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Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
North Korea and Missile Trade
By Rajiv Nayan
*
Introduction
North Korea, an important country in the East Asian region, has been placed in a unique geographical situation. The beginning of the Cold War witnessed the division of Korea on ideological lines. North Korea embraced Communism to guide the destiny of the country, while the southern part followed the capitalist path of development. North Korea has got yet another capitalist country—Japan—as its neighbour that has a different set of economic and foreign policy priorities and hence a separate model of security architecture. It has also got a mighty Communist power, China, in its vicinity. The active strategic involvement of the superpowers in different phases of the Cold War by and large shaped the strategic environment of the region. In the initial years, there was a more compact interaction among the Communist countries. After the Soviet Union–China rift, the strategic environment of the region was also altered. China remained the most dominant force; however, it did not choose the policy of continuous confrontation with the capitalist powers. At times, it tried to engage these powers but mutual suspicion continued. North Korea had also been trying throughout the Cold War to give an independent angle to its security. It tried to synthesize bloc security and nation’s security. North Korea became an important factgor in the regional arms balance and, as perceived, is engaged in “highly focused competitive arms accumulations.” The end of the Cold War did not bring much respite to the strategic evironment of the region. The United States remained active in the region with nuclear weapons. Only the Soviet Union ended its active role.
In order to assert itself strategically, North Korea, has always been trying to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their most sophisticated carriers. The acquisition of such weaponry became more imperative in order to compensate for its declining conventional strength. The development of the missile—a sophisticated carrier of WMD—was quite logical in such strategic thinking. Several ballistic and cruise missiles are believed to have been in the arsenals of North Korea. The Scud sereies of missiles has always been hogging the limelight. Nodong–1 with a range of 1,000 km is also successfully being produced by North Korea. Nevertheless, the Taepo-dong series of missiles above the range of 1,500 km has generated much heat. The United States has been targetting this particular series for a long time. It perceives it as a threat to the continental US. It is generally accepted that North Korea has achieved success in manufacturing the missile in the range of 1,500–2,000 km. The Western bloc and its East Asian neighbours are of the opinion that it is seriously working on inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The August 31, 1998, test of a satellite as claimed by North Korea, was for many in fact a step towards testing the missile in the range of 4,000 to 6,000 km. This was carrying a three-stage rocket. The third stage was said to have a solid fuel engine. Western, especially American sources report that the test could not achieve its mission. Though security is the ostensible reason for the development of missiles, writers on the subject have been highlighting various other influencing factors such as prestige, equality, commerce and influence as equally responsible for the development of missiles. Reports suggest that North Korea has been trying to embark on the path of missile development since the 1960s. Commerce has been pointed out as an important factor in North Korean missile acquisition. The present paper will concentrate on the non-indigenous components of North Korean missiles and missile technology as well as the emergence of North Korea as an important supplier of missiles.
Imports
Although North Korea has been claiming that it has embarked on the indigenous missile development programme, different reports indicate that there has been much outside help in the development of indigenous missiles of the country. For some, the North Korean missile rendezvous began with Samlet missiles purchased from the Soviet Union. 1 It further took off with the production of the Type 63 107 mm MRL of China in the early 1960s. In the late 1960s, it procured S–2 Sopka coastal defence missiles with 30 mobile launchers and BM–21 122 mm MRLs from the Soviet Union. China supplied HY–1 to North Korea in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s, although the Soviet Union continued to supply Samlet missiles, because of certain political developments it was reported that the Soviet Union had expressed unwillingness to supply missiles to North Korea in future. Later, it became more dependent on China for missiles. It continued to adapt already supplied missiles like the SA–2, SS–C–2b, Frog and HY series of missiles, and so on. It was reported that in April 1975, North Korea tried to procure tactical ballistic missiles from China. China, at that time, reportedly, did not have missiles in that category. In the 1970s, North Korea received rocket engine design technology, production metallurgy and air frames from China to upgrade Scud missiles. The joint North Korean–Chinese work on the DF–61 missile began but was abandoned later. Yet, it helped North Korea in gaining a breakthrough in some vital technological areas.
