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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
Neorealist Theory and the India–Pakistan Conflict*–II
By Rajesh Rajagopalan *
The India–Pakistan conflict is the direct consequence of the imbalance of power between the two states and Pakistan’s insecurity about this imbalance. The persistence of the conflict is a consequence of the persistence of this imbalance and of Pakistan’s attempts to correct it. The structure of the international system in South Asia has constrained the choices available to India and Pakistan in their relations with each other. Because Pakistan has been, and is the weaker power, these constraints have been more severe for Pakistan than for India.
The Imbalance of Power
The imbalance between India and Pakistan is so huge and so obvious that it does not require much elaboration. India is more powerful than Pakistan by almost any definition of material power. Examining a few of the elements gives some idea of the disparity. India has almost ten times Pakistan’s population; in fact, India’s Muslim minority (who make up only about 14 per cent of India’s population) is as large as the entire population of Pakistan. India’s economy is more than six times as large as Pakistan’s. It is also much more broadly industrialised, and it includes a defense industrial base that is the largest in the developing world. Though Pakistan’s industrial might is not inconsiderable, and it does have a large and diverse defense industry, it is nevertheless dwarfed by India. The size of the Indian economy also allows India to meet its defence burden more easily: as proportion of the Gross National Product (GNP), Pakistan has almost always spent twice as much on defence as India has. Still, in absolute terms, this has not made much difference to the imbalance between the two countries: Indian defence budgets have always been several times the size of Pakistan’s defence budgets for comparable years.
Finally, India has a military force that is twice the size of Pakistan’s. At partition, the British Indian military was divided on a 2:1 basis between India and Pakistan and this ratio has not changed much in the last five decades. However, even this ratio does not entirely illustrate the difference. In general, the Indian military also has a qualitative edge. For example, most of the Pakistani tank fleet is made up of Chinese-built T–59s and American-built M–48/60s, all of 1960s vintage. Similarly, except for its three dozen American-built F–16s, the Pakistan Air Force flies mostly obsolete aircraft. Though a part of the Indian military force is dedicated to the northeastern border with China, this only slightly affects the military imbalance between India and Pakistan. For example, only seven out of the Indian Army’s roughly forty infantry divisions are stationed on the Chinese border. 1 Also, though the army is engaged in a number of internal counterinsurgency operations, these tasks are increasingly being handed over to the various paramilitary forces. In short, the imbalance of power between India and Pakistan is overwhelmingly in India’s favour.
This overwhelming Indian advantage is one reason why Pakistan’s balancing efforts have been more frantic than those of India. Small adverse changes in the balance have affected Pakistan more than India. Thus Pakistan has responded with greater energy to changes in international alignments than India has.
Balancing India
Pakistan’s unremitting concern for the last five decades has been to correct the imbalance of power in South Asia. States in the international system have one of two ways of dealing with their perceived aggressors:
Balancing is often the preferred choice, because it is assumed that states want to maintain their autonomy. But bandwagoning is sometimes unavoidable, particularly in instances where there is little capacity for internal balancing and no credible options for external balancing. Small states with powerful neighbours usually find themselves in such a situation: they are not strong enough to protect themselves and they might not be able to attract other powers to do the balancing on their behalf. 3 Such states have little choice but to bandwagon.
While the bandwagoning characterizes the behaviour of most of India’s smaller neighbours, Pakistan has constantly sought to balance India, partly because it is relatively stronger than India’s other neighbours and partly because it has been able to attract extra-regional alliances. 4 Pakistan’s strategic choices reflect a mix of the balancing options: it used as much of its domestic resources as possible—probably more than was prudent—towards its defence budget, and, whenever such option was available, supplemented it with alliances with other powers, mainly the United States and China.
