms control for arms

manoeuverability impact and exports, incl.

technology. TMD systems.

Backs the B-1B, the Seawolf Submarine once trashed by Colin Powell

Republicans Rogue state Offensive- Unilateral Against arms

attack/blackmail defensive mix abrogation of control

Russian nukes ABM "blackmail"

Chinese nukes Strong Full fledged Against

Threat from CBW conventional NMD engagement

posture Priority to Wants more

NTW checks on

Chinese proliferation

Arms control No threat for Deterrence Support START Strong ABM

lobby TMD (now chang- centrality, but processes, NPT links from the

(FAS, ACA, ed) No need at at lower Preserve ABM past. Have now

CATO , all for NMD thresholds Cooperate with shifted to

Union of Fear erosion Russia and accepting some

Concerned of deterrence China to pro- form of treaty

Scientists, etc) vide early compatible

warning and TMD

technology for

some form of

Missile defence

The "reason- Threat exists, Strong emphasis Reduce alert Claim to

able" lobby likely to grow on deterrence levels preserve ABM

Scientific (wider Encourage but are seeking

experts, interpretation) administration to destroy it

(Garwink, In favour of to bring in Advocated a

Teller, non ABM Russia for stringent

Ivo Daalder compatible TMD NMD counter

etc) systems ABM Observer Proliferation

Group proposed

* In fact Garwin noted " The country engaging in tests of two or three stage missiles would be made the target of US strategic weaponry ..... That country should understand that developing a missile that could strike the United States is not in its security interests 64 For arguments of ABMOG see Ivo H. Daalder, " Move on Missile Defense", Washington Times, January 6, 2000.

Internal aspects

The debate has revealed the various interests involved from the 1960s. While the interests of the MIC is fairly clear, what has to be factored in is the interests of individual congressmen who have "tilted' against the "new threat" for various interests that include employment in their home state, 65 personal grudges against President Clinton, the deaths of soldiers in Desert Storm from the single Iraqi attack which hit the army camp, and used the NMD issue to stall various other bills which went against their interests. The Chinese spy scandal, as well as the perceived inability of the administration to have correctly foreseen the Korean tests ( as well as the Indian and Pakistani tests) and other such incidents also eroded the stand of Democrats in the latter half of the debate, turning them "squishy" in strongly acting against the NMD legislation. The 2000 elections are also clearly an issue here, with the Democrats unwilling to lose ground to the Republicans in being perceived as having failed to defend America. The need to nullify the humiliating defeat of President Clinton on the CTBT issue is also another factor here, where there seems to be a "swap" with limited NMD in exchange for CTBT agreement, (which is in essence a forerunner for all the other linked treaties and agreements that the US seeks to put through). Therefore the whole non-proliferation strategy of the Administration has ironically led to more proliferation-even if this is in so called defensive systems-rather than the reverse.

The Administration has preferred to take the path of engagement at one level, while pushing TMD with Japan on the other. The deployment of Patriot systems has been strongly pushed by the defence industries, particularly Raytheon, while the Japanese decision on forming a joint BMDO link with the US was again decided after an architecture study laid out by sections of Japanese industry as well as McDonnell Douglas. The instances of the push of defence industry moving foreign policy will be detailed more in the next section, but there is enough here to note that the Administration while trying to stall the NMD issue for arms control reasons (basically the fear of other arms control /multilateral arrangements unravelling) has however pushed the TMD issue in response to a genuine perception of threat post-Desert Storm, and to push domestic industry.

It is also noteworthy here that programmes like the B-1B are sought to be continued with additional aircraft purchased (long after these were thought to be unnecessary after the demise of the Soviets) and others like the Seawolf submarine, three new tactical aviation programmes, the F-22 Joint Strike Fighter, the Comanche, a new attack submarine, and support arsenal ships. The services-specifically the Joint Chiefs of Staff-have pressed for the maintenance of these programmes, and since the Authorisation bills are held hostage to passage of NMD, the tendency has been to allow some funding for the latter to keep the former programmes alive. The incremental progress of the NMD is basically due to this trade-off.