However, a US Congressional Research Service Report 2 traces the North Korean missile acquisition programme to the 1970s. As per this report, the country failed to procure Scud missiles from the former Soviet Union. There were other reports 3 that indicated that North Korea got the Scud–B missiles through Egypt which, in turn, had bought them from the Soviet Union. In the subsequent years, news of Egyptian technical assistance to North Korea kept coming. The South Korean government in its White Paper mentioned that more than 10 Scud–B missiles had been procured by North Korea from the Soviet Union, and since 1976, Scud–B missiles had been constituting part of the North Korean missiles inventory. On the other hand, the National Unification Board of South Korea held the opinion that North Korea had purchased 240 SS–1B or Scud–B missiles from the Soviet Union in the 1980s. 4
In 1979, North Korea started negotiating with the United Nations Development Programme for the setting up of a bipolar integrated circuit plant which after a period of time would help the development of integrated circuit capability required for missile guidance, control and navigation. 5 By 1986, the complete control of the integrated circuit pilot factory was transferred to North Korea. 6
The Congressional Study reported that by reverse engineering Scud–B missiles bought in 1981, North Korea manufactured Scud–Mod–A with a range of 280–300 km and a payload capacity of 1,000 kg by 1984. 7 In 1984, in New York, two persons were prosecuted for arranging missile guidance components for North Korea. 8 According to a Japanese source, North Korea clandestinely imported integreted circuits from Japan to increase the precision of its Scud–C missiles. 9 It was claimed that the integrated circuits were transferred in 1987. In May 1996, an official of the US Treasury Department Secret Service divulged that in the 1980s, North Korea procured Austrian counterfeiting technology from Iran in lieu of ballistic missiles. 10
It was reported that the Scud–C of North Korea is actually a modified version of the Russian Scud–B, originally supplied to Egypt. Till 1991, the North Korean ability in guidance and control technology had been very low. 11 In December 1992, a ship with German machine tools was detected at an Italian port. 12 North Korea was believed to be the destination of the ship and these machine tools were meant for the modernisation of Scud missiles. A German intelligence agency indicated clandestine supply of special metals to North Korea from the German grey market. 13
It was also brought to notice that third and fourth generation ethnic Koreans, popularly known as “Chosen Soren” in Japan, helped North Korea to obtain advanced electronics manufacturing equipment, guidance kits, composite materials, machine tools and many other such items required for manufacturing missiles and nuclear weapons. 14 The same report also accused these ethnic Koreans of diverting missile technology from Germany via Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia to North Korea.
A North Korean Army defector revealed that North Korea got 75 per cent of the construction equipment needed for missile development from Japan. 15 According to him, whenever North Korea needed any equipment, it faxed its photograph and the number to Chongryun, the pro-North Korean organisation; arrangements were made for shipment of the equipment to North Korea. The equipment to downsize the missile warhead was the most important equipment sent through this method. On January 14, 1994, three companies were raided in Japan for illegally supplying spectrum analysers to North Korea. 16 North Korea maintained that the equipment was meant for television communication while Japan feared that it would actually be used for improving the missile guidance systems. Earlier, in 1989, one of these companies was suspected of supplying three spectrum analysers to North Korea via China.
In 1993, news also came in regarding the flight of Russian missile scientists and engineers. Although Russia claimed that it had arrested the scientists and prevented them from fleeing the country, 17 there was no certainty inside the ruling establishment that some scientists had not crossed over to North Korea. Later, it was reported that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgy Kunadze, had been promised by North Korea that no Russian missile engineer and scientist would be employed for the missile development programme. 18 In November 1993, a North Korean diplomat, Major General Nam Gae Work, was thrown out of Russia. 19 He was accused of arranging for Russian scientists to work for the North Korean ballistic missile development programme. These Russian scientists, who were unable to get an opportunity to work on missiles and were asked to work on consumer goods, had been offered $700 to 2,000 per month for working on missiles. 20 According to an American intelligence report, seven Russian MAZ 543 chasses meant for missile development were transported to North Korea, although the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister denied it.