Internal Balancing
Since 1947, Pakistan has devoted a considerable portion of its national resources to balancing India, leading Ayesha Jalal to describe Pakistan’s political economy as defence oriented rather than development oriented. 5 Throughout the 1950s, Pakistan spent around 4 per cent of its Gross National Product (GNP) on defence. While the impact of this high level of defence spending is in dispute, this was seen as essential by the Pakistani political elite. 6 Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin did attempt to reduce defence spending in the early 1950s, but his successor, Mohammed Ali Bogra, quickly reversed the decision, and defence expenditure continued to remain high. 7 By the late 1960s, Pakistan’s defence expenditure consumed almost 6 per cent of the GNP, while the Indian figure was about half of this. Despite bearing only half the burden, in absolute terms, India still spent between six and seven times what Pakistan spent on defence. 8 In 1970, Pakistan spent 5.75 per cent of its GNP on defence, which amounted to $325 million (in current dollars); India spent 2.99 per cent of its GNP, but this amounted to $2.43 billion. By 1975, Pakistan was spending 6.28 per cent of its GNP on defence, amounting to $622 million, while India, spent 3.32 per cent of its GNP on defence, a total of $3.3 billion. 9 Through the rest of the decade, Pakistan’s defence burden of 5 per cent of GNP remained nearly twice as high as India’s. India’s defence burden increased in the 1980s, staying consistently over 3 per cent of its GNP, and Pakistan kept pace, raising its defence budget to more than 6 per cent of its GNP. 10 Indian defence spending has since come down, staying mostly below 3 per cent of GNP through most of the 1990s, but Pakistan’s defence budget has remained high even through the 1990s, mostly above 6 per cent of GNP.
Such sacrifices illustrate Pakistan’s emphasis on balancing India. But because internal resources alone have been insufficient, Pakistan has also stressed external assistance in the form of military alliances.
External Balancing
Pakistan’s external balancing efforts have mainly focussed on establishing alliances with the US and China. Though Pakistan and the Soviet Union attempted to improve their relations in the late 1960s, these efforts were not very fruitful. This paper focusses on the 1950s and early 1960s because that was the period when Pakistan’s external balancing efforts were most active.
Pakistan’s search for great power allies against India initially focussed on the United States. The Mutual Defence Assistance treaty which Pakistan signed with the US in 1954 was seen as a way to counter India. Prime Minister Bogra was clear about the reason for seeking an alliance with the United States:
At present, we can’t get a settlement, mainly because India has greater military strength...When there is more equality of military strength, then I am sure that there will be greater chance of a settlement. 11
Pakistan’s balancing effort was partly successful: between 1954 and 1959, Pakistan received $522 million in military hardware, in addition to other defence support as well as economic aid of over $600 million. 12 The US alliance also allowed Pakistan to buy high-technology weapons like the F–104 Starfighter, which partly helped to compensate for India’s quantitative superiority. 13
Nevertheless, the alliance was a risky one for Pakistan. Because of the close US–Israeli relations, the alliance caused problems between Pakistan and some Muslim states. 14 Egypt was so incensed at Pakistan that, after the Suez war, it refused to allow Pakistani troops as members of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt and refused to receive the Pakistani Prime Minister when he wanted to visit Egypt. Nasser even declared that “Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India.” 15 Pakistanis were proud of being the only state founded for Muslims and they had expected to make common cause with other Muslim states. 16 Antagonising Muslim states was thus particularly difficult for Pakistan. 17 That Pakistan was nevertheless willing to do so in order to balance India indicates how strongly Pakistan felt the threat from India.
The US–Pakistan treaty also threatened to ruin Pakistan’s relations with China and the Soviet Union, since the treaty was designed primarily to counter these communist powers. However, Pakistan’s motivation was primarily to balance India. Hence, it tried hard to assuage Soviet and Chinese apprehensions about the treaty, repeatedly emphasising that the treaty was not directed at them. The Soviet government was told that Pakistan “does not contemplate taking any step in hostility or unfriendliness to any Government or State, with which, like the USSR, it has friendly relations.” 18 The Soviet Union was not convinced, and its policy towards both the Kashmir dispute as well as the Pushtoon issue changed dramatically to reflect this displeasure. 19 China was more prudent, taking Pakistan’s word that the treaty was not directed at it. 20 Additionally, Beijing was apparently already worried about India, though the Sino–Indian border dispute was almost a decade away. 21 But Pakistan’s attempt to assuage China was less than welcome in the US. After a change of leadership, Pakistan started taking a more antagonistic approach towards China. 22 Beijing responded in kind, suggesting that the Kashmir problem should be resolved bilaterally between India and Pakistan, “since no good result can be expected through UN mediation.” 23
