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Middle East Review of International Affairs
Underwriting Peace in the Middle East: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Limits of Economic Inducements
by Scott Lasensky
*
Introduction
The United States has invested huge amounts of financial capital in the Middle East and has used "check-book" diplomacy as a key instrument for protecting its interests and promoting its policies there. Since 1973, U.S. aid to the Middle East has exceeded $100 billion. Over time, there were different principal reasons for this aid. After 1993, however, this spending was used to play a major role in promoting an Israel-Palestinian political settlement. This article discusses several key issues in this context: What has been gained from this tremendous outlay of resources? To what extent have these vast sums of economic and military aid served American interests? Have economic inducements helped or hindered America's decades-long search for peace between Israel and its neighbors?
The United States has invested a tremendous amount of financial capital in the Middle East, using its "check-book" as a key diplomatic instrument for promoting American interests in the region. Since 1973, U.S. economic and military aid to the Middle East has topped $100 billion. In the past decade, Israel and its neighbors have consumed between one-fourth and one-third of the total American foreign aid budget.
During this period, American outlays were used to underwrite an Israel-Palestinian political settlement as part of a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
What has been gained from this vast expenditure of resources? To what extent have these large sums of economic and military aid served American interests? Have economic inducements helped or hindered Washington's decades long search for peace between Israel and its neighbors?
This article evaluates the role of positive economic inducement strategies (PEIS) as part of U.S. involvement in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the 1990s.(2) The Middle East represents the preeminent case of using inducements to manage a major regional conflict. This study indicates that PEIS are a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient in promoting an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. Economic inducements can reassure insecure parties and provide domestic cover for leaders who take risks for peace.
But to be effective, integrated strategies are critical to PEIS utility. Pure "check-book" diplomacy does not work. Neither can PEIS be effective in the absence of basic political will and a political process, as evidenced since the failed Camp David summit.
Economic inducements also function as diplomatic "follow-through." They can enable the implementation of agreements and sustain step-by-step negotiating processes. Their value is prospective and ongoing, not immediate. At the same time as policymakers consider how they will use PEIS at the negotiating table, they also need to develop a parallel domestic strategy to ensure support at home, without which PEIS may not be available as an instrument.
Full PDF Document, 19 pages, 97kB
Endnotes
Note *: Scott Lasensky is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. This article is taken from Lasensky's forthcoming book on the role of economic inducements in post-Cold War American foreign policy. Back