There was a report 21 in the Japanese media that referred to a study conducted by Russia. The study, according to the report, noted that the Nodong–1 received ample help from Russian experts. However, Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, the Russian Armed Forces Chief of General Staff, dubbed the report as utter nonsense. There was yet another report 22 mentioning a contract of August 1990 between the Soviet Union and North Korea for sending 200 rocket experts to the latter. The deal was reportedly abandoned after Russia and South Korea moved towards normalising their relationship. The same report carried information provided by a Russian solid state physicist who claimed that he had been assigned the job to recruit engineers and missile experts. He said that he had arranged 36 Russian engineers for North Korea but the group was detected and stopped in Moscow in September 1992. However, more than 20 Russian scientists managed to enter North Korea and were working at monthly salaries of $3,000–4,000, according to the report. However, several of the scientists kept sending information by computer mail even while staying in North Korea. The Russian scientists and the supply of Russian fuel technologies helped the North Korean missile development programme, as revealed by the document control number 001–SM–137, published by the Russian Defence Ministry on October 22, 1993. 23 There was also a report claiming the presence of more upgraded Scud–C missiles.
North Korea has got some sub-systems from China whereby several missile projects like the Nodong–1 could be developed. The help of Project 8610 of China was also utilised by North Korea. 24 A section of the American intelligence community was of the opinion that the Taepo–dong–2 missile with an approximate range of 2,170 miles resembled the Chinese CSS–2. 25 In June 1994, the US Assistant Defence Secretary, Ashton Carter, stated that North Korea had got 12–14 obsolete strategic ballistic missile submarines. 26 In 1996, China was asked to supply North Korea with 40 missiles and three missile boats. 27
John McLaughlin, Vice Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council informed that the proper development of the Taepo-dong missiles required a new propulsion system and improved guidance and controls but due to the weak North Korean economic, technological and engineering base, it would be extremely difficult for it to indigenously acquire this equipment. 28 The Americans perceived that in such a condition, it would be difficult for North Korea to produce the Taepo-dong in the near future. However, this prognostication is proving wrong. North Korea appears to be successful in one of the Taepo-dong categories. The possibility of the procurement of required technology and components from outside for further development of missiles cannot be ruled out. Interestingly, in August 1996, it was alleged that North Korea had got a Soviet-made highly accurate SS–21 with 70-km range from Syria to improve the accuracy of Scud missiles. 29
Exports
Iran
Iran has been listed as a recipient of North Korean missiles since the Iran–Iraq War. It is considered the first recipient of North Korean missiles. In 1987, North Korea entered into a deal with Iran for supplying 100 reverse engineered Scud–B missiles. Forty of them were supplied in 1988. The then Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, stated 30 that an Iranian ship carried these missiles, though different Western reports did not point out about the carrier very precisely. Several possible routes of the passage of the missiles to Iran were indicated. Iran augmented its missiles base by purchasing 20 missiles in 1990. In December 1990, North Korea conducted on-site training in production and launching of ballistic missiles for Iranian officials along with dispatching a team of technical advisors to convert the missile maintenance facility into a missile production factory. 31 In 1991, Iran also started getting missile parts from North Korea. In 1991, Iran tested two ballistic missiles. Some reports believed that, in fact, these were tests of the Soviet Scud–C purchased from North Korea. 32 However, Lt. General V. Nikityuk of the Soviet Union informed in 1991 that after the objection raised by the Soviet government, North Korea stopped the supply of ballistic missiles to Iran. 33 In 1991, an Egyptian government-controlled newspaper reported that North Korea had supplied 300 Scud missiles to Iran. 34 A Western report put the number of Scud missiles supplied in the B and C categories at 120. 35 In Israel, it was believed that 250 Scud–B missiles were transferred to Iran by North Korea before the commencement of the Gulf War. 36 There was a report in the US media that Iran had acquired Scud missiles from North Korea in March 1992. 37 In March 1992, the US imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for missile transactions. As per the US information, North Korean Lyongakasan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Credit Corporation were involved in missile related activities with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics. Under the sanctions, steps taken included suspension of export licences for controlled items to the banned entities for two years, denial of licences to listed firms and the North Korean government for two years, denial of any contract to the sanctioned entities by the US government for two years, and denial of import permission to the sanctioned entities for two years. 38
In June 1992, the American media highlighted that North Korea supplied 170 Scud–B Scud–C missiles to Iran. 39 Subsequently, a report indicated that the number of Scud–C missiles supplied was 150. 40 In 1992, North Korea received 20,000 barrels of oil per day from Iran in lieu of missiles and some other armaments. 41 In addition to complete missile systems, Iran got technical details from North Korea whereby its indigenous missile systems could get a major boost.