Pakistan was prepared to bear these sacrifices in the interest of balancing India, but by the turn of the decade this basic objective was put to test because of improving US–Indian relations. If the United States could not be depended on to help balance India, Pakistan threatened to seek China’s help. 24 In the Parliament, Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon bluntly voiced Pakistan’s frustration and options:
Our people, if they find their freedom threatened by Bharat, will break all pacts and will shake hands with people whom we have made enemies because of others. Let there be no mistake about it. 25
As Anglo–American efforts to build-up Indian defence began in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino–Indian border war, Pakistan’s apprehensions increased. Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s military dictator, claimed that India’s northern borders could be defended by just seven brigades, rather than the ten-plus divisions that India was building up, suggesting that the rest of the build-up would be used to augment India’s existing military superiority over Pakistan. 26 As Sino–Indian relations worsened, Sino–Pakistan relations rapidly improved. A week before the Sino–Indian war began, China and Pakistan began talks to settle their border dispute, which was completed a few months later. 27 Between 1962 and 1965, Sino–Pakistan relations improved dramatically, increasingly giving the impression of a military alliance, an impression that Pakistan sought to cultivate. Though the exact commitments China made to Pakistan remain unclear, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto claimed in parliament that any Indian attack on Pakistan will involve India with “the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia,” presumably China. 28
Pakistan’s changing alliance patterns reflect its emphasis on external balancing, a consequence both of its relative weakness as well as the inadequacy of its internal balancing efforts. Given the structure of the interstate system in South Asia, Pakistan’s response was neither surprising nor particularly unique. India’s other neighbours, Sri Lanka and Nepal in particular, have also attempted occasionally to balance India, though far less successfully. These states have apparently concluded that balancing India is beyond their capacity and hence have shifted towards a bandwagoning approach. But Pakistan finds bandwagoning with India unpalatable, at least partly because Pakistan is sufficiently materially endowed to make balancing an option, albeit an expensive one.
Neorealism and Interstate Outcomes in South Asia
It is not only Pakistan’s behaviour that can be traced to the imbalance of power in South Asia. The difficulties of peace-building between India and Pakistan, despite persistent efforts in this direction, is another effect of the structure of the South Asian state system. The article focusses on two major efforts: the Nehru–Ali talks in 1953 and the post- war settlements (the Tashkent and Simla agreements). Though these were not the only attempts at peace-building—there have been at least two attempts every decade—these were the most promising. These were mutual efforts (as opposed to Nehru’s offer of a no-war pact, or Zia-ul-Haq’s ‘peace-offensive’), which included explicit treaty commitments from both sides (as opposed to the ‘feel-good’ relations of the late 1970s and the late 1980s which included no specific agreements). Thus these had the greatest chance of sustaining peaceful relations.
The Nehru–Ali Talks
Despite a war-scare in 1951 and a multitude of unresolved post-partition disputes, India–Pakistan relations warmed in the summer of 1953. In June, the Prime Ministers of both countries met in London, and they agreed to meet again in Karachi in July. The meeting in Karachi was followed by the Pakistani Prime Minister’s visit to New Delhi in August. 29 Though none of the major issues were resolved at these meetings, there was considerable movement on the Kashmir issue during the New Delhi meeting. Nehru agreed to hold plebiscite in Kashmir, if an impartial Plebiscite Administrator could be found. 30 An additional element that pointed to favourable conclusion to these talks was the substantial popular support for them. Both Prime Ministers were warmly welcomed in each other’s capital, and, for the first time ever, the prospect of resolving outstanding issues between the two countries appeared to be good.
Nevertheless, the talks soon foundered. Throughout the summer Pakistan had been negotiating a defence treaty with the United States, despite clear public and private warnings from Nehru that such a treaty would seriously affect India–Pakistan relations. Once the defence treaty was announced, Nehru withdrew from his earlier commitment and refused to consider any further changes in Kashmir and relations between the two countries returned to the familiar hostility. Though Pakistan’s pursuit of the defence treaty in 1953 seems difficult to understand, it was clearly motivated by the need to balance against India. While resolution of the Kashmir dispute and other outstanding disputes was important to Pakistan, the resolution of these disputes by themselves would not have removed the imbalance of power in South Asia. Because Pakistan’s insecurity was tied to the power imbalance in South Asia rather than to specific disputes with India, Pakistan saw greater security in a defence treaty with the US, even if the pursuit of such a treaty put at risk its the negotiations with India over Kashmir. Pakistan’s actions made it clear that the resolution of the Kashmir dispute was less important that the need to balance India.