At the heart of the internal debate is the tension between the world view of the Republicans and the Democrats, with the former accused of drifting not towards isolation (as some of their statements seem to imply) but towards a dangerous unilateralism. The Democrats backed by the arms control lobby prefer the path of engagement, which however has dangerous connotations for the rest of the world, since it seems to emphasise the sharing of technology (under severe security limitations) which would mean that China and Russia could then reverse their opposition to NMD due to access to technology. The most dangerous group so far have been the "reasonable opposition" who while apparently trying to save the ABM in fact do everything to scuttle it. The proposal from this camp for boost phase intercepts (either air, land or sea) from various bases around the world is,- apart from in effect being a far flung NMD-also dangerously offensive in its content. This group has inputs at various levels of policy making, where they have pushed for a "saving" of the ABM combined with an expansion of the deterrent.

The arms control lobby with members basically drawn from the universities and think tanks, backed by a few scientists has been the most vociferous in arguing against the dilution of the ABM. The scientists have propounded various methods by which any serious missile power would be able to circumvent defensive measures with surprising ease. 66 Others have pointed recently (since Madeline Albrights's visit late in 1999) to the dangers of Russia energising her own ABM, and the effects this would have on Chinese and European arsenals. But what is unnerving is the various "policy alternatives" that have been outlined as measures that would allow the missile defence process-for it is nothing less-to stop short of abrogating the Treaty. Eminent scholar Spurgeon M. Keeny was advocating that the US should aim for "Full integration of Russia and eventually China into the sensing and information management network necessary to support any NMD deployment, where while they would not have command authority over the system, they would nonetheless be able to use this information for their own missile defence. Cooperation of this sort is what is being held out as "bait" to Russia, where a significant lobby still wants to cooperate with the US. Meanwhile the central theme is that the apparent failures of deterrence (North Korea, Iraq) was due to failures to seek deterrence rather than to achieve it. (South Korea was neglected to be included in US security perimeter, while April Glaspie indicated US indifference to Iraqi action). Thus the 'deterrence only' posture must be made more explicit, and clear to be achievable.

Technical aspects

The NMD architecture outlined above underlines the fact that a limited NMD can be rapidly expanded into a full fledged NMD in a short space of time. This was exactly the fear that was once expressed by McNamara in the 1960's. Essentially the war has been taken into space, and this is where the next " offensive" response can be expected. Some analysts note that the development of the hyperplane (like the HOTOL) points to this direction. It is this that China is trying to stall by moving the issue at international forums. Present programmes like THAAD (Theatre High Altitude Defence) can protect an area roughly the size of the District of Columbia in its present configuration. With space based sensors ( the Brilliant Eyes programme) it can protect roughly eight states.

A point rarely taken note of is that a Theatre missile system like the Navy or the Army system is an essential component of National Missile Defence, since at full capability it would provide the first line of defence against a rising missile. Thus even the most innocuous TMD programme is a way station to an NMD. Without this outer circle of defence, a NMD programme would be difficult to implement.

It needs also to be noted that the difference between what constitutes a " tactical " defence and a "strategic" is an artificial one. Firstly, even a short range missile may have " strategic" mission,( as a Syrian missile against Israel) Therefore in such circumstances the Patriot provides a theatre or strategic capability. Similarly, an Aegis cruiser equipped with the Navy Theatre Wide (with attendant sensors) stationed off China would technically be classified as a "theatre" missile, but in effect it would provide a national defense for the whole of Japan and Taiwan.

Finally, for those who wonder how 100 interceptors in Alaska can repel even a full-fledged Chinese attack, it must be noted that the various tiers of missile defence are somewhat like the various rings of air defence. The innermost ring is that of the Patriot class missiles, the next, that of boost phase intercepts , the next that of Navy TMD at sea, and the final, that of the land based interceptors in the US. The whole system therefore relies on a "look-shoot-look" concept where the ascending missile could be shot down by any of these systems at most levels of its flight.

Also as McNamara noted in the 1960s, a limited NMD can be quickly moved up to a full-fledged missile defence which in that period was assessed to take three or four years. Today's technology can significantly reduce that time period. This is essentially what the Russians fear.