In 1993, it was claimed inside the US that the two-stage Nodong–1 having a range of 600 miles had been transferred from North Korea to Iran. It was asserted that the total number of missiles sold to Iran would be 150. 42 In January 1993, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), George Tenet, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that North Korea has been one of the main actors of missile proliferation to Iran. On March 28, 1993, some leaders of the People’s Mujahideen of Iran, an Opposition organisation, informed that a delegation under Brigadier General Hossein Mantequei of the Revolutionary Guards, the missile force command of the country, went to North Korea to study the final Nodong–1 tests and to get operational training. On the other hand, in the US, it was believed that the delegation went to find out the feasibility of getting the Nodong–1 in components to avoid detection. The deal had to ensure the supply of Iranian oil to North Korea. 43 In June 1993, a Deputy Director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry asked North Korea not to supply 150 Nodong–1 missiles for cash and oil. It was reported that North Korea in exchange sought cash. 44 During a public session, a member of the Iranian Parliament made a statement that North Korea had demanded $2.4 to 2.7 billion per piece of Scud–B transferred to Iran during the war. 45 Iran maintained that it had got a strong missile technology base so any report regarding exchange of missiles with North Korea was ridiculous. 46 Later, it was reported that Russian aircraft unloaded parts of the Scud–C missile. It also came to light that Iran and North Korea agreed to co-produce the Nodong–1 missile. Moreover, it was viewed that the Iranian decision to produce its own long-range Scud–C and other Scud type missiles was bolstered by North Korean support. 47
On June 12, 1996, the US notified that the government, semi-government and private organisations could not have missile technology related business with Changgwang Credit Company of North Korea and Iranian organisations—the Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Logistics as well as the State Purchasing Office. The prohibition was to become effective from May 24, 1996. 48 In April 1997, Israel media reported that Iran had got computer software from North Korea to fabricate missiles. 49 In the same year, news came in that North Korea had sent its technicians to help in the development of an extended version of the Taepo-dong. 50
Syria
Syria is another prominent country that has been a favourite of North Korea in the missile business. North Korea supplied Scud–B missiles to Syria. Media in the former Soviet Union reported that either in late 1989 or early 1990, North Korea and Syria entered into negotiations for the supply of Scud–Cs from the former to the latter. In 1991, the transactions of Scud–C missiles between the two countries were reported. 51 This $500 million agreement was stated to have been for more than 150 Scud–Cs. This particular missile is supposed to have a range of 400 miles. 52 It was reported that, in 1991, about 24 Scud missiles and 20 mobile launchers were supplied to Syria by North Korea. 53 In March 1991, 30 more missiles were supplied. 54 Later, a few more dozen missiles went in, so by the end of the year, the total number of missiles supplied to Syria reached 100. However, another report indicated that the second batch of 150 Scud–C missiles was sent in December 1991, but did not find its destination. 55
The German Intelligence Service Chief also talked about the transaction of missiles and related technology between North Korea and Syria. 56 Interestingly, the Egyptian government-controlled Al-Ahram too, reported the transfer of at least 20 Scud missiles to Syria. North Korea was also accused of helping Syria to develop Scud production capability at Aleppo and guidance systems at Hamah. 57