The Tashkent and Simla Agreements
The settlements which followed the 1965 and 1971 wars, at Tashkent and Simla, were designed not simply to end the wars but to provide the basis for lasting peace in the subcontinent. In both agreements, Indian negotiators bargained on the strength of battlefield successes. In 1965, though the Pakistani military forces had performed creditably, and both sides had captured some territory, India held the most valuable pieces, mainly strategically important passes in the Kashmir region. 31 In 1971, India held over 91,000 Pakistani prisoners, in addition to territory. Nevertheless, in both cases, India was willing to give up these advantages in return for a Pakistani commitment to resolving disputes through bilateral negotiations. These were seen as generous terms by India, and Pakistan’s failure to live up to them has repeatedly been seen as another indication of Pakistan’s duplicity. The explanation for the failure of both the ‘spirit of Tashkent’ and the ‘spirit of Simla’ to provide lasting peace can also be found in the influence of the structure of power in South Asia. For Pakistan, neither of these agreements solved the fundamental problem: it still faced an overwhelming imbalance of power. Indeed, after the loss of East Pakistan, it was now even weaker in relation to India. Pakistan’s efforts in the post-war period emphasised the importance of balancing India. In the aftermath of the Tashkent agreement, Pakistan tried to build its relations with the Soviet Union, in the hope that weaning the Soviet Union away from India would at least partly correct the imbalance. In the aftermath of the 1971 defeat and dismemberment, Pakistan began its atomic weapons programme, primarily to balance India’s advantage in the conventional military balance.
At both Tashkent and Simla (and to a lesser extent during the 1953 prime ministerial talks), India expected that concessions to Pakistan might help to convince Pakistan of India’s goodwill and, as a consequence, help to resolve the outstanding disputes between the two. This failed because, much as Pakistan might have appreciated Indian concessions, it did not dilute the imbalance of power in South Asia. Indeed, the Indian insistence at Simla on solving the outstanding disputes with Pakistan bilaterally threatened to widen the imbalance. Without its external military alliances Pakistan’s capacity to balance India was inadequate, if not negligible. Thus, far from reducing Pakistan’s insecurity, the Simla agreement made it worse. The consequence was Pakistan’s refusal to live up to either the letter or the spirit of the Simla agreement.
Thus, focussing on the structure of power in South Asia gives useful insights into both state behaviour and the outcomes of interstate behaviour in South Asia. However, because neorealism does not claim to be either a theory of state behaviour or of foreign policy, it does not claim to be able to explain all aspects of Indian and Pakistani behaviour. Knowing what constraints Pakistan faces, for example, cannot tell us how it will respond to these constraints. Pakistan’s decision to balance India is easily explainable, but how Pakistan balanced was not determined by the interstate structure. Thus, the paper has only described how it balanced, not explained the specific choices that Pakistan made. Pakistan’s particular mix of balancing options—high defence spending as well as a persistent search for allies—was not inevitable. Pakistan could have chosen to rely entirely on external alliances and ‘passed the buck’ of balancing India to China or the US. Or, alternatively, Pakistan could have chosen to depend entirely on its internal resources (as China did, for example, against the US and the Soviet Union through the 1960s), especially given the fickleness and faithlessness of its allies. Similarly, why Pakistan allied with the US rather than with China and the Soviet Union in the early 1950s cannot be explained without examining the character of the Pakistani state as well as those of the Soviet Union and China. Thus, a fuller explanation of state behaviour requires a theory that can explain how states respond to the constraints of the interstate system that neorealism ably points out. Expanding neorealism to explain also specific state choices, as some neorealists have attempted, only threatens to make neorealism ineffective and unwieldy.
Implications and Conclusions
Neorealism explains the India–Pakistan conflict as the consequence of the structure of the international system in South Asia. The gross imbalance of power between India and Pakistan constrains both states, but more so Pakistan. This imbalance also means that India has a larger margin for error; Pakistan can afford to make no mistakes. And because Pakistan can afford to make no mistakes, trust is a rather scarce commodity. Pakistan’s mistrust and fear have little to do with specific Indian policies or even the occasional insensitivity of an Indian official or leader. Similarly, it has little to do with specific disputes or their resolution. Because fear of India goes beyond any single dispute, new fears replace old ones. The litany of Pakistani complaints have gone from Kashmir, to the Indus river dispute, to the Indian military build-up after the 1962 war, to Bangladesh, to nuclear weapons and back to Kashmir. Thus Pakistan’s fear constantly forces it to balance India.