The de-mystifying of the threat

In the first period, the Chinese threat was used as a "smoke screen" so as not to annoy the Soviets. In the present period the reverse seems to hold true, with the "Russia and the rogue states" threat revived so as not to alarm the Chinese. The North Korean "Capability" appears to have been exposed as a rather "can-do" effort which (more importantly ) relies to a greater degree on foreign assistance than thought. What the missile alarmists will now project will be interesting to say the least. It must be noted that while defining the threat, even the BMDO site,-which is otherwise prolific in its assessments- fails to mention China, though its report notes " long range missile threats" from the Third World-which essentially means China (and Russia which has now been relegated to the Third World) . Cohen has consistently refused to talk about China even when explicitly questioned. The Republicans have not been so shy-Jesse Helms has pushed for Taiwanese defence, calling for a system which would provide defence against China. 67 Chinese reaction illustrates that it perceives the threat very clearly indeed, with opposition to NMD leading to closer cooperation with Russia, and joint action at the General Assembly.

Few in the Administration say anything at all about the Indian capability either. Outside experts usually acknowledge this as a threat to non-proliferation efforts, but rarely as a threat in itself. However, given that the US is apt to classify even allies as future threats, the possibility that the Indian missile programme would be included in threat assessments ( and reaction) cannot be ruled out. The one thing that can be said with certainty is that the development of an ICBM would immediately bring this country within US sights.

Clearly the NMD programme is not likely to be trashed by any new Administration. Given a Republican win, the programme would be pushed towards a deployment decision either with the consent of the Russians or without. However, much would depend also on the strong opposition from NATO allies especially France- who have so far remained lukewarm. Regarding allies however it must be noted that both Germany and Italy are part of a programme ( MEADS) that stresses transatlantic co-operation in missile defence. The politically correct phrase in NATO circles is "Extended Air Defence", but nonetheless it is no more or no less than a missile defence system, which when paired with the Patriot or a like system would provide area coverage. This means that for the first time since 1945, Germany will be producing long range missiles, which can translate as easily into an offensive one as a defensive.

International Reactions-in brief

The reactions to the ABM distortion-which is what has essentially happened- will be discussed in detail in the next phase of this project. However a few "pointers" to the future are given below:

However what all countries need to note is that the present move implies that treaties can be trashed or changed unilaterally. The argument that these may be changed as time and interests permit means that ALL treaties conducted in the period before the 1970s need to be reviewed for their possible relevance in a changed world. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is obviously one that heads the list in terms of a complete overhauling. Meanwhile another phase of covert war can be expected as countries with no defence-even in terms of an offensive capability-view this present push for untrammelled power. In the final analysis, the world is in for a greater measure of instability, as a new technological fix is considered. Armed with CBW weapons a new breed of terrorists could well be the weapon of the offence.

 

Theatre Defense Programmes under development

US ARMY LOWER TIER DESCRIPTION

PATRIOT PAC-2 Deployed on an emergency basis from 1990 onwards

Allies operating PAC-2 Netherlands, Germany, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Japan

Patriot PAC-3 Post Gulf war Quick Reaction Programme (QRP) /Guidance Enhancement improvement (GEM) provide increased lethality and coverage for the defence of large urban areas and large and small military targets against ballistic and possibly cruise missiles. US army in S.Korea may have these.

UPPER TIER

THAAD UOES The Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) User Operational Evaluation Systems(UOES) is a rapidly deployable , air transportable, prototype consisting of four launchers, two ground based radar, two battle management suites. IT is slated to intercept ballistic missiles outside and inside the atmosphere and is designed to be capable of taking two shots at attacking ballistic missiles . This capability would also enable lower tier systems like the Hawk and Patriot) to have this shoot-look-shoot capability. The THAAD missile is a hit to kill missile which is expected to neutralise some or all of the destructive effects of WMD missiles warheads

THAAD FUE The First Unit Equipped ( FUE), an improved version of the UOES will militarise the UOES Design and upgrade certain components, such as the infrared seeker, the radar and BMC3.

US marine Corps-lower tier

Improved HAWK Upgrade version of HAWK will provide ATBM capability by Phase 3 improving the radar , the missile and through development of the Air Defense Communications Platform -1.Phase 3 allows for near term defense of amphibious point of disembarkation and other critical theatre targets.