In March 1992, the US media, apparently on the basis of information provided by spy satellites, reported transactions of 20 Scud cannisters between the two countries through Iran. The report also expressed the possibility of Syria becoming the first country to get Scud–D missiles having a range of 625 miles. 58 In July 1992, the parcelling of Scud–C missiles and production equipment to Syria was certified by American intelligence agencies. It was reported that this $100 million deal was executed via Iran. The US unsuccessfully threatened a naval intervention. It was also reported that North Korea sent its representatives when the Syrian test of Scud–C missiles was conducted. 59 Russia was accused of shipping components for the Scud–C missiles from North Korea to Syria in August 1993. Later, in 1993, Western newspapers reported that launcher parts of Scud–C missiles were deported from North Korea to Syria through Russian aircraft. Russia maintained that the transferred articles were dual-use items. The US appeared to agree with Russia—later several reports accused the US of softpedalling on the issue. The Israeli intelligence community believed that Syria would start producing Scud–C tactical ballistic missiles by 1996. It was of the opinion that the production rights were granted in the late 1980s.
Iraq
Iraq had also contracted North Korea to supply Scud–B and Scud–C missiles. However, the contract could not come into operation because of the inability of the Iraqis to give payment in cash or in oil. 60 Iraq was supplied soid fuel tanks by North Korea.
Libya
Libya was also supplied Scud–B and Scud–C missiles by North Korea from 1986 to 1991. In 1991, it was reported that Libya was trying to get some missiles with a range of 620 miles at a cost of $7 million per missile system. 61 In Israel, it was speculated that by the end of 1993 or the beginning of 1994, Libya might have procured the Nodong–1 missiles. However, there is no confirmed report so far.
Pakistan
The Ghauri missile launched by Pakistan has been widely perceived as a missile of North Korean origin not only by the Indian experts but also by several Western experts. 62 But this has not come all of a sudden. On March 7, 1996, a North Korean vessel was seized by Taiwan. This was carrying 15 metric tonnes of ammonia perchlorate. The final destination of the consignment was the Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO) of Pakistan, though it had to be routed through Hong Kong. 63
Egypt
As mentioned earlier, Egypt reportedly assisted North Korea in its missile endeavour; in return, it got benefits in missile development. North Korea is understood to have extended assistance to the Condor–2 project jointly undertaken by Egypt, Argentina and Iraq. In addition, North Korea was accused of helping Egypt in developing new missiles as well as modernising its existing arsenal. Spare parts and components like guidance were surmised to be supplied by North Korea. Israeli sources claimed that North Korea was one of the important partners of Egypt in the improvement of Scud–C missiles as well as in the development of ballistic missiles in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 km. It was also reported that in April 1997, Egypt asked for spare parts and technology for guidance and control equipment for its Scud missiles from North Korea. Also, it was claimed that not less than seven shipments of materials such as special sheet metal and support equipment needed for the Scud–C were despatched from North Korea to Egypt. Besides, missile production equipment like gyroscope measuring equipment and pulse-cold modulation equipment, previously supplied to Egypt, was repaired, as revealed by the report.
Other Countries
General Zivota Panic, the former Chief of the General Staff informed that for the development of 600 km and 1,000 km missiles, parts had been procured from North Korea. Also, reports regarding Peru’s willingness to purchase Taepo-dong missiles from North Korea appeared in Ecuador’s media.