The consequence of Pakistan’s balancing efforts has been conflict with India. Pakistan’s balancing efforts are viewed with suspicion in New Delhi, where political leaders have repeatedly claimed that such efforts are unnecessary. Pakistan is accused of acquiring military might disproportionate to her ‘legitimate’ needs and, during the Cold War years, of bringing the Cold War to South Asia by inviting external powers to the region. These are valid enough claims, considering that Pakistan rather than India has been the initiator of each of the three wars and that Indian terms for settlement of these wars have been uniformly generous. Nevertheless, such criticism failed to address the underlying imbalance of South Asian power. Pakistan was not responding to specific Indian threats or misbehaviour but rather to this imbalance.
This explanation also suggests that unilateral Indian concessions, such as the ‘Gujral doctrine’, are unlikely to end the India–Pakistan conflict. This is not to suggest that the Gujral doctrine should be given up; but because the doctrine does not address the imbalance of power in South Asia, it should not be expected to resolve the India–Pakistan dispute. As with previous Indian efforts, linking unilateral Indian concessions to a resolution of the India–Pakistan conflict is only likely to lead to disappointment. But there are other good reasons for continuing with the Gujral doctrine, and even for expanding it. The doctrine seeks to remove many of the restrictions on interactions between Indians and Pakistanis and, in its explicit commitment not to seek reciprocity from India’s smaller neighbours, acknowledges the material imbalance in South Asia and India’s capacity to bear a disproportionate amount of transaction costs associated with cooperation.
Another implication of this view of the structural influence on India and Pakistan is that resolution of specific issues, in particular Kashmir, is unlikely to lead to peace between India and Pakistan, since such a resolution, whatever form it takes, would not alter the basic structure of power in South Asia. Again, this does not mean that there are not other good reasons to seek a solution to such disputes—it merely suggests that linking such solutions to an expectation of peace and cooperation in South Asia will only lead to disappointment. Pakistan’s claims that Kashmir is the central dispute between the two states and that the resolution of the Kashmir dispute will lead to an era of peace and cooperation in South Asia thus has little merit. Even if the Kashmir dispute is resolved to the satisfaction of all, Pakistan will not give up its balancing efforts and the consequence will be continuing conflict with India.
Does all this mean that India and Pakistan are condemned to conflict? Given the improbability of a radical change in the South Asian power structure, it is difficult to imagine the cessation of the India–Pakistan conflict. Nevertheless, three scenarios can be suggested that could end the conflict.
The first scenario is of a structural change: a common threat to both India and Pakistan, which requires them to ally. Though this might appear difficult to imagine, such common threats have risen twice in the last five decades, though differences in perception of the seriousness of the threat prevented any actual cooperation. In 1959, Ayub Khan proposed joint defence against China, which Nehru rejected. In the early 1980s, India suggested that Pakistan move its forces towards the Afghanistan border, and apparently promised not to take advantage of the resulting Pakistan weakness along the India–Pakistan border. A more serious and sufficiently unambiguous threat to both countries could compel them to address such a threat together, much like Germany and France did during the Cold War years.
The second (non-structural) development that can reduce Pakistan’s insecurity is the nuclearisation of the India–Pakistan conflict, in particular a Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons have the potential to neutralize all other imbalances; a nuclear Pakistan can become a secure Pakistan, and a secure Pakistan is a necessary condition for peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. Nuclear weaponization can thus lead to peace in the subcontinent. 32 However, one danger exists with overt nuclearization: nuclear weapons can become an additional source of insecurity, if, for example, India and Pakistan engage in the wasteful bean-counting approach to nuclear deterrence that the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in during the Cold War period. India’s early pronouncements about its nuclear doctrine wisely suggest a minimum deterrent force structure and an assured retaliation doctrine. But Indian restraint in this area might erode, if, for example, Pakistan undertakes to match or exceed Indian capabilities in nuclear weapons. 33 Pakistan’s failure to enunciate its nuclear doctrine, months after the nuclear tests thus remains an area of concern.