US navy lower tier

Lower Tier Consists of Standard missile -2 Block IVA interceptors deployed aboard two Aegis ( Navy Area Defense) cruisers. The missile with UOES has a new terminal infrared seeker, fuze, and warhead

UOES The Aegis SPY-1 radar will receive upgraded software and weapons and command detection system . Navy Lower Tier will provide a mobile seaborne Patriot like coverage for ports, coastal cities, and airfields

Upper Tier

Upper Tier Slated to provide coverage similar to THAAD ,and also offers ascent phase interceptability in cases where Aegis ships can be positioned near the launch point and between the launch point and target area. The kill vehicle will possibly be a manoeuvering hit to kill warhead called the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP)

US Air Force

Airborne Laser (ABL) ABL Boost Phase Intercept system designed to engage enemy TBM's when their rockets are still firing and still over enemy territory. Deployed on a Boeing 747.

NATO-Lower tier

Germany-Italy-US

Medium Extended TMD system designed to provide US and NATO manoeuver forces Air system Defense (MEADS) with 360 degree protection against cruise, ballistic missiles and UAV's. Transportable on C-130 aircraft , and will be the replacement for Hawk., and will have 3-4 more missiles per launcher than Patriot

Note:

1. Many of these programmes are legacies of the SDI .For instance the BPI concept has evolved from the Space Based Interceptor system which was selected from demonstration and validation in August 1987. Many have also re-emerged under new names. The new PAC-3 missile was formerly called the ERINT ( Extended Range Interceptor)

2. The Improved Hawk -1 is already deployed in over 22 allied countries.

Source: Robin Ranger , David Wiencek, Humphry Crum Ewing " Missile Defence: Options for US/UK cooperation" http://www. global-defence . IDSA Data base.

 

Endnotes

Note *: Research Fellow, IDSA.  Back.

Note 1: Robin Ranger, "Theatre Missile Defences: Lessons from British Experiences with Air and Missile Defences" Comparative Strategy, vol. 12, pp. 399-413.  Back.

Note 2: Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage, Unmanned Aircraft, (New York: Pergammon, Brassey's, vol. 3, 1988, p. 17.  Back.

Note 3: In the 1950's research into BAMBI (Ballistic Missile Boost Interceptor), a space based ABM system and a satellite interceptor were however on the anvil. See Edward Reiss, The Strategic Defence Initiative, (Cambridge University Press, 1992).  Back.

Note 4: Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).  Back.

Note 5: Herman Kahn, "The Case for a Thin System" in Johan J. Holst & William Schneider, Jr. Why ABM? (Pergammon Press: New York 1969).  Back.

Note 6: Abraham Chayes and Jerome Weisner, "ABMJ", (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).  Back.

Note 7: Ibid.  Back.

Note 8: Excerpts from the testimony by Secretary McNamara before the Senate committee on January 23, 1967, in "Zbigniew Brezinski (ed.), Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defence Initiative, (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center: 1986), pp. 19-25.  Back.

Note 9: Ibid.  Back.

Note 10: Vannevar Bush, Science the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President, Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1945, asq.mil (Excerpts).  Back.

Note 11: Retired USAF Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft was asked to form a blue ribbon committee to examine the administrations strategic force modernisation programme and arms control programme. It's report was released on April 6, 1983 and had a major effect on US policy. Snyder and Brown, n. 25.  Back.

Note 12: Regina Cowen, Peter Rajcsanyi, Vladimir Bilandzic, SDI And European Security, (Westview: Boulder, 1987).  Back.

Note 13: For instance see Paul Kennedy's, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (Random House: New York, 1987 which argued that the US could not avert an inevitable decay unless it concentrated on the reconstruction of its domestic infrastructure.  Back.

Note 14: Quoted in Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, (New Delhi: Universal Book Traders, 1995) p. 9-11. The Aerospace Weekly was also noting in headlines "Pentagon Budget due to be headed for $150 billion-Half Current Level-by 1996."  Back.

Note 15: Klare, p. 14.  Back.

