|
|
|
|
The National Interest
Power, Wealth and Wisdom
by David P. Calleo
. . . Budgetary expectations have to be weighed in the light of the administration's new strategic doctrine. That doctrine, formally proclaimed in September 2002, warns that, given today's weapons of mass destruction, together with the lunatic proclivities of rogue states and terrorist organizations, the United States "cannot remain idle while dangers gather." America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that the doctrine is meant to be taken seriously. But the doctrine's logic and language imply a still wider application — not merely preemptive strikes at rogue states, but preventive war whenever a hostile power or coalition threatens American military primacy in any of the world's major regions. Such a doctrine suggests a formidable circle of potential enemies, many with large armies. Indeed, if the doctrine's logic is taken seriously, the United States could eventually look forward to war with China, Russia, perhaps even Europe. Meanwhile, there are lesser but more urgent challenges — North Korea and Iran, for example. Even the lesser challenges point to a continuing large investment in military power, with heavy fiscal consequences. These geopolitically-driven fiscal prospects raise the all-important question of whether the neo-conservative global agenda is economically sustainable. Just as there has been a revival of "Reaganomics" in America, so it seems likely there will soon be a revival of "declinism", with its warning of hegemonic "overstretch." A feeble economy seems a likely and reinforcing complement to such a revival. To say that a policy is economically ruinous is not to say that it is impossible. But sustaining the financial burdens of the Bush geopolitical agenda implies a radical change in the country's political culture, together with a more authoritarian state than Americans are used to. The public may reject the Bush agenda and return the country to a different administration with a different geopolitical worldview. Or the Bush Administra-tion can change itself. But the longer the current geopolitical agenda holds sway, the more its expectations of the rest of the world's hostility will become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the harder it will be for America to turn back. And the more the American and global economies are abused by huge deficits and unstable money, the greater will be the damage and the longer the time needed to recover. As in the 1930s, the collateral social and political consequences may be severe. . . .