Conclusion
It is evident that North Korea had to rely on external sources for the acquisition of missiles. In the early years, it did not have ballistic missiles. However, its tryst with non-ballistic missiles helped it in handling the ballistic missiles in the later period. Similarly, in the early years, it was ideology that helped it in getting missiles. In later years, ideology has not been the sole source of the supply of missile technology and equipment, although the major missile systems have been coming from the ideologically proximate countries. It has been mixing ideology and market quite appropriately to achieve its mission. Because of the operation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), since the late 1980s, the entire transactions related to missiles are being conducted clandestinely. The missile technology from the capitalist bloc has been coming through the black market, whereas the non-Western countries like China and the Middle Eastern countries have been supplying through the grey market. Egypt, the country close to the Western capitalist bloc, may be an exception. It is believed that the missile transactions between these two countries have been conducted with the proper knowledge of the governments of both countries. China has been the major collaborator in the development and modernisation of the missiles of North Korea. The phenomenon of third party has been witnessed in North Korea both as a missile recipient and as a supplier. Third Party sale has been resorted to for overcoming the difficult circumstances. As a recipient, it adopted the route to get the items or the whole systems from a reluctant supplier like the Soviet Union, whereas as a supplier, it adopted the route to avoid detection.
In recent years, North Korea has emerged as one of the two important missile suppliers, the other being China. Sometimes, it appears that it is a competitor of China but in reality, it has been playing a complementary role to China. Both have got almost the same clientele. It seems China allows or encourages North Korea to supply missiles where it finds difficulty in supplying due to various pressures. However, in some cases, North Korea has been found acting autonomously. The main motive of the North Korean missile sales has been commerce. On January 15, 1992, the Director of the CIA expressed apprehensions in a testimony to Congress that North Korea is near completion of a longer-range missile with a rage of 1,000 km which has got no other purpose but commerce. This aspect of Korea’s missile trade distinguishes it from China’s. Apart from commerce, China has a strategic motive in transferring prohibited missiles. Cash is the most preferred mode of exchange for North Korea. However, it has been reported that in several instances it has swapped missiles with oil and missile technology. Another characteristic feature of the North Korean missile trade has been that it has never hesitated in supplying even the most sophisticated version of missiles in its arsenal. It has not had the policy of maintaining strategic superiority or holding the edge. Some Western studies have pointed out that in 1998, missiles in similar categories with resembling characteristics have been tested by Iran, Pakistan and, if the August test is considered a missile test, then North Korea. It needs to be mentioned here that one group of analysts believes that the August test was conducted in the range of 1,800–2,000 km. It is inferred that all these countries are helping each other in the development of missiles with the technologies procured from variegated sources. This situation will be very alarming for India because Pakistan is one of the members of this consortium and it has been officially stating that India is the sole target of its defence preparedness. Unfortunately, the US and capitalist bloc have been targetting North Korea in a very lopsided way. Though the predominant sources of information on the North Korean missiles have been Western, many recipients of North Korean missiles have still been getting discriminatory treatment. The enemy countries are targetted but countries friendly to the capitalist countries are ignored.
Endotes
*: Research Officer, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Back.
Note 1: For details, see Greg J. Gerardi and James A. Plotts, “An Annotated Chronology of DPRK Missile Trade and Developments,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1994, pp. 70–72. Back.
Note 2: US Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, “CRS Report for Congress: Ballistic and Cruise Missile Forces of Foreign Countries,” October 25, 1996. Back.
Note 3: New York Times, April 10, 1991. Back.
Note 4: Yonhap, July 3, 1990 in Nuclear Developments, July 20, 1990, p. 7. Back.
Note 5: Gerardi, n. 1, p. 71. Back.
Note 8: Gerardi, n. 1, p. 72. Back.
Note 9: Kyodo, September 20, 1991 in Proliferation Issues, September 29, 1991. Back.
Note 10: Hanguk Ilbo, April 25, 1996 in FBIS–EAS–96–084, April 25, 1996. Back.
Note 11: Sing Tong-A, December 1990, pp. 212–228 in Nuclear Developments, February 5, 1991, pp. 6–8. Back.
Note 12: BNS, January 22, 1993 in Proliferation Issues, February 5, 1993, p. 42. Back.
Note 13: Focus, March 22, in FBIS–WEU–93–053, March 22, 1993, p. 6. Back.
Note 14: Mednews, March 22, 1993, p. 4. Back.
Note 15: Kyodo, December 15, 1993 in JPRS–TND–94–002, January 18, 1994, p. 5. Back.
Note 16: Independent, January 15, 1994. Back.
Note 17: Far Eastern Economic Review, May 13, 1993, p. 9. Back.
Note 18: Washington Post, February 17, 1993. Back.
Note 19: Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 27, 1993, p. 19. Back.
Note 20: Rabochaya Tribuna, August 13, 1993 in JPRS–TND–93–032, October 12, 1993, pp. 35–38. Back.
Note 21: Radio Moscow, January 29, 1994 in FBIS–SOV–94–020, January 31, 1994, p. 15. Back.
Note 22: Yonhap, April 23, 1994 in JPRS–TND–94–011, May 16, 1994, pp. 51–52. Back.
Note 23: Izvestiya, January 27, 1994 in FBIS–SOV–94–019, January 28, 1994, pp. 8–9. Back.
Note 24: Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 30, 1994, pp. 24–28. Back.
Note 25: Washington Times, March 19, 1994. Back.
Note 26: Washington Times, June 14, 1994. Back.
Note 27: Hsin Pao, July 19, 1996 in FBIS–CHI–96–140, July 19, 1996. Back.
Note 28: Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 11, 1996, p. 10. Back.
Note 29: Jane’s IDR, Extra at pp. 1–3. Back.
Note 30: Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 204–207. Back.
Note 31: Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1991. Back.
Note 32: Washington Times, May 30, 1991. Back.
Note 33: Moscow News, March 31, 1991, p. 12. Back.
Note 34: KBS–1, Radio Network, Seoul, September 21, 1991 in Proliferation Issues, October 29, 1991, p. 19. Back.
Note 35: Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 1, 1993, pp. 158–159. Back.
Note 36: Israel Television Network (Jerusalem), February 9, 1993, in Proliferation Issues, March 5, 1993, p. 13. Back.
Note 37: Washington Times, March 27, 1992. Back.
Note 38: Federal Register, vol. 57, no. 67, April 7, 1992, pp. 1167–8. Back.
Note 39: Washington Times, June 4, 1992. Back.
Note 40: Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 30, 1994. Back.
Note 41: Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 8, 1992, pp. 26–27. Back.
Note 42: New York Times, April 8, 1993. Back.
Note 44: Arms Control Today, September 1993, p. 24. Back.
Note 45: Mednews, January 25, 1993. Back.
Note 46: IRNA, December 2, 1993, in JPRS–TND–93–001, January 6, 1994, p. 38. Back.
Note 47: Anoushiravan Enteshami, “Iran Boosts Domestic Arms Industry,” Jane’s IDR, April 1994, pp. 72–73. Back.
Note 48: Federal Register, vol. 61, no. 114, June 12, 1996, p. 29785. Back.
Note 49: Ha’aretz, in FBIS–NES–97–080, April 24, 1997. Back.
Note 50: Arms Control Today, September 1997. Back.
Note 51: Defence & Foreign Affairs Weekly, January 28–February 3, 1998, p. 2. Back.
Note 52: Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1991. Back.
Note 53: Washington Times, March 31, 1991. Back.
Note 54: Washington Times, June 4, 1991. Back.
Note 55: Washington Times, December 10, 1991. Back.
Note 56: Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 14, 1991, p. 1134. Back.
Note 57: Washington Times, March 10, 1992. Back.
Note 58: Washington Post, March 29, 1992. Back.
Note 59: Washington Times, July 16, 1992. Back.
Note 60: Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1991. Back.
Note 61: Washington Times, June 4, 1991. Back.
Note 62: New York Times, April 11, 1998. Back.
Note 63: DPA-Yonhap, March 13, 1996 in FBIS–EAS–96–062–A, March 13, 1996. Back.