Note 16: For instance, Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy in the Clinton Administration wrote (before he took office) that "A unified Germany would not readily rely indefinitely on a British or French deterrent. The practical issue, therefore, is whether there will be US nuclear weapons in Europe-or German ones" Yost notes the results of a survey of German military and civilian leaders in 1995, which addressed the degree of interest in a national nuclear weapon capacity under various potential security conditions. Interest was low in a scenario that included NATO and a US military and nuclear presence in Europe. In the absence of this however, the survey found "a German hesitancy to trust the commitment of French or British guarantees of nuclear protection" in a European led security force. In the lack of any security alliances, where Germany would be alone in providing for its security, a high level of interest in a national nuclear weapons programme was apparent. Now security incentives for acquiring a national capability included the prospect that nuclear weapons could contribute at least indirectly to new feelings of German pride, prestive and sovereignty, as well as being credible instruments for international influence. See David S. Yost "The US Nuclear Deterrence in Europe", Adelphi Papers, No: 326, IISS, March 1999.  Back.

Note 17: While this was enunciated by General Larry D. Welch in early 1990 and rejected by General Powell, it is one that has continued to hold security planners in thrall. This "uncertainty" threat is commented on extensively by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998, vol. 54, no. 2.  Back.

Note 18: See for instance, the Bottom up Review, the Quadrennial Defence Review for OSD documents, See Assessment by John C. Gannon, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, "Intelligence Challenges for the Next Century", June 4, 1998.  Back.

Note 19: Fred Ikle, Albert Wohlstetter et. al., Discriminate Deterrence, Robert of the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, January 1998 in Strategic Digest, (New Delhi: IDSA) March 1988.  Back.

Note 20: William Webster "Nuclear and Missile Proliferation" at the town hall of California, March 30, 1989, USIS Press Release, April 1, 1989.  Back.

Note 21: Quoted in Hans M. Christensen, Nuclear Future: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, British American Security Information Council, Research Report No. 98.2.  Back.

Note 22: Jane's Defence Weekly, November 16, 1991, p. 8.  Back.

Note 23: Arms Control Today, (Washington), March 1991, p. 27.  Back.

Note 24: Opponents included Les Aspin (then Chairman of the powerful Armed Services Committee), Steven Hildreth, Gerard Smith, and former Secretary of Defence Harold Brown for a compendium of these criticisms see Arms Control Reporter, 575.E.32.11-91. For later comments see Stephen I. Schwartz "Expenditures for Anti-missile Systems," Los Angeles Times, September 23, 1996. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy, (Washington: DC, National Academy Press, 1997).  Back.

Note 25: This reflects spending over a 16 year period, and is a highly conservative estimate, and is given by Michael O' Hanlon, "Star Wars Strikes back", Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999.  Back.

Note 26: Arms Control Today, May 1992, p. 18.  Back.

Note 27: John Pike in Arms Control Today, November 1992, p. 3.  Back.

Note 28: Henry Cooper, "Uneasy Evolution of the Emerging Consensus on SDI", Comparative Strategy, vol. 12, no. 1, 1993, pp. 25-32.  Back.

Note 29: New York Times, January 16, 1992.  Back.

Note 30: Former SDIO Director Henry Cooper "Unsteady Evolution of the Emerging Consensus on SCI" Comparative Strategy, vol. 12, no. 1, 1993, pp. 25-32.  Back.

Note 31: In October 1992, 10 members of the CIS signed the Bishkek agreement in which they committed themselves to fulfil the provisions of the ABM Treaty. And to conclude separate agreement with the United States.  Back.

Note 32: Report of the Secretary of Defence to the President and the Congress, (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office) January 1994.  Back.

Note 33: Ibid.  Back.

Note 34: "Nuclear Posture Review" September 22, 1994, Extracted from the Annual Defence Report 1995, Office of the Secretary of Defence, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995).  Back.

Note 35: This telling and imaginative analogy is given by cognitive researcher Massimimo Piatelli-Palmarini. See Carl Conetta and Charles Knight "Inventing Threats" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998, vol. 34, no. 2.  Back.

Note 36: The definition of WMD in the new JCS document calls it "Weapons that are capable of a higher order of destruction and/or being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people". Joint-Pub.3.12.  Back.

Note 37: Essentially this signifies greater radar capability, greater interceptor speed, better time-compression, multiple target capability, and decoy discrimination, all of which would be relevant against, "strategic missiles".  Back.