The third scenario is also non-structural: a change in Pakistan’s strategy from balancing India to bandwagoning with India. As suggested earlier, many of India’s smaller neighbours have opted to bandwagon rather than balance, primarily because their occasional attempts to balance India failed. Such attempts failed because these states had little internal balancing capability and they could not attract external powers to shoulder the balancing burden. Pakistan’s position is odd: it is not so weak as to need to bandwagon, but neither is it strong enough to balance India alone. Like India’s other neighbours, Pakistan’s efforts at external balancing have also usually been unsuccessful. Should Pakistan decide, as India’s other neighbours, that bandwagoning is a better strategy than balancing India, it will signal a fundamental change in the nature of India–Pakistan relations, with peace and cooperation as the logical corollary.
Thus, from the neorealist perspective, since the source of the India–Pakistan conflict is in the natural imbalance of power between India and Pakistan, the solution requires either some change in this imbalance or a change towards bandwagoning in Pakistan’s strategy. As long as no such change takes place, Pakistan is likely to continue to be insecure, and the consequence of this insecurity will be continuing India–Pakistan conflict.
Endotes
*: Research Fellow, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Back.
Note 1: Calculated from figures provided in International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Miltary Balance, 1996/97 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 159–60. Back.
Note 2: Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), chapter 2. On ‘internal’ and ‘external’ balancing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 168. Back.
Note 3: Great powers do, of course, align with small states on occasion. But in such cases, the small state will have some attribute that makes them sufficiently attractive for the great power, such as, for example, a strategically important location (Belgium prior to the world wars is a good example), or a strategic resource (Kuwaiti oil, for example). Great powers will rarely undertake the balancing burden of a distant small state without such attributes. Back.
Note 4: India’s other neighbours, in particular Nepal and Sri Lanka, have at times attempted to balance India, primarily on the strength of extra-regional alliances. But prudently, such attempts appear to have been given up, at least partly because of the fickleness of such alliances. Back.
Note 5: Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 142. Back.
Note 6: See differing conclusions in Ibid and Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Investment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 240. Back.
Note 7: Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India–Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), pp. 74–75. For Pakistan’s view of the military imbalance, see, Golem Wahed Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947–1966 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 236–38. Back.
Note 8: Based on figures in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966–1975 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1976) p. 33, 43. Back.
Note 10: Based on figures in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 66, 76. Back.
Note 11: As quoted in Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980), p. 55. Back.
Note 13: Choudhury, n. 7, p. 267. Back.
Note 14: Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 71–72. Back.
Note 15: S. M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p. 155 Back.
Note 16: Rizvi, n. 14, p. 71. Back.
Note 17: Sherwani, n. 11, p. 59. Back.
Note 18: As quoted in Ibid, p. 61. Back.
Note 19: Choudhury, n. 7, p. 242. Back.
Note 20: Sherwani, n. 11, p. 65–67. Back.
Note 21: Yaacov Vertzberger, Enduring Entente: Sino–Pakistani Relations 1960–1980 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Papers/95, 1983), p. 2. Back.
Note 22: For example, until 1956 Pakistan refrained from voting against Beijing’s attempt to gain admission to the UN; it now began to vote with the US on this issue. Back.
Note 23: Sherwani, n. 11, pp. 65–67. Vertzberger suggests that the Chinese position was at least partly motivated by the desire to extricate itself from the pressures for support of both India and Pakistan. See, Vertzberger, Enduring Entente, pp. 4–5. Back.
Note 24: Choudhury, n. 7, pp. 275–76. Back.
Note 25: Sherwani, n. 11, pp. 79–80. Back.
Note 27: Vertzberger, n. 21, p. 7. Back.
Note 28: Sherwani, n. 11, p. 131. Back.
Note 29: Gupta, n. 7, pp. 260–62. Back.
Note 30: Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol. 2, 1947–1956 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 188. Back.
Note 31: William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (NY: Praeger Publisher, 1972), pp. 203, 211. Back.
Note 32: The proposition that nuclear weapons can prevent war, if not ensure peace, continues to be controversial. For opposing perspectives on the issue, see Scott Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995). Devin Hagerty has suggested that nuclear weapons played a role in dampening risks of escalation during the 1988 Brasstacks crisis between India and Pakistan. See Devin Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1998 India–Pakistan Crisis,” International Security 20:3 (Winter 1995–96): pp. 79–114. Back.
Note 33: This has many precedents. Most recently, India’s Agni missile program was revived, primarily because of unrestrained Pakistani missile procurement efforts. Back.