Note 38: Text of letter from Senate majority leader Bob Dole (signed by eight Republican leaders) to President Bill Clinton, dated February 6, 1995, in Comparative Strategy, vol. 14, no. 3, July to September 1995, p. 321.  Back.

Note 39: Text of letter from the office of Senate Majority Leader (signed by 13 Republican Senators) to President Clinton, March 8, 1995, Ibid.  Back.

Note 40: Congressional Record, Introduction of Bills and Joint Resolutions, Senate February 10, 1995, Page S2494.  Back.

Note 41: Congressional Record, Senate, April 6, 1995, page S5494.  Back.

Note 42: Ibid.  Back.

Note 43: Arms Control Reporter, 603.B.260, 12-95.  Back.

Note 44: For instance, the GBR (ground based radar) of the Army was the SDI Terminal Imaging Radar. ERINT which replaces the PAC-3 was the original SR-HIT (short range Homing Intercept Technology), similarly the THAAD was originally conceived as the HEDI (High Endo Atmospheric Defence Interceptor).  Back.

Note 45: See Spurgeon M. Keeny (Jr) "The Theatre Missile Defence Threat to US Security," Arms Control Today, September 1994, Jack Mendelsohn and John B. Rhinelander "Shooting down the ABM Treaty" Ibid.  Back.

Note 46: "Fact Sheet-Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty", The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 10, 1995.  Back.

Note 47: "Defending America" The Heritage Foundation website.  Back.

Note 48: The Heritage Foundation had estimated it as requiring only $7.3 billion through 2001. See "for the full programme. See "Defend America", http:/www.heritage.org. This was clearly an underbidding given that the relatively simple defence Sentinel had got some $22 billion 1996 dollar terms. This figure is given by Joseph Cirnicione "Why the Right Lost the Missile Defence Debate", Foreign Policy,  Back.

Note 49: Congressional Record, Page S3373, April 17, 1997.  Back.

Note 50: Congressional Record, National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Senate, June 19, 1997.  Back.

Note 51: Kurt Weldon, "Union Jobs lost due to cuts in Defence Spending", Congressional Record, House of Representatives, April 29, 1997, Page H1976.  Back.

Note 52: Organisations participating in an NIC may include the Central Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence organisations and the Departments of Treasury and Energy, and the military services, GAO-NSIAD-96-225, National Intelligencee Estimates.  Back.

Note 53: The NIE noted that "no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and Canada" Ibid.  Back.

Note 54: Report to the Chairman, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, August 1996, GAO, National Security and International Affairs Division, B-274120.  Back.

Note 55: The commission submitted its 307 page report on July 15, 1998.  Back.

Note 56: CBW warheads were also considered but was given less weightage. See Rumsfeld Report on Ballistic Missile Threats, September 17, 1998, http://www.ceip.org/programmes/npp/walpole.htm  Back.

Note 57: Bill Gertz in Washington Times, July 26, 1999.  Back.

Note 58: Text of Statement in Arms Control Reporter, 603.B.3.18, October 1999.  Back.

Note 59: Ted Warner quoted in Arms Control Reporter, 603.B-3.4, May 1999.  Back.

Note 60: Text of the Welch report, Arms Control Today, November 1999.  Back.

Note 61: The satellite photographs were put by the Federation of American Scientists, see website at fas.org.  Back.

Note 62: Daily Press Briefing, US Department of State, January 12, 2000.  Back.

Note 63: This is the interpretation by Defence Secretary Cohen-which means two criteria will be applied, technological readiness, and threat. This was however challenged by Albright who noted that the threat was expected to materialise quickly, Bill Gertz, Washington Times, March 26, 1999.  Back.

Note 64: Richard L. Garwin "The Rumsfeld Report: What we did", The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 1998, pp. 40-45.  Back.

Note 65: Curt Weldon (R-Penn) for instance brought this up as a major issue noting that over 1 million had been laid off in the past five years in defence industries, Note 50.  Back.

Note 66: George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol and John Pike "Why National Missile Defence Wont work" Scientific American, August 1999, pp. 36-42.  Back.

Note 67: http:www.Fas.org